You are on page 1of 114

(17a) G.R. No.

220598 IRREGULARITIES IN THE CONFIDENTIAL/INTELLIGENCE FUND (CIF)


DISBURSEMENT PROCESS, QUESTIONABLE PRACTICE OF CO-MINGLING
GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO, Petitioner, OF FUNDS AND AGUAS' REPORTS TO THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT (COA)
vs. THAT BULK OF THE PHP365,997,915.00 WITHDRAWN FROM THE
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND THE SANDIGANBAYAN, (First Division), PHILIPPINE CHARITY SWEEPSTAKES OFFICE'S (PCSO) CIF WERE
Respondents DIVERTED TO THE ARROYO-HEADED OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT.

RE SO LUTI ON C. ARROYO AND AGUAS, BY INDISPENSABLE COOPERATION, IN


CONSPIRACY WITH THEIR COACCUSED IN SB-12-CRM-0174, COMMITTED
PLUNDER VIA· A COMPLEX ILLEGAL SCHEME WHICH DEFRAUDED PCSO
BERSAMIN,, J.: IN HUNDREDS OF MILLIONS OF PESOS.

On July 19, 2016, the Court promulgated its decision, disposing: D. EVEN ASSUMING THAT THE ELEMENTS OF PLUNDER WERE NOT
PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT, THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petitions for certiorari; ANNULS and SETS ASIDE the THE PEOPLE SHOWS, BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT, THAT ARROYO,
resolutions issued in Criminal Case No. SB-12-CRM-0174 by the Sandiganbayan on April 6, 2015 AGUAS AND THEIR COACCUSED IN SB-12-CRM-0174 ARE GUILTY OF
and September 10, 2015; GRANTS the petitioners' respective demurrers to evidence; DISMISSES MALVERSATION.2
Criminal Case No. SB-12-CRM-0174 as to the petitioners GLORIAMACAPAGAL-ARROYO and
BENIGNOAGUAS for insufficiency of evidence; ORDERS the immediate release from detention In contrast, the petitioners submit that the decision has effectively barred the consideration and
of said petitioners; and MAKES no pronouncements on costs of suit. granting of the motion for reconsideration of the State because doing so would amount to the re-
prosecution or revival of the charge against them despite their acquittal, and would thereby violate
SO ORDERED. 1 the constitutional proscription against double jeopardy.

On August 3, 2016, the State, through the Office of the Ombudsman, has moved for the Petitioner Gloria M. Macapagal-Arroyo (Arroyo) points out that the State miserably failed to prove
reconsideration of the decision, submitting that: the corpus delicti of plunder; that the Court correctly required the identification of the main plunderer
as well as personal benefit on the part of the raider of the public treasury to enable the successful
I. THIS HONORABLE COURT'S GIVING DUE COURSE TO A CERTIORARI ACTION prosecution of the crime of plunder; that the State did not prove the conspiracy that justified her
ASSAILING AN INTERLOCUTORY ORDER DENYING DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE inclusion in the charge; that to sustain the case for malversation against her, in lieu of plunder, would
VIOLA TES RULE 119, SECTION 23 OF THE RULES OF COURT, WHICH PROVIDES violate her right to be informed of the accusation against her because the information did not
THAT AN ORDER DENYING THE DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE SHALL NOT BE necessarily include the crime of malversation; and that even if the information did so, the
REVIEWABLE BY APPEAL OR BY CERTIORARI BEFORE JUDGMENT. constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy already barred the re-opening of the case for that
purpose.

II. THE HONORABLE COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ERRORS WHICH AMOUNT TO A


VIOLATION OR DEPRIVATION OF THE STATE'S FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO DUE Petitioner Benigno B. Aguas echoes the contentions of Arroyo in urging the Com1 to deny the motion
PROCESS OF LAW. for reconsideration.

A. THE DECISION REQUIRES ADDITIONAL ELEMENTS IN THE In reply, the State avers that the prohibition against double jeopardy does not apply because it was
PROSECUTION OF PLUNDER, VIZ. IDENTIFICATION OF THE MAIN denied its day in court, thereby rendering the decision void; that the Court should re-examine the
PLUNDERER AND PERSONAL BENEFIT TO HIM/HER, BOTH OF WHICH ARE facts and pieces of evidence in order to find the petitioners guilty as charged; and that the allegations
NOT PROVIDED IN THE TEXT OF REPUBLIC ACT (R.A.) NO. 7080. of the information sufficiently included all that was necessary to fully inform the petitioners of the
accusations against them.

B. THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE PROSECUTION WAS NOT FULLY


TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE Ruling of the Court

1
The Court DENIES the motion for reconsideration for its lack of merit. require.' So it is that the writ will be granted where necessary to prevent a substantial wrong or
to do substantial justice.
To start with, the State argues' that the consolidated petitions for certiorari were improper remedies
in light of Section 23, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court expressly prohibiting the review of the denial of The Constitution itself has imposed upon the Court and the other courts of justice the duty to correct
their demurrer prior to the judgment in the case either by appeal or by certiorari; that the Court has errors of jurisdiction as a result of capricious, arbitrary, whimsical and despotic exercise of discretion
thereby limited its own power, which should necessarily prevent the giving of due course to the by expressly incorporating in Section 1 of Article VIII the following provision:
petitions for certiorari, as well as the undoing of the order denying the petitioners' demurrer to
evidence; that the proper remedy under the Rules of Court was for the petitioners to proceed to trial Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may
and to present their evidence-in-chief thereat; and that even if there had been grave abuse of be established by law.
discretion attending the denial, the Court's certiorari powers should be exercised only upon the
petitioners' compliance with the stringent requirements of Rule 65, particularly with the requirement
that there be no plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, which they did not Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving
establish. rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the Government. The exercise of this power to correct grave
Section 23, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, pertinently provides: abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government cannot be thwarted by rules of procedure to the contrary or
Section 23. Demurrer to evidence. – xxx for the sake of the convenience of one side. This is because the Court has the bounden
constitutional duty to strike down grave abuse of discretion whenever and wherever it is
xxxx committed. Thus, notwithstanding the interlocutory character and effect of the denial of the
demurrers to evidence, the petitioners as the accused could avail themselves of the remedy of
certiorari when the denial was tainted with grave abuse of discretion. As we shall soon show, the
The order denying the motion for leave of court to file demurrer to evidence or the demurrer Sandiganbayan as the trial court was guilty of grave abuse of discretion when it capriciously
itself shall not be reviewable by appeal or by certiorari before judgment. (n) denied the demurrers to evidence despite the absence of competent and sufficient evidence to
sustain the indictment for plunder, and despite the absence of the factual bases to expect a
The argument of the State, which is really a repetition of its earlier submission, was squarely resolved guilty verdict.3
in the decision, as follows:
We reiterate the foregoing resolution, and stress that the prohibition contained in Section 23, Rule
The Court holds that it should take cognizance of the petitions for certiorari because the 119 of the Rules of Court is not an insuperable obstacle to the review by the Court of the denial of the
Sandiganbayan, as shall shortly be demonstrated, gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or demurrer to evidence through certiorari. We have had many rulings to that effect in the past. For
excess of jurisdiction. instance, in Nicolas v. Sandiganbayan,4the Court expressly ruled that the petition for certiorari was
the proper remedy to assail the denial of the demurrer to evidence that was tainted with grave abuse
The special civil action for certiorari is generally not proper to assail such an interlocutory order of discretion or excess of jurisdiction, or oppressive exercise of judicial authority.
issued by the trial court because of the availability of another remedy in the ordinary course of law.
Moreover, Section 23, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court expressly provides that "the order denying the Secondly, the State submits that its right to due process was violated because the decision imposed
motion for leave of court to file demurrer to evidence or the demurrer itself shall not be reviewable additional elements for plunder that neither ' Republic Act No. 7080 nor jurisprudence had
by appeal or by certiorari before judgment." It is not an insuperable obstacle to this action, however, theretofore required, i.e., the identification of the main plunderer, and personal benefit on the part of
that the denial of the demurrers to evidence of the petitioners was an interlocutory order that did not the accused committing the predicate crime of raid on the public treasury. The State complains that it
terminate the proceedings, and the proper recourse of the demurring accused was to go to trial, and was not given the opportunity to establish such additional elements; that the imposition of new
that in case of their conviction they may then appeal the conviction, and assign the denial as among elements fu1iher amounted to judicial legislation in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers;
the errors to be reviewed. Indeed, it is doctrinal that the situations in which the writ of certiorari may that the Court nitpicked on the different infirmities of the information despite the issue revolving only
issue should not be limited, because to do so - around the sufficiency of the evidence; and that it established all the elements of plunder beyond
reasonable doubt.
x x x would be to destroy its comprehensiveness and usefulness. So wide is the discretion of the
com1 that authority is not wanting to show that certiorari is more discretionary than either The State cites the plain meaning rule to highlight that the crime of plunder did not require personal
prohibition or mandamus. In the exercise of oursuperintending control over other courts, we are benefit on the part of the raider of the public treasury. It insists that the definition of raids on the
to be guided by all the circumstances of each particular case 'as the ends of justice may public treasury, conformably with the plain meaning rule, is the taking of public money through
2
fraudulent or unlawful means, and such definition does not require enjoyment or personal benefit on 1. Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or raids
the part of plunderer or on the part of any of his co-conspirators for them to be convicted for plunder. on the public treasury;

The submissions of the State are unfounded. 2. By receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage, kickbacks or
any/or entity in connection with any government contract or project or by reason of the
The requirements for the identification of the main plunderer and for personal benefit in the predicate office or position of the public officer concerned;
act of raids on the public treasury have been written in R.A. No. 7080 itself as well as embedded in
pertinent jurisprudence. This we made clear in the decision, as follows: 3. By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the National
Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities or government-owned
A perusal of the information suggests that what the Prosecution sought to show was an implied or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries;
conspiracy to commit plunder among all of the accused on the basis of their collective actions prior
to, during and after the implied agreement. It is notable that the Prosecution did not allege that the 4. By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock, equity or
conspiracy among all of the accused was by express agreement, or was a wheel conspiracy or a chain any other form of interest or participation including the promise of future employment in
conspiracy. any business enterprise or undertaking;

This was another fatal flaw of the Prosecution. 5. By establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other combinations
and/or implementation of decrees and orders intended to benefit particular persons or
In its present version, under which the petitioners were charged, Section 2 of Republic Act No. 7080 special interests; or
(Plunder Law) states:
6. By taking undue advantage of official positi0n, authority, relationship, connection or
Section 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder: Penalties. - Any public officer who, by himself or in influence to unjustly enrich himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage and
connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, prejudice
subordinates or other persons, amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through a
combination or series of overt criminal acts as described in Section 1 (d) hereof in the aggregate The law on plunder requires that a particular public officer must be identified as the one who
amount or total value of at least Fifty million pesos (₱50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of the crime of amassed, acquired or accumulated ill-gotten wealth because it plainly states that plunder is
plunder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death. Any person who participated with the committed by any public officer who, by himself or in connivance with members of his family,
said public officer in the commission of an offense contributing to the crime of plunder shall likewise relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons,
be punished for such offense. In the imposition of penalties, the degree of participation and the amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount or total value of at
attendance of mitigating and extenuating circumstances, as provided by the Revised Penal Code, least ₱50,000,000.00 through a combination or series of overt criminal acts as described in
shall be considered by the court. The court shall declare any and all ill-gotten wealth and their Section l(d) hereof. Surely, the law requires in the criminal charge for plunder against several
interests and other incomes and assets including the properties and shares of stocks derived from the individuals that there must be a main plunderer and her co-conspirators, who may be members
deposit or investment thereof forfeited in favor of the State. [As Amended by Section 12, Republic of her family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordim1tes or other
Act No. 7659 (The Death Penalty Law)] persons. In other words, the allegation of the wheel conspiracy or express conspiracy in the
information was appropriate because the main plunderer would then be identified in either
Section l(d) of Republic Act No. 7080 provides: manner. Of course, implied conspiracy could also identify the main plunderer, but that fact
must be properly alleged and duly proven by the Prosecution.
Section 1. Definition of terms. - As used in this Act, the term:
This interpretation is supported by Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, where the Court explained the nature
of the conspiracy charge and the necessity for the main plunderer for whose benefit the amassment,
xxxx accumulation and acquisition was made, thus:

