A.M. No.

11-7-10-SC July 31, 2012 that undermines the security of tenure of the members of the
Re: COA Opinion on the Computation of the Appraised Value of the judiciary.
Properties Purchased by the Retired Chief/Associate Justices of the (2) The Constitution also mandates that the judiciary shall enjoy
Supreme Court. fiscal autonomy
(3) and grants the Supreme Court administrative supervision over
Facts: The present administrative matter stems from the two all courts and judicial personnel
Memoranda, dated July 14, 2011 and August 10, 2010, submitted by (4) The Constitution protects as well the salaries of the Justices
Atty. Candelaria, Deputy Clerk of Court and Chief Administrative Officer, and judges by prohibiting any decrease in their salary during
Office of Administrative Services, to the Office of the Chief Justice. their continuance in office
These Memoranda ask the Court to determine the proper formula to be
(5) and ensures their security of tenure by providing that
used in computing the appraisal value that a retired Chief Justice and
"Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts
several Associate Justices of the Supreme Court have to pay to acquire
shall hold office during good behavior until they reach the age
the government properties they used during their tenure.
of seventy years or become incapacitated to discharge the
Office of the General counsel of COA found that an underpayment
duties of their office.
amounting 221, 021.50php resulted when 5 retired SC justices
purchased from the SC the personal properties assigned to them during
Fiscal autonomy means freedom from outside control. The
their incumbency in the court.
Judiciary’s fiscal autonomy is realized through the actions of the
COA attributed this underpayment to the use by Property Division (PD)
Chief Justice, as its head, and of the Supreme Court En Banc, in the
of SC of wrong formula in computing appraisal value of purchased
exercise of administrative control and supervision of the courts
vehicles in w/c PD appraised the subj vehicles by applying Constitutional
and its personnel.
Fiscal Autonomy Group (CFAG) when it should have applied the formula
found in COA memorandum.
By way of a long standing tradition, partly based on the intention
Atty. Candelaria recommended that the Court advise the COA to respect
to reward long and faithful service, the sale to the retired Justices
the in-house computation based on CFAG formula noting that this was
of specifically designated properties that they used during their
the first time that COA questioned the authority of the court in using
incumbency has been recognized both as a privilege and a benefit.
CFAG joint resolution no. 35 and its guidelines in the appraisal and
This has become an established practice within the Judiciary that
disposal of govt. property since these were issued. In fact, COA in the
even the COA has previously recognized. Thus, under the
last two insatnces upheld the in house appraisal of govt. property using
guarantees of the Judiciary’s fiscal autonomy and its
CFAG formula.
independence, the Chief Justice and the Court En Banc determine
and decide the who, what, where, when and how of the privileges
ISSUE: Whether Atty. Candelaria’s recommendation is to be well taken?
and benefits they extend to justices, judges, court officials and
court personnel within the parameters of the Court’s granted
HELD: Yes. Separation of Powers and Judicial Independence. The
power; they determine the terms, conditions and restrictions of
concept of the independence of the three branches of government, on
the grant as grantor.
the other hand, extends from the notion that the powers of government
must be divided to avoid concentration of these powers in any one
branch; To achieve this purpose, the divided power must be wielded by
co-equal branches of government that are equally capable of
A.M. No. 13-09-08-SC October 1, 2013
independent action in exercising their respective mandates; lack of
RE: REQUEST FOR GUIDANCE/CLARIFICATION ON SECTION 7, RULE III
independence would result in the inability of one branch of government
OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 10154 REQUIRING RETIRING GOVERNMENT
to check the arbitrary or self-interest assertions of another or others.
EMPLOYEES TO SECURE A CLEARANCE OF PENDENCY/NON-PENDENCY
OF CASE/S FROM THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION.
Under the Judiciary’s unique circumstances, independence
encompasses the idea that individual judges can freely exercise their
FACTS: Atty. Candelaria requested for the guidance/clarification on the
mandate to resolve justiciable disputes, while the judicial branch, as a
applicability to the judiciary of sec. 7 rule III of IRR of RA 10154 w/c
whole, should work in the discharge of its constitutional functions free
states that:
of restraints and influence from the other branches, save only for those
Section 7. Notice of Pendency of Case. The retiring employee shall seek
imposed by the Constitution itself. Thus, judicial independence can be
Clearance of Pendency/Non-Pendency of Administrative Case from
"broken down into two distinct concepts: decisional independence and
his/her employer agency, Civil Service Commission (CSC), Office of the
institutional independence. "Decisional independence "refers to a
Ombudsman, or in case of presidential appointees, from the Office of
judge’s ability to render decisions free from political or popular
the President.
