III.

CANCELLATION AND INDEFEASIBILITY OF TITLE

Reference: DAR Administrative Order No. 06, series of 2014

Department of Agrarian Reform

ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO.06
Series of 2014
SUBJECT: RULES AND PROCEDURES AND CANCELLATION OF EMANCIPATION PATENTS
AND CERTIFICATES OF LANDOWNERSHIP AWARD FOR PURPOSES OF CORRECTING
ERRONEOUS TECHNICAL DESCRIPTIONS
SECTION 1. Applicability – These rules shall apply to Landholdings awarded by the Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR) where the technical description provided in the Emancipation Patent (EP) or Certificate of Landownership Award
(CLOA) is erroneous and therefore requires cancellation in order to be corrected. It shall also apply to those EPs or
CLOAs that requires cancellation to be corrected due to erroneous survey returns and those which needs survey
adjustments.
The ordinary rules on the cancellation of EPs or CLOAs, however, shall apply whenever there is an issue pertaining to
the identification of the agrarian reform beneficiary or the correctness of the coverage of the landholding, or any portion
thereof.
Furthermore, these rules shall not apply to the cancellation of EPs or CLOAs that will result to the decrease in the
number, increase in the number, or change of beneficiaries, except for those mentioned in Section 8 hereof.
SECTION 2. Determination and Initiation by the Provincial Agrarian Reform Office- It shall be the task of the
Provincial Agrarian Reform Office to make an initial determination and verification whether or not the technical
description is erroneous. Upon the Office’s determination, it shall draw up a report to be executed by the Provincial
Agrarian Reform Program Officer (PARPO), stating therein:

a. Which portion of the technical description is erroneous;

b. The correct entry; and
c. The basis of the correct entry.

The Office shall attach to the report all pertinent documents that will serve as the basis of the correction of the entry,
such as, but not limited to, approved survey plans certified by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
or the Land Registration Authority.
SECTION 3. Concurrence of the Pertinent Beneficiaries – It is incumbent upon the Provincial Agrarian Reform Office
to explain to the beneficiary/ies named in the erroneous EP or CLOA the error in his/her/their title and the correct entry.
If the beneficiaries have no objection on the said correction, he/she/they shall sign a statement included in the report
that circumstances have been properly explained to them by the DAR and that he/she/they have no objection to eh
correction. If any on the beneficiaries affected refuse to sign, then the proper remedy is to file an ordinary cancellation
case.
If any of the beneficiaries have already died, the concurrence must signed by all his heirs, or such person duly authorized
by all the heirs to sign on their behalf.
SECTION 4. Verificaton by the Regional Director – The report shall be reviewed by the pertinent Regional Office.
Upon verification, the Regional Director shall endorse the said report together with the attached documents to the
Central Office, through the Bureau of Land Tenure and Improvement (BLTI), for the cancellation order of the Secretary.
SECTION 5. Review, Findings, and Recommendation by the Bureau of Land Tenure and Improvement – The
BLTI shall conduct its own review, evaluation, and thorough assessment of the entire report and its attached documents.
Upon verification, it shall prepare the draft cancellation order for the Secretary and indorse the entire records to the
Office of the Undersecretary/Assistant Secretary for Field Operations (UFOO/AFOO).
SECTION 6. Review, Findings, and Recommendation by the Field Operations Office – The UFOO/AFOO shall
conduct its own review, evaluation, and through assessment of the entire records. Upon verification, the
Undersecretary/Assistant Secretary for Field Operations shall endorse the prepared draft cancellation order to the Office
of the Secretary.
SECTION 7. Decision – The DAR Secretary shall render a decision by issuing an Order and furnishing a copy of thereof
by registered mail to the pertinent beneficiaries, the registry of deeds, the Provincial Agrarian Reform Office and the
Regional Office.
SECTION 8. Death or Original Beneficiary – Whenever the beneficiary named in the EP or CLOA to be cancelled is
already dead, the new EP or CLOA to be issued shall be in the name of “The Heirs of [the deceased beneficiary]”. The
issuance of new EPs or CLOAs for the heir shall be governed by the appropriate laws and rules.
SECTION 9. Repealing Clause – All A.O.s inconsistent herewith are hereby repealed, modified, and/or amended
accordingly.
SECTION 10. Separability Clause – Any judicial pronouncement declaring as unconstitutional or invalid any provision
of this A.O. shall have no effect on the validity of the other provisions not affected thereby.
SECTION 11. Effectivity Clause – These Rules take effect ten (10) days after its publication in two (2) newspapers of
general circulation.
Diliman, Quezon City, AUG 01 2014
VIRGILIO R. DE LOS REYES
Publish in two (2) National Newspaper of General Circulations: Secretary
1. Business Word
2. Daily Tribune
Date of Publication – August 04, 2014

A.
This is to certify the Administrative Order No. 06, Series of 2014 entitled
“RULES AND PROCEDURES FOR CANCELLATION OF EMANCIPATION PATENTS AND CERTIFICATES OF
LANDOWNERSHIP AWARD FOR PURPOSES OF CORRECTIONG ERRONEOUS
TECHNICAL DESCRIPTIONS” was published today, Monday, 04 August at Business World and Daily Tribune
newspapers.
Issued this 4th day of August 2014 for whatever purpose it may serve.
ERLINDA M. MANLUCTAO
OIC-Director IV, PAMRS

DAR Administrative Order No. 07, series of 2014

PREFATORY STATEMENT
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657, as amended by R.A. No. 9700, Executive Order (E.O.) No. 229, Presidential Decree
(P.D.) No. 27, E.O. No. 228, R.A. No. 3844, as amended by R.A. No. 6389, and other agrarian laws prescribe the
manner of acquisition, re-distribution, and award of agricultural lands to qualified farmer-beneficiaries with corresponding
rights and obligations. The awards of land to qualified beneficiaries are evidenced by Emancipation Patents (EPs) and
Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs).

The titles generated and distributed pursuant to the agrarian reform program form an integral part of the property
registration system, and enjoy the same degree of importance and weight accorded to titles issued and registered under
the Torrens System.
Section 24 of R.A. No. 6657, as amended, states, ". . . the emancipation patents, the certificates of land ownership
award, and other titles issued under any agrarian reform program shall be indefeasible and imprescriptible after one (1)
year from its registration with the Office of the Registry of Deeds subject to the conditions, limitations and qualifications
of this act, the property registration decree, and other pertinent laws."
Moreover, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) Secretary has the exclusive and original jurisdiction on cases for
cancellation of the aforesaid titles. Section 24 of R.A. No. 6657, as amended, states: "All cases involving the cancellation
of registered emancipation patents, certificates of land ownership award, and other titles issued under any agrarian
reform program are within the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Secretary of the DAR". Considering, however,
that the proximity to the subject landholding of the Adjudicators of the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB), which
previously had jurisdiction to resolve cancellation cases, are closer than that of the Secretary, they are now tasked to
undertake the case build up therefor, but not to resolve them, to ensure that due process is properly accorded to the
parties involved.
This amendatory Administrative Order is accordingly issued to highlight the indefeasibility of the EPs, CLOAs, and other
titles distributed under agrarian reform, emphasize due process in the cancellation proceedings, streamline the
cancellation process before the DAR Secretary, protect the interest of the farmer beneficiaries, and improve the access
to justice of farmers before the DAR.
 ARTICLE I
General Provisions

SECTION 1. Coverage. — These rules of procedure ("Rules") shall apply to all cases involving the involuntary
cancellation of individual registered EPs, CLOAs, and other titles issued by the DAR under any agrarian reform program,
except in the following instances:
(a) Cancellation of EPs, CLOAs, or other titles on the ground of erroneous technical descriptions
that will not, however, result in a decrease in the number, increase in the number, or change of
beneficiaries as enunciated under Administrative Order No. 6, Series of 2014;
Transfer of awarded lands to the heir/s of a deceased beneficiary;
(b) Correction of typographical errors/entries, as the same falls within the jurisdiction of the DARAB, where
correction therein is defined as the process of correcting or changing clerical or typographical errors in the title
without, however, affecting the substantial rights of other interested persons; or
(c) Other analogous circumstances.
SECTION 2. Statement of Policies. — The cancellation of EPs, CLOAs, and other titles issued by the DAR pursuant
to agrarian reform laws shall be governed by the following policies:
(a) The State recognizes the indefeasibility of EPs, CLOAs, and other titles issued under any agrarian reform
program; and
(b) The cancellation of registered EPs, CLOAs, and other titles issued under any agrarian reform program
shall be strictly regulated and may be allowed only in the manner and conditions prescribed hereunder.
SECTION 3. Definition of Terms. — For purposes of these Rules, the following terms are defined as follows:
(a) Agrarian Law Implementation (ALI) Case — is an administrative matter involving disputes
or controversies such as the identification of beneficiaries, exemption from coverage, and the like, in
the implementation of agrarian reform laws which falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the DAR
Secretary or his/her authorized representative and the Regional Director. This shall also include ALI
cases covered by special Administrative Orders (A.O.s) such as, but not limited to, cases for exemption
or exclusion from coverage and conversion.
(b) Agrarian Reform Beneficiary — refers to farmers who were granted lands under P.D. No.
27and R.A. No. 6657, as amended, and regular farmworkers who are landless, irrespective of tenurial
arrangement, who benefited from the redistribution of lands, as evidenced by an EP or a CLOA.
(c) Cancellation — refers to the process of annulling, invalidating, and revoking the EPs,
CLOAs, or other titles issued under the agrarian reform program, including the correction of technical
descriptions where vested rights will be affected, as well as the addition or removal of any beneficiary.
(d) Case Control Number — refers to the number assigned by the clerk of the Provincial
Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) to the petition for cancellation received by it for monitoring
purposes and for the determination of case folders actually transmitted by the PARAD, which number
shall be substantially adopted up to the Office of the Secretary (OSEC) level. The case control number
shall be in a format distinct from ordinary DARAB cases. The docketing of cases per title should also
be adopted in the assignment of case control numbers.
(e) Comment — refers to the verified responsive pleading of the respondent either admitting or denying
the allegations in the petition and setting forth his/her defenses. The respondent may attach affidavit/s or
counter-affidavit/s and other relevant documents to the comment, pre-marked as Exhibits "1", "2", "3", and
so forth.
(f) Common Interest – on the basis of the definition lifted from the Scotts vs. Donald case (165 U.S.
107, 41 Ed. 447, 52 S. Ct. 217), as cited in Sulo ng Bayan vs. Araneta, et al. (G.R. No. L-31061, August
17, 1976), refers to the interest that will allow parties to join in a complaint, petition, or legal action, for
having not only an interest in the question, but one in common in the subject matter of the suit. It is a
community of interest growing out of the nature and condition of the right in dispute; for, although there
may not be any privity between the numerous parties, there is a common title out of which the question
arises, and which lies at the foundation of the proceedings.
(g) Farmer Beneficiaries — refer to Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries (ARBs).
(h) Final Order or Resolution — is an order or resolution that disposes of the subject matter in its entirety
or terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing else to be done but to enforce by execution
what has been determined by the court, quasi-judicial body, or tribunal.
(i) Exclusive Jurisdiction — is the power to adjudicate a case to the exclusion of all other courts and
quasi-judicial bodies. It is that forum in which an action must be commenced because no other forum has
the jurisdiction to hear and determine the action.
(j) Indispensable Party — is a party who has such an interest in the controversy or subject matter that
a final adjudication cannot be made in his absence, without injuring or affecting that interest. Agrarian reform
beneficiaries or identified beneficiaries, or their heirs in case of death, and/or their associations
are indispensable parties in petitions for cancellation of their respective EPs, CLOAs, or other title
issued to them under any agrarian reform program. The fact of non-registration of such associations with
the Securities and Exchange Commission, Cooperative Development Authority, or any other
concerned government agency, shall not be used against them to deny the existence of their legal
standing and interest in a case filed before the DAR.
(k) Investigation Proceeding — is the process of verifying the allegations in the petition and the
comment.
(l) Misuse of the Land — is any act causing substantial and unreasonable damage on the land, and
causing the deterioration and depletion of its soil fertility and improvements thereon.
(m) Necessary Party — is not an indispensable party but ought to be a party if complete relief is to be
accorded as to those already parties, or for a complete determination or settlement of the claim subject
of the action. Except when the concerned Provincial Agrarian Reform Program Officer (PARPO) is himself
the petitioner, in cases for cancellation, the PARPO shall be impleaded as party- respondent where it
would be incumbent upon him/her to defend the propriety of the issuance of the subject title. All oppositors to
the cancellation of an EP or CLOA shall be impleaded as a necessary party.
(n) Neglect or Abandonment — refers to a clear and absolute intention to renounce a right or a claim, or
to abandon a right or property, coupled with an external act by which that intention is expressed or carried
into effect. Intention to abandon implies a departure, with the avowed intent of never returning, resuming,
or claiming the right and the interest that have been abandoned. It consists in any one of these conditions:
(a) failure to cultivate the lot due to reasons other than the non-suitability of the land to agricultural purposes,
for at least two (2) calendar years, and to pay the amortizations for the same period; (b) permanent transfer
of residence by the beneficiary and his family, which has rendered him incapable of cultivating the lot; or
(c) relinquishment of possession of the lot for at least two (2) calendar years and failure to pay the
amortization for the same period.
The failure to cultivate the awarded land due to old age, physical incapacity, and/or other natural causes
shall not be considered as neglect or abandonment.
(o) Nominal Party — refers to the party to an action who is connected to the case, but without any
interest or prejudice, so that the tribunal can resolve certain issues or have all the evidence proved with his help
to give a proper judgment. This nominal party will not be affected by the result of the case and is not at
fault or considered for any benefits out of it. In cases for cancellation, the Register of Deeds (ROD) of the
place where the land covered by EPs, CLOAs, or titles sought to be cancelled is situated must be
impleaded as party-respondent.
(p) Original Jurisdiction — is the power to take cognizance of a case at its inception, try it, and pass
judgment thereon upon the law and facts.
(q) Pauper or Indigent Litigant — is a party who is a farmer, agricultural lessee, tenant, farm worker,
actual tiller, occupant, collective or cooperative of the foregoing beneficiaries, or amortizing owner-
cultivator, and who shall allege in the verified complaint/petition or sworn statement such fact of being an
indigent or pauper litigant without need of further proof.
(r) Petition for Cancellation — is a verified pleading alleging the grounds relied upon by the petitioner
in seeking the cancellation of the subject EPs, CLOAs, or other titles issued under any agrarian reform
program, which shall be duly supported by original or certified true or photocopies of relevant
documents together with affidavits of witnesses, and accordingly pre-marked as Exhibits "A", "B", "C",
and so forth. A
The petition must include as party-respondents the concerned holders or successors-in-interest of EPs,
CLOAs, or other titles issued under any agrarian reform program.
 The filing of joint petitions for cancellation without common interest among the petitioners, identity of
landholdings, and the like, is hereby strictly prohibited.
(s) Premature Conversion — refers to the undertaking of any development activity, the result of which
may modify or alter the physical characteristics of the agricultural land as would render it suitable for
non-agricultural purposes, without an approved conversion order from the DAR, pursuant to Section 11
of R.A. No. 8435.
(t) Re-allocation — refers to the process of substituting the farmer beneficiary on a specific landholding
because the said beneficiary is found to be disqualified in an administrative proceeding. The grounds for re-
allocation include but are not limited to the following: (1) abandonment, (2) waiver of rights to become
a beneficiary, and (3) commission of illegal transactions such as the transfer of rights or ownership
of the awarded land without the written consent and approval of the DAR Regional Director concerned.

ARTICLE II
Grounds for Cancellation
SECTION 4. Grounds. — The following are the grounds for the cancellation of EPs, CLOAs, and other titles issued
under any agrarian reform program:
1. The landholding involves the retention area of the landowner provided that the retention right was
exercised by the latter within the period allowed by the applicable laws or rules from the receipt of the
Notice of Coverage;
2. The landholding is excluded or exempted from coverage of CARP, P.D. No. 27, or any other agrarian
reform laws provided that the application for exclusion thereof was filed within the period allowed by the
applicable laws or rules from receipt of the Notice of Coverage;
3. Defective or irregular Notices of Coverage (NOCs) amounting to lack of notice, due to, among others,
improper service thereof, or erroneous identification of the landowner or landholding;
4. The landholding falls under the exclusive authority of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) or the National Commission on Indigenous People (NCIP);
5. Erroneously-issued titles as a result of:
a. Erroneous technical description of the covered landholding, where:
i. one or more of the affected beneficiaries does not consent to the procedures set forth in
A.O. No. 6, Series of 2014; or
ii. the cancellation of the title will result in a decrease in the number, increase in the
number, or change of beneficiaries;
b. the cancellation of the landowner's title prior to the issuance of the Certificate of Deposit
(COD), in the case of CLOAs;
6. Nullification of DAR Clearance;
7. Misuse or diversion of financial and support services extended to ARBs pursuant to Section 37 of R.A.
No. 6657, as amended;
8. Misuse of the land;
9. Material misrepresentation of the ARB's basic qualifications as provided under Section 22 of R.A.
No. 6657, as amended, P.D. No. 27, and other agrarian laws;
10. Premature conversion by the ARB pursuant to Section 73 (F) of R.A. No. 6657, as amended and
Section 11 of R.A. No. 8435;
11. Sale, transfer, lease, or any other form of conveyance by a beneficiary of the right of ownership, right
to use, or any other usufructuary right over the land acquired by virtue of being a beneficiary, in order to
violate or circumvent the provisions of Sections 27 and 73 of R.A. No. 6657, as amended, P.D. No. 27,
and other agrarian laws;
12. Deliberate and absolute non-payment of three (3) consecutive amortizations in case of voluntary
land transfer/direct payment scheme, provided that the ARB has been installed and is in actual
possession of the land, and provided further that the last proviso will not apply if the non-possession of the
ARB is attributable to his or her own fault;
13. Deliberate and absolute failure of the ARB to pay at least three (3) annual amortizations to the Land
Bank of the Philippines (LBP), provided an amortization table has been issued to the ARB, and provided
further that the amortizations shall start one (1) year from the ARB's actual occupancy pursuant to
Section 26 of R.A. No. 6657, as amended;
14. Willful and deliberate neglect or abandonment of the awarded land as defined by Section 3(n), except in case
of a waiver of said awarded land; or
15. Acts and circumstances analogous to the foregoing.

SECTION 5. Indefeasibility, A Bar to Cancellation Proceedings. — EPs, CLOAs, and other titles issued under any
agrarian reform program shall be indefeasible and imprescriptible after one (1) year from its registration with the Office
of the Register of Deeds (ROD). Accordingly, the filing of any action for the cancellation of EPs, CLOAs, and titles after
the lapse of the said one (1) year period, except for cases involving Sections 4.3 to 4.15 of these Rules, is a ground for
the dismissal of the case. The said one (1) year period, however, shall be interrupted upon the filing of any:
1. ALI case, with a prayer for the cancellation of the title, involving only the grounds mentioned in Sections
4.1 to 4.2, with the Regional Director or the DAR Secretary;
2. other case with any court, office, or tribunal other than the Regional Director or the DAR Secretary,
where the latter two has no jurisdiction, involving the grounds mentioned in Sections 4.1 to 4.2, or other
cases of cancellation filed by ARBs in these tribunals.
This period shall likewise be deemed interrupted with respect to all pending ALI cases involving the grounds
mentioned in Sections 4.1 to 4.2 at the time these Rules take into effect.
Nothing in this provision may be used to unduly delay the ripening of the indefeasibility of a title.
SECTION 6. ALI Cases Covering the Grounds Mentioned in Section 4. — All ALI cases pending with the Office of
the Regional Director of the DAR as of the date of effectivity of A.O. No. 6, Series of 2011, involving any of the grounds
mentioned in Section 4 of Article II, insofar as there are already registered EPs or CLOAs covering the subject
landholding, shall be dismissed with instructions to file a verified Petition for Cancellation in accordance with this A.O.

ARTICLE III
Procedure
SECTION 7. Initiation of a Cancellation Case. — A cancellation case shall be initiated by the filing of a verified
Petition for Cancellation and the payment of the filing fee, if necessary.
The verified Petition shall be filed with the Office of the PARAD who has jurisdiction over the place where the land
covered by the EPs, CLOAs, or other titles sought to be cancelled is located.
The Disclosure Statement stated in Section 8 of this A.O. must be attached to the verified Petition.
After filing the Petition, the petitioner shall cause the production of a billboard, preferably made of any visible,
waterproof, environmentally-friendly, and sturdy material, measuring 60.96 by 91.44 centimeters (2 x 3 feet),
containing the following:

"To all concerned,

[Original/Transfer] Certificate of Title No. CLOA- ___________registered in the name of
_________________ will be the subject of a cancellation proceeding with the Department of Agrarian
Reform.
The above-mentioned farmer-beneficiary and all other respondents are required to submit their verified
comments with the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator located at _____________.
Petitioner”
and install the same at a conspicuous location along the premises of the landholding within three (3) days from his
filing of his verified petition. He shall thereafter take at least three (3) photographs of the same notice and submit them
to the PARAD no later than five (5) days from the filing of his verified petition. The petitioner may seek the assistance
of the DAR in case there is probable cause to believe that the installation of the billboard will be confronted with
violence.
The documentary and evidentiary requirements mandated by the appropriate administrative orders governing the ALI
component of the cancellation case must also be attached to the verified Petition. It is the responsibility of the party
initiating the cancellation case to ensure that the evidence to satisfy the grounds stated in Section 4 of this
Administrative Order are submitted. The initiating party and the respondents are hereby warned that the grounds and
the evidence necessary are provided for in administrative orders other than this Administrative Order. In the event any
of these requirements are lacking, the PARAD shall issue an Interlocutory Order requiring the petitioner to submit
them. The failure of the PARAD to issue such Interlocutory Order, or the failure of the petitioner to receive the same,
shall not prevent the dismissal of the cancellation case on the ground that the petitioner failed to prove his/her/its
cause of action.
Finally, in case the EP/CLOA is being sought to be cancelled based on allegations that the landholding involves the
retention area of the landowner or is excluded/exempted from CARP coverage, or that there is a defect or irregularity
in the Notice of Coverage, the petitioner must submit a certification from the LBP that he has yet to withdraw any of
the deposited just compensation. Failure to submit the said certification is a ground for the dismissal of the petition.
At least five (5) copies of the petition must be prepared and filed with the PARAD. If there is more than one (1)
respondent, more copies should be prepared and filed by the petitioner in order to provide all of them with a copy.
In case of joint petitions without common interest, the PARAD shall issue an interlocutory order directing the
petitioner/s to file separate petitions for cancellation and pay the corresponding filing fees. If the petitioner/s fail/s to
comply within the period given in the interlocutory order, the PARAD shall immediately transmit the complete records
of the case to the OSEC, through the BALA, for proper disposition.
SECTION 8. Disclosure Statement. — The petitioner shall disclose and certify under oath, in the petition or its
integral annex, that:
(a) He is a party-in-interest or properly authorized by a party-in-interest;

(b) He has not commenced and/or is aware of any other action or proceeding involving the same land,
or a portion thereof, or issue in any court, tribunal, or quasi-judicial agency; and to the best of his
knowledge, no such action or proceeding is pending in any court, tribunal, or quasi-judicial agency;

(c) If there is any action or proceeding which is either pending or may have been terminated, he
shall state the status thereof; and

(d) If he thereafter learns that a similar action or proceeding has been filed or is pending before
any court, tribunal, or quasi-judicial agency, he undertakes to report that fact within five (5) days therefrom
to the DAR Office where the case for cancellation is pending.

The failure to file the required disclosure statement, and/or the commission of acts constituting forum shopping, shall
be a ground for dismissal of the cancellation case without prejudice.

SECTION 9. Who May File a Petition for Cancellation. — The verified petition for cancellation may be filed by any
party in interest with respect to the title of the land, such as, but not limited to, the following:

(a) The person granted or applying for retention;

(b) The person whose land was declared exempted or excluded from the coverage of R.A. No. 6657, as
amended, or of P.D. No. 27, or who is applying for such exemption or exclusion thereunder;

(c) The person whose landholding was covered under R.A. No. 6657 or P.D. No. 27 despite the
existence of a valid final and executory Conversion Order;

(d) Qualified farmer-beneficiaries who have been determined as legally entitled to the generated and
issued CLOA, or persons applying for inclusion as a farmer- beneficiary;

(e) Re-allocatees of the awarded land, or persons applying for reallocation,

(f) Actual tillers or occupants of the subject land who could have otherwise qualified as ARB pursuant
to applicable laws and rules, and who have been on the land prior to or at the time of coverage; or
 (g) Provincial Agrarian Reform Program Officers (PARPOs) or the Regional Directors (RDs) with
respect to those cases involving any of the grounds under Sections 4.3 to 4.15 or pursuant to a lawful
Order.

If any of the aforementioned persons file the petition for cancellation through a representative, said representative
must be able to present a duly executed Special Power of Attorney or, in case of juridical persons, a Board
Resolution, specifically authorizing him or her to file the cancellation case. If necessary, said authority must likewise
state that the representative is authorized to enter into an amicable settlement, and to enter into stipulations or
admissions of facts and of documents.

SECTION 10. Filing Fee. — A filing fee of Three Thousand Pesos (Php3,000.00) shall be paid for every
petition, regardless of the number of titles involved therein, by the petitioner to the nearest DAR Provincial Office
Cashier within the same region where the subject landholding is located, except if the petitioner is the government or
any of its officials or employees in the exercise of its or their official function or in case the petitioner is an indigent
litigant, in which case the payment of the filing fee shall be waived.

In case of joint petitions without common interest, the PARAD shall issue an interlocutory order directing the
petitioner/s to file separate petitions for cancellation and pay the corresponding filing fees.

SECTION 11. Cancellation with Final Judgment in an ALI Case. — In the event that there is already a prior and
final determination of an ALI case by the court, office, or tribunal having jurisdiction involving any of the grounds
mentioned in Section 4 of Article II, the petitioner may file an action for cancellation in accordance with these Rules by
filing a petition together with the following duly marked documents:

1. Original or certified true copy of the final and executory Order or Resolution of the DAR Regional
Director, DAR Secretary, or the court;

2. Certified true copy of the Certificate of Finality, Order of Finality, or Entry of Judgment;

3. Certified true copy of the EPs, CLOAs, or any other titles sought to be cancelled;

4. Official Receipt issued for the payment of the corresponding filing fee, unless the petitioner is an
indigent litigant; and

5. Any other relevant documents that may support the petition for cancellation.

In the event that any of these requirements are lacking, the PARAD shall issue an Interlocutory Order requiring the
petitioner to submit them; in the event of non-compliance therewith, the PARAD shall issue another Interlocutory
Order to ensure the submission of complete documentary requirements.

In case the petitioner still fails to comply therewith within the prescribed period despite receipt of the second
Interlocutory Order, the PARAD shall immediately transmit the records of the case to the OSEC, through BALA,
provided that the date of transmittal shall not exceed a period of six (6) months from the date of filing of the petition for
cancellation. The transmittal letter shall state such non-compliance of the petitioner.

SECTION 12. Assignment of Case Control Number. — Within the same day of receipt of the verified petition
and, if applicable, proof of payment of the filing fee, the clerk of the PARAD shall assign a Case Control Number for
monitoring purposes.
The assignment of case control numbers shall be based on the number of titles involved in the petition, in accordance
with Article I, Section 3 (d) hereof.

SECTION 13. Issuance of Notice. — The PARAD shall retain two (2) copies of the petition, with the rest to be
served upon the respondents, ROD, and PARPO concerned. The EP or CLOA holder must be deemed a respondent.

The PARAD shall, within five (5) days from receipt of the verified petitions and full payment of the filing fee, issue a
Notice to Comment, attaching thereto a copy of the petition and supporting documents, if any, pre-marked as exhibits
"A", "B", "C", and so forth.

The aforesaid Notice shall direct the respondent(s) and concerned ROD to file a verified Comment to the petition,
attaching thereto duly marked documentary evidence marked as exhibits "1", "2", "3" and so forth within a non-
extendible period of fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof, furnishing a copy to the petitioner. The same Notice shall
inform the party that the ALI component of the cancellation case may be governed by other A.O.s and he/she is
therefore advised to review the said A.O.s. The recommended form of said Notice is attached hereto as Form 2.
HSIDTE

SECTION 14. Service of Notice. — The PARAD shall immediately instruct his Sheriff to serve the Notice to
Comment, together with the petition and marked exhibits, to the respondent(s) and concerned ROD. The PARAD may
request the PARPO to designate any personnel from the DAR Provincial Agrarian Reform Office to assist the Sheriff
in the service of notices. In case one or all of the respondents reside in other provinces, the PARAD may coordinate
with the PARPO of the said place to assist the Sheriff in serving the Notices to Comment.

Service of the Notice to Comment shall be made to the respondents through the following persons:

(1) Service upon the respondent who is a natural person — The Notice shall be served to the
respondent;

(2) Service upon co-owners of collective CLOAs — In case the CLOA-holder of the landholding are
multiple persons as co-owners, the Notice shall be served upon each and every registered co-owner,
unless one is specifically authorized, in a written public document, to receive for the co-owners;

(3) Service upon minors — When the respondent is a minor, service shall be made upon him/her
personally and to his/her father and/or mother, whoever has lawful custody of the said minor. If the
respondent has no parents, service shall be made upon him/her personally and to his/her legal guardian
if he/she has one, or, if none, upon his/her relative having custody on his/her person;

(4) Service upon incompetents — When the respondent is insane or otherwise incompetent, service shall
be made to his/her spouse, or his/her parents, whoever has lawful custody of the said incompetent. If
the respondent has no parents, service shall be made upon his/her legal guardian if he/she has one,
or, if none, upon his/her relative having custody on his/her person;

(5) Service upon entity without juridical personality — When the respondents who are persons
associated through an entity without juridical personality are issued a Notice under the name by which
they are generally or commonly known, service may be effected upon all the respondents by serving
upon any one of them, or upon the person in charge of the office or place of business maintained in
such name, provided that service shall not individually bind any person whose connection with the
entity has, upon due notice, been severed before the proceeding was brought;
 (6) Service upon domestic private juridical entity — When the respondent is a corporation, partnership,
or association organized under the laws of the Philippines with a juridical personality, service may be
made on the president, managing partner, general manager, corporate secretary, treasurer, or in-
house counsel; and

(7) Service upon the Estate of a deceased respondent — When the respondent is an Estate of a
deceased person, the Notice shall be served to:
1. the Executor or Administrator of the Estate if the settlement of the same is currently
pending with the court,; or

2. all known heirs if the Estate is not pending with the court or if there is no executor or
administrator, which Notice shall also be published.

The Notice to Comment shall be served personally. If the person authorized to receive cannot be found at the date of
service, it shall be, on the same day, served personally to any person of suitable age and discretion who is residing at
the residence of the Respondent, or with some competent person in charge at the place of business of the
Respondent. In the case of juridical entities, the substituted service of said Notice shall be made to a competent
person in charge of the office of those mentioned in Section 14 (6) hereof.

If the respondent cannot be personally served with the Notice to Comment, service may also be effected by
publication, the Notice following the form stated in Annex "A" of this A.O. In case the Sheriff effects the service by
publication, he must submit a report to the PARAD explaining in detail the efforts he has made to personally serve the
said Notice. The published Notice shall include instructions on how the Respondent may get a copy of the verified
Petition from the PARAD. The expenses for the publication of the Notice to Comment shall be borne by the petitioner,
unless the latter is a pauper or indigent litigant.

The Sheriff or any personnel of the DAR that may be authorized by the Sheriff shall post on the bulletin board of the
Barangay Hall where the land covered by the EP, CLOA, or other title of the land sought to be cancelled is located, a
72.39 by 57.15 centimeters (28.5 x 22.5 inches) notice stating the following both in English and in the local dialect:

"To all concerned,

[Original/Transfer] Certificate of Title No. CLOA-____________ registered in the name of ______________ is
currently the subject of a cancellation proceeding with the Department of Agrarian Reform with case number
___________.
The above-mentioned farmer-beneficiary and all other respondents _______________ are required to submit
their verified comments on or before _________________ with the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator
located at _______________________.
Removal of this notice is punishable by law.
_________________
PARAD of ________"

The Sheriff shall request from the Punong Barangay, Barangay Secretary, or Barangay Treasurer, a certificate of
posting, containing, among others, the date when the notice was posted at the bulletin board. The Sheriff shall collect
the said certification and take photographs of the posted notice and submit them to the PARAD.
The Sheriff shall submit a report to the PARAD on the mode of service used for said Notice, and the fact of transmittal
of the notice to the Barangay Secretary concerned.

SECTION 15. Time to Comment. — The respondent has fifteen (15) days from receipt of the aforesaid Notice
to file or submit his or her verified Comment to the PARAD. For those respondents who did not receive the Notice to
Comment personally, the date of publication or the posting at the bulletin board, whichever is later, shall be deemed
the date of receipt of the same. The failure to submit the Comment shall be deemed a general denial of the material
allegations of the petition.

SECTION 16. Information About the Parties or their Counsel. — The counsel of the Parties, or, if none, the
Parties themselves, must indicate in their verified petition or their comment, whichever is applicable, their name,
address, electronic mail address, telephone numbers, and fax numbers.

SECTION 17. Case Folder Build-Up. — The clerk of the PARAD is tasked with the preparation of a complete Case
Folder, which must contain the following:

(a) Official Receipt as proof of payment, except those exempted from payment of filing fees under
Section 10 of these Rules;

(b) Verified Petition with Disclosure Statement;

(c) Verified Comment;

(d) Valid authorization by a person allowed by Section 9 of these Rules to file a cancellation case,
in case the person filing is acting on behalf of the said person;

(e) Notices, and proof of service and receipt of said notices;

(f) Owner's duplicate copy or certified photocopy of EPs, CLOAs, or other titles;

(g) Memorandum;

(h) Marked documentary exhibits;

(i) Either:
a. Documentary requirements of A.O.s governing the ALI component of the case; or
b. If the case is filed in accordance with Section 11 hereof:
i. Original or certified true or photocopy of final and executory orders and resolutions; and
ii. Original or certified true or photocopy of Certificate of Finality; and STECA
(j) Other pertinent documents.

SECTION 18. Preliminary Hearing. – The PARAD shall set the date for the Preliminary Hearing, which must be set
not later than twenty (20) days from receipt of the Comments (or from the last day to submit the Comments). The
PARAD shall issue Notices of Preliminary Hearing stating the date thereof and the address of the PARAD’s office not
later than three (3) days from the setting of the schedule which must not be later than five (5) days from receipt of the
Comments. Notices of Preliminary Hearing shall be sent personally to all the parties.
The following shall be conducted during the Preliminary Hearing:

1. Simplification and joinder of issues;

2. Advise by the PARAD to the parties of all the documents and other evidence required by this A.O., other
pertinent A.O.s, and those otherwise necessary for the proper resolution of the issues that have yet to be
submitted, and requiring them to submit these; and

3. Notification by the PARAD to all the parties of the date of the On-Site Inspection (if necessary) as well as the
schedule of the Clarificatory Hearing.

The failure of the PARAD to state which documents are lacking shall not be an excuse for the said party, who has the
primary responsibility to submit all necessary documents, to submit all documents necessary to support his or her
claim or defense.

SECTION 19. On-Site Inspection. – Except in cases where the petition for cancellation was filed on the basis of a
final and executory Order in an ALI case, the PARAD may conduct an on-site inspection (OSI), but only if absolutely
necessary. The PARAD shall use video recordings during the OSI, together with an affidavit of authentication from the
person recording the video, both of which shall form part of the OSI Report. If an OSI is conducted, said PARAD shall
issue a Report thereon and it shall form part of the records of the case.
The OSI shall be set not later than twenty (20) days from the Preliminary Hearing, and the parties shall be notified of
such date during the Preliminary Hearing. Notices of the schedule of the OSI shall also be sent by the PARAD to the
parties concerned, which should be received by the latter prior to the actual date thereof.

In conducting the OSI, the PARAD may request for assistance from the Office of the RD or PARPO, as the case may
be, which assistance shall not be unreasonably withheld.
SECTION 20. Clarificatory Hearing and Submission of Position Paper. – After a thorough review of all evidence
presented, and after the conduct of the OSI, the PARAD shall schedule a Clarificatory Hearing to be attended by the
parties and/or their counsel or representative.
During the Clarificatory Hearing, the PARAD shall propound questions on matters and issues arising from the OSI and
the evidence submitted. The proceedings shall be properly recorded by a stenographer. The transcript of
stenographic notes (TSN) during the hearing shall form part of the records of the case. Any person answering
questions during the Clarificatory Hearing shall be under oath.
The Clarificatory Hearing shall be set not later than twenty (20) days from the conduct of the OSI or, if no OSI
conducted, from the date of the Preliminary Hearing. The parties shall be notified of such date during the Preliminary
Hearing. Notices of the schedule of the Clarificatory Hearing shall also be sent by the PARAD to all the parties, which
should be received by them prior to the actual date thereof.
Within five (5) days from the termination of the Clarificatory Hearing, the PARAD shall issue an Order directing the
petitioner, the private respondent/s, and PARPO to file their respective Position Papers within ten (10) days from
receipt thereof.
SECTION 21. Report of the PARAD. – The PARAD shall issue a report on the ALI component of the cancellation
case no later than thirty (30) days from the conduct of the Clarificatory Hearing and upon the lapse of the period to file
Position Papers.
Findings of facts in the recommendation must be based on the evidence presented, whether testimonial,
documentary, or object. Such basis must be mentioned in the report, stating therein the page number in the case
records where such evidence may be found. The report shall form part of the case records.
SECTION 22. Absence of a PARAD. — In the event there is a vacancy in the Office of the PARAD concerned, and
no radiating Adjudicator has yet been designated, then the functions of the PARAD in Sections 3 (d), 7, 10, 11, 12, 13,
14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, and 23 hereof shall be assumed by the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (RARAD) of
the place where the land covered by the EPs, CLOAs, or other titles sought to be cancelled is located.

SECTION 23. Transmittal of Case Folder to the BALA. — Upon completion of the Case Folder, the clerk of the
PARAD shall cause the arranging of each document therein in chronological order according to date of receipt, and
affix his or her initial on each and every page. When for special reasons a particular document in the records requires
that it be free from any form of marking, the affixing of initials shall be made only upon photocopies thereof, with the
originals placed in a separate envelope while said photocopies shall form part of the case folder.

The PARAD shall prepare a Transmittal Letter, copy furnished all the parties, accompanying the Case Folder,
particularly stating therein the parties involved, the number and description of the contents of the Case Folder, and the
number of pages contained therein. Thereafter, the PARAD shall, within ten (10) days from the completion of the Case
Folder, forward the same to BALA.
The PARAD shall keep for his file one Case Folder containing photocopies of the contents of the original Case Folder.

SECTION 24. Pagination and Indexing of Case Folders. — Upon receipt of the Case Folder, the BALA shall
substantially adopt the Case Control Number previously assigned therefor. For this purpose, the BALA shall maintain
a Docket Book containing the docket numbers assigned for each case, the details of the petition, and the date the
Case Folder was received.

The BALA shall cause the arranging of each document therein in chronological order according to date of receipt, and
inscribe a page number on and initial each and every page. When for special reasons a particular document in the
records requires that it be free from any form of marking, the pagination and affixing of initials shall be made only upon
photocopies thereof, with the originals placed in a separate envelope while said photocopies shall form part of the
case folder. It shall also prepare a table of contents, which shall be placed immediately after the Endorsement by the
BALA of the Case Folder.

SECTION 25. Review, Findings, and Recommendation by the BALA. — The BALA shall conduct a review,
evaluation, and thorough assessment of the entire case records. Thereafter, the BALA shall prepare its findings and
recommendation and transmit the same to the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Legal Affairs (ASEC-LAO).

SECTION 26. Review, Findings, and Recommendation by the ASEC-LAO. — The ASEC-LAO shall conduct its
own review, evaluation, and thorough assessment of the entire case records. Thereafter, the ASEC-LAO shall prepare
its findings and recommendation and submit the same to the USEC-LAO.

SECTION 27. Review, Findings, and Recommendation by Office of the Undersecretary for Legal Affairs
(USEC-LAO).- The USEC-LAO shall conduct its own review, evaluation, and thorough assessment of the entire case
records. Thereafter, the USEC-LAO shall prepare its findings and recommendations.

SECTION 28. Conduct of Clarificatory Hearing. — The DAR Undersecretary for Legal Affairs, when he deems it
necessary or upon the recommendation of the Assistant Secretary for Legal Affairs, may conduct a hearing for
clarification, issue interlocutory orders, and require submission of additional evidence. He may authorize the Legal
Division Chief of the Provincial or Regional Office or the PARAD or RARAD concerned, to conduct such hearings, if
the Undersecretary deems it necessary. For this purpose, the official record of the proceedings conducted shall be
kept and form part of the case folder.
SECTION 29. Transmittal of Case Folder with Findings and Recommendation to the DAR Secretary. — The
USEC-LAO shall, within five (5) days from the completion of its aforesaid recommendation, transmit the same,
together with the Case Folder, to the DAR Secretary. The date of such transmittal shall be considered the date when
the case is deemed submitted for resolution. Such date shall be indicated in the Department's case monitoring
system.

SECTION 30. Decision. — The DAR Secretary shall render a Decision by issuing an Order and furnishing a copy
thereof by registered mail and, if available, electronic mail, to the parties' counsel or representatives, as well as the
parties themselves and the DAR officials who took part in the proceedings. The soft copy of the Order transmitted to
the parties by electronic mail shall merely serve as advance notice thereof, as the actual date of receipt of the hard
copy sent by registered mail shall be the basis for the determination of the period to file either a motion for
reconsideration or an appeal.

In case a copy of the Order sent by registered mail is unclaimed and is returned to the DAR Secretary, the caption and
the dispositive portion thereof shall be published in a newspaper of general circulation. The date of the publication
shall be deemed as the time the Order is received by the party who failed to receive it by registered mail.

When the cancellation of a CLOA is based on Section 4 (5) (b) hereof, and there is no finding that the COD should not
be issued, the DAR Secretary shall not issue the Order until a COD has been issued. A certified true copy of the COD
must be attached to the Order of the DAR Secretary, especially the copies of the Order that shall be furnished to the
parties.

ARTICLE IV
Disqualification of the Secretary
From Deciding the Case

SECTION 31. Disqualification of the Secretary to decide the Cancellation Case. — In cancellation cases
other than those falling under Section 11 of this A.O., where in the Secretary's sound discretion, there are just and
valid grounds to believe he might be induced to act in favor of one party or with bias or prejudice against a party
arising out of circumstances reasonably capable of inciting such a state of mind, he must recuse from deciding the ALI
component of the case by putting such fact and reason into writing and incorporating it in the case folder.

Thereafter, the Secretary shall inform the Office of the President (OP) of the reasons of his recusal and shall request
for the OP to designate one of DAR’s Undersecretaries to resolve the case. This is pursuant to Department of Justice
(DOJ) Opinion dated 15 May 2013 (Office Document Number LML-L-15E13-609).

ARTICLE V
Prohibited Motions

SECTION 32. Prohibited Motions. — The following motions shall not be allowed:
 (a) Motion to declare respondent in default or for default judgment;

(b) All motions filed before the Comment;

(c) Motion for extension of time to file an appeal, a motion for reconsideration, or a memorandum; and

(d) Second motion for reconsideration.

In case any party files any of the prohibited motions, the PARAD or RARAD, BALA, Assistant Secretary for Legal
Affairs, Undersecretary for Legal Affairs, or the Secretary, as the case may be depending on who or which office has
the Case Folder, shall accept the written motion and include it in the Case Folder, but shall not act upon the matter.

ARTICLE VI
Grounds for Dismissal

SECTION 33. Dismissal of Petition. — The petition for cancellation may be denied by the DAR Secretary on the
following grounds:

1. If, in an action for cancellation falling under Section 11 of Article III, the petitioner failed
to submit any of the following documents:

(a) Original, certified true, or photocopies of the final and executory Order and Resolution of
the DAR Regional Director, DAR Secretary, or the courts;

(b) Certificate of Finality;

(c) Original owner's duplicate or certified true copy of the EPs, CLOAs, or any other titles
sought to be cancelled;

(d) Official Receipt issued for the payment of the corresponding filing fee, unless the
petitioner is exempt under Section 10 of Article III of these Rules; and

(e) Any other relevant documents that may support the petition for cancellation;

2. Failure to pay filing fee;

3. Failure to comply with Section 8 of Article III of these Rules on Disclosure Statement;

4. Failure to submit the documentary requirements mandated by other A.O.s governing the ALI
component of the case;
 5. Failure to comply with the Order to implead the PARO, ROD, and/or other indispensable parties;

6. When the petition for cancellation was filed after the one (1) year period as provided under Article III,
Section 5 of these Rules, save those instances covered by Article II, Sections 4.3 to 4.15 hereof; or

7. Failure to prove a cause of action or for lack of merit.

ARTICLE VII
Direct Order of Cancellation

SECTION 34. Direct Cancellation. — The procedures in Articles III, IV, and V notwithstanding, the Secretary may, in
the exercise of his original or appellate jurisdiction, order the cancellation of an EP, CLOA, or any other title issued
under any agrarian reform program, provided that all of the following conditions are present:

1. The decision of the Secretary in the exercise of his original or appellate jurisdiction may result in
the cancellation of the EP, CLOA, or other title issued under any agrarian reform program; and

2. The holder of the EP, CLOA, or other title is given the right to be heard through the procedures set
by Section 35 of this A.O.

SECTION 35. Order to Comment. — To ensure that due process is afforded to the holder of the EP, CLOA, or other
title issued under the agrarian reform program that may be cancelled, if the Secretary, pending resolution of the
pending case determines that: AEIHC
S
1. A possible decision of the Secretary in the pending case may result in the cancellation of the EP,
CLOA, or other title issued under any agrarian reform program; and

2. the holder of the EP, CLOA, or other title is a party to the appealed ALI case, he shall
issue an Interlocutory Order directing the PARAD to:

a. inform the holder of the EP, CLOA, or other title, through a Notice that shall be served in
the same manner as the service of a Notice to Comment provided in Section 14 of this A.O.,
that the pending ALI case is being considered by the OSEC as a cancellation case, and
direct him/her to submit to the OSEC, with a copy furnished to the opposing party, within
thirty (30) days from receipt thereof, a Comment on the issue of the ALI case and the possibility of
the cancellation of the his/her awarded title as a consequence of an adverse decision in the case;
and

b. post Notices in the landholding and on the bulletin board of the Barangay Hall that the
subject landholding is a subject of a cancellation case.
The opposing party may file a Reply to the Comment within fifteen (15) days from his receipt thereof without the need
of an Order from the OSEC.

ARTICLE VIII
Motion for Reconsideration

SECTION 36. Motion for Reconsideration. — A party may file only one (1) Motion for Reconsideration of the Order
of the DAR Secretary to cancel the EP, CLOA, or other title issued under any agrarian reform program, within a period
of fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof, furnishing a copy of the motion to all other parties' counsel or representative.
The filing of the Motion for Reconsideration shall interrupt the running of the reglementary period within which to file a
notice of appeal.

SECTION 37. Comment on Motion for Reconsideration. — The adverse party may file a Comment on the Motion
for Reconsideration within a non-extendible period of ten (10) days from receipt thereof. No Order from the DAR
Secretary is necessary for a party to file a Comment.

SECTION 38. Resolution of the Motion for Reconsideration. — The DAR Secretary shall resolve the Motion for
Reconsideration by issuing an Order/Resolution in due course, furnishing a copy thereof by registered mail and, if
available, electronic mail, to the parties' counsel or representative as well as the parties themselves and the DAR
officials who took part in the proceedings. The soft copy of the Order transmitted to the parties by electronic mail shall
merely serve as advance notice thereof, as the actual date of receipt of the hard copy sent by registered mail shall be
the basis for the determination of the period to file an appeal.

In case a copy of the Order sent by registered mail is unclaimed and is returned to the DAR Secretary, the caption and
the dispositive portion thereof shall be published in a newspaper of general circulation. The date of the publication
shall be deemed as the time the Order is received by the party who failed to receive it by registered mail.

ARTICLE IX
Appeal

SECTION 39. Appeal of the Decision of the DAR Secretary. — The Order or Resolution of the DAR Secretary may
be appealed to the Office of the President, in accordance with the rules and procedures set forth by the latter.
ARTICLE X
Finality

SECTION 40. Finality. — The Order or Resolution of the DAR Secretary shall become final and executory upon the
expiration of the period to appeal therefrom if no appeal has been duly perfected.
SECTION 41. Certificate of Finality. — The BALA shall issue a Certificate of Finality upon any party's formal
request and presentation of a certification from the Office of the President and the Court of Appeals that no appeal has
been filed before the period to appeal expired.

ARTICLE XI
Execution

SECTION 42. Execution. — If the Order or Resolution of the DAR Secretary becomes final and executory in
accordance with Article X hereof, the BALA, on motion or motu proprio, shall issue a Writ of Implementation directing
the PARPO to implement the final and executory decision of the Secretary.

If an appeal has been duly perfected and finally resolved, the execution may forthwith be applied by filing a Motion for
the Issuance of a Writ of Implementation with the BALA within five (5) years from the date of entry of the final decision.

After the lapse of the five (5) year reglementary period, a party may file an action for the revival of the judgment of the
Cancellation case with the Office of the Secretary at any time prior to it being barred by the statute of limitations.

The Writ of Implementation shall direct the concerned Registry of Deeds to cancel the EP, CLOA, or other title issued
pursuant to any agrarian reform program. The PARPO concerned shall effect the necessary actions in order to
implement the DAR Secretary's Order.

SECTION 43. Writ of Possession and Writ of Demolition. — After the issuance of the Writ of Implementation, the
BALA, on motion, after hearing and after giving the respondent reasonable time to vacate, may issue a Writ of
Possession and/or a Writ of Demolition directing the PARPO, with the assistance with the Sheriff of the concerned
PARAD, to demolition and improvements on the subject landholding, if necessary, and to install the rightful title-holder
of the subject landholding.

SECTION 44. Enforcement of Partial Cancellation. — Whenever the Order of cancellation pertains only to a portion
of an awarded land, the Writ of Implementation shall direct the:

1. PARPO concerned to issue a new EP or CLOA covering the area not cancelled or in the name of
the ARBs whose right to the said award are not terminated by the cancellation Order; and

2. Register of Deeds concerned to cancel the entire affected EP or CLOA and to register that issued
by the PARO.

ARTICLE XII
Provisional Relief

SECTION 45. Temporary Restraining Order. — In cases where any party may immediately suffer grave or
irreparable damage, or where the performance or continuance of certain acts will render the case moot and academic,
or where there is a need to maintain peace and order and prevent injury or loss of life or property, the said party may
request for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), either as a prayer in the Petition for Cancellation or
through motion, before the PARAD or RARAD.

Upon receipt of the Petition for Cancellation with a prayer for the issuance of a TRO, or of the motion for issuance of
TRO, the PARAD or RARAD shall transmit a copy of the said petition or motion with supporting documents (i.e.,
Affidavit of Merit and other supporting documents) to the OSEC. In case it is established on the basis of the
allegations in the petition or motion that any of the grounds for the issuance of a TRO exist, the Secretary shall issue
the TRO, and the same shall be effective for three (3) days from issuance thereof. The OSEC shall furnish the PARAD
or RARAD a copy of the Order granting or denying the request for a TRO.

The PARAD or RARAD, whenever the Petition for Cancellation filed before his or her office contains a prayer for such
TRO or a CDO pursuant to Section 44 below, shall nevertheless continue and proceed with the case build up
procedures prescribed by these rules.

In the event there is an additional prayer for the issuance of a CDO, the PARAD or RARAD shall forward the copy of
the petition or motion with supporting documents and his recommendation to the OSEC or USEC-LAO, through BALA,
for proper disposition pursuant to Section 44 of this A.O.

SECTION 46. Cease and Desist Order. — At any time prior to either the finality of the Order of the Secretary or the
perfection of an appeal, in cases where any party may suffer grave or irreparable damage, or where the performance
or continuance of certain acts will render the case moot and academic, or where there is a need to maintain peace
and order and prevent injury or loss of life or property, the Secretary or the Undersecretary for Legal Affairs may, at
the instance of any party, issue a Cease and Desist Order (CDO) to prevent grave and irreparable damage while
awaiting resolution of the case.

SECTION 47. Failure to Comply, Ground for Contempt. — The failure of any person to comply with the TRO or
CDO is a ground for Indirect Contempt.

ARTICLE XIII
Powers of the Secretary

SECTION 48. Powers of the Secretary. — The DAR Secretary, the Undersecretary for Legal Affairs, the Assistant
Secretary, the BALA Director, and the PARADs/RARADs shall have the power to summon witnesses, administer
oaths, take testimonies, require submission of reports, compel the production of books and documents and answers to
interrogatories, issue subpoena duces tecum and ad testificandum, and issue other writs and processes necessary for
the resolution of the petition.

These may be enforced under pain of indirect contempt which may be filed at the proper court.

ARTICLE XIV
Final Provisions
SECTION 49. Case Records are Public Documents. — Subject to the provisions of pertinent laws and guidelines on
confidentiality and transparency, including Memorandum Circular No. 7, Series of 2011, the records of a cancellation
case are public documents. However, confidential information as provided for by the Department's rules and related
laws shall not be disclosed.

SECTION 50. Suspension of Rules. — The DAR Secretary may suspend the application of these Rules in order to
serve and protect the interest of justice.

SECTION 51. Transitory Provisions. — The provisions of this A.O. shall be applicable to all cancellation
cases filed on or after its effectivity.

The above paragraph notwithstanding, the PARAD is hereby directed to proceed with the investigation of the ALI
component pursuant to this A.O. if the case folder is pending with them at the time of the effectivity of these rules.

SECTION 52. Repealing Clause. — These Rules repeal A.O. No. 6, Series of 2011, and all orders, circulars, rules
and regulations, and issuances or portions thereof that are inconsistent herewith.

SECTION 53. Separability Clause. — Any judicial pronouncement declaring as unconstitutional any provision of
these Rules shall have no effect on the validity of the other provisions not affected thereby.

SECTION 54. Effectivity Clause. — These Rules shall take effect ten (10) days after its publication in two (2)
newspapers of general circulation.

Diliman, Quezon City, __________________________________.

VIRGILIO R. DE LOS REYES

Secretary

DAR Administrative Order No. 04, series of 2015

In' order to make the procedure of deciding cases more efficient, the following amendments to
Administrative Order (AO.) No.7, Series of2014 is hereby instituted, as follows:

SECTION 1. The first sentence of Section 1 of AO. No.7, Series 0(2014 is hereby amended to read as follows:

SECTION 1. Coverage. - These rules of procedure ("Rules") shall apply to all cases
Involving the involuntary cancellation of registered EPs, CLOAs, and other titles issued pursuant to any agrarian
reform program, except in the following instances:

SECTION 2. The first enumerated item in Section 11 of AG. No.7, Series of 2014 is hereby amended to read as
follows:
 Certified true copy of the final and executory Order or Resolution of the DAR Regional Director, DAR Secretary, or
the court;
SECTION 3. The last paragraph of Section 14 of AO. No.7, Series of 2014 is hereby amended to read as follows

The Sheriff shall submit a report to the PARAD on the mode of service used for said Notice, and the fact of
transmittal of the notice to the Barangay Secretary concerned. The report shall contain the following:

1. The date the Notice was served;

2. The time the Notice was served or attempted to serve, through personal or substituted service;
3. The mode of service (whether personal, substituted, registered mail case the respondent is residing abroad],
and/or publication);
4. The name of the person who received the Notice and the proof of identification shown by the person
who received the same, in case through personal or substituted service;
5. In case through substituted service, the age of the person receiving the Notice, if received in the residence,
or the position of the person in the office, if received in the place of business; and
6. The fact of failure of personal or substituted service.