d. "Ill-gotten wealth" means any asset, property, business enterprise or material possession of any There is no denying the fact that the "plunder of an entire nation resulting in material damage to the
person within the purview of Section two (2) hereof, acquired by him directly or indirectly through national economy" is made up of a complex and manifold network of crimes. In the crime of plunder,
dummies, nominees, agents, subordinates and/or business associates by any combination or series of therefore, different parties may be united by a common purpose. In the case at bar, the different
the following means or similar schemes: accused and their different criminal acts have a commonality - to help the former President amass,
3
accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth. Sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) in the Amended Information 1) Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or raids on the
alleged the different participation of each accused in the conspiracy. The gravamen of the public treasury;
conspiracy charge, therefore, is not that each accused agreed to receive protection money from
illegal gambling, that each misappropriated a portion of the tobacco excise tax, that each accused xxxx
ordered the GSIS and SSS to purchase shares of Belle Corporation and receive commissions from
such sale, nor that each unjustly enriched himself from commissions, gifts and kickbacks; rather, it is
that each of them, by their individual acts, agreed to participate, directly or indirectly, in the To discern the proper import of the phrase raids on the public treasury, the key is to look at the
amassing, accumulation and acquisition of ill-gotten wealth of and/or for former President accompanying words: misappropriation, conversion, misuse or malversation of public funds. This
Estrada. 5 [bold underscoring supplied for emphasis] process is conformable with the maxim of statutory construction noscitur a sociis, by which the
correct construction of a particular word or phrase that is ambiguous in itself or is equally
susceptible of various meanings may be made by considering the company of the words in
Indeed, because plunder is a crime that only a public official can commit by amassing, accumulating, which the word or phrase is found or with which it is associated. Verily, a word or phrase in a
or acquiring ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount or total value of at least ₱50,000,000.00, the statute is always used in association with other words or phrases, and its meaning may,
identification in the information of such public official as the main plunderer among the several therefore, be modified or restricted by the latter.
individuals thus charged is logically necessary under the law itself. In particular reference to Criminal
Case No. SB-12-CRM-0174, the individuals charged therein - including the petitioners - were 10
public officials; hence, it was only proper to identify the main plunderer or plunderers among the 10 To convert connotes the act of using or disposing of another's property as if it were one's own; to
accused who herself or himself had amassed, accumulated, or acquired ill-gotten wealth with the total misappropriate means to own, to take something for one's own benefit; misuse means "a good,
value of at least ₱50,000,000.00. substance, privilege, or right used improperly, unforcsccably, or not as intended;" and malversation
occurs when "any public officer who, by reason of the duties of his office, is accountable for public
funds or property, shall appropriate the same or shall take or misappropriate or shall consent, through
The phrase raids on the public treasury as used in Section 1 (d) of R. A. No. 7080 is itself abandonment or negligence, shall permit any other person to take such public funds, or property,
ambiguous. In order to ascertain the objective meaning of the phrase, the act of raiding the public wholly or partially." The common thread that binds all the four terms together is that the public
treasury cannot be divided into parts. This is to differentiate the predicate act of raids on the public officer used the property taken. Considering that raids on the public treasury is in the company of the
treasury from other offenses involving property, like robbery, theft, or estafa. Considering that R.A. four other terms that require the use of the property taken, the phrase raids on the public treasury
No. 7080 does not expressly define this predicate act, the Court has necessarily resorted to statutory similarly requires such use of the property taken. Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan gravely erred in
construction. In so doing, the Court did not adopt the State's submission that personal benefit on the contending that the mere accumulation and gathering constituted the forbidden act of raids on the
part of the accused need not be alleged and shown because doing so would have defeated the clear public treasury. Pursuant to the maxim of noscitur a sociis, raids on the public treasury requires the
intent of the law itself,6 which was to punish the amassing, accumulating, or acquiring of ill-gotten raider to use the property taken impliedly for his personal benefit.7
wealth in the aggregate amount or total value of at least ₱150,000,000.00 by any combination or
series of acts of misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or raids on the
public treasury. The Prosecution asserts that the Senate deliberations removed personal benefit as a requirement for
plunder. In not requiring personal benefit, the Sandiganbayan quoted the following exchanges
between Senator Enrile and Senator Tafiada, viz.:
As the decision has observed, the rules of statutory construction as well as the deliberations of
Congress indicated the intent of Congress to require personal benefit for the predicate act of raids on
the public treasury, viz.: Senator Enrile. The word here, Mr. President, "such public officer or person who conspired or
knowingly benefited". One does not have to conspire or rescheme. The only element needed is
that he "knowingly benefited". A candidate for the Senate for instance, who received a political
The phrase raids on the public treasury is found in Section 1 (d) of R.A. No. 7080, which provides: contribution from a plunderer, knowing that the contributor is a plunderer and therefore, he
knowingly benefited from the plunder, would he also suffer the penalty, Mr. President, for life
Section l .Definition of Terms. – xxx imprisonment?

