PORMENTO V ESTRADA
a
Facts: Estrada was elected President of the Republic of the Philippines
in the May 1998 elections. He sought the presidency again in the May
2010 elections. Pormento opposed Estrada’s candidacy and filed a
petition for disqualification. COMELEC (Division) denied his petition as
well as his subsequent Motion for Reconsideration (En
Banc). Pormento then filed the present petition for certiorari before
the Court. In the meantime, Estrada was able to participate as a
candidate for President in the May 10, 2010 elections where he
garnered the second highest number of votes.
Issue: Is Estrada disqualified to run for presidency in the May 2010
elections in view of the prohibition in the Constitution which states
that: "[t]he President shall not be eligible for any reelection?
Held: Private respondent was not elected President the second time he
ran. Since the issue on the proper interpretation of the phrase any
reelection will be premised on a persons second (whether immediate
or not) election as President, there is no case or controversy to be
resolved in this case. No live conflict of legal rights exists. There is in
this case no definite, concrete, real or substantial controversy that
touches on the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests.
No specific relief may conclusively be decreed upon by this Court in this
case that will benefit any of the parties herein. As such, one of the
essential requisites for the exercise of the power of judicial review, the
existence of an actual case or controversy, is sorely lacking in this case.
As a rule, this Court may only adjudicate actual, ongoing
controversies.The Court is not empowered to decide moot questions
or abstract p
?ropositions, or to declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect
the result as to the thing in issue in the case before it. In other words,
when a case is moot, it becomes non-justiciable.
An action is considered moot when it no longer presents a justiciable
controversy because the issues involved have become academic or
dead or when the matter in dispute has already been resolved and
hence, one is not entitled to judicial intervention unless the issue is
likely to be raised again between the parties. There is nothing for the
court to resolve as the determination thereof has been overtaken by
subsequent events.
Assuming an actual case or controversy existed prior to the
proclamation of a President who has been duly elected in the May 10,
2010 elections, the same is no longer true today. Following the results
of that elections, private respondent was not elected President for the
second time. Thus, any discussion of his reelection will simply be
hypothetical and speculative. It will serve no useful or practical
purpose.
MACALINTAL V PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL (PET)
Facts: Macalintal questions the constitution of the Presidential
Electoral Tribunal (PET) as an illegal and unauthorized progeny of Par
7, Sec 4, Art VII of the 1987 Constitution provides: “The Supreme Court,
sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President,
and may promulgate its rules for the purpose.”
Sec 12, Art. VIII of the Constitution provides: The Members of the
Supreme Court and of other courts established by law shall not be
designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative
functions.
The case at bar is a motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner of the
SC’s decision dismissing the former’s petition and declaring the
establishment of the respondent PET as constitutional.
Macalintal argues that PET is unconstitutional on the ground that Sec
4, Art VII of the Constitution does not provide for the creation of the
PET, and it violates Sec 12, Art VIII of the Constitution.
The Solicitor General maintains that the constitution of the PET is on
firm footing on the basis of the grant of authority to the Supreme Court
to be the sole judge of all election contests for the President or Vice-
President under par 7, Sec 4, Art VII of the Constitution.
Issues:
Whether or not PET is constitutional.
Whether or not PET exercises quasi-judicial power.
Held: Yes. The explicit reference of the Members of the Constitutional
Commission to a Presidential Electoral Tribunal, with Fr. Joaquin Bernas
categorically declaring that in crafting the last paragraph of Sec. 4, Art
VII of the 1987 Constitution, they “constitutionalized what was
statutory. It is not an infringement on the separation of
powers because the power being given to the Supreme Court
is a judicial power.” Judicial power granted to the Supreme Court by
the same Constitution is plenary. And under the doctrine of necessary
implication, the additional jurisdiction bestowed by the last paragraph
of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution to decide presidential and
vice-presidential elections contests includes the means necessary to
carry it into effect. By the same token, the PET is not a separate
and distinct entity from the Supreme Court, albeit it has
functions peculiar only to the Tribunal. It is obvious that the
PET was constituted in implementation of Section 4, Article
VII of the Constitution, and it faithfully complies – not
unlawfully defies – the constitutional directive.
No. The traditional grant of judicial power is found in Section 1, Article
VIII of the Constitution which provides that the power “shall be vested
in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established
by law.” The set up embodied in the Constitution and statutes
characterize the resolution of electoral contests as essentially an
exercise of judicial power. When the Supreme Court, as PET, resolves a
presidential or vice-presidential election contest, it performs what is
essentially a judicial power.
The COMELEC, HRET and SET are not, strictly and literally speaking,
courts of law. Although not courts of law, they are, nonetheless,
empowered to resolve election contests which involve, in essence, an
exercise of judicial power, because of the explicit constitutional
empowerment found in Section 2(2), Article IX-C (for the COMELEC)
and Section 17, Article VI (for the Senate and House Electoral Tribunals)
of the Constitut
FUNA V ERMITA
Facts: Pres. Arroyo appointed Maria Bautista as undersecretary of
DOTC. When MARINA administrator Suazo resigned, Baustista was
designated as OIC office of administrator of MARINA. Funa in his
capacity as taxpayer, concerned citizen and lawyer, filed the instant
petition challenging the constitutionality of Bautista’s
appointment/designation, which is proscribed by the prohibition on
the President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their
deputies and assistants to hold any other office or employment.
During the pendency of this petition, Bautista was appointed
Administrator of the MARINA and she assumed her duties and
responsibilities.
Funa argues that Bautista’s concurrent positions as DOTC
Undersecretary and MARINA OIC is in violation of Section 13, Article VII
of the 1987 Constitution. On the other hand, the respondents argue
that the requisites of a judicial inquiry are not present in this case. In
fact, there no longer exists an actual controversy that needs to be
resolved in view of the appointment of respondent Bautista as MARINA
Administrator effective February 2, 2009 and the relinquishment of her
post as DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport, which rendered
the present petition moot and academic. Petitioner’s prayer for a
temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction is likewise
moot and academic since, with this supervening event, there is nothing
left to enjoin.