SECTION 4. Items (e) and (f) of Section 17 of A.O. No.7, Series of2014 is-hereby amended to read as follows:

(e) Notices, and proof of service and receipt of said notices, and the report of the Sheriff to the PARAD;

(f) Certified true copy of EPs, CLOAs, or other titles

SECTION 5. Section 25 of A.O. No.7, Series of2014 is hereby amended to read as follows:

SECTION 25. Review, Findings, and Recommendation by the BALA. - The BALA shall conduct a review,
evaluation, and thorough assessment of the entire case records. Thereafter, the BALA shall prepare its
findings and recommendation and transmit the same to the Legal Affairs Office (LAO).

SECTION 6. Section 26 of A.O. No.7, Series of2014is hereby amended to read as follows:

SECTION 26. Review, Findings, and Recommendation by the LAO. - The LAO shall conduct its own
review, evaluation, and thorough assessment of the entire case records. Thereafter, the LAO shall prepare its
findings and recommendation.
SECTION 7. Section 27 of A.O. No.7, Series of2014 is hereby repealed.

SECTION 8. Section 28 of A.O. No.7, Series of2014is hereby amended to read as follows:

SECTION 28. Conduct of Clarificatory Hearing. - The DAR Undersecretary or Assistant Secretary for
Legal Affairs may conduct a hearing for clarification, issue interlocutory orders, and require submission of
additional evidence. The Legal Division Chief of the Provincial or Regional Office or the PARAD or RARAD
concerned may be authorized to conduct such hearings, if the Undersecretary or Assistant Secretary deems it
 necessary. For this purpose, the official record of the proceedings conducted shall be kept and form part of the
case folder.

SECTION 9. Section 29 of A.O. No.7, Series of2014 is hereby amended to read as follows:

SECTION 29. Transmittal of Case Folder with Findings and Recommendation to the DAR Secretary. – The
LAO shall, upon the completion of its aforesaid recommendation, transmit the same, together with the Case Folder,
to the DAR Secretary.

SECTION 10. Sub-items (a), (b), and (c) of the first enumerated item in Section 33, and the third enumerated item
therein are hereby amended to read as follows:

a. Certified true copies of the final and executory Order and Resolution of the DAR Regional Director, DAR
Secretary, or the courts;
b. Original or Certified true copy of the Certificate of Finality;
c. Certified true copy of the EPs, CLOAs, or any other tides sought to be cancelled;

X X X

3. Failure to comply with Section 8 of Article III of these Rules on Disclosure Statement and/or failure to verify the
Petition;

SECTION 11.Transitory Provisions. - Sections 3 and 4 shall not be applicable-to pending cases at the time of the
effectivity of this A.O. where Notices to Comment have already been served, provided that if the
Undersecretary/Assistant Secretary of Legal Affairs require the reissuance or a repeat of the service thereof, these
two provisions shall apply therein.

All the other provisions shall apply only to all pending cases covered by A.O. No.7, Series of 2014.

SECTION 12. Repealing Clause. - All orders, circulars, rules and regulations, and issuances or portions thereof
inconsistent herewith are hereby accordingly deemed repealed or modified.

SECTION 13. Separability Clause. - Any judicial pronouncement declaring as unconstitutional any provision hereof
shall have no effect on the validity of the other provisions not affected thereby.

SECTION 14. Effectivity Clause. - This A.O. shall take effect ten (10) days after its publication in two (2) newspapers
of general circulation.

Diliman, Quezon City, MAY 28, 2015

VIRGILIO DE LOS REYES

Secretary
 Jurisprudence: a. The Tenants Of The Estate Of Dr. Jose Sison, Represented By
Fernando Cayabyab Vs. The Hon. Court Of Appeals, Et Al., 210
SCRA 545

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 93045 June 29, 1992

THE TENANTS OF THE ESTATE OF DR. JOSE SISON, Represented by FERNANDO

CAYABYAB, petitioners,

vs.

THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, SECRETARY PHILIP ELLA JUICO of the DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN
REFORM, AND THE HEIRS OF DR. JOSE SISON, represented by MANUEL SISON, respondents.

GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:

This is a petition for review of the decision dated March 29, 1990 of the Court of Appeals upholding an order of
the Secretary of Agrarian Reform, Philip Ella Juico, setting aside the previous orders of his predecessors who
had issued certificates of land transfer to the tenants of the rice and corn lands of the late Dr. Jose Sison without
due regard for the right of his legal heirs to retain ownership of their shares if they did not own more than seven
(7) hectares of rice or corn land.

Pursuant to the Operation Land Transfer Program of the Government under Presidential Decree No. 27,
certificates of land transfer were issued by the Ministry of Agrarian Reform to the petitioners, tenants of the
Estate of Dr. Jose Sison, for their respective areas of cultivation. Upon discovering that certificates of land
transfer were being issued to the petitioners, the heirs of Dr. Sison protested to the then Minister of Agrarian
Reform, Conrado Estrella, who ordered that the certificates of land transfer be marked, "UNDER PROTEST."

Minister Estrella ordered an investigation of the case. The investigation report dated November 17, 1980,
revealed that the landholdings of the late Dr. Jose Sison at Bayambang, Pangasinan, were subdivided among
his heirs pro-indiviso under a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition dated April 2, 1966. Consequently, the acting MAR
District Officer of Lingayen, Pangasinan, recommended the cancellation of the certificates of land transfer that
had been issued to the petitioners-tenants.

However, a Reinvestigation Report, dated October 8, 1981 recommended that the landholdings be included in
the Operation Land Transfer. This was affirmed in a second Reinvestigation Report dated February 9, 1982. Still
another (third) Reinvestigation Report, dated September 29, 1986, affirmed the previous recommendation that
the landholdings of the Heirs be covered by the Operation Land Transfer.

On February 17, 1987, then Minister Heherson Alvarez dismissed the petition filed by Manuel Sison, as
representative of all the Heirs of Dr. Sison, for exemption of their landholdings from the coverage of Operation
Land Transfer. The heirs' Motion for Reconsideration of said Order was denied on July 6, 1987.

On December 8, 1987, the heirs reiterated their request for reconsideration when Secretary Philip Ella Juico
succeeded Secretary Alvarez. They stressed the fact that their individual landholdings were too small, not
exceeding 7 hectares each, to come under the coverage of the Operation Land Transfer.
After ordering a reinvestigation of the landholdings of the individual heirs, an order was issued on September 7,
1988 by Secretary Juico, modifying the orders of his predecessors. He ruled that the ricelands of Consuelo S.
Nazareno and Peter Sison are exempt from the Operation Land Transfer and that Elisa S. Reyes, Renato Sison,
Jose Sison, Josefina S. Zulueta and Jaime Sison, are entitled to retain not more than seven (7) hectares of their
ricelands, since they are not owners of more than seven (7) hectares of other lands, and that Alfredo Sison and
Manuel Sison are not entitled to retention or exemption of their ricelands from the Operation Land Transfer
because they each own more than seven (7) hectares of other agricultural land.

The tenants filed on October 27, 1988 a motion for reconsideration which the Heirs of Dr. Sison opposed. On
February 20, 1989, an order was issued by Secretary Juico denying the motion for reconsideration.

Petitioners sought relief in the Court of Appeals which rendered judgment on March 29, 1990, dismissing their
petition for certiorari. Hence, this petition for review, alleging:

1. that the order dated September 7, 1988, of respondent Secretary Philip Ella Juico,
reconsidering and reversing the orders of his predecessors dated February 17, 1987 and July 6,
1987, violates the rule on estoppel, which prohibits the resurrection of a case after it has become
final and executory;

2. that the respondents Heirs of Dr. Jose Sison having failed to file any application for retention
within the period required by law, and having filed their intentions to apply for retention and/or
exemption only on March 13, 1987, which was beyond the period required by law, are estopped
and totally barred from claiming such retentions or exemptions;

3. that even assuming that the said Heirs of Dr. Jose Sison are still entitled to file such
applications for retention and/or exemption, still they are disqualified by law to be granted the
same under the provisions of P.D. 27, in relation to LOI 474, which grant such retentions or
exemptions only "if such landowner is cultivating such area or will now cultivate it" (p. 6, Rollo);
and

4. that the Secretary of Agrarian Reform had no more authority or jurisdiction to cancel the
Certificates of Land Transfer after they have been issued to the tenants beneficiaries.

The petition has no merit.

Petitioners herein question the propriety and legality of the order of former Secretary Philip Ella Juico of the
Department of Agrarian Reform dated September 7, 1988, reversing and modifying the orders of his
predecessors which allegedly had attained finality after the lapse of more than five (5) months since the order
sought to be reconsidered therein contained a proviso that "so far as this Office is concerned, this case is
considered already closed" (p. 26, Rollo). Respondent Secretary allegedly violated the rule on estoppel, which
prohibits the resurrection of a case after the decision has become final and executory.

The first and fourth grounds of the petition for review are not well-taken. The orders for the issuance of
Certificates of Land Transfer to the petitioners had not become final and executory because the certificates had
been marked "under protest" on orders of Secretary Estrella.

The Court of Appeals correctly observed that the technical rules of court practice and procedure do not apply to
administrative proceedings in the Department (formerly Ministry) of Agrarian Reform:

. . . In the present case, respondent Secretary was not in estoppel when it reconsidered the
previous ruling of his predecessor, because the latter's ruling is plainly and directly against the
law. As the order of September 7, 1986, stated, and to repeat, the concerned heirs are entitled
under the law to a retention of seven (7) hectares of agricultural lands which is mandatory and
the office had no discretion to alter the disposition on the retention limits accorded by law to the
landowners. No one, not even the petitioners tenants, nor any court of justice can deprive or
deny the land owners of the retention of seven (7) hectares which the law has reserved for them.
Otherwise, the law would be set to naught or would lose its very reason for being. Besides, there
is no administrative rule or regulation, and Our attention has not been called to it, which would
preclude the Secretary of Agrarian Reform, to change the decision of his predecessor if the ruling
 is patently against the law; on the contrary justice and equity demand, that the wrong should be
righted and the error should not be made to prevail over what is correct and legal. . . . " (p.
22, Rollo.)

The failure of the private respondents to apply for retention of seven (7) hectares each of their agricultural
landholdings did not constitute an estoppel or waiver of their respective right of retention. The omission was
cured by their timely protest against the issuance of the certificates of land transfer to the petitioners. In the 1st
Indorsement by Gregorio Sapera, Legal Office, of the Kagawarang Pangsakahan, it was noted that as early as
December 20, 1973, the Heirs of Dr. Jose Sison had been seeking exemption of their landholdings from the
Operation Land Transfer.

Whether or not each of their Heirs of Dr. Jose Sison owns more than seven (7) hectares of riceland and other
agricultural lands, is a factual issue which we generally do not review. We are bound by Secretary Juico's
finding, affirmed by the Court of Appeals, that their respective landholdings are as follows:

Riceland Other Agricultural

Lands

1. Elisa S. Reyes 9.3370 Has. 5.3135 Has.

2. Consuelo S. Nazareno 2.4972 Has. 6.1460 Has.
3. Alfredo Sison 5.4584 Has. 9.1935 Has.
4. Renato Sison 9.4091 Has. 5.2435 Has.
5. Peter Sison 4.6663 Has. 5.3135 Has.
6. Jose Sison 9.4069 Has. 5.2435 Has.
7. Josefina S. Zulueta 9.4066 Has. 5.2435 Has.
8. Manuel Sison 2.4972 Has. 12.1529 Has.
9. Jaime Sison 9.1496 Has. 5.2435 Has.
(p. 19, Rollo.)

Secretary Juico and the Court of . Appeals correctly ruled that:

Consequently, the landholdings of Consuelo and Peter, are exempted from the OLT Coverage,
and Elisa, Renato, Jose, Josefina and Jaime are entitled to a retention of not more than seven
(7) hectares of their ricelands since they are not the owners of more than seven (7) hectares of
other agricultural lands. However, the excess areas of the retained portion are covered by
Operation Land Transfer. With respect to Alfredo and Manuel, they are not entitled to the
exemption and/or retention of their ricelands because they are owners of more than seven (7)
hectares of other agricultural lands.

Anchored on the rule of law, the applicability of LOI No. 474 (Oct. 21, 1976) as the Implementing
measure of P.D. No. 27 (Oct. 21, 1972) on the foregoing facts and circumstances is mandatory.
This office does not even have the discretion to alter the above disposition on retention limits
accorded the landowners as the law is clear and explicit on this point.

xxx xxx xxx

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the orders dated February 17, 1987 and July 6, 1987 of
this Office are hereby modified in the following manner as it is declared and ordered that:

1. The ricelands of Consuelo S. Nazareno situated at Labrador, Pangasinan, and the ricelands of
Peter Sison situated at Labrador and Bayambang, Pangasinan, are exempted from the coverage
of Operation Land Transfer;

2. Petitioners Elisa S. Reyes, Renato Sison, Jose Sison, Josefina S. Zulueta and Jaime Sison
are to retain not more than seven (7) hectares of their respective ricelands situated in
Bayambang, Pangasinan, but the excess areas thereof situated in Labrador, Pangasinan, which
are covered by the OLT and the CLTs already issued, if any, to the tenants are hereby affirmed;
 3. Petitioners Alfredo Sison and Manuel Sison are not entitled to this exemption and/or retention
of their ricelands as they are owners of more than seven (7) hectares of other agricultural land,
and the tenant-tillers thereon, if they have not yet been issued the Certificates of Land Transfer,
shall be issued such Certificates by the Regional Director of Region I, DAR, San Fernando, La
Union;

4. The tenants in the exempted and retained riceland areas of the petitioners shall remain as
agricultural lessees thereon and the Certificates of Land Transfer issued to them, if any, shall be
as they are hereby recalled/cancelled; and

5. The tenant-farmers within the exempted and retained riceland areas are hereby ordered to pay
to the landowners the lease rentals due them; or if such lease rentals were deposited with the
Land Bank, the landowners are therefore, authorized to withdraw the said deposits. (pp. 19-
20, Rollo.)

There is no merit in the petitioners' contention that the Heirs of Dr. Sison are disqualified to retain their shares of
the agricultural lands of the estate for failure to comply with the requirement that "such landowner is cultivating
such area, or will now cultivate it" (p. 23, Rollo), The Secretary interpreted that provision to mean "that the
tenants in the exempted and retained riceland areas of the concerned Heirs of Sison, shall remain as agricultural
lessees therein. Which means, that while ownership of the exempted and retained riceland areas shall pertain to
the concerned Heirs of Sison, the petitioners-tenant, as agricultural lessees, shall remain as such and cultivate
the same. The concerned Heirs of Sison therefore, do not have to cultivate the retained and exempted areas,
unless the petitioners, as agricultural lessees, would voluntarily relinquish the task of cultivation and vacate and
surrender the said areas to the Heirs" (p. 23, Rollo; Emphasis ours).

Respect should be accorded to the Secretary's construction of the law which his department administers and
implements (Asturias Sugar Central Inc. vs. Com. of Customs, 29 SCRA 617; Atlas Consolidated Mining and
Development Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, 182 SCRA 166; Sierra Madre Trust vs. Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources, 121 SCRA 384).

Hence, personal cultivation by the Heirs of Sison is not a mandatory precondition for them to be entitled to their
retention right.

Secretary Juico's interpretation of the owner's right of retention conforms with our own construction
in Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reforms, G.R. No. 78742,
August 23, 1990, where we ruled that:

. . . in case the area selected for retention by the landowner is tenanted, the tenant shall have the
option to choose whether to remain therein or be a beneficiary in the same or another agricultural
land with similar or comparable features. In case the tenant chooses to remain in the retained
area, he shall be considered as leaseholder and shall lose his right to be a beneficiary under this
Act. In case the tenant chooses to be a beneficiary in another agricultural land, he loses his right
as a leaseholder to the land retained by the landowner. The tenant must exercise this option
within a period of one (1) year from the time the land owner manifests his choice of the area for
retention. (En Banc, Minute Resolution.)

Petitioners' contention that the Secretary of Agrarian Reform had no mare authority or jurisdiction to cancel the
Certificates of Land Transfer after they had been issued to the tenants-beneficiaries, is not correct. The
issuance, recall or cancellation of certificates of land transfer fall within the Secretary's administrative jurisdiction
as implementor of P.D. 27. Having found that certain heirs of Dr. Sison were entitled to retain their ricelands
(which did not exceed seven [7] hectares) and had been illegally denied that right, Secretary Juico properly
ordered the cancellation of the Certificates of Land Transfer which had been erroneously issued to the
petitioners.

WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the decision of the Court of Appeals, the Court hereby AFFIRMS
it in toto.

SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Medialdea and Bellosillo, JJ., concur.

b. Samuel Estribillo, et al. vs. Department of Agrarian Reform and

Hacienda Maria, Inc. G.R. No. 159674 June 30, 2006

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 159674 June 30, 2006

SAMUEL ESTRIBILLO, CALIXTO P. ABAYATO, JR., RONGIE D. AGUILAR, TACIANA D. AGUILAR,

ARTEMIO G. DE JUAN, ESTANISLAO DELA CRUZ, SR., EDGAR DUENAS, MARIO ERIBAL, REYNALDO
C. ESENCIA, EMMA GONZAGA, RUBEN A. IBOJO, SAMUEL JAMANDRE, HILARION V. LANTIZA,
ANSELMO LOPEZ, TERESITA NACION, CHARIE E. NASTOR, NELSON L. NULLAS, CARLITO S. OLIA,
ANA PATIÑO, ROBERTO T. PATIÑO, ANTONIO P. ROCHA, FERNANDO C. RUFINO, PATERNO P. SAIN,
CLAUDIO S. SAYSON, and JOEMARIE VIBO, Petitioners,
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM and HACIENDA MARIA, INC., Respondents.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking the review and reversal
of the Resolutions1 of the Court of Appeals dated 27 January 2003 and 28 August 2003, respectively.

The factual and procedural antecedents are as follows:

The petitioners, with the exception of two, are the recipients of Emancipation Patents (EPs) over parcels of land
located at Barangay Angas, Sta. Josefa, Agusan del Sur, with their respective Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
and EP numbers presented below:

Areas
Petitioners TCT/EP Nos.
(has.)

1. SAMUEL ESTRIBILLO TCT No. T-287/EP No. A-037675 1.7833

2. CALIXTO P. ABAYATO, JR. TCT No. T-297/EP No. A-037814 2.0000

TCT No. T-829/EP No. A-027293 0.1565

3. RONGIE D. AGUILAR TCT No. T-913/EP No. A-027295 3.1441

4. TACIANA D. AGUILAR TCT No. T-944/EP No. A-027296 4.2405

5. ARTEMIO G. DE JUAN TCT No. T-302/EP No. A-037809 3.3082
6. ESTANISLAO DELA CRUZ, SR. TCT No. T-290/EP No. A-035676 3.1437
7. EDGAR DUENAS TCT No. T-949/EP No. A-037658 4.0128

8. MARIO P. ERIBAL TCT No. T-952/EP No. A-037836 2.3087

 9. REYNALDO C. ESENCIA TCT No. T-950/EP No. A-037844 2.0950
10. RUBEN A. IBOJO TCT No. T-928/EP No. A-037873 1.5737

11. SAMUEL JAMANDRE TCT No. T-909/EP No. A-159348 2.2670

12. HILARION V. LANTIZA TCT No. T-288/EP No. A-037674 4.5526
TCT No. T-401/EP No. A-037825 0.4579

13. ANSELMO LOPEZ TCT No. T-973/EP No. A-037840 4.4939

14. TERESITA NACION TCT No. T-900/EP No. A-037849 2.2140

15. CHARIE E. NASTOR TCT No. T-825/EP No. A-037829 3.9291

16. NELSON L. NULLAS TCT No. T-396/EP No. A-037826 2.7491

17. CARLITO S. OLIA TCT No. T-910/EP No. A-037673 1.7954
18. ROBERTO T.PATIÑO TCT No. T-912/EP No. A-037860 6.4266

19. ANTONIO P. ROCHA TCT No. T-914/EP No. A-037830 2.2143

20. FERNANDO C. RUFINO TCT No. T-923/EP No. A-037848 4.5322

21. PATERNO P. SAIN TCT No. T-954/EP No. A-037813 4.3223

22. CLAUDIO S. SAYSON, and TCT No. T-891/EP No. A-037880 3.7151

23. JOEMARIE VIBO TCT No. T-893/EP No. A-037827 1.31852

The two other petitioners, Emma Gonzaga and Ana Patiño, are the surviving spouses of deceased recipients of
EPs over parcels of land also located at Barangay Angas, Sta. Josefa, Agusan del Sur, with their corresponding
TCT and EP numbers identified as follows:

Areas
(Deceased) Registered Owners TCT/EP Nos.
(has.)

1. MANUEL S. GONZAGA TCT No. T-920/EP No. A-037832 4.1953

2. RAFAEL PATIÑO TCT No. T-929/EP No. A-037861 3.00783

The parcels of land described above, the subject matters in this Petition, were formerly part of a forested area
which have been denuded as a result of the logging operations of respondent Hacienda Maria, Inc. (HMI).
Petitioners, together with other persons, occupied and tilled these areas believing that the same were public
lands. HMI never disturbed petitioners and the other occupants in their peaceful cultivation thereof.

HMI acquired such forested area from the Republic of the Philippines through Sales Patent No. 2683 in 1956 by
virtue of which it was issued OCT No. P-3077-1661. The title covered three parcels of land with a total area of
527.8308 hectares, to wit:

Area
Lot No.
(in hectares)
Lot No. 1620, Pls – 4 28.52
Lot No. 1621, Pls – 4 11.64
Lot No. 1622, Pls – 4 487.47

TOTAL 527.834
On 21 October 1972, Presidential Decree No. 275 was issued mandating that tenanted rice and corn lands be
brought under Operation Land Transfer and awarded to farmer-beneficiaries.

HMI, through a certain Joaquin Colmenares, requested that 527.8308 hectares of its landholdings be placed
under the coverage of Operation Land Transfer. Receiving compensation therefor, HMI allowed petitioners and
other occupants to cultivate the landholdings so that the same may be covered under said law.

In 1973, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) conducted a parcellary mapping of the entire landholdings of
527.8308 hectares covered by OCT No. P-3077-1661. In 1975 and 1976, the DAR approved the Parcellary Map
Sketching (PMS) and the Amended PMS covering the entire landholdings.

HMI, through its representatives, actively participated in all relevant proceedings, including the determination of
the Average Gross Production per hectare at the Barangay Committee on Land Production, and was a signatory
of an undated Landowner and Tenant Production Agreement (LTPA), covering the 527.8308 hectares. The
LTPA was submitted to the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) in 1977.

Also in 1977, HMI executed a Deed of Assignment of Rights in favor of petitioners, among other persons, which
was registered with the Register of Deeds and annotated at the back of OCT No. P-3077-1661. The annotation
in the OCT showed that the entire 527.8308 hectares was the subject of the Deed of Assignment.

In 1982, a final survey over the entire area was conducted and approved. From 1984 to 1988, the corresponding
TCTs and EPs covering the entire 527.8308 hectares were issued to petitioners, among other persons.

In December 1997, HMI filed with the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (RARAD) of CARAGA, Region XIII,
17 petitions seeking the declaration of erroneous coverage under Presidential Decree No. 27 of 277.5008
hectares of its former landholdings covered by OCT No. P-3077-1661. HMI claimed that said area was not
devoted to either rice or corn, that the area was untenanted, and that no compensation was paid therefor. The
17 petitions, which were later consolidated, sought for the cancellation of the EPs covering the disputed
277.5008 hectares which had been awarded to petitioners. HMI did not question the coverage of the other
250.3300 hectares under Presidential Decree No. 27 despite claiming that the entire landholdings were
untenanted and not devoted to rice and corn.

On 27 November 1998, after petitioners failed to submit a Position Paper, the RARAD rendered a Decision
declaring as void the TCTs and EPs awarded to petitioners because the land covered was not devoted to rice
and corn, and neither was there any established tenancy relations between HMI and petitioners when
Presidential Decree No. 27 took effect on 21 October 1972. The Decision was based on a 26 March 1998 report
submitted by the Hacienda Maria Action Team. Petitioners’ TCTs and EPs were ordered cancelled. Petitioners
filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the same was denied. Petitioners appealed to the Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) which affirmed the RARAD Decision.

After the DARAB denied petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration, the latter proceeded to the Court of Appeals
with their Petition for Review on Certiorari. The Court of Appeals issued the following assailed Resolution:

A perusal of the petition reveals that the Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping was executed by
Samuel A. Estribillo who is one of the petitioners, without the corresponding Special Power of Attorneys
executed by the other petitioners authorizing him to sign for their behalf in violation of Section 5, Rule 7 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED DUE COURSE and necessarily DISMISSED.6

Petitioners filed a "Motion for Reconsideration With Alternative Prayer with Leave of Court for the Admission of
Special Power of Attorney (SPA) Granted to Petitioner Samuel Estribillo by his Co-Petitioners." The Court of
Appeals denied the motion by issuing the following assailed Resolution:

Petitioners seek the reconsideration of Our Resolution promulgated on January 27, 2003 which dismissed the
petition for certiorari.
We find no reason to reverse, alter or modify the resolution sought to be reconsidered, since petitioners have
failed to show that their belated submission of the special power of attorney can be justified as against the
unequivocal requirements set forth by Sec. 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.

While it is true that the Supreme Court has recognized special circumstances that justify the relaxation of the
rules on non-forum shopping, such circumstances, however, are not present in the case at bar.

More importantly, said Rules cannot be relaxed in view of the Supreme Court’s ruling in Loquias vs.
Ombudsman, 338 SCRA 62, which stated that, substantial compliance will not suffice in a matter involving strict
observance by the rules. The attestation contained in the certification [on] non-forum shopping requires personal
knowledge by the party who executed the same.

Since the Verification and Certification on Non-Forum shopping was executed without the proper authorization
from all the petitioners, such personal knowledge cannot be presumed to exist thereby rendering the petition
fatally defective.

Par. 2, Sec. 5 of Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended states:

"Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere amendment of the complaint or
other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case without prejudice x x x"

It is, thus, clear that the Motion for Reconsideration has no legal basis to support it and should be dismissed
forthwith. Moreover, granting arguendo that a special power of attorney belatedly filed could cure the petition’s
defect, the requirement of personal knowledge of all the petitioners still has not been met since some of the
other petitioners failed to sign the same.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED.7

Petitioners now file this present Petition contending that there had been compliance with Rule 7, Section 5 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. They further reiterate their argument that the EPs are ordinary titles which
become indefeasible one year after their registration.

The petition is impressed with merit. 1aw phil.net

Petitioners have sufficiently complied with Rule 7, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure concerning the
Certification Against Forum shopping

Rule 7, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure was preceded by Revised Circular No. 28-91 and
Administrative Circular No. 04-94, which required a certification against forum shopping to avoid the filing of
multiple petitions and complaints involving the same issues in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, and
other tribunals and agencies. Stated differently, the rule was designed to avoid a situation where said courts,
tribunals and agencies would have to resolve the same issues. Rule 7, Section 5, now provides:

Sec. 5. Certification against forum shopping. – The plaintiff or principal party shall certify under oath in the
complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and
simultaneously filed therewith: (a) that he has not theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim involving
the same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such other
action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a complete statement of the
present status thereof; and (c) if he should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has been filed
or is pending, he shall report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court wherein his aforesaid complaint
or initiatory pleading has been filed.

Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere amendment of the complaint or
other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case without prejudice, unless otherwise
provided, upon motion and after hearing. The submission of a false certification or non-compliance with any of
the undertakings therein shall constitute indirect contempt of court, without prejudice to the corresponding
administrative and criminal actions. If the acts of the party or his counsel clearly constitute willful and deliberate
forum shopping, the same shall be ground for summary dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute direct
contempt as well as a cause for administrative sanctions.

Revised Circular No. 28-91 "was designed x x x to promote and facilitate the orderly administration of justice and
should not be interpreted with such absolute literalness as to subvert its own ultimate and legitimate objective or
the goal of all rules of procedure – which is to achieve substantial justice as expeditiously as
possible."8 Technical rules of procedure should be used to promote, not frustrate, justice.9 The same guidelines
should still apply in interpreting what is now Rule 7, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

Petitioner Samuel A. Estribillo, in signing the Verification and Certification Against Forum Shopping, falls within
the phrase "plaintiff or principal party" who is required to certify under oath the matters mentioned in Rule 7,
Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Such was given emphasis by this Court when we held in
Mendigorin v. Cabantog10 and Escorpizo v. University of Baguio11 that the certification of non-forum shopping
must be signed by the plaintiff or any of the principal parties and not only by the legal counsel. In Condo Suite
Club Travel, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission,12 we likewise held that:

The certification in this petition was improperly executed by the external legal counsel of petitioner. For a
certification of non-forum shopping must be by the petitioner, or any of the principal parties and not by counsel
unless clothed with a special power of attorney to do so. This procedural lapse on the part of petitioner is also a
cause for the dismissal of this action. (Emphasis supplied)

The Court of Appeals heavily relied on the seemingly conflicting case of Loquias v. Office of the
Ombudsman,13where this Court ruled that:

At the outset, it is noted that the Verification and Certification was signed by Antonio Din, Jr., one of the
petitioners in the instant case. We agree with the Solicitor General that the petition is defective. Section 5, Rule 7
expressly provides that it is the plaintiff or principal party who shall certify under oath that he has not
commenced any action involving the same issues in any court, etc. Only petitioner Din, the Vice-Mayor of San
Miguel, Zamboanga del Sur, signed the certification. There is no showing that he was authorized by his co-
petitioners to represent the latter and to sign the certification. It cannot likewise be presumed that petitioner Din
knew, to the best of his knowledge, whether his co-petitioners had the same or similar actions or claims filed or
pending. We find that substantial compliance will not suffice in a matter involving strict observance by the rules.
The attestation contained in the certification on non-forum shopping requires personal knowledge by the party
who executed the same. Petitioners must show reasonable cause for failure to personally sign the certification.
Utter disregard of the rules cannot justly be rationalized by harking on the policy of liberal construction.
(Emphasis supplied)

Loquias, however, was a case involving only five petitioners seeking relief from the Resolution of the
Ombudsman charging them with violation of Republic Act No. 3019, where the above declaration "at the outset"
was made together with a determination on the lack of jurisdiction on our part to decide the Petition.14 There
being only five petitioners in Loquias, the unreasonableness of the failure to obtain the signatures of Antonio Din,
Jr.’s four co-accused is immediately apparent, hence the remark by this Court that "[p]etitioners must show
reasonable cause for failure to personally sign the certification." In the present petition, petitioners allege that
they are farmer-beneficiaries who reside in a very remote barangay in Agusan del Sur. While they reside in the
same barangay, they allegedly have to walk for hours on rough terrain to reach their neighbors due to the
absence of convenient means of transportation. Their houses are located far apart from each other and the
mode of transportation, habal-habal, is scarce and difficult. Majority of them are also nearing old age. On the
other hand, their lawyers (who are members of a non-government organization engaged in development work)
are based in Quezon City who started assisting them at the latter part of the RARAD level litigation in 1998, and
became their counsel of record only at the DARAB level. The petitioner who signed the initiatory pleading,
Samuel Estribillo, was the only petitioner who was able to travel to Manila at the time of the preparation of the
Petition due to very meager resources of their farmers’ organization, the Kahiusahan sa Malahutayong mga
Mag-uugma Para sa Ekonomikanhong Kalambuan (KAMMPE). When the Petition a quo was dismissed,
petitioners’ counsel went to Agusan del Sur and tried earnestly to secure all the signatures for the SPA. In fact,
when the SPA was being circulated for their signatures, 24 of the named petitioners therein failed to sign for
various reasons – some could not be found within the area and were said to be temporarily residing in other
towns, while some already died because of old age.15 Be that as it may, those who did not sign the SPA did not
participate, and are not parties to this petition.
The Court of Appeals merely said that the special circumstances recognized by this Court that justify the
relaxation of the rules on the certification against forum shopping are not present in the case at bar,16 without
discussing the circumstances adduced by the petitioners in their Motion for Reconsideration. Thus, assuming for
the sake of argument that the actuation of petitioners was not strictly in consonance with Rule 7, Section 5 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, it should still be determined whether there are special circumstances that would
justify the suspension or relaxation of the rule concerning verification and certification against forum shopping,
such as those which we appreciated in the ensuing cases.

In General Milling Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission,17 the appeal to the Court of Appeals had
a certificate against forum shopping, but was dismissed as it did not contain a board resolution authorizing the
signatory of the Certificate. Petitioners therein attached the board resolution in their Motion for Reconsideration
but the Court of Appeals, as in this case, denied the same. In granting the Petition therein, we explained that:

[P]etitioner complied with this procedural requirement except that it was not accompanied by a board resolution
or a secretary’s certificate that the person who signed it was duly authorized by petitioner to represent it in the
case. It would appear that the signatory of the certification was, in fact, duly authorized as so evidenced by a
board resolution attached to petitioner’s motion for reconsideration before the appellate court. It could thus be
said that there was at least substantial compliance with, and that there was no attempt to ignore, the prescribed
procedural requirements.

The rules of procedure are intended to promote, rather than frustrate, the ends of justice, and while the swift
unclogging of court dockets is a laudable objective, it, nevertheless, must not be met at the expense of
substantial justice. Technical and procedural rules are intended to help secure, not suppress, the cause of
justice and a deviation from the rigid enforcement of the rules may be allowed to attain that prime objective for,
after all, the dispensation of justice is the core reason for the existence of courts. [Acme Shoe, Rubber and
Plastic Corp. vs. Court of Appeals; BA Savings Bank vs. Sia, 336 SCRA 484].

In Shipside Incorporated v. Court of Appeals,18 the authority of petitioner’s resident manager to sign the
certification against forum shopping was submitted to the Court of Appeals only after the latter dismissed the
Petition. It turned out, in the Motion for Reconsideration, that he already had board authority ten days before the
filing of the Petition. We ratiocinated therein that:

On the other hand, the lack of certification against forum shopping is generally not curable by the submission
thereof after the filing of the petition. Section 5, Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the
failure of the petitioner to submit the required documents that should accompany the petition, including the
certification against forum shopping, shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal thereof. The same rule applies to
certifications against forum shopping signed by a person on behalf of a corporation which are unaccompanied by
proof that said signatory is authorized to file a petition on behalf of the corporation.

In certain exceptional circumstances, however, the Court has allowed the belated filing of the certification. In
Loyola v. Court of Appeals, et al. (245 SCRA 477 [1995]), the Court considered the filing of the certification one
day after the filing of an election protest as substantial compliance with the requirement. In Roadway Express,
Inc. v. Court of Appeals, et al. (264 SCRA 696 [1996]), the Court allowed the filing of the certification 14 days
before the dismissal of the petition. In Uy v. Landbank, supra, the Court had dismissed Uy’s petition for lack of
verification and certification against non-forum shopping. However, it subsequently reinstated the petition after
Uy submitted a motion to admit certification and non-forum shopping certification. In all these cases, there were
special circumstances or compelling reasons that justified the relaxation of the rule requiring verification and
certification on non-forum shopping.

In the instant case, the merits of petitioner’s case should be considered special circumstances or compelling
reasons that justify tempering the requirement in regard to the certificate of non-forum shopping. Moreover, in
Loyola, Roadway, and Uy, the Court excused non-compliance with the requirement as to the certificate of non-
forum shopping. With more reason should we allow the instant petition since petitioner herein did submit a
certification on non-forum shopping, failing only to show proof that the signatory was authorized to do so. That
petitioner subsequently submitted a secretary’s certificate attesting that Balbin was authorized to file an action
on behalf of petitioner likewise mitigates this oversight.

It must also be kept in mind that while the requirement of the certificate of non-forum shopping is mandatory,
nonetheless the requirements must not be interpreted too literally and thus defeat the objective of preventing the
undesirable practice of forum-shopping. Lastly, technical rules of procedure should be used to promote, not
frustrate justice. While the swift unclogging of court dockets is a laudable objective, the granting of substantial
justice is an even more urgent ideal.

In Uy v. Land Bank of the Philippines,19 we, likewise, considered the apparent merits of the substantive aspect of
the case as a special circumstance or compelling reason for the reinstatement of the case, and invoked our
power to suspend our rules to serve the ends of justice. Thus:

The admission of the petition after the belated filing of the certification, therefore, is not unprecedented. In those
cases where the Court excused non-compliance with the requirements, there were special circumstances or
compelling reasons making the strict application of the rule clearly unjustified. In the case at bar, the apparent
merits of the substantive aspects of the case should be deemed as a "special circumstance" or "compelling
reason" for the reinstatement of the petition. x x x

There were even cases where we held that there was complete non-compliance with the rule on certification
against forum shopping, but we still proceeded to decide the case on the merits. In De Guia v. De
Guia,20 petitioners raised in their Petition for Review the allowance of respondents’ Appeal Brief which did not
contain a certificate against forum shopping. We held therein that:

With regard to the absence of a certification of non-forum shopping, substantial justice behooves us to agree
with the disquisition of the appellate court. We do not condone the shortcomings of respondents’ counsel, but we
simply cannot ignore the merits of their claim. Indeed, it has been held that "[i]t is within the inherent power of the
Court to suspend its own rules in a particular case in order to do justice."

In Damasco v. National Labor Relations Commission,21 the non-compliance was disregarded because of the
principle of social justice, which is equally applicable to the case at bar:

We note that both petitioners did not comply with the rule on certification against forum shopping. The
certifications in their respective petitions were executed by their lawyers, which is not correct. The certification of
non-forum shopping must be by the petitioner or a principal party and not the attorney. This procedural lapse on
the part of petitioners could have warranted the outright dismissal of their actions.

But, the court recognizes the need to resolve these two petitions on their merits as a matter of social justice
involving labor and capital. After all, technicality should not be allowed to stand in the way of equitably and
completely resolving herein the rights and obligations of these parties. Moreover, we must stress that technical
rules of procedure in labor cases are not to be strictly applied if the result would be detrimental to the working
woman.

The foregoing cases show that, even if we assume for the sake of argument that there was violation of Rule 7,
Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a relaxation of such rule would be justified for two compelling
reasons: social justice considerations and the apparent merit of the Petition, as shall be heretofore discussed.

Certificates of Title issued pursuant to Emancipation Patents are as indefeasible as TCTs issued in registration
proceedings.

Petitioners claim that the EPs have become indefeasible upon the expiration of one year from the date of its
issuance. The DARAB, however, ruled that the EP "is a title issued through the agrarian reform program of the
government. Its issuance, correction and cancellation is governed by the rules and regulations issued by the
Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). Hence, it is not the same as or in the same category of
a Torrens title."

The DARAB is grossly mistaken.

Ybañez v. Intermediate Appellate Court,22 provides that certificates of title issued in administrative proceedings
are as indefeasible as certificates of title issued in judicial proceedings:

It must be emphasized that a certificate of title issued under an administrative proceeding pursuant to a
homestead patent, as in the instant case, is as indefeasible as a certificate of title issued under a judicial
registration proceeding, provided the land covered by said certificate is a disposable public land within the
contemplation of the Public Land Law.

There is no specific provision in the Public Land Law (C.A. No. 141, as amended) or the Land Registration Act
(Act 496), now P.D. 1529, fixing the one (1) year period within which the public land patent is open to review on
the ground of actual fraud as in Section 38 of the Land Registration Act, now Section 32 of P.D. 1529, and
clothing a public land patent certificate of title with indefeasibility. Nevertheless, the pertinent pronouncements in
the aforecited cases clearly reveal that Section 38 of the Land Registration Act, now Section 32 of P.D. 1529
was applied by implication by this Court to the patent issued by the Director of Lands duly approved by the
Secretary of Natural Resources, under the signature of the President of the Philippines in accordance with law.
The date of issuance of the patent, therefore, corresponds to the date of the issuance of the decree in ordinary
registration cases because the decree finally awards the land applied for registration to the party entitled to it,
and the patent issued by the Director of Lands equally and finally grants, awards, and conveys the land applied
for to the applicant. This, to our mind, is in consonance with the intent and spirit of the homestead laws, i.e.
conservation of a family home, and to encourage the settlement, residence and cultivation and improvement of
the lands of the public domain. If the title to the land grant in favor of the homesteader would be subjected to
inquiry, contest and decision after it has been given by the Government through the process of proceedings in
accordance with the Public Land Law, there would arise uncertainty, confusion and suspicion on the
government’s system of distributing public agricultural lands pursuant to the "Land for the Landless" policy of the
State.

The same confusion, uncertainty and suspicion on the distribution of government-acquired lands to the landless
would arise if the possession of the grantee of an EP would still be subject to contest, just because his certificate
of title was issued in an administrative proceeding. The silence of Presidential Decree No. 27 as to the
indefeasibility of titles issued pursuant thereto is the same as that in the Public Land Act where Prof. Antonio
Noblejas commented:

Inasmuch as there is no positive statement of the Public Land Law, regarding the titles granted thereunder, such
silence should be construed and interpreted in favor of the homesteader who come into the possession of his
homestead after complying with the requirements thereof. Section 38 of the Land Registration Law should be
interpreted to apply by implication to the patent issued by the Director of Lands, duly approved by the Minister of
Natural Resources, under the signature of the President of the Philippines, in accordance with law.23

After complying with the procedure, therefore, in Section 105 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known
as the Property Registration Decree (where the DAR is required to issue the corresponding certificate of title
after granting an EP to tenant-farmers who have complied with Presidential Decree No. 27), 24 the TCTs issued
to petitioners pursuant to their EPs acquire the same protection accorded to other TCTs. "The certificate of title
becomes indefeasible and incontrovertible upon the expiration of one year from the date of the issuance of the
order for the issuance of the patent, x x x. Lands covered by such title may no longer be the subject matter of a
cadastral proceeding, nor can it be decreed to another person."25

As we held through Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Lahora v. Dayanghirang, Jr.26 :

The rule in this jurisdiction, regarding public land patents and the character of the certificate of title that may be
issued by virtue thereof, is that where land is granted by the government to a private individual, the
corresponding patent therefor is recorded, and the certificate of title is issued to the grantee; thereafter, the land
is automatically brought within the operation of the Land Registration Act, the title issued to the grantee
becoming entitled to all the safeguards provided in Section 38 of the said Act. In other words, upon expiration of
one year from its issuance, the certificate of title shall become irrevocable and indefeasible like a certificate
issued in a registration proceeding. (Emphasis supplied.)

The EPs themselves, like the Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs) in Republic Act No. 6657 (the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988), are enrolled in the Torrens system of registration. The Property
Registration Decree in fact devotes Chapter IX27 on the subject of EPs. Indeed, such EPs and CLOAs are, in
themselves, entitled to be as indefeasible as certificates of title issued in registration proceedings.

The only defense of respondents, that the issue of indefeasibility of title was raised for the first time on appeal
with the DARAB, does not hold water because said issue was already raised before the RARAD.28
The recommendation of the Hacienda Maria Action Team to have the EPs cancelled and the lots covered under
the Republic Act No. 6657,29 with the farmer-beneficiaries later on being issued with CLOAs, would only delay
the application of agrarian reform laws to the disputed 277.5008 hectares, leading to the expenditure of more
time and resources of the government.

The unreasonable delay of HMI in filing the Petition for cancellation more than 20 years after the alleged
wrongful annotation of the Deed of Assignment in OCT No. P-3077-1661, and more than ten years after the
issuance of the TCTs to the farmers, is apparently motivated by its desire to receive a substantially higher
valuation and just compensation should the disputed 277.5008 hectares be covered under Republic Act No.
6657 instead of Presidential Decree No. 27.30 This is further proved by the following uncontested allegations by
petitioners:

(i) HMI neither asked for rentals nor brought any action to oust petitioners from the farm they were
cultivating;

(ii) HMI had not paid realty taxes on the disputed property from 1972 onwards and never protested
petitioners’ act of declaring the same for realty taxation;

(iii) HMI, represented by a certain Angela Colmenares, signed the LTPA covering the entire landholdings
or the area of 527.8308 hectares, which was then represented to be rice and corn lands;

(iv) HMI abandoned the entire landholdings after executing the Deed of Assignment of Rights in 1977.

WHEREFORE, the Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 73902 are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The following EPs and the corresponding TCTs issued to petitioners or to their successors-in-interest
are hereby declared VALID and SUBSISTING:

Original Grantees TCT/EP Nos.

1. SAMUEL ESTRIBILLO TCT No. T-287/EP No. A-037675
2. CALIXTO P. ABAYATO, JR. TCT No. T-297/EP No. A-037814
TCT No. T-829/EP No. A-027293
3. RONGIE D. AGUILAR TCT No. T-913/EP No. A-027295

4. TACIANA D. AGUILAR TCT No. T-944/EP No. A-027296

5. ARTEMIO G. DE JUAN, TCT No. T-302/EP No. A-037809

6. ESTANISLAO DELA CRUZ, SR. TCT No. T-290/EP No. A-035676

7. EDGAR DUENAS TCT No. T-949/EP No. A-037658

8. MARIO P. ERIBAL TCT No. T-952/EP No. A-037836

9. REYNALDO C. ESENCIA TCT No. T-950/EP No. A-037844

10. RUBEN A. IBOJO TCT No. T-928/EP No. A-037873

11. SAMUEL JAMANDRE TCT No. T-909/EP No. A-159348

12. HILARION V. LANTIZA TCT No. T-288/EP No. A-037674

TCT No. T-401/EP No. A-037825

13. ANSELMO LOPEZ TCT No. T-973/EP No. A-037840

14. TERESITA NACION TCT No. T-900/EP No. A-037849
15. CHARIE E. NASTOR TCT No. T-825/EP No. A-037829

16. NELSON L. NULLAS TCT No. T-396/EP No. A-037826

 17. CARLITO S. OLIA TCT No. T-910/EP No. A-037673
18. ROBERTO T.PATIÑO TCT No. T-912/EP No. A-037860

19. ANTONIO P. ROCHA TCT No. T-914/EP No. A-037830

20. FERNANDO C. RUFINO TCT No. T-923/EP No. A-037848
21. PATERNO P. SAIN TCT No. T-954/EP No. A-037813

22. CLAUSIO S. SAYSON TCT No. T-891/EP No. A-037880

23. JOEMARIE VIBO TCT No. T-893/EP No. A-037827

24. MANUEL S. GONZAGA TCT No. T-920/EP No. A-037832

25. RAFAEL PATIÑO TCT No. T-297/EP No. A-037861

Costs against respondent Hacienda Maria, Inc.

SO ORDERED.

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

On Official Leave
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
Chairperson

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice Asscociate Justice
Acting Chairman

ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Acting Chairman, First Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, and the Division Chairman’s Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned
to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Acting Chief Justice
Footnotes

1CA-G.R. SP No. 73902. Both Resolutions were penned by Associate Justice Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr., with
Associate Justices Bernardo P. Abesamis and Edgardo F. Sundiam, concurring; Rollo, pp. 35-36; 38-40.

2 Rollo, p. 5.

3 Id.

4 Id. at 6.

5DECREEING THE EMANCIPATION OF TENANTS FROM THE BONDAGE OF THE SOIL

TRANSFERRING TO THEM THE OWNERSHIP OF THE LAND THEY TILL AND PROVIDING THE
INSTRUMENTS AND MECHANISM THEREFOR.

6 Id. at 36.

7 Id. at 39-40.

8 Gabionza v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112547, 18 July 1994, 234 SCRA 192, 198.

9 Cusi-Hernandez v. Diaz, 390 Phil. 1245, 1252 (2000).

10 436 Phil. 483, 491 (2002).

11 366 Phil. 166, 175 (1999).

12 380 Phil. 660, 667 (2000).

13 392 Phil. 596, 603-604 (2000).

14We held in Loquias that "this court will not interfere with the Ombudsman’s exercise of his
constitutionally mandated investigatory and prosecutory powers. Otherwise stated, it is beyond the ambit
of this Court to review the exercise of discretion of the Ombudsman in prosecuting or dismissing a
complaint filed before it. Such initiative and independence are inherent in the Ombudsman who,
beholden to no one, acts as the champion of the people and preserver of the integrity of the public
service. x x x" (Id.)

15 Rollo, pp. 190-191.

16 Id. at 30.

17 442 Phil. 425, 427-428 (2002).

18 G.R. No. 143377, 20 February 2001, 352 SCRA 334, 346-347.

391 Phil. 303, 314 (2000), citing Melo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123686, 16 November 1999, 318
19

SCRA 94.

20 G.R. No. 135384, 4 April 2001, 356 SCRA 287, 294-295.

21G.R. Nos. 115755 & 116101, 4 December 2000, 346 SCRA 714, 720-721, citing Condo Suite Club
Travel, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 125671, January 28, 2000, 323 SCRA
679; Philippine Scout Veterans Security and Investigation Agency Inc. v. National Labor Relations
Commission, G.R. No. 124500, 4 December 1998, 299 SCRA 690, 694; Judy Phils., Inc. v. National
Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 111934, 29 April 1998, 289 SCRA 755, 764.
 22 G.R. No. 68291, 6 March 1991, 194 SCRA 743, 749-750.

23 REGISTRATION OF LAND, TITLES AND DEEDS, Antonio H. Noblejas, p. 431 (1992 revised ed.)

24Presidential Decre No. 1529, Section 105: "x x x After the tenant-farmer shall have fully complied with
the requirements for a grant of title under P.D. No. 27, an Emancipation Patent which may cover
previously titled or untitled property shall be issued by the Department of Agrarian Reform.

The Register of Deeds shall complete the entries on the aforementioned Emancipation Patent
and shall assign an original certificate of title in case of unregistered land, and in case of
registered property, shall issue the corresponding certificate of title without requiring the owner’s
duplicate of the title to be cancelled.x x x"

25 Amado D. Aquino, Land registration and related Proceedings, Chapter XII "Land Patents", p. 139;
citing Gomez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-77770, 15 December 1988, 168 SCRA 503, 511; Duran v.
Oliva, 113 Phil. 144, 148-149 (1961).

26 147 Phil. 301, 304 (1971).

Chapter IX: CERTIFICATE OF LAND TRANSFER, EMANCIPATION PATENT, AFFIDAVIT OF NON-

27

TENANCY.

28DARAB/RARAD Records, p. 472: "x x x It bears emphasis that a patent when registered in the
corresponding Register of Deeds is a veritable Torrens title and becomes as indefeasible as to the
Torrens title upon the expiration of one (1) year from the date of its issuance. Nullification of certificate
may be had only in a case directly attacking its validity but never collaterally."

29Under R.A. No. 6657, the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988, Agrarian Reform means the
"redistribution of lands, regardless of crops and fruits produced, to farmers and regular farmworkers who
are landless, irrespective of tenurial arrangement, x x x."

30 See DARAB records, p. 472.

c. Mercado v. Mercado, G.R. No. 178672, March 19, 2009

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 178672 March 19, 2009

JULIO MERCADO, Petitioner,

vs.
EDMUNDO MERCADO, Respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Julio Mercado (petitioner) was a tenant of an agricultural land (the property) owned by the grandfather of
Edmundo Mercado (respondent). In 1976, petitioner was issued a Certificate of Land Transfer1 (CLT) covering
the property pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 27. In 1982, he was issued an Emancipation Patent (EP).2
On August 1, 1994, respondent, relying on a Certificate of Retention (CR) issued in his name on the strength of
his grandfather’s Huling Habilin,3 filed a complaint4 against petitioner, for rescission of contract, cancellation of
the CLT and EP, payment of rentals in arrears, and ejectment, before the Provincial Adjudication Board
(PARAB), Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), docketed as DARAB Case No. 733-Bul-
94.

Respondent alleged that petitioner’s CLT and EP were irregularly issued as the property is covered by his CR,
and that petitioner had not been paying rentals on the property since 1979 despite repeated demands.

Respondent later amended his complaint by impleading the son of petitioner whom he allowed to erect a house
on the property.5

In his Answer,6 petitioner, invoking his rights under the EP, contends that respondent’s CR was anomalously
issued and, in any event, respondent’s claim is barred by the statute of limitations under Section 38 of Republic
Act No. 3844, as amended by Republic Act No. 6389.

The PARAB, declaring that petitioner’s EP was legally and validly issued, dismissed respondent’s complaint.7

On respondent’s appeal8 which was docketed as DARAB Case No. 4389, the DARAB, finding petitioner to
have deliberately failed to comply with the law, reversed the PARAB decision in this wise:

It is categorically admitted by respondent[-herein petitioner] Julio Mercado in his memorandum/position paper

dated 05 April 1995 that in 1981, he ceased paying lease rentals and instead paid his amortizations with the
Land Bank of the Philippines, Baliuag, Bulacan Branch. x x x To be precise, the payment of lease rentals to the
landowner terminates only on the date the value of the land is established. In a situation where the value of the
land is yet to be determined, the farmer-beneficiary shall continue paying the lease rentals to the landowner x x x
It is the assertion of [herein petitioner] that he paid his amortization with the Land Bank of the Philippines since
1981 but his evidence show[s] that he made payment with the LBP only in 1990 and 1992. It was not explained
where he brought the landowner’s share or the alleged amortizations from 1981 when he stopped paying the
lease rentals to the landowner as well as those from 1993 up to the filing of the instant case. Considering the
length of time that the respondent did not pay lease rentals nor paid amortizations, it can be safely concluded
that his omission is not merely simple but a deliberate non-compliance with the mandate of Presidential Decree
No. 816 x x x.

x x x x9 (Underscoring supplied)

The DARAB accordingly ordered, among other things, the rescission of the leasehold contract between
petitioner and respondent, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed Decision is hereby SET ASIDE and a new judgment is
rendered as follows:

1. Declaring the respondent Julio Mercado guilty of deliberate non-payment of lease rentals pursuant to
Section 3 of Presidential Decree No. 816 and Section 26 and 36 of Republic Act No. 3844, as amended;

2. Ordering the rescission of the leasehold contract between the plaintiff and respondent;

3. Ordering the ejectment of respondent Julio Mercado and all person or persons acting in his behalf to
vacate the area in dispute and deliver to the same to the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the
plaintiff-appellant herein;

4. The concerned official of the DAR is hereby directed to cause the cancellation of CLT No. 033197 and
CLT No. 033198 from its record considering that the land covered by said certificate had been certified
as retention areas;

5. All claims and counterclaims for damages are dismissed.

NO COSTS.
SO ORDERED.10 (Emphasis in the original, underscoring supplied)

The DARAB decision having become final and executory, a Writ of Execution11 was issued.