xxxx Senator Tafiada. In the committee amendments, Mr. President, we have deleted these lines 1 to 4 and
part of line 5, on page 3. But, in a way, Mr. President, it is good that the Gentleman is bringing out
d) Ill-gotten wealth means any asset, prope1iy, business enterprise or material possession of any these questions, I believe that under the examples he has given, the Court will have to...
person within the purview of Section Two (2) hereof, acquired by him directly or indirectly through
dummies, nominees, agents, subordinates and/or business associates by any combination or series of Senator Enrile. How about the wife, Mr. President, he may not agree with the plunderer to plunder
the following means or similar schemes: the country but because she is a dutiful wife or a faithful husband, she has to keep her or his vow of

4
fidelity to the spouse. And, of course, she enjoys the benefits out of the plunder. Would the accused public officials, particularly petitioner Arroyo, had amassed, accumulated, or acquired ill-
Gentleman now impute to her or him the crime of plunder simply because she or he knowingly gotten wealth in the aggregate amount or total value of at least ₱50,000,000.00.
benefited out of the fruits of the plunder and, therefore, he must suffer or he must suffer the penalty
of life imprisonment? Fourthly, in accenting certain inadequacies of the allegations of the information, the Court did not
engage in purposeless nitpicking, and did not digress from the primary task of determining the
The President. That was stricken out already in the Committee amendment. sufficiency of the evidence presented by the State against the petitioners. What the Court thereby
intended to achieve was to highlight what would have been relevant in the proper prosecution of
Senator Tañada. Yes, Mr. President. Lines 1 to 4 and part of line 5 were stricken out in the Committee plunder and thus enable itself to discern and determine whether the evidence of guilt was sufficient or
amendment. But, as I said, the examples of the Minority Floor Leader are still worth spreading the not. In fact, the Court categorically clarified that in discussing the essential need for the identification
Record. And, I believe that in those examples, the Court will have just to take into consideration all of the main plunderer it was not harping on the sufficiency of the information, but was only enabling
the other circumstances prevailing in the case and the evidence that will be submitted. itself to search for and to find the relevant proof that unequivocally showed petitioner Arroyo as the
"mastermind" - which was how the Sandiganbayan had characterized her participation - in the
context of the implied conspiracy alleged in the information. But the search came to naught, for the
The President. In any event, 'knowingly benefited' has already been stricken off." information contained nothing that averred her commission of the overt act necessary to implicate her
in the supposed conspiracy to commit the crime of plunder. Indeed, the Court assiduously searched
The exchanges between Senator Enrile and Senator Tañada reveal, therefore, that what was removed for but did not find the sufficient incriminatory evidence against the petitioners. Hence, the
from the coverage of the bill and the final version that eventually became the law was a person who Sandiganbayan capriciously and oppressively denied their demurrers to evidence.
was not the main plunderer or a co-conspirator, but one who personally benefited from the
plunderers' action. The requirement of personal benefit on the part of the main plunderer or his co- Fifthly, the State posits that it established at least a case for malversation against the petitioners.
conspirators by virtue of their plunder was not removed.
Malversation is defined and punished under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, which reads
As a result, not only did the Prosecution fail to show where the money went but, more importantly, thusly:
that GMA and Aguas had personally benefited from the same. Hence, the Prosecution did not prove
the predicate act of raids on the public treasury beyond reasonable doubt. 8
Article 217. Malversation of public funds or property; Presumption of malversation. - Any public
officer who, by reason of the duties of his office, is accountable for public funds or property, shall
Thirdly, the State contends that the Court did not appreciate the totality of its evidence, particularly appropriate the same or shall take or misappropriate or shall consent, through abandonment or
the different irregularities committed in the disbursement of the PCSO funds, i.e., the commingling of negligence, shall permit any other person to take such public funds, or property, wholly or partially,
funds, the non-compliance with LOI No. 1282, and the unilateral approval of the disbursements. Such or shall otherwise be guilty of the misappropriation or malversation of such funds or property, shall
totality, coupled with the fact of the petitioners' indispensable cooperation in the pilfering of public suffer:
funds, showed the existence of the conspiracy to commit plunder among all of the accused.
1. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, if the amount
The contention lacks basis. involved in the misappropriation or malversation does not exceed two hundred pesos.

As can be readily seen from the decision, the Court expressly granted the petitioners' respective 2. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the amount
demurrers to evidence and dismissed the plunder case against them for insufficiency of evidence involved is more than two hundred pesos but does not exceed six thousand pesos.
because:
3. The penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its
x x x the Sandiganbayan as the trial court was guilty of grave abuse of discretion when it capriciously minimum period, if the amount involved is more than six thousand pesos but is less than
denied the demurrers to evidence despite the absence of competent and sufficient evidence to twelve thousand pesos.
sustain the indictment for plunder, and despite the absence of the factual bases to expect a
guilty verdict. 9
4. The penalty of reclusion temporal, in its medium and maximum periods, if the amount
involved is more than twelve thousand pesos but is less than twenty-two thousand pesos. If
Such disposition of the Court fully took into consideration all the evidence adduced against the the amount exceeds the latter, the penalty shall be reclusion temporal in its maximum
petitioners. We need not rehash our review of the evidence thus adduced, for it is enough simply to period to reclusion perpetua.
stress that the Prosecution failed to establish the corpus delicti of plunder - that any or all of the
5
In all cases, persons guilty of malversation shall also suffer the penalty of perpetual special (b) raiding the public treasury by withdrawing and receiving, in several instances, the
disqualification and a fine equal to the amount of the funds malversed or equal to the total value of above-mentioned amount from the Confidential/Intelligence Fund from PCSO's accounts,
the property embezzled. and or unlawfully transferring or conveying the same into their possession and control
through irregularly issued disbursement vouchers and fictitious expenditures; and
The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property with which he is
chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized officer, shall be prima facie evidence that he has (c) taking advantage of their respective official positions, authority, relationships,
put such missing funds or property to personal use. (As amended by RA 1060). connections or influence, in several instances, to unjustly enrich themselves in the
aforementioned sum, at the expense of, and the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people
The elements of malversation are that: (a) the offender is an accountable public officer; (b) he/she is and the Republic of the Philippines.
responsible for the misappropriation of public funds or property through intent or negligence; and (c)
he/she has custody of and received such funds and property by reason of his/her office. 10 CONTRARY TO LAW.