Issue: Whether or not the designation of respondent Bautista as OIC of
MARINA, concurrent with the position of DOTC Undersecretary for
Maritime Transport to which she had been appointed, violated the
constitutional proscription against dual or multiple offices for Cabinet
Members and their deputies and assistants.
Held: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The designation of
respondent Ma. Elena H. Bautista as Officer-in-Charge, Office of the
Administrator, Maritime Industry Authority, in a concurrent capacity
with her position as DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport, is
hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL for being violative of Section 13,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution and therefore, NULL and VOID.
Ratio: Undersecretary Bautistas designation as MARINA OIC falls
under the stricter prohibition under Section 13, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution. Respondent Bautista being then the appointed
Undersecretary of DOTC, she was thus covered by the stricter
prohibition under Section 13, Article VII and consequently she cannot
invoke the exception provided in Section 7, paragraph 2, Article IX-B
where holding another office is allowed by law or the primary functions
of the position. Neither was she designated OIC of MARINA in an ex-
officio capacity, which is the exception recognized in Civil Liberties
Union. The prohibition against holding dual or multiple offices or
employment under Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution was
held inapplicable to posts occupied by the Executive officials specified
therein, without additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as
provided by law and as required by the primary functions of said office.
The reason is that these posts do not comprise any other office within
the contemplation of the constitutional prohibition but are properly an
imposition of additional duties and functions on said officials. Apart
from their bare assertion that respondent Bautista did not receive any
compensation when she was OIC of MARINA, respondents failed to
demonstrate clearly that her designation as such OIC was in an ex-
officio capacity as required by the primary functions of her office as
DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport.
FUNA V AGRA
Facts: Funa alleges that on March 1, 2010, President Gloria M.
Macapagal Arroyo appointed Agra as the Acting Secretary of Justice
following the resignation of Secretary Agnes VST Devanadera in order
to vie for a congressional seat in Quezon Province; that on March 5,
2010, President Arroyo designated Agra as the Acting Solicitor General
in a concurrent capacity; that on April 7, 2010, the petitioner, in his
capacity as a taxpayer, a concerned citizen and a lawyer, commenced
this suit to challenge the constitutionality of Agra’s concurrent
appointments or designations, claiming it to be prohibited under
Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution; that during the
pendency of the suit, President Benigno S. Aquino III appointed Atty.
Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz as the Solicitor General; and that Cadiz assumed
as the Solicitor General and commenced his duties as such on August
5, 2010. Agra renders a different version of the antecedents. He
represents that on January 12, 2010, he was then the Government
Corporate Counsel when President Arroyo designated him as the Acting
Solicitor General in place of Solicitor General Devanadera who had
been appointed as the Secretary of Justice; that on March 5, 2010,
President Arroyo designated him also as the Acting Secretary of Justice
vice Secretary Devanadera who had meanwhile tendered her
resignation in order to run for Congress representing a district in
Quezon Province in the May 2010 elections; that he then relinquished
his position as the Government Corporate Counsel; and that pending
the appointment of his successor, Agra continued to perform his duties
as the Acting Solicitor General. Notwithstanding the conflict in the
versions of the parties, the fact that Agra has admitted to holding the
two offices concurrently in acting capacities is settled, which is
sufficient for purposes of resolving the constitutional question that
petitioner raises herein.
Issue: Whether or not Agra’s holding of concurrent position is
unconstitutional.
Held: Yes. At the center of the controversy is the correct application of
Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, viz:
Section 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet,
and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in
this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their
tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly practice
any other profession, participate in any business, or be financially
interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege
granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of
interest in the conduct of their office.
A relevant and complementing provision is Section 7, paragraph (2),
Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution, to wit:
Section 7. x x x Unless otherwise allowed by law or the primary functions
of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or
employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries.
Being designated as the Acting Secretary of Justice concurrently with
his position of Acting Solicitor General, therefore, Agra was
undoubtedly covered by Section 13, Article VII, supra, whose text and
spirit were too clear to be differently read. Hence, Agra could not
validly hold any other office or employment during his tenure as the
Acting Solicitor General, because the Constitution has not otherwise so
provided.
It was of no moment that Agra’s designation was in an acting or
temporary capacity. The text of Section 13, supra, plainly indicates that
the intent of the Framers of the Constitution was to impose a stricter
prohibition on the President and the Members of his Cabinet in so far
as holding other offices or employments in the Government or in
government-owned or government controlled-corporations was
concerned. In this regard, to hold an office means to possess or to
occupy the office, or to be in possession and administration of the
office, which implies nothing less than the actual discharge of the
functions and duties of the office. Indeed, in the language of Section 13
itself, supra, the Constitution makes no reference to the nature of the
appointment or designation. The prohibition against dual or multiple
offices being held by one official must be construed as to apply to all
appointments or designations, whether permanent or temporary, for
it is without question that the avowed objective of Section 13, supra, is
to prevent the concentration of powers in the Executive Department
officials, specifically the President, the Vice-President, the Members of
the Cabinet and their deputies and assistants. To construe differently
is to “open the veritable floodgates of circumvention of an important
constitutional disqualification of officials in the Executive Department
and of limitations on the Presidents power of appointment in the guise
of temporary designations of Cabinet Members, undersecretaries and
assistant secretaries as officers-in-charge of government agencies,
instrumentalities, or government-owned or controlled corporations.
It is not amiss to observe, lastly, that assuming that Agra, as the Acting
Solicitor General, was not covered by the stricter prohibition under
Section 13, supra, due to such position being merely vested with a
cabinet rank under Section 3, Republic Act No. 9417, he nonetheless
remained covered by the general prohibition under Section 7, supra.
Hence, his concurrent designations were still subject to the conditions
under the latter constitutional provision. In this regard, the Court aptly
pointed out in Public Interest Center, Inc. v. Elma:
The general rule contained in Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution
permits an appointive official to hold more than one office only if
“allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position.” In the case
of Quimson v. Ozaeta, this Court ruled that, “[t]here is no legal
objection to a government official occupying two government offices
and performing the functions of both as long as there is no
incompatibility.” The crucial test in determining whether
incompatibility exists between two offices was laid out in People v.
Green – whether one office is subordinate to the other, in the sense
that one office has the right to interfere with the other.