The finality of the DARAB decision notwithstanding, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for
Preliminary Injunction12 before the Court of Appeals which dismissed it, due to, in the main, the finality of the
DARAB decision.13

Petitioner thereupon filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari14 before this Court which it denied due to procedural
flaws.15

Undaunted, petitioner filed a Petition for Relief from Judgment16 of the DARAB decision before the DARAB itself
which denied the same. Petitioner went on to challenge the denial of the petition via Petition for Review17 before
the Court of Appeals, in which same petition he again sought the review of the DARAB decision on his appeal in
DARAB Case No. 4389,18 contending that:

1. The assailed decision in DARAB Case No. 4389 was rendered WITHOUT or IN EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION and is, therefore, NULL and VOID ab initio; and,

2. The Board seriously ERRED and/or GRAVELY ABUSED its discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when it issued the assailed resolutions denying the petition and petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration despite the miserable failure of respondent to produce any single authentic document
that would prima facie establish his ownership of the parcels of land in question to qualify him as a
"landlord" or "land owner" thereof and despite the clear showing therein that the complaint filed by
respondent, as well as the appeal he filed before the Board a quo, was barred under the Statute of
Limitations.

3. The Board seriously ERRED and/or GRAVELY ABUSED its discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when it rendered the assailed decision in violation of petitioner’s constitutional right to due
process of law.19 (Emphasis and italics in the original)

By Decision20 of March 21, 2007, the Court of Appeals denied petitioner’s petition as well as his Motion for
Reconsideration.21 Hence, the present petition22 which faults the Court of Appeals in deciding his petition "in a
way not in accord[ance with] law or with applicable decisions of [this] Court"23 and raises the same arguments he
raised before the Court of Appeals.24

The petition is bereft of merit.

The DARAB decision in DARAB Case No. 4389 had long become final and executory, hence, immutable and
unalterable. It may thus no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct
erroneous conclusions of fact or law.25 Excepted from this rule is when the modification involves correction of 1)
clerical errors, 2) nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party, and 3) void judgments.26 None of
these exceptions is present in the case at bar, however.

Petitioner insists that the decision in DARAB Case No. 4389 is void for having been rendered without
jurisdiction, there having been no more tenancy relationship between him and respondent after the issuance to
him of the EP.

Since jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the allegations in the complaint,27 a recital of the
following allegations of respondent in his Complaint which were reproduced substantially in his Amended
Complaint is in order:

xxxx

3. That plaintiff is the owner of a parcel of agricultural land, with an area of more than two (2) hectares and
located at Niugan, Angat, Bulacan; said land is being tenanted by the defendant, with whom plaintiff has
executed an agricultural leasehold contract in 1976 as shown by a copy of a document herewith attached as
Annex "A";
4. That as per said contract, defendant is obligated to pay plaintiff an annual rental of sixty (60) cavans of palay,
payable on two occasions, namely 25 cavans during the "panag-ulan" season; and 35 cavans during the "panag-
araw" season;

x x x x28 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Those allegations show the existence of the following elements of a tenancy relationship between the parties,
viz:

1) that the parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; 2) that the subject matter of the
relationship is an agricultural land; 3) that there is consent between the parties to the relationship; 4) that the
purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production; 5) that there is personal cultivation on the
part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and 6) that the harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant
or agricultural lessee.29

Precisely, respondent filed the complaint against petitioner to question the regularity of the issuance to petitioner
of the EP on which EP petitioner anchors his denial of the existence of a tenancy relationship. Ayo-Alburo v.
Matobato30 instructs:

The mere issuance of an emancipation patent does not put the ownership of the agrarian reform beneficiary
beyond attack and scrutiny. Emancipation patents may be cancelled for violations of agrarian laws, rules and
regulations. Section 12(g) of P.D. 946 (issued on June 17, 1976) vested the then Court of Agrarian Relations
with jurisdiction over cases involving the cancellation of emancipation patents issued under P.D. 266. Exclusive
jurisdiction over such cases was later lodged with the DARAB under Section 1 of Rule 11 of the DARAB Rules of
Procedure.31(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Jurisdiction over a case does not thus disappear the moment a certificate of title is issued, for the issuance of
such certificate is not a mode of transfer of property but merely an evidence of such transfer.32

IN ANY EVENT, petitioner may not question the jurisdiction of the DARAB and its adjudicative arm at this late
juncture of the proceedings, he having actively participated in the proceedings below.33

Respecting the affirmance by the appellate court of the denial by the DARAB of petitioner’s Petition for Relief
from Judgment, Rule XVI of the 2003 DARAB Rules of Procedure provides the following conditions for availing
of such relief:

Section 1. Petition for Relief from Decision/Resolution/Final Order. When a decision/resolution/final order is
rendered by the adjudicator against any party, through fraud, accident, mistake, and excusable negligence and
such party has no other adequate remedy available to him in the ordinary course of law, he may file a petition for
relief with said adjudicator, praying that the decision/resolution/final order be set aside. (Underscoring supplied)1avvphi1

Section 2. Form and Time of Filing of Petition. A petition for relief must be verified and a copy thereof together
with its annexes and supporting affidavits, if any, must be furnished to the adverse party or parties and filed
within sixty (60) days from the time the fraud, mistake or excusable negligence was discovered and within six (6)
months after the decision/resolution/final order was rendered. (Underscoring supplied)

Relief from judgment is thus available only against the decision of an adjudicator, to be filed before the
adjudicator, when the party seeking it has no other adequate remedy available to him in the ordinary course of
law. In the case at bar, petitioner sought relief from the decision of the DARAB, not that of the adjudicator, before
the DARAB.34 This leaves it unnecessary to pass upon the other glaring flaws attendant to petitioner’s Petition
for Relief from Judgment.

As for petitioner’s plaint of having been deprived of due process, thus:

x x x Indeed it was unfortunate that, instead of granting petitioner a new period within which to file the answer in
view of the sudden withdrawal of his counsel during the very limited period of ten (10) days, the DARAB resolved
the appeal without such answer or comment even as it sat on the case for a period of six (6) years without
resolving the same. To be sure, petitioner’s failure to submit his answer or comment could only be attributed to
his lack of education, old age and inability to immediately hire a new lawyer within the said 10-day period.

Petitioner’s lack of education and understanding of the legal requirements and formalities of a lawsuit is
buttressed by the fact that he even allowed himself to be later represented by a non-lawyer, Ms. Edna R. Boja,
before the Court a quo[,]35

the same fails. For the records show otherwise. Parenthetically, even petitioner’s new counsel conceded in his
Manifestation36 filed before the DARAB that:

xxxx

. . . upon the engagement of the undersigned counsel by herein defendant/appelle[e] beyond the period given
within which to submit his appellee’s memorandum, and after the records and documents were finally handed
over to the undersigned for evaluation, no new matters were presented in the appeal memorandum as to justify
a reconsideration or a reversal of the decision dated June 6, 1995;

4. That, the appealed decision is fully supported by the evidences adduced by both parties; hence, the findings
thereof, need not be disturbed but fully confirmed by the appellate board;37 (Underscoring supplied)

The Court of Appeals’ finding in its challenged decision that petitioner had been negligent in not protecting his
right is thus well-taken.

xxxx

With respect to the decision of the PARAD, respondent Edmundo filed his appeal memorandum. Petitioner
Julio’s former counsel, Atty. Antonio Castro, was supposed to file answer or comment to the said appeal
memorandum within ten days from October 26, 1995. Instead of filing the same, Atty. Castro filed a
Manifestation and Motion to Withdraw as counsel with petitioner Julio’s consent.38

After the lapse of eleven months, or on September 19, 1996, he secured the services of Atty. Glicerio Sampana.
The case was eventually decided after the lapse of 6 [sic] years without him having filed his answer or comment
thereto. He should have at least followed up the status of his case within that span of time with the help of his
lawyer but sadly, he did not.

He even elevated the case to this Court but the same was dismissed due to the fact that the assailed decision
had already become final and executory. While this Court subscribes to the principles of liberality in the
availment of due process, in the interest of justice, the same should be extended to those who are vigilant in the
protection of one’s rights.39 (Underscoring supplied)

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 21, 2007 is
AFFIRMED.

Double costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
 PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA*
Associate Justice Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that
the conclusions in the above decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

Footnotes

* Additional member per Special Order No. 571 dated February 12, 2009 in lieu of Justice Dante O.
Tinga who is on leave.

1 DARAB records, pp. 24-25.

2 Id. at 23; rollo, pp. 112-113.

3 Vide CA rollo, p. 363; rollo, pp. 114-115.

4 DARAB records, pp. 1-6.

5 The records do not show what happened to the complaint against the son.

6 DARAB records, pp. 28-45, 63-71.

7 Id. at 112-116.

8 Id. at 117.

9 Id. at 165-166.

10 Id. at 162-163.

11 Id. at 196-198.

12 CA rollo, pp. 130-140

13 Id. at 141-142.

14 Id. at 145-158.

15 Id. at 159-160.

16 Id. at 202-229.

17 Id. at 2-45.

18 Id. at 3-4.

19 Id. at 15-16.

20
Penned by Court of Appeals Associate Justice Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando, with the concurrence
of Associate Justices Jose C. Mendoza and Ramon M. Bato, Jr.; id. at 442-457.

21 Id. at 482-485.

22 Rollo, pp. 28-72.

23 Id. at 42.

24 Vide rollo, pp. 42-67.

25Vide Biglang-awa v. Philippine Trust Company, G.R. No. 158998, March 28, 2008, 550 SCRA 160,
177.

26 Ibid.

27 Villacastin v. Pelaez, G.R. No. 170478, May 22, 2008, 554 SCRA 189, 194.

28 DARAB records, p. 6.

29 Morta, Sr. v. Occidental, 367 Phil. 438, 446 (1999).

30 G.R. No. 155181, April 15, 2005, 456 SCRA 399.

31 Id. at 409.

32 Vide Hermoso v. C.L. Realty Corporation, G.R. No. 140319, May 5, 2006, 489 SCRA 556, 563.

33 Vide ibid.

34 Vide CA rollo, pp. 202-204.

35 Rollo, p. 63. Vide DARAB records, p. 144.

36 Id. at 149.

37 Ibid.

38 CA rollo, p. 456.

39 Id. at 456-457.
 d. Gabriel v. Jamias, G.R. No. 156482, September 17, 2008

FIRST DIVISION

PEDRO GABRIEL, FERNANDO G.R. No. 156482

JAMIAS, ALFREDO NIEDO,
MABINI JAMIAS, BRAULIO Present:
TANGO, MARIANO ECHAVARI,
ISIDRO RECITES, BERNARDO PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
BAQUIRIN, FERMIN JAMIAS, CORONA,
FRANCISCO NIEDO, GAVINO CARPIO MORALES*,
JAMIAS, JULIANO ORBILLO, AZCUNA, and
ROSENDO NIEDO, PACITA A. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, JJ.
QUIO, JESUS CACHO,
REICARDO TAGANAS,
BERNARDO PECIO,
CELESTINO NIEDO,
FRANCISCO TUBERA, JUAN
NIEDO, CONSOLACIO DINGAL,
SOFRONIO NIEDO,
ROSALINDA JAMIAS &
DOMINGO PARSASO,
Petitioners,

- versus -

MURMURAY JAMIAS,
INANAMA JAMIAS DE LARA,
LIWAWA JAMIAS DE LOS
REYES, LANGIT JAMIAS,
DALISAY JAMIAS & ISAGANI
JAMIAS,
Respondents. Promulgated:

September 17, 2008

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

In this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of

Court, petitioners seek the reversal and setting aside of the following issuances of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 73197, to wit:

1) Resolution dated October 18, 2002,[1] dismissing their petition for review of
the decision dated September 12, 2002 of the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (DARAB), Diliman, Quezon City;[2] and

2) Resolution dated December 17, 2002,[3] denying petitioners motion for

reconsideration.

The root of the controversy in this case is a large tract of rice land known as the
Jamias Estate, with a total area of 36.5794 hectares situated in Bantog, Asingan,
Pangasinan and originally covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 23299 in the
names of the now deceased spouses Martin and Delfina Jamias.

Upon Martin Jamias death in 1958, his wife, Delfina, and six (6) children, who
are the respondents herein, namely Inanama, Murmuray, Langit, Dalisay, Liwawa and
Isagani, all surnamed Jamias, inherited the Jamias Estate. Immediately thereafter,
said heirs partitioned among themselves the whole property at 1/7 each for which
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 36192 was issued in their names on June 20,
1961. Eventually, on November 7, 1972, the heirs were issued their separate and
individual titles corresponding to their respective portions of the estate, which, as
found by the DARAB, were as follows:

NAMES AREA/HAS. TCT NO. LOCATION/PANGASINAN

Inanama 5.1826 T-5920 Bantog, Asingan

Murmuray 5.1826 T-5919 do
1.0210 T-5955 do
6.2036
Langit 5.1826 T-5923 do
0.9169 T-5958 do
6.0995
Dalisay 5.1826 T-5922 do
1.5809 T-5954 do
6.7635
Liwawa 5.1826 T-5925 do
2.2529 T-5956 do
7.4355
Isagani 5.1826 T-5921 do
1.2381 T-5935 Libertad, Tayug
7.6707
Delfina 5.1826 T-5924 Bantog, Asingan
1.6532 T-1874/T-18703 Amestad
2.4521 TD 15743-TD15744 San Roque, San Nicolas
1.5298 TD 16442 Legaspi, Tayug
10.8177

On November 29, 1980, Delfina Jamias died. However, on May 15, 1981, the whole
Jamias Estate was covered by Operation Land Transfer (OLT) pursuant to
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 27.[4] Having been identified by the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR) as farmer-beneficiaries, herein petitioners (tenants on the
said land) were issued Certificates of Land Transfer (CLTs).

Claiming that their landholdings were erroneously covered by OLT since they
already have individual Torrens titles covering the same, respondents filed, with
the DAR on July 12, 1981, a petition/application for exemption/retention of seven (7)
hectares each of the Jamias Estate and for the cancellation of the CLTs issued to the
petitioners covering portions thereof. During the pendency of the said petition, or
on September 21, 1983, emancipation patents were issued and distributed by
the DAR to the petitioners.

Eventually, on March 17, 1986,[5] then DAR Minister Conrado Estrella granted
the respondents petition/application, thus:

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Order is hereby issued:

1. Granting and giving due course to the petition of Inanama, Murmuray,

Langit, Dalisay, Liwawa and Isagani, all surnamed Jamias, to retain not
more that seven (7) hectares each of their tenanted Riceland situated at
Bant[o]g, Asingan, Pangasinan;

2. Recalling and/or canceling the Certificates of Land Transfer covering

portions of the retained areas issued to the tenants;

3. The landowner shall maintain the tenants in the peaceful possession and
cultivation of the landholding under leasehold;

4. Directing the DAR District Officer of Urdaneta, Pangasinan to prepare and

issue the Certificates of Agricultural Leasehold (CAL) in favor of the herein
tenants;

5. Authorizing the [respondents] to withdraw the lease rentals deposited by

the tenants with the Land Bank, in his favor if there are any.

SO ORDERED.
The petitioners filed an Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration[6] of the aforesaid Order
on the ground that the same was unsupported by the law and the facts and has been
rendered moot and academic by the issuance of CLTs and, then later, of
emancipation patents in their names.

Meanwhile, sometime in 1987, Torrens titles covering the landholdings subject

of the emancipation patents earlier issued to the petitioners were personally
distributed to the latter by the then President of the Philippines, Corazon C. Aquino.

On May 20, 1991, then DAR Secretary Benjamin Leong issued an

[7]
Order affirming with modification the assailed Order of March 17, 1986. Among
others, it was declared in his Order that the cancellation/revocation of the
emancipation patents which were issued to the tenants within the retained areas
should be made before a proper court.The dispositive portion of the said Order reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Order is hereby issued denying the
instant Omnibus Motion for lack of merit and affirming the Order dated March 17,
1986 of this Department with the following modifications:

1. The landholdings of Inanama, Murmuray, Langit and Dalisay all

surnamed Jamias being less than seven (7) hectares each, are exempted from
the coverage of Operation Land Transfer, while Delfina, Isagani and Liwawa,
all surnamed Jamias, are entitled to retain not more than seven (7) hectares of
their landholdings and the excess areas thereof should be covered under OLT.

2. Directing the issuance of Certificates of Land Transfer, if none has yet

been issued, to the tenants within the excess areas of the landholdings of
Delfina, Isagani and Liwawa.

3. This Order shall serve as a basis for the cancellation/revocation before

the proper court of the Emancipation Patents (EPs) issued to the tenants within
the exempt/retained areas and which are already registered.

SO ORDERED.

Seeking the nullification of the two (2) aforementioned Orders of the DAR for allegedly
having been executed with grave abuse of discretion considering that titles were
already issued to them, the petitioners filed a petition for certiorari[8] before the CA. In
its decision dated April 21, 1992,[9] the CA, ruling that the distribution of land titles to
the petitioners was improper considering that the same was made during the
pendency of respondents petition/application for exemption/retention with the DAR,
dismissed for lack of merit the petition for certiorari declaring that:
The mere distribution of land titles to petitioners consequently posed no legal
impediment to the ultimate resolution of the pending petition of respondents for
retention of portions of lands already previously distributed.
Petitioners appealed the CAs April 21, 1992 Decision to this Court. However, in a
Resolution dated September 20, 1995, the Court denied the petition for failure to
sufficiently show that the CA had committed any reversible error in the questioned
judgment. The Courts resolution subsequently became final and executory as shown
in the Entry of Judgment dated February 5, 1996[10] issued by the Supreme Court
Judicial Records Office.
Thereafter, respondents filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution of
the DAR Order dated May 20, 1991 with the DAR Regional Office in San Fernando,
La Union.On September 11, 1997, the DAR Regional Director issued a
Resolution[11] granting the motion but pertinently directed the respondents to file with
the DARAB an action for the cancellation or recall of the emancipation patents
covering the retained areas. To quote from the Resolution:

WHEREFORE, by virtue of the authority vested in me by law and the Implementing

guidelines thereof, Order is hereby issued:

1) Directing the Provincial Agrarian Reform Office (PARO) of Pangasinan

or his duly authorized representatives to implement the Order dated
March 17, 1986 as affirmed by the Order dated May 20, 1991 as to the
segregation of the retention area and the documentation of the coverage
relative to the excess on the landholdings of Delfina, Isagani and
Liwawa, all surnamed Jamias;

2) Directing the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office (MARO) of Asingan,

Pangasinan to cause the execution of leasehold contracts between the
[respondents] and the tenants within the retention area;

3) Directing the tenants within the retained areas to pay the lease rentals
due to the [respondents], respectively;

4) Directing the [respondents] to file an action to (sic) the

Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) for
the cancellation or recall of the Emancipation Patents covering the
retained areas.

SO ORDERED. [Emphasis supplied]

Pursuant to the aforecited Resolution, respondents separately filed on June 5,

1998 with the DARAB, Region I, Urdaneta City, Pangasinan, their respective
petitions[12] for cancellation and recall of the emancipation patents covering the
exempt/retained areas.

The petitioners forthwith moved for a dismissal of the petitions on the main ground of
lack of jurisdiction of the DARAB Regional Office. Petitioners motion, however, as well
as their subsequent motion for reconsideration, were denied as per Orders
dated November 16, 1998 and January 7, 1999,[13] respectively.
In their Position Paper before the DARAB,[14] respondents averred that the
jurisdiction of the DARAB to hear and decide the issue as to the cancellation of the
subject emancipation patents has already become a foregone conclusion and the
same is true with respect to their exercise of retention rights as the issue was already
decided with finality by this Court. The petitioners, on the other hand, alleged in their
Position Paper[15] the following: lack of jurisdiction of the DARAB over the action; no
erroneous coverage of the subject land under OLT since it was the President of the
Philippines who personally distributed the land titles; and respondents lack of
entitlement to retention rights because they did not signify any intention to cultivate
the land.
In a consolidated decision dated June 21, 1999,[16] the DARAB Regional Office,
through the Regional Adjudicator, ruled in favor of the respondents and rendered
judgment, as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises duly considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1. Declaring the emancipation patents issued in the name of the [petitioners] in these
seven (7) cases to be cancelled or null and void on the ground that the landholding is
the retained area of the [respondents];
2. Directing the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan and the DAR Chief of
Operations to effect the cancellation of the Emancipation Patent issued to the
[petitioners], the numbers of which are as follows:

xxxx
3.Ordering the Register of Deeds to reinstate or restore the titles of the
[respondents] which are TCT Nos. 5919, 5955, 5924, 5920, 5925, 5956, 5923, 5922,
5954, 5921, and 5953 if the same have been cancelled; and

4. Directing the tenants in the retained areas and the respective owners thereof
to execute an Agricultural Leasehold Contract with the assistance of the MARO of
Asingan, Pangasinan.

SO ORDERED.

Reiterating the same arguments they earlier made with the DARAB Regional
Office, the petitioners appealed to the DARAB, Central Office in Diliman, Quezon
City.[17]
In its Decision dated September 12, 2002,[18] however, the DARAB, Central Office
affirmed the decision of the Regional Adjudicator and accordingly dismissed
petitioners appeal.

In time, petitioners went to the CA on a petition for review under Rule 43 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 73197.
 Eventually, in its Resolution dated October 18, 2002,[19] which is subject of the
present petition, the CA dismissed outright petitioners petition for review due to
deficiency in form and substance for failure to incorporate and/or attach, as annexes
thereto, documents/pleadings materially referred to therein in violation of Paragraph
[c],[20]Section 6, Rule 43 in relation to Section 7, Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure.

The petitioners moved for reconsideration of the aforesaid Resolution, pointing

out that the pleadings enumerated by the CA which they did not attach to their petition
were not material to the legal issues they raised therein which were (a) lack of
jurisdiction of the DARAB and (2) lack/denial of due process.[21]

The CA, in its Resolution of December 17, 2002,[22] denied petitioners motion
for reconsideration.

Hence, the instant petition before the Court.

Petitioners raise as grounds for the present petition for review on certiorari
that: (a) the DARAB has no jurisdiction to cancel and recall emancipation patents and
the land titles issued consequent thereto; (b) respondents have no retention rights
over the subject land; and (c) petitioners emancipation patents which were given to
them by the President cannot be cancelled by the orders of any subordinate.

The petition must fail.

At the outset, we note that the two (2) CA Resolutions assailed herein dismissed
petitioners appeal from the DARAB issuances on purely technical grounds. Yet, the
petition before this Court neither mentions nor presents arguments with regard to the
CAs dismissal on procedural grounds. Nonetheless, whether petitioners omission was
done intentionally or inadvertently, this Court sees fit to address the procedural issues
if only to underscore the correctness of the dismissal of said petition.

Under Rule 43, Section 6(c) of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a petition for
review shall be accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original or a certified true
copy of the award, judgment, final order or resolution appealed from, together with
certified true copies of such material portions of the record referred to therein and
other supporting papers. Failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the
requirements of a petition for review is sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition
pursuant to Section 7 of the same Rule.[23]
 Here, it is not disputed that the petitioners failed to attach to their petition filed
with the CA copies of the following documents and/or pleadings referred to therein:

(a) Petition for the recall and cancellation of emancipation patents;

(b) Appeal memorandum dated October 1, 1999 filed by Barolo Pablo, et. al;
(c) Petition to retain 7 hectares;
(d) Order dated March 17, 1986 of then Minister Estella;
(e) Omnibus motion for reconsideration filed on April 17, 1986;
(f) Petition for certiorari filed with the Court of Appeals docketed as SP 25399;
(g) Decision of the Court of Appeals dated April 21, 1992;
(h) Petition filed with the Supreme Court docketed as G.R. No. 107043;
(i) Resolution dated September 20, 1995 of the Supreme Court in G.R. No.
107043;
(j) Motion for the issuance of writ of execution;
(k) Order dated November 16, 1998;
(l) Motion to dismiss;
(m) Order dated November 16, 1998;
(n) Motion for reconsideration;
(o) Order dated January 7, 1999;
(p) Decision dated June 21, 1999; and
(q) Appeal memorandum filed with DARAB.[24]

Petitioners assertion in their motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of their

petition that (a) the foregoing documents/pleadings were not material to the issues
they raised and (b) anyway, the records of the case may be ordered elevated by the
CA, cannot excuse them from failing to comply with a requirement of a petition for
review under Rule 43. We reiterate here that the right to appeal is neither a natural
right nor a part of due process as it is merely a statutory privilege and may be
exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law. [25] Save
for the most persuasive of reasons, strict compliance with procedural rules is enjoined
to facilitate the orderly administration of justice.[26] Thus, one who seeks to avail of the
right to appeal must comply with the requirements of the Rules. Failure to do so often
leads to the loss of the right to appeal.[27]
But even if such procedural infirmity was to be disregarded, the petition must
still fail for lack of merit.
Arguing that the cancellation of certificates of title is civil in nature and not
agrarian, the petitioners insist that proceedings must be with the regular courts and
not with the DARAB.

We are not persuaded.

It is well-settled that the DAR, through its adjudication arm, i.e., the DARAB and
its regional and provincial adjudication boards, exercises quasi-judicial functions and
jurisdiction on all matters pertaining to an agrarian dispute or controversy and the
implementation of agrarian reform laws.[28] Pertinently, it is provided in the DARAB
Revised Rules of Procedure that the DARAB has primary and exclusive jurisdiction,
both original and appellate, to determine and adjudicate all agrarian disputes involving
the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) and
related agrarian reform laws. Such jurisdiction shall extend to cases involving the
issuance, correction and cancellation of Certificates of Land Ownership Award
(CLOAs) and Emancipation Patents which are registered with the Land Registration
Authority.[29]

This Court has had the occasion to rule that the mere issuance of an emancipation
patent does not put the ownership of the agrarian reform beneficiary beyond attack
and scrutiny. Emancipation patents may be cancelled for violations of agrarian laws,
rules and regulations. Section 12(g) of P.D. No. 946 (issued on June 17, 1976) vested
the then Court of Agrarian Relations with jurisdiction over cases involving the
cancellation of emancipation patents issued under P.D. No. 266. Exclusive jurisdiction
over such cases was later lodged with the DARAB under Section 1 of Rule II of the
DARAB Rules of Procedure.[30]

For sure, the jurisdiction of the DARAB cannot be deemed to disappear the
moment a certificate of title is issued, for, such certificates are not modes of transfer
of property but merely evidence of such transfer, and there can be no valid transfer of
title should the CLOA, on which it was grounded, be void.[31] The same holds true in
the case of a certificate of title issued by virtue of a void emancipation patent.

From the foregoing, it is therefore undeniable that it is the DARAB and not the
regular courts which has jurisdiction herein, this notwithstanding the issuance
of Torrenstitles in the names of the petitioners. For, it is a fact that the
petitioners Torrens titles emanated from the emancipation patents previously issued
to them by virtue of being the farmer-beneficiaries identified by the DAR under the
OLT of the government. The DAR ruling that the said emancipation patents were
erroneously issued for failing to consider the valid retention rights of respondents had
already attained finality. Considering that the action filed by respondents with the
DARAB was precisely to annul the emancipation patents issued to the petitioners, the
case squarely, therefore, falls within the jurisdiction of the DARAB. As likewise
correctly held by the DARAB in its decision:[32]
x x x the present case for cancellation of the EPs is a mere off-shoot of the
administrative petition for retention filed by the petitioners as early as 1981. That
previous case culminated in a decision upholding petitioners right of retention. The
case at bar is for cancellation of the EPs. Hence, the present case is an incident
 flowing from the earlier decision of the administrative agency and affirmed judicially
involving the same parties and relating to the same lands.

As for petitioners arguments regarding respondents retention rights and the

validity of the DARs orders directing the filing of an action for cancellation of
petitioners emancipation patents, suffice it to state that these issues were already
subject of the proceedings on the petition for retention filed by respondents in 1981.
The DAR Orders of March 17, 1986 and May 20, 1991 which declared respondents
entitlement to retention rights over the subject land and directing the filing of the
appropriate action for the cancellation of petitioners emancipation patents have
attained finality as shown by this Courts Entry of Judgment dated February 5,
1996. Indeed, the proceedings before the DARAB now being assailed here (i.e.
respondents petitions to cancel petitioners emancipation patents) were merely in
execution or implementation of the DAR Orders of March 17, 1986 and May 20,
1991 which have long since become final and executory. Indeed, this Court looks with
disfavor upon the present attempt of petitioners to avoid execution of the
said DAR Orders by litigating anew in this petition matters already previously passed
upon with finality by the DAR and the appellate courts, including this Court.

Under DAR Administrative Order No. 02, Series of 1994,[33] that the subject land
is found to be exempt/excluded from P.D. No. 27/E.O. No. 228 or CARP coverage or
to be part of the landowners retained area as determined by the DAR Secretary or his
authorized representative is a ground for cancellation of an emancipation patent.
Thus, this Court finds no reason to disturb the DARABs order directing the
cancellation of petitioners emancipation patents.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the Resolutions dated October 18,
2002 and December 17, 2003 of the Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED.
Costs against the petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:
 REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Chairperson

RENATO C. CORONA CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in
the above decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned
to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

[1] Rollo, pp. 17-19.

[2] The DARAB decision dated September 12, 2002 affirmed the Regional Adjudicators decision declaring the
cancellation of the Emancipation Patents issued in the names of the petitioners.
[3] Rollo, pp. 23-24.
[4] P.D. No. 27 decreed the emancipation of tenants from the bondage of the soil and transferred to them the

ownership of the land they till. It was promulgated on October 21, 1972.
[5] Record, pp. 27-31.
[6] Rollo, pp. 48-53.
[7] Rollo, pp. 48-54.
[8] Docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 25399 entitled Mariano Echavaria et al. v. Benjamin T. Leong as Secretary of DAR

and Inanama Jamias.

[9] Rollo, pp. 78-90.
[10] Record, p. 182.
[11] Id., pp.172-175.
[12] Docketed as DARAB Case Nos. 01-1661 to 01-1667 EP 99; Record, Folders DCN 9368-9374.
[13] Record, pp. 116-117 and pp. 121-129.
[14] Rollo, pp. 64-66.
[15] Id., pp. 56-62.
[16] Record, pp. 312-329.
[17] The appeal was docketed as DARAB Case Nos. 9368-9374; Records, pp. 348-355.
[18] Rollo, pp. 34-44.
[19] Supra note 1.
[20] Erroneously indicated as Paragraph (b) of Section 6 in the CA Resolution.
[21] Rollo, pp. 20-21.
[22] Supra note 2.
[23] In full, this section reads:

Sec. 7. Effect of failure to comply with requirements. The failure of the petitioner to comply with any of
the foregoing requirements regarding the payment of the docket and other lawful fees, the deposit for
costs, proof of service of the petition, and the contents of and the documents which should accompany
the petition shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal thereof.
[24] Supra note 1.
[25] Marison C. Basuel v. Fact-Finding and Intelligence Bureau (FFIB), G.R. No. 143664, June 30, 2006, 494 SCRA 118,

123.
[26] Id., p. 126.
[27] Neypes v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 141524, September 14, 2005, 469 SCRA 633, 638.
[28] Hermoso v. C.L. Realty Corporation, G.R. No. 140319, May 5, 2006, 489 SCRA 556, 562.
[29] Section 1(f), Rule II of DARAB Revised Rules of Procedure.
[30] Ayo-Alburo v. Matobato, G. R. No. 155181, April 15, 2005, 456 SCRA 399, 409
[31] Supra note 28, p. 563.
[32] Supra note 17.
[33] Grounds for the cancellation of registered EPs or CLOAs may include but not be limited to the following:

1. Misuse or diversion of financial and support services extended to the ARB (Section 37 of
R.A. No. 6657);
2. Misuse of the land (Section 22 of R.A. No. 6657);
3. Material misrepresentation of the ARBs basic qualification as provided under Section 22 of
R.A. No. 6657, P.D. No. 27 and other agrarian laws;
4. Illegal conversion by the ARB (Cf. Section 73, Paragraph C and E of R.A. No. 6657);
5. Sale, transfer, lease or other forms of conveyance by a beneficiary of the right to use or any
other usufructuary right over the land acquired by virtue of being a beneficiary. In order to circumvent
the provisions of Section 73 of R.A. No. 6657, P.D. No. 27 and other agrarian laws. However, if the land
has been acquired under P.D. No. 27/E.O. No. 228, ownership may be transferred after full payment of
amortization by the beneficiary (Sec. 6 of E.O. No. 228);
6. Default in the obligation to pay an aggregate of three (3) consecutive amortizations
in case of voluntary land transfer/direct payment scheme except in cases of fortuitous events
and force majeure;
7. Failure of the ARBs to pay for at least three (3) annual amortizations to the LBP,
except in cases of fortuitous events and force majeure (Section 26 of RA 6657);
8. Neglect or abandonment of the awarded land continuously for a period of two (2)
calendar years as determined by the Secretary or his authority represented (Section 22 0f RA
6657);
9. The land is found to be expect/excluded from P.D. No. 27/E.O. No. 228 or CARP
coverage or to be part of the landowners retained area as determined by the Secretary
or his authorized representative; and
10. Other grounds that will circumvent laws related to the implementation of agrarian
reform program. (Emphasis supplied)

e. Mago v. Barbin, G.R. No. 173923, October 12, 2009

THIRD DIVISION
 PEDRO MAGO (deceased), G.R. No. 173923
represented by his spouse
SOLEDAD MAGO, AUGUSTO Present:
MAGO (deceased), represented by
his spouse NATIVIDAD MAGO, CARPIO, J., Chairperson,
and ERNESTO MAGO, represented CHICO-NAZARIO,
by LEVI MAGO, VELASCO, JR.,
Petitioners, NACHURA, and
PERALTA, JJ.

- versus -

JUANA Z. BARBIN,
Respondent. Promulgated:
October 12, 2009
x----------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This is a petition for review[1] of the Decision[2] dated 20 October 2005 and the
Resolution dated 13 July 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 87370.

The Facts

On 11 November 1994, respondent Juana Z. Barbin filed with the Provincial

Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) of Camarines Norte an action for Cancellation
of Emancipation Patents, Disqualification of Tenant-Beneficiary, Repossession and
Damages. Respondent alleged that she is the owner in fee simple of an irrigated
riceland located in Barangay Guinacutan, Vinzons, Camarines Norte, with an area of
4.7823 hectares, and that Augusto Mago, Crispin Mago, Ernesto Mago, and Pedro
Mago were tenants of the subject landholding. Respondent further alleged that
petitioners violated the terms of their leasehold contracts when they failed to pay lease
rentals for more than two years, which is a ground for their dispossession of the
landholding.

On the other hand, petitioners alleged that the subject landholding was placed under
the Operation Land Transfer program of the government pursuant to Presidential
Decree No. 27 (PD 27).[3] Respondents title, OCT No. P-4672, was then cancelled and
the subject landholding was transferred to Augusto Mago,[4] Crispin Mago,[5] Ernesto
Mago,[6] and Pedro Mago,[7] who were issued Emancipation Patents on 20 February
1987 by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). The Transfer Certificates of Title
issued to petitioners[8] emanating from the Emancipation Patents were registered with
the Registry of Deeds on 9 February 1989. Petitioners averred that prior to the
issuance of the Emancipation Patents, they already delivered their lease rentals to
respondent. They further alleged that after the issuance of the Emancipation Patents,
the subject landholding ceased to be covered by any leasehold contract.

In a Decision[9] dated 30 January 1997, the PARAD denied the petition for lack of
merit. The PARAD found that in her petition for retention and exemption from the
coverage of the Operation Land Transfer, and cancellation of Certificates of Land
Transfer, filed before the DAR, respondent admitted that aside from the 6.7434
hectares of riceland, she also owns other agricultural lands with an aggregate of
16.8826 hectares consisting of cocolands. The PARAD held that the subject
landholding is clearly covered by the Operation Land Transfer under Letter of
Instruction No. 474 (LOI 474).[10] Under LOI 474, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos
directed the Secretary of Agrarian Reform to place under the Land Transfer Program
of the government pursuant to PD 27 all tenanted rice/corn lands with areas of seven
hectares or less belonging to landowners who own other agricultural lands of more
than seven hectares in aggregate areas or lands used for residential, commercial,
industrial or other urban purposes from which they derive adequate income to support
themselves and their families.

The PARAD further held that pursuant to DAR Memorandum Circular No. 6, series of
1978, payment of lease rentals to landowners covered by the Operation Land Transfer
shall terminate on the date the value of the land is established. Thus, the PARAD held
that the proper recourse of respondent is to file a claim for just compensation.

On appeal, the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) reversed

and set aside the PARAD Decision. The dispositive portion of the DARAB Decision
dated 18 June 2004 reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated 30 January 1997 is hereby

REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new judgment is hereby entered:

1. ORDERING the Register of Deeds of Camarines Norte to cancel EP Nos. 745, 747, and 749 issued in the
name of Augusto Mago, Ernesto Mago, and Pedro Mago respectively, and
2. DIRECTING the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer of Vinzons, Camarines Norte, to reallocate the subject
lands to qualified beneficiaries.

SO ORDERED.[11]
The DARAB held that when the subject landholding was placed under the Operation
Land Transfer, the tenancy relationship between the parties ceased and the tenant-
beneficiaries were no longer required to pay lease rentals to the landowner. However,
when petitioners entered into an agreement with respondent for a direct payment
scheme embodied in the Deeds of Transfer, petitioners obligated themselves to pay
their amortizations to respondent who is the landowner. The DARAB found that except
for Crispin Mago, who had fully paid his tillage, petitioners defaulted in their obligation
to pay their amortization for more than three consecutive years from the execution of
the Deeds of Transfer in July 1991. Under DAR Administrative Order No. 2, series of
1994, one of the grounds for cancellation of registered Emancipation Patents is when
there is default in the obligation to pay an aggregate of three consecutive
amortizations in case of direct payment schemes. Thus, the DARAB ruled that the
cancellation of the Emancipation Patents issued to petitioners is warranted in this
case.

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, which the DARAB denied for lack of
merit. Petitioners then appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the DARAB
Decision and thereafter denied petitioners motion for reconsideration. Hence, this
petition.

The Court of Appeals Ruling

The Court of Appeals held that the mere issuance of an Emancipation Patent to a
qualified farmer-beneficiary is not absolute and can be attacked anytime upon
showing of any irregularity in its issuance or non-compliance with the conditions
attached to it. The Emancipation Patent is subject to the condition that amortization
payments be remitted promptly to the landowner and that failure to comply with this
condition is a ground for cancellation under DAR Administrative Order No. 02, series
of 1994. The Court of Appeals found that petitioners failed to comply with this
condition since petitioners failed to prove that they have remitted the amortizations
due to the landowner in accordance with their agreed direct payment scheme
embodied in the Deeds of Transfer.

The Issues

Petitioners contend that:

1. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THE

PETITIONERS LIABLE FOR VIOLATING DAR ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO.
02, SERIES OF 1994;

2. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE

DECISION OF THE HONORABLE DAR ADJUDICATOR IN ORDERING THE
CANCELLATION OF THE EMANCIPATION TITLES ISSUED TO THE
PETITIONERS-FARMER BENEFICIARIES DESPITE THE LAPSE OF ONE (1)
YEAR WHICH RENDERS THE SAID TITLES INDEFEASIBLE PURSUANT TO
THE LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE;
 3. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THE
RECEIPTS EVIDENCING PAYMENTS OF THE DISPUTED AMORTIZATION
WHICH WERE FORMALLY OFFERED AND CONSIDERED BY THE
HONORABLE DAR PROVINCIAL ADJUDICATOR OF CAMARINES NORTE
(PARAD) IN DECIDING THE CASE AS SHOWN IN THE DECISION DATED
JANUARY 30, 1997.[12]

The Ruling of the Court

We find the petition without merit.

Petitioners argue that the Emancipation Patents and Transfer Certificates of Title
issued to them which were already registered with the Register of Deeds have already
become indefeasible and can no longer be cancelled.

We do not adhere to petitioners view. This Court has already ruled that the mere
issuance of an emancipation patent does not put the ownership of the agrarian reform
beneficiary beyond attack and scrutiny.[13] Emancipation patents issued to agrarian
reform beneficiaries may be corrected and cancelled for violations of agrarian laws,
rules and regulations. In fact, DAR Administrative Order No. 02, series of 1994, which
was issued in March 1994, enumerates the grounds for cancellation of registered
Emancipation Patents or Certificates of Landownership Award:

Grounds for the cancellation of registered EPs [Emancipation Patents] or CLOAs [Certificates
of Landownership Award] may include but not be limited to the following:

1. Misuse or diversion of financial and support services extended to the ARB [Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries];
(Section 37 of R.A. No. 6657)
2. Misuse of the land; (Section 22 of R.A. No. 6657)
3. Material misrepresentation of the ARBs basic qualifications as provided under Section 22 of R.A. No. 6657,
P.D. No. 27, and other agrarian laws;
4. Illegal conversion by the ARB; (Cf. Section 73, Paragraphs C and E of R.A. No. 6657)
5. Sale, transfer, lease or other forms of conveyance by a beneficiary of
the right to use or any other usufructuary right over the land acquired by
virtue of being a beneficiary, in order to circumvent the provisions of
Section 73 of R.A. No. 6657, P.D. No. 27, and other agrarian
laws. However, if the land has been acquired under P.D. No. 27/E.O. No.
228, ownership may be transferred after full payment of amortization by
the beneficiary; (Sec. 6 of E.O. No. 228)
6. Default in the obligation to pay an aggregate of three (3) consecutive
amortizations in case of voluntary land transfer/direct payment scheme, except
in cases of fortuitous events and force majeure;
7. Failure of the ARBs to pay for at least three (3) annual amortizations to the LBP, except in
cases of fortuitous events and force majeure; (Section 26 of RA 6657)
8. Neglect or abandonment of the awarded land continuously for a period of two (2) calendar years as
determined by the Secretary or his authorized representative; (Section 22 of RA 6657)
9. The land is found to be exempt/excluded from P.D. No. 27/E.O. No. 228 or CARP coverage or to be part
of the landowners retained area as determined by the Secretary or his authorized representative; and
10. Other grounds that will circumvent laws related to the implementation
of agrarian reform program. (Emphasis supplied)

Under Section 3 of Executive Order No. 228 (EO 228),[14] one of the modes of paying
compensation to the landowner is by direct payment in cash or kind by the farmer-
beneficiaries. In this case, petitioners entered into an agreement with respondent for
a direct payment scheme embodied in the Deeds of Transfer. However, petitioners
failed to pay the amortizations to respondent landowner in accordance with their
agreed direct payment scheme. As found by the Court of Appeals:

There is no substantial evidence on record that the petitioners had

remitted the amortizations due to the landowner in accordance with their
agreed direct payment scheme embodied in their deeds of transfer. In
view thereof, We have no recourse but to sustain the findings of fact of
the agency below. x x x

Indeed, We have scrutinized the evidentiary records but found no valid

reason to depart from the challenged decision. Petitioner Pedro Magos
supposed receipts of payment to prove that he paid the amortizations due
were not even attached to the records of this case. In the case of Augusto
Mago, his payment of P3,500.00 does not clearly show that the payment
was intended for the subject land. Granting that it was so, it appeared to
be for initial payment only. In Ernesto Magos case, his heirs relied on a
MARO Certification stating that Juana Barbin had refused to accept their
payment. It was, however, issued only on October 1, 2003 long after the
filing of the complaint. While P.D. 27 aims to emancipate landless
farmers, it does not also allow unjust treatment of landowners by depriving
the latter of the just compensation due.[15]

Petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals erred in finding them liable for violating
DAR Administrative Order No. 02, series of 1994. Well-settled is the rule that only
questions of law can be raised in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Civil Procedure.[16] The factual findings of the Court of Appeals are conclusive and
cannot be reviewed on appeal, provided they are based on substantial
evidence.[17] More so in this case where the findings of the Court of Appeals coincide
with those of the DARAB, an administrative body with expertise on matters within its
specific and specialized jurisdiction.[18]

In the first place, the Emancipation Patents and the Transfer Certificates of Title
should not have been issued to petitioners without full payment of the just
compensation.[19]Under Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 266,[20] the DAR will issue
the Emancipation Patents only after the tenant-farmers have fully complied with the
requirements for a grant of title under PD 27. Although PD 27 states that the tenant-
farmers are already deemed owners of the land they till, it is understood that full
payment of the just compensation has to be made first before title is transferred to
them.[21] Thus, Section 6 of EO 228 provides that ownership of lands acquired under
PD 27 may be transferred only after the agrarian reform beneficiary has fully paid the
amortizations. In Corua v. Cinamin,[22] the Court held:
As discussed above, the laws mandate the full compensation for the lands acquired under
Pres. Decree No. 27 prior to the issuance of emancipation patents. This is understandable
particularly since the emancipation patent presupposes that the grantee thereof has already
complied with all the requirements prescribed by Pres. Decree No. 27. x x x

While this Court commiserates with respondents in their plight, we are constrained by the explicit
requirements of the laws and jurisprudence on the matter to annul the emancipation patents issued to
respondents in the absence of any proof that they or the LBP has already fully paid the value of the lands put
under the coverage of Pres. Decree No. 27. The requirement is unequivocal in that the values of the
lands awarded to respondents must, prior to the issuance of emancipation patents be paid in
full.[23] (Emphasis supplied)

In this case, both the Court of Appeals and the DARAB found that petitioners have
not fully paid the amortizations for the land granted to them. The PARAD had a similar
finding when it recommended that the proper recourse of respondent is to file a claim
for just compensation. Clearly, the cancellation of the Emancipation Patents issued to
petitioners is proper under the circumstances.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision dated 20 October

2005 and the Resolution dated 13 July 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 87370.
SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:
 MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

ASSOCIATE JUSTICE ASSOCIATE JUSTICE

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE

ATTESTATION
I ATTEST THAT THE CONCLUSIONS IN THE ABOVE DECISION HAD BEEN
REACHED IN CONSULTATION BEFORE THE CASE WAS ASSIGNED TO THE
WRITER OF THE OPINION OF THE COURTS DIVISION.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairpersons
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts
Division.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Acting Chief Justice

[1] Under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

[2]Penned by Associate Justice Jose Catral Mendoza with Associate Justices Jose L. Sabio, Jr. and Arturo G. Tayag,
concurring.
[3]DECREEING THE EMANCIPATION OF TENANTS FROM THE BONDAGE OF THE SOIL, TRANSFERRING TO

THEM THE OWNERSHIP OF THE LAND THEY TILL AND PROVIDING THE INSTRUMENTS AND
MECHANISM THEREFOR.
[4]Emancipation Patent No. 745.
[5]Emancipation Patent No. 746.
[6]Emancipation Patent No. 747.
[7]Emancipation Patent No. 749.
[8]CA rollo, pp. 34-43. TCT No. EP-745 was issued to Augusto Mago covering a portion of the landholding containing an

area of 8,278 square meters. TCT No. EP-747 was issued to Ernesto Mago covering a portion of the landholding
containing an area of 15,310 square meters. TCT No. EP-749 was issued to Pedro Mago covering a portion of
the landholding containing an area of 18,221 square meters. Crispin Mago was not included as petitioner in the
petition for review filed with the Court of Appeals.
[9]Rollo, pp. 43-49.
[10]LOI 474 was issued on 21 October 1976 by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos.
[11]Rollo, p. 60.
[12]Id. at 16.
[13]Mercado v. Mercado, G.R. No. 178672, 19 March 2009; Gabriel v. Jamias, G.R. No. 156482, 17 September 2008,

565 SCRA 443.

[14]EO 228, issued on 17 July 1987, provides for the manner of payment by the farmer beneficiary covered by PD 27

and the mode of compensation to the landowner. Section 3 of EO 228 reads:

SECTION 3. Compensation shall be paid to the landowners in any of the following modes, at the point of the landowner:
(a) Bond payment over ten (10) years, with ten percent (10%) of the value of the land payable immediately in cash, and
the balance in the form of LBP bonds bearing market rates of interest that are aligned with 90-day treasury bill rates,
net of applicable final withholding tax. One tenth of the face value of the bonds shall mature every year from the date
of issuances until the tenth year.
The LBP bonds issued hereunder shall be eligible for the purchase of government assets to the privatized.
(b) Direct payment in cash or kind by the farmer-beneficiaries with the terms to be mutually agreed upon by the
beneficiaries and landowners and subject to the approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform; and
(c) Other modes of payment as may be prescribed or approved by the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council. (Emphasis
supplied)
[15]Rollo , pp. 36-37.
[16]Section 1, Rule 45 states that the petition shall raise only questions of law which must be distinctly set forth. Ortega

v. People, G.R. No 177944, 24 December 2008, 575 SCRA 519.

[17]Milestone Realty & Co. v. Court of Appeals, 431 Phil. 119 (2002).
[18]Ayo-Alburo v. Matobato, 496 Phil. 293 (2005); Toralba v. Mercado, 478 Phil. 563 (2004); Padunan v. DARAB, 444

Phil. 213 (2003).

[19]Del Castillo v. Orciga, G.R. No. 153850, 31 August 2006, 500 SCRA 498.
[20]PROVIDING FOR THE MECHANICS OF REGISTRATION OF OWNERSHIP AND/OR TITLE TO LAND UNDER

PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 27. Issued on 4 August 1973.

[21]Paris v. Alfeche, 416 Phil. 473 (2001), citing Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of
Agrarian Reform, G.R. Nos. 78742, 79310, 79744, and 79777, 14 July 1989, 175 SCRA 343.
[22]G.R. No. 154286, 28 February 2006, 483 SCRA 507.
[23]Id. at 521-522.