The information in Criminal Case No. SB-12-CRM-017411 avers: In thereby averring the predicate act of malversation, the State did not sufficiently allege the
aforementioned essential elements of malversation in the information. The omission from the
The undersigned Assistant Ombudsman and Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer III, Office of information of factual details descriptive of the aforementioned elements of malversation highlighted
the Ombudsman, hereby accuse GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, ROSARIO C. URIARTE, the insufficiency of the allegations. Consequently, the State's position is entirely unfounded.
SERGIO O. VALENCIA, MANUEL L. MORATO, JOSE R. TARUC V, RAYMUNDO T.
ROQUERO, MA. FATIMA AS. VALDES, BENIGNO B. AGUAS, REYNALDO A. VILLAR and Lastly, the petitioners insist that the consideration and granting of the motion for reconsideration of
NILDA B. PLARAS, of the crime of PLUNDER, as defined by, and penalized under Section 2 of the State can amount to a violation of the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy because
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7080, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, committed, as follows: their acquittal under the decision was a prior jeopardy within the context of Section 21, Article III
(Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution, to wit:
That during the period from January 2008 to June 2010 or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in
Quezon City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused GLORIA Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is
MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, then the President of the Philippines, ROSARIO C. URIARTE, then punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to
General Manager and Vice Chairman, SERGIO 0. VALENCIA, then Chairman of the Board of another prosecution for the same act.
Directors, MANUEL L. MORA TO, JOSE R. TARUC V, RAYMUNDO T. ROQUERO, MA.
FATIMA AS. VALDES, then members of the Board of Directors, BENIGNO B. AGUAS, then The insistence of the petitioners is fully warranted. Indeed, the consideration and granting of the
Budget and Accounts Manager, all of the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO), motion for reconsideration of the State will amount to the violation of the constitutional guarantee
REYNALDO A. VILLAR, then Chairman, and NILDA B. PLARAS, then Head of against double jeopardy.
Intelligence/Confidential Fund Fraud Audit Unit, both of the Commission on Audit, all public
officers committing the offense in relation to their respective offices and taking undue advantage of
their respective official positions, authority, relationships, connections or influence, conniving, The Court's consequential dismissal of Criminal Case No. SB-12- CRM-0174 as to the petitioners for
conspiring and confederating with one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and insufficiency of evidence amounted to their acquittal of the crime of plunder charged against them. In
criminally 'amass,, accumulate and/or acquire directly or indirectly, ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate People v. Tan, 12the Court shows why:
amount or total value of THREE HUNDRED SIXTY FIVE MILLION NINE HUNDRED NINETY
SEVEN THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED FIFTEEN PESOS (PHP365,997,915.00), more or less, In People v. Sandiganbayan, this Com1 explained the general rule that the grant of a demurrer to
through any or a combination or a series of overt or criminal acts, or similar schemes or means, evidence operates as an acquittal and is, thus, final and unappealable, to wit:
described as follows:
The demurrer to evidence in criminal cases, such as the one at bar, is ''filed after tile prosecution
(a) diverting in several instances, funds from the operating budget of PCSO to its had rested its case," and when the same is granted, it calls "for an appreciation of the evidence
Confidential/Intelligence Fund that could be accessed and withdrawn at any time with adduced by the prosecution and its sufficiency to warrant conviction beyond reasonable doubt,
minimal restrictions, and converting, misusing, and/or illegally conveying or transferring resulting in a dismissal of the case on the merits, tantamount to an acquittal of the accused." Such
the proceeds drawn from said fund in the aforementioned sum, also in several instances, to dismissal of a criminal case by the grant of demurrer to evidence may not be appealed, for to do
themselves, in the guise of fictitious expenditures, for their personal gain and benefit; so would be to place the accused in double jeopardy. The verdict being one of acquittal, the case
ends there.

6
xxxx enjoyed no similar right. United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662. (Bold underscoring supplied for
emphasis)
The rule on double jeopardy, however, is not without exceptions. In People v. Laguio, Jr., this Court
stated that the only instance when double jeopardy will not attach is when the RTC acted with grave WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.
abuse of discretion, thus:
SO ORDERED.
... The only instance when double ,jeopardy will not attach is when the trial court acted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, such as where the prosecution was LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
denied the opportunity to present its case or where the trial was a sham. However, while certiorari Associate Justice
may be availed of to correct an erroneous acquittal, the petitioner in such an extraordinary proceeding
must clearly demonstrate that the trial court blatantly abused its authority to a point so grave as to
deprive it of its very power to dispense justice. 13

The constitutional prohibition against placing a person under double jeopardy for the same offense
bars not only a new and independent prosecution but also an appeal in the same action after jeopardy
had attached. 14 As such, every acquittal becomes final immediately upon promulgation and cannot
be recalled for correction or amendment. With the acquittal being immediately final, granting the
State's motion for reconsideration in this case would violate the Constitutional prohibition against
double jeopardy because it would effectively reopen the prosecution and subject the petitioners to a
second jeopardy despite their acquittal.