DE CASTRO VS. JBC
FACTS:
This is a consolidated case regarding the appointment of President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to Associate Justice Renato Corona as Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court.
All the petitions to the Court pose as the principal legal question
whether the incumbent President can appoint the successor of Chief
Justice Puno upon his retirement. The question is undoubtedly
impressed with transcendental importance to the nation because the
appointment of the Chief Justice is any President’s most important
appointment. The conflicting provisions are Art. VII, Sec. 15 and Art.
VIII, Sec. 9.
Considering, Art. VII, under Executive Department,
Art. VII, Sec. 15. Two months immediately before the next presidential
elections and up to the end of his term, a President or Acting President
shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments to
executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice
public service or endanger public safety.
in relation to Art. VIII, under Judicial Department,
Art. VIII, Sec. 9. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of the
lower courts shall be appointed by the President from a list of at least
three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every
vacancy. Such appointments need no confirmation.
For the lower courts, the President shall issue the appointments within
ninety days from the submission of the list.
ISSUE: Whether the prohibition against presidential appointments
under Art. VII, Sec. 15 (Midnight Appointment Ban), does not extend to
appointments in the Judiciary.
HELD: Prohibition under Art. VII, Sec.15 does not apply to
appointments to fill a vacancy in the Supreme Court or to other
appointments to the Judiciary.
As can be seen, Article VII is devoted to the Executive Department, and,
among others, it lists the powers vested by the Constitution in the
President. The presidential power of appointment is dealt with in
Sections 14, 15 and 16 of the Article. Article VIII is dedicated to the
Judicial Department and defines the duties and qualifications of
Members of the Supreme Court, among others. Sec. 4(1) and Sec. 9 of
this Article are the provisions specifically providing for the appointment
of Supreme Court Justices. In particular, Sec. 9 states that the
appointment of Supreme Court Justices can only be made by the
President upon the submission of a list of at least three nominees by
the JBC; Sec. 4(1) of the Article mandates the President to fill the
vacancy within 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy.
Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Art.
VII, Sec. 15 to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they
could have explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the
meticulous ordering of the provisions. That such specification was not
done only reveals that the prohibition against the President or Acting
President making appointments within two months before the next
presidential elections and up to the end of the President’s or Acting
President’s term does not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.
Taken into consideration also that the appointment of the next Chief
Justice by the incumbent President is preferable to having the
Associate Justice who is first in precedence take over. Under the
Constitution, the heads of the Legislative and Executive Departments
are popularly elected, and whoever are elected and proclaimed at once
become the leaders of their respective Departments. However, the lack
of any appointed occupant of the office of Chief Justice harms the
independence of the Judiciary, because the Chief Justice is the head of
the entire Judiciary. The Chief Justice performs functions absolutely
significant to the life of the nation. With the entire Supreme Court
being the Presidential Electoral Tribunal, the Chief Justice is the
Chairman of the Tribunal. There being no obstacle to the appointment
of the next Chief Justice, aside from its being mandatory for the
incumbent President to make within the 90-day period from May 17,
2010, there is no justification to insist that the successor of Chief Justice
Puno be appointed by the next President.
Velicaria-Garafil v Office of the Pres. (GR No. 203372)
Facts: Prior to the conduct of the May 2010 elections, then President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (President Macapagal-Arroyo) issued more
than 800 appointments to various positions in several government
offices.
The ban on midnight appointments in Section 15, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution reads:
Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up
to the end of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make
appointments, except temporary appointments to executive positions
when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or
endanger public safety.
Thus, for purposes of the 2010 elections, 10 March 2010 was the cutoff
date for valid appointments and the next day, 11 March 2010, was the
start of the ban on midnight appointments. Section 15, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution recognizes as an exception to the ban on midnight
appointments only "temporary appointments to executive positions
when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or
endanger public safety."
None of the petitioners claim that their appointments fall under this
exception.
On 30 June 2010, President Benigno S. Aquino III (President Aquino)
took his oath of office as President of the Republic of the Philippines.
On 30 July 2010, President Aquino issued EO 2 recalling, withdrawing,
and revoking appointments issued by President Macapagal-Arroyo
which violated the constitutional ban on midnight appointments.
Issue:
(1) Whether petitioners' appointments violate Section 15, Article VII of
the 1987 Constitution, and

Held: The following elements should always concur in the making of a
valid (which should be understood as both complete and effective)
appointment:
(1) Authority to appoint and evidence of the exercise of the authority;
The President's exercise of his power to appoint officials is provided for
in the Constitution and laws. Discretion is an integral part in the
exercise of the power of appointment. Considering that appointment
calls for a selection, the appointing power necessarily exercises a
discretion.
The power to appoint is, in essence, discretionary. The appointing
power has the right of choice which he may exercise freely according
to his judgment, deciding for himself who is best qualified among those
who have the necessary qualifications and eligibilities.
(2) transmittal of the appointment paper and evidence of the
transmittal;
It is not enough that the President signs the appointment paper. There
should be evidence that the President intended the appointment paper
to be issued. It could happen that an appointment paper may be dated
and signed by the President months before the appointment ban, but
never left his locked drawer for the entirety of his term. Release of the
appointment paper through the MRO is an unequivocal act that
signifies the President's intent of its issuance.
For purposes of verification of the appointment paper's existence and
authenticity, the appointment paper must bear the security marks (i.e.,
handwritten signature of the President, bar code, etc.) and must be
accompanied by a transmittal letter from the MRO.
(3) a vacant position at the time of appointment; and
Petitioners have failed to raise any valid ground for the Court to declare
EO 2, or any part of it, unconstitutional. Consequently, EO 2 remains
valid and constitutional.
(4) receipt of the appointment paper and acceptance of the
appointment by the appointee who possesses all the qualifications and
none of the disqualifications.
Acceptance is indispensable to complete an appointment. Assuming
office and taking the oath amount to acceptance of the appointment.
An oath of office is a qualifying requirement for a public office, a
prerequisite to the full investiture of the office.
Petitioners have failed to show compliance with all four elements of a
valid appointment. They cannot prove with certainty that their
appointment papers were transmitted before the appointment ban
took effect. On the other hand, petitioners admit that they took their
oaths of office during the appointment ban.