IV. CONVERSION
Reference: DAR Administrative Order No. 01, series of 2002

DAR ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 01-02

SUBJECT : 2002 Comprehensive Rules On Land Use Conversion

Pursuant to Section 65 and 49 of Republic Act (RA) No. 6657 (Comprehensive

Agrarian Reform Law of 1988), Section 4(j) and 5(l) of Executive Order (EO) No. 129-A
(Reorganization Act of the Department of Agrarian Reform), the pertinent provisions of RA
8435 (Agriculture and Fisheries Modernization Act), EO-45-2001 [25 October 2001], and in
order to provide effective means of evaluating applications for land use conversion, these
Rules are hereby promulgated:
ARTICLE I
Preliminary Provisions
SECTION 1. Statement of Policies. — The conversion of agricultural lands to non-
agricultural uses shall be governed by the following policies:
1.1. The State shall preserve prime agricultural lands to ensure food security.
1.2. The State shall ensure that all sectors of the economy and all regions of
the country are given optimum opportunity to develop, through the rational and
sustainable use of resources peculiar to each area, in order to maximize
agricultural productivity, to promote efficiency and equity, and to accelerate the
modernization of the agriculture and fisheries sectors of the country.
1.3. Conversion of agricultural lands to non-agricultural uses shall be strictly
regulated and may be allowed only when the conditions prescribed under RA
6657 and/or RA 8435 are present and complied with.
SECTION 2. Definition of Terms. — All references in these Rules in the masculine
gender form (he/him/his) shall interchangeably mean the feminine form (she/her/hers) or
may refer to a group (it/it's/their). As used in this AO, the terms enumerated are defined as
follows:
2.1. Agricultural land refers to land devoted to or suitable for the cultivation of the
soil; planting of crops, growing of trees, raising of livestock, poultry, fish or
aquaculture production, including the harvesting of such farm products and other farm
activities and practices performed in conjunction with such farming operations by
persons whether natural or juridical, and not classified by law as mineral land, forest
or timber, or national park, or classified for residential, commercial, industrial or other
non-agricultural uses before 15 June 1988.
2.2. Area Highly Restricted from Conversion refers to agro-industrial cropland, or
land presently planted to industrial crops that support the economic viability of
existing agricultural infrastructure and agro-based enterprises; highland or area
located at an elevation of 500 meters or higher and have the potential for growing
semi-temperate and/or high value crops; land covered by a notice of land valuation
and acquisition; irrigable land not covered by irrigation projects with firm funding
commitment; and Environmentally Critical Area and Environmentally Critical Projects
as determined by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).
2.3. Area Non-Negotiable for Conversion refers to agricultural land not eligible for
conversion as enumerated in Section 4 hereof.
2.4. Comprehensive Land Use Plan refers to a document accompanied by maps
and similar illustrations, which represent the community-desired pattern of population
distribution and proposal for the future allocation of land for various land use
activities. It identifies the allocation, character and extent of the area's land resources
to be used for different purposes and includes the process and the criteria employed
in the determination of the land's use.
2.5. Conversion Moratorium refers to the policy enunciated in RA 8435 which
prohibits the conversion of irrigated lands, irrigable lands already covered by irrigation
projects with firm funding commitments, and lands with existing or having the
potential for growing high value crops so delineated and included within the Strategic
Agriculture and Fisheries Development Zones for the period starting 10 February
1998 to 09 February 2003.
2.6. Environmentally Critical Areas (ECA) refer to areas that are ecologically,
socially, or geologically sensitive as declared by law such as:
2.6.1. Areas declared by law as national parks, watershed reserves, wildlife
preserves and sanctuaries;
2.6.2. Areas identified as potential tourist spots;
2.6.3. Areas that are habitats of endangered or threatened species of
indigenous Philippine plants and animals;
2.6.4. Areas of unique historic, archeological or scientific interest;
2.6.5. Areas traditionally occupied by indigenous people or cultural
communities;
2.6.6. Areas frequently hit by natural calamities (geologic hazards, floods,
typhoons and volcanic activities);
2.6.7. Areas with critical slopes of 18% and above;
2.6.8. Areas classified as prime agricultural lands;
2.6.9. Recharged areas of aquifer;
2.6.10. Water bodies used for domestic supply or to support fisheries and
wildlife;
 2.6.11. Mangrove areas with critical ecological functions or on which people
depend for livelihood; or
2.6.12. Coral reefs.
2.7. Environmentally Critical Project (ECP) refers to a:
2.7.1. Heavy industry project involving ferrous metals, iron or steel mills;
petroleum or petro-chemicals, oil, gas, or smelting plants;
2.7.2. Resource extractive project such as major mining and quarrying project,
forestry logging project, major wood processing, introduction of fauna or exotic
animals in public or private forests, forest occupancy, extraction of mangrove
products, grazing, fishery dikes, or fishpond development;
2.7.3. Major infrastructure project such as dam, power plant (utilizing fossil-fuel,
hydroelectric, geothermal, or nuclear power), reclamation, bridge, or a major
road; or
2.7.4. Golf course project.
2.8. Illegal Conversion is the conversion by any landowner of his agricultural land
into any non-agricultural use with intent to avoid the application of RA 6657 to his
landholding and to dispossess his tenant farmers of the land tilled by them; or the
change of nature of lands outside urban centers and city limits either in whole or in
part after the effectivity of RA 6657, as provided in Section 73 (c) and (e),
respectively, of the said Act.
2.9. Irrigable Land refers to land displaying marked characteristics justifying the
operation of an irrigation system.
2.10. Irrigated Land refers to land serviced by natural irrigation or irrigation facilities.
This includes lands where water is not readily available because existing irrigation
facilities need rehabilitation or upgrading or where irrigation water is not available
year-round.
2.11. Land Use refers to the manner of utilization of land, including its allocation,
development and management.
2.12. Land Use Conversion refers to the act or process of changing the current
physical use of a piece of agricultural land into some other use or for another
agricultural use other than the cultivation of the soil, planting of crops, growing of
trees, including harvesting of produce therefrom, as approved by DAR.
2.13. National Integrated Protected Areas System (NIPAS) refers to the
classification and administration of all designated protected areas to maintain
essential ecological processes and life support systems, to preserve genetic diversity,
to ensure sustainable use of resources found therein, and to maintain their natural
conditions to the greatest extent possible. NIPAS includes areas designated as initial
components of the system under Section 5 (a) of RA 7586 which include all areas or
islands in the Philippines proclaimed, designated or set aside, pursuant to a law,
presidential decree, presidential proclamation or executive order as national park,
game refuge, bird and wildlife sanctuary, wilderness area, strict nature reserve,
watershed, mangrove reserve, fish sanctuary, natural and historical landmark,
protected and managed landscape/seascape as well as identified virgin forest before
the effectivity of RA 7586; those proclaimed as part of the system in accordance with
the procedure established under the said Act such as strict nature reserve, natural
park, natural monument, wildlife sanctuary, protected landscapes and seascapes;
resource reserve; natural biotic areas; and other categories established by law,
conventions or international agreements wherein the Philippine Government is a
signatory.
2.14. Network of Protected Areas for Agricultural and Agro-Industrial
Development(NPAAAD) refers to agricultural areas identified by the Department of
Agriculture (DA) through the Bureau of Soils and Water Management in coordination
with the National Mapping and Resource Information Authority, in order to ensure the
efficient utilization of land to agriculture and agro-industrial development and promote
sustainable growth. The NPAAAD covers all irrigated areas, all irrigable lands already
covered by irrigation projects with firm funding commitments; all alluvial plains highly
suitable for agriculture, whether irrigated or not; agro-industrial croplands or lands
presently planted to industrial crops that support the viability of existing agricultural
infrastructure and agro-based enterprises; highland or areas located at an elevation
of five hundred (500) meters or above, which have the potential for growing semi-
temperate and high-value crops; all agricultural lands that are ecologically fragile, the
conversion of which will result in serious environmental degradation, and mangrove
areas and fish sanctuaries; and all fishery areas as defined pursuant to the Fisheries
Code of 1998.
2.15. Premature Conversion of Agricultural Land refers to the undertaking of any
development activity, the result of which may modify or alter the physical
characteristics of the agricultural land as would render it suitable for non-agricultural
purposes without an approved Conversion Order from the DAR.
2.16. Prime Agricultural Land refers to land that can be used for various or specific
agricultural activities and can provide optimum and sustainable yield with minimum
inputs and development costs as determined by the DA.
2.17. Private Agricultural Land refers to agricultural land as defined herein and
owned by natural or juridical persons or by the government in its proprietary capacity.
2.18. Project Feasibility Study involves the investigation of the market, technical,
financial, economic, and operational viability of the project. Specifically, it looks into
the alternative technical schemes to attain the project's objectives including possible
size, location, production process, and physical and financial resource requirements.
The study also determines whether the project would generate sufficient benefits to
offset estimated investment and operating costs. Similarly, it ascertains which of the
alternatives would yield the largest positive return to the economy that would justify its
use of resources. Finally, it seeks the most suitable legal, administrative and
organizational arrangements to ensure that implementation would proceed as
planned and that completed facilities would be properly maintained and operated.
2.19. Reclassification of Agricultural Land refers to the act of specifying how
agricultural lands shall be utilized for non-agricultural uses such as, residential,
industrial, commercial, as embodied in the land use plan, subject to the requirements
and procedure for land use conversion, undertaken by a Local Government Unit
(LGU) in accordance with Section 20 of RA 7160 and Joint Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board (HLURB), DAR, DA, and Department of Interior and Local
 Government (DILG) MC-54-1995. It also includes the reversion of non-agricultural
lands to agricultural use.
2.20. Socialized Housing refers to housing programs and projects covering houses
and lots or homelots undertaken by the government or the private sector for the
underprivileged and homeless citizens where the maximum cost per unit does not
exceed the maximum amount as prescribed by the Housing and Urban Development
Coordinating Council (HUDCC) which shall include sites and services development,
long-term financing, liberalized terms on interest payments, and such other benefits in
accordance with RA 7279.
2.21. Socio-Economic Benefit-Cost Study involves the assessment of the project's
net contribution to the national economic and social welfare, done through a
comparison of the economic and social benefits expected to be generated from the
project with the social and economic costs of its implementation and operation.
2.22. Special Economic Zone or Eco Zone refers to selected areas which are highly
developed or which have the potential to be developed into agro-industrial, tourist,
recreational, commercial, banking, investment and financial centers whose metes and
bounds are delimited by Presidential Proclamation.
2.23. Strategic Agriculture and Fisheries Development Zone (SAFDZ) refer to the
areas within the NPAAAD identified for production, agro-processing and marketing
activities to help develop and modernize, with the support of the government, the
agriculture and fisheries sectors in an environmentally and socio-culturally sound
manner.
2.24. Unauthorized Conversion is the act of changing the current use of the land
from agricultural (e.g. riceland) to another agricultural use, the effect of which is to
exclude the land from CARP coverage (e.g. livestock) without a Conversion Order
from the DAR, or changing the use of the land other than that allowed under the
Conversion Order issued by the DAR.
2.25. Watershed refers to a catchment area or drainage basin from which the waters
of a stream or stream system are drawn.
2.26. Zoning is the delineation/division of a city/municipality into functional zones
where only specific land uses are allowed. It directs and regulates the use of all lands
in the community in accordance with an approved or adopted land use plan for the
city/municipality. It prescribes setback provisions, minimum lot sizes, building heights
and bulk.
2.27. Zoning Ordinance refers to a local legislation approving the comprehensive
land use plan and providing for the regulations and other conditions, on the uses of
land including the limitation on the infrastructures that may be placed thereon within
the territorial jurisdiction of a city or municipality.
ARTICLE II
Coverage
SECTION 3. Applicability of Rules — These guidelines shall apply to all
applications for conversion, from agricultural to non-agricultural uses or to another
agricultural use, such as:
 3.1. Conversions into residential, commercial, industrial, institutional and other
non-agricultural purposes;
3.2. Development into other types of agricultural activities such as livestock,
poultry, and fishpond, the effect of which is to exempt the land from CARP coverage;
3.3. Conversions into non-agricultural use other than that previously authorized; or
3.4 Conversion of agricultural lands or areas that have been reclassified by the
LGU or by way of a Presidential Proclamation, to residential, commercial, industrial,
or other non-agricultural uses on or after the effectivity of R.A. 6657 on 15 June 1988,
pursuant to Section 20 of RA 7160, and other pertinent laws and regulations, and are
to be converted to such uses. However, for those reclassified prior to 15 June 1988,
the guidelines in securing an exemption clearance from the DAR shall apply.
SECTION 4. Areas Non-Negotiable for Conversion — An application involving
areas non-negotiable for conversion shall not be given due course even when some
portions thereof are eligible for conversion. The following areas shall not be subject to
conversion:
4.1. Lands within protected areas designated under the NIPAS, including mossy
and virgin forests, riverbanks, and swamp forests or marshlands, as determined by
the DENR;
4.2. All irrigated lands, as delineated by the DA and/or the National Irrigation
Administration (NIA), where water is available to support rice and other crop
production, and all irrigated lands where water is not available for rice and other crop
production but are within areas programmed for irrigation facility rehabilitation by the
government;
4.3. All irrigable lands already covered by irrigation projects with firm funding
commitments, as delineated by the DA and/or NIA; and
4.4. All agricultural lands with irrigation facilities.
SECTION 5. Areas Highly Restricted from Conversion — The following
areas/projects are classified as highly restricted from conversion:
5.1. Irrigable lands not covered by irrigation projects with firm funding commitment;
5.2. Agro-industrial croplands, or lands presently planted to industrial crops that
support the economic viability of existing agricultural infrastructure and agro-based
enterprises;
5.3. Highlands or areas located in elevations of five hundred (500) meters or
above and which have the potential for growing semi-temperate or high value crops;
5.4. Lands issued with notice of land valuation and acquisition, or subject of a
perfected agreement between the landowner and the beneficiaries under the
Voluntary Land Transfer (VLT)/Direct Payment Scheme (DPS) under the CARP; and
5.5. Lands within an Environmentally Critical Area (ECA) or those involving the
establishment of an Environmentally Critical Project (ECP). Applications for
conversion under this sub-section shall require, apart from the standard,
requirements, an Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) which the applicant
must secure from the DENR prior to application (for ordinary applications) or prior to
 commencement of actual land development (for applications involving housing
projects).
The Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC) Land Use Technical Committee
(PLUTC) shall participate in the deliberations when the application involves land that is
highly restricted from conversion and with an area larger than five (5) hectares, except
housing projects covered by EO-45-2001.
SECTION 6. Priority Development Areas and Projects. —
6.1. In accordance with RA 7916, EO-124-1993, and EO-258-2000, the following
are priority development areas for land conversion:
6.1.1. Specific sites in Regional Agri-Industrial Centers/Regional Industrial
Centers (RAIC/RIC) identified by the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI)
and the DA pursuant to EO-124-1993.
6.1.2. Tourism Development Areas (TDA) identified by the Department of
Tourism (DOT) pursuant to EO-124-1993.
6.1.3. Agricultural areas intended for Eco Zone Projects, endorsed by Philippine
Economic Zone Authority (PEZA), pursuant to RA 7916.
6.1.4. Agricultural land, owned by the government, to be converted for projects
of national interest, as certified by proper government agency.
6.1.5. Agricultural land proposed to be developed as sites for processing plants
of agricultural products, as certified by the Department of Agriculture.
6.1.6. Sites intended for telecommunication facilities endorsed by the National
Telecommunications Commission.
6.2. Housing projects are priority development projects for land conversion that
shall follow the fast-tracking scheme prescribed under EO-45-2001. When the
application involves a mixed use of housing and non-housing projects, the application
shall not enjoy the privileges of housing projects unless at least eighty percent (80%)
of the land applied for conversion shall be used directly and exclusively for housing.
SECTION 7. Lands within SAFDZ. — In accordance with Section 9 of RA 8435, the
following rules shall govern conversion of lands within SAFDZ:
7.1. All irrigated lands, irrigable lands already covered by irrigation projects with
firm funding commitments, and lands with existing or having the potential for growing
high-value crops included within the SAFDZ shall be subject to a conversion
moratorium for a period of five (5) years from 10 February 1998 to 9 February 2003.
7.2. During the effectivity of the moratorium, conversion may be allowed with
respect to only five percent (5%) of said lands within SAFDZ upon compliance with
existing laws, rules and regulations.
7.3. The maximum of five percent (5%) of land(s) eligible for conversion to non-
agricultural use from the total SAFDZ area shall be jointly determined by the DA and
the DAR, upon the recommendation of the Regional and National SAFDZ
Committees pursuant to Rule 9.5.2 of DA-AO-6-1998, or the implementing rules and
regulations ofRA 8435.
 7.4. After the expiration of the conversion moratorium, conversion may be allowed
on a case-to-case basis, subject to existing laws, rules and regulations on land use
conversion.
ARTICLE III
Procedures
SECTION 8. Criteria for Conversion. — The following criteria shall guide the
resolution of application for conversion:
8.1. Conversion may be allowed if the land subject of application is not among
those considered non-negotiable for conversion as provided in Section 4 hereof.
8.2. Conversion may be allowed, in accordance with Section 65 of RA 6657, when
the land has ceased to be economically feasible and sound for agricultural purposes
or the locality has become urbanized and the land will have a greater economic value
for residential, commercial, industrial, or other non-agricultural purposes. ICTcDA

8.3. Conversion of lands within SAFDZ, as provided in Rule 9.5.2 of DA-AO-6-

1998, shall take into account the following factors:
8.3.1. The conversion of land use is consistent with the natural expansion of the
municipality or locality, as contained in the approved physical framework and
land use plan.
8.3.2. The area to be converted in use is not the only remaining food production
area of the community.
8.3.3. The land use conversion shall not hamper the availability of irrigation to
nearby farmlands.
8.3.4. The areas with low productivity will be accorded priority for land use
conversion.
8.3.5. Sufficient disturbance compensation shall be given to farmers whose
livelihood are negatively affected by the land use conversion as provided for by
existing laws and regulations.
8.4. When the agricultural land which is the subject of the application for
conversion has been acquired under RA 6657, its conversion shall be allowed only if
the applicant is the agrarian reform beneficiary thereof, and after he has fully paid his
obligation as required under Section 65 of RA 6657.
SECTION 9. Who May Apply for Conversion. — The following persons may apply
for conversion:
9.1. Owners of private agricultural lands or other persons duly authorized by the
landowner;
9.2. Beneficiaries of the agrarian reform program after the lapse of five (5) years
from award, reckoned from the date of the issuance of the Certificate of
Landownership Award (CLOA), and who have fully paid their obligations and are
qualified under these Rules, or persons duly authorized by them; and
9.3. Government agencies, including government-owned or controlled
corporations, and LGUs, which own agricultural lands as their patrimonial property.
 SECTION 10. Documentary Requirements. — The applicant shall submit in
sextuplicate the following documents in six (6) separate bound folders (one [1] original set
and five [5] photocopy sets) with table of contents and page numbers of all documents
including photographs, sequentially numbered, except for maps and development plans
which shall likewise be in sextuplicate but shall be submitted in six separate envelopes
with contents properly labeled on each envelope. Of the six (6) folders, two (2) will be
transmitted to the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO), containing therein only the
filled-up application form and the documents specified in 10.4, 10.5 and 10.26 hereunder.
The remaining four folders shall contain all the documents enumerated hereunder that are
applicable. The arrangement thereof shall follow the sequence of the enumeration below,
with the requirement referred to in Section 10.1 hereof being the first document after the
table of contents:
10.1. Official receipt showing proof of payment of filing fee and inspection cost.
10.2. Official receipt showing proof of posting of bond in accordance with the terms
and conditions set forth in Section 24 hereof.
10.3. Duly accomplished application for conversion subscribed and sworn to before
a notary public or any person authorized to administer oaths.
10.4. True copy of the Original Certificate of Title (OCT) or Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) of the subject land, certified by the Register of Deeds not earlier than thirty
(30) days prior to application filing date.
In case of untitled land, the following shall be required in lieu of a title:
10.4.1. Certification from the DENR Community Environment and Natural
Resources Officer (CENRO) that the landholding has been
classified as alienable and disposable; and
10.4.2. Certification from the DENR CENRO (for administrative
confirmation of imperfect title) or the Clerk of Court (for judicial
confirmation of imperfect title) that the titling process/proceedings
has commenced and there are no adverse claimants;
10.5. True copy of the Certificate of Title of the subject land as of 15 June 1988, and
all successor Titles until the present Title referred to in Section 10.4 hereof, if
applicable.
10.6. True copy of the current Tax Declaration covering the subject property.
10.7. Project feasibility study.
10.8. Joint venture agreement or any other business arrangement on the use of the
land between the landowner and the developer (if the developer is other than the
landowner) or between the EP/CLOA holders and the developer (if the land was
awarded under the agrarian reform program).
10.9. Narrative description of the development plan describing in detail the activities,
program components, phasing, schedule, work and financial plan, all duly certified by
a licensed engineer, architect, or land use planner.
10.10. Proof of financial and organizational capability of the developer to develop
land, including the following information:
 10.10.1. Statement of project cost and availability of potential funding
source(s) for the development of the proposed project;
10.10.2. Profile of the developer;
10.10.3. Most recent financial statement, not later than the year before
application, duly authenticated by a certified public accountant; and
10.10.4. If the developer is a corporation or partnership, a copy of its
Certificate of Registration and recent General Information Sheet (GIS) for the
immediately preceding year, certified by the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC), or in lieu of the latter, a duly accomplished GIS sworn to
before a notary public, provided, that if the land is to be used for socialized
housing by the LGU under EO 124-1993, a Sanggunian Resolution
appropriating funds for the project and authorizing the LGU to undertake the
same shall be required: Provided, further, that if the socialized housing shall be
undertaken by other government agencies such as the National Housing
Authority and the like, a board resolution approving the project and appropriating
funds therefor shall likewise be submitted.
10.11. Socio-Economic Benefit-Cost Study of the proposed project.
10.12. Photographs, size 5R (five [5] inches by seven [7] inches), using color film,
and taken on the landholding under sunlight. The applicant shall attach the pictures to
a paper background and the photographer who took said pictures shall sign on said
paper background to certify the authenticity of the pictures. On each background
paper shall be written a short description of each picture. The pictures shall consist
of:
10.12.1. At least four (4) photographs taken from the center of the
landholding: one (1) facing north, one (1) facing east, one (1) facing south, and
one (1) facing west;
10.12.2. At least one (1) photograph per corner, taken from each corner of
the landholding's borders.
10.12.3. At least two (2) photographs each for all distinct man-made
structures existing on the land, taken from opposite angles;
10.12.4. At least two (2) photographs each of the front view of the
billboard(s) required in Section 11 hereof. The applicant shall set aside the
second copy of said billboard photograph(s) for submission to the MARO; and
10.12.5. Sufficient number of photographs of the most conspicuous
landmarks from the nearest barangay center and leading to and from the ingress
and egress routes at the subject landholding, for the purpose of assisting the
ocular inspection team in locating the site.
10.13. Affidavit/Undertaking in a single document of the applicant stating:
10.13.1. The number and names of the farmers, agricultural lessees, share
tenants, farmworkers, actual tillers, and/or occupants in the landholding; if there
are no such persons, a statement attesting to such fact;
 10.13.2. That the applicant has paid or shall pay disturbance compensation
to the persons mentioned in Section 10.13.1 hereof, in accordance with the
computation, and under the terms and conditions, in Section 28 hereof;
10.13.3. That the applicant has erected the required number of billboards
and undertakes not to remove, deface or destroy said billboard, and that he shall
repair or replace the same when damaged, until after the approving authority
disposes of the application with finality;
10.13.4. That the applicant has not undertaken and shall not undertake
premature development prior to issuance of a Conversion Order;
10.13.5. That he authorizes the DAR to forfeit his bond when he undertakes
any premature development within the area before or after filing of the
application for conversion; and
10.13.6. That he has not commenced any action or filed any claim involving
the same land in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency; to the best of his
knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending therein; he has no
knowledge of any controversy or proceeding involving the status of said parcel
of land or the rights of person over its possession and entitlement to fruits or as
beneficiary, the determination of which is filed before any tribunal, court, the
DAR or any other agency; to his own knowledge, no such action or proceeding
is pending in any court, tribunal, or quasi-judicial agency; and should there be
any same or similar action or proceeding involving the property applied for
conversion, which is either pending or may have been terminated, he shall
report such fact within five (5) days from knowledge thereof to the approving
authority where his aforesaid application has been filed.
10.14. Certification of the MARO in a single document attesting compliance with
Section 14.1 hereof.
10.15. Certification from the HLURB Regional Officer on the actual zoning or
classification of the land subject of the application on the approved comprehensive
land use plan citing: (a) the municipal or city zoning ordinance number; and (b)
resolution number and date of approval by the HLURB or the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan concerned, as the case may be.
10.16. Certification from the authorized DA official stating, among others, the
classification of the property under the NPAAAD/SAFDZ, whether or not the subject
property is within the five percent (5%) limit of the SAFDZ allowed for conversion and
whether the land has ceased to be economically feasible and sound for agricultural
purposes. As provided for in DA-AO-2-2002, Article VI, Paragraph "4.2", the
certification inventory must include the following information:
10.16.1. Location and accessibility;
10.16.2. Limitations to agricultural production, such as steep slope, unstable
soil condition (landslide, etc.); inadequate land drainage; very shallow, stony,
rocky soil; very serious boulder problem;
10.16.3. Existing land use;
 10.16.4. Indication of premature development or alteration of land use (with
picture);
10.16.5. Land use of adjoining area;
10.16.6. Indication of non-agricultural development; and
10.16.7. Potential for agricultural production.
In the event the land being applied for is within the 5% allowable limit under
Section 9 of RA 8435, the investigation report accompanying the inventory should
also include the following information:
10.16.8. Total area of the SAFDZ;
10.16.9. Allowable 5% limit;
10.16.10. Total area already approved for reclassification by the DA;
10.16.11. Balance of the 5% allowable area; and
10.16.12. Balance of the 5% allowable area if the application is approved.
10.17. Certification from the authorized DENR official stating, among others, whether
or not the subject land is within the NIPAS, mossy and virgin forests, riverbanks, or
swamp forests and marshlands; within an ECA, or will involve the establishment of an
ECP.
10.18. Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) when the subject land is within
an ECA or will involve the establishment of an ECP.
10.19. If applicable, Special Power of Attorney (SPA), when the applicant is not the
registered owner.
10.20. If applicable, notarized secretary's certificate of a corporate/cooperative board
resolution authorizing the representative, when the applicant is a corporation or
cooperative.
10.21. If applicable, concurrence letter of the mortgagee or of the individual or entity
in whose favor the encumbrance was constituted, when the property is encumbered.
10.22. If applicable, endorsement from the concerned government agency, when the
application involves a priority development area or project.
10.23. If applicable, Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) certification attesting that the
applicant-landowner has fully paid his obligations to the LBP, when the applicant-
landowner is a beneficiary of the agrarian reform program.
10.24. If applicable, Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO) certification attesting
that the applicant-landowner acquired the subject land from a landed-estate or under
the Voluntary Land Transfer/Direct Payment Scheme (VLT/DPS) and he has already
fully paid his obligation thereunder, when the applicant-landowner is a beneficiary of
the agrarian reform program.
10.25. Vicinity map and a lot plan prepared by a duly-licensed geodetic engineer
indicating the lots being applied for and their technical descriptions, name of owner/s,
lot number and area. The map shall highlight the specific area applied for conversion
if the application covers less than the total lot area.
 10.26. Directional sketch map showing the orientation of the subject property in
relation to adjoining lands and nearest provincial and/or national and/or feeder roads,
to facilitate and determine the location of the property for the purpose of ocular
inspection. The map shall: indicate the existing infrastructure and/or improvements
thereon including any house or tillage thereupon of any occupant therein; landmarks
within a one (1) kilometer radius; and owners of adjacent properties. The map need
not be drawn to scale.
10.27. Map of the development plan. For socialized housing projects, blueprint copy
of the development plan submitted and certified by the HLURB as basis for its
certification that the project conforms with the minimum standards of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 220.
10.28. Topographic Map if the subject property is within an upland, hilly or
mountainous area.
As a general rule, the applicant shall submit all the foregoing applicable requirements
from Sections 10.1 to 10.28 hereof at the time of application filing. However, for
applications involving housing projects under EO-45-2001, he may defer the
submission of the requirements mentioned in Sections 10.15 to 10.18 hereof and
follow the alternative timetable in Sections 22.9.2 and 22.21 hereof.
SECTION 11. Public Notice — The applicant shall post, in a conspicuous place(s)
within the subject property, a public notice contained in a billboard made of strong weather-
resistant material such as plywood, galvanized iron, tin, panaflex, or other similar durable
material, measuring 1.22 meters by 2.44 meters (4 feet by 8 feet). If the landholding has an
area of more than twenty (20) hectares, the applicant shall erect one (1) billboard for every
twenty (20) hectares, on strategic and visible points in the landholding, preferably along a
road. The billboard shall be written in the local dialect and shall display all the information
mentioned below, to wit:
11.1. Statement that the applicant is proposing to convert the subject landholding
from agricultural to non-agricultural use;
11.2. Complete name of the landowner(s) and applicant(s) and developer(s);
11.3. Total area and exact location of the conversion proposal;
11.4. Filing date of application for conversion;
11.5. Date of posting of billboard;
11.6. Schedule of ocular inspection;
11.7. Deadline for filing protest;
11.8. Address of the CLUPPI and RCLUPPI and PARO where oppositors may
formally file their protest;
11.9. Address of the approving authority; and
11.10. Date of approval or denial of the application, which shall be left blank, and
which the applicant shall fill up upon approval or denial of the application.
SECTION 12. Where to file application and Approving Authority. —
12.1. Duly accomplished and notarized application forms and the complete
documentary requirements sit forth in Section 10 hereof shall be filed with the
following offices:
12.1.1. Regional Center for Land Use Policy Planning and
Implementation (RCLUPPI), located at the DAR Regional Office,
for applications involving lands with an area less than or equal
to five (5) hectares, or a fraction above five (5) hectares. The
Regional Director shall be the approving authority for such
applications; and
12.1.2. Center for Land Use Policy Planning and Implementation
(CLUPPI), located at the DAR Central Office, for applications
involving lands with an area larger than five (5) hectares. The
Secretary shall be the approving authority for such applications
and may delegate the same authority to any Undersecretary.
12.2. When the application concerns a parcel of land that is adjacent to another
parcel of land that was previously granted a Conversion Order, and the sum of the
areas of both adjoining parcels of land exceeds five (5) hectares, the approving
authority for the present application shall be the Secretary, acting upon the
recommendation of the CLUPPI.
12.3. When the applicant owns or represents the owner(s) of two (2) or more parcels
of land within the same barangay or within two (2) or more barangays that are
adjacent to each other, and the sum of the areas of said parcels of land exceeds five
(5) hectares, the approving authority for an application involving any of said parcels of
land shall be the Secretary, acting upon the recommendation of the CLUPPI.
12.4. When a single project proposes the conversion of two (2) or more parcels of
land with different owners but within the same barangay or within two (2) or more
barangays that are adjacent to each other, and the sum of the areas of said parcels
of land exceeds five (5) hectares, the approving authority for an application involving
any of said parcels of land shall be the Secretary, acting upon the recommendation of
the CLUPPI.
12.5. When the applicant or any oppositor challenges the jurisdiction of the
approving authority on the ground of error in computation of jurisdictional area, and a
higher authority takes cognizance of the dispute, the DAR approving authority shall
hold in abeyance the application for conversion until said higher authority determines
with finality the correct jurisdictional area.
12.6. Except in housing projects, the PLUTC shall act as the recommending body
when the application involves lands with an area larger than five (5) hectares and
which is highly restricted from conversion as per Section 5 hereof, or when, in the
opinion of the Secretary, the application requires inter-agency inputs that are crucial
for its judicious disposition.
12.7. The CLUPPI shall organize a Secretariat that shall be responsible for
processing all land use conversion applications and shall be the repository of all
records pertaining thereto. The CLUPPI/RCLUPPI shall be a one-stop processing
center for conversion applications undertaken in line with housing projects under EO-
45-2001. The RCLUPPI shall adopt the standard docketing system, and adopt its own
document-tracing system, and shall forward to the CLUPPI all its
decisions/resolutions/final orders, together with its quarterly statistic report on land
use conversion applications, for monitoring and consolidation of status reports by the
CLUPPI and safekeeping of the decisions/resolutions/final orders by the Records
Division. The CLUPPI shall be responsible for the centralized printing of all
applications for land use conversion.
SECTION 13. Filing Fee and Inspection Cost. —
13.1. Filing Fee:
13.1.1. One thousand (1,000) pesos for applications involving lands with an
area less than or equal to five (5) hectares; or
13.1.2. Two thousand (2,000) pesos for applications involving lands with an
area larger than five (5) hectares.
13.2. Inspection Cost:
13.2.1. For applications involving lands with an area less than or equal to
five (5) hectares:
13.2.1.1. Ten thousand (10,000) pesos if the subject landholding is
within the same island as that of the Office of the Regional Director; or
13.2.1.2. Fifteen thousand (15,000) pesos if the subject landholding is
not within the same island as that of the Office of the Regional Director.
13.2.2. For applications involving lands with an area larger than five (5)
hectares:
13.2.2.1. Ten thousand (10,000) pesos if the subject landholding is
within the main island of Luzon (except Bicol peninsula);
13.2.2.2. Fifteen thousand (15,000) pesos if the subject landholding is
within Regions I to IV but is not located within the main island of Luzon;
13.2.2.3. Fifteen thousand (15,000) pesos if the subject landholding is
in Bicol Peninsula or Visayas group of islands; or
13.2.2.4. Twenty thousand (20,000) pesos if the subject landholding is
in the Mindanao group of islands.
SECTION 14. MARO Certification. —
14.1. Upon accomplishing the application form, the applicant shall furnish the MARO
with a photocopy of the same, together with a photocopy of the title(s) in Sections
10.4 and/or 10.5 hereof and directional sketch map in Section 10.26 hereof. Upon
receipt thereof, the MARO shall:
14.1.1. check the status of CARP coverage on and around the subject land;
14.1.2. inspect the applicant's billboard posting;
14.1.3. check the presence of any farmer, agricultural lessee, share tenant,
farm worker, actual tiller, or occupant; and
14.1.4. post the notices of application in a conspicuous place in the
municipality and a conspicuous place in the barangay covering the subject land
(or a larger portion of the subject land for properties that overlap on more than
one barangay).
 Thereafter, the MARO shall accomplish a certification of his findings thereon,
furnishing the applicant with the original copy of the certificate, as required under
Section 10.14 hereof.
14.2. For housing projects under EO-45-2001, if the MARO fails to act upon the
request for certification within ten (10) days from receipt of request, the applicant shall
notify the RCLUPPI/CLUPPI of such failure by personally filing an affidavit reporting
such inaction. The RCLUPPI/CLUPPI shall investigate the reason for the non-
issuance and take the steps necessary for the judicious resolution of the pending
application for conversion. Simultaneously, the disciplining authority of the DAR shall,
after proper investigation, impose upon the erring MARO the proper administrative
sanction(s).
SECTION 15. Ocular Inspection. —
15.1. The ocular inspection shall be conducted on the property by the
RCLUPPI/CLUPPI.
15.2. The team designated to conduct ocular inspection shall verify and evaluate the
following:
15.2.1. Veracity of information contained in the application for land use
conversion;
15.2.2. Description of the property(ies) applied for conversion, including
among others the location, terrain/topography, land cover and dominant land
use of the subject land and the surrounding areas;
15.2.3. Status of the coverage under CARP of the land applied for
conversion;
15.2.4. Whether or not the land applied for conversion falls within the
appropriate zone in the land use plan of the city or municipality;
15.2.5. Existence of farmers, agricultural lessees, share tenants,
farmworkers, actual tillers, and/or occupants on the subject land;
15.2.6. Whether or not the farmers, agricultural lessees, share tenants,
farmworkers, actual tillers, and/or occupants have been paid or have agreed to
the terms of the disturbance compensation due them; and
15.2.7. Other information, relevant and useful in deciding whether to
approve/disapprove the application for conversion.
15.3. The Barangay Agrarian Reform Council (BARC) and Barangay Chairman shall
be notified of the ocular inspection but their presence is not mandatory.
SECTION 16. Protest. — Persons affected by the proposed land use conversion,
such as identified beneficiaries, farmers, agricultural lessees, share tenants, actual tillers,
occupants, or residents of adjoining properties or communities, may file a written protest
against the application for conversion within thirty (30) days from posting of the requisite
billboard(s) under Section 11 hereof, or within fifteen (15) days from conduct of ocular
inspection, whichever is later. For applications involving housing projects under EO-45-
2001, the protest period shall be within seventeen (17) days from posting of the requisite
billboard(s) under Section 11 hereof, or within five (5) days from conduct of ocular
inspection, whichever is later. Thereafter, the RCLUPPI/CLUPPI shall furnish all oppositors
with copies of all orders or actions taken relative to the subject application. An oppositor
who is an identified Agrarian Reform-Beneficiary (ARB) of the land applied for conversion,
and who failed to file a written protest within the protest period due to fraud, accident,
mistake, or excusable neglect, may intervene at any time during the pendency of the
application. The filing of any protest shall interrupt any running period for processing
applications for conversion, and shall lift the deadline for approving or disapproving the
application.
SECTION 17. Where to file protest. — Protests against the application for
conversion shall be filed with the PARO and/or RCLUPPI and/or CLUPPI, as the case may
be, by personal service, if feasible. An oppositor who files a protest before the PARO shall
do so by personal service, not by mail. Upon receipt of a protest by personal service, the
PARO shall, before the end of the next working day, communicate with the
RCLUPPI/CLUPPI by telephone or text message, to inform the members thereof of such
protest, and send a corresponding telegram and/or radiogram which shall serve as written
proof of compliance with the protest notification requirement herein. Within four (4) working
days from receipt of the protest, the PARO shall transmit, by courier or speed delivery, to
the RCLUPPI/CLUPPI the original copy of the protest itself, and keep a photocopy thereof
in his custody. Failure of the PARO to comply with the directive under this Section shall
subject him to the appropriate disciplinary action.
SECTION 18. Examination of Records. — Any interested person or his duly
authorized representative or counsel may request from the CLUPPI/RCLUPPI or
PARO/MARO a copy of the application, including the attachments thereto, but not the DAR
inter-office endorsement/recommendation and other documents as set forth in DAR MC-
25-1995. The CLUPPI/RCLUPPI shall not divulge its recommendation so as not to pre-
empt the final decision of the proper approving authority.
SECTION 19. Resolution of Protest. — The approving authority shall resolve the
protest simultaneously with the application for conversion. Whenever necessary, the
approving authority may, motu propio or upon motion by any oppositor, issue a Cease and
Desist Order (CDO).
SECTION 20. Grounds for Protest/Denial of Conversion. — Protests against the
application and denial of the application may be instituted or founded on any of the
following grounds:
20.1. The area under application is non-negotiable for conversion;
20.2. The adverse effects of the displacement to be caused by the proposed
conversion far outweigh the social and economic benefits to the affected
communities;
20.3. Misrepresentation or concealment of facts material to the application for
conversion;
20.4. Illegal or premature conversion;
20.5. Existence of proof that conversion was resorted to as a means to evade CARP
coverage and to dispossess the tenant farmers of the land tilled by them.
20.6. The land applied for conversion has not ceased to be economically feasible
and sound for agricultural purposes, or the locality where it is found has not become
 urbanized and the land will not have a greater economic value for residential,
commercial or industrial purposes. (Section 65 of RA 6657)
20.7. The applicant has violated, or the application for conversion is violative, of
agrarian laws, rules and regulations as well as other applicable statutes and other
administrative issuances.
SECTION 21. Processing of Applications. — The following steps are the procedure
for ordinary conversions that do not involve "priority development areas and projects" nor
housing projects under Section 6 hereof:
21.1. The applicant shall first secure an Application Form from the RCLUPPI or
CLUPPI.
21.2. Following the instructions that accompany the Application Form, the applicant
shall install the public notice billboard(s) required under Section 11 hereof.
21.3. Immediately thereafter, the applicant shall fill up the Application Form with all
the necessary data. He shall reproduce at least five (5) clear photocopies of the
accomplished Application Form and place them in five (5) separate folders (plus a
sixth folder for the original set), the distribution of which shall be as follows:
21.3.1. The original copy for the RCLUPPI/CLUPPI (the receiving clerk
must rubberstamp the words "ORIGINAL" on the original copy);
21.3.2. Three (3) photocopies for the RCLUPPI/CLUPPI; and
21.3.3. Two (2) photocopies which the applicant shall furnish to the MARO
as advance copies.
21.4. When furnishing the MARO with folders of the application, the applicant shall
attach to the filled-up application form, clear photocopies of the:
21.4.1. Title(s) required under either Section 10.4 and/or Section 10.5
hereof, and
21.4.2. Directional sketch map required under Section 10.26 hereof.
21.5. Within five (5) days from receipt of the folders containing the documents in
Section 21.4 hereof, the MARO shall keep one folder for himself and transmit the
other folder to the PARO.
21.6. Within twenty (20) days from receipt of the above folder, the MARO shall:
check the status of CARP coverage on the subject land; inspect the billboard; check
presence of farmers, agricultural lessees, share tenants, farm workers, actual tillers,
or occupants; post notices of the application in a conspicuous place in the
municipality and a conspicuous place in the barangay covering the subject land (or a
larger portion of the subject land for properties that overlap on more than one
barangay); prepare a single-document MARO certification reporting the result of all
the foregoing tasks; and make available to the applicant the original copy of said
MARO certification.
21.7. If the MARO fails to act upon the request for issuance of the above certification
within twenty (20) days from receipt of the request, the applicant shall notify the
PARO and RCLUPPI/CLUPPI of such failure by personally filing an affidavit reporting
such inaction. Within five (5) days from receipt of the affidavit of inaction, the PARO
shall compel the MARO to act upon the request. If the MARO still refuses to act for no
justifiable reason, the PARO shall, within twenty (20) days from receipt of the affidavit
of inaction, perform by himself the duties abandoned by the MARO. Meantime, the
disciplining authority of the DAR, shall, after proper investigation, impose upon said
MARO the appropriate administrative sanction(s).
21.8. At this juncture, the applicant has four (4) application forms left after furnishing
two (2) advance copies for the MARO and PARO. The applicant shall place said
application forms in the remaining four (4) folders and all the applicable documentary
requirements set forth in Section 10 hereof, all the originals being in one (1) folder,
and the photocopies thereof being in the three (3) other folders. These four (4) folders
shall be the initiatory pleading of the application for conversion.
21.9. The applicant shall submit to the RCLUPPI/CLUPPI the four (4) folders. The
RCLUPPI/CLUPPI shall then review the completeness of the folders. If found
complete, the applicant shall pay the filing fees and inspection cost (in accordance
with Section 13 hereof) and post the necessary bond (in accordance with Section 24
hereof), after which the RCLUPPI/CLUPPI may accept the application. Acceptance
date of the folders shall be the "Filing Date" of the application.
21.10. The distribution of the four (4) folders shall be as follows: The
RCLUPPI/CLUPPI shall keep a folder containing the originals and a folder containing
photocopies. At the same time, the RCLUPPI/CLUPPI Secretariat shall transmit the
remaining two (2) folders to the PARO and MARO respectively. Immediate transmittal
of said folders is important because the PARO shall utilize the information therein
when acting upon any protest against the application, or when issuing any comment
that he may wish to submit to the RCLUPPI/CLUPPI in connection with the
application.
21.11. Within ten (10) days from Filing Date, the RCLUPPI/CLUPPI shall issue to the
applicant a Notice of Conduct of Ocular Inspection, indicating the date thereof. The
ocular inspection shall be held not earlier than ten (10) days nor later than twenty (20)
days from issuance date of the Notice of Conduct of Ocular .Inspection. The
RCLUPPI/CLUPPI shall inform the MARO by the fastest means of communication of
the date of ocular inspection with instructions to ensure dissemination of the Notice to
all farmers, agricultural lessees, share tenants, farmworkers, actual tillers, or
occupants in the subject landholding.
21.12. The applicant shall transmit said Notice to the MARO and indicate the ocular
inspection date on the billboard(s) at least five (5) days before conduct of ocular
inspection. On or before ocular inspection date, the applicant shall submit to the
RCLUPPI/CLUPPI a proof that the MARO was able to receive a copy of said Notice.
21.13. The RCLUPPI/CLUPPI shall then conduct ocular inspection, and if possible,
hold a dialogue with the farmers, agricultural lessees, share tenants, farmworkers,
actual tillers, or occupants found in the subject landholding.
21.14. The RCLUPPI/CLUPPI ocular inspection team shall, within five (5) days from
conduct of ocular inspection, accomplish an Investigation Report which shall include
the result of its dialogue.
21.15. The RCLUPPI/CLUPPI shall deliberate on the merits of the application and
may call the applicant and/or oppositor(s), if any, for clarificatory questioning, to
 judiciously resolve any dispute arising from the application. The RCLUPPI shall invite
the PARO to participate in the deliberations. Upon his discretion, the PARO may
submit a written comment to the RCLUPPI/CLUPPI.
21.16. Within sixty (60) days from issuance of the MARO certification, but not later
than eighty (80) days from Filing Date, the RCLUPPI/CLUPPI shall forward its
recommendation, together with the records, to the approving authority.
21.17. Within thirty (30) days from submission of the recommendation, the approving
authority shall resolve the application and furnish copies of the decision to the
applicant and oppositor(s), if any.
21.18. The filing of any protest shall interrupt any running period for processing
applications for conversion and shall lift the deadline for approving or disapproving
the application. Upon receipt of a protest, the RCLUPPI/CLUPPI shall order the filing
of a comment, reply, rejoinder, and such other pleadings that may aid in a judicious
resolution of the protest issues, and thereafter schedule hearings where the parties
may present their respective evidence. After conclusion of the hearings, the
RCLUPPI/CLUPPI shall submit its recommendation to the approving authority which
shall resolve the protest simultaneously with the application.
SECTION 22. Processing of Applications Involving Priority Development Areas and
Projects. — Applications involving "priority development areas and projects" under Section
6.1 hereof, and housing projects under Section 6.2 hereof, shall follow the following steps:
22.1. The applicant shall first secure an Application Form from the RCLUPPI or
CLUPPI.
22.2. Following the instructions that accompany the Application Form, the applicant
shall install the public notice billboard(s) required under Section 11 hereof.
22.3. Immediately thereafter, the applicant shall fill up the Application Form with all
the necessary data. He shall reproduce at least five (5) clear photocopies of the
accomplished Application Form and place them in five (5) separate folders (plus a
sixth folder for the original set), the distribution of which shall be as follows:
22.3.1. The original copy for the RCLUPPI/CLUPPI (the receiving clerk
must rubberstamp the words "ORIGINAL" on the original copy);
22.3.2. Three (3) photocopies for the RCLUPPI/CLUPPI; and
22.3.3. Two (2) photocopies which the applicant shall furnish to the MARO
as advance copies.
22.4. When furnishing the MARO with folders of the application, the applicant shall
attach to the filled-up application form, clear photocopies of the:
22.4.1. Title(s) required under either Section 10.4 and/or Section 10.5
hereof; and
22.4.2. Directional sketch map required under Section 10.26 hereof.
22.5. Within five (5) days from receipt of the folders containing the documents in
Section 22.4 hereof, the MARO shall keep one folder for himself and transmit the
other folder to the PARO.
22.6. MARO certification:
22.6.1. Priority development areas and projects under Section 6.1 hereof.
Within twenty (20) days from receipt of the above folder, the MARO shall: check
the status of CARP coverage on the subject land; inspect the billboard; check
presence of farmers, agricultural lessees, share tenants, farm workers, actual
tillers, or occupants; post notices of the application in a conspicuous place in the
municipality and a conspicuous place in the barangay covering the subject land
(or a larger portion of the subject land for properties that overlap on more than
one barangay); prepare a single-document MARO certification reporting the
result of all the foregoing tasks; and make available to the applicant the original
copy of said MARO certification.
22.6.2. Housing projects under Section 6.2 hereof (EO-45-2001). Within ten
(10) days from receipt of the above folder, the MARO shall: check the status of
CARP coverage on the subject land; inspect the billboard; check presence of
farmers, agricultural lessees, share tenants, farm workers, actual tillers, or
occupants; post notices of the application in a conspicuous place in the
municipality and a conspicuous place in the barangay covering the subject land
(or a larger portion of the subject land for properties that overlap on more than
one barangay); prepare a single-document MARO certification reporting the
result of all the foregoing tasks; and make available to the applicant the original
copy of said MARO certification.
22.7. MARO inaction:
22.7.1. Priority development areas and projects under Section 6.1 hereof. If
the MARO fails to act upon the request for issuance of the above certification
within twenty (20) days from receipt of the request, the applicant shall notify the
PARO and RCLUPPI/CLUPPI of such failure by personally filing an affidavit
reporting such inaction. Within five (5) days from receipt of the affidavit of
inaction, the PARO shall compel the MARO to act upon the request. If the
MARO still refuses to act for no justifiable reason, the PARO shall, within twenty
(20) days from receipt of the affidavit of inaction, perform by himself the duties
abandoned by the MARO. Meantime, the disciplining authority of the DAR shall,
after proper investigation, impose upon said MARO the appropriate
administrative sanction(s).
22.7.2. Housing projects under Section 6.2 hereof (EO-45-2001). If the
MARO fails to act upon the request for said certification within ten (10) days
from receipt of the request, the applicant shall notify the RCLUPPI/CLUPPI of
such failure by personally filing an affidavit reporting such inaction. The
RCLUPPI/CLUPPI shall investigate the reason for the non-issuance and take
the steps necessary for the judicious resolution of the pending application for
conversion. Simultaneously, the disciplining authority of the DAR shall, after
proper investigation, impose upon the erring MARO the proper administrative
sanction(s).
22.8. At this juncture, the applicant has four (4) application forms left after furnishing
two (2) advance copies for the MARO and PARO. The applicant shall place said
application forms in the remaining four (4) folders and all the applicable documentary
requirements set forth in Section 10 hereof, all the originals being in one (1) folder,
and the photocopies thereof being in the three (3) other folders. These four (4) folders
shall be the initiatory pleading of the application for conversion.
22.9. Filing Date:
22.9.1. Priority development areas and projects under Section 6.1 hereof .
The applicant shall submit to the RCLUPPI/CLUPPI the four (4) folders
containing all the applicable documentary requirements set forth in Section 10
hereof. The RCLUPPI/CLUPPI shall then review the completeness of the
application. If found complete, the applicant shall pay the filing fee and
inspection cost (in accordance with Section 13 hereof) and post the necessary
bond (in accordance with Section 24 hereof), after which the RCLUPPI/CLUPPI
may accept the application. Acceptance date of the folders shall be the "Filing
Date" of the application.
22.9.2. Housing projects under Section 6.2 hereof (EO-45-2001). The
applicant shall submit to the RCLUPPI/CLUPPI the four (4) folders containing all
the applicable requirements set forth in Section 10 hereof except those in
Sections 10.15 to 10.18 (certifications from the HLURB, DA, and DENR) which
the applicant may submit at a later time. The RCLUPPI/CLUPPI shall then
review the completeness of the application. If found complete, the applicant shall
pay the filing fee and inspection cost (in accordance with Section 13 hereof) and
post the necessary bond (in accordance with Section 24 hereof), after which the
RCLUPPI/CLUPPI may accept the application. Acceptance date of the folders
shall be the "Filing Date" of the application.
22.10. The distribution of the four (4) folders shall be as follows: The
RCLUPPI/CLUPPI shall keep a folder containing the originals and a folder containing
photocopies. At the same time, the RCLUPPI/CLUPPI Secretariat shall transmit the
remaining two (2) folders to the PARO and MARO respectively. Immediate transmittal
of said folders is important because the PARO shall utilize the information therein
when acting upon any protest against the application, or when issuing any comment
that he may wish to submit to the RCLUPPI/CLUPPI in connection with the
application.
22.11. Within five (5) days from Filing Date, the RCLUPPI/CLUPPI shall issue to the
applicant a Notice of Conduct of Ocular Inspection, indicating the date thereof. The
ocular inspection shall be held not earlier than ten (10) days nor later than fifteen (15)
days from issuance date of the Notice of Conduct of Ocular Inspection. The
RCLUPPI/CLUPPI shall inform the MARO by the fastest means of communication of
the date of ocular inspection with instructions to ensure dissemination of the Notice to
all farmers, agricultural lessees, share tenants, farmworkers, actual tillers, or
occupants in the subject landholding.
22.12. The applicant shall transmit said Notice to the MARO and indicate the ocular
inspection date on the billboard(s) at least five (5) days before conduct of ocular
inspection. On or before ocular inspection date, the applicant shall submit to the
RCLUPPI/CLUPPI a proof that the MARO was able to receive a copy of said Notice.
22.13. The RCLUPPI/CLUPPI shall then conduct ocular inspection, and if possible,
hold a dialogue with the farmers, agricultural lessees, share tenants, farmworkers,
actual tillers, and/or occupants found in the subject landholding.
22.14. The RCLUPPI/CLUPPI ocular inspection team shall, within five (5) days from
conduct of ocular inspection, accomplish an Investigation Report which shall include
the result of its dialogue.
22.15. The RCLUPPI/CLUPPI shall deliberate on the merits of the application and
may call the applicant and/or oppositor(s), if any, for clarificatory questioning to
judiciously resolve any dispute arising from the application. The RCLUPPI shall invite
the PARO to participate in the deliberations. Upon his discretion, the PARO may
submit a written comment to the RCLUPPI/CLUPPI.
22.16. RCLUPPI/CLUPPI recommendation:
22.16.1. Priority development areas and projects under Section 6.1 hereof .
Within forty (40) days from issuance of the MARO certification, but not later than
sixty (60) days from Filing Date, the RCLUPPI/CLUPPI shall forward its
recommendation, together with the records, to the approving authority.
22.16.2. Housing projects under Section 6.2 hereof (EO-45-2001). Within
thirty (30) days from issuance of the MARO certification or filing of affidavit of
MARO inaction, but not later than forty (40) days from Filing Date, the
RCLUPPI/CLUPPI shall forward its recommendation, together with the records,
to the approving authority.
22.17. The filing of any protest shall interrupt the running period for processing
applications for conversion and shall lift the deadline for approving or disapproving
the application. Upon receipt of a protest, the RCLUPPI/CLUPPI shall order the filing
of a comment, reply, rejoinder, and such other pleadings that may aid in a judicious
resolution of the protest issues, and thereafter schedule hearings where the parties
may present their respective evidence. After conclusion of the hearings, the
RCLUPPI/CLUPPI shall submit its recommendation to the approving authority which
shall resolve the protest simultaneously with the application.
22.18. Protests against applications involving housing projects shall likewise interrupt
the running period and lift the deadline for approving or disapproving the application.
In line with Section 4(c) of EO 45-2001, the RCLUPPI/CLUPPI shall make a
preliminary determination on whether or not the protest stands on valid grounds.
When the protest is prima facie meritorious, the RCLUPPI/CLUPPI shall order the
filing of a comment, reply, rejoinder, and such other pleadings that may aid in a
judicious resolution of the protest issues, and thereafter schedule hearings where the
parties may present their respective evidence. After conclusion of the hearings, the
RCLUPPI/CLUPPI shall submit its recommendation to the approving authority which
shall resolve the protest simultaneously with the application.
22.19. Approving Authority Decision:
22.19.1. Priority development areas and projects under Section 6.1 hereof .
Within thirty (30) days from submission of the recommendation, the approving
authority shall resolve the application and furnish copies of the decision to the
applicant and oppositor(s), if any.
22.19.2. Housing projects under Section 6.2 hereof (EO-45-2001). Within
thirty (30) days from submission of the recommendation, the approving authority
shall resolve the application and furnish copies of the decision to the applicant
 and oppositor(s), if any. The thirty (30) day period herein shall not run unless the
applicant submits to the approving authority the requirements set forth in
Sections 10.15 and 10.16 (certifications from the HLURB and DA).
22.20. In housing projects under EO-45-2001, when the approving authority finds the
application meritorious, but the applicant has not yet submitted the necessary DENR
certifications referred to in Sections 10.17 and 10.18 hereof, the approving authority
shall not issue any Conversion Order, but may, in lieu thereof, issue a Provisional
Conversion Order. A Provisional Conversion Order does not allow the applicant to
undertake any development activity on the subject land. No reglementary period for
filing a motion for reconsideration or appeal shall run upon the issuance of a
Provisional Conversion Order. The issuance of the final Conversion Order or its
denial shall be done only after the approving authority has received from the DENR: a
certification that the subject land is not within the NIPAS; and an ECC or a
certification that the same is not necessary.
SECTION 23. Bond. — To guarantee that the applicant shall not undertake
premature conversion pending consideration of the application, and ensure faithful
compliance with the conditions of the Conversion Order by the applicant/developer, cash
or surety bonds shall be required pursuant to Section 35, Chapter 6, Book IV of
the Administrative Code of 1987.
23.1. No surety bond shall be acceptable except that issued by the Government
Service Insurance System (GSIS), in line with the Office of the President (OP)
Administrative Order (AO) No. 33 [25 August 1987], as amended by OP-AO-141 [12
August 1994], "Prescribing Guidelines for the Insurance of All Properties, Contracts,
Rights of Action and other Insurance Risks of the Government, Including Those in
Which the Government Has an Insurable Interest, with the General Insurance Fund of
the Government Service Insurance System". This Guidelines expressly repeals all
provisions in DAR-MC-9-1999 relating to posting of bond.
23.2. The PARO shall be the recommending authority in resolving all motions for
withdrawal or refund of bond.
SECTION 24. Bond To Guarantee Against Premature Conversion. —
24.1. The applicant shall, upon filing of the application, post a cash bond equivalent
to at least two point five percent (2.5%) of the zonal value of the land per latest
issuance of the Department of Finance, in the form of cash or manager's/cashier's
check posted in favor of the DAR.
24.2. In lieu of a cash bond, the applicant may post a surety bond, issued by the
GSIS, equivalent to at least fifteen percent (15%) of the total zonal value of the land
per latest issuance of the Department of Finance, indicating the following conditions
at the minimum that:
24.2.1. The bond is callable on demand;
24.2.2. The DAR shall forfeit the bond in favor of the Agrarian Reform Fund
when it finds the applicant carrying out any premature conversion activity; and
24.2.3. The validity of the bond shall be for a period of one (1) year,
renewable by not more than one (1) year when necessary.
 24.3. The DAR shall forfeit the bond in favor of the Agrarian Reform Fund when the
applicant, or any person acting in his behalf, carries out any actual conversion activity
on the land prior to the application's approval. Forfeiture shall be without prejudice to
the filing of criminal charges against those responsible for premature conversion.
24.4. After faithful compliance with the terms and conditions of the bond, the
applicant may opt to refund or convert the same into a performance bond after
issuance of the Conversion Order.
24.5. The following projects shall be exempt from posting a "bond to guarantee
against premature conversion":
24.5.1. Socialized housing projects as certified by the HLURB;
24.5.2. Resettlement projects for families displaced by development of
government projects as certified by the National Housing Authority (NHA); and
24.5.3. Community Mortgage Program (CMP) projects as certified by the
National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC).
When the application involves a mixed use of socialized and non-socialized housing
projects, the application shall not enjoy any bond exemption for socialized housing unless
at least eighty (80) percent of the land applied for conversion shall be used directly and
exclusively for socialized housing.
SECTION 25. Convertibility of Bond. — An applicant who posted a "bond to
guarantee against premature conversion" using a GSIS surety bond may thereafter opt to
convert said surety bond into a performance bond after securing the consent of the GSIS,
in line with Article 2079 of the Civil Code.
SECTION 26. Performance Bond. — Within five (5) days from receipt of a copy of
the Conversion Order, the applicant shall post a performance bond in the form of either of
the following:
26.1. Cash or manager's/cashier's check equivalent to at least two point five percent
(2.5%) of the total zonal value of the land per latest issuance of the Department of
Finance; or
26.2. GSIS surety bond equivalent to at least fifteen percent (15%) of the total zonal
value of the land per latest issuance of the Department of Finance, indicating the
following conditions at the minimum that:
26.2.1. The bond is callable on demand;
26.2.2. A photocopy of the approved Conversion Order is attached and
forms part of the bond;
26.2.3. The DAR shall forfeit the bond in favor of the Agrarian Reform Fund
when it finds the applicant in default of his obligation to complete development of
the land and/or comply with any of the conditions in the Conversion Order; and
26.2.4. The validity of the bond shall be equivalent to the prescribed period
of development of the area under the Conversion Order.
SECTION 27. Reimbursement for Government Investment. — Pursuant to DA-AO-6-
1998, in case of approved conversion of land within SAFDZ, the registered owner shall pay
the government, through the Treasurer of the Philippines, the amount equivalent to the
government's investment cost, including inflation, estimated to include all expenditures for
capital goods expended by any and all agencies, financed from public, national or local
budget resources, whether sourced from domestic or foreign, on the land applied for land
use conversion, provided, that:
27.1. The valuation of such investments will be equivalent to the total government
expenditure made on the land in question, adjusted for average inflation over the
period starting from the beginning of investment up to the month of approval of
conversion;
27.2. The valuation shall be determined jointly by the Municipal Assessor and
Municipal Treasurer, in consultation with those agencies which have made public
investments in the area; and
27.3. The payment of the landowner shall be made in a single, lump sum payment
to the Treasurer of the Philippines through the Municipal Treasurer of the Municipality
where the farmland concerned is located.
SECTION 28. Disturbance Compensation. —
28.1. The applicant and/or landowner and/or developer shall pay disturbance
compensation in cash or kind or combination of cash and kind to the farmers,
agricultural lessees, share tenants, farmworkers, actual tillers, and/or occupants
affected by the conversion, in such amounts or under such terms as the parties may
mutually agree upon.
28.2. The amount of disturbance compensation shall not be less than five (5) times
the average of the gross harvests on the target landholding during the last five (5)
preceding calendar years, pursuant to Section 36 of RA 3844, as amended by
Section 7 of RA 6389.
28.3. Compensation in kind may consist of some or all or mixture of housing,
homelots, employment, and/or other benefits. The DAR shall approve the terms of
any agreement for the payment of disturbance compensation and monitor compliance
therewith. In no case shall compliance with the terms and conditions thereof extend
beyond sixty (60) days from the date of approval of the application for conversion.
28.4. If the parties fail to agree on the amount of disturbance compensation, or raise
an issue questioning the lease or tenancy relationship or any other prejudicial issue
that tends to justify non-payment of disturbance compensation, either or both parties
may refer the issue to the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) for
resolution. While the case is pending before the Adjudicating Authority, the
landowner(s)/applicant(s) may not evict said farmers, agricultural lessees, share
tenants, farmworkers, actual tillers, or occupants, until such time when the
Adjudicating Authority resolves the prejudicial issue(s) with finality.
28.5. The applicant shall furnish the RCLUPPI/CLUPPI with proof of payment of
disturbance compensation within five (5) days from receipt of payment.
ARTICLE IV
Conversion to Homelot
 SECTION 29. Criteria. — Conversion to a homelot is allowable when: the applicant
owns the lot that he proposes to convert; he intends to establish a dwelling place for
himself on said lot; the lot has an area not exceeding five hundred (500) square meters;
and the conversion shall be from agricultural to purely residential use.
SECTION 30. Documentary Requirements. —
30.1. Official receipt showing proof of payment of filing fee and inspection cost;
30.2. Duly accomplished application for conversion subscribed and sworn to before
a notary public or any person authorized to administer oaths;
30.3. True copy of the Original Certificate of Title (OCT) or Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) of the subject land, certified by the Register of Deeds not earlier than thirty
(30) days prior to application filing date.
In case of untitled land, the following shall be required in lieu of a title:
30.3.1. Certification from the DENR Community Environment and Natural
Resources Officer (CENRO) that the landholding has been classified as
alienable and disposable; and
30.3.2. Certification from the DENR CENRO (for administrative
confirmation of imperfect title) or the Clerk of Court (for judicial confirmation of
imperfect title) that the titling process/proceedings has commenced and there
are no adverse claimants;
30.4. True copy of the Certificate of Title of the subject land as of 15 June 1988, and
all successor Titles until the present Title referred to in Section 10.4 hereof, if
applicable.
30.5. Directional sketch map to guide the ocular inspection team in locating the
homelot.
SECTION 31. Procedure. —
31.1. The applicant shall first secure an Application Form from the RCLUPPI.
31.2. Following the instructions that accompany the Application Form, the applicant
shall fill up the same with all the necessary data, and thereafter, reproduce at least
three (3) clear photocopies of the accomplished Application Form which he shall
place in three (3) separate folders (plus a fourth folder for the original set), the
distribution of which shall be as follows:
31.2.1. The original copy for the RCLUPPI (the receiving clerk must
rubberstamp the words "ORIGINAL" on the original copy);
31.2.2. One (1) photocopy for the RCLUPPI;
31.2.3. One (1) photocopy for the PARO; and
31.2.4. One (1) photocopy for the MARO.
31.3. The RCLUPPI shall then review the completeness of the application folders. If
found complete, the applicant shall pay a filing fee amounting to Five Hundred Pesos
(P500) and the inspection cost amounting to One Thousand Pesos (P1,000).
Acceptance date of the application folders shall be the "Filing Date" of the application.
 31.4. Within five (5) days from Filing Date, the RCLUPPI shall transmit two (2) of the
above folders, containing photocopies, to the PARO and MARO, respectively.
31.5. Within thirty (30) days from receipt of the folder, the MARO shall: check the
status of CARP coverage on the subject landholding, post notices of the application in
a conspicuous place in the municipality and a conspicuous place in the barangay
covering the subject landholding; and submit a report thereon to the PARO.
31.6. Within thirty (30) days from receipt of the MARO report, the PARO shall issue
to the applicant a Notice of Conduct of Ocular Inspection indicating the date thereof.
The ocular inspection shall be held not earlier than fifteen (15) days nor later than
thirty (30) days from issuance date of the Notice of Conduct of Ocular Inspection.
31.7. The PARO and MARO or their representatives shall conduct ocular inspection
in the presence of the applicant and oppositor(s), if any.
31.8. Within thirty (30) days from conduct of ocular inspection, the PARO shall
submit a report and forward the records to the RCLUPPI.
31.9. The RCLUPPI shall deliberate on the merits of the application and may call the
applicant and/or oppositor(s), if any, for clarificatory questioning, to judiciously resolve
any dispute arising from the application.
31.10. Within thirty (30) days from receipt of the PARO report, the RCLUPPI shall
submit its recommendation to the Regional Director.
31.11. Within thirty (30) days from receipt of the RCLUPPI recommendation, the
Regional Director shall promulgate his decision on whether to grant or deny
conversion.
31.12. The filing of a protest shall interrupt the running of any of the foregoing
deadline periods. The RCLUPPI shall thereupon proceed to hear the protest and
thereafter submit its recommendation to the Regional Director who shall resolve the
protest simultaneously with the application.
ARTICLE V
Issuance of Conversion Order and its Effects
SECTION 32. Issuance of Order. — No Conversion Order (or its denial) shall be
valid without the following information:
32.1. Conversion case number.
32.2. OCT/TCT numbers and corresponding lot numbers. In case of untitled lands,
the lot numbers and corresponding survey plan numbers.
32.3. Names of all registered landowners for each parcel of land.
32.4. Name of applicant or representative, if the applicant is not the landowner.
32.5. Name of developer.
32.6. Proposed use of the land.
32.7. Total area applied for conversion.
32.8. Total area approved or disapproved for conversion; and
 32.9. Date of approval or denial of the order.
SECTION 33. Conditions of Conversion Order. — The approval of the application for
conversion shall be subject to the following conditions:
33.1. The applicant shall not undertake any development until all the applicable
permits and clearances from the other concerned government agencies have been
granted.
33.2. Within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the Conversion Order, the landowner
shall post a performance bond in accordance with Sections 25 or 26 hereof.
33.3. Within thirty (30) days from receipt of the Conversion Order, the landowner
shall request the Register of Deeds to annotate on the property's title the land use
allowed under the Conversion Order.
33.4. Within sixty (60) days from receipt of the Conversion Order, the landowner
shall return to the CLUPPI or RCLUPPI a certified true copy of the title that already
contains the annotation indicating the land use allowed under the Conversion Order.
33.5. Within sixty (60) days from receipt of the Conversion Order, the landowner,
solidarity with his co-owner(s) and developer(s), shall pay disturbance compensation
to the affected farmers, agricultural lessees, share tenants, farmworkers, actual tillers,
or occupants, in such amounts or kinds as the parties may mutually agree upon,
subject to the approval of the DAR.
33.6. Within one (1) year from issuance of the Conversion Order, the landowner
and/or developer shall commence development on the property approved for
conversion, and shall complete development not later than the deadline(s) set forth in
its site development plan schedule, but in no case shall development extend beyond
five (5) years from issuance of the Conversion Order.
33.7. For housing projects, the landowner shall secure an ECC, if applicable, prior to
undertaking any development therein.
33.8. The landowner and his representatives shall allow DAR officials free and
unhampered access into the property approved for conversion for the purpose of
monitoring compliance with the terms and conditions thereof.
33.9. The landowner and future landowner(s) of the property approved for
conversion shall not change its use to another use not authorized under the
Conversion Order without prior consent from the DAR. This prohibition extends to
changes in housing standards, changes in selling schemes, changes from social
housing to open market housing or vice-versa, and all other similar changes.
33.10. The landowner and/or developer shall submit quarterly reports on the status of
development to the MARO, PARO, and DAR Regional Office covering the subject
property.
33.11. The grant of a Conversion Order alone shall not be a ground for eviction. Any
person who desires to evict occupants on the basis of the Conversion Order shall
invoke other meritorious grounds and file the proper action.
33.12. The DAR reserves the right to revoke the Conversion Order upon valid
grounds and after proper investigation.
 SECTION 34. Effects of approval of conversion — The approval of an application for
conversion shall have, but shall not be limited to, the following effects:
34.1. It shall be limited to the specific use of the land authorized in the Conversion
Order;
34.2. It shall be subject to the schedule indicated in the detailed site development,
work and financial plans, but in no case shall the period of development extend
beyond five (5) years from issuance of the Conversion Order except as authorized by
the Secretary or the approving official on meritorious grounds, provided that, if the
development cannot be accomplished within five (5) years, the grantee of the
Conversion Order shall submit a written request for extension within the six (6)
months before the lapse of the five (5)-year period, and provided further, that the
extended development period shall be one (1) year for every five (5) hectares, but in
no case shall the extension exceed five (5) years.
34.3. The conditions thereof shall be binding upon successors-in-interest of the
property; HTacDS