influence based solely on the individual facts and applicable law." On
Sec. 6 Art. 8 of the Constitution exclusively vests in the Court
the other hand, institutional independence "describes the separation of
administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel; it
the judicial branch from the executive and legislative branches of
oversees the court personnel’s compliance with all laws and takes the
government." Simply put, institutional independence refers to the
proper administrative action against them for any violation thereof; it
"collective independence of the judiciary as a body."
keeps in its custody records pertaining to the administrative cases of
retiring court personnel.
A truly independent judiciary is possible only when both concepts of
independence are preserved - wherein public confidence in the
ISSUE: Whether the rule that requires retiring govt. employees to
competence and integrity of the judiciary is maintained, and the public
secure to secure a prior clearance of pendency/non-pendency of admin
accepts the legitimacy of judicial authority. Constitution provides a
cases from among others, the csc should not be made to apply to
number of safeguards to ensure that judicial independence is protected
employees of judiciary?
and maintained.
(1) The Constitution expressly prohibits Congress from depriving HELD: No. To deem it otherwise would disregard the Court’s
the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction, as enumerated in constitutionally- enshrined power of administrative supervision over its
Section 5, Article VII of the Constitution, or from passing a law personnel. Besides, retiring court personnel are already required to
secure a prior clearance of the pendency/non-pendency of admin case
from the court which makes the CSC clearance a superfluous and non-
expeditious requirement contrary to the declared state policy of RA
10154. Verily, the administrative supervision of court personnel and all
affairs related thereto fall within the exclusive province of Judiciary.
It must however be noted that since the Constitution only accords the
Judiciary administrative supervision over its personnel, a different
treatment of the clearance requirement obtains with respect to criminal
cases. As such, a clearance requirement which pertains to criminal cases
may be imposed by the appropriate govt. agency (e.g the office of
Ombudsman on retiring court personnel as it is a matter beyond the
ambit of the Judiciary’s power of administrative supervision.
UDK-15143 January 21, 2015
IN THE MATTER OF: SAVE THE SUPREME COURT JUDICIAL
INDEPENDENCE AND FISCAL AUTONOMY MOVEMENT VS. ABOLITION
OF JUDICIARY DEVELOPMENT FUND (JDF) AND REDUCTION OF FISCAL
AUTONOMY.
FACTS: Mijares a, Filipino citizen and concerned tax payer filed a
petition for mandamus with manifestation to invoke the Judicial
Independence and Fiscal Autonomy as mandated under the
constitution prays in oder to compel this court to exercise its judicial
independence and fiscal autonomy against the perceived hostility of
Congress. He is concerned about the threats against the judiciary after
this court promulgated Priority Development Assistance fund on 2013
and Disbursement Acceleration Program on 2014.
In the first week of July 2014, Ilocos Norte Rep. Farinas filed House Bill
4690, which would require this court to remit its Judiciary Development
Fund collections to the national treasury. A week later Iloilo Rep. Tupas
filed House Bill No. 4783 entitled “The Act of creating the Judicial
Support Fund under the National Treasury, repealing for the purpose
Presidential Decree No. 1949.”
ISSUES: (1) Whether Mijares has sufficiently shown grounds for this
court to grant the petition and issue a writ of mandamus?
(2) Whether Constitution grants fiscal autonomy to the
judiciary to maintain its judicial independence
HELD: No. The power of judicial review, like all powers granted by the
constitution is subject to limitations. Petitioner must comply with all the
requisites for judicial review before this court may take cognizance of
the case. The requisites are: (1) there must be an actual case or
controversy (2) the person challenging the act must have a legal
standing to question the validity; must have a personal and substantial
interest in the case; will sustain direct injury as a result of its
enforcement (3) question of constitutionality must be raised at the
earliest opportunity (4)issue of constitutionality must be he very lis
mota of the case. Mijares’ failure to comply with the first 2 requisites
warrants the outright dismissal of this petition.
There can be no justiciable controversy involving the constitutionality
of a proposed bill. The Court can exercise its power of judicial review
only after a law is enacted, not before. Under the separation of powers,
the Court cannot restrain Congress from passing any law, or from
setting into motion the legislative mill according to its internal rules.
Even assuming that there is an actual case or controversy that this court
must resolve, petitioner has no legal standing to question the validity of
the proposed bill. Locus standi is defined as "a right of appearance in a
court of justice on a given question." Here, the plaintiff has not shown
that he has sustained or will sustain a direct injury if the proposed bill is
passed into law. While his concern for judicial independence is laudable,
it does not, by itself, clothe him with the requisite standing to question
the constitutionality of a proposed bill that may only affect the judiciary.