Petitioners have failed to raise any valid ground for the Court to declare
EO 2, or any part of it, unconstitutional. Consequently, EO 2 remains
valid and constitutional.
Resident Marine Mammals v Reyes ( GR No. 180771 & 181527)
Almario v Exec. Sec ( GR No. 189028)
 Facts: On 6 May 2009, the Chairperson of NCCA and the President
and Artistic Director of the CCP sent President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo a letter containing the recommendation of the Board of
Trustees of both the NCCA and the CCP that the following persons
be proclaimed National Artists: (1) Manuel Conde (posthumous) for
Film and Broadcast Arts, (2) Ramon Santos (Santos) for Music, (3)
Lazaro Francisco (posthumous) for Literature, and (4) Federico
Aguilar-Alcuaz for Visual Arts.
 The said letter was supposedly referred by the Office of the
President to the Committee on Honors.
 In the meantime, the Office of the President allegedly received
nominations from various sectors, cultural groups, and individuals
strongly endorsing other persons for the same conferment, namely,
(1) Cecile Guidote-Alvarez (Guidote-Alvarez), (2) Carlo Magno, (3)
Jose Caparas (Caparas), (4) Francisco Mañosa, and (5) Jose Moreno
(Guidote-Alvarez et al.).
 The Committee on Honors purportedly processed these nominations
and invited resource persons to validate the qualifications and
credentials of the nominees.
 The Committee on Honors thereafter submitted a memorandum to
the President recommending the conferment of the Order of
National Artists on the four recommendees of the NCCA and the CCP
Boards, as well as on Guidote-Alvarez et al.
 Acting on this recommendation, several proclamations were made
declaring Manuel Conde, Lazaro Francisco, Federico Aguilar-Alcuaz,
and Guidote-Alvarez et al. as National Artists.
 Consequently, Almario, his fellow National Artists, a number of
cultural workers and academics, and the Concerned Artists of the
Philippines (Almario et al.) filed a Petition for Prohibition, Certiorari,
and Injunction before the Supreme Court assailing the declaration of
Guidote-Alvarez et al. as National Artists.
Almario et al.’s Contention: The President gravely abused her
discretion in disregarding the results of the rigorous screening and
selection process for the Order of National Artists and in substituting
her own choice for those of the deliberation panels.
Caparas’ Contention: The function of the NCCA and the CCP Boards is
simply to advise the President. The award of the Order of National
Artists is the exclusive prerogative of the President who is not bound
in any way by such recommendation. The implementing rules and
regulations or guidelines of the NCCA cannot restrict or limit the
exclusive power of the President to select the recipients of the Order
of National Artists.
The Solicitor General’s Contention: While the President exercises
control over the NCCA and the CCP, she has the duty to faithfully
execute the laws, including the NCCA-CCP guidelines for the
selection of National Artists and the implementing rules of Executive
Order No. 236, Series of 20031.
Issue: Whether or not the President gravely abused her discretion in
declaring Guidote-Alvarez et al. National Artists.
Held: Yes. Guidote-Alvarez et al. were not recommended by the NCCA
and CCP Board of Trustees and consequently, their declaration as
National Artists were done in disregard of the applicable rules.
Ratio:
 The President’s discretion in the conferment of the Order of National
Artists should be exercised in accordance with the duty to faithfully
execute the relevant laws.
 The faithful execution clause is best construed as an obligation
imposed on the President, not a separate grant of power.
 It simply underscores the rule of law and, corollarily, the cardinal
principle that the President is not above the laws but is obliged to
obey and execute them.
 An administrative regulation adopted pursuant to law has the force
and effect of law and thus, the rules, guidelines, and policies
regarding the Order of National Artists jointly issued by the CCP
Board of Trustees and the NCCA pursuant to their respective
statutory mandates have the force and effect of law and until set
aside, they are binding upon executive and administrative agencies,
including the President herself as chief executor of laws.
 In view of the various stages of deliberation in the selection process
and as a consequence of her duty to faithfully enforce the relevant
laws, the discretion of the President in the matter of the Order of
National Artists is confined to the names submitted to her by the
NCCA and the CCP Boards.
 This means that the President could not have considered
conferment of the Order of National Artists on any person not
considered and recommended by the NCCA and the CCP Boards.
 The President could not have properly considered Guidote-Alvarez
et al., as their names were not recommended by the NCCA and the
CCP Boards.
 The NCCA and CCP Guidelines provide that Board members and
consultants and NCCA and CCP officers and staff are automatically
disqualified from being nominated.
 Consequently, Guidote-Alvarez, who was the Executive Director of
the NCCA at that time, could not have even been nominated and
hence, she was not qualified to be considered and conferred the
Order of National Artists.
 The President’s discretion on the matter does not extend to
removing a legal impediment or overriding a legal restriction.
 The advice or recommendation of the NCCA and the CCP Boards as
to the conferment of the Order of National Artists was not binding
on the former President but only discretionary or optional for her
whether or not to act on such advice or recommendation.
 Also, by virtue of the power of control, the President had the
authority to alter or modify or nullify or set aside such
recommendation or advice.
 It was well within the President’s power and discretion to proclaim
all, or some or even none of the recommendees of the CCP and the
NCCA Boards, without having to justify his or her action.
 Thus, the exclusion of Santos did not constitute grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the former President.
 There was a violation of the equal protection clause of the
Constitution when the President gave preferential treatment to
Guidote-Alvarez et al.
 The President’s constitutional duty to faithfully execute the laws and
observe the rules, guidelines, and policies of the NCCA and the CCP
as to the selection of the nominees for conferment of the Order of
National Artists proscribed her from having a free and uninhibited
hand in the conferment of the said award.
 The manifest disregard of the rules, guidelines, and processes of the
NCCA and the CCP was an arbitrary act that unduly favored
respondents Guidote-Alvarez et al.