34.4. The applicant shall allow duly authorized representatives of DAR free and
unhampered access to the property subject of the Conversion Order to monitor
compliance with the terms and conditions thereof;
34.5. The use authorized in the Conversion Order shall be annotated on the title of
the subject property; and
34.6. It shall be without prejudice to the ancestral domain claims of indigenous
peoples, if any, pursuant to RA 8371 or the "Indigenous Peoples Rights Act".
SECTION 35. Distribution of copy of Conversion Order. —
35.1. For monitoring purposes, the RCLUPPI shall furnish the CLUPPI with copies
of all Conversion Orders issued at the regional level.
35.2. The RCLUPPI/CLUPPI shall be responsible and liable for giving a copy of the
Conversion Order (or its denial) to all parties listed in the Conversion Order.
35.3. The Registry of Deeds of the locality wherein the area applied for conversion is
located, among others, shall be given a copy of the Conversion Order. The applicant,
upon filing of the application for conversion, shall give the complete address of the
local Registry of Deeds to the RCLUPPI/CLUPPI Secretariat.
35.4. The DENR's Environmental Management Bureau (EMB), and all other
concerned agencies and parties, shall be given a copy of the Conversion Order or its
denial.
ARTICLE VI
Motion for Reconsideration
SECTION 36. Motion for Reconsideration — A party may file only one (1) motion for
reconsideration of the decision, resolution, or final order of the Regional Director or
Secretary, and may do so only within a non-extendible period of fifteen (15) calendar days
from receipt of the challenged decision, resolution, or final order. The pendency of a timely
motion for reconsideration by the proper party shall stay execution of the challenged
decision, resolution, or final order.
 36.1. At the Regional Director's level, if the motion for reconsideration is denied, the
movant may perfect an appeal before the Secretary within only the remainder of said
non-extendible period of fifteen (15) calendar days. If the motion for reconsideration is
granted, resulting to the reversal of the original decision, the aggrieved party may
perfect an appeal before the Secretary within a full but non-extendible period of
fifteen (15) calendar days from receipt of the reversed resolution.
36.2. At the Office of the Secretary's level, if the motion for reconsideration is
denied, the movant may perfect an appeal before the Office of the President (OP)
within fifteen (15) calendar days from receipt of the resolution denying the motion for
reconsideration.
ARTICLE VII
Appeals
SECTION 37. Who May Appeal. — Only the aggrieved party or parties who is/are
either the applicant(s) or protestor(s)/oppositor(s), or both, or their successor(s)-in-interest,
may appeal the decision, resolution, or final order of the Regional Director or Secretary
within the periods prescribed in Section 33 hereof. The appellant(s) shall furnish copies of
the appeal pleadings to all parties and to the RCLUPPI, Regional Director, CLUPPI, and
Secretary.
SECTION 38. When to Appeal. — The appellant(s) may perfect his/their appeal
within a non-extendible period of fifteen (15) calendar days from receipt of the decision,
resolution, or final order of the approving authority. The moment the DAR loses jurisdiction
over a case by reason of an appeal to the OP, the applicable rules of the OP shall then
govern the appeal.
SECTION 39. Where to File an Appeal. —
39.1. Appeal from the decision, resolution, or final order of the Regional Director to
the Secretary shall be made by filing a Notice of Appeal before the Office of the
Regional Director of origin, furnishing copies thereof to all adverse parties, if any,
together with payment of the requisite appeal fees to the cashier of the regional office
of origin.
39.2. Appeal from the decision, resolution, or final order of the Secretary shall be
made by filing a Notice of Appeal before either the Office of the Bureau of Agrarian
Legal Assistance (BALA) Director, or directly at the OP, furnishing copies thereof to
all adverse parties, if any, together with payment of the requisite appeal fees to the
cashier of either the DAR or OP.
39.3. Appeal from the decision, resolution, or final order of the Secretary may be
taken to the Court of Appeals by certiorari in accordance with Section 54 of RA 6657.
SECTION 40. Appeal by a Pauper Litigant. — A party opposing an application for
conversion, who is a farmer, agricultural lessee, share tenant, farmworker, actual tiller,
occupant, member of a farmers' collective or cooperative, or any other person directly
working on the land may allege that he is a pauper litigant without need for further proof.
He shall enjoy pauper litigant privileges such as exemption from payment of appeal fees.
SECTION 41. Appeal Pleadings. — For appeals from the Regional Director to the
Secretary, the appellant shall submit an appeal brief with the BALA within fifteen (15) days
from perfection of the appeal, furnishing a copy thereof to all parties and to the RCLUPPI,
Regional Director and CLUPPI. The appellee may submit a comment (not motion to
dismiss) within ten (10) days from receipt of the appeal brief, furnishing a copy thereof to
the appellant and to the RCLUPPI, Regional Director and CLUPPI. Within fifteen (15) days
from filing of appellee's comment, the BALA shall issue a preliminary order stating either
that:
41.1. The pleadings on record need further clarification and the conduct of a
clarificatory hearing is necessary. Ten (10) days after the termination thereof, the
parties may be ordered to simultaneously file their respective appeal memorandum.
41.2. The pleadings on record are insufficient for a proper determination of the
issues raised and so the parties shall simultaneously file their respective appeal
memorandum within ten (10) days from receipt of order for simultaneous filing.
41.3. The pleadings on record are sufficient for deciding the appeal and henceforth
the deciding authority shall promulgate its decision.
Upon submission of sufficient pleadings, the BALA Director shall submit his
recommendation to the deciding authority.
SECTION 42. Perfection of Appeal. —
42.1. The filing of a proper notice of appeal and payment of requisite appeal fees in
due time perfects the appeal with respect to the subject matter thereof.
42.2. The office that rendered the challenged decision, resolution, or final order
loses jurisdiction over the case after perfection of the appeal and expiration of the
period to appeal by all other parties.
SECTION 43. DAR Representation on Appeal. —
43.1. The Secretary shall represent the DAR in all appeals to the OP.
43.2. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) shall represent the DAR in all
appeals to the Court of Appeals. Alternatively, the OSG may deputize any DAR
lawyer to represent the DAR in said appeals.
SECTION 44. Execution Pending Appeal. —
44.1. Appeal from the Regional Director — The appeal shall stay execution of the
decision, resolution, or final order of the Regional Director unless the Secretary
directs execution pending appeal when the exceptional nature and circumstances of
the case so requires (EO 292-1987, Book VII, Chapter 4, Section 21).
44.2. Appeal to the OP — The appeal shall stay execution of the decision,
resolution, or final order of the Secretary unless the OP directs execution pending
appeal upon such terms and conditions as it may deem just and reasonable (OP-AO-
18-1987Section 4).
SECTION 45. Finality of Conversion Order. — The Conversion Order or its denial
shall become final and executory after all parties were able to receive a copy of the Order,
and after the lapse of fifteen (15) calendar days from receipt by the party who last receives
a copy of the Order, and no motion for reconsideration or appeal has been filed. The Head
of the Legal Division of the Regional Office or the BALA Director, as the case may be, shall
issue the appropriate Certificate of Finality.
 ARTICLE VIII
Revocation or Withdrawal of Conversion Orders
SECTION 46. Filing of Petition. — Any person may file a petition to revoke, and the
landowner may file a petition to withdraw, the Conversion Order before the approving
authority within ninety (90) days from discovery of facts warranting revocation or
withdrawal, but not more than one (1) year from issuance of the Conversion Order. When
the petition alleges any of the grounds in the enumeration in the next section, the filing
period shall be within ninety (90) days from discovery of such facts but not beyond the
development period stipulated in the Conversion Order. Within the DAR, only the Secretary
may resolve petitions that question the jurisdiction of the recommending body or approving
authority.
SECTION 47. Grounds. — The following acts or omissions shall warrant revocation
of the Conversion Order:
47.1. Lack of jurisdiction of the approving authority;
47.2. Misrepresentation or concealment of facts material to the grant of conversion;
47.3. Non-compliance with the conditions of the Conversion Order;
47.4. Non-compliance with the agreement on disturbance compensation payment;
47.5. Conversion to a use other than that authorized in the Conversion Order, or
47.6. Any other serious violation of agrarian laws.
SECTION 48. General Procedure. —
48.1. Upon receipt of the petition, the approving authority shall order the
respondent(s) to file a comment within fifteen (15) days from receipt of said order.
48.2. The proceedings shall be non-litigious in nature. Except for basic essential
requirements of due process, the approving authority shall refrain from strict
application of procedural technicalities and rules governing admissibility and
sufficiency of evidence obtaining in judicial courts.
48.3. The approving authority shall undertake reasonable means to ascertain the
facts of the controversy, including a thorough examination of witnesses, and, ocular
inspection of the premises in question, as may be necessary.
48.4. The approving authority shall render a decision on the merits of the case within
thirty (30) days from the time the case is deemed submitted for resolution.,
SECTION 49. Effect of Revocation or Withdrawal of Conversion Order. — The land
subject thereof shall revert to the status of agricultural lands and shall be subject to CARP
coverage as circumstances may warrant.
ARTICLE IX
Monitoring of Land Use Conversion
SECTION 50. Responsibility for Monitoring Illegal Conversion. — The Provincial/City
Task Forces on Illegal Conversion, created pursuant to DAR-DOJ Joint AO 5-1994, shall
monitor cases of illegal conversion of agricultural lands in the provinces or cities, as the
case may be. The PARO shall submit quarterly reports on illegal conversion to the National
Task Force on Illegal Conversion at the DAR Central Office.
SECTION 51. Compliance Monitoring. — Compliance with the terms and conditions
of the Conversion Order shall be monitored, as follows:
51.1. The landowner or developer shall submit quarterly reports on the status of the
development to the RCLUPPI and the PARO with jurisdiction over the property.
51.2. The RCLUPPI shall turn over reports to the designated office in the Regional
Office which shall monitor compliance by the applicant/developer with the terms and
conditions of the conversion, including the posting of the approved order. It shall
submit quarterly reports to the CLUPPI regarding the status of land use conversions,
copy furnished the DAR Provincial and Municipal Offices concerned.
51.3. The CLUPPI shall evaluate and consolidate the reports submitted by the
Regional Office, and render quarterly reports on the status of the land use conversion
applications to the Secretary, through the Undersecretary for Field Operations and
Support Services, copy furnished the National Task Force on Illegal Conversion.
51.4. The BARC and representative of Non-Government Organizations/People's
Organizations (NGO/PO) may be authorized by the DAR Secretary or Regional
Director to assist in monitoring compliance with the terms and conditions of the
Conversion Order, as may be necessary.
ARTICLE X
Investigation and Prosecution
SECTION 52. Prohibited Acts and Omissions. — The following acts or omissions are
prohibited:
52.1. The conversion by any landowner of his agricultural land into any non-
agricultural use with intent to avoid the application of the CARP on his landholdings
and to dispossess his tenant farmers of the land tilled by them, as provided for under
Section 73 (c) of RA 6657;
52.2. The change of the nature of lands outside urban centers and city limits, either
in whole or in part, after the effectivity of RA 6657, as provided in Section 73 (e)
thereof;
52.3. Premature conversion as defined under Section 4 of RA 8435 and Section 2
hereof, or the undertaking of any development activity, the results of which modify or
alter the physical characteristics of the agricultural lands to render them suitable for
non-agricultural purposes without an approved Conversion Order from the DAR;
52.4. Unauthorized conversion or changing the current use of the land from
agricultural (e.g. rice land) to another agricultural use, the effect of which is to exempt
the land from CARP coverage (e.g. livestock, poultry, aquaculture) without a
Conversion Order from the DAR, or changing the use of the land to one other than
that allowed under the Conversion Order issued by the DAR as defined under Section
2 hereof.
SECTION 53. Who May be Held Liable. —
 53.1. Any landowner or developer, who commits any act which constitutes illegal,
premature or unauthorized conversion, including, their accomplices and accessories,
if any, shall be investigated pursuant to these Rules.
53.2. If the offender is a corporation or an association, the officer responsible
therefor shall be held liable.
SECTION 54. Investigating Officials. —
54.1. The DAR Officials, who are designated members of the Provincial/City Task
Forces on Illegal Conversion pursuant to DAR-DOJ Joint AO-5-1994, shall be
primarily responsible for the investigation, gathering of evidence, and the filing of the
complaints against illegal, premature or unauthorized conversions within their
respective areas of jurisdiction.
54.2. The Secretary may, however, direct such other officials as may be appropriate
to investigate cases of illegal, premature, or unauthorized conversion. He may
constitute a team composed of national and/or local DAR officials, representatives
from other law enforcement agencies, and volunteers from NGOs/POs for this
purpose.
54.3. The Secretary or his duly authorized representative shall be furnished copies
of the investigation reports and other relevant documents for appropriate action.
SECTION 55. Duties of Provincial/City Task Forces on Illegal Conversion. — In
accordance with DAR-DOJ Joint AO-5-1994, the Provincial/City Task Forces on Illegal
Conversion shall perform the following duties and responsibilities:
55.1. DAR Members:
55.1.1. Conduct actual ocular inspection and case build-up;
55.1.2. File the necessary complaint/affidavit together with supporting
documents before the task force member prosecutor;
55.1.3. Investigate all ongoing development project and conversion of
agricultural land;
55.1.4. Monitor the conversion situation in the province and cities within the
province;
55.1.5. Report to the National Task Force on the conversion situation in the
province and cities within the province; and
55.1.6. Perform such other related functions, which may be assigned by the
National Task Force on Illegal Conversion.
55.2. DOJ Prosecutor Members:
55.2.1. Conduct inquest or preliminary investigation, as the case may be;
55.2.2. Recommend and file criminal cases against the landowners and
developers involved in illegal conversion of agricultural lands under RA 6657;
55.2.3. Submit to the National Task Force a monthly progress/status report
of all cases involving illegal conversion of agricultural lands; and
 55.2.4. Perform such other related functions, which may be assigned by the
National Task Force on Illegal Conversion.
SECTION 56. Evidentiary Requirements. — In illegal, premature or unauthorized
conversions, the investigating officials mentioned in Section 51 hereof shall be responsible
for securing the evidence necessary to support the charges.
SECTION 57. Administrative Action. — The following procedure shall be followed in
the administrative investigation of illegal, premature, or unauthorized conversions:
57.1. On the basis of the complaint or report received, the Secretary or his duly
authorized representative shall conduct an investigation to determine if a prima
faciecase of illegal, premature, or unauthorized conversion exists.
57.2. Upon determination of the prima facie case, the Secretary, or Regional
Director (for those cases where he was the approving authority), shall issue a cease
and desist order (CDO) directing the respondent to stop any and all development
activities in the area and requiring him to explain within ten (10) days from receipt of
the CDO why he should not be penalized for violation of existing laws, rules and
regulations on land use conversion.
57.3. After the lapse of the period to answer, whether or not an answer has been
filed, administrative proceedings shall be conducted to determine if the respondent
can be held liable for illegal, premature, or unauthorized conversion. The proceedings
shall not be bound by the technical rules of procedure and evidence, but shall
proceed in a most expeditious manner, employing all reasonable means to ascertain
the facts of every case in accordance with justice and equity and the merits of the
case. The investigating official shall have the power to summon witnesses, administer
oaths, take testimony, require submission of reports, compel the production of books
and documents and answers to interrogatories and issue subpoena ad
testificandum and subpoena duces tecum and to enforce its writs through sheriffs or
other duly deputized officers. He shall likewise have the power to punish for direct
and indirect contempt in the same manner and subject to the same penalties as
provided in the Rules of Court, in accordance with Section 50 of RA 6657.
57.4. Upon determination that the respondent committed illegal, premature, or
unauthorized conversion, the cash bond or performance bond, if any, shall be
cancelled and forfeited in favor of the government, without prejudice to the imposition
of other penalties or sanctions, as may be warranted.
57.5. Any government official who, directly or indirectly, assisted or took part in the
commission of illegal, premature or unauthorized conversion shall be administratively
charged or dealt with in accordance with pertinent laws and regulations.
SECTION 58. Institution of Criminal Action. —
58.1. The DAR members of Provincial/City Task forces on Illegal Conversion shall
be primarily responsible for filing complaints of illegal or premature conversion
pursuant to RA 6657 or RA 8435 before the Office of the Provincial or City
Prosecutor. However, the Secretary or the National Task Force on Illegal Conversion
may directly institute such criminal action in flashpoint cases or those, which, in his
judgment, would require immediate action to protect public interest.
 58.2. The DOJ prosecutor-members of the Provincial/City Task Forces on Illegal
Conversion shall conduct inquest or preliminary investigation, as the case maybe,
and recommend the filing of criminal cases in court against the landowners,
developers, and all those responsible for illegal or premature conversion, as the
evidence may warrant.
58.3. However, unauthorized conversions as defined herein shall not warrant
criminal prosecution but only administrative sanctions, as may be appropriate.
SECTION 59. Prosecution of Illegal Conversion Cases. — The prosecution of illegal
conversion cases shall be the primary responsibility of the designated provincial/city
prosecutors, with active support from the concerned DAR Officials.
SECTION 60. Role of National Task Force on Illegal Conversion. — Pursuant
toDAR-DOJ Joint AO-4-1993, the National Task Force on Illegal Conversion shall perform
the following duties and responsibilities:
60.1. Identify and set priority areas or provinces where illegal conversion of
agricultural lands are rampant;
60.2. Report to the Secretaries of the DAR and the DOJ on the conversion situation
in the country;
60.3. Recommend the issuance and/or amendment of guidelines and circulars on
conversion and/or illegal conversion of agricultural lands;
60.4. Designate such persons who will coordinate and monitor the activities of the
Provincial Task Forces on Illegal Conversion; and
60.5. Perform such other related functions as may be assigned by the Secretary of
the Department of Agrarian Reform and the Secretary of the Department of Justice.
ARTICLE XI
Penalties and Sanctions
SECTION 61. Administrative Sanctions. — The DAR may impose any or all of the
following sanctions after determining, in an appropriate administrative proceeding, that a
violation of these Rules has been committed:
61.1. Revocation or withdrawal of the authorization for land use conversion;
61.2. Blacklisting of the applicant, developer or representative;
61.3. Automatic disapproval of pending and subsequent conversion applications that
the offender may file with the DAR;
61.4. Issuance of cease and desist order by the Secretary or Regional Director, as
the case may be, upon verified reports that premature, illegal or unauthorized
conversion activities are being undertaken; or
61.5. Forfeiture of cash bond or performance bond.
SECTION 62. Administrative Sanctions against DAR officials or employees. — The
DAR may impose against its own officials or employees the following sanctions, in
accordance with the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service [effective
26 September 1999], specifically Rule IV, Section 52, sub-section "C", numbers "13" to
"15", to wit:
62.1. Failure to act promptly on letters and request within fifteen (15) days from
receipt, except as otherwise provided in the rules implementing the Code of Conduct
and Ethical Standards of Public Officials and Employees:
1st Offense — Reprimand;
2nd Offense — Suspension 1 to 30 days;
3rd Offense — Dismissal.
62.2. Failure to process documents and complete action on document and papers
within a reasonable time from preparation thereof, except as otherwise provided in
the rules implementing the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards of Public Officials
and Employees:
1st Offense — Reprimand;
2nd Offense — Suspension 1 to 30 days;
3rd Offense — Dismissal.
62.3. Failure to attend to anyone who wants to avail himself of the services of the
office, or act promptly and expeditiously on public transactions:
1st Offense — Reprimand;
2nd Offense — Suspension 1 to 30 days;
3rd Offense — Dismissal.
SECTION 63. Criminal Penalties. —
63.1. Pursuant to Section 73 (c), (e) and 74 of RA 6657, any person who knowingly
or willfully converts agricultural lands into any non-agricultural use with intent to avoid
the application of said Act and to dispossess his tenant farmers of the land tilled by
them; or who changes the nature of the land outside urban centers and city limits in
whole or in part after the effectivity of RA 6657 shall be punished by imprisonment of
not less than one (1) month to not more than three (3) years or a fine of not less than
fifteen thousand (P15,000.00) pesos, or both, at the discretion of the court.
63.2. Any person found guilty of premature or illegal conversion under RA 8435 shall
be penalized, in accordance with Section 11 thereof, with imprisonment of two (2) to
six (6) years, or a fine equivalent to one hundred percent (100%) of the government's
investment cost, or both, at the discretion of the court, and an accessory penalty of
forfeiture of the land and any improvement thereon.
ARTICLE XII
Transitory and Final Provisions
SECTION 64. Effect of Pending Applications. — This Administrative Order shall
apply prospectively to all applications for land use conversion. Existing rules shall govern
all pending applications for land use conversion. Grantees of previous conversion orders
who were not yet able to complete development of properties approved for conversion may
request for extension of the development period by first posting a new performance bond
in accordance with Sections 23 to 26 of this Administrative Order.
SECTION 65. Repealing Clause. — This Administrative Order amends or repeals all
other DAR issuances inconsistent herewith.
 SECTION 66. Separability Clause. — Any judicial pronouncement declaring as
unconstitutional any provision or portion of this Administrative Order shall not affect the
validity of the other provisions herein.
SECTION 67. Effectivity. — This Administrative Order shall take effect ten (10) days
after complete publication in at least two (2) newspapers with nationwide circulation.
Diliman, Quezon City, 28 February 2002. CDAHIT

(SGD.) HERNANI A. BRAGANZA

Secretary

DAR Administrative Order No. 04, series of 2003

DAR ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 04-03

SUBJECT : 2003 Rules on Exemption of Lands from CARP Coverage under

Section 3 (c) of Republic Act No. 6657 and Department of Justice (DOJ) Opinion No. 44,
Series of 1990.

I. PREFATORY STATEMENT
Republic Act (RA) 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL),
Section 3, Paragraph (c) defines "agricultural land" as referring to "land devoted to
agricultural activity as defined in this Act and not classified as mineral, forest, residential,
commercial or industrial land."
Department of Justice Opinion No. 44, Series of 1990, (or "DOJ Opinion 44-1990"
for brevity) and the case of Natalia Realty versus Department of Agrarian Reform (12
August 1993, 225 SCRA 278) opines that with respect to the conversion of agricultural
lands covered by RA 6657 to non-agricultural uses, the authority of the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR) to approve such conversion may be exercised from the date of
its effectivity, on 15 June 1988. Thus, all lands that are already classified as commercial,
industrial or residential before 15 June 1988 no longer need any conversion clearance.
However, the reclassification of lands to non-agricultural uses shall not operate to
divest tenant-farmers of their rights over lands covered by Presidential Decree (PD) No.
27, which have been vested prior to 15 June 1988.
In order to implement the intent and purpose of the provisions of the aforecited
laws, these guidelines are hereby issued.
II. REQUIREMENTS
The applicant shall submit in quadruplicate the following documents in four (4)
separate bound folders (one [1] original set and three [3] photocopy sets) with table of
contents and page numbers of all documents, sequentially numbered, except for maps
which the applicant shall likewise submit in quadruplicate but in four separate envelopes
with proper label of the contents of each envelope. The arrangement thereof shall follow
the sequence of the enumeration below, with the requirement referred to in Section 2.1
hereof being the first document after the table of contents. All references in the masculine
form (he/him/his) shall interchangeably mean the feminine form (she/her/hers) or group
form (it/it's/their).
2.1. Official receipt showing proof of payment of filing and inspection
fees.
2.2. Sworn Application for CARP Exemption or Exclusion, duly
accomplished, and subscribed and sworn to before a notary public or any
person authorized to administer oaths.
2.2.1. Special Power of Attorney (SPA) if the applicant is not the
registered owner nor one of the co-owners of the property;
2.2.2. Notarized secretary's certificate of a corporate or cooperative
board resolution authorizing the applicant's representative to file the
Sworn Application for CARP Exemption if the applicant is a
corporation or cooperative or some other juridical entity. The
applicant shall also submit its latest notarized General Information
Sheet (GIS) which must comply with the pertinent requirements of
the Securities and Exchange Commission.
2.3. True copy of the Original Certificate of Title (OCT) or Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) of the subject land, certified by the Register of
Deeds not earlier than thirty (30) days prior to application filing date.
In case of untitled land, the following shall be required in lieu of a
title:
2.3.1. Certification from the DENR Community Environment and
Natural Resources Officer (CENRO) that the landholding has been
classified as alienable and disposable; and
2.3.2. Certification from the DENR CENRO (for administrative
confirmation of imperfect title) or the Clerk of Court (for judicial
confirmation of imperfect title) that the titling process/proceedings
has commenced and there are no adverse claimants;
2.4. Land classification certification:
2.4.1. Certification from the Housing and Land Use Regulatory
Board (HLURB) Regional Officer on the actual zoning or
classification of the subject land in the approved comprehensive land
use plan, citing the municipal or city zoning ordinance number,
resolution number, and date of its approval by the HLURB or its
corresponding board resolution number.
2.4.2. For lands classified as mineral: certification issued by the
DENR Mines and Geosciences Bureau or the proper DENR office
attesting that the subject land is classified as mineral and covered by
a mining permit issued by said Bureau or the proper Local
Government Unit (LGU) in case of small scale mines.
2.4.3. For lands classified as forest: certification issued by the
DENR Forestry Sector or the proper DENR office attesting that the
subject land is classified as within the forest zone.
2.5. Certification of the National Irrigation Administration (NIA) that the
area is not irrigated nor scheduled for irrigation rehabilitation nor irrigable
with firm funding commitment.
2.6. Certification of the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO)
attesting compliance with the public notice requirement in Part III hereof
and its corresponding report in 7.6 hereof.
2.7. Photographs, size 5R (five [5] inches by seven [7] inches), using
color film, and taken on the subject land under sunlight. The applicant shall
attach the pictures to a paper background, and the photographer who took
said pictures shall sign on said paper background to certify the authenticity
of the pictures. On each background paper shall be written a short
description of each picture. The pictures shall consist of:
2.7.1. At least four (4) photographs taken from the center of the
landholding: one (1) facing north, one (1) facing east, one (1) facing
south, and one (1) facing west;
2.7.2. At least one (1) photograph per corner, taken from each
corner of the landholding's borders;
2.7.3. At least two (2) photographs each for all distinct man-made
structures existing on the land, taken from opposite angles; cHDEaC

2.7.4. At least two (2) photographs each of the front view of the
billboard(s) required in Part III hereof. The applicant shall set aside
the second copy of said billboard photographs for submission to the
MARO; and
2.7.5. Sufficient number of photographs of the most conspicuous
landmarks on the ingress and egress routes leading to and from the
subject landholding, for the purpose of assisting the ocular
inspection team in locating the site.
2.8. Proof of receipt of payment of disturbance compensation or a valid
agreement to pay or waive payment of disturbance compensation.
2.9. Affidavit/Undertaking in a single document of the applicant stating:
2.9.1. The number and names of the farmers, agricultural lessees,
share tenants, farmworkers, actual tillers, and/or occupants in the
landholding; if there are no such persons, a statement attesting to
such fact;
2.9.2. That the applicant has erected the billboard(s) required in
Part III hereof; and undertakes not to remove, deface or destroy the
same; and that he shall repair or replace the same when damaged,
until after the approving authority disposes of the application with
finality;
2.9.3. That he has not committed any act of forum shopping as
defined in the rules governing Agrarian Law Implementation (ALI)
cases; and
 2.9.4. That when there is a dispute on the fixing of disturbance
compensation pending before the Provincial Agrarian Reform
Adjudicator (PARAD) or Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator
(RARAD) or DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB), the applicant shall
abide with the decision of the Adjudicating Authority on the fixing of
disturbance compensation.
2.10. Lot plan prepared by a duly-licensed geodetic engineer indicating
the lots being applied for and their technical descriptions.
2.11. Vicinity or directional map to assist the ocular inspection team in
locating the subject land. The directional map need not be drawn to scale
but must show the orientation of the subject land in relation to adjoining
lands; existing infrastructures and improvements thereon including any
house or tillage by any occupant therein; owners of adjacent properties;
the nearest barangay, municipal, city, and/or provincial feeder road; and
other popular landmarks within a one (1) kilometer radius.
III. PUBLIC NOTICE
The applicant shall post in a conspicuous place within the subject property a public
notice contained in a billboard made of strong materials such as weather-resistant
plywood, galvanized iron, tin, panaflex, or other similar durable material, measuring 1.22
meters by 2.44 meters (4 feet by 8 feet). There shall be installed at least one (1) billboard
for every twenty (20) hectares. The billboard shall be written in the local dialect and shall
display the following information:
3.1. Announcement that the applicant is applying for exemption;
3.2. Complete name(s) of the landowner(s) and applicant(s);
3.3. Total area and exact location of the exemption proposal;
3.4. Date of filing of the application for exemption;
3.5. Date of posting of billboard;
3.6. Deadline for filing protest;
3.7. Addresses of DAR offices where resident oppositors may
conveniently file their protests;
3.8. Address of the approving authority;
3.9. Date of ocular inspection, which shall be left blank, and which the
applicant shall fill up after the MARO determines its exact date, but not
later than seven (7) days before ocular inspection day; and
3.10. Date of approval or denial of the application, which shall be left
blank, and which the MARO or applicant or any party-in-interest shall fill up
after approval or denial of the application. AHSEaD

IV. DISTURBANCE COMPENSATION

4.1. The applicant shall pay disturbance compensation, in cash or kind
or combination of cash and kind, to the farmers, agricultural lessees, share
tenants, farmworkers, and actual tillers (as defined and following the order
of priority in Section 22 of RA 6657) found in the subject landholding, in
 such amount and under such terms which the parties may mutually agree
upon among themselves.
4.2. The amount of disturbance compensation shall not be less than five
(5) times the average of gross harvests on the subject landholding during
the last five (5) preceding calendar years, pursuant to Section 36 of RA
3844, as amended by Section 7 of RA 6389.
4.3. Compensation in kind may consist of some or all or mixture of
housing, homelots, employment, and/or other benefits. The DAR shall
approve the terms of any agreement for the payment of disturbance
compensation and monitor compliance therewith.
4.4. Whenever there is a dispute on the fixing of disturbance
compensation or entitlement to disturbance compensation, the Regional
Director shall refer the matter to the Adjudicator who shall be bound to take
cognizance of and resolve the case despite the non-finality of the issue on
whether or not the subject land is exempt from CARP.
4.5. The Approving Authority may grant a conditional exemption order,
despite non-payment of disturbance compensation or while awaiting
determination of entitlement thereto, subject however to the condition that
the applicant and/or landowner shall post a bond in an amount to be
determined by the Adjudicator. Notwithstanding the posting of such bond,
the property applied for exemption shall not be developed for non-
agricultural purposes and the farmers, agricultural lessees, share tenants,
farmworkers, and actual tillers thereof cannot be ejected therefrom until the
finality of the exemption order.
V. APPROVING AUTHORITIES
5.1. For properties with an area less than or equal to five (5) hectares,
the approving authority shall be the Regional Director, acting upon the
recommendation of the Regional Center for Land Use Policy Planning and
Implementation (RCLUPPI).
5.2. For properties with an area larger than five (5) hectares, the
approving authority shall be the Secretary, acting upon the
recommendation of the Center for Land Use Policy Planning and
Implementation – 2 (CLUPPI-2).
5.3. When the applicant owns (or represents the owner of) two (2) or
more parcels of land within the same barangay or within two (2) or more
barangays that are adjacent to each other, and the sum of the areas of
said parcels of land exceeds five (5) hectares, the approving authority for
an application involving any of said parcels of land shall be the Secretary,
acting upon the recommendation of the CLUPPI-2.
5.4. When the applicant or any oppositor challenges the jurisdiction of
the approving authority on the ground of error in computation of
jurisdictional area, and a higher authority takes cognizance of the dispute,
the Approving Authority herein shall hold in abeyance the processing of the
present application until said higher authority determines with finality the
correct jurisdictional area.
VI. INSPECTION COST
6.1. For applications involving lands with an area less than or equal to
five (5) hectares:
6.1.1. Ten thousand (10,000) pesos if the subject landholding is
within the same island as that of the Office of the Regional Director;
or
6.1.2. Fifteen thousand (15,000) pesos if the subject landholding is
not within the same island as that of the Office of the Regional
Director.
6.2. For applications involving lands with an area larger than five (5)
hectares:
6.2.1. Ten thousand (10,000) pesos if the subject landholding is
within the main island of Luzon (except Bicol peninsula);
6.2.2. Fifteen thousand (15,000) pesos if the subject landholding is
within Regions I to IV but is not located within the main island of
Luzon;
6.2.3. Fifteen thousand (15,000) pesos if the subject landholding is
in Bicol Peninsula or Visayas group of islands; or
6.2.4. Twenty thousand (20,000) pesos if the subject landholding is
in the Mindanao group of islands.
VII. PROCEDURE
7.1. The applicant shall first secure an Application Form from the
RCLUPPI or CLUPPI-2.
7.2. The applicant shall:
7.2.1. Fill-up the application form with all the necessary data;
7.2.2. Indicate whether or not the application is for a housing project
under Executive Order (EO) No. 45, Series of 2001 (EO-45-2001);
7.2.3. Acknowledge the accomplished application form before a
notary public;
7.2.4. Attach the Title(s) required under either 2.3 or 2.4 hereof;
7.2.5. Attach the vicinity or directional map required under 2.11
hereof;
7.2.6. Reproduce the above documents into four (4) sets (one [1]
original set and three [3] photocopy sets). At least one (1) photocopy
set shall be forwarded to the MARO.
7.3. Following the instructions that accompany the Application Form,
the applicant shall install the public notice billboard(s) required under Part
III hereof.
7.4. Immediately thereafter, the applicant shall reproduce the
application form into at least six (6) clear photocopy sets and place them in
six (6) separate folders (plus a seventh folder for the original set), the
distribution of which shall be as follows:
7.4.1. The original copy for the RCLUPPI/CLUPPI-2;
7.4.2. Three (3) photocopies for the RCLUPPI/CLUPPI-2; and
7.4.3. Two (2) photocopies which the applicant shall furnish to the
MARO as advance copies.
7.5. Within five (5) days from receipt of the folders containing the
documents in Section 7.4 hereof, the MARO shall keep one folder for
himself and transmit the other folder to the PARO.
7.6. MARO certification – Within ten (10) days from receipt of the above
folder, the MARO shall: check the status of CARP coverage on the subject
land; inspect the billboard; check presence of farmers, agricultural lessees,
share tenants, farm workers, actual tillers, or occupants; post notices of the
application in a conspicuous place in the municipality and a conspicuous
place/s in the barangay/s covering the subject land (or in the barangay
where a larger portion of the subject land is situated when said land
overlaps into another barangay); prepare a single-document MARO
certification reporting the result of all the foregoing tasks; and make
available to the applicant the original copy of said MARO certification.
7.7. MARO inaction – If the MARO fails to act upon the request for said
certification within ten (10) days from receipt of the request, the applicant
shall notify the RCLUPPI/CLUPPI-2 of such failure by personally filing an
affidavit reporting such inaction. The RCLUPPI/CLUPPI-2 shall investigate
the reason for the non-issuance and take the steps necessary for the
judicious resolution of the pending application for exemption.
Simultaneously, the disciplining authority of the DAR shall, after proper
investigation, impose upon the erring MARO the proper administrative
sanction(s).
7.8. At this juncture, the applicant has four (4) folders left after
furnishing two (2) advance copies for the MARO and PARO. The applicant
shall place in said four (4) folders all the applicable documentary
requirements set forth in Part II hereof, all the originals being in one (1)
folder, and the photocopies thereof being in the three (3) other folders.
These four (4) folders shall be the initiatory pleading of the application for
exemption.
7.9. Filing Date – The applicant shall submit to the RCLUPPI/CLUPPI-2
the four (4) folders containing all the applicable requirements set forth in
Part II hereof. The RCLUPPI/CLUPPI-2 shall then review the
completeness of the application. If found complete, the applicant shall pay
the inspection cost in accordance with Part VI hereof, after which the
RCLUPPI/CLUPPI-2 may accept the application. Acceptance date of the
folders shall be the "Filing Date" of the application.
7.10. The distribution of the four (4) folders shall be as follows: The
RCLUPPI/CLUPPI-2 shall keep a folder containing the originals and a
folder containing the photocopies. At the same time, the
RCLUPPI/CLUPPI-2 Secretariat shall transmit the remaining two (2)
folders to the PARO and MARO respectively. Immediate transmittal of said
folders is important because the PARO shall utilize the information therein
when acting upon any protest against the application, or when issuing any
comment that he may wish to submit to the RCLUPPI/CLUPPI-2 in
connection with the application.
7.11. Within five (5) days from Filing Date, the RCLUPPI/CLUPPI-2 shall
issue to the applicant a Notice of Conduct of Ocular Inspection, indicating
the date thereof. The ocular inspection shall be held not earlier than ten
(10) days nor later than fifteen (15) days from issuance date of the Notice
of Conduct of Ocular Inspection. The RCLUPPI/CLUPPI-2 shall inform the
MARO of the date of ocular inspection through the speediest means of
communication with instructions to ensure dissemination of the Notice to all
farmers, agricultural lessees, share tenants, farmworkers, actual tillers, or
occupants in the subject landholding.
7.12. The applicant shall transmit said Notice to the MARO and indicate
the ocular inspection date on the billboard(s) at least five (5) days before
conduct of ocular inspection. On or before ocular inspection date, the
applicant shall submit to the RCLUPPI/CLUPPI-2 a proof that the MARO
received a copy of said Notice.
7.13. The RCLUPPI/CLUPPI-2 shall then conduct ocular inspection, and
if possible, hold a dialogue with the farmers, agricultural lessees, share
tenants, farmworkers, actual tillers, and/or occupants found in the subject
landholding. Notwithstanding the finding of the NIA on the irrigation status
of the subject land, the ocular inspection team shall make its own
determination on the irrigation status. Where irrigation is absent in the
subject land but present in adjoining or neighboring lands, the
RCLUPPI/CLUPPI-2 shall determine whether or not the subject land is a
servient estate of an easement of irrigation waterway such that irrigation
water crosses thru a portion of the subject land en route to or from the
adjoining or neighboring lands. If in the affirmative, any grant of exemption
herein shall in no way give the applicant (or any of his successor-in-
interest) any right to block or otherwise impede the free flow of water thru
said easement.
7.14. The RCLUPPI/CLUPPI-2 ocular inspection team shall, within five (5)
days from conduct of ocular inspection, accomplish an Investigation Report
which shall include the result of its dialogue.
7.15. The RCLUPPI/CLUPPI-2 shall deliberate on the merits of the
application and may call the applicant and/or oppositor(s), if any, for
clarificatory questioning to judiciously resolve any dispute arising from the
application. The RCLUPPI shall invite the PARO to participate in the
deliberations. Upon his discretion, the PARO may submit a written
comment to the RCLUPPI/CLUPPI-2.
7.16. RCLUPPI/CLUPPI-2 recommendation – Within thirty (30) days from
issuance of the MARO certification or filing of affidavit of MARO inaction,
but not later than forty (40) days from Filing Date, the RCLUPPI/CLUPPI-2
 shall forward its recommendation, together with the records, to the
approving authority.
7.17. The filing of any protest shall interrupt the running period for
processing applications for exemption and shall lift the deadline for
approving or disapproving the application. Upon receipt of a protest, the
RCLUPPI/CLUPPI-2 shall order the filing of a comment, reply, rejoinder,
and such other pleadings that may aid in a judicious resolution of the
protest issues, and thereafter, schedule hearings where the parties may
present their respective evidence. After conclusion of the hearings, the
RCLUPPI/CLUPPI-2 shall submit its recommendation to the approving
authority which shall resolve the protest simultaneously with the
application.
7.18. Protests against applications involving housing projects shall
likewise interrupt the running period and lift the deadline for approving or
disapproving the application. In line with Section 4 (c) of EO-45-2001, the
RCLUPPI/CLUPPI-2 shall make a preliminary determination on whether or
not the protest stands on valid grounds. When the protest is prima facie
meritorious, the RCLUPPI/CLUPPI-2 shall order the filing of a comment,
reply, rejoinder, and such other pleadings that may aid in a judicious
resolution of the protest issues, and thereafter, schedule hearings where
the parties may present their respective evidence. After conclusion of the
hearings, the RCLUPPI/CLUPPI-2 shall submit its recommendation to the
approving authority which shall resolve the protest simultaneously with the
application. THcaDA

VIII. EFFECT ON PRE-EXISTING CARP COVERAGE

When the filing of an application for exemption clearance is in response to a notice
of CARP coverage, the DAR shall deny due course to the application if it was filed after
sixty (60) days from the date the landowner received a notice of CARP coverage.
IX. PROTESTS
9.1. Who may file – Any person may file a written protest against the
application within thirty (30) days from posting of the requisite billboard(s),
or within fifteen (15) days from conduct of ocular inspection, whichever is
later.
9.2. Where to file – Protests against applications for exemption may be
filed in the office of the PARO or RCLUPPI having jurisdiction over the
applied property, or at the CLUPPI-2.
9.3. Grounds:
9.3.1. The subject landholding is classified as within the agricultural
zone based on the Zoning Ordinance or Comprehensive Land Use
Plan (CLUP) of the LGU approved by the HLURB prior to 15 June
1988. A protest based on this ground shall not be given due course
unless the oppositor invoking said ground submits the necessary
certification from the HLURB Regional Office or the proper
government agency.
 9.3.2. The subject property has been covered by Operation Land
Transfer (OLT) under PD 27.
9.4. The RCLUPPI/CLUPPI-2 shall make a preliminary determination on
whether or not the protest stands on valid grounds. When the protest is
prima facie meritorious, the RCLUPPI/CLUPPI-2 shall order the filing of a
comment, reply, rejoinder, and such other pleadings that may aid in a
judicious resolution of the protest issues, and thereafter schedule hearings
where the parties may present their respective evidence. After conclusion
of the hearings, the RCLUPPI/CLUPPI-2 shall submit its recommendation
to the approving authority which shall resolve the protest simultaneously
with the application.
9.5. An oppositor who files a protest before the PARO shall do so by
personal service, not by mail. Upon receipt of a protest by personal
service, the PARO shall, before the end of the next working day,
communicate with the RCLUPPI/CLUPPI-2 by telephone or text message,
to inform the members thereof of such protest, and send a corresponding
telegram and/or radiogram which shall serve as written proof of compliance
with the protest notification requirement herein. Within five (5) working
days from receipt of the protest, the PARO shall transmit, by courier or
speed delivery, to the RCLUPPI/CLUPPI-2 the original copy of the protest
itself, and keep a photocopy thereof in his custody. Failure of the PARO to
comply with the directive under this Section shall subject him to the
appropriate disciplinary action.
X. PROVISIONAL REMEDIES
In cases where grave and irreparable damage will result to the parties or where
the doing and continuance of certain acts will render the case moot and academic, or
where there is a need to maintain peace and order and prevent loss to life or property,
the Secretary or Regional Director may, motu proprio or at the instance of any party,
issue a Cease and Desist Order (CDO) pending the resolution of the case. In this regard,
the issuing authority may request the assistance of law enforcement agencies to
implement the CDO.
XI. MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND APPEAL
This Order shall adopt the provisions of the ALI rules on motion for reconsideration
and appeal.
XII. FINALITY OF THE ORDER
The Exemption Clearance or its denial shall become final and executory after all
parties receive a copy of the Order, and after the lapse of fifteen (15) calendar days from
date of receipt date by the last recipient of an official copy of the Order, and no motion
for reconsideration or appeal therefrom has been filed. The Head of the Legal Division of
the Regional Office or the BALA Director shall issue the appropriate Certificate of Finality.
XIII. REVOCATION OR WITHDRAWAL OF EXEMPTION CLEARANCES
Any person may file a petition to revoke, or the landowner may file a petition to
withdraw, the Exemption Clearance, when there is a serious violation of agrarian laws or
DAR rules, or on any other substantial ground which the Secretary may deem proper,
within ninety (90) days from discovery of the fact(s) constituting the ground(s) for
 cancellation or withdrawal, but not more than one (1) year from issuance of the
Exemption Clearance.
XIV. SANCTIONS
The DAR may impose against its own officials or employees the following
sanctions, in accordance with RA 6713 or the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards
for Public Officials and Employees, and the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in
the Civil Service (effective 26 September 1999), specifically Rule IV, Section 52, sub-
section "C", numbers "13" to "15" thereof, to wit:
"13. Failure to act promptly on letters and request within fifteen
(15) days from receipt, except as otherwise provided in the rules
implementing the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards of Public
Officials and Employees."
"14. Failure to process documents and complete action on
document and papers within a reasonable time from preparation thereof,
except as otherwise provided in the rules implementing the Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards of Public Officials and Employees."
"15. Failure to attend to anyone who wants to avail himself of the
services of the office, or act promptly and expeditiously on public
transactions." SDEHIa

"1st Offense Reprimand"

"2nd Offense Suspension 1-30 days"
"3rd Offense Dismissal"

XV. TRANSITORY PROVISION

The rules and procedures herein shall apply to cases pertaining to the Lungsod
Silangan Townsite, provided that the requirements in Memorandum Circular No. 25,
Series of 1997, as amended, shall continue to govern.
XVI. REPEALING CLAUSE AND EFFECTIVITY
This Order amends or repeals all issuances inconsistent herewith and shall take
effect ten (10) days after its publication in two (2) national newspapers of general
circulation, in line with Section 49 of RA 6657.
CIcEHS

Diliman, Quezon City, 16 January 2003.