(2) Yes. The Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, and the
Ombudsman must have the independence and flexibility needed in the
discharge of their constitutional duties. The imposition of restrictions
and constraints on the manner the independent constitutional offices
allocate and utilize the funds appropriated for their operations is
anathema to fiscal autonomy and violative not only of the express
mandate of the Constitution but especially as regards the Supreme
Court, of the independence and separation of powers upon which the
entire fabric of our constitutional system is based.
Courts, therefore, must also be accountable with their own budget. The
Judiciary Development Fund, used to augment the expenses of the
judiciary, is regularly accounted for by this court on a quarterly basis.
The financial reports are readily available at the Supreme Court website.
These funds, however, are still not enough to meet the expenses of
lower courts and guarantee credible compensation for their
personnel. As a result, our fiscal autonomy and judicial independence
are often undermined by low levels of budgetary outlay, the lack of
provision for maintenance and operating expenses, and the reliance on
local government units and the Department of Justice.
G.R. No. 202242 April 16, 2013
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, Petitioner,
vs.
JUDICIALAND BAR COUNCIL, SEN. FRANCIS JOSEPH G. ESCUDERO and
REP. NIEL C. TUPAS, JR.,Respondents.
NATURE:
The case is a motion for reconsideration filed by the JBC in a prior
decision rendered July 17, 2012 that JBC’s action of allowing more than
one member of the congress to represent the JBC to be unconstitutional
FACTS:
In 1994, instead of having only seven members, an eighth member was
added to the JBC as two representatives from Congress began sitting in
the JBC – one from the House of Representatives and one from the
Senate, with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote. Then, the JBC En Banc,
in separate meetings held in 2000 and 2001, decided to allow the
representatives from the Senate and the House of Representatives one
full vote each. Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero and Congressman
Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents) simultaneously sit in the JBC as
representatives of the legislature. It is this practice that petitioner has
questioned in this petition. it should mean one representative each
from both Houses which comprise the entire Congress. Respondent
contends that the phrase “ a representative of congress” refers that
both houses of congress should have one representative each, and that
these two houses are permanent and mandatory components of
“congress” as part of the bicameral system of legislature. Both houses
have their respective powers in performance of their duties. Art VIII Sec
8 of the constitution provides for the component of the JBC to be 7
members only with only one representative from congress.
ISSUE:
Whether the JBC’s practice of having members from the Senate and the
House of Representatives making 8 instead of 7 sitting members to be
unconstitutional as provided in Art VIII Sec 8 of the constitution.
HELD: Yes. The practice is unconstitutional; the court held that the
phrase “a representative of congress” should be construed as to having
only one representative that would come from either house, not both.
That the framers of the constitution only intended for one seat of the
JBC to be allotted for the legislative.
It is evident that the definition of “Congress” as a bicameral body refers
to its primary function in government – to legislate. In the passage of
laws, the Constitution is explicit in the distinction of the role of each
house in the process. The same holds true in Congress’ non-legislative
powers. An inter-play between the two houses is necessary in the
realization of these powers causing a vivid dichotomy that the Court
cannot simply discount. This, however, cannot be said in the case of JBC
representation because no liaison between the two houses exists in the
workings of the JBC. Hence, the term “Congress” must be taken to mean
the entire legislative department. The Constitution mandates that the
JBC be composed of seven (7) members only.
GR No. 21381 August 19, 2014
Francis Jardaleza, Petitioner
Vs
CJ Ma. Lourdes Sereno, JBCand Exec. Sec. Paquito Ochoa Jr.,
respondents
Facts: Due to compulsory retirement of Asoc Justice Roberto Abad, JBC
announced the opening for pplication or recommendation for said
vacant position. March 14, 2014- JBC received letter from Dean
Concepcion of UP nominating Jardaleza w/c upon his acceptance, he
was included as one of the candidates and was interviewed by JBC.
Jardaleza received telephone calls from former CA Asoc. JusticeLagman
informing him that CJ Sereno will be invoking unanimity rule against
him It is invoked because Jardaleza’s integrity is in question.
G.R. No. 211833, April 07, 2015
FERDINAND R. VILLANUEVA, PRESIDING JUDGE, MCTC, COMPOSTELA-
NEW BATAAN, COMPOSTELA VALLEY
PROVINCE, Petitioner, v. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL, Respondent.
FACTS : The petitioner was appointed on September 18, 2012 as the
Presiding Judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Compostela-New
Bataan, Poblacion, Compostela Valley Province, Region XI, which is a
first-level court. On September 27, 2013, he applied for the vacant