Monsanto v Factoran (GR No. 78239)
Facts: The Sandiganbayan convicted petitioner Salvacion A. Monsanto
(then assistant treasurer of Calbayog City) of the crime of estafa
through falsification of public documents. She was sentenced to jail and
to indemnify the government in the sum of P4,892.50. The SC affirmed
the decision. She then filed a motion for reconsideration but while said
motion was pending, she was extended by then President Marcos
absolute pardon which she accepted (at that time, the rule was that
clemency could be given even before conviction). By reason of said
pardon, petitioner wrote the Calbayog City treasurer requesting that
she be restored to her former post as assistant city treasurer since the
same was still vacant. Her letter was referred to the Minister of Finance
who ruled that she may be reinstated to her position without the
necessity of a new appointment not earlier than the date she was
extended the absolute pardon.
Petitioner wrote the Ministry stressing that the full pardon bestowed
on her has wiped out the crime which implies that her service in the
government has never been interrupted and therefore the date of her
reinstatement should correspond to the date of her preventive
suspension; that she is entitled to backpay for the entire period of her
suspension; and that she should not be required to pay the
proportionate share of the amount of P4,892.50
The Ministry referred the issue to the Office of the President. Deputy
Executive Secretary Factoran denied Monsanto’s request averring that
Monsanto must first seek appointment and that the pardon does not
reinstate her former position.
Issues:
1. Is Monsanto entitled to backpay?
2. Is a public officer, who has been granted an absolute pardon by the
Chief Executive, entitled to reinstatement to her former position
without need of a new appointment?
3. May petitioner be exempt from the payment of the civil indemnity
imposed upon her by the sentence?
Held:
1. Pardon is defined as "an act of grace, proceeding from the power
entrusted with the execution of the laws, which exempts the
individual, on whom it is bestowed, from the punishment the law
inflicts for a crime he has committed. It is the private, though
official act of the executive magistrate, delivered to the individual
for whose benefit it is intended, and not communicated officially to
the Court.
While a pardon has generally been regarded as blotting out the
existence of guilt so that in the eye of the law the offender is as
innocent as though he never committed the offense, it does not
operate for all purposes. The very essence of a pardon is
forgiveness or remission of guilt. Pardon implies guilt. It does not
erase the fact of the commission of the crime and the conviction
thereof. It does not wash out the moral stain. It involves
forgiveness and not forgetfulness.
A pardon looks to the future. It is not retrospective. It makes no
amends for the past. It affords no relief for what has been suffered
by the offender. It does not impose upon the government any
obligation to make reparation for what has been suffered. “Since the
offense has been established by judicial proceedings, that which has
been done or suffered while they were in force is presumed to have
been rightfully done and justly suffered, and no satisfaction for it can
be required.” This would explain why petitioner, though pardoned,
cannot be entitled to receive backpay for lost earnings and benefits.
2. The pardon granted to petitioner has resulted in removing her
disqualification from holding public employment but it cannot go
beyond that. To regain her former post as assistant city treasurer, she
must re-apply and undergo the usual procedure required for a new
appointment.
3. Civil liability arising from crime is governed by the Revised Penal
Code. It subsists notwithstanding service of sentence, or for any reason
the sentence is not served by pardon, amnesty or commutation of
sentence. Petitioner's civil liability may only be extinguished by the
same causes recognized in the Civil Code, namely: payment, loss of the
thing due, remission of the debt, merger of the rights of creditor and
debtor, compensation and novation.
Risos-Vidal v COMELEC (GR No. 206666)
Facts: In September 12, 2007, the Sandiganbayan convicted former
President Estrada for the crime of plunder and was sentenced to suffer
the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and the accessory penalties of civil
interdiction during the period of sentence and perpetual absolute
disqualification. On October 25, 2007, however, former President
Gloria Macapagal Arroyo extended executive clemency, by way of
pardon, to former President Estrada, explicitly stating that he is
restored to his civil and political rights.
In 2009, Estrada filed a Certificate of Candidacy for the position of
President. None of the disqualification cases against him prospered but
he only placed second in the results.
In 2012, Estrada once more ventured into the political arena, and filed
a Certificate of Candidacy, this time vying for a local elective post, that
of the Mayor of the City of Manila.
Petitioner Risos-Vidal filed a Petition for Disqualification against
Estrada before the Comelec stating that Estrada is disqualified to run
for public office because of his conviction for plunder sentencing him
to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with perpetual absolute
disqualification. Petitioner relied on Section 40 of the Local
Government Code (LGC), in relation to Section 12 of the Omnibus
Election Code (OEC).
The Comelec dismissed the petition for disqualification holding that
President Estrada’s right to seek public office has been effectively
restored by the pardon vested upon him by former President Gloria M.
Arroyo.
Estrada won the mayoralty race in May 13, 2013 elections. Alfredo Lim,
who garnered the second highest votes, intervened and sought to
disqualify Estrada for the same ground as the contention of Risos-Vidal
and praying that he be proclaimed as Mayor of Manila.
Issue: May former President Joseph Estrada run for public office
despite having been convicted of the crime of plunder which carried an
accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification to hold public office?
Held: Yes. Estrada was granted an absolute pardon that fully restored
all his civil and political rights, which naturally includes the right to seek
public elective office, the focal point of this controversy. The wording
of the pardon extended to former President Estrada is complete,
unambiguous, and unqualified. It is likewise unfettered by Articles 36
and 41 of the Revised Penal Code. The only reasonable, objective, and
constitutional interpretation of the language of the pardon is that the
same in fact conforms to Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code.
It is insisted that, since a textual examination of the pardon given to
and accepted by former President Estrada does not actually specify
which political right is restored, it could be inferred that former
President Arroyo did not deliberately intend to restore former
President Estrada’s rights of suffrage and to hold public office, orto
otherwise remit the penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification.
Even if her intention was the contrary, the same cannot be upheld
based on the pardon’s text.
The pardoning power of the President cannot be limited by legislative
action.
The 1987 Constitution, specifically Section 19 of Article VII
and Section 5 of Article IX-C, provides that the President of the
Philippines possesses the power to grant pardons, along with other acts
of executive clemency. It is apparent from the foregoing constitutional
provisions that the only instances in which the President may not
extend pardon remain to be in: (1) impeachment cases; (2) cases that
have not yet resulted in a final conviction; and (3) cases involving
violations of election laws, rules and regulations in which there was no
favorable recommendation coming from the COMELEC. Therefore, it
can be argued that any act of Congress by way of statute cannot
operate to delimit the pardoning power of the President.