(SGD.) HERNANI A. BRAGANZA
Secretary

Published in two (2) national newspapers of general circulation:

1. THE PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER

2. MALAYA

Date of Publication – January 30, 2003

Application for CARP Exemption (ACE)
Form # 1

Republic of the Philippines

DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM
Center for Land Use Policy Planning & Implementation – 2
RCLUPPI: ___________________________________________

For CLUPPI-2 / RCLUPPI to fill up:

COMPLETE APPLICATION
RECEIVED

Date: ______ ______________ 200__

Time: _____ Number of Pages: _____
Signature of Evaluator: ____________

SWORN APPLICATION
FOR
EXEMPTION CLEARANCE

For the CLUPPI-2 / RCLUPPI to fill up:

FILING FEE OFFICIAL RECEIPT: INSPECTION COST OFFICIAL RECEIPT:
Amount: ___________________ Pesos Amount: ___________________ Pesos
Date: ___________________ 200__ Date: ___________________ 200__
Number: _______________________ Number: _________________________

May I / we request for EXEMPTION CLEARANCE for the following parcel of land:

Area in hectares: ___________________________________________

Street / Road / access: ___________________________________________
Sitio / Purok / vicinity: ___________________________________________
Barangay: ___________________________________________
Municipality: ___________________________________________
Province / City: ___________________________________________
Owner/s: ___________________________________________
Title (if any): ___________________________________________

In support of this application, I / we hereby submit the following information under oath:

APPLICANT'S PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES

INDIVIDUAL LANDOWNER
IF THE APPLICANT IS THE LANDOWNER

Name: _________________________________________________
Address: _________________________________________________
_________________________________________________
Telephone: __________________ Fax: __________________________
Telephone: __________________ E-mail: ________________________

CORPORATION/PARTNERSHIP/CO-OWNERSHIP/GOVERNMENT ENTITY
 Name: _________________________________________________
Address: _________________________________________________
_________________________________________________
Telephone: __________________ Fax: __________________________
Telephone: __________________ E-mail: ________________________

PRESIDENT or HEAD of corporation or government entity:

Name: _________________________________________________
Telephone: __________________ Fax: __________________________
Telephone: __________________ E-mail: ________________________

For CO-OWNERSHIP:
Number of co-owners: ________
Name and address of co-owners:

Co-owner Name: ____________________________________________

Address: ____________________________________________
Co-owner Name: ____________________________________________
Address: ____________________________________________
Co-owner Name: ____________________________________________
Address: ____________________________________________
Co-owner Name: ____________________________________________
Address: ____________________________________________
Co-owner Name: ____________________________________________
Address: ____________________________________________
Co-owner Name: ____________________________________________
Address: ____________________________________________

REPRESENTATIVE
IF APPLICANT IS NOT THE LANDOWNER:

Name: _________________________________________________
Address: _________________________________________________
Telephone: __________________ Fax: __________________________
Mobile phone: _________________ E-mail: ____________________
SOURCE OF AUTHORITY:
[ ] Special Power of Attorney [ ] Board Resolution

DESCRIPTION OF LANDHOLDINGS
Main Access Road: ________________________________________
Barangay: ________________________________________
Municipality/City: ________________________________________
Province: ________________________________________

TITLE OF OWNERSHIP
[ ] WITH TITLE (PLEASE ATTACH CERTIFIED TRUE COPY OR COPIES)
[ ] NO TITLE

[ ] Tax Declaration as of 15 June 1988 (attach photocopy):

[ ] Latest Tax Declaration (attach photocopy):
Year _______________
Number _______________

[ ] Alienable and Disposable

[ ] Pending Administrative Confirmation of Imperfect Title

When Filed: _____________________
Where Filed: _____________________
Case Number: _____________________

[ ] Pending Judicial Confirmation of Imperfect Title

When Filed: _____________________
Where Filed: _____________________
Case Number: _____________________

[ ] Name(s) Adverse Claimant(s):

_________________________ _________________________
_________________________ _________________________
TERRAIN / TOPOGRAPHY:

TOPOGRAPHY: HECTARES: PEAK ELEVATION:

[ ] Flat _________ [ ] Not above 500 meters
[ ] Upland _________ [ ] Above 500 meters
[ ] Hilly _________
[ ] Mountainous _________
 [ ] Plateau _________
[ ] Valley _________

ACCESSIBILITY (approximate distance in kilometers):

Barangay Road ______ Barangay Center ______
Municipal Road ______ Municipal Hall ______
Provincial Road ______ Provincial Capitol ______
National Highway ______
Public Market ______
School ______
Other Landmarks ______ Specify: _____________________
Other Landmarks ______ Specify: _____________________

Remarks (specify type of road, means of access, others):

________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________

EXISTING CARP coverage

[ ] With Notice of Acquisition / Valuation

date issued: ___________________

[ ] With perfected Voluntary Land Transfer / Direct Payment Scheme

date executed: ___________________

[ ] With approved Stock Distribution Option

date approved: ___________________

[ ] Within landed estate / resettlement

[ ] Not covered by any of the above

NUMBER of PERSONS and STATUS of OCCUPANCY

NUMBER:
[ ] with agricultural lessee(s) ________
[ ] with share tenant(s) ________
[ ] with regular farmworker(s) ________
[ ] with seasonal farmworker(s) ________
[ ] with other farmworker(s) ________
[ ] with actual tiller(s) ________
[ ] with occupant(s) ________
[ ] with ______________________ ________
[ ] none
CHECK IF AVAILABLE AND ATTACH CERTIFIED TRUE COPIES OF THE FOLLOWING:
[ ] Certification from the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) Regional
Officer on the actual zoning or classification of the subject land in the approved
 comprehensive land use plan, citing the municipal or city zoning ordinance number,
resolution number, and date of its approval by the HLURB or its corresponding board
resolution number
[ ] Comprehensive Land Use Plan (CLUP)
[ ] Not yet approved by the Sanggunian
[ ] Approved by the Sanggunian
[ ] Municipal or City Zoning Ordinance
Number __________________
Date: __________________
[ ] Not yet approved by HLURB
[ ] Approved by HLURB resolution
Number __________________
Date: __________________
[ ] Certification issued by the DENR Mines and Geosciences Bureau or the proper
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) office attesting that the
subject land is classified as mineral and covered by a mining permit issued by said Bureau
or the proper Local Government Unit (LGU) in case of small scale mining.
[ ] Certification issued by the DENR Forestry Sector or the proper DENR office attesting
that the subject land is classified as within the forest zone.
[ ] Certification issued by the National Irrigation Administration (NIA).
[ ] Lot Plan: date: ____________ Geodetic Engineer: _______________________
[ ] Vicinity or directional map

BILLBOARD
Number of Billboards Erected: ______ Billboard Height in meters: _______
Date Erected: ______________________ Billboard Length in meters: _______
Materials used for billboard: ________________________________________
Exact Location(s) of Billboard(s):
Billboard 1 ____________________________________________________
Billboard 2 ____________________________________________________
Billboard 3 ____________________________________________________
MESSAGE WRITTEN ON BILLBOARD
DIALECT: _________________________
ATTACH BEST SHOT COLOR PHOTOGRAPH OF BILLBOARD (size 5 inches by 7 inches)

LANDOWNER/APPLICANT
TIN: _________________
Community Tax Certificate
Number: _________________
Place: _________________
Date: _________________
LANDOWNER/APPLICANT
TIN: _________________
Community Tax Certificate
Number: _________________
Place: _________________
Date: _________________

____________________________ ____________________________
 LANDOWNER/APPLICANT LANDOWNER/APPLICANT
TIN: _________________ TIN: _________________
Community Tax Certificate Community Tax Certificate
Number: _________________ Number: _________________
Place: _________________ Place: _________________
Date: _________________ Date: _________________

____________________________ ____________________________
WITNESS WITNESS

SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me this _________________________________ 200__

in ___________________________________ personally appeared the above, known to me
and to me known to be the person(s) who executed this SWORN APPLICATION FOR
EXEMPTION after exhibiting to me his/her/their respective Tax Identification Number (TIN) and
Community Tax Certificate, and he/she/they acknowledge the voluntary execution of this sworn
application and full comprehension of its legal consequences.

Document ____
Page ____
Book ____
Series of 200_

Fill in the blanks or write a check in the appropriate brackets "[ ]. Any false statement in this
application or attachments thereto shall be a ground for outright denial of the application and
criminal prosecution. Any portion left blank is equivalent to a sworn statement by the applicant
that the information for the blank line is "N/A" or "Not Applicable", which, if found to be otherwise,
shall likewise be subject to criminal prosecution.

DAR Administrative Order No. 05, series of 2007

DAR ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 05-07

SUBJECT : Amendments to the 2002 Comprehensive Rules on Land Use Conversion

Towards keeping abreast with the needs of the changing times, to remain
effectively capable of confronting any calamity or other form of emergency, and, to avoid
said administrative order from constituting a hindrance to effective rendition of public
service and catering to the urgent needs of the populace, DAR Administrative Order No.
1 dated February 28, 2002, entitled, "2002 Comprehensive Rules on Land Use
Conversion" is hereby amended, to wit:
SECTION 1. Section 3 (3.1) of Article II, On Coverage, of DAR
Administrative Order No. 01, Series of 2002, is hereby amended to read as follows:
"Section 3. Applicability of Rules. — These guidelines shall apply to all
applications for conversion, from agricultural to non-agricultural uses or to
another agricultural use, such as:
"3.1. Conversions into residential, commercial, industrial, institutional and
other non-agricultural purposes EXCEPT WHEN IT IS STRICTLY FOR THE
 CONSTRUCTION OF CHURCHES AND OTHER PLACES OF WORSHIP,
INCLUSIVE OF A SPACE FOR USE AS CHURCHYARD, THE LATTER
NOT TO EXCEED MORE THAN ONE-HALF OF THE REASONABLE AREA
NEEDED FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE CHURCH. FOR THE
PURPOSE AND SUBJECT ONLY TO THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 4
HEREOF, ON AREAS NON-NEGOTIABLE FOR CONVERSION,
CLEARANCE FROM THE PROVINCIAL AGRARIAN REFORM OFFICER
OF THE PARTICULAR PROVINCE SHALL BE NECESSARY BUT SAME
SHALL BE PROPERLY MONITORED AND REPORTED BY SAID OFFICIAL
TO THE DAR SECRETARY WITHIN A PERIOD OF TEN (10) DAYS FROM
THE ISSUANCE OF CLEARANCE, WITH FINAL REPORT TO BE
SUBMITTED NOT LATER FIVE (5) DAYS FROM THE DATE OF
COMPLETION OF THE PROJECT.
"xxx xxx xxx"
SECTION 2. Section 6.2 of DAR Administrative Order No. 01, Series of 2002, is
hereby amended to read as follows: SEAHcT

"Section 6.2. Housing projects are priority development projects for land
conversion that shall follow the fast-tracking scheme prescribed under EO-
45-2001. When the application involves a mixed use of housing and non-
housing projects, the application shall not enjoy the privileges of housing
projects unless at least eighty percent (80%) of the land applied for
conversion shall be used directly and exclusively for housing. NO
CONVERSION ORDER IS NECESSARY WHERE THE CONSTRUCTION
OF HOUSES/SHELTER IS ONLY INTENDED TO MEET THE EXIGENCIES
OF A CALAMITY IN A NATIONALLY DECLARED CALAMITY AREA.
HOWEVER, CLEARANCE SHALL BE SECURED FROM THE MUNICIPAL
AGRARIAN REFORM OFFICER OF THE LOCALITY, WHO SHALL
MONITOR THE ACTIVITY, WITH REPORT TO THE DAR SECRETARY
WITHIN TEN (10) DAYS FROM THE COMMENCEMENT THEREOF AND A
FINAL REPORT, NOT LATER THAN FIVE (5) DAYS FROM ITS DATE OF
COMPLETION. IN NO CASE, HOWEVER, SHALL THE DURATION OF THE
TEMPORARY USE THEREOF FOR SHELTER/HOUSING FACILITIES
EXCEED ONE (1) YEAR FROM THE DATE OF DECLARATION OF
NORMALCY.
SECTION 3. Any existing issuances or orders inconsistent herewith are
hereby revoked or modified accordingly.
SECTION 4. This takes effect ten (10) days after publication in at least two
national newspapers of general circulation.
DONE at Quezon City, Metro Manila, on this 2nd day of August, in the Year of Our
Lord, Two Thousand and Seven.

(SGD.) NASSER C. PANGANDAMAN

Secretary
 Published in The Manila Times on August 6, 2007.

DAR Administrative Order No. 01, series of 2016

ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. QL

Series of 2016

SUBJECT: AMENDING DAR ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 01, SERIES OF 2002, ENTITLED "2002
COMPREHENSIVE RULES ON LAND USE CONVERSION", BY ALLOWING PRIVATE
INSURANCE AND SURETY COMPANIES To POST BOND

Recognizing the jurisdiction of the Insurance Commissioner to grant authority to

private insurance and surety companies to act as sureties in government transactions by
virtue of the Letter of the Office of the President dated 07 May 2014 and DOJ Opinion No.
93-2012 dated 05 December 2013, DAR Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 01 dated 28
February 2002, entitled "2002 Comprehensive Rules on Land use Conversion" is hereby
amended.

Section 1. Section 23, Article Ill of A.O. No. 01, Series of 2002 is hereby amended
to read, as follows:

"Section 23 Bond - To guarantee that the applicant shall not

undertake premature conversion pending consideration of the
application, and ensure faithful compliance with the condition of the
Conversion Order by the applicant/developer, cash or surety bonds shall
be required pursuant to Section 35, Chapter 6, Book IV of the
Administrative Code of 1987.

231. Surety bond issued by the Government Service Insurance

System (GSIS), in line with the Office of the President (OP) Administrative
Order (AO) No. 33 [25 August 1987], as amended by OP-AO-141 [12
August 1994], "Prescribing Guidelines for the Insurance ofAll Properties,
Contracts, Rights ofAction and Other Insurance Risks of the Government,
Including Those in Which the Government Has an Insurable Interest, with
the General Insurance Fund of the Government Service Insurance
System" a private insurance and surety company shall be allowed
and accepted.

23.2. xxx"

Section 2. Sectio 24, Article Ill of A. Or Nor 01, Series of 2002 is likewise amended to
read as follóys:
"Section 24. Bond to Guaranty Against Premature
Conversion xxx

24.2 In lieu of cash bond, the applicant may post a surety bond issued
by the GSIS or anv private insurance or suretv company, equivalent to at
 least fifteen percent (15%) of the total zonal value of the land per latest
issuance of the Department of Finance, indicating the following conditions
at the minimum that:

242.1. xxx

24.22. xxx
242.3. The validity of the bond shall be for a period of one (1) year,
renewable by not more than (1) year when necessary. Failure of the
applicant to renew the bond shall result in the suspension or dismissal of
the application. or the revocation of the approved land use conversion,
without prejudice.
xxx"

Section 3. Section 25, Article Ill of A.O. No. 01, Series of 2002 is further amended to
read, as follows:

"Section 25. Convertibility of Bond - An applicant who posted a "bond

to guarantee against premature conversion" using a GSIS or rivate
insurance or suret com an surety bond may thereafter opt to convert said
surety bond into a performance bond after securing the consent of the GSIS
or private insurance and surety company, in line with Article 2079 of the
Civil Code, "

Section 4. Section 26, Article Ill of A.O. No. 01, Series of 2002 is further amended to
read, as follows:

"Section 26. Performance Bond - Within five (5) days from receipt of
a copy of the Conversion Order, the applicant shall post a performance
bond in the form of either of the following:
xxx

26.2. GSIS or private insurance and surety company surety bond

equivalent to at least fifteen percent (15%) of the total zonal value of the
land per latest issuance of the Department of Finance, indicating the
following conditions at the minimum that:
xxx

26.24. The validity of the bond shall be equivalent to the prescribed period
of development of the area under the Conversion
 Order. In the event that the bond expires even before the prescribed
period of development, the same shall be consistently renewed;
otherwise, the Conversion Order shall be revoked.

Section 6. This Administrative Order shall take effect within ten (10) days after
publication in at least two (2) national newspapers of general circulation.

Diliman, Quezon City, MAR 3 0 2016

VIBGLIO R. LOS REYES

/ J Secfetary
¥artment of Agarian Reform

Cfice of the Scretar

Published in two (2) National Newspaper of General Circulation

1. Business Mirror
2. Malaya Business Insight

Date of Publication:
April 4, 2016

CERTIFICATION

This is to certify that Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 2016 entitled "AMENDING
DAR ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO 01, SERIES OF 2002, ENTITLED "2002
COMPREHENSIVE RULES ON LAND USE CONVERSION", BY ALLOWING PRIVATE
INSURANCE AND SURETY COMPANIES TO POST BOND" was published today,
Monday, 04 April 2016 in the Business Mirror and Malaya Business Insight newspapers.
 Issued this 4th day of April 2016 for whatever purpose it may serve.

ERLIND M. MANLUCTAO

Directo , PAMRS

1. Conversion vs. Reclassification

2. Prohibition: irrigated or irrigable
3. Coverage
4. Conditions of the Conversion Order; Effects of
5. Prohibited Acts
6. Procedure: denial, revocation, investigation and prosecution

Jurisprudence: a. CREBA vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, GR No. 183409,

June 18, 2010
FIRST DIVISION

CHAMBER OF REAL ESTATE G.R. No. 183409

AND BUILDERS
ASSOCIATIONS, INC. Present:
(CREBA),
Petitioner, CORONA, C.J.,
Chairperson,
VELASCO, JR.,
LEONARDO DE-
- versus - CASTRO,
DEL CASTILLO, and
PEREZ, JJ.

THE SECRETARY OF
AGRARIAN REFORM, Promulgated:
Respondent. June 18, 2010
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

This case is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition (with application for
temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction) under Rule 65 of the
1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, filed by herein petitioner Chamber of Real
Estate and Builders Associations, Inc. (CREBA) seeking to nullify and prohibit the
enforcement of Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) Administrative Order (AO) No.
01-02, as amended by DAR AO No. 05-07,[1] and DAR Memorandum No. 88,[2] for
having been issued by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction as some provisions of the
aforesaid administrative issuances are illegal and unconstitutional.

Petitioner CREBA, a private non-stock, non-profit corporation duly organized

and existing under the laws of the Republic of the Philippines, is the umbrella
organization of some 3,500 private corporations, partnerships, single proprietorships
and individuals directly or indirectly involved in land and housing development,
building and infrastructure construction, materials production and supply, and
services in the various related fields of engineering, architecture, community planning
and development financing. The Secretary of Agrarian Reform is named respondent
as he is the duly appointive head of the DAR whose administrative issuances are the
subject of this petition.

The Antecedent Facts

The Secretary of Agrarian Reform issued, on 29 October 1997, DAR AO No.

07-97,[3] entitled Omnibus Rules and Procedures Governing Conversion of
Agricultural Lands to Non-Agricultural Uses, which consolidated all existing
implementing guidelines related to land use conversion. The aforesaid rules
embraced all private agricultural lands regardless of tenurial arrangement and
commodity produced, and all untitled agricultural lands and agricultural lands
reclassified by Local Government Units (LGUs) into non-agricultural uses after 15
June 1988.

Subsequently, on 30 March 1999, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform issued DAR

AO No. 01-99,[4] entitled Revised Rules and Regulations on the Conversion of
Agricultural Lands to Non-agricultural Uses, amending and updating the previous
rules on land use conversion. Its coverage includes the following agricultural lands, to
wit: (1) those to be converted to residential, commercial, industrial, institutional and
other non-agricultural purposes; (2) those to be devoted to another type of agricultural
activity such as livestock, poultry, and fishpond ─ the effect of which is to exempt the
land from the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) coverage; (3) those
to be converted to non-agricultural use other than that previously authorized; and (4)
those reclassified to residential, commercial, industrial, or other non-agricultural uses
on or after the effectivity of Republic Act No. 6657[5] on 15 June 1988 pursuant to
Section 20[6] of Republic Act No. 7160[7] and other pertinent laws and regulations, and
are to be converted to such uses.

On 28 February 2002, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform issued another

Administrative Order, i.e., DAR AO No. 01-02, entitled 2002 Comprehensive Rules on
Land Use Conversion, which further amended DAR AO No. 07-97 and DAR AO No.
01-99, and repealed all issuances inconsistent therewith. The aforesaid DAR AO No.
01-02 covers all applications for conversion from agricultural to non-agricultural uses
or to another agricultural use.

Thereafter, on 2 August 2007, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform amended certain

provisions[8] of DAR AO No. 01-02 by formulating DAR AO No. 05-07, particularly
addressing land conversion in time of exigencies and calamities.

To address the unabated conversion of prime agricultural lands for real estate
development, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform further issued Memorandum No. 88
on 15 April 2008, which temporarily suspended the processing and approval of all
land use conversion applications.

By reason thereof, petitioner claims that there is an actual slow down of housing
projects, which, in turn, aggravated the housing shortage, unemployment and illegal
squatting problems to the substantial prejudice not only of the petitioner and its
members but more so of the whole nation.

Hence, this petition.

The Issues

In its Memorandum, petitioner posits the following issues:

I.

WHETHER THE DAR SECRETARY HAS JURISDICTION OVER LANDS THAT HAVE BEEN
RECLASSIFIED AS RESIDENTIAL, COMMERCIAL, INDUSTRIAL, OR FOR OTHER NON-
AGRICULTURAL USES.

II.

WHETHER THE DAR SECRETARY ACTED IN EXCESS OF HIS JURISDICTION AND

GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION BY ISSUING AND ENFORCING [DAR AO NO. 01-
02, AS AMENDED] WHICH SEEK TO REGULATE RECLASSIFIED LANDS.
 III.
WHETHER [DAR AO NO. 01-02, AS AMENDED] VIOLATE[S] THE LOCAL AUTONOMY OF
LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS.

IV.

WHETHER [DAR AO NO. 01-02, AS AMENDED] VIOLATE[S] THE DUE PROCESS

AND EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE[S] OF THE CONSTITUTION.

V.

WHETHER MEMORANDUM NO. 88 IS A VALID EXERCISE OF POLICE POWER.[9]

The subject of the submission that the DAR Secretary gravely abused his
discretion is AO No. 01-02, as amended, which states:

Section 3. Applicability of Rules. These guidelines shall apply to all applications

for conversion, from agricultural to non-agricultural uses or to another agricultural use,
such as:

xxxx

3.4 Conversion of agricultural lands or areas that have been reclassified by the LGU
or by way of a Presidential Proclamation, to residential, commercial, industrial, or other
non-agricultural uses on or after the effectivity of RA 6657 on 15 June 1988, x x
x. [Emphasis supplied].

Petitioner holds that under Republic Act No. 6657 and Republic Act No.
[10]
8435, the term agricultural lands refers to lands devoted to or suitable for the
cultivation of the soil, planting of crops, growing of fruit trees, raising of livestock,
poultry or fish, including the harvesting of such farm products, and other farm activities
and practices performed by a farmer in conjunction with such farming operations done
by a person whether natural or juridical, and not classified by the law as mineral,
forest, residential, commercial or industrial land. When the Secretary of Agrarian
Reform, however, issued DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, he included in the
definition of agricultural lands lands not reclassified as residential, commercial,
industrial or other non-agricultural uses before 15 June 1988. In effect, lands
reclassified from agricultural to residential, commercial, industrial, or other non-
agricultural uses after 15 June 1988 are considered to be agricultural lands for
purposes of conversion, redistribution, or otherwise. In so doing, petitioner avows that
the Secretary of Agrarian Reform acted without jurisdiction as he has no authority to
expand or enlarge the legal signification of the term agricultural lands through DAR
AO No. 01-02. Being a mere administrative issuance, it must conform to the statute it
seeks to implement, i.e., Republic Act No. 6657, or to the Constitution, otherwise, its
validity or constitutionality may be questioned.

In the same breath, petitioner contends that DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, was
made in violation of Section 65[11] of Republic Act No. 6657 because it covers all
applications for conversion from agricultural to non-agricultural uses or to other
agricultural uses, such as the conversion of agricultural lands or areas that have been
reclassified by the LGUs or by way of Presidential Proclamations, to residential,
commercial, industrial or other non-agricultural uses on or after 15 June
1988. According to petitioner, there is nothing in Section 65 of Republic Act No. 6657
or in any other provision of law that confers to the DAR the jurisdiction or authority to
require that non-awarded lands or reclassified lands be submitted to its conversion
authority. Thus, in issuing and enforcing DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, the
Secretary of Agrarian Reform acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction.

Petitioner further asseverates that Section 2.19,[12] Article I of DAR AO No. 01-
02, as amended, making reclassification of agricultural lands subject to the
requirements and procedure for land use conversion, violates Section 20 of Republic
Act No. 7160, because it was not provided therein that reclassification by LGUs shall
be subject to conversion procedures or requirements, or that the DARs approval or
clearance must be secured to effect reclassification. The said Section 2.19 of DAR
AO No. 01-02, as amended, also contravenes the constitutional mandate on local
autonomy under Section 25,[13] Article II and Section 2,[14] Article X of the 1987
Philippine Constitution.

Petitioner similarly avers that the promulgation and enforcement of DAR AO No. 01-
02, as amended, constitute deprivation of liberty and property without due process of
law.There is deprivation of liberty and property without due process of law because
under DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, lands that are not within DARs jurisdiction
are unjustly, arbitrarily and oppressively prohibited or restricted from legitimate use
on pain of administrative and criminal penalties. More so, there is discrimination and
violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitution because the aforesaid
administrative order is patently biased in favor of the peasantry at the expense of all
other sectors of society.

As its final argument, petitioner avows that DAR Memorandum No. 88 is not a valid
exercise of police power for it is the prerogative of the legislature and that it is
unconstitutional because it suspended the land use conversion without any basis.

The Courts Ruling

This petition must be dismissed.

Primarily, although this Court, the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts
have concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto, habeas corpus and injunction, such concurrence does not give the
petitioner unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum.[15] In Heirs of
Bertuldo Hinog v. Melicor,[16]citing People v. Cuaresma,[17] this Court made the
following pronouncements:
 This Court's original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari is not
exclusive. It is shared by this Court with Regional Trial Courts and with the Court of
Appeals. This concurrence of jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken as according to
parties seeking any of the writs an absolute, unrestrained freedom of choice of the
court to which application therefor will be directed. There is after all a hierarchy of
courts. That hierarchy is determinative of the venue of appeals, and also serves as
a general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary
writs. A becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that
petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level (inferior) courts
should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter, with the
Court of Appeals. A direct invocation of the Supreme Courts original jurisdiction
to issue these writs should be allowed only when there are special and important
reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. This is [an]
established policy. It is a policy necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon the
Courts time and attention which are better devoted to those matters within its exclusive
jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-crowding of the Courts docket.[18](Emphasis
supplied.)

The rationale for this rule is two-fold: (a) it would be an imposition upon the
precious time of this Court; and (b) it would cause an inevitable and resultant delay,
intended or otherwise, in the adjudication of cases, which in some instances had to
be remanded or referred to the lower court as the proper forum under the rules of
procedure, or as better equipped to resolve the issues because this Court is not a trier
of facts.[19]

This Court thus reaffirms the judicial policy that it will not entertain direct resort
to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts, and
exceptional and compelling circumstances, such as cases of national interest and of
serious implications, justify the availment of the extraordinary remedy of writ
of certiorari, calling for the exercise of its primary jurisdiction.[20]

Exceptional and compelling circumstances were held present in the following

cases: (a) Chavez v. Romulo,[21] on citizens right to bear arms; (b) Government of
[the] United States of America v. Hon. Purganan,[22] on bail in extradition proceedings;
(c) Commission on Elections v. Judge Quijano-Padilla,[23] on government contract
involving modernization and computerization of voters registration list; (d) Buklod ng
Kawaning EIIB v. Hon. Sec. Zamora,[24] on status and existence of a public office; and
(e) Hon. Fortich v. Hon. Corona,[25] on the so-called Win-Win Resolution of the Office
of the President which modified the approval of the conversion to agro-industrial
area.[26]

In the case at bench, petitioner failed to specifically and sufficiently set

forth special and important reasons to justify direct recourse to this Court and
why this Court should give due course to this petition in the first instance, hereby
failing to fulfill the conditions set forth in Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog v. Melicor.[27] The
present petition should have been initially filed in the Court of Appeals in strict
observance of the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts. Failure to do so is sufficient
cause for the dismissal of this petition.

Moreover, although the instant petition is styled as a Petition for Certiorari, in

essence, it seeks the declaration by this Court of the unconstitutionality or illegality of
the questioned DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, and Memorandum No. 88. It, thus,
partakes of the nature of a Petition for Declaratory Relief over which this Court has
only appellate, not original, jurisdiction.[28] Section 5, Article VIII of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution provides:

Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

(1) Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls, and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus.

(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari as the

law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders
of lower courts in:

(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty,

international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree,
proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in
question. (Emphasis supplied.)

With that, this Petition must necessarily fail because this Court does not have
original jurisdiction over a Petition for Declaratory Relief even if only questions of law
are involved.

Even if the petitioner has properly observed the doctrine of judicial hierarchy,
this Petition is still dismissible.

The special civil action for certiorari is intended for the correction of
errors of jurisdiction only or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. Its principal office is only to keep the inferior court within the
parameters of its jurisdiction or to prevent it from committing such a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.[29]

The essential requisites for a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 are: (1) the
writ is directed against a tribunal, a board, or an officer exercising judicial or quasi-
judicial functions; (2) such tribunal, board, or officer has acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law.[30]
 Excess of jurisdiction as distinguished from absence of jurisdiction means
that an act, though within the general power of a tribunal, board or officer, is not
authorized and invalid with respect to the particular proceeding, because the
conditions which alone authorize the exercise of the general power in respect of it are
wanting.[31] Without jurisdiction means lack or want of legal power, right or authority
to hear and determine a cause or causes, considered either in general or with
reference to a particular matter. It means lack of power to exercise authority.[32] Grave
abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as
is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction or, in other words, where the power is exercised in
an arbitrary manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility, and it must
be so patent or gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual
refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. [33]

In the case before this Court, the petitioner fails to meet the above-mentioned
requisites for the proper invocation of a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65. The
Secretary of Agrarian Reform in issuing the assailed DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended,
as well as Memorandum No. 88 did so in accordance with his mandate to implement
the land use conversion provisions of Republic Act No. 6657. In the process, he
neither acted in any judicial or quasi-judicial capacity nor assumed unto himself any
performance of judicial or quasi-judicial prerogative. A Petition for Certiorari is a
special civil action that may be invoked only against a tribunal, board, or officer
exercising judicial functions.Section 1, Rule 65 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure is explicit on this matter, viz.:

SECTION 1. Petition for certiorari. When any tribunal, board or officer

exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in
the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment must be
rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer.

A tribunal, board, or officer is said to be exercising judicial function where it

has the power to determine what the law is and what the legal rights of the parties
are, and then undertakes to determine these questions and adjudicate upon the rights
of the parties. Quasi-judicial function, on the other hand, is a term which applies to
the actions, discretion, etc., of public administrative officers or bodies x x x required
to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw
conclusions from them as a basis for their official action and to exercise discretion of
a judicial nature.[34]

Before a tribunal, board, or officer may exercise judicial or quasi-judicial acts, it

is necessary that there be a law that gives rise to some specific rights of persons or
property under which adverse claims to such rights are made, and the controversy
ensuing therefrom is brought before a tribunal, board, or officer clothed with power
and authority to determine the law and adjudicate the respective rights of the
contending parties.[35]

The Secretary of Agrarian Reform does not fall within the ambit of a tribunal,
board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. The issuance and
enforcement by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform of the questioned DAR AO No. 01-
02, as amended, and Memorandum No. 88 were done in the exercise of his quasi-
legislative and administrative functions and not of judicial or quasi-judicial functions.
In issuing the aforesaid administrative issuances, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform
never made any adjudication of rights of the parties. As such, it can never be said that
the Secretary of Agrarian Reform had acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing and enforcing DAR AO No. 01-02, as
amended, and Memorandum No. 88 for he never exercised any judicial or quasi-
judicial functions but merely his quasi-legislative and administrative functions.

Furthermore, as this Court has previously discussed, the instant petition in

essence seeks the declaration by this Court of the unconstitutionality or illegality of
the questioned DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, and Memorandum No. 88. Thus,
the adequate and proper remedy for the petitioner therefor is to file a Petition for
Declaratory Relief, which this Court has only appellate and not original jurisdiction. It
is beyond the province of certiorari to declare the aforesaid administrative issuances
unconstitutional and illegal because certiorari is confined only to the determination of
the existence of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. Petitioner cannot simply allege grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction and then invoke certiorari to declare the aforesaid
administrative issuances unconstitutional and illegal. Emphasis must be given to the
fact that the writ of certiorari dealt with in Rule 65 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure is a prerogative writ, never demandable as a matter of right, never issued
except in the exercise of judicial discretion.[36]

At any rate, even if the Court will set aside procedural infirmities, the instant
petition should still be dismissed.

Executive Order No. 129-A[37] vested upon the DAR the responsibility of
implementing the CARP. Pursuant to the said mandate and to ensure the successful
implementation of the CARP, Section 5(c) of the said executive order authorized the
DAR to establish and promulgate operational policies, rules and regulations and
priorities for agrarian reform implementation. Section 4(k) thereof authorized the
DAR to approve or disapprove the conversion, restructuring or readjustment of
agricultural lands into non-agricultural uses. Similarly, Section 5(l) of the same
executive order has given the DAR the exclusive authority to approve or
disapprove conversion of agricultural lands for residential, commercial,
industrial, and other land uses as may be provided for by law. Section 7 of the
aforesaid executive order clearly provides that the authority and responsibility for the
exercise of the mandate of the [DAR] and the discharge of its powers and functions
shall be vested in the Secretary of Agrarian Reform x x x.

Under DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, lands not reclassified as residential,

commercial, industrial or other non-agricultural uses before 15 June 1988 have been
included in the definition of agricultural lands. In so doing, the Secretary of Agrarian
Reform merely acted within the scope of his authority stated in the aforesaid sections
of Executive Order No. 129-A, which is to promulgate rules and regulations for
agrarian reform implementation and that includes the authority to define agricultural
lands for purposes of land use conversion. Further, the definition of agricultural lands
under DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, merely refers to the category of agricultural
lands that may be the subject for conversion to non-agricultural uses and is not in any
way confined to agricultural lands in the context of land redistribution as provided for
under Republic Act No. 6657.

More so, Department of Justice Opinion No. 44, Series of 1990, which Opinion
has been recognized in many cases decided by this Court, clarified that after the
effectivity of Republic Act No. 6657 on 15 June 1988 the DAR has been given the
authority to approve land conversion.[38] Concomitant to such authority, therefore, is
the authority to include in the definition of agricultural lands lands not reclassified as
residential, commercial, industrial or other non-agricultural uses before 15 June
1988 for purposes of land use conversion.

In the same vein, the authority of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform to include
lands not reclassified as residential, commercial, industrial or other non-agricultural
uses before 15 June 1988 in the definition of agricultural lands finds basis in
jurisprudence. In Ros v. Department of Agrarian Reform,[39] this Court has enunciated
that after the passage of Republic Act No. 6657, agricultural lands, though
reclassified, have to go through the process of conversion, jurisdiction over
which is vested in the DAR.However, agricultural lands, which are already
reclassified before the effectivity of Republic Act No. 6657 which is 15 June 1988, are
exempted from conversion.[40] It bears stressing that the said date of effectivity of
Republic Act No. 6657 served as the cut-off period for automatic reclassifications or
rezoning of agricultural lands that no longer require any DAR conversion clearance or
authority.[41] It necessarily follows that any reclassification made thereafter can be the
subject of DARs conversion authority. Having recognized the DARs conversion
authority over lands reclassified after 15 June 1988, it can no longer be argued that
the Secretary of Agrarian Reform was wrongfully given the authority and power to
include lands not reclassified as residential, commercial, industrial or other non-
agricultural uses before 15 June 1988 in the definition of agricultural lands. Such
inclusion does not unduly expand or enlarge the definition of agricultural lands;
instead, it made clear what are the lands that can be the subject of DARs conversion
authority, thus, serving the very purpose of the land use conversion provisions of
Republic Act No. 6657.
The argument of the petitioner that DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, was made in
violation of Section 65 of Republic Act No. 6657, as it covers even those non-awarded
lands and reclassified lands by the LGUs or by way of Presidential Proclamations on
or after 15 June 1988 is specious. As explained in Department of Justice Opinion No.
44, series of 1990, it is true that the DARs express power over land use conversion
provided for under Section 65 of Republic Act No. 6657 is limited to cases in which
agricultural lands already awarded have, after five years, ceased to be economically
feasible and sound for agricultural purposes, or the locality has become urbanized
and the land will have a greater economic value for residential, commercial or
industrial purposes. To suggest, however, that these are the only instances that the
DAR can require conversion clearances would open a loophole in Republic Act No.
6657 which every landowner may use to evade compliance with the agrarian reform
program. It should logically follow, therefore, from the said departments express duty
and function to execute and enforce the said statute that any reclassification of a
private land as a residential, commercial or industrial property, on or after the
effectivity of Republic Act No. 6657 on 15 June 1988 should first be cleared by the
DAR.[42]
This Court held in Alarcon v. Court of Appeals[43] that reclassification of lands
does not suffice. Conversion and reclassification differ from each
other. Conversion is the act of changing the current use of a piece of agricultural land
into some other use as approved by the DAR while reclassification is the act of
specifying how agricultural lands shall be utilized for non-agricultural uses such as
residential, industrial, and commercial, as embodied in the land use plan, subject to
the requirements and procedures for land use conversion. In view thereof, a mere
reclassification of an agricultural land does not automatically allow a landowner to
change its use. He has to undergo the process of conversion before he is permitted
to use the agricultural land for other purposes.[44]

It is clear from the aforesaid distinction between reclassification and conversion

that agricultural lands though reclassified to residential, commercial, industrial or other
non-agricultural uses must still undergo the process of conversion before they can be
used for the purpose to which they are intended.

Nevertheless, emphasis must be given to the fact that DARs conversion

authority can only be exercised after the effectivity of Republic Act No. 6657 on 15
June 1988.[45]The said date served as the cut-off period for automatic reclassification
or rezoning of agricultural lands that no longer require any DAR conversion clearance
or authority.[46]Thereafter, reclassification of agricultural lands is already subject to
DARs conversion authority. Reclassification alone will not suffice to use the
agricultural lands for other purposes. Conversion is needed to change the current use
of reclassified agricultural lands.

It is of no moment whether the reclassification of agricultural lands to residential,

commercial, industrial or other non-agricultural uses was done by the LGUs or by way
of Presidential Proclamations because either way they must still undergo conversion
process. It bears stressing that the act of reclassifying agricultural lands to non-
agricultural uses simply specifies how agricultural lands shall be utilized for non-
agricultural uses and does not automatically convert agricultural lands to non-
agricultural uses or for other purposes. As explained in DAR Memorandum Circular
No. 7, Series of 1994, cited in the 2009 case of Roxas & Company, Inc. v. DAMBA-
NFSW and the Department of Agrarian Reform,[47] reclassification of lands denotes
their allocation into some specific use and providing for the manner of their utilization
and disposition or the act of specifying how agricultural lands shall be utilized for non-
agricultural uses such as residential, industrial, or commercial, as embodied in the
land use plan. For reclassified agricultural lands, therefore, to be used for the purpose
to which they are intended there is still a need to change the current use thereof
through the process of conversion. The authority to do so is vested in the DAR, which
is mandated to preserve and maintain agricultural lands with increased
productivity. Thus, notwithstanding the reclassification of agricultural lands to non-
agricultural uses, they must still undergo conversion before they can be used for other
purposes.

Even reclassification of agricultural lands by way of Presidential Proclamations

to non-agricultural uses, such as school sites, needs conversion clearance from the
DAR.We reiterate that reclassification is different from conversion. Reclassification
alone will not suffice and does not automatically allow the landowner to change its
use. It must still undergo conversion process before the landowner can use such
agricultural lands for such purpose.[48] Reclassification of agricultural lands is one
thing, conversion is another.Agricultural lands that are reclassified to non-agricultural
uses do not ipso facto allow the landowner thereof to use the same for such
purpose. Stated differently, despite having reclassified into school sites, the
landowner of such reclassified agricultural lands must apply for conversion before the
DAR in order to use the same for the said purpose.

Any reclassification, therefore, of agricultural lands to residential, commercial,

industrial or other non-agricultural uses either by the LGUs or by way of Presidential
Proclamations enacted on or after 15 June 1988 must undergo the process of
conversion, despite having undergone reclassification, before agricultural lands may
be used for other purposes.

It is different, however, when through Presidential Proclamations public

agricultural lands have been reserved in whole or in part for public use or purpose, i.e.,
public school, etc., because in such a case, conversion is no longer necessary. As
held in Republic v. Estonilo,[49] only a positive act of the President is needed to
segregate or reserve a piece of land of the public domain for a public purpose. As
such, reservation of public agricultural lands for public use or purpose in effect
converted the same to such use without undergoing any conversion process and that
they must be actually, directly and exclusively used for such public purpose for which
they have been reserved, otherwise, they will be segregated from the reservations
and transferred to the DAR for distribution to qualified beneficiaries under the
CARP.[50] More so, public agricultural lands already reserved for public use or purpose
no longer form part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain suitable
for agriculture.[51] Hence, they are outside the coverage of the CARP and it logically
follows that they are also beyond the conversion authority of the DAR.
Clearly from the foregoing, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform did not act without
jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in (1) including lands not reclassified as residential,
commercial, industrial or other non-agricultural uses before 15 June 1988 in the
definition of agricultural lands under DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, and; (2) issuing
and enforcing DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, subjecting to DARs jurisdiction for
conversion lands which had already been reclassified as residential, commercial,
industrial or for other non-agricultural uses on or after 15 June 1988.

Similarly, DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, providing that the reclassification of

agricultural lands by LGUs shall be subject to the requirements of land use conversion
procedure or that DARs approval or clearance must be secured to effect
reclassification, did not violate the autonomy of the LGUs.

Section 20 of Republic Act No. 7160 states that:

SECTION 20. Reclassification of Lands. (a) A city or municipality may, through an

ordinance passed by the sanggunian after conducting public hearings for the purpose,
authorize the reclassification of agricultural lands and provide for the manner of their
utilization or disposition in the following cases: (1) when the land ceases to be
economically feasible and sound for agricultural purposes as determined by the
Department of Agriculture or (2) where the land shall have substantially greater
economic value for residential, commercial, or industrial purposes, as determined by
the sanggunian concerned: Provided, That such reclassification shall be limited to the
following percentage of the total agricultural land area at the time of the passage of
the ordinance:

xxxx

(3) For fourth to sixth class municipalities, five percent (5%): Provided, further, That
agricultural lands distributed to agrarian reform beneficiaries pursuant to Republic Act
Numbered Sixty-six hundred fifty-seven (R.A. No. 6657), otherwise known as The
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, shall not be affected by the said reclassification
and the conversion of such lands into other purposes shall be governed by Section 65
of said Act.

xxxx

(e) Nothing in this Section shall be construed as repealing, amending, or modifying in

any manner the provisions of R.A. No. 6657.

The aforequoted provisions of law show that the power of the LGUs to reclassify
agricultural lands is not absolute. The authority of the DAR to approve conversion of
agricultural lands covered by Republic Act No. 6657 to non-agricultural uses has been
validly recognized by said Section 20 of Republic Act No. 7160 by explicitly providing
therein that, nothing in this section shall be construed as repealing or modifying in any
manner the provisions of Republic Act No. 6657.

DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, does not also violate the due process clause,
as well as the equal protection clause of the Constitution. In providing administrative
and criminal penalties in the said administrative order, the Secretary of Agrarian
Reform simply implements the provisions of Sections 73 and 74 of Republic Act No.
6657, thus:

Sec. 73. Prohibited Acts and Omissions. The following are prohibited:

xxxx
(c) The conversion by any landowner of his agricultural land into any non-agricultural use with
intent to avoid the application of this Act to his landholdings and to disposes his tenant farmers
of the land tilled by them;
xxxx
(f) The sale, transfer or conveyance by a beneficiary of the right to use or any other
usufructuary right over the land he acquired by virtue of being a beneficiary, in order to
circumvent the provisions of this Act.
xxxx
Sec. 74. Penalties. ─ Any person who knowingly or willfully violates the provisions of
this Act shall be punished by imprisonment of not less than one (1) month to not more than
three (3) years or a fine of not less than one thousand pesos (P1,000.00) and not more than
fifteen thousand pesos (P15,000.00), or both, at the discretion of the court.

If the offender is a corporation or association, the officer responsible therefor

shall be criminally liable.

And Section 11 of Republic Act No. 8435, which specifically provides:

Sec. 11. Penalty for Agricultural Inactivity and Premature Conversion. x x x.
Any person found guilty of premature or illegal conversion shall be penalized with
imprisonment of two (2) to six (6) years, or a fine equivalent to one hundred percent (100%)
of the government's investment cost, or both, at the discretion of the court, and an accessory
penalty of forfeiture of the land and any improvement thereon.
In addition, the DAR may impose the following penalties, after determining, in an
administrative proceedings, that violation of this law has been committed:
a. Consolation or withdrawal of the authorization for land use conversion; and
b. Blacklisting, or automatic disapproval of pending and subsequent conversion
applications that they may file with the DAR.

Contrary to petitioners assertions, the administrative and criminal penalties

provided for under DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, are imposed upon the illegal or
premature conversion of lands within DARs jurisdiction, i.e., lands not
reclassified as residential, commercial, industrial or for other non-agricultural
uses before 15 June 1998.
The petitioners argument that DAR Memorandum No. 88 is unconstitutional, as it
suspends the land use conversion without any basis, stands on hollow ground.

It bears emphasis that said Memorandum No. 88 was issued upon the
instruction of the President in order to address the unabated conversion of prime
agricultural lands for real estate development because of the worsening rice shortage
in the country at that time. Such measure was made in order to ensure that there are
enough agricultural lands in which rice cultivation and production may be carried
into. The issuance of said Memorandum No. 88 was made pursuant to the general
welfare of the public, thus, it cannot be argued that it was made without any basis.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition

for Certiorari is DISMISSED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Chairperson

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR TERESITA LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice
 CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I hereby certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

[1] Rollo, pp. 182-183.

[2] Id. at 185.
[3] Id. at 42-59.
[4] Id. at 77-110.
[5] Otherwise known as The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988.
[6] SECTION 20. Reclassification of Lands. (a) A city or municipality may, through an ordinance passed by the

sanggunian after conducting public hearings for the purpose, authorize the reclassification of agricultural lands
and provide for the manner of their utilization or disposition in the following cases: (1) when the land ceases to
be economically feasible and sound for agricultural purposes as determined by the Department of Agriculture
or (2) where the land shall have substantially greater economic value for residential, commercial, or industrial
purposes, as determined by the sanggunian concerned: Provided, That such reclassification shall be limited to
the following percentage of the total agricultural land area at the time of the passage of the ordinance:

(1) For highly urbanized and independent component cities, fifteen percent (15%);
(2) For component cities and first to third class municipalities, ten percent (10%); and
(3) For fourth to sixth class municipalities, five percent (5%): Provided, further, That agricultural
lands distributed to agrarian reform beneficiaries pursuant to Republic Act Numbered Sixty-six
hundred fifty-seven (R.A. No. 6657), otherwise known as The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law, shall not be affected by the said reclassification and the conversion of such lands into other
purposes shall be governed by Section 65 of said Act.

(b) The President may, when public interest so requires and upon recommendation of the National
Economic and Development Authority, authorize a city or municipality to reclassify lands in excess of the limits
set in the next preceding paragraph.
(c) The local government units shall, in conformity with existing laws, continue to prepare their
respective comprehensive land use plans enacted through zoning ordinances which shall be the primary and
dominant bases for the future use of land resources: Provided, That the requirements for food production,
human settlements, and industrial expansion shall be taken into consideration in the preparation of such plans.
(d) Where approval by a national agency is required for reclassification, such approval shall not be
unreasonably withheld. Failure to act on a proper and complete application for reclassification within three (3)
months from receipt of the same shall be deemed as approval thereof.
(e) Nothing in this Section shall be construed as repealing, amending, or modifying in any manner the
provisions of R.A. No. 6657.
[7] Otherwise known as The Local Government Code of 1991.
[8] Particularly Sections 3.1 and 6.2 of DAR AO No. 01-02.
[9] Rollo, p. 272.
[10] Otherwise known as The Agriculture and Fisheries Modernization Act of 1997.
[11] SEC. 65. Conversion of Lands. ─ After the lapse of five (5) years from its award, when the land ceases to be

economically feasible and sound for agricultural purposes, or the locality has become urbanized and the land
will have a greater economic value for residential, commercial or industrial purposes, the DAR, upon application
of the beneficiary or the landowner, with due notice to the affected parties, and subject to existing laws, may
authorize the reclassification or conversion of the land and its disposition: Provided, That the beneficiary shall
have fully paid his obligation.
[12] Section 2.19. Reclassification of Agricultural Lands refers to the act of specifying how agricultural lands shall be
utilized for non-agricultural uses such as, residential, industrial, commercial, as embodied in the land use plan,
subject to the requirements and procedure for land use conversion, undertaken by a Local Government Unit
(LGU) in accordance with Section 20 of RA 7160 and Joint Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB),
DAR, DA, and Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) MC-54-1995. It also includes the reversion
of non-agricultural lands to agricultural use.
[13] Section 25. The State shall ensure the autonomy of local governments.
[14] Section 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy.
[15] Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog v. Melicor, G.R. No. 140954, 12 April 2005, 455 SCRA 460, 470.
[16] Id.
[17] 254 Phil. 418 (1989).
[18] Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog v. Melicor, supra note 15 at 471.
[19] Liga ng mga Barangay National v. City Mayor of Manila, 465 Phil. 529, 543 (2004); Santiago v. Vasquez, G.R. Nos.

99289-90, 27 January 1993, 217 SCRA 633, 652.

[20] Tano v. Hon. Gov. Socrates, 343 Phil. 670, 700 (1997).
[21] G.R. No. 157036, 9 June 2004, 431 SCRA 534.
[22] 438 Phil. 417 (2002).
[23] 438 Phil. 72 (2002).
[24] 413 Phil. 281 (2001).
[25] 352 Phil. 461 (1998).
[26] Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog v. Melicor, supra note 15.
[27] Id.
[28] Philnabank Employees Association v. Estanislao, G.R. No. 104209, 16 November 1993, 227 SCRA 804, 811.
[29] People v. Court of Appeals, 468 Phil. 1, 10 (2004).
[30] Rivera v. Hon. Espiritu, 425 Phil. 169, 179-180 (2002).
[31] Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 456 Phil. 755, 785 (2003).
[32] Id.
[33] Id. at 786.
[34] Ligan ng mga Barangay National v. City Mayor of Manila, supra note 19 at 541.
[35] Id.
[36] Mayor Balindong v. Vice Gov. Dacalos, 484 Phil. 574, 579 (2004).
[37] Otherwise known as The Reorganization Act of the Department of Agrarian Reform, which was approved on 26 July

1987.
[38] In the said Opinion, the Secretary of Justice declared, viz: Based on the foregoing premises, we reiterate the view

that with respect to conversions of agricultural lands covered by Republic Act No. 6657 to non-agricultural uses,
the authority of DAR to approve such conversions may be exercised from the date of the laws effectivity on 15
June 1988. This conclusion is based on a liberal interpretation of Republic Act No. 6657 in the light of DARs
mandate and the extensive coverage of the agrarian reform program.
[39] G.R. No. 132477, 31 August 2005, 468 SCRA 471.
[40] Junio v. Garilao, G.R. No. 147146, 29 July 2005, 465 SCRA 173, 182-183.
[41] Heirs of Francisco R. Tantoco, Sr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 149621, 5 May 2006, 489 SCRA 590, 606-607.
[42] Ros v. Department of Agrarian Reform, supra note 39 at 483.
[43] 453 Phil. 373, 382-383 (2003).
[44] Id.
[45] Junio v. Garilao, G.R. No. 147146, 29 July 2005, 465 SCRA 173, 181-182.
[46] Heirs of Francisco R. Tantoco, Sr. v. Court of Appeals, supra note 41.
[47] G.R. Nos. 149548, 167505, 167540, 167543, 167845, 169163 and 179650, 4 December 2009.
[48] Roxas & Company, Inc. v. DAMBA-NFSW and the Department of Agrarian Reform, id.
[49] G.R. No. 157306, 25 November 2005, 476 SCRA 265, 274.
[50] Section 1.A of Executive Order No. 506 dated 18 February 1992.
[51] Department of Agrarian Reform v. Department of Education, Culture and Sports, 469 Phil. 1083, 1092-1093 (2004)

citing Central Mindanao University v. Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board, G.R. No. 100091, 22
October 1992, 215 SCRA 86, 99.

b. Jose, Junio and Federico all surnamed Junio vs. Ernesto

Garilao, GR No. 147146, July 29, 2005

THIRD DIVISION
 [G.R. No. 147146. July 29, 2005]

JOSE, JULIO and FEDERICO, All Surnamed JUNIO, petitioners, vs. ERNESTO
D. GARILAO, in His Capacity as Secretary of Agrarian
Reform, respondent.

DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:

Lands already classified and identified as commercial, industrial or residential before June 15,
1988 -- the date of effectivity of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) -- are outside the
coverage of this law. Therefore, they no longer need any conversion clearance from the Department
of Agrarian Reform (DAR).

The Case

Before the Court is a Petition for Review[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to set
aside the February 24, 2000 Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-GR SP No. 37217. The
Decision denied petitioners Petition for Certiorari[3] for its failure to show that the DAR had acted with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it issued its Exemption
Order dated September 13, 1994. The Order, issued by then DAR Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao,
had excluded Lot 835-B from the coverage of Republic Act 6657, otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL).
In its Resolution dated April 4, 2001, this Court (through the Second Division) immediately
denied the Petition for failure of petitioners (1) to attach the duplicate original/certified true copy of
the CA Resolution denying their Motion for Reconsideration of the CA Decision; and (2) to state the
dates of their receipt and filing of a Motion for Reconsideration of that Decision.
In their Motion for Reconsideration[4] of the April 4, 2001 Resolution, petitioners alleged that they
had received the assailed CA Decision on March 8, 2000 and filed their Motion for Reconsideration
on March 22, 2000. They likewise submitted a duplicate original of the February 2, 2001 CA
Resolution,[5] which had denied that Motion.
On January 22, 2002, petitioners filed a Manifestation.[6] It stated that in a clarificatory letter dated
July 30, 1997,[7] Salvador S. Malibong, the deputized zoning administrator of Bacolod City,
completely reversed the false Certification he had issued earlier. That Certification had been the
basis of the DAR secretarys assailed Exemption Order.
On February 18, 2002, public respondent submitted its Comment on the Motion for
Reconsideration filed by petitioners. They in turn submitted their Reply to the Comment on June 14,
2002, in compliance with the Courts Resolution dated April 10, 2002. In its Resolution dated August
13, 2003, the Court (Second Division) resolved to grant their Motion for Reconsideration and to
require the solicitor general to comment on the Petition within ten days from notice.
On October 9, 2003, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) submitted a Manifestation in Lieu
of Comment. The OSG stated that its Comment on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by
petitioners on February 18, 2002, had fully addressed the issues presented in their Petition for
Review. On November 12, 2003, the Court resolved to give due course to the Petition and required
the parties to submit their respective memoranda within thirty days from notice. Thereafter, the case
was transferred to the First Division, and finally to the Third, which will now resolve the controversy.
 The Facts

The CA summarized the antecedents of the case as follows:

In a Complaint dated February 12, 1994, filed with the [Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (DARAB)] by complainants (some of whom are herein petitioners),
identified as Potential CARP Beneficiaries per Certification of OIC [Municipal Agrarian
Reform Officer (MARO)] dated November 21, 1991 x x x, it is prayed that a writ of
preliminary injunction be issued against the registered owners of a certain parcel of
agricultural land consisting of 71 hectares, more or less, known as Lot No. 835-B of
Bacolod Cadastre, Brgy. Pahanocoy, Bacolod City, covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title No. T-79622. Petitioners claim that x x x Sta. Lucia Realty Corporation and the
Estate of Guillermo Villasor, represented by Irving Villasor, are bulldozing and leveling
the subject property for the purpose of converting it into a residential subdivision; that
as prospective CARP beneficiaries of the land in question, being former laborers, actual
occupants and permanent residents of Barangay Pahanocoy, their rights will be
prejudiced by the illegal conversion of the land into a residential subdivision x x x.