It is cogent to remind in this regard that the Constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy
provides to the accused three related protections, specifically: protection against a second
prosecution for the same offense after acquittal; protection against a second prosecution for the same
offense after conviction; and protection against multiple punishments for the same offense. 15The
rationale for the three protections is expounded in United States v. Wilson: 16

The interests underlying these three protections arc quite similar. When a defendant has been
once convicted and punished for a particular crime, principles of fairness and finality require
that he not be subjected to the possibility of further punishment by being again tried or
sentenced for the same offense. Ex pa rte Lange, 18 Wall 163 (1874); In re Nielsen, 131 U.S. 176
(1889). When a defendant has been acquitted of an offense, the Clause guarantees that the State
shall not be permitted to make repeated attempts to convict him,

"thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal, and compelling him to live in a
continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that, even though
innocent, he may be found guilty."

Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-188 (1957).

The policy of avoiding multiple trials has been regarded as so important that exceptions to the
principle have been only grudgingly allowed. Initially, a new trial was thought to be unavailable
after appeal, whether requested by the prosecution or the defendant. See United States v. Gibert,
25 F. Cas. 1287 (No. 15,204) (CCD Mass. 1834) (Story, J.). It was not until 1896 that it was made
clear that a defendant could seek a new trial after conviction, even though the Government
7
Sometime in July 1993, appellant Alipio Santiano was detained at the Naga City
Jail (pp. 4-5, ibid.). He was detained in the same cell occupied by the victim (p. 6,
ibid.). When appellant Santiano was mauled by the inmates of Cell 3, the victim
was one of those who participated in mauling him (p. 16, ibid.).

After the release of Santiano, he returned to the City Jail in November 1993
(17b) G.R. No. 123979 December 3, 1998
accompanied by one Lt. Dimaano (pp. 7-8, ibid.). Thereat, the victim was pointed
to by appellant Santiano as the one who mastermind his mauling (ibid.).
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
On December 27, 1993, at about 6:00 o'clock in the evening, the victim asked
ALIPIO SANTIANO, JOSE SANDIGAN, ARMENIA PILLUETA and JOSE VICENTE
permission from a jail trustee to allow him to buy viand outside the jail (pp. 7-9,
(JOVY) CHANCO, accused-appellants.
ibid.). When he left, the victim was wearing a fatigue jacket and short pants (p. 9,
ibid.).

As the victim emerged from the PNP store, he was accosted by appellants
VITUG, J.: Sandigan and Santiano (p. 7, TSN, April 25, 1994). The two (2) appellants held
the victim between them and thereafter hurriedly, proceeded towards the
Accuse-appellants Alipio Santiano, Jose Sandigan, Armenia Pillueta and Jose Vicente (Jovy) Chance NARCOM Office situated at a distance of about twenty-five (25) meters away
were indicted for the kidnapping with murder of Ramon John Dy Kow, Jr., a detention prisoner at the (pp. 7, 38-41, ibid.). Upon reaching the door of the NARCOM office, the victim
Naga City Jail, in an amended Information, docketed Criminal Case No. P-2319, filed with the was pushed inside (pp. 7-8, ibid.). Once the victim was already inside the
Regional Trial Court ("RTC") of Pili, Branch 32, Camarines Sur. NARCOM Office, appellant Sandigan proceeded to and took his place at Plaza
Barlin facing the PNP Police Station (pp. 8-12, ibid.). The victim was made to sit
and thereafter mauled by appellant Santiano (pp. 8-11, ibid.). Santiano got hold
When arraigned, the four accused pleaded not guilty to the charge. The trial thereupon ensued.
of a handkerchief, rolled it around his fists and continued to punch the victim for
almost fifteen (15) minutes (p. 16, ibid.). As the victim was being mauled,
The evidence submitted by the prosecution, disclosing its version of the case, is narrated by the appellant Pillueta stood by the door of the NARCOM office, her both hands
Solicitor General in the People's brief. inside her pockets while looking to her right and left, acting as a lookout (ibid.).

On May 13, 1993, the kidnap victim, Ramon John Dy Kow, Jr. and his live-in At this time, appellant Chanco who owned and drove his trimobile, parked it in
partner, Loida Navidad were arrested by appellants Jose Sandigan and Armenia front of the door of the NARCOM Office (pp. 15, 17, TSN, April 25, 1994).
Pillueta and several other NARCOM agents for alleged illegal possession of Thereafter, he proceeded inside the NARCOM Office (pp. 15, 17, ibid.).
marijuana (p. 32, TSN, April 20, 1994).
After a few minutes, appellant Chanco went out of the NARCOM Office and
After the arrest, they were brought to the NARCOM Office situated at the started the trimobile (p. 21, ibid.). His co-appellant Santiano and Pillueta
compound of the Philippine National Police (PNP) Headquarters, Naga City (p. followed him. Inside the trimobile, appellant Pillueta occupied the back seat (p.
32, ibid.). Thereat, they were at first warned by appellant Pillueta not to contact a 21, ibid.). Santiano occupied the reserved seat in front of the passenger seat
lawyer (p. 35, ibid.). Appellant Pillueta likewise reminded them that "it is only a which was occupied by the victim (ibid.).
matter of P10,000.00" (p. 35, ibid.).
As appellant Chanco was about to start his trimobile, appellant Sandigan, who
When Navidad's brother nonetheless arrived accompanied by a lawyer, appellant was at Plaza Barlin, transferred to and stationed himself at the Century Fox in
Pillueta got angry (p. 38, ibid.). At once, the victim and Navidad were dragged to front of the GSIS building situated at the corner of General Luna and Arana
the Naga City Jail situated at a distance of six (6) to seven (7) meters from the Streets (p. 23, ibid.).
NARCOM Office (pp. 10, 38-39, ibid.). Since their arrest, they were detained at
the Naga City Jail (ibid.).
The trimobile proceeded towards the direction of San Francisco Church (p. 40,
TSN, April 23, 1994). When it passed the Panganiban Drive, Naga City, on its