The disqualification of former President Estrada under Section 40 of the
LGC in relation to Section 12 of the OEC was removed by his acceptance
of the absolute pardon granted to him
While it may be apparent that the proscription in Section 40(a) of the
LGC is worded in absolute terms, Section 12 of the OEC provides a legal
escape from the prohibition – a plenary pardon or amnesty. In other
words, the latter provision allows any person who has been granted
plenary pardon or amnesty after conviction by final judgment of an
offense involving moral turpitude, inter alia, to run for and hold any
public office, whether local or national position.
The third preambular clause of the pardon did not operate to make
the pardon conditional.
Contrary to Risos-Vidal’s declaration, the third preambular clause of
the pardon, i.e., "[w]hereas, Joseph Ejercito Estrada has publicly
committed to no longer seek any elective position or office," neither
makes the pardon conditional, nor militate against the conclusion that
former President Estrada’s rights to suffrage and to seek public
elective office have been restored.
This is especially true as the pardon itself does not explicitly impose a
condition or limitation, considering the unqualified use of the term
"civil and political rights" as being restored. Besides, a preamble is
really not an integral part of a law. It is merely an introduction to
show its intent or purposes.
Kulayan et al vs Gov. Tan (G.R. No. 187298 July 3, 2012)
FACTS: Three members from the International Committee of the Red
Cross (ICRC) were kidnapped in the vicinity of the Provincial Capitol in
Patikul, Sulu. Andres Notter, a Swiss national, Eugenio Vagni, an Italian
national, and Marie Jean Lacaba, a Filipino engineer, were purportedly
inspecting a water and sanitation project for the Sulu Provincial Jail
when inspecting a water and sanitation project for the Sulu Provincial
Jail when they were seized by three armed men who were later
confirmed to be members of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). The leader
of the alleged kidnappers was identified as Raden Abu, a former guard
at the Sulu Provincial Jail. News reports linked Abu to Albader Parad,
one of the known leaders of the Abu Sayyaf.
The local group, later renamed Sulu Crisis Management Committee,
convened under the leadership of respondent Abdusakur Mahail Tan,
the Provincial Governor of Sulu, organized the Civilian Emergency Force
(CEF), a group of armed male civilians coming from different
municipalities.The organization of the CEF was embodied in a
"Memorandum of Understanding" entered into between three parties:
the provincial government of Sulu, represented by Governor Tan; the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, represented by Gen. Saban; and the
Philippine National Police, represented by P/SUPT. Latag.
Governor Tan issued Proclamation No. 1, Series of 2009 (Proclamation
1-09), declaring a state of emergency in the province of Sulu. It cited
the kidnapping incident as a ground for the said declaration, describing
it as a terrorist act pursuant to the Human Security.
On 1 April 2009, SPO1 Sattal Jadjuli was instructed by his superior to
report to respondent P/SUPT. Julasirim Kasim. Upon arriving at the
police station, he was booked, and interviewed about his relationship
to Musin, Jaiton, and Julamin, who were all his deceased relatives.
Upon admitting that he was indeed related to the three, he was
detained. After a few hours, former Punong Barangay Juljahan Awadi,
companions were arrested. The affidavit of the apprehending officer
alleged that they were suspected ASG supporters and were being
arrested under Proclamation 1-09.
Petitioners contend that Proclamation No. 1 and its Implementing
Guidelines were issued ultra vires, and thus null and void, for violating
Sections 1 and 18, Article VII of the Constitution, which grants the
President sole authority to exercise emergency powers and calling-out
powers as the chief executive of the Republic and commander-in-chief
of the armed forces. The Provincial Governor is not authorized by any
law to create civilian armed forces under his command, nor regulate
and limit the issuances of PTCFORs to his own private army.
On 16 April 2009, Jamar M. Kulayan, Temogen S. Tulawie, Hadji
Mohammad Yusop Ismi, Ahajan Awadi, and SPO1 Sattal H. Jadjuli,
residents of Patikul, Sulu, filed the present Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition.
Issue: Whether Gov. Tan is also vested with calling out powers
Ruling: Only the President is vested with calling-out powers, as the
commander-in-chief of the Republic
It has already been established that there is one repository of executive
powers, and that is the President of the Republic. This means that when
Section 1, Article VII of the Constitution speaks of executive power, it is
granted to the President and no one else.
The exceptional character of Commander-in-Chief powers dictate that
they are exercised by one president
One of these acts or prerogatives is the bundle of Commander-in-Chief
powers to which the "calling-out" powers constitutes a portion. The
President’s Emergency Powers, on the other hand, is balanced only by
the legislative act of Congress, as embodied in the second paragraph of
Section 23, Article 6 of the Constitution:
The Local Government Code does not involve the diminution of central
powers inherently vested in the National Government, especially not
the prerogatives solely granted by the Constitution to the President in
matters of security and defense.
The intent behind the powers granted to local government units is
fiscal, economic, and administrative in nature. The Code is concerned
only with powers that would make the delivery of basic services more
effective to the constituents, and should not be unduly stretched to
confer calling-out powers on local executives.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is granted said proclamation and
guidelines are hereby declared NULL and VOID.
Ampatuan v Puno (GR No. 190259)
Facts: On 24 November 2009, the day after the Maguindanao
Massacre, then Pres. Arroyo issued Proclamation 1946, placing “the
Provinces of Maguindanao and Sultan Kudarat and the City of Cotabato
under a state of emergency.” She directed the AFP and the PNP “to
undertake such measures as may be allowed by the Constitution and
by law to prevent and suppress all incidents of lawless violence” in the
named places. Three days later, she also issued AO 273 “transferring”
supervision of the ARMM from the Office of the President to the DILG.
She subsequently issued AO 273-A, which amended the former AO (the
term “transfer” used in AO 273 was amended to “delegate”, referring
to the supervision of the ARMM by the DILG).