On April 13, 1994, the DARAB OIC Executive Director forwarded the complaint to
[Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD)], DAR, Region VI, Bacolod City for
appropriate action x x x. Before any hearing could be conducted thereon, the Secretary
of the Department of Agrarian Reform issued an Order dated September 13, 1994 in
RE: PETITION FOR EXEMPTION FROM CARP COVERAGE PURSUANT TO DOJ
OPINION NO. 44, SERIES OF 1990, IRVING P. VILLASOR, et al., Rep. by Atty. Angel
Lobaton, Jr., Petitioners, portions of which read as follows:

After a careful study of the facts of the case and the evidences presented by the
parties, this Office finds the petition for exemption to be well founded. Under DOJ
Opinion No. 44, Series of 1990, it provides that lands which has already been classified
as mineral, forest, residential, commercial and industrial areas, prior to June 15, 1988
shall be excluded from CARP coverage. To this, it is an [i]nescapable conclusion that
the subject property is exempted from CARP coverage considering the fact that the
same was classified as residential as evidenced by the Resolution No. 5153-A, Series
of 1976 of the City Council of Bacolod and as approved by the Human Settlements
Regulatory Commission (now HLURB) in its Resolution dated September 24, 1980 as
per Certification dated June 22, 1994 issued by the said Commission. The Certification
of the National Irrigation Administration (NIA) dated June 9, 1994 stated that the subject
land is not irrigable or is outside the service area of the irrigation system in the locality.
In effect the said application had conformed to the requirements of the law on
exemption. In accord thereto, the stand of Mr. Espanola that the portion, which he
planted to trees and developed into mini-forest should be covered by CARP[,] is
beyond recognition as the program does not apply to those which are already classified
as residential lands prior to the effectivity of CARL on June 15, 1988. Instead, it is
confined only to agricultural lands, which under R.A. 6657, Sec. 3(c), it defines
agricultural lands as lands devoted to agricultural activity as defined in this Act and not
classified as mineral, forest, residential or industrial land. With the above stated
definition, it is beyond reason that the placing of the said portion under CARP coverage
(1.5 hectare) is devoid of legal and factual basis. [8]

As earlier said, the Exemption Order was challenged before the appellate court via a Petition
for Certiorari.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The Court of Appeals sustained the Exemption Order issued by public respondent. It found that
prior to June 15, 1988, Lot 835-B had been reclassified from agricultural to residential land. It relied
on the Courts pronouncement in Natalia Realty v. Department of Agrarian Reform[9] that lands were
outside the coverage of the CARL if they had been converted to non-agricultural uses by government
agencies, other than the DAR, prior to the effectivity of that law.
Further, the CA ruled that neither the CARL nor the Local Government Code of 1991 had
nullified the reclassification of Lot 835-B. The appellate court noted that the land had been validly
reclassified from agricultural to residential in 1976, prior to the effective date of both laws. It added
that neither of those two laws could be applied retroactively, since they contained no provision
authorizing their retroactivity.
Hence, this Petition.[10]

Issues

In their Memorandum, petitioners submit this lone issue for our consideration:

Whether the respondent DAR secretary had the inherent authority or power to exclude
or exempt at will from the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program
(CARP) the subject agricultural land which was already automatically covered by the
CARL (RA 6657) upon its effectivity on June 15, 1988 without affording due process to
herein petitioners and without the necessity of Congress having first to amend Section
4 of the said law authorizing such exemption or exclusion from CARP coverage. [11]

The Courts Ruling

The Petition is devoid of merit.

Sole Issue:
Coverage

Section 4 of RA 6657 sets forth the coverage of the CARL as follows:

SEC. 4. Scope. The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 shall cover,
regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, all public and private
agricultural lands as provided in Proclamation No. 131 and Executive Order No. 229,
including other lands of the public domain suitable for agriculture.

More specifically, the following lands are covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program:

xxxxxxxxx

(d) All private lands devoted to or suitable for agriculture regardless of the agricultural
products raised or that can be raised thereon.

Section 3(c) of the CARL defines agricultural land as that which is devoted to agricultural activity
x x x and not classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial land.
The meaning of agricultural lands covered by the CARL was explained further by the DAR in its
Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 1990,[12] entitled Revised Rules and Regulations Governing
Conversion of Private Agricultural Land to Non-Agricultural Uses, issued pursuant to Section 49 of
CARL, which we quote:

x x x. Agricultural land refers to those devoted to agricultural activity as defined in R.A.

6657 and not classified as mineral or forest by the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR) and its predecessor agencies, and not classified in town
plans and zoning ordinances as approved by the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board (HLURB) and its preceding competent authorities prior to 15
June 1988 for residential, commercial or industrial use. (Emphasis supplied)

Prior to this Order, Department of Justice Opinion No. 44 dated March 16, 1990, which was
addressed to then DAR Secretary Florencio Abad, recognized the fact that before the date of the
laws effectivity on June 15, 1988, the reclassification or conversion of lands was not exclusively
done by the DAR.[13] Rather, it was a coordinated effort of all concerned agencies; namely, the
Department of Local Governments and Community Development, the Human Settlements
Commission and the DAR.[14] Then Justice Secretary Franklin M. Drilon explained the coordination
in this wise:

x x x. Under R.A. No. 3844, as amended by R.A. No. 6389, an agricultural lessee
[15] [16]

may, by order of the court, be dispossessed of his landholding if after due hearing, it is
shown that the landholding is declared by the [DAR] upon the recommendation of the
National Planning Commission to be suited for residential, commercial, industrial or
some other urban purposes. [17]

Likewise, under various Presidential Decrees (P.D. Nos. 583, 815 and 946) which were
issued to give teeth to the implementation of the agrarian reform program decreed in
P.D. No. 27, the DAR was empowered to authorize conversions of tenanted agricultural
lands, specifically those planted to rice and/or corn, to other agricultural or to non-
agricultural uses, subject to studies on zoning of the Human Settlements
Commissions (HSC). This non-exclusive authority of the DAR under the aforesaid laws
was, x x x recognized and reaffirmed by other concerned agencies, such as the
Department of Local Government and Community Development (DLGCD) and the then
Human Settlements Commission (HSC) in a Memorandum of Agreement executed by
the DAR and these two agencies on May 13, 1977, which is an admission that with
respect to land use planning and conversions, the authority is not exclusive to any
particular agency but is a coordinated effort of all concerned agencies.

It is significant to mention that in 1978, the then Ministry of Human Settlements was
granted authority to review and ratify land use plans and zoning ordinance of local
governments and to approve development proposals which include land use
conversions (see LOI No. 729 [1978]). This was followed by [E.O.] No. 648 (1981)
which conferred upon the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission (the
predecessors of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board [HLURB] the authority to
promulgate zoning and other land use control standards and guidelines which shall
govern land use plans and zoning ordinances of local governments, subdivision or
estate development projects of both the public and private sector and urban renewal
plans, programs and projects; as well as to review, evaluate and approve or disapprove
comprehensive land use development plans and zoning components of civil works and
infrastructure projects, of national, regional and local governments, subdivisions,
condominiums or estate development projects including industrial estates.

Hence, the justice secretary opined that the authority of the DAR to approve conversions of
agricultural lands to non-agricultural uses could be exercised only from the date of the laws effectivity
on June 15, 1988.
Following the opinion of the Department of Justice (DOJ), the DAR issued Administrative Order
(AO) No. 6, Series of 1994,[18] stating that conversion clearances were no longer needed for lands
already classified as non-agricultural before the enactment of Republic Act 6657. Designed to
streamline the issuance of exemption clearances, based on DOJ Opinion No. 44, the AO provided
guidelines and procedures for the issuance of exemption clearances.
Thereafter, DAR issued AO 12,[19] Series of 1994, entitled Consolidated and Revised Rules and
Procedures Governing Conversion of Agricultural Lands to Non-Agricultural Uses. It provided that
the guidelines on how to secure an exemption clearance under DAR AO No. 6, Series of 1994, shall
apply to agricultural lands classified or zoned for non-agricultural uses by local government units
(LGUs); and approved by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) before June 15,
1988. Under this AO, the DAR secretary had the ultimate authority to issue orders granting or
denying applications for exemption filed by landowners whose lands were covered by DOJ Opinion
No. 44.
Contrary to petitioners stance, the CA properly applied Natalia Realty v. Department of Agrarian
Reform,[20] which had earlier held that lands previously converted by government agencies, other
than DAR, to non-agricultural uses prior to the effectivity of the CARL were outside the coverage of
that law. Our ruling in Natalia was not confined solely to agricultural lands located within townsite
reservations, but applied also to real estate converted to non-agricultural uses prior to the effectivity
of the CARL,[21] provided the conversion was made by government agencies other than the DAR --
like the HLURB and its predecessor, the Human Settlement Regulatory Commission (HSRC).[22]
The Courts ruling in Natalia was reiterated in Pasong Bayabas Farmers Association v. Court of
Appeals,[23] which affirmed the authority of the Municipal Council of Carmona to issue a zoning
classification and to reclassify the property in question from agricultural to residential, as approved
by the HSRC (now the HLURB). The Court held that Section 3 of RA 2264, [24]amending the Local
Government Code, specifically empowered municipal and/or city councils, in consultation with the
National Planning Commission, to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or regulations. Hence,
the power of the local government to convert or reclassify lands to residential or non-agricultural
was not subject to the approval of the DAR.[25]
 It is thus settled that with respect to areas classified and identified as zonal areas not for
agricultural uses, like those approved by the HSRC before the effectivity of RA 6657 on June 15,
1988, the DARs clearance is no longer necessary for conversion.
The next question before us is whether the subject landholding was in fact reclassified as
residential before June 15, 1988, the date of effectivity of the CARL. The Exemption Order of the
DAR secretary pointed out that the parcel had indeed been reclassified as residential under
Resolution No. 5153-A of the City Council of Bacolod. This reclassification was later affirmed by the
HSRC.
The courts generally accord great respect, if not finality, to factual findings of administrative
agencies because of their special knowledge and expertise over matters falling under their
jurisdiction.[26] It must be stressed at this point that with the DAR lies the power to determine whether
Lot 835-B is non-agricultural and, hence, exempt from the coverage of the CARL.
According to DAR AO 6-94, an application for exemption from the coverage of the CARP must
be accompanied by a certification from the HLURB that the pertinent zoning ordinance has been
approved by the Board prior to June 15, 1988 (the date of effectivity of the CARL). In the instant
case, the landowner did file an accompanying Certification from the HLURB.
The Certification issued by the Board expressly mentioned that the property x x x, Lot 835-B
located at Brgy. Tangub, Bacolod City, covered by TCT T-79622, x x x was identified for residential
use under the 1976 Framework Plan of the City of Bacolod prepared pursuant to the Program of the
then Ministry of Local Government and approved by the City Council in its Resolution No. 5153-A,
Series of 1976.[27] It also certified that the area where the aforecited property is located was likewise
identified for residential use under the Town Planning, Housing Zoning Program of the National
Coordinating Council of the then Ministry of Human Settlements as approved under the City Council
Resolution No. 5792, Series of 1977. x x x.[28]
These Certifications carried the presumption of regularity in their issuance. Petitioners did not
present any evidence to overcome that presumption. [29] The letter of the deputized zoning
administrator of Bacolod City -- cited by petitioners to contradict the Certifications -- did not touch
on, much less corroborate, their claim that the subject landholding remained classified as
agricultural. It merely restated what was already provided in the law -- that only the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Bacolod City could reclassify lands.
Petitioners next assert that, for tax purposes, the subject property was declared by its owners
as agricultural land since time immemorial until at least 1994.[30] It is settled, however, that a tax
declaration is not conclusive of the nature of the property for zoning purposes.[31] It may have been
declared by its owner as residential for real estate taxation purposes, but it may well be within a
commercial zone.[32] In the determination of the nature of a piece of property, a discrepancy would
thus exist between its classification for real estate taxation purposes vis--vis that for zoning
purposes.
Under the Real Property Tax Code, a tax declaration serves only to enable the assessor to
identify a property for assessment levels,[33] not to bind a provincial/city assessor. Under Section 220
of the Real Estate Tax Code, appraisal and assessment are based on the actual use, regardless of
any previous assessment or taxpayers valuation thereon which, in turn, is based on a taxpayer's
declaration.
Republic v. Court of Appeals[34] ruled thus:

There is no law or jurisprudence that holds that the land classification embodied in the
tax declarations is conclusive and final nor would proscribe any further inquiry.
Furthermore, the tax declarations are clearly not the sole basis of the classification of a
land. In fact, DAR Administrative Order No. 6 lists other documents, aside from tax
declarations, that must be submitted when applying for exemption from CARP. In Halili
v. Court of Appeals, we sustained the trial court when it ruled that the classification
made by the Land Regulatory Board of the land in question outweighed the
classification stated in the tax declaration.

Consequently, even if the subject landholding has been declared as agricultural for taxation
purposes, once a local government has reclassified it as residential, that determination must prevail
for zoning purposes.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED, and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against
the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio-Morales, and Garcia, JJ., concur.
Corona, J., on official leave.

[1]
Rollo, pp. 3-7. This was erroneously entitled Petition for Certiorari.
[2]
Annex A of Petition; id., pp. 8-13. Sixth Division. Penned by Justice Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez (Division chair, now a
member of this Court) and concurred in by Justices Oswaldo D. Agcaoili and Wenceslao I. Agnir Jr. (members).
[3]
Entitled In the Matter of Petition for Declaratory Judgment regarding the Validity of the Order of Exemption of DAR
Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao dated September 13, 1994. Ramon de la Torre, Rudy Balena, Jose Junio, Romulo
Obag, Loreto Pahilona, Emilia Junio, Julio Junio, Danilo Maban and Romulo M. Matti in his official capacity as
Chairman of the Barangay Agrarian Reform Committee (BARC) for Brgy. Pahanocoy, Bacolod City, Petitioners,
versus Ernesto D. Garilao in his official capacity as the Secretary of Agrarian Reform, Respondent.
[4]
Rollo, p. 20.
[5]
Id., p. 21.
[6]
Id., p. 71.
[7]
Id., p. 91. The pertinent portion of the letter reads:
Let it be stated clearly that the City Planning and Development Office (CPDO) did not reclassify subject lands, it merely
identified areas for expansion under the 1976 Framework Plan of Bacolod City under City Council Resolution
No. 5153-A Ser. of 1976 and Resolution No. 5792 Ser. of 1977, only the Sangguniang Panlungsod (SP) of
Bacolod City can reclassify land and only the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) can convert lands.
[8]
CA Decision, pp. 2-3; rollo, pp. 9-10.
[9]
225 SCRA 278, August 12, 1993.
[10]
This case was deemed submitted for decision on March 23, 2004, upon this Courts receipt of public respondents
Memorandum, signed by Assistant Solicitor General Nestor J. Ballacillo and Associate Solicitor Louella Vieve
B. Fernandez. Petitioners seven-page Memorandum, signed by Atty. Romulo A. Deles, was received by this
Court on February 6, 2004.
[11]
Memorandum, pp. 4-5; rollo, pp. 217-218. Original in uppercase.
[12]
March 22, 1990.
[13]
4(j) of Executive Order No. 129-A, (which took effect on July 26, 1987), specifically provides that the Department of
Agrarian Reform shall be responsible for implementing the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program and, for
that purpose, is authorized to approve or disapprove the conversion, restructuring, or readjustment of
agricultural lands into non-agricultural uses. 5(l) of the same EO also provides that, pursuant to its mandate and
in order to ensure the successful implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program, the DAR
has exclusive authority to approve or disapprove conversion of agricultural lands for residential, commercial,
industrial and other land uses as may be provided for by law.
[14]
See also DOJ Opinion No. 136, Series of 1993.
[15]
Entitled An Act to Ordain the Agricultural Land Reform Code and to Institute Land Reforms in the Philippines, Including
the Abolition of Tenancy and the Channeling of Capital into Industry, Provide for the Necessary Implementing
Agencies, Appropriate Funds therefor and for other purposes; which took effect on August 8, 1963.
[16]
Code of Agrarian Reforms, September 10, 1971. Designed as an improvement of RA No. 3844, this amendatory Act
featured the creation of the Department of Agrarian Reforms (DAR), which was vested with powers and duties
to resolve all agrarian conflicts thru the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions.
[17]
36(1).
[18]
May 27, 1994.
[19]
Dated October 24, 1994.
[20]
225 SCRA 278, August 12, 1993.
[21]
Advincula-Velasquez v. Court of Appeals et al., 431 SCRA 165, June 8, 2004. See also National Housing Authority
v. Allarde, 318 SCRA 22, November 16, 1999.
[22]
Section 5 of Executive Order No. 648 dated February 7, 1981 provides as follows:
Powers and Duties of the Commission.
a) Promulgate zoning and other land use control standards and guidelines which shall govern land use plans and zoning
ordinances of local governments; the zoning components of civil works and infrastructure projects of the
national, regional and local governments; subdivision or estate development projects of both the public and
private sectors; and urban renewal plans, programs and projects: provided that the zoning and other land use
control standards and guidelines to be promulgated hereunder shall respect the classification of public lands for
forest purposes as certified by the Ministry of Natural Resources.
b) Review, evaluate and approve or disapprove comprehensive land use development plans and zoning ordinances of
local governments; and the zoning component of civil works and infrastructure projects of national, regional and
local governments, subdivisions, condominiums or estate development projects including industrial estates, of
both the public and private sectors and urban renewal plans, programs and projects: Provided, that the land
use Development Plans and Zoning Ordinances of Local Governments herein subject to review, evaluation and
approval of the commission shall respect the classification of public lands for forest purposes as certified by the
Ministry of Natural Resources: Provided, further, that the classification of specific alienable and disposable lands
by the Bureau of Lands shall be in accordance with the relevant zoning ordinance of Local government where
it exists: and provided, finally that in cities and municipalities where there are as yet no zoning ordinances, the
Bureau of Lands may dispose of specific alienable and disposable lands in accordance with its own classification
scheme subject to the condition that the classification of these lands may be subsequently changed by the local
governments in accordance with their particular zoning ordinances which may be promulgated later.
c) Issue rules and regulations to enforce the land use policies and human settlements as provided for in Presidential
Decrees No. 399, 815, 933, 957, 1216, 1344, 1396, 1517, Letter of Instructions No. 713, 729, 833, 935, and
other related laws regulating the use of land including the regulatory aspects of the Urban Land Reform Act and
all decrees relating to regulation of the value of land and improvements, and their rental.
[23]
429 SCRA 109, May 25, 2004.
[24]
Otherwise known as the Local Autonomy Act of 1959.
Sec. 3. Power to adopt zoning and planning ordinances. Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, Municipal
Boards or City Councils in cities, and Municipal Councils in municipalities are hereby authorized to adopt zoning
and subdivision ordinances or regulations for their respective cities and municipalities subject to the approval
of the City Mayor or Municipal Mayor, as the case may be. Cities and municipalities may, however, consult the
National Planning Commission on matters pertaining to planning and zoning.
[25]
Pasong Bayabas Farmers Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals et al., id.
[26]
Pasong Bayabas Farmers Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals et al., supra; Sps. Calvo v. Sps. Vergara, 423 Phil.
939, December 19, 2001; Palele v. Court of Appeals, 362 SCRA 141, July 31, 2001.
[27]
Rollo, p. 126.
[28]
Ibid.
[29]
Sec. 3, Rule 131 of the Revised Rules of Court. Lercana v. Jalandoni, 426 Phil. 319, February 1, 2002.
[30]
Memorandum, p. 3; rollo, p. 216.
[31]
Patalinghug v. Court of Appeals, 229 SCRA 554, January 27, 1994.
[32]
In Article 217 of the LGC 1991 on Real Property Taxation, it is provided that real property shall be classified, valued
and assessed on the basis of its actual use regardless of where located, whoever owns it, and whoever uses it.
[33]
Article 202, Real Property Taxation, LGC 1991.
[34]
342 SCRA 189, 190, October 5, 2000 per Gonzaga-Reyes, J.

c. Province of Camarines Sur vs. Court of Appeals,

222 SCRA 173

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 103125 May 17, 1993

PROVINCE OF CAMARINES SUR, represented by GOV. LUIS R. VILLAFUERTE and HON. BENJAMIN V.
PANGA as Presiding Judge of RTC Branch 33 at Pili, Camarines Sur, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS (THIRD DIVISION), ERNESTO SAN JOAQUIN and EFREN SAN
JOAQUIN, respondents.

The Provincial Attorney for petitioners.

Reynaldo L. Herrera for Ernesto San Joaquin.

QUIASON, J.:

In this appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of Appeals in AC-G.R. SP No. 20551 entitled "Ernesto
N. San Joaquin, et al., v. Hon. Benjamin V. Panga, et al.," this Court is asked to decide whether the
expropriation of agricultural lands by local government units is subject, to the prior approval of the Secretary of
the Agrarian Reform, as the implementator of the agrarian reform program.

On December 22, 1988, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Camarines Sur passed Resolution
No. 129, Series of 1988, authorizing the Provincial Governor to purchase or expropriate property contiguous to
the provincial capitol site, in order to establish a pilot farm for non-food and non-traditional agricultural crops and
a housing project for provincial government employees.

The "WHEREAS" clause o:f the Resolution states:

WHEREAS, the province of Camarines Sur has adopted a five-year Comprehensive

Development plan, some of the vital components of which includes the establishment of model
and pilot farm for non-food and non-traditional agricultural crops, soil testing and tissue culture
laboratory centers, 15 small scale technology soap making, small scale products of plaster of
paris, marine biological and sea farming research center,and other progressive feasibility
concepts objective of which is to provide the necessary scientific and technology know-how to
farmers and fishermen in Camarines Sur and to establish a housing project for provincial
government employees;

WHEREAS, the province would need additional land to be acquired either by purchase or
expropriation to implement the above program component;
 WHEREAS, there are contiguous/adjacent properties to be (sic) present Provincial Capitol Site
ideally suitable to establish the same pilot development center;

WHEREFORE . . . .

Pursuant to the Resolution, the Province of Camarines Sur, through its Governor, Hon. Luis R.Villafuerte, filed
two separate cases for expropriation against Ernesto N. San Joaquin and Efren N. San Joaquin, docketed as
Special Civil Action Nos. P-17-89 and P-19-89 of the Regional Trial Court, Pili, Camarines Sur, presided by the
Hon. Benjamin V. Panga.

Forthwith, the Province of Camarines Sur filed a motion for the issuance of writ of possession. The San Joaquins
failed to appear at the hearing of the motion.

The San Joaquins moved to dismiss the complaints on the ground of inadequacy of the price offered for their
property. In an order dated December 6, 1989, the trial court denied the motion to dismiss and authorized the
Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of the property upon the deposit with the Clerk of Court of the
amount of P5,714.00, the amount provisionally fixed by the trial court to answer for damages that private
respondents may suffer in the event that the expropriation cases do not prosper. The trial court issued a writ of
possession in an order dated January18, 1990.

The San Joaquins filed a motion for relief from the order, authorizing the Province of Camarines Sur to take
possession of their property and a motion to admit an amended motion to dismiss. Both motions were denied in
the order dated February 1990.

In their petition before the Court of Appeals, the San Joaquins asked: (a) that Resolution No. 129, Series of 1988
of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan be declared null and void; (b) that the complaints for expropriation be
dismissed; and (c) that the order dated December 6, 1989 (i) denying the motion to dismiss and (ii) allowing the
Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of the property subject of the expropriation and the order dated
February 26, 1990, denying the motion to admit the amended motion to dismiss, be set aside. They also asked
that an order be issued to restrain the trial court from enforcing the writ of possession, and thereafter to issue a
writ of injunction.

In its answer to the petition, the Province of Camarines Sur claimed that it has the authority to initiate the
expropriation proceedings under Sections 4 and 7 of Local Government Code (B.P. Blg. 337) and that the
expropriations are for a public purpose.

Asked by the Court of Appeals to give his Comment to the petition, the Solicitor General stated that under
Section 9 of the Local Government Code (B.P. Blg. 337), there was no need for the approval by the Office of the
President of the exercise by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the right of eminent domain. However, the
Solicitor General expressed the view that the Province of Camarines Sur must first secure the approval of the
Department of Agrarian Reform of the plan to expropriate the lands of petitioners for use as a housing project.

The Court of Appeals set aside the order of the trial court, allowing the Province of Camarines Sur to take
possession of private respondents' lands and the order denying the admission of the amended motion to
dismiss. It also ordered the trial court to suspend the expropriation proceedings until after the Province of
Camarines Sur shall have submitted the requisite approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform to convert the
classification of the property of the private respondents from agricultural to non-agricultural land.

Hence this petition.

It must be noted that in the Court of Appeals, the San Joaquins asked for: (i) the dismissal of the complaints for
expropriation on the ground of the inadequacy of the compensation offered for the property and (ii) the
nullification of Resolution No. 129, Series of 1988 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of
Camarines Sur.

The Court of Appeals did not rule on the validity of the questioned resolution; neither did it dismiss the
complaints. However, when the Court of Appeals ordered the suspension of the proceedings until the Province
of Camarines Sur shall have obtained the authority of the Department of Agrarian Reform to change the
classification of the lands sought to be expropriated from agricultural to non-agricultural use, it assumed that the
resolution is valid and that the expropriation is for a public purpose or public use.

Modernly, there has been a shift from the literal to a broader interpretation of "public purpose" or "public use" for
which the power of eminent domain may be exercised. The old concept was that the condemned property must
actually be used by the general public (e.g. roads, bridges, public plazas, etc.) before the taking thereof could
satisfy the constitutional requirement of "public use". Under the new concept, "public use" means public
advantage, convenience or benefit, which tends to contribute to the general welfare and the prosperity of the
whole community, like a resort complex for tourists or housing project (Heirs of Juancho Ardano v. Reyes, 125
SCRA 220 [1983]; Sumulong v. Guerrero, 154 SC.RA 461 [1987]).

The expropriation of the property authorized by the questioned resolution is for a public purpose. The
establishment of a pilot development center would inure to the direct benefit and advantage of the people of the
Province of Camarines Sur. Once operational, the center would make available to the community invaluable
information and technology on agriculture, fishery and the cottage industry. Ultimately, the livelihood of the
farmers, fishermen and craftsmen would be enhanced. The housing project also satisfies the public purpose
requirement of the Constitution. As held in Sumulong v. Guerrero, 154 SCRA 461, "Housing is a basic human
need. Shortage in housing is a matter of state concern since it directly and significantly affects public health,
safety, the environment and in sum the general welfare."

It is the submission of the Province of Camarines Sur that its exercise of the power of eminent domain cannot be
restricted by the provisions of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (R.A. No. 6657), particularly Section 65
thereof, which requires the approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform before a parcel of land can be
reclassified from an agricultural to a non-agricultural land.

The Court of Appeals, following the recommendation of the Solicitor General, held that the Province of
Camarines Sur must comply with the provision of Section 65 of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law and
must first secure the approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform of the plan to expropriate the lands of the
San Joaquins.

In Heirs of Juancho Ardana v. Reyes, 125 SCRA 220, petitioners raised the issue of whether the Philippine
Tourism Authority can expropriate lands covered by the "Operation Land Transfer" for use of a tourist resort
complex. There was a finding that of the 282 hectares sought to be expropriated, only an area of 8,970 square
meters or less than one hectare was affected by the land reform program and covered by emancipation patents
issued by the Ministry of Agrarian Reform. While the Court said that there was "no need under the facts of this
petition to rule on whether the public purpose is superior or inferior to another purpose or engage in a balancing
of competing public interest," it upheld the expropriation after noting that petitioners had failed to overcome the
showing that the taking of 8,970 square meters formed part of the resort complex. A fair and reasonable reading
of the decision is that this Court viewed the power of expropriation as superior to the power to distribute lands
under the land reform program.

The Solicitor General denigrated the power to expropriate by the Province of Camarines Sur by stressing the
fact that local government units exercise such power only by delegation. (Comment, pp. 14-15; Rollo, pp. 128-
129)

It is true that local government units have no inherent power of eminent domain and can exercise it only when
expressly authorized by the legislature (City of Cincinnati v. Vester, 28l US 439, 74 L.ed. 950, 50 SCt. 360). It is
also true that in delegating the power to expropriate, the legislature may retain certain control or impose certain
restraints on the exercise thereof by the local governments (Joslin Mfg. Co. v. Providence, 262 US 668 67 L. ed.
1167, 43 S Ct. 684). While such delegated power may be a limited authority, it is complete within its limits.
Moreover, the limitations on the exercise of the delegated power must be clearly expressed, either in the law
conferring the power or in other legislations.

Resolution No. 129, Series of 1988, was promulgated pursuant to Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 337, the Local
Government Code, which provides:

A local government unit may, through its head and acting pursuant to a resolution of its
sanggunian exercise the right of eminent domain and institute condemnation proceedings for
public use or purpose.
Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 337 does not intimate in the least that local government, units must first secure the
approval of the Department of Land Reform for the conversion of lands from agricultural to non-agricultural use,
before they can institute the necessary expropriation proceedings. Likewise, there is no provision in the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law which expressly subjects the expropriation of agricultural lands by local
government units to the control of the Department of Agrarian Reform. The closest provision of law that the
Court of Appeals could cite to justify the intervention of the Department of Agrarian Reform in expropriation
matters is Section 65 of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, which reads:

Sec. 65. Conversion of Lands. — After the lapse of five (5) years from its award, when the land
ceases to be economically feasible and sound for, agricultural purposes, or the locality has
become urbanized and the land will have a greater economic value for residential, commercial or
industrial purposes, the DAR, upon application of the beneficiary or the landowner, with due
notice to the affected parties, and subject to existing laws, may authorize the reclassification or
conversion of the land and its disposition: Provided, That the beneficiary shall have fully paid his
obligation.

The opening, adverbial phrase of the provision sends signals that it applies to lands previously placed under the
agrarian reform program as it speaks of "the lapse of five (5) years from its award."

The rules on conversion of agricultural lands found in Section 4 (k) and 5 (1) of Executive Order No. 129-A,
Series of 1987, cannot be the source of the authority of the Department of Agrarian Reform to determine the
suitability of a parcel of agricultural land for the purpose to which it would be devoted by the expropriating
authority. While those rules vest on the Department of Agrarian Reform the exclusive authority to approve or
disapprove conversions of agricultural lands for residential, commercial or industrial uses, such authority is
limited to the applications for reclassification submitted by the land owners or tenant beneficiaries.

Statutes conferring the power of eminent domain to political subdivisions cannot be broadened or constricted by
implication (Schulman v. People, 10 N.Y. 2d. 249, 176 N.E. 2d. 817, 219 NYS 2d. 241).

To sustain the Court of Appeals would mean that the local government units can no longer expropriate
agricultural lands needed for the construction of roads, bridges, schools, hospitals, etc, without first applying for
conversion of the use of the lands with the Department of Agrarian Reform, because all of these projects would
naturally involve a change in the land use. In effect, it would then be the Department of Agrarian Reform to
scrutinize whether the expropriation is for a public purpose or public use.

Ordinarily, it is the legislative branch of the local government unit that shall determine whether the use of the
property sought to be expropriated shall be public, the same being an expression of legislative policy. The courts
defer to such legislative determination and will intervene only when a particular undertaking has no real or
substantial relation to the public use (United States Ex Rel Tennessee Valley Authority v. Welch, 327 US 546, 90
L. ed. 843, 66 S Ct 715; State ex rel Twin City Bldg. and Invest. Co. v. Houghton, 144 Minn. 1, 174 NW 885, 8
ALR 585).

There is also an ancient rule that restrictive statutes, no matter how broad their terms are, do not embrace the
sovereign unless the sovereign is specially mentioned as subject thereto (Alliance of Government Workers v.
Minister of Labor and Employment, 124 SCRA 1 [1983]). The Republic of the Philippines, as sovereign, or its
political subdivisions, as holders of delegated sovereign powers, cannot be bound by provisions of law couched
in general term.

The fears of private respondents that they will be paid on the basis of the valuation declared in the tax
declarations of their property, are unfounded. This Court has declared as unconstitutional the Presidential
Decrees fixing the just compensation in expropriation cases to be the value given to the condemned property
either by the owners or the assessor, whichever was lower ([Export Processing Zone Authority v. Dulay, 149
SCRA 305 [1987]). As held in Municipality of Talisay v. Ramirez, 183 SCRA 528 [1990], the rules for determining
just compensation are those laid down in Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, which allow private respondents to
submit evidence on what they consider shall be the just compensation for their property.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the questioned decision of the Court of Appeals is set aside
insofar as it (a) nullifies the trial court's order allowing the Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of
private respondents' property; (b) orders the trial court to suspend the expropriation proceedings; and (c)
requires the Province of Camarines Sur to obtain the approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform to convert
or reclassify private respondents' property from agricultural to non-agricultural use.

The decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED insofar as it sets aside the order of the trial court, denying
the amended motion to dismiss of the private respondents.

SO ORDERED.

Cruz, Griño-Aquino and Bellosillo, JJ., concur.

d. Fortich vs Corona (G.R. No. 131457, 17 November 1998)

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SPECIAL SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 131457 August 19, 1999

HON. CARLOS O. FORTICH, PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR OF BUKIDNON, HON. REY B. BAULA, MUNICIPAL
MAYOR OF SUMILAO, BUKIDNON, NQSR MANAGEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, petitioners,
vs.
HON. RENATO C. CORONA, DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, HON. ERNESTO D. GARILAO,
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, respondents.

RESOLUTION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This resolves the pending incidents before us, namely, respondents' and intervenors' separate motions for
reconsideration of our Resolution dated November 17, 1998, as well as their motions to refer this case to this
Court En banc.

Respondents and intervenors jointly argue, in fine, that our Resolution dated November 17, 1998, wherein we
voted two-two on the separate motions for reconsideration of our earlier Decision or April 24, 1998, as a result of
which the Decision was deemed affirmed, did not effectively resolve the said motions for reconsideration
inasmuch as the matter should have been referred to the Court sitting en banc, pursuant to Article VIII, Section
4(3) of the Constitution. Respondents and intervenors also assail our Resolution dated January 27, 1999,
wherein we noted without action the intervenors' "Motion For Reconsideration With Motion To Refer The Matter
To The Court En Banc" filed on December 3, 1998, on the following considerations, to wit:

the movants have no legal personality to further seek redress before the Court after their motion for
leave to intervene in this case was denied in the April 24, 1998 Decision. Their subsequent motion for
reconsideration of the said decision, with a prayer to resolve the motion to the Court En Banc, was also
denied in the November 17, 1998 Resolution of the Court. Besides, their aforesaid motion of December
3, 1998 is in the nature of a second motion for reconsideration which is a forbidden motion (Section 2,
Rule 52 in relation to Section 4, Rule 56 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure). The impropriety of
movants' December 3, 1998 motion becomes all the more glaring considering that all the respondents in
this case did not anymore join them (movants) ill seeking a reconsideration of the November 17, 1998
Resolution.1

Subsequently, respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed their "Motion For Reconsideration
Of The Resolution Dated November 17, 1998 And For Referral Of The Case To This Honorable Court En
Banc (With Urgent Prayer For Issuance Of A Restraining Order)" on December 3, 1998, accompanied by a
"Manifestation and Motion"2 and a copy of the Registered Mail Bill3 evidencing filing of the said motion for
reconsideration to this Court by registered mail. 1âwphi1.nêt

In their respective motions for reconsideration, both respondents and intervenors pray that this case be referred
to this Court en banc. They contend that inasmuch as their earlier motions for reconsideration (of the Decision
dated April 24, 1998) were resolved by a vote of two-two, the required number to carry a decision, i.e., three,
was not met. Consequently, the case should be referred to and be decided by this Court en banc, relying on the
following constitutional provision:

Cases or matters heard by a division shall be decided or resolved with the concurrence of a majority of
the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon, and
in no case without the concurrence of at least three of such Members. When the required number is not
obtained, the case shall be decided en banc: Provided, that no doctrine or principle of law laid down by
the Court in a decision rendered en banc or in division may be modified or reversed except by the Court
sitting en banc.4

A careful reading of the above constitutional provision, however, reveals the intention of the framers to draw a
distinction between cases, on the one hand, and matters, on the other hand, such that cases are "decided"
while matters, which include motions, are "resolved". Otherwise put, the word "decided" must refer to "cases";
while the word "resolved" must refer to "matters", applying the rule of reddendo singula singulis. This is true not
only in the interpretation of the above-quoted Article VIII, Section 4(3), but also of the other provisions of the
Constitution where these words appear.5

With the aforesaid rule of construction in mind, it is clear that only cases are referred to the Court en banc for
decision whenever the required number of votes is not obtained. Conversely, the rule does not apply where, as
in this case, the required three votes is not obtained in the resolution of a motion for reconsideration. Hence, the
second sentence of the aforequoted provision speaks only of "case" and not "matter". The reason is simple. The
above-quoted Article VIII, Section 4(3) pertains to the disposition of cases by a division. If there is a tie in the
voting, there is no decision. The only way to dispose of the case then is to refer it to the Court en banc. On the
other hand, if a case has already been decided by the division and the losing party files a motion for
reconsideration, the failure of the division to resolve the motion because of a tie in the voting does not leave the
case undecided. There is still the decision which must stand in view of the failure of the members of the division
to muster the necessary vote for its reconsideration. Quite plainly, if the voting results in a tie, the motion for
reconsideration is lost. The assailed decision is not reconsidered and must therefore be deemed affirmed. Such
was the ruling of this Court in the Resolution of November 17, 1998.

It is the movants' further contention in support of their plea for the referral of this case to the Court en banc that
the issues submitted in their separate motions are of first impression. In the opinion penned by Mr. Justice
Antonio M. Martinez during the resolution of the motions for reconsideration on November 17, 1998, the
following was expressed:

Regrettably, the issues presented before us by the movants are matters of no extraordinary import to
merit the attention of the Court En Banc. Specifically, the issue of whether or not the power of the local
government units to reclassify lands is subject to the approval of the DAR is no longer novel, this having
been decided by this Court in the case of Province of Camarines Sur, et al. vs. Court of Appeals wherein
we held that local government units need not obtain the approval of the DAR to convert or reclassify
lands from agricultural to non-agricultural use. The dispositive portion of the Decision in the aforecited
case states:

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the questioned decision of the Court of Appeals is
set aside insofar as it (a) nullifies the trial court's order allowing the Province of Camarines Sur to
take possession of private respondent's property (b) orders the trial court to suspended the
exportation proceedings; and (c) requires the Province of Camarines Sur to obtain the approval
of the Department of Agrarian Reform to convert or reclassify private respondents' property from
agricultural to non-agricultural use.

xxx xxx x x x(Emphasis supplied)

 Moreover, the Decision sought to be reconsidered was arrived at by a unanimous vote of all five (5)
members of the Second Division of this Court, Stated otherwise, this Second Division is of the opinion
that the matters raised by movants are nothing new and do not deserve the consideration of the Court en
banc. Thus, the participation of the full Court in the resolution of movants' motions for reconsideration
would be inappropriate.6

The contention, therefore, that our Resolution of November 17, 1998 did not dispose of the earlier motions for
reconsideration of the Decision dated April 24, 1998 is flawed. Consequently, the present motions for
reconsideration necessarily partake of the nature of a second motion for reconsideration which, according to the
clear and unambiguous language of Rule 56, Section 4, in relation to Rule 52, Section 2, of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, is prohibited.

True, there are exceptional cases when this Court may entertain a second motion for reconsideration, such as
where there are extraordinarily persuasive reasons. Even then, we have ruled that such second motions for
reconsideration must be filed with express leave of court first obtained.7 In this case, not only did movants fail to
ask for prior leave of court, but more importantly, they have been unable to show that there are exceptional
reasons for us to give due course to their second motions for reconsideration. Stripped of the arguments for
referral of this incident to the Court en banc, the motions subject of this resolution are nothing more but rehashes
of the motions for reconsideration which have been denied in the Resolution of November 17, 1998. To be sure,
the allegations contained therein have already been raised before and passed upon by this Court in the said
Resolution.

The crux of the controversy is the validity of the "Win-Win" Resolution dated November 7, 1997. We maintain
that the same is void and of no legal effect considering that the March 29, 1996 decision of the Office of the
President had already become final and executory even prior to the filing of the motion for reconsideration which
became the basis of the said "Win-Win" Resolution. This ruling, quite understandably, sparked a litany of
protestations on the part of respondents and intervenors including entreaties for a liberal interpretation of the
rules. The sentiment was that notwithstanding its importance and far-reaching effects, the case was disposed of
on a technicality. The situation, however, is not as simple as what the movants purport it to be. While it may be
true that on its face the nullification of the "Win-Win" Resolution was grounded on a procedural rule pertaining to
the reglementary period to appeal or move for reconsideration, the underlying consideration therefor was the
protection of the substantive rights of petitioners. The succinct words of Mr. Justice Artemio V. Panganiban are
quoted in the November 17, 1998 opinion of Mr. Justice Martinez, viz.: "Just as a losing party has the right to file
an appeal within the prescribed period, the winning party also has the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the
resolution of his/her case."8

In other words, the finality of the March 29, 1996 OP Decision accordingly vested appurtenant rights to the land
in dispute on petitioners as well as on the people of Bukidnon and other parts of the country who stand to be
benefited by the development of the property. The issue in this case, therefore, is not a question of technicality
but of substance and merit.9

Before finally disposing of these pending matters, we feel it necessary to rule once and for all on the legal
standing of intervenors in this case. In their present motions, intervenors insist that they are real parties in
interest inasmuch as they have already been issued certificates of land ownership award, or CLOAs, and that
while they are seasonal farmworkers at the plantation, they have been identified by the DAR as qualified
beneficiaries of the property. These arguments are, however, nothing new as in fact they have already been
raised in intervenors' earlier motion for reconsideration of our April 24, 1998 Decision. Again as expressed in the
opinion of Mr. Justice Martinez, intervenors, who are admittedly not regular but seasonal farmworkers, have no
legal or actual and substantive interest over the subject land inasmuch as they have no right to own the land.
Rather, their right is limited only to a just share of the fruits of the land.10 Moreover, the "Win-Win" Resolution
itself states that the qualified beneficiaries have yet to be carefully and meticulously determined by the
Department of Agrarian Reform.11 Absent any definitive finding of the Department of Agrarian Reform,
intervenors cannot as yet be deemed vested with sufficient interest in the controversy as to be qualified to
intervene in this case. Likewise, the issuance of the CLOA's to them does not grant them the requisite standing
in view of the nullity of the "Win-Win" Resolution. No legal rights can emanate from a resolution that is null and
void.

WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, the following incidents, namely: intervenors' "Motion For
Reconsideration With Motion To Refer The Matter To The Court En Banc," dated December 3, 1998;
respondents' "Motion For Reconsideration Of The Resolution Dated November 17, 1998 And For Referral Of
The Case To This Honorable Court En Banc (With Urgent Prayer For Issuance Of A Restraining Order)," dated
December 2, 1998; and intervenors' "Urgent Omnibus Motion For The Supreme Court Sitting En Banc To Annul
The Second Division's Resolution Dated 27 January 1999 And Immediately Resolve The 28 May 1998 Motion
For Reconsideration Filed By The Intervenors," dated March 2, 1999; are all DENIED with FINALITY. No further
motion, pleading, or paper will be entertained in this case.

SO ORDERED.

Melo, J., please see separate opinion.

Puno, J., in the result. I maintain my original position that the case should go to CA for further proceedings.
Mendoza, J., in the result.

Separate Opinions

MELO, J., separate opinion;

On the merits, I still maintain my vote with Mr. Justice Puno that this case should be referred to the Court of
Appeals for further proceedings.

Since what is now before us is a second motion for reconsideration, which under the rules is generally
proscribed, the majority deemed it pertinent to limit its resolution in regard to cogent procedural points.

At the outset, I wish to point out that inasmuch as I am bound to abide by the Court En Banc's Resolution No.
99-109-SC dated January 2, 1999, which settled the issue of an even (2-2) vote in a division, I am constrained to
vote with the majority in denying all of the subject motions in the above-captioned case. Nevertheless, I wish to
express my views on this issue and put them or record, so, in the event that the Court decides to open and re-
discuss this issue at some future time, these consideration may be referred to.

I continue to have some reservations regarding majority's position regarding an even (2-2) vote in a division, due
to the following considerations:

By mandate of the Constitution, cases heard by a division when the required majority of at least 3 votes in the
division is not obtained are to be heard and decided by the Court En Banc. Specifically, Paragraph 3, Section 4,
Article VIII of the Constitution provides that:

xxx xxx xxx

(3) Cases or matters heard by a division shall e decided or resolved with the concurrence of a majority of the
members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon, and in no case,
without the concurrence of at least three of such members. When the required number is not obtained, the case
shall be decided en banc: provided, that no doctrine or principle of law laid down by the court in a decision
rendered en banc or in division may be modified or reversed by the court sitting en banc.

The deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission disclose that if the case is not decided in a division by
a majority vote, it goes to the Court En Banc and not to a longer division. Moreover, the elevation of a case to
the Banc shall be automatic. Thus,

MR. RODRIGO: Madam President, may I ask some questions for clarification.

MR. PRESIDENT: Commissioner Rodrigo is recognized.

MR. RODRIGO: Under these provisions, there are 3 kinds of divisions: one would be a division
composed of 3 justices in which case there will be 5 divisions; another division is composed of 5 justices
 each, in which case there will be 3 divisions; and the other is composed of 7 members each, in which
case, there will be 2 divisions.

Let us take the smallest division of 3 and the vote is 2-1. So, it is less than 3 votes. Should it immediately
go to the court en banc of 15 justices or should it first go to a bigger division?

MR. CONCEPCION: Yes.

MR. RODRIGO: They immediately go to the court en banc?

MR. SUAREZ: Yes, Madam President.

MR. RODRIGO: Is that automatic? Let us say that in the division of 3, the vote is 2-1, automatically it
goes to the court en banc?

MR. SUAREZ: Yes, because the required number of 3 is not obtained. So, this last phrase would
operate automatically — "WHEN THE REQUIRED NUMBER IS NOT OBTAINED, THE CASE SHALL
BE DECIDED EN BANC."

xxx xxx xxx

(V Record 635, Oct. 8, 1986)

Explicit, therefore, is the requirement that at least 3 members must concur in any case or matter heard by a
division. Failing thus, or, when the required number of 3 votes is not obtained, the case or matter will have to be
decided by the Court En Banc.

In a situation where a division of 5 has only 4 members, the 5th member having inhibited himself or is otherwise
not in a position to participate, or has retired, a minimum of 3 votes would still be required before there can be
any valid decision or resolution by that division. There may, then, be instances when a deadlock may occur, i.e.,
the votes tied at 2-2. It is my humble view that under the clear and unequivocal provisions of the 1986
Constitution, if the required majority is not reached in a division, the case should automatically got to the Court
En Banc.

A distinction has been made between "cases" and "matters" referred to in the above-quoted constitutional
provision. "Cases" being decided, and "matters" being resolved. Only "cases" are referred to the Court En
Banc for decision whenever the required number of votes is not obtained Matters" are not referred anymore.

I regret I cannot square with such position.

The majority view is that "cases" would only refer to deliberations at first instance on the merits of a case filed
with the Court, and other deliberations, such as motions, including motions of reconsideration, are "matters" to
be resolved. To give flesh to this distinction, it is cited that if a tie occurs in the voting on motions for
reconsideration, the decision which already been passed stands.

This is not true all the time. It may be true only in original cases, as opposed to appealed cases, filed with the
Court. However, because of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts, to only original cases which are taken cognizable
of by this Court are those wherein it has exclusive jurisdiction. But, invariably, these cases are all required by the
Constitution to be heard by the Court En Banc. so, there will be no instance when a division will be ever taking
cognizance of an original actions filed with this Court.

It may be noted that cases taken cognizable of by the divisions are either petitions for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 or petitions for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus, under Rule 65. Under Rule 45, appeal by way of
petition for review on certiorari is not a matter of right. Thus, should there be a tie in the voting on deliberation of
a "case" by the division, although apparently no action is passed, a decision may still be rendered — the petition
is thereby DENIED due course, and it is forthwith DISMISSED. This is definitely in consonance with the
majority's line of reasoning in the 2-2 vote on motions for reconsideration. But why is it that, the 2-2 vote in the
deliberation of the "case" at the first instance should still be referred to the Court En Banc? The reason is simple.
Because the express provision of the Constitution requires a vote of at least three justices for there to be a valid
and binding decision of the Court. But, why do we not apply the same rule to motions for reconsideration? Even
on this score alone, it is my view that, in all instances, whether it be in the deliberations of a case at first instance
or on a motion for reconsideration, a division having a 2-2 vote cannot pass action. 1âwphi1.nêt

I submit that the requirement of 3 votes equally applies to motions for reconsideration because the provision
contemplates "cases" or "matters" (which for me has no material distinction insofar as divisions are concerned)
heard by a division, and a motion for reconsideration cannot be divorced from the decision in a case that it seeks
to be reconsidered. Consequently, if the required minimum majority of 3 votes is not met, the matter of the
motion for reconsideration has to be heard by the Court En Banc, as mandated by the Constitution (par. 3, Sec.
4, Art. VIII). To say that the motion is lost in the division on 2-2 vote, is to construe something which cannot be
sustained by a reading of the Constitution. To argue that a motion for reconsideration is not a "case" but only a
"matter" which does not concern a case, so that, even through the vote thereon in the division is 2-2, the matter
or issue is not required to elevated to the Court En Banc, is to engage in a lot of unfounded hairsplitting.

Furthermore, I humbly submit that the theory of leaving the issue hanging on a 2-2 vote or any even vote may be
sustained only in cases where there is no recourse to a higher assemblage.

In the Court of Appeals, for instance, an even vote in a division of 5 (2-2, with 1 abstaining) would result in the
motion not being carried, but only because there is and there cannot be recourse to the Court of Appeals En
Bancwhich, does not act on judicial matters. In a legislative body, an even vote results in the failure of the
proposition, only because there is no higher body which can take over. In our own Court En Banc, if there voting
is evenly split, on a 7-7 vote with 1 slot vacant, or with 1 justice inhibiting or disqualifying himself, the motion
shall, of course, not be carried because that is the end of the line.

But in the situation now facing us, the even vote is in a division, and there being recourse to the Court En Banc,
and more so, this being expressly directed by the Constitution, the matter of the motion for reconsideration
should, by all means, be decided by the Court En Banc.

Footnotes

1 Rollo, p. 1310. References to the Rollo pages are omitted.

2 Rollo, p. 1313.

3 Rollo, p. 1319.

4 Art. VIII, Section 4 (3).

5 See Article VIII, Section 15; Article XVIII, Section 12 to 14.

6 Rollo, pp. 1243-1244: emphasis omitted.

7 Ortigas and Company Ltd. Partnership v. Judge Tirso Velasco, et al., 254 SCRA 234 (1996).

8 Videogram Regulatory Board v. Court of Appeals, 265 SCRA 50, 56 (1996).

9 Opinion of Justice Martinez, November 17, 1998, p. 10.

Ibid., pp. 12-13, citing the Constitution, Article XIII, Section 4, and Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, The 1987
10

Philippine Constitution: A Reviewer-Primer, Third Edition (1997), p. 441.

 11 Ibid., p. 13.

e. The Hon. Carlos Fortich et. al. vs. The Hon. Renato Corona
GR. No. 131457, April 24, 1998 (MR Case)

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Baguio City

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 131457 April 24, 1998

HON. CARLOS O. FORTICH, PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR OF BUKIDNON, HON. REY B. BAULA, MUNICIPAL
MAYOR OF SUMILAO, BUKIDNON, NQSR MANAGEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, petitioners,
vs.
HON. RENATO C. CORONA, DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, HON. ERNESTO D. GARILAO,
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, respondents.

MARTINEZ, J.:

The dramatic and well-publicized hunger strike staged by some alleged farmer-beneficiaries in front of the
Department of Agrarian Reform compound in Quezon City on October 9, 1997 commanded nationwide attention
that even church leaders and some presidential candidates tried to intervene for the strikers' "cause."

The strikers protested the March 29, 1996 Decision 1 of the Office of the President (OP), issued through then
Executive Secretary Ruben D. Torres in OP Case No. 96-C-6424, which approved the conversion of a one
hundred forty-four (144)-hectare land from agricultural to agro-industrial/institutional area. This led the Office of
the President, through then Deputy Executive Secretary Renato C. Corona, to issue the so-called "Win-Win"
Resolution 2 on November 7, 1997, substantially modifying its earlier Decision after it had already become final
and executory. The said Resolution modified the approval of the land conversion to agro-industrial area only to
the extent of forty-four (44) hectares, and ordered the remaining one hundred (100) hectares to be distributed to
qualified farmer-beneficiaries.

But, did the "Win-Win" Resolution culminate in victory for all the contending parties?

The above-named petitioners cried foul. They have come to this Court urging us to annul and set aside the "Win-
Win" Resolution and to enjoin respondent Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao of the Department of Agrarian Reform
from implementing the said Resolution.

Thus, the crucial issue to be resolved in this case is: What is the legal effect of the "Win-Win" Resolution issued
by the Office of the President on its earlier Decision involving the same subject matter, which had already
become final and executory?

The antecedent facts of this controversy, as culled from the pleadings, may be stated as follows:

1. This case involves a 144-hectare land located at San Vicente, Sumilao, Bukidnon, owned by the Norberto
Quisumbing, Sr. Management and Development Corporation (NQSRMDC), one of the petitioners. The property
is covered by a Transfer Certificate of Title No. 143713 of the Registry of Deeds of the Province of Bukidnon.
2. In 1984, the land was leased as a pineapple plantation to the Philippine Packing Corporation, now Del Monte
Philippines, Inc. (DMPI), a multinational corporation, for a period of ten (10) years under the Crop Producer and
Grower's Agreement duly annotated in the certificate of title. The lease expired in April, 1994.