8
way towards the direction of Palestina, Pili, Camarines Sur, the victim was still That upon leaving the NARCOM office and while on board the trimobile
aboard the trimobile seated at the passenger seat nearest the driver (p. 4, TSN, accused-appellants Sandigan, Santiano and Chanco were deciding whether to see
May 24, 1994). a movie or have a round of drink and, after failing to decide whether to see a
movie or a round of drink, accused-appellants Sandigan and Chanco conducted
When prosecution witness Rañola heard over the radio that a person was found accused-appellant Santiano to the jeepney terminal for Milaor, Camarines Sur
dead at the canal in Palestina, Pili, Camarines Sur, he lost no time in informing a and thereupon, accused-appellant Chanco also conducted accused-appellant
policeman Prila of the Pili Police Department that the descriptions of the dead Sandigan to the Philtranco terminal where the latter boarded a bus to Bato,
person he heard over the radio fit not only the person he saw being hauled to and Camarines Sur where he resides.
thereafter mauled at the NARCOM Office but likewise the same person who was
on board the trimobile driven by appellant Chanco (p. 13, TSN, May 6, 1994). That between 6:30 and 7:00 o'clock P.M. of the same date, accused-appellant
Santiano was in Milaor, Camarines Sur, a Municipality less than four kilometers
Robert Dy Kow identified the man found dead in Palestina, Pili, Camarines Sur, away from Naga City, and fetched Ms. Arcadia Paz, a traditional mid-wife
as his brother Ramon John Dy Kow, Jr.1 (komadrana), from the latter's residence to conduct/perform a pre-natal therapy
(hilot) upon his (Santiano) pregnant wife; that Ms. Paz and accused-appellant
Santiano proceeded to and arrived at the latter's house in Naga City about past
The defense presented its own account of the facts hereunder expounded by it; viz: 7:00 o'clock in the evening where Ms. Paz conducted a pre-natal therapy upon
appellant Santiano's wife; that Ms. Paz finished the pre-natal therapy at or about
Accused-appellant Armenia Pillueta is an organic member of the NARCOM, 9:00 o'clock P.M.; that she (Paz) left the house of accused-appellant Santiano and
Naga City, Command. Accused-Appellant Jose Sandigan is a regular member of was accompanied for home by latter at or about 10:00 o'clock of the same
the PNP but, he was a former organic member of the NARCOM. On the other evening; that from past 7:00 o'clock when Paz and Santiano arrived at the latter's
hand, Accused Alipio Santiano and Jose Vicente "Jovi" Chanco are amongst the house until past 10:00 o'clock when they left Santiano's house, accused-appellant
active Civilian Volunteer/Assists of the NARCOM. Santiano was all the time present at and never left his house;

That at or about 5:00 o'clock P.M. of December 27, 1993, accused-appellant That on the other hand, SPO3 Fernandez, Deniega and accused-appellant
Sandigan was in front of the Advent theater; that while thereat, he saw accused- Pillueta, upon leaving the NARCOM office, went directly to the Sampaguita
appellant Santiano and he invited the latter for a snack at the Mang Donald's, a Music Lounge and watched the lady band perform thereat; that Roy Cabral, a
burger house, situated just beside the Advent theater; that after taking their common acquaintance of SPO3 Fernandez, Deniega and accused-appellant
snacks, they decided to go to the NARCOM office; that while on their way to the Pillueta, even saw and approached them (SPO3 Fernandez, Deniega and Pillueta)
NARCOM office, they saw accused-appellant Chanco emerging from the Nehrus at their table inside the Sampaguita Music Lounge; that the three of them (SPO3
Department Store where the latter bought something; that this Nehrus Fernandez, Deniega and Pillueta) left the Sampaguita Music Lounge at or about
Department Store is located in front of the Naga City Police Head Quarters which 2:00 A.M. of December 28, 1993, and thereupon, they went to their respective
is also near the NARCOM office, that the three of them (Sandigan, Santiano and homes.
Chanco) proceeded to the NARCOM office; that when they arrived, accused-
appellant Pillueta, SPO3 Lorna "Onang" Fernandez, Tet Deniega and the That on December 27, 1993, at any time of the day, the late Ramon John Dy
NARCOM, District Commander P/Insp. Del Socorro were at the NARCOM Kow, Jr. was neither seen by the accused-appellants nor was he in the NARCOM
office while accused-appellant. Chanco's trimobile was parked in front of the office more specifically and particularly between 6:00 to 7:00 P.M. of the same
NARCOM office; that while in the NARCOM office, accused-appellant Santiano date; that the late Ramon John Dy Kow, Jr. was known to SPO3 Fernandez and
and Chanco were joking with each other, like kids, such that accused-appellants his (Dy Kow, Jr.) height and body built is almost the same or similarly the same
Santiano would sling accused-appellant Chanco with his handkerchief; that, as it as that of accused-appellant Chanco; that she (SPO3 Fernandez) also known
was intermittently raining, accused-appellants Sandigan, Santiano and Chanco William Rañola whom she usually see drunk/under the influence of liquor;
left the NARCOM office past 6:00 P.M. aboard the trimobile of accused-
appellant Chanco, while accused-appellant Pillueta together with SPO3 Lorna
Fernandez and Tet Deniega left the NARCOM office at or about 8:00 P.M. and That in the first week of January, 1994, during the investigation of the case
proceeded to the Sampaguita Music Lounge to watch a lady band performing at conducted by the PNP Pili, Camarines Sur, SPO3 Fernandez was asked by major
the Sampaguita Music Lounge, leaving behind P/Insp. Nelson Del Socorro at the Ernesto Idian, chief of PNP Pili, Camarines Sur, of accused-appellant Pillueta's
NARCOM office. whereabouts in the night of December 27, 1993, where she (SPO3 Fernandez)
told Major Idian that accused-appellant Pillueta was with her (SPO3 Fernandez)