Claiming that the President’s issuances encroached on the ARMM’s
autonomy, petitioners Datu Zaldy Uy Ampatuan, Ansaruddin Adiong,
and Regie Sahali-Generale, all ARMM officials, filed this petition for
prohibition under Rule 65. They alleged that the President’s
proclamation and orders encroached on the ARMM’s autonomy as
these issuances empowered the DILG Secretary to take over ARMM’s
operations and to seize the regional government’s powers. They also
claimed that the President had no factual basis for declaring a state of
emergency, especially in the Province of Sultan Kudarat and the City of
Cotabato, where no critical violent incidents occurred and that the
deployment of troops and the taking over of the ARMM constitutes an
invalid exercise of the President’s emergency powers. Petitioners asked
that Proclamation 1946 as well as AOs 273 and 273-A be declared
unconstitutional.
Issues: 1. Whether or not President Arroyo invalidly exercised
emergency powers when she called out the AFP and the PNP to prevent
and suppress all incidents of lawless violence in Maguindanao, Sultan
Kudarat, and Cotabato City
2. Whether or not the President had factual bases for her actions
Held:
I. The deployment is not by itself an exercise of emergency powers as
understood under Section 23 (2), Article VI of the Constitution, which
provides:
SECTION 23. x x x (2) In times of war or other national emergency, the
Congress may, by law, authorize the President, for a limited period and
subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers
necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy. Unless
sooner withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, such powers shall
cease upon the next adjournment thereof.
The President did not proclaim a national emergency, only a state of
emergency in the three places mentioned. And she did not act pursuant
to any law enacted by Congress that authorized her to exercise
extraordinary powers. The calling out of the armed forces to prevent or
suppress lawless violence in such places is a power that the
Constitution directly vests in the President. She did not need a
congressional authority to exercise the same.
II. The President’s call on the armed forces to prevent or suppress
lawless violence springs from the power vested in her under Section 18,
Article VII of the Constitution, which provides:
Section 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed
forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may
call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion. x x x
While it is true that the Court may inquire into the factual bases for the
President’s exercise of the above power, it would generally defer to her
judgment on the matter. As the Court acknowledged in Integrated Bar
of the Philippines v. Hon. Zamora, it is clearly to the President that the
Constitution entrusts the determination of the need for calling out the
armed forces to prevent and suppress lawless violence. Unless it is
shown that such determination was attended by grave abuse of
discretion, the Court will accord respect to the President’s judgment.
Thus, the Court said:
If the petitioner fails, by way of proof, to support the assertion that the
President acted without factual basis, then this Court cannot undertake
an independent investigation beyond the pleadings. The factual
necessity of calling out the armed forces is not easily quantifiable and
cannot be objectively established since matters considered for
satisfying the same is a combination of several factors which are not
always accessible to the courts. Besides the absence of textual
standards that the court may use to judge necessity, information
necessary to arrive at such judgment might also prove unmanageable
for the courts. Certain pertinent information might be difficult to verify,
or wholly unavailable to the courts. In many instances, the evidence
upon which the President might decide that there is a need to call out
the armed forces may be of a nature not constituting technical proof.
On the other hand, the President, as Commander-in-Chief has a vast
intelligence network to gather information, some of which may be
classified as highly confidential or affecting the security of the state. In
the exercise of the power to call, on-the-spot decisions may be
imperatively necessary in emergency situations to avert great loss of
human lives and mass destruction of property. Indeed, the decision to
call out the military to prevent or suppress lawless violence must be
done swiftly and decisively if it were to have any effect at all. x x x.
Here, petitioners failed to show that the declaration of a state of
emergency in the Provinces of Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat and
Cotabato City, as well as the President’s exercise of the “calling out”
power had no factual basis. They simply alleged that, since not all areas
under the ARMM were placed under a state of emergency, it follows
that the takeover of the entire ARMM by the DILG Secretary had no
basis too.
The imminence of violence and anarchy at the time the President
issued Proclamation 1946 was too grave to ignore and she had to act
to prevent further bloodshed and hostilities in the places
mentioned. Progress reports also indicated that there was movement
in these places of both high-powered firearms and armed men
sympathetic to the two clans. Thus, to pacify the people’s fears and
stabilize the situation, the President had to take preventive action. She
called out the armed forces to control the proliferation of loose
firearms and dismantle the armed groups that continuously threatened
the peace and security in the affected places.
Since petitioners are not able to demonstrate that the proclamation of
state of emergency in the subject places and the calling out of the
armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence there have clearly
no factual bases, the Court must respect the President’s actions.
Fortun V GMA (GR No. 190293)
Facts: On November 23, 2009, heavily armed men believed led by the
ruling Ampatuan family of Maguindanao gunned down and buried
under shoveled dirt 57 innocent civilians. In response to this carnage,
President Arroyo issued on November 24, 2009 PP 1946 declaring a
state of emergency in Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat,
and Cotabato City.
On December 4, 2009, President Arroyo issued PP 1959
declaring martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus in Maguindanao except for identified areas of the Moro Islamic
Liberation Front. On December 6, 2009, President Arroyo submitted
her report to Congress. On December 9, 2009, Congress convened in
joint session to review the validity of the President’s action. But two
days later, or on December 12, 2009, before Congress could act, the
President issued PP 1963, lifting martial law and restoring the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus.
Issue: Whether the issue of constitutionality of Proclamation No 1959
is unavoidable
Ruling: The issue of the constitutionality of Proclamation 1959 is not
unavoidable for two reasons:
First. President Arroyo withdrew her proclamation of martial law and
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus before the joint
houses of Congress could fulfill their automatic duty to review and
validate or invalidate the same (18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution).
Although the above vests in the President the power to proclaim
martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, he
shares such power with the Congress. Under the 1987 Constitution the
President and the Congress act in tandem in exercising the power to
proclaim martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus. They exercise the power, not only sequentially, but in a sense
jointly since, after the President has initiated the proclamation or the
suspension, only the Congress can maintain the same based on its own
evaluation of the situation on the ground, a power that the President
does not have. The constitutional validity of the Presidents
proclamation of martial law or suspension of the writ of habeas
corpus is first a political question in the hands of Congress before it
becomes a justiciable one in the hands of the Court.