position of Presiding Judge in the following Regional Trial Courts (RTCs):
Branch 31, Tagum City; Branch 13, Davao City; and Branch 6,
Prosperidad, Agusan Del Sur In a letter2 dated December 18, 2013, JBC's
Office of Recruitment, Selection and Nomination, informed the
petitioner that he was not included in the list of candidates for the said
stations. On the same date, the petitioner sent a letter, through
electronic mail, seeking reconsideration of his non-inclusion in the list
of considered applicants and protesting the inclusion of applicants who
did not pass the prejudicature examination. The petitioner was
informed by the JBC Executive Officer, through a letter3 dated February
3, 2014, that his protest and reconsideration was duly noted by the JBC
en banc. However, its decision not to include his name in the list of
applicants was upheld due to the JBC's long-standing policy of opening
the chance for promotion to second-level courts to, among others,
incumbent judges who have served in their current position for at least
five years, and since the petitioner has been a judge only for more than
a year, he was excluded from the list. This caused the petitioner to take
recourse to this Court
ISSUE : WON the writ of certiorari and prohibition cannot issue to
prevent the JBC from performing its principal function under the
Constitution to recommend appointees to the Judiciary because the JBC
is not a tribunal exercising judicial or quasi-judicial function
HELD : The remedies of certiorari and prohibition are tenable. "The
present Rules of Court uses two special civil actions for determining and
correcting grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
In this case, it is clear that the JBC does not fall within the scope of a
tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions.
In the process of selecting and screening applicants, the JBC neither
acted in any judicial or quasi-judicial capacity nor assumed unto itself
any performance of judicial or quasi-judicial prerogative. However,
since the formulation of guidelines and criteria, including the policy that
the petitioner now assails, is necessary and incidental to the exercise of
the JBC's constitutional mandate, a determination must be made on
whether the JBC has acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing and enforcing the said policy.
Besides, the Court can appropriately take cognizance of this case by
virtue of the Court's power of supervision over the JBC. Jurisprudence
provides that the power of supervision is the power of oversight, or the
authority to see that subordinate officers perform their duties.
Following this definition, the supervisory authority of the Court over the
JBC is to see to it that the JBC complies with its own rules and
procedures. Thus, when the policies of the JBC are being attacked, then
the Court, through its supervisory authority over the JBC, has the duty
to inquire about the matter and ensure that the JBC complies with its
own rules
The remedy of mandamus cannot be availed of by the petitioner in
assailing JBC's policy. It is essential to the issuance of a writ of
mandamus that the applicant should have a clear legal right to the thing
demanded and it must be the imperative duty of the respondent to
perform the act required. The remedy of mandamus, as an
extraordinary writ, lies only to compel an officer to perform a ministerial
duty, not a discretionary one.14 Clearly, the use of discretion and the
performance of a ministerial act are mutually exclusive. Clearly, to be
included as an applicant to second-level judge is not properly
compellable by mandamus inasmuch as it involves the exercise of sound
discretion by the JBC
The petition for declaratory relief is improper. "An action for declaratory
relief should be filed by a person interested under a deed, a will, a
contract or other written instrument, and whose rights are affected by
a statute, an executive order, a regulation or an ordinance. The relief
sought under this remedy includes the interpretation and
determination of the validity of the written instrument and the judicial
declaration of the parties' rights or duties thereunder."
In this case, the petition for declaratory relief did not involve an
unsound policy. Rather, the petition specifically sought a judicial
declaration that the petitioner has the right to be included in the list of
applicants although he failed to meet JBC's five-year requirement
policy. Again, the Court reiterates that no person possesses a legal right
under the Constitution to be included in the list of nominees for vacant
judicial positions. The opportunity of appointment to judicial office is a
mere privilege, and not a judicially enforceable right that may be
properly claimed by any person
Furthermore, the instant petition must necessarily fail because this
Court does not have original jurisdiction over a petition for declaratory
relief even if only questions of law are involved.18 The special civil
action of declaratory relief falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the
appropriate RTC pursuant to Section 1919 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129,
as amended by R.A.No. 7691
Therefore, by virtue of the Court's supervisory duty over the JBC and in
the exercise of its expanded judicial power, the Court assumes
jurisdiction over the present petition. But in any event, even if the Court it impairs the Court's guaranteed fiscal autonomy and erodes its
will set aside procedural infirmities independence.