3. In October, 1991, during the existence of the lease, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) placed the
entire 144-hectare property under compulsory acquisition and assessed the land value at P2.38 million.4

4. NQSRMDC resisted the DAR's action. In February, 1992, it sought and was granted by the DAR Adjudication
Board (DARAB), through its Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) in DARAB Case No. X-576, a writ
of prohibition with preliminary injunction which ordered the DAR Region X Director, the Provincial Agrarian
Reform Officer (PARO) of Bukidnon, the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office (MARO) of Sumilao, Bukidnon, the
Land Bank of the Philippines (Land Bank), and their authorized representatives "to desist from pursuing any
activity or activities" concerning the subject land "until further orders."5

5. Despite the DARAB order of March 31, 1992, the DAR Regional Director issued a memorandum, dated May
21, 1992, directing the Land Bank to open a trust account for P2.38 million in the name of NQSRMDC and to
conduct summary proceedings to determine the just compensation of the subject property. NQSRMDC objected
to these moves and filed on June 9, 1992 an Omnibus Motion to enforce the DARAB order of March 31, 1992
and to nullify the summary proceedings undertaken by the DAR Regional Director and Land Bank on the
valuation of the subject property.

6. The DARAB, on October 22, 1992, acted favorably on the Omnibus Motion by (a) ordering the DAR Regional
Director and Land Bank "to seriously comply with the terms of the order dated March 31, 1992;" (b) nullifying the
DAR Regional Director's memorandum, dated May 21, 1992, and the summary proceedings conducted pursuant
thereto; and (c) directing the Land Bank "to return the claim folder of Petitioner NQSRMDC's subject Property to
the DAR until further orders."6

7. The Land Bank complied with the DARAB order and cancelled the trust account it opened in the name of
petitioner NQSRMDC. 7

8. In the meantime, the Provincial Development Council (PDC) of Bukidnon, headed by Governor Carlos O.
Fortich, passed Resolution No. 6,8 dated January 7, 1993, designating certain areas along Bukidnon-Sayre
Highway as part of the Bukidnon Agro-Industrial Zones where the subject property is situated.

9. What happened thereafter is well-narrated in the OP (TORRES) Decision of March 29, 1996, pertinent
portions of which we quote:

Pursuant to Section 20 of R.A. No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code, the
Sangguniang Bayan of Sumilao, Bukidnon, on March 4, 1993, enacted Ordinance No. 24
converting or re-classifying 144 hectares of land in Bgy. San Vicente, said Municipality, from
agricultural to industrial/institutional with a view of providing an opportunity to attract investors
who can inject new economic vitality, provide more jobs and raise the income of its people.

Parenthetically, under said section, 4th to 5th class municipalities may authorize the classification
of five percent (5%) of their agricultural land area and provide for the manner of their utilization or
disposition.

On 12 October 1993, the Bukidnon Provincial Land Use Committee approved the said
Ordinance. Accordingly, on 11 December 1993, the instant application for conversion was filed
by Mr. Gaudencio Beduya in behalf of NQSRMDC/BAIDA (Bukidnon Agro-Industrial
Development Association).

Expressing support for the proposed project, the Bukidnon Provincial Board, on the basis of a
Joint Committee Report submitted by its Committee on Laws, Committee on Agrarian Reform
and Socio-Economic Committee approved, on 1 February 1994, the said Ordinance now
docketed as Resolution No. 94-95. The said industrial area, as conceived by NQSRMDC (project
proponent) is supposed to have the following components:
1. Development Academy of Mindanao which constitutes following: Institute for Continuing
Higher Education; Institute for Livelihood Science (Vocational and Technical School); Institute for
Agribusiness Research; Museum, Library, Cultural Center, and Mindanao Sports Development
Complex which covers an area of 24 hectares;

2. Bukidnon Agro-Industrial Park which consists of corn processing for corn oil, corn starch,
various corn products; rice processing for wine, rice-based snacks, exportable rice; cassava
processing for starch, alcohol and food delicacies; processing plants, fruits and fruit products
such as juices; processing plants for vegetables processed and prepared for market; cold
storage and ice plant; cannery system; commercial stores; public market; and abattoir needing
about 67 hectares;

3. Forest development which includes open spaces and parks for recreation, horse-back riding,
memorial and mini-zoo estimated to cover 33 hectares; and

4. Support facilities which comprise the construction of a 360-room hotel, restaurants, dormitories
and a housing project covering an area of 20 hectares.

The said NQSRMDC Proposal was, per Certification dated January 4, 1995, adopted by the
Department of Trade and Industry, Bukidnon Provincial Office, as one of its flagship projects. The
same was likewise favorably recommended by the Provincial Development Council of Bukidnon;
the municipal, provincial and regional office of the DAR; the Regional Office (Region X) of the
DENR (which issued an Environmental Compliance Certificate on June 5, 1995); the Executive
Director, signing "By Authority of PAUL G. DOMINGUEZ," Office of the President — Mindanao;
the Secretary of DILG; and Undersecretary of DECS Wilfredo D. Clemente.

In the same vein, the National Irrigation Administration, Provincial Irrigation Office, Bagontaas
Valencia, Bukidnon, thru Mr. Julius S. Maquiling, Chief, Provincial Irrigation Office, interposed
NO. OBJECTION to the proposed conversion "as long as the development cost of the irrigation
systems thereat which is P2,377.00 per hectare be replenished by the developer . . . ." Also, the
Kisolon-San Vicente Irrigators Multi Purpose Cooperative, San Vicente, Sumilao, Bukidnon,
interposed no objection to the proposed conversion of the land in question "as it will provide
more economic benefits to the community in terms of outside investments that will come and
employment opportunities that will be generated by the projects to be put up . . . .

On the same score, it is represented that during the public consultation held at the Kisolan
Elementary School on 18 March 1995 with Director Jose Macalindong of DAR Central Office and
DECS Undersecretary Clemente, the people of the affected barangay rallied behind their
respective officials in endorsing the project.

Notwithstanding the foregoing favorable recommendation, however, on November 14, 1994, the
DAR, thru Secretary Garilao, invoking its powers to approve conversion of lands under Section
65 of R.A. No. 6657, issued an Order denying the instant application for the conversion of the
subject land from agricultural to agro-industrial and, instead, placed the same under the
compulsory coverage of CARP and directed the distribution thereof to all qualified beneficiaries
on the following grounds:

1. The area is considered as a prime agricultural land with irrigation facility;

2. The land has long been covered by a Notice of Compulsory Acquisition (NCA);

3. The existing policy on withdrawal or lifting on areas covered by NCA is not applicable;

4. There is no clear and tangible compensation package arrangements for the beneficiaries;

5. The procedures on how the area was identified and reclassified for agro-industrial project has
no reference to Memo Circular No. 54, Series of 1993, E.O. No. 72, Series of 1993, and E.O. No.
124, Series of 1993.
 A Motion for Reconsideration of the aforesaid Order was filed on January 9, 1995 by applicant
but the same was denied (in an Order dated June 7, 1995). 9

10. Thus, the DAR Secretary ordered the DAR Regional Director "to proceed with the compulsory acquisition
and distribution of the property." 10

11. Governor Carlos O. Fortich of Bukidnon appealed" the order of denial to the Office of the President and
prayed for the conversion/reclassification of the subject land as the same would be more beneficial to the people
of Bukidnon.

12. To prevent the enforcement of the DAR Secretary's order, NQSRMDC, on June 29, 1995, filed with the Court
of Appeals a petition for certiorari, prohibition with preliminary injunction, 12 docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 37614.

13. Meanwhile, on July 25, 1995, the Honorable Paul G. Dominguez, then Presidential Assistant for Mindanao,
after conducting an evaluation of the proposed project, sent a memorandum 13 to the President favorably
endorsing the project with a recommendation that the DAR Secretary reconsider his decision in denying the
application of the province for the conversion of the land.

14. Also, in a memorandum 14 to the President dated August 23, 1995, the Honorable Rafael Alunan III, then
Secretary of the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG), recommended the conversion of the
subject land to industrial/institutional use with a request that the President "hold the implementation of the DAR
order to distribute the land in question."

15. On October 23, 1995, the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. SP No. 37614, issued a Resolution 15 ordering the
parties to observe status quo pending resolution of the petition. At the hearing held in said case on October 5,
1995, the DAR, through the Solicitor General, manifested before the said court that the DAR was merely "in the
processing stage of the applications of farmers-claimants" and has agreed to respect status quo pending the
resolution of the petition. 16

16. In resolving the appeal, the Office of the President, through then Executive Secretary Ruben D. Torres,
issued a Decision in OP Case No. 96-C-6424, dated March 29, 1996, reversing the DAR Secretary's decision,
the pertinent portions of which read:

After a careful evaluation of the petition vis-a-vis the grounds upon which the denial thereof by
Secretary Garilao was based, we find that the instant application for conversion by the
Municipality of Sumilao, Bukidnon is impressed with merit. To be sure, converting the land in
question from agricultural to agro-industrial would open great opportunities for employment and
bring about real development in the area towards a sustained economic growth of the
municipality. On the other hand, distributing the land to would-be beneficiaries (who are not even
tenants, as there are none) does not guarantee such benefits.

Nevertheless, on the issue that the land is considered a prime agricultural land with irrigation
facility it maybe appropriate to mention that, as claimed by petitioner, while it is true that there is,
indeed, an irrigation facility in the area, the same merely passes thru the property (as a right of
way) to provide water to the ricelands located on the lower portion thereof. The land itself,
subject of the instant petition, is not irrigated as the same was, for several years, planted with
pineapple by the Philippine Packing Corporation.

On the issue that the land has long been covered by a Notice of Compulsory Acquisition (NCA)
and that the existing policy on withdrawal or lifting on areas covered by NCA is not applicable,
suffice it to state that the said NCA was declared null and void by the Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) as early as March 1, 1992. Deciding in favor of NQSRMDC,
the DARAB correctly pointed out that under Section 8 of R.A. No. 6657, the subject property
could not validly be the subject of compulsory acquisition until after the expiration of the lease
contract with Del Monte Philippines, a Multi-National Company, or until April 1994, and ordered
the DAR Regional Office and the Land Bank of the Philippines, both in Butuan City, to "desist
from pursuing any activity or activities covering petitioner's land.
 On this score, we take special notice of the fact that the Quisumbing family has already
contributed substantially to the land reform program of the government, as follows: 300 hectares
of rice land in Nueva Ecija in the 70's and another 400 hectares in the nearby Municipality of
Impasugong, Bukidnon, ten(10) years ago, for which they have not received "just compensation"
up to this time.

Neither can the assertion that "there is no clear and tangible compensation package
arrangements for the beneficiaries' hold water as, in the first place, there are no beneficiaries to
speak about, for the land is not tenanted as already stated.

Nor can procedural lapses in the manner of identifying/reclassifying the subject property for agro-
industrial purposes be allowed to defeat the very purpose of the law granting autonomy to local
government units in the management of their local affairs. Stated more simply, the language of
Section 20 of R.A. No. 7160, supra, is clear and affords no room for any other interpretation. By
unequivocal legal mandate, it grants local government units autonomy in their local affairs
including the power to convert portions of their agricultural lands and provide for the manner of
their utilization and disposition to enable them to attain their fullest development as self-reliant
communities.

WHEREFORE, in pursuance of the spirit and intent of the said legal mandate and in view of the
favorable recommendations of the various government agencies abovementioned, the subject
Order, dated November 14, 1994 of the Hon. Secretary, Department of Agrarian Reform, is
hereby SET ASIDE and the instant application of NQSRMDC/BAIDA is hereby APPROVED. 17

17. On May 20, 1996, DAR filed a motion for reconsideration of the OP decision.

18. On September 11, 1996, in compliance with the OP decision of March 29, 1996, NQSRMDC and the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) executed a Memorandum of Agreement whereby the
former donated four (4) hectares from the subject land to DECS for the establishment of the NQSR High
School. 18

When NQSRMDC was about to transfer the title over the 4-hectare donated to DECS, it discovered that the title
over the subject property was no longer in its name. It soon found out that during the pendency of both the
Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, with Preliminary Injunction it filed against DAR in the Court of Appeals and the
appeal to the President filed by Governor Carlos O. Fortich, the DAR, without giving just compensation, caused
the cancellation of NQSRMDC's title on August 11, 1995 and had it transferred in the name of the Republic of
the Philippines under TCT No. T-50264 19 of the Registry of Deeds of Bukidnon. Thereafter, on September 25,
1995, DAR caused the issuance of Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) No. 00240227 and had it
registered in the name of 137 farmer-beneficiaries under TCT No. AT-3536 20 of the Registry of Deeds of
Bukidnon.

19. Thus, on April 10, 1997, NQSRMDC filed a complaint 21 with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malaybalay,
Bukidnon (Branch 9), docketed as Civil Case No. 2687-97, for annulment and cancellation of title, damages and
injunction against DAR and 141 others. The RTC then issued a Temporary Restraining Order on April 30,
1997 22and a Writ of Preliminary Injunction on May 19, 1997, 23 restraining the DAR and 141 others from entering,
occupying and/or wresting from NQSRMDC the possession of the subject land.

20. Meanwhile, on June 23, 1997, an Order 24 was issued by then Executive Secretary Ruben D. Torres denying
DAR's motion for reconsideration for having been filed beyond the reglementary period of fifteen (15) days. The
said order further declared that the March 29, 1996 OP decision had already become final and executory.

21. The DAR filed on July 11, 1997 a second motion for reconsideration of the June 23, 1997 Order of the
President.

22. On August 12, 1997, the said writ of preliminary injunction issued by the RTC was challenged by some
alleged farmers before the Court of Appeals through a petition for certiorari and prohibition, docketed as CA-
G.R. SP No. 44905, praying for the lifting of the injunction and for the issuance of a writ of prohibition from
further trying the RTC case.
23. On October 9, 1997, some alleged farmer-beneficiaries began their hunger strike in front of the DAR
Compound in Quezon City to protest the OP Decision of March 29, 1996. On October 10, 1997, some persons
claiming to be farmer-beneficiaries of the NQSRMDC property filed a motion for intervention (styled as
Memorandum In Intervention) in O.P. Case No. 96-C-6424, asking that the OP Decision allowing the conversion
of the entire 144-hectare property be set aside. 25

24. President Fidel V. Ramos then held a dialogue with the strikers and promised to resolve their grievance
within the framework of the law. He created an eight (8)-man Fact Finding Task Force (FFTF) chaired by
Agriculture Secretary Salvador Escudero to look into the controversy and recommend possible solutions to the
problem. 26

25. On November 7, 1997, the Office of the President resolved the strikers' protest by issuing the so-called
"Win/Win" Resolution penned by then Deputy Executive Secretary Renato C. Corona, the dispositive portion of
which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Office of the President, through
Executive Secretary Ruben Torres, dated March 29, 1996, is hereby MODIFIED as follows:

1. NQSRMDC's application for conversion is APPROVED only with respect to the approximately
forty-four (44) hectare portion of the land adjacent to the highway, as recommended by the
Department of Agriculture.

2. The remaining approximately one hundred (100) hectares traversed by an irrigation canal and
found to be suitable for agriculture shall be distributed to qualified farmer-beneficiaries in
accordance with RA 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law with a right of way to said
portion from the highway provided in the portion fronting the highway. For this purpose, the DAR
and other concerned government agencies are directed to immediately conduct the segregation
survey of the area, valuation of the property and generation of titles in the name of the identified
farmer-beneficiaries.

3. The Department of Agrarian Reform is hereby directed to carefully and meticulously determine
who among the claimants are qualified farmer-beneficiaries.

4. The Department of Agrarian Reform is hereby further directed to expedite payment of just
compensation to NQSRMDC for the portion of the land to be covered by the CARP, including
other lands previously surrendered by NQSRMDC for CARP coverage.

5. The Philippine National Police is hereby directed to render full assistance to the Department of
Agrarian Reform in the implementation of this Order.

We take note of the Memorandum in Intervention filed by 113 farmers on October 10, 1997
without ruling on the propriety or merits thereof since it is unnecessary to pass upon it at this
time.

SO ORDERED. 27

A copy of the "Win-Win" Resolution was received by Governor Carlos O. Fortich of Bukidnon, Mayor Rey B.
Baula of Sumilao, Bukidnon, and NQSRMDC on November 24, 1997 28 and, on December 4, 1997, they filed the
present petition for certiorari, prohibition (under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court) and injunction with urgent
prayer for a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction (under Rule 58, ibid.), against then
Deputy Executive Secretary Renato C. Corona and DAR Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao.

On December 12, 1997, a Motion For Leave To Intervene 29 was filed by alleged farmer-beneficiaries, through
counsel, claiming that they are real parties in interest as they were "previously identified by respondent DAR as
agrarian reform beneficiaries on the 144-hectare" property subject of this case. The motion was vehemently
opposed 30 by the petitioners.
In seeking the nullification of the "Win-Win" Resolution, the petitioners claim that the Office of the President was
prompted to issue the said resolution "after a very well-managed hunger strike led by fake farmer-beneficiary
Linda Ligmon succeeded in pressuring and/or politically blackmailing the Office of the President to come up with
this purely political decision to appease the 'farmers,' by reviving and modifying the Decision of 29 March
1996 which has been declared final and executory in an Order of 23 June 1997. . . ."31 Thus, petitioners further
allege, respondent then Deputy Executive Secretary Renato C. Corona "committed grave abuse of discretion
and acted beyond his jurisdiction when he issued the questioned Resolution of 7 November 1997. . . ." 32 They
availed of this extraordinary writ of certiorari "because there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law."33 They never filed a motion for reconsideration of the subject Resolution "because (it)
is patently illegal or contrary to law and it would be a futile exercise to seek a reconsideration. . . ." 34

The respondents, through the Solicitor General, opposed the petition and prayed that it be dismissed outright on
the following grounds:

(1) The proper remedy of petitioners should have been to file a petition for review directly with the Court of
Appeals in accordance with Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Court;

(2) The petitioners failed to file a motion for reconsideration of the assailed "Win-Win" Resolution before filing the
present petition; and

(3) Petitioner NQSRMDC is guilty of forum-shopping.

These are the preliminary issues which must first be resolved, including the incident on the motion for
intervention filed by the alleged farmer-beneficiaries.

Anent the first issue, in order to determine whether the recourse of petitioners is proper or not, it is necessary to
draw a line between an error of judgment and an error of jurisdiction. An error of judgment is one which the court
may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction, and which error is reviewable only by an appeal. 35 On the other
hand, an error of jurisdiction is one where the act complained of was issued by the court, officer or a quasi-
judicial body without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion which is tantamount to lack or
in excess of jurisdiction. 36 This error is correctable only by the extraordinary writ of certiorari. 37

It is true that under Rule 43, appeals from awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions of any quasi-judicial
agency exercising quasi-judicial functions, 38 including the Office of the President, 39 may be taken to the Court of
Appeals by filing a verified petition for review 40 within fifteen (15) days from notice of the said judgment, final
order or resolution, 41 whether the appeal involves questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law. 42

However, we hold that, in this particular case, the remedy prescribed in Rule 43 is inapplicable considering that
the present petition contains an allegation that the challenged resolution is "patently illegal" 43 and was issued
with "grave abuse of discretion" and "beyond his (respondent Secretary Renato C. Corona's) jurisdiction" 44 when
said resolution substantially modified the earlier OP Decision of March 29, 1996 which had long become final
and executory. In other words, the crucial issue raised here involves an error of jurisdiction, not an error of
judgment which is reviewable by an appeal under Rule 43. Thus, the appropriate remedy to annul and set aside
the assailed resolution is an original special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65, as what the petitioners have
correctly done. The pertinent portion of Section 1 thereof provides:

Sec. 1. Petition for certiorari. — When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-
judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file
a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment
be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and
granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.

xxx xxx xxx

The office of a writ of certiorari is restricted to truly extraordinary cases — cases in which the act of the
lower court or quasi-judicial body is wholly void. 45
The aforequoted Section 1 of Rule 65 mandates that the person aggrieved by the assailed illegal act "may file a
verified petition (for certiorari) in the proper court." The proper court where the petition must be filed is stated in
Section 4 of the same Rule 65 which reads:

Sec. 4. Where petition filed. — The petition may be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice
of the judgment, order or resolution sought to be assailed in the Supreme Court or, if it relates to
the acts or omissions of a lower court or of a corporation, board, officer or person, in the
Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme
Court. It may also be filed in the Court of Appeals whether or not the same is in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction, or in the Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of its jurisdiction. If it involves the acts
or omissions of a quasi-judicial agency, and unless otherwise provided by law or these Rules, the
petition shall be filed in and cognizable only by the Court of Appeals. (4a)

Under the above-qouted Section 4, the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and Regional Trial Court have original
concurrent jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, 46 prohibition 47 and mandamus. 48 But the jurisdiction of these
three (3) courts are also delineated in that, if the challenged act relates to acts or omissions of a lower court or of
a corporation, board, officer or person, the petition must be filed with the Regional Trial Court which exercises
jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. And if it involves the act or omission of a
quasi-judicial agency, the petition shall be filed only with the Court of Appeals, unless otherwise provided by law
or the Rules of Court. We have clearly discussed this matter of concurrence of jurisdiction in People
vs. Cuaresma, et. al.,49 through now Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa, thus:

. . . . This Court's original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari (as well as

prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction) is not exclusive. It is shared
by this Court with Regional Trial Courts (formerly Courts of First Instance), which may issue the
writ, enforceable in any part of their respective regions. It is also shared by this Court, and by the
Regional Trial Court, with the Court of Appeals (formerly, Intermediate Appellate Court), although
prior to the effectivity of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 on August 14, 1981, the latter's
competence to issue the extraordinary writs was restricted to those "in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction." This concurrence of jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken as according to parties
seeking any of the writs an absolute, unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which
application therefor will be directed. There is after all a hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is
determinative of the venue of appeals, and should also serve as a general determinant of the
appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs. A becoming regard for that judicial
hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against
first level ("inferior") courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those against the
latter, with the Court of Appeals. (Citations omitted)

But the Supreme Court has the full discretionary power to take cognizance of the petition filed directly to it if
compelling reasons, or the nature and importance of the issues raised, warrant. This has been the judicial policy
to be observed and which has been reiterated in subsequent cases, namely: 50 Uy vs. Contreras, et. al., 51 Torres
vs. Arranz, 52 Bercero vs. De Guzman, 53 and Advincula vs. Legaspi, et. al. 54 As we have further stated in
Cuaresma:

. . . . A direct invocation of the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be
allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set
out in the petition. This is established policy. It is a policy that is necessary to prevent inordinate
demands upon the Court's time and attention which are better devoted to those matters within its
exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-crowding of the Court's docket.

Pursuant to said judicial policy, we resolve to take primary jurisdiction over the present petition in the interest of
speedy justice 55 and to avoid future litigations so as to promptly put an end to the present controversy which, as
correctly observed by petitioners, has sparked national interest because of the magnitude of the problem created
by the issuance of the assailed resolution. Moreover, as will be discussed later, we find the assailed resolution
wholly void and requiring the petitioners to file their petition first with the Court of Appeals would only result in a
waste of time and money.

That the Court has the power to set aside its own rules in the higher interests of justice is well-entrenched, in our
jurisprudence. We reiterate what we said in Piczon vs. Court of Appeals: 56
 Be it remembered that rules of procedure are but mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment
of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to
frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must always be avoided. Time and again, this
Court has suspended its own rules and excepted a particular case from their operation whenever
the higher interests of justice so require. In the instant petition, we forego a lengthy disquisition of
the proper procedure that should have been taken by the parties involved and proceed directly to
the merits of the case.

As to the second issue of whether the petitioners committed a fatal procedural lapse when they failed to file a
motion for reconsideration of the assailed resolution before seeking judicial recourse, suffice it to state that the
said motion is not necessary when the questioned resolution is a patent nullity, 57 as will be taken up later.

With respect to the third issue, the respondents claim that the filing by the petitioners of: (a) a petition
for certiorari, prohibition with preliminary injunction (CA-G.R. SP No. 37614) with the Court of Appeals; (b) a
complaint for annulment and cancellation of title, damages and injunction against DAR and 141 others (Civil
Case No. 2687-97) with the Regional Trial Court of Malaybalay, Bukidnon; and (c) the present petition, constitute
forum shopping.

We disagree.

The rule is that:

There is forum-shopping whenever, as a result of an adverse opinion in one forum, a party seeks
a favorable opinion (other than by appeal or certiorari) in another. The principle applies not only
with respect to suits filed in the courts but also in connection with litigation commenced in the
courts while an administrative proceeding is pending, as in this case, in order to defeat
administrative processes and in anticipation of an unfavorable administrative ruling and a
favorable court ruling. This specially so, as in this case, where the court in which the second suit
was brought, has no jurisdiction (citations omitted).

The test for determining whether a party violated the rule against forum shopping has been laid
down in the 1986 case of Buan vs. Lopez (145 SCRA 34), . . . and that is, forum shopping exists
where the elements of litis pendentia are present or where a final judgment in one case will
amount to res judicatain the other, as follows:

There thus exists between the action before this Court and RTC Case No. 86-
36563 identity of parties, or at least such parties as represent the same interests
in both actions, as well as identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the
relief being founded on the same facts, and the identity on the two preceding
particulars is such that any judgment rendered in the other action, will, regardless
of which party is successful, amount to res adjudicata in the action under
consideration: all the requisites, in fine, of auter action pendant. 58

It is clear from the above-quoted rule that the petitioners are not guilty of forum shopping. The test for
determining whether a party has violated the rule against forum shopping is where a final judgment in one case
will amount to res adjudicata in the action under consideration. A cursory examination of the cases filed by the
petitioners does not show that the said cases are similar with each other. The petition for certiorari in the Court
of Appeals sought the nullification of the DAR Secretary's order to proceed with the compulsory acquisition and
distribution of the subject property. On the other hand, the civil case in RTC of Malaybalay, Bukidnon for the
annulment and cancellation of title issued in the name of the Republic of the Philippines, with damages, was
based on the following grounds: (1) the DAR, in applying for cancellation of petitioner NQSRMDC's title, used
documents which were earlier declared null and void by the DARAB; (2) the cancellation of NQSRMDC's title
was made without payment of just compensation; and (3) without notice to NQSRMDC for the surrender of its
title. The present petition is entirely different from the said two cases as it seeks the nullification of the assailed
"Win-Win" Resolution of the Office of the President dated November 7, 1997, which resolution was issued long
after the previous two cases were instituted.

The fourth and final preliminary issue to be resolved is the motion for intervention filed by alleged farmer-
beneficiaries, which we have to deny for lack of merit. In their motion, movants contend that they are the farmer-
beneficiaries of the land in question, hence, are real parties in interest. To prove this, they attached as Annex "I"
in their motion a Master List of Farmer-Beneficiaries. Apparently, the alleged master list was made pursuant to
the directive in the dispositive portion of the assailed "Win-Win" Resolution which directs the DAR "to carefully
and meticulously determine who among the claimants are qualified farmer-beneficiaries." However, a perusal of
the said document reveals that movants are those purportedly "Found Qualified and Recommended for
Approval." In other words, movants are merely recommendee farmer-beneficiaries.

The rule in this jurisdiction is that a real party in interest is a party who would be benefited or injured by the
judgment or is the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Real interest means a present substantial interest, as
distinguished from a mere expectancy or a future, contingent, subordinate or consequential
interest. 59 Undoubtedly, movants' interest over the land in question is a mere expectancy. Ergo, they are not real
parties in interest.

Furthermore, the challenged resolution upon which movants based their motion is, as intimated earlier, null and
void. Hence, their motion for intervention has no leg to stand on.

Now to the main issue of whether the final and executory Decision dated March 29, 1996 can still be
substantially modified by the "Win-Win" Resolution.

We rule in the negative.

The rules and regulations governing appeals to the Office of the President of the Philippines are embodied in
Administrative Order No. 18. Section 7 thereof provides:

Sec. 7. Decisions/resolutions/orders of the Office of the President shall, except as otherwise

provided for by special laws, become final after the lapse of fifteen (15) days from receipt of a
copy thereof by the parties, unless a motion for reconsideration thereof is filed within such period.

Only one motion for reconsideration by any one party shall be allowed and entertained, save in
exceptionally meritorious cases. (Emphasis ours).

It is further provided for in Section 9 that "The Rules of Court shall apply in a suppletory character
whenever practicable.

When the Office of the President issued the Order dated June 23, 1997 declaring the Decision of March 29,
1996 final and executory, as no one has seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration thereto, the said Office
had lost its jurisdiction to re-open the case, more so modify its Decision. Having lost its jurisdiction, the Office of
the President has no more authority to entertain the second motion for reconsideration filed by respondent DAR
Secretary, which second motion became the basis of the assailed "Win-Win" Resolution. Section 7 of
Administrative Order No. 18 and Section 4, Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Court mandate that only one (1)
motion for reconsideration is allowed to be taken from the Decision of March 29, 1996. And even if a second
motion for reconsideration was permitted to be filed in "exceptionally meritorious cases," as provided in the
second paragraph of Section 7 of AO 18, still the said motion should not have been entertained considering that
the first motion for reconsideration was not seasonably filed, thereby allowing the Decision of March 29, 1996 to
lapse into finality. Thus, the act of the Office of the President in re-opening the case and substantially modifying
its March 29, 1996 Decision which had already become final and executory, was in gross disregard of the rules
and basic legal precept that accord finalityto administrative determinations.

In San Luis, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al. 60 we held:

Since the decisions of both the Civil Service Commission and the Office of the President had
long become final and executory, the same can no longer be reviewed by the courts. It is well-
established in our jurisprudence that the decisions and orders of administrative agencies,
rendered pursuant to their quasi-judicial authority, have upon their finality, the force and binding
effect of a final judgment within the purview of the doctrine of res judicata [Brillantes v. Castro, 99
Phil. 497 (1956), Ipekdijna Merchandizing Co., Inc. v. Court of Tax Appeals, G.R. No. L-15430,
September 30, 1963, 9 SCRA 72.] The rule of res judicata which forbids the reopening of a
matter once judicially determined by competent authority applies as well to the judicial and quasi-
judicial acts of public, executive or administrative officers and boards acting within their
 jurisdiction as to the judgments of courts having general judicial powers [Brillantes v.
Castro, supra at 503].

The orderly administration of justice requires that the judgments/resolutions of a court or quasi-judicial body
must reach a point of finality set by the law, rules and regulations. The noble purpose is to write finis to disputes
once and for all. 61 This is a fundamental principle in our justice system, without which there would no end to
litigations. Utmost respect and adherence to this principle must always be maintained by those who wield the
power of adjudication. Any act which violates such principle must immediately be struck down.

Therefore, the assailed "Win-Win" Resolution which substantially modified the Decision of March 29, 1996 after
it has attained finality, is utterly void. Such void resolution, as aptly stressed by Justice Thomas A. Street 62 in a
1918 case, 63 is "a lawless thing, which can be treated as an outlaw and slain at sight, or ignored wherever and
whenever it exhibits its head." 64

WHEREFORE, the present petition is hereby GRANTED. The challenged Resolution dated November 7, 1997,
issued by the Office of the President in OP Case No. 96-C-6424, is hereby NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. The
Motion For Leave To Intervene filed by alleged farmer-beneficiaries is hereby DENIED.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Regalado, Melo, Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 Annex "AA," Petition; Rollo, pp. 163-167.

2 Annex "A," Petition; Ibid., pp. 48-63.

3 Annex "B," Petition; Rollo, pp. 64-655.

4 Par. 12, Petition; Ibid., p. 6.

5 Annex "C," Petition; ibid, pp. 66-67.

6 Annex "D," Petition; ibid., p. 68.

7 Annexes "E," "F" and "G," Petition; ibid., pp. 69-71.

8 Annex "H," Petition; Ibid., p. 72.

9 Annex "AA," Petition; Ibid., pp. 163-166.

10 Annex "S," Petition; Ibid., p. 113.

11 Annex "T," Petition; Ibid., pp. 115-120.

12 Annex "U," Petition; Ibid., pp. 121-146.

13 Annexes "V" and "V-1," Petition; Ibid., pp. 147-150.

14 Annex "W," Petition; Ibid., pp. 151-153.

15 Annex "X," Petition; Ibid., pp. 154-156.

16 Annex "Y," Petition; Ibid., pp. 157-158.

17 Ibid., pp. 166-167.

18 Par. 37, Petition, rollo, pp. 14-15.

19 Annex "BB," Petition; Ibid., p. 168.

20 Annex "CC," Petition; Ibid., pp. 169-176.

21 Annex "DD," Petition; Ibid., pp. 177-189.

22 Annex "EE," Petition; Rollo, pp. 190-191.

23 Annex "GG," Petition; Ibid., pp. 193-194.

24 Annex "FF," Petition; Ibid., p. 192.

25 Par. 17, Respondents' Comment, rollo, p. 532.

26 Par. 18, ibid., p. 533.

27 Rollo, pp. 61-62.

28 Par. 3, Petition; Ibid., p. 4.

29 Rollo, pp. 195-200.

30 Ibid., pp. 280-282.

31 Petition, ibid., p. 17.

32 Ibid., p. 18.

33 Ibid., p. 4.

34 Ibid., p. 5.

35 Fernando vs. Vasquez, et. al., 31 SCRA 288.

36 Ibid; Section 1, Rule 65, Revised Rules of Court.

37 Ibid.

38 Except those issued under the Labor Code of the Philippines (Sec. 2, Rule 43, Revised Rules of
Court).

39 Section 1, Rule 43, Revised Rules of Court.

40 Sections 3 & 5, ibid.

41 Section 4, ibid.

42 Section 3, ibid.

43 Petition, rollo, p. 5.

44 Ibid., p. 18.
 45 Fernando vs. Vasquez, et al., 31 SCRA 288.

46 Section I, Rule 65, Revised Rules of Court; People vs. Cuaresma, et. al., 172 SCRA 415, 423;
Vergara, Sr. vs. Suelto, et. al., 156 SCRA 753, 766.

47 Section 2, ibid.

48 Section 3, ibid.

49 Supra.

50 Cited in Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, Vol. One, 1997 edition, p. 721.

51 G.R. Nos. 111416-17, Sept. 26, 1994.

52 G.R. No. 123352, Feb. 7, 1996.

53 G.R. No. 123573, Feb. 28, 1996.

54 G.R. No. 125500, Aug. 7, 1996.

55 Eugenio vs. Drilon, et. al., G.R. No. 109404, Jan. 22, 1996; 252 SCRA 106,110.

56 190 SCRA 31, 38.

57 Vigan Electric Light Co., Inc. vs. Public Service Commission, L-19850, Jan. 30, 1964; Luzon Surety
Co. vs. Marbella, et al., L-16088, Sept. 30, 1960; Dir. Of Lands vs. Santamaria, 44 Phil. 594, all cited in
Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, supra, p. 710.

58 First Philippine International Bank, et. al. vs. Court of Appeals, et. al., 252 SCRA 259, 283 (Jan. 24,
1996).

59 Garcia vs. David, 67 Phil. 27.

60 174 SCRA 258, 271.

61 Legarda, et al. vs. Savellano, et al., 158 SCRA 194, 200.

62 One of the first Justices of the Supreme Court of the Philippines.

63 El Banco Español-Filipino vs. Palanca, 37 Phil. 921.

64 Ibid., at p. 949.

f. Jose Luis Ros, et. al. vs DAR G.R. No. 132477. August 31,
2005

SECOND DIVISION
JOSE LUIS ROS, ANDONI F. G.R. No. 132477
ABOITIZ, XAVIER ABOITIZ,
ROBERTO E. ABOITIZ,
ENRIQUE ABOITIZ, MATTHIAS
 G. MENDEZONA, CEBU Present:
INDUSTRIAL PARK
DEVELOPERS, INC. and FBM PUNO,
ABOITIZ MARINE, INC., Chairman,
P e t i t i o n e r s, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR.,
TINGA, and
- versus - CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.

DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN
REFORM, HON. ERNESTO
GARILAO, in his capacity as
DAR Secretary, and DIR. JOSE Promulgated:
LLAMES, in his capacity as
Director of DAR-Regional 7,
R e s p o n d e n t s. August 31, 2005
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Petitioners are the owners/developers of several parcels of land located in Arpili,

Balamban, Cebu. By virtue of Municipal Ordinance No. 101 passed by the Municipal
Council of Balamban, Cebu, these lands were reclassified as industrial lands.[1] On 03
April 1995, the Provincial Board of Cebu approved Balambans land use plan and
adopted en totoBalambans Municipal Ordinance No. 101 with the passage of
Resolution No. 836-95 and Provincial Ordinance No. 95-8, respectively.[2] As part of
their preparation for the development of the subject lands as an industrial park,
petitioners secured all the necessary permits and appropriate government
certifications.[3]

Despite these permits and certifications, petitioner Matthias Mendezona received a

letter from Mr. Jose Llames, Director of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR)
Regional Office for Region 7, informing him that the DAR was disallowing the
conversion of the subject lands for industrial use and directed him to cease and desist
from further developments on the land to avoid the incurrence of civil and criminal
liabilities.[4]
Petitioners were thus constrained to file with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Toledo
City a Complaint dated 29 July 1996 for Injunction with Application for Temporary
Restraining Order and a Writ of Preliminary Injunction, docketed as Civil Case No. T-
590.[5] In an order[6] dated 12 August 1996, the RTC, ruling that it is the DAR which
has jurisdiction, dismissed the Complaint for lack of jurisdiction. [7] It justified the
dismissal in this wise:

A perusal of Section 20 of the Local Government Code expressly provides that

the Municipalities through an Ordinance by the Sanggunian may authorize the
reclassification of the agricultural land within their area into non-agricultural.
Paragraph (e) of the aforesaid Section, provides further: that nothing in this
Section shall be construed as repealing or modifying in any manner the
provision of Republic Act 6657. In an opinion of the Secretary of Justice, quoted:
With respect of (sic) conversion of agricultural land to non-agricultural uses the
authority of the DAR to approve the same may be exercise (sic) only from the
date of the effectivity of the Agrarian Reform Law on June 15, 1988. It appears
that the petitioners had applied for conversion on June 13, 1995 and therefore
the petitioner (sic) are estopped from questioning the authority and jurisdiction
of the Department of Agrarian Reform. The application having been filed after
June 15, 1988, the reclassification by the Municipal Council of Balamban was
just a step in the conversion of the aforestated lands according to its purpose.
Executive Order No. 129-A, Section 5, The Department shall be responsible for
implementing Comprehensive Agrarian Reform and for such purpose it is
authorized to (J) approve or disapprove the conversion, restructuring or
readjustment of agricultural land into non-agricultural uses. Said Executive
Order amended Section 36 of Republic Act No. 3644 which clearly mandates
that the DAR Secretary (sic) approve or disapprove conversion are not impliedly
repealed. In fact, under Section 75 of Republic Act 6657 the above laws and
other laws not inconsistent of (sic) this act shall have suppletory effect. Further,
Section 68 of Republic Act 6657 provides: No injunction, restraining order,
prohibition or mandamus shall be issued by the lower court against the
Department of Agrarian Reform, DENR and Department of Justice in their
implementation of the program. With this provision, it is therefore clear (sic)
when there is conflict of laws determining whether the Department of Agrarian
Reform has been exclusively empowered by law to approve land conversion
after June 15, 1988 and (sic) the final ruling falls only with the Supreme Court
or Office of the President.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Application for Restraining Order is

hereby ordered DENIED and the main case is DISMISSED, this Court having
no jurisdiction over the same.[8]
In an order dated 18 September 1996, the trial court denied the motion for
reconsideration filed by the petitioners.[9] Petitioners filed before this Court a Petition
for Review on Certiorari with application for Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of
Preliminary Injunction.[10] In a resolution[11] dated 11 November 1996, this Court
referred the petition to the Court of Appeals.[12] Petitioners moved for a
reconsideration of the said resolution but the same was denied in a resolution dated
27 January 1997.[13]

At the Court of Appeals, the public respondents were ordered[14] to file their Comments
on the petition. Two sets of comments from the public respondents, one from the
Department of Agrarian Reform Provincial Office[15] and another from the Office of the
Solicitor General,[16] were submitted, to which petitioners filed their Consolidated
Reply.[17]

On 02 December 1997, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision[18] affirming the

Order of Dismissal issued by the RTC.[19] A motion for reconsideration filed by the
petitioners was denied in a resolution dated 30 January 1998.[20]

Hence, this petition.

The following issues[21] are raised by the petitioners for resolution:

(a) Whether or not the reclassification of the subject lands to industrial use by
the Municipality of Balamban, Cebu pursuant to its authority under Section
20(a) of Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991 (the
LGC) has the effect of taking such lands out of the coverage of the CARL and
beyond the jurisdiction of the DAR;

(b) Whether or not the Complaint for Injunction may be dismissed under the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction;

(c) Whether or not the Complaint for Injunction is an appropriate remedy against
the order of the DAR enjoining development works on the subject lands;

(d) Whether or not the Regional Trial Court of Toledo City had authority to issue
a writ of injunction against the DAR.

In sum, petitioners are of the view that local governments have the power to reclassify
portions of their agricultural lands, subject to the conditions set forth in Section
20[22][23]of the Local Government Code. According to them, if the agricultural land
sought to be reclassified by the local government is one which has already been
brought under the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL)
and/or which has been distributed to agrarian reform beneficiaries, then such
reclassification must be confirmed by the DAR pursuant to its authority under Section
6522 of the CARL, in order for the reclassification to become effective. If, however, the
land sought to be reclassified is not covered by the CARL and not distributed to
agrarian reform beneficiaries, then no confirmation from the DAR is necessary in order
for the reclassification to become effective as such case would not fall within the DARs
conversion authority. Stated otherwise, Section 65 of the CARL does not, in all cases,
grant the DAR absolute, sweeping and all-encompassing power to approve or
disapprove reclassifications or conversions of all agricultural lands. Said section only
grants the DAR exclusive authority to approve or disapprove conversions of
agricultural lands which have already been brought under the coverage of the CARL
and which have already been distributed to farmer beneficiaries.

The petition lacks merit.

After the passage of Republic Act No. 6657, otherwise known as Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program, agricultural lands, though reclassified, have to go through
the process of conversion, jurisdiction over which is vested in the DAR. However,
agricultural lands already reclassified before the effectivity of Rep. Act No. 6657 are
exempted from conversion.

Department of Justice Opinion No. 44, Series of 1990, provides:

. . . True, the DARs express power over land use conversion is limited to cases
in which agricultural lands already awarded have, after five years, ceased to be
economically feasible and sound for agricultural purposes, or the locality has
become urbanized and the land will have a greater economic value for
residential, commercial or industrial purposes. But to suggest that these are the
only instances when the DAR can require conversion clearances would open a
loophole in R.A. No. 6657, which every landowner may use to evade
compliance with the agrarian reform program. Hence, it should logically follow
from the said departments express duty and function to execute and enforce
the said statute that any reclassification of a private land as a residential,
commercial or industrial property should first be cleared by the DAR.
The requirement that agricultural lands must go through the process of conversion
despite having undergone reclassification was underscored in the case of Alarcon v.
Court of Appeals,[24] where it was held that reclassification of land does not suffice:

In the case at bar, there is no final order of conversion. The subject landholding
was merely reclassified. Conversion is different from reclassification.
Conversion is the act of changing the current use of a piece of agricultural land
into some other use as approved by the Department of Agrarian Reform.
Reclassification, on the other hand, is the act of specifying how agricultural
lands shall be utilized for non-agricultural uses such as residential, industrial,
commercial, as embodied in the land use plan, subject to the requirements and
procedure for land use conversion. Accordingly, a mere reclassification of
agricultural land does not automatically allow a landowner to change its use and
thus cause the ejectment of the tenants. He has to undergo the process of
conversion before he is permitted to use the agricultural land for other purposes.

Rep. Act No. 6657 took effect on 15 June 1988. Municipal Ordinance No. 101 of
Balamban, Cebu, which reclassified the subject lands, was passed on 25 March 1992,
and Provincial Ordinance No. 95-8 of the Provincial Board of Cebu, which adopted
Municipal Ordinance No. 101, was passed on 03 April 1995, long after Rep. Act No.
6657 has taken effect. Section 4 of Rep. Act No. 6657 provides:

SEC. 4. Scope. The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 shall cover,
regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, all public and
private agricultural lands as provided in Proclamation No. 131 and Executive
Order No. 229, including other lands of the public domain suitable for
agriculture.

...

(d) All private lands devoted to or suitable for agriculture regardless of the
agricultural products raised or that can be raised thereon.

To further clarify any doubt on its authority, the DAR issued Administrative Order No.
12 dated October 1994 which reads:

Administrative Order No. 12

Series of 1994
SUBJECT: CONSOLIDATED AND REVISED RULES AND PROCEDURES
GOVERNING CONVERSION OF ARICULTURAL LANDS TO
NON-AGRICULTURAL USES

I. PREFATORY STATEMENT

The guiding principles on land use conversion is to preserve prime

agricultural lands. On the other hand, conversion of agricultural lands,
when coinciding with the objectives of the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law to promote social justice, industrialization, and the optimum
use of land as a national resource for public welfare, shall be pursued in
a speedy and judicious manner.

To rationalize these principles, and by virtue of Republic Act (R.A.) No.

3844, as amended, Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 27, P.D. No. 946,
Executive Order (E.O.) No. 129-A and R.A. No. 6657, the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR) has issued several policy guidelines to regulate
land use conversion. This Administrative Order consolidates and revises
all existing implementing guidelines issued by the DAR, taking into
consideration, other Presidential issuances and national policies related
to land use conversion.

II. LEGAL MANDATE

A. The Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) is mandated to

approve or disapprove applications for conversion, restructuring or
readjustment of agricultural lands into non-agricultural uses,
pursuant to Section 4(i) of Executive Order No. 129-A, Series of
1987.

B. Section 5(i) of E.O. No. 129-A, Series of 1987, vests in the DAR,
exclusive authority to approve or disapprove applications for
conversion of agricultural lands for residential, commercial,
industrial, and other land uses.

C. Section 65 of R.A. No. 6657, otherwise known as the

Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988, likewise empowers
the DAR to authorize under certain conditions, the reclassification
or conversion of agricultural lands.

D. Section 4 of Memorandum Circular No. 54, Series of 1993 of the

Office of the President, provides that action on applications for land
use conversion on individual landholdings shall remain as the
responsibility of the DAR, which shall utilize as its primary
reference, documents on the comprehensive land use plans and
accompanying ordinances passed upon and approved by the local
 government units concerned, together with the National Land Use
Policy, pursuant to R.A. No. 6657 and E.O. No. 129-A.

III. DEFINITION OF TERMS

A. Agricultural land refers to land devoted to agricultural activity and not

classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial
land (Section 3[c], R.A. No. 6657).

B. Conversion is the act of changing the current use of a piece of

agricultural land into some other use.

C. Reclassification of agricultural lands is the act of specifying how

agricultural lands shall be utilized for non-agricultural uses such as
residential, industrial, commercial, as embodied in the land use
plan. It also includes the reversion of non-agricultural lands to
agricultural use.

...

V. COVERAGE

These rules shall cover all private agricultural lands as defined herein
regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced. It shall also
include agricultural lands reclassified by LGUs into non-agricultural uses,
after June 15, 1988, pursuant to Memorandum Circular (M.C.) No. 54,
Series of 1993 of the Office of the President and those proposed to be
used for livestock, poultry and swine raising as provided in DAR
Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1993.

In the case of Advincula-Velasquez v. Court of Appeals,[25] we held:

Our ruling in the Natalia case was reiterated in National Housing Authority v.
Allarde (318 SCRA 22 [1999]).

The Court of Appeals reliance on DOJ Opinion No. 44, Series of 1990, is in
order. In the said opinion, the Secretary of Justice declared, viz:

Based on the foregoing premises, we reiterate the view that with respect to
conversions of agricultural lands covered by R.A. No. 6657 to non-agricultural
uses, the authority of DAR to approve such conversions may be exercised from
the date of the laws effectivity on June 15, 1988. This conclusion is based on a
liberal interpretation of R.A. No. 6657 in the light of DARs mandate and
extensive coverage of the agrarian reform program.
 Following the DOJ opinion, the DAR issued Administrative Order No. 6, Series
of 1994, stating that lands already classified as non-agricultural before the
enactment of Rep. Act No. 6657 no longer needed any conversion clearance:

I. Prefatory Statement

In order to streamline the issuance of exemption clearances, based on DOJ

Opinion No. 44, the following guidelines are being issued for the guidance of
the DAR and the public in general.

II. Legal Basis

Sec. 3(c) of RA 6657 states that agricultural lands refers to the land devoted to
agricultural activity as defined in this act and not classified as mineral, forest,
residential, commercial or industrial land.

Department of Justice Opinion No. 44, series of 1990 has ruled that, with
respect to the conversion of agricultural lands covered by RA No. 6657 to non-
agricultural uses, the authority of DAR to approve such conversion may be
exercised from the date of its effectivity, on June 15, 1988. Thus, all lands that
are already classified as commercial, industrial, or residential before 15 June
1988 no longer need any conversion clearance.

The authority of the DAR to approve conversions of agricultural lands covered by Rep.
Act No. 6657 to non-agricultural uses has not been pierced by the passage of the
Local Government Code. The Code explicitly provides[26] that nothing in this section
shall be construed as repealing or modifying in any manner the provisions of Rep. Act
No. 6657.

It being settled that jurisdiction over conversion of land is vested in the DAR, the
complaint for injunction was correctly dismissed by the trial and appellate courts under
the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. This Court, in Bautista v. Mag-isa Vda. De
Villena,[27] found occasion to reiterate the doctrine of primary jurisdiction

The doctrine of primary jurisdiction precludes the courts from resolving a

controversy over which jurisdiction has initially been lodged with an
administrative body of special competence. For agrarian reform cases,
jurisdiction is vested in the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR); more
specifically, in the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
(DARAB).
 Executive Order 229 vested the DAR with (1) quasi-judicial powers to determine
and adjudicate agrarian reform matters; and (2) jurisdiction over all matters
involving the implementation of agrarian reform, except those falling under the
exclusive original jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture and the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources. This law divested the
regional trial courts of their general jurisdiction to try agrarian reform matters.

Under Republic Act 6657, the DAR retains jurisdiction over all agrarian reform
matters. The pertinent provision reads:

Section 50. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR. The DAR is hereby vested with
the primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and
shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the
implementation of agrarian reform, except those falling under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture and the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources.

It shall not be bound by technical rules of procedure and evidence but shall
proceed to hear and decide all cases, disputes or controversies in a most
expeditious manner, employing all reasonable means to ascertain the facts of
every case in accordance with justice and equity and the merits of the case.
Toward this end, it shall adopt a uniform rule of procedure to achieve a just,
expeditious and inexpensive determination of every action or proceeding before
it. . . .

Finally, the third and fourth issues which may be summed up into whether or not an
injunction is the appropriate remedy against the order of the DAR enjoining petitioners
in developing the subject land, we rule in the negative. Section 68 of Rep. Act No.
6657 provides:

SEC. 68. Immunity of Government Agencies from Undue Interference. No

injunction, restraining order, prohibition or mandamus shall be issued by the
lower courts against the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), the Department
of Agriculture (DA), the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR), and the Department of Justice (DOJ) in their implementation of the
program.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 42666 dated 02 December
1997 affirming the order dated 12 August 1996 of the Regional Trial Court of Toledo
City, Branch 29, in Civil Case No. T-590 is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate Justice
Chairman

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate Justice
Chairman, Second Division
 CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, and the Division Chairmans
Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of
the Courts Division.

HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.

Chief Justice

[1] Annex D; Rollo, pp. 60-61.

[2] Annexes E - E1; Rollo, pp. 62-64.
[3] a. Balamban Municipal Planning and Development Coordinators Certification dated May 11, 1995, certifying that the

subject parcels were, in fact, classified as industrial lands by virtue of the municipal and provincial resolutions
and ordinances abovementioned.
b. Housing and Land Use Regulatory Boards (HLURB) letter dated August 3, 1995, granting its consent to the industrial
development project to be undertaken by petitioners.
c. Balamban Municipal Planning and Development Coordinators Certificate of Eligibility for Conversion dated August
10, 1995, certifying that petitioners industrial development project conforms with Balambans zoning and land
use ordinance.
d. Certifications dated August 7, 1995 issued by the National Irrigation Administration (NIA), certifying that the subject
lands were outside irrigated lands and water is not available to support rice and other crop production.
e. Certificates of Eligibility for Conversion dated September 11, 1995 issued by the Department of Agricultures (DA)
Regional Office, certifying that the subject lands were proper for conversion into industrial lands.
f. Environment Clearances issued by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources dated September 28,
1995, granting clearance for the conversion of the subject lands from agricultural to industrial.
g. Certification dated August 3, 1995 issued by the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) of Balamban, certifying
that there are no CARPABLE AREAS and therefore no CARP Farmer-beneficiaries within the subject lands.
[4] Annex N; Rollo, p. 93.
[5] Annex O; Rollo, pp. 96-107.
[6] Penned by Executive Judge Gualberto P. Delgado.
[7] Annex P; Rollo, pp. 109-112.
[8] Rollo, pp. 111-112.
[9] Annex Q; Rollo, pp. 113-114.
[10] Annex R; Rollo, p. 115.
[11] Rendered by the 1st Division.
[12] Annex S; Rollo, pp. 139-140.
[13] Annex T; Rollo, p. 141.
[14] 09 January 1997.
[15] Annex U; Rollo, p. 142.
[16] Annex V; Rollo, p. 163.
[17] Annex W; Rollo, p. 176.
[18] Docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 42666, penned by Associate Justice (now Presiding Justice) Romeo A. Brawner with

Associate Justices Ricardo P. Galvez and Marina L. Buzon, concurring.

[19] Rollo, pp. 41-54.
[20] Rollo, p. 57.
[21] Memorandum of the Petitioners; Rollo, pp. 360-361.
[22] Rep. Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code).
SEC. 20. Reclassification of Lands. (a) A city or municipality may, through an ordinance passed by the sanggunian after
conducting public hearings for the purpose, authorize the reclassification of agricultural lands and provide for
the manner of their utilization or disposition in the following cases: (1) when the land ceases to be economically
feasible and sound for agricultural purposes as determined by the Department of Agriculture or (2) where the
land shall have substantially greater economic value for residential, commercial, or industrial purposes, as
determined by the sanggunian concerned: Provided, That such reclassification shall be limited to the following
percentage of the total agricultural land area at the time of the passage of the ordinance:

(1) For highly urbanized and independent component cities, fifteen percent (15%);

(2) For component cities and first to third class municipalities, ten percent (10%); and

(3) For fourth to sixth class municipalities, five percent (5%): Provided, further, That agricultural lands distributed to
agrarian reform beneficiaries pursuant to Republic Act Numbered sixty six hundred fifty seven (R.A. No. 6657),
otherwise known as The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, shall not be affected by the said reclassification
and the conversion of such lands into other purposes shall be governed by Section 65 of said Act.
23 Rep. Act No. 6657 (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program)
SEC. 65. Conversion of Lands. After the lapse of five (5) years from its award, when the land ceases to be economically
feasible and sound for agricultural purposes, or the locality has become urbanized and the land will have a
greater economic value for residential, commercial or industrial purposes, the DAR, upon application of the
beneficiary or the landowner, with due notice to the affected parties, and subject to existing laws, may authorize
the reclassification or conversion of the land and its disposition: Provided, That the beneficiary shall have fully
paid his obligation.

[24] G.R. No. 152085, 08 July 2003, 405 SCRA 440, 448-449.
[25] G.R. No. 111387, 08 June 2004, 431 SCRA 165, 185-186.
[26] Sec. 20(e) of the Rep. Act No. 7160, Local Government Code.
[27] G.R. No. 152564, 13 September 2004, 438 SCRA 259, 262-263.