Here, President Arroyo withdrew Proclamation 1959 before the joint
houses of Congress, which had in fact convened, could act on the
same. Consequently, the petitions in these cases have become moot
and the Court has nothing to review. The lifting of martial law and
restoration of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in
Maguindanao was a supervening event that obliterated any justiciable
controversy.
Second. Since President Arroyo withdrew her proclamation of martial
law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in just
eight days, they have not been meaningfully implemented. The military
did not take over the operation and control of local government units
in Maguindanao. The President did not issue any law or decree
affecting Maguindanao that should ordinarily be enacted by
Congress. No indiscriminate mass arrest had been reported. Those who
were arrested during the period were either released or promptly
charged in court. Indeed, no petition for habeas corpus had been
filed with the Court respecting arrests made in those eight days. The
point is that the President intended by her action to address an uprising
in a relatively small and sparsely populated province. In her judgment,
the rebellion was localized and swiftly disintegrated in the face of a
determined and amply armed government presence.
Section 18, Article VII, requires the President to report his actions to
Congress, in person or in writing, within 48 hours of such proclamation
or suspension. In turn, the Congress is required to convene without
need of a call within 24 hours following the Presidents proclamation or
suspension. Clearly, the Constitution calls for quick action on the part
of the Congress. Whatever form that action takes, therefore, should
give the Court sufficient time to fulfill its own mandate to review the
factual basis of the proclamation or suspension within 30 days of its
issuance.
If the Congress procrastinates or altogether fails to fulfill its duty
respecting the proclamation or suspension within the short time
expected of it, then the Court can step in, hear the petitions challenging
the Presidents action, and ascertain if it has a factual basis. If the Court
finds none, then it can annul the proclamation or the suspension. But
what if the 30 days given it by the Constitution proves
inadequate? Justice Carpio himself offers the answer in his dissent: that
30-day period does not operate to divest this Court of its jurisdiction
over the case. The settled rule is that jurisdiction once acquired is not
lost until the case has been terminated.
The problem in this case is that the President aborted the
proclamation of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus in Maguindanao in just eight days. In a real sense,
the proclamation and the suspension never took off. The Congress
itself adjourned without touching the matter, it having become moot
and academic.
Vinuya V Romulo (GR No. 162230, April 28, 2010)
Facts: Petitioners are all members of the MALAYA LOLAS, a non-stock,
non-profit organization registered with the SEC, established for the
purpose of providing aid to the victims of rape by Japanese military
forces in the Philippines during the Second World War.
Petitioners claim that since 1998, they have approached the Executive
Department through the DOJ, DFA, and OSG, requesting assistance in
filing a claim against the Japanese officials and military officers who
ordered the establishment of the “comfort women” stations in the
Philippines. But officials of the Executive Department declined to assist
the petitioners, and took the position that the individual claims of the
comfort women for compensation had already been fully satisfied by
Japan’s compliance with the Peace Treaty between the Philippines and
Japan.
Hence, this petition where petitioners pray for this court to (a) declare
that respondents committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of discretion in refusing to espouse their claims for the
crimes against humanity and war crimes committed against them; and
(b) compel the respondents to espouse their claims for official apology
and other forms of reparations against Japan before the International
Court of Justice (ICJ) and other international tribunals.
Issue: W/N the Executive Department has exclusive determination and
judgment regarding the petitioners claim as part of their foreign policy
prerogative.
Held: YES. Court DENIES the Motion for Reconsideration and
Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration for their lack of merit.
The Constitution has entrusted to the Executive Department the
conduct of foreign relations for the Philippines. Whether or not to
espouse petitioners’ claim against the Government of Japan is left to
the exclusive determination and judgment of the Executive
Department. The Court cannot interfere with or question the wisdom
of the conduct of foreign relations by the Executive Department.
Accordingly, we cannot direct the Executive Department, either by writ
of certiorari or injunction, to conduct our foreign relations with Japan
in a certain manner.

ISSUE: WON the Executive Department committed grave abuse of

discretion in not espousing petitioners’ claims for official apology and
other forms of reparations against Japan
RULING: From a Domestic Law Perspective, the Executive Department
has the exclusive prerogative to determine whether to espouse
petitioners’ claims against Japan. The question whether the Philippine
government should espouse claims of its nationals against a foreign
government is a foreign relations matter, the authority for which is
demonstrably committed by our Constitution not to the courts but to
the political branches. In this case, the Executive Department has
already decided that it is to the best interest of the country to waive all
claims of its nationals for reparations against Japan in the Treaty of
Peace of 1951. The wisdom of such decision is not for the courts to
question.
The President, not Congress, has the better opportunity of knowing the
conditions which prevail in foreign countries, and especially is this true
in time of war. He has his confidential sources of information. He has
his agents in the form of diplomatic, consular and other officials.
The Executive Department has determined that taking up petitioners’
cause would be inimical to our country’s foreign policy interests, and
could disrupt our relations with Japan, thereby creating serious
implications for stability in this region. For the to overturn the Executive
Department’s determination would mean an assessment of the foreign
policy judgments by a coordinate political branch to which authority to
make that judgment has been constitutionally committed.

Vinuya v Romulo (GR No. 162230, Aug. 12, 2014)

Facts: In their Motion for Reconsideration, petitioners contended that

our constitutional and jurisprudential histories have rejected the
Court’s ruling that the foreign policy prerogatives of the Executive
Branch are unlimited and that the court has erred in holding that the
Chief Executive has the prerogative whether to bring their claims
against Japan because the foreign policy prerogatives are subject to
obligations to promote international humanitarian law as incorporated
into the laws of the land through the Incorporation Clause enshrined in
Section 2, Article II of the 1987 Constitution as cited in the cases of
Yamashita v. Styer and Kuroda v. Jalandoni. Moreover, they argue that
the Philippines is bound to abide by the erga omnes (in relation to
everyone) obligations arising from the jus cogens (compelling law)
norms embodied in the laws of war and humanity that include the
principle of the imprescriptibility of war crimes and that international
legal obligations prevail over national legal norms. Thus, the Chief
Executive has the constitutional duty to afford redress and to give
justice to the victims of the comfort women system in the Philippines.