A.M. No. 08-2-01-0 : February 11, 2010

RE: PETITION FOR RECOGNITION OF THE EXEMPTION OF THE

GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM FROM PAYMENT OF LEGAL
FEES. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM,Petitioner.

FACTS: The GSIS seeks exemption from the payment of legal fees
imposed on government-owned or controlled corporations under
Section 22, Rule 141 (Legal Fees) of the Rules of Court. The GSIS anchors
its petition on Section 39 of its charter, RAcrala8291 (The GSIS Act of
1997). The GSIS then avers that courts still assess and collect legal fees
in actions and proceedings instituted by the GSIS notwithstanding its
exemption from taxes, assessments, fees, charges, or duties of all kinds
under Section 39. For this reason, the GSIS urges this Court to recognize
its exemption from payment of legal fees.

The GSIS argues that its exemption from the payment of legal fees
would not mean that RA 8291 is superior to the Rules of Court. It would
merely show "deference" by the Court to the legislature as a co-equal
branch. OSG maintains that petition should be denied according to OCA
Circular No. 93-2004. Moreover Section 21, Rule 141 of the Rules of
Court explicitly provides that government owned and controlled
corporations with or without independent charters are not exempt
from paying it (legal fees).

According to OCAT (Office of Chief Atty.) the claim of the GSIS for
exemption from the payment of legal fees has no legal basis. Read in its
proper and full context, Section 39 intends to preserve the actuarial
solvency of GSIS funds by exempting the GSIS from government
impositions through taxes. Legal fees imposed under Rule 141 are not
taxes. Rule 141 (on Legal Fees) of the Rules of Court was promulgated
by this Court in the exercise of its rule-making powers under Section
5(5), Article VIII of the Constitution. The payment of legal fees under
Rule 141 of the Rules of Court is an integral part of the rules
promulgated by this Court pursuant to its rule-making power under
Section 5(5), Article VIII of the Constitution. As one of the safeguards of
this Court's institutional independence, the power to promulgate rules
of pleading, practice and procedure is now the Court's exclusive
domain. That power is no longer shared by this Court with Congress,
much less with the Executive.

ISSUE: Whether legislature may exempt the GSIS from legal fees
imposed by the court on GOCC and LGU’s?

HELD: No. Congress could not have carved out an exemption for the
GSIS from the payment of legal fees without transgressing another
equally important institutional safeguard of the Court's independence
fiscal autonomy. Fiscal autonomy recognizes the power and authority
of the Court to levy, assess and collect fees, including legal fees.
Moreover, legal fees under Rule 141 have two basic components, the
Judiciary Development Fund (JDF) and the Special Allowance for the
Judiciary Fund (SAJF). The laws which established the JDF and the SAJF
expressly declare the identical purpose of these funds to "guarantee the
independence of the Judiciary as mandated by the Constitution and
public policy." Legal fees therefore do not only constitute a vital source
of the Court's financial resources but also comprise an essential element
of the Court's fiscal independence. Any exemption from the payment of
legal fees granted by Congress to government-owned or controlled
corporations and local government units will necessarily reduce the JDF
and the SAJF. Undoubtedly, such situation is constitutionally infirm for