9
at the Sampaguita Music Lounge; that Major Idian did not ask her (SPO3 Dr. Thomas S. Gonzales performed an autopsy on the cadaver of the victim. His findings revealed
Fernandez) to execute an affidavit of what she told him instead, Major Idian that Dy Kow, Jr., had fatally sustained the following injuries:
requested her not to tell accused-appellant Pillueta about what he asked her.
Eye: Contusion, upper lid extending to the outer canthus, right;
That on January 20, 1994, accuse-appellants Pillueta, Santiano and Chanco,
reported and submitted themselves to their superior officer, Col. Norberto Ear: lacerated wound ripping off the lowest pole of the lobule,
Manaog, Deputy Director of the NARCOM at Camp Crame, Quezon City, right; serrated border
wherein they reported that they were suspected of having killed Ramon John Dy
Kow, Jr. and requested that they be placed under his custody; that Col. Manaog
referred them to the legal officer of the NARCOM, Major Acpal; that after being Sub-occipital region: lacerated wound, 0.9 cms. in length,
informed by accused-appellants Pillueta, Santiano and Chanco that they did not centrally located;
have any idea of whether a warrant of arrest was already issued against them,
Col. Manaog, in consultation with Major Acpal, told them that there is no yet Neck: punctured wound, 3-4 mm deep, semi-circular with
basis for them to be placed under custody, so that, Col. Manaog instructed them serrated border, base of neck at the sternomastoid border, right;
just get in touch with him so that if a warrant of arrest comes out, the same could
be served upon them; that Col. Manaog directed Major Acpal to proceed to Pili, Chest: Gunshot wound
Camarines Sur to determine the status of the investigation and to know whether a
warrant of arrest was already issued; that on January 24, 1994, Major Acpal went
to Pili, Camarines Sur and found out that a warrant of arrest against accused- point of entrance: 2nd ICS, sternal border, right, 12 mm in diameter
appellants, Sandigan, who was already arrested, Pillueta and Santiano has been
issued on January 21, 1994; that on January 25, 1994, Major Acpal, being a Bullet route: from the point of entrance extending backwards to the left,
lawyer and the Legal officer of the NARCOM filed before the Municipal Trial piercing the heart and left lung and lodging on the anterior aspect or
Court, Pili, Camarines Sur, a motion to quash the warrant of arrest; that on surface of the sub scapular area, left
January 23, 1994 accused-appellant Pillueta informed Col. Manaog that she was
hospitalized due to a car accident and that she may be placed under his custody
Point of exist: None
should a warrant for her arrest be issued; on January 26, 1994, she was placed
under the custody of her superior, Col. Manaog of the NARCOM. On the other
hand, accused-appellants, Santiano and Chanco were, from time to time, Bullet slug: Recovered
contacting Col. Manaog to determine whether a warrant of arrest was already
issued but, since Col. Manaog was always out of his office, they were able to CAUSE OF DEATH: INTERNAL HEMORRHAGE
contact, via telephone facility, Col. Manaog only on April 16, 1994; and accused-
appellants Chanco and Santiano went to the office of NARCOM, Camp Crame,
SECONDARY TO GUNSHOT WOUND.4
Quezon City, voluntarily surrendered, and Maj. Acpal placed them under the
custody of the NARCOM and were detained at PNP NARCOM Cell, Camp
Crame, Quezon City. The records of this case show that no warrant of arrest was Evaluating the evidence before it, the trial court found all four accused guilty beyond reasonable
issued against accused-appellant Chanco (Order dated Sept. 5, 1994), however, doubt of kidnapping, defined and penalized under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code; the court
he voluntarily surrendered and submitted to the custody of the NARCOM and to adjudged:
the trial court.2
UPON THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, this Court FINDS FOR THE
Appellant Jovy Chanco had this further statement in his supplemental appeal brief; thus: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and finds all of the accused, Jose Sandigan,
Armenia, aka Armie Pillueta, Alipio Santiano, and Jose Vicente Chanco, aka
Jovy, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of KIDNAPPING as defined
On December 28, 1993, a cadaver of an unknown person was discovered
and penalized under Art. 267 of the Revised Penal Code, and there being no
somewhere in the vicinity of Barangay Palestina, Municipality of Pili, Province
mitigating or aggravating circumstances, hereby sentences each and all of them to
of Camarines, by Danilo Camba, the Barangay Captain of said locality. The
suffer imprisonment, RECLUSION PERPETUA, with all the accessories of the
corpse was later on identified by Robert Dy Kow as that one of his brother,
penalty, and to indemnify the heirs of Ramon John Dy Kow, Jr. the sum of Fifty
Ramon John Dy Kow, Jr. 3

10
Thousand Pesos, and to pay the costs; they are credited in full for the preventive Article 248 (Murder) of the Revised Penal Code" Evidently, appellants have been properly apprised
imprisonment.5 of the charges, the information did go on to state thus —

Accused-appellants filed the instant appeal. That on or about the 27th day of December 1993 between 6:00 o'clock to 7:00
o'clock in the evening at Barangay Palestina, Municipality of Pili, Province of
Assailing the decision of the court a quo, appellants would insist that the amended information under Camarines Sur, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
which they were arraigned, tried and convicted, although so captioned as an indictment for the the above-named accused conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one
complex crime of kidnapping with murder, was, in reality a mere indictment for murder. According to another with intent to kill, with treachery, superior strength and evident
appellants, the use of the words "abducted" and "kidnapping" in the amended information was not in premeditation, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously abduct
itself indicative of the crime of kidnapping being charged but that, from the averments of the kidnap and bring into a secluded place at Palestina, Pili, Camarines Sur one
information, it could be apparent that Ramon John Dy Kow, Jr., was "abducted or kidnapped" not for RAMON JOHN DY KOW, JR. and while thereat attack and shoot with firearm
the purpose of detaining but of liquidating him. Hence, the defense theorized, the conviction for the said Ramon John Dy Kow, Jr. for several times hitting him on the different
kidnapping had no legal ground to stand on. parts of his body causing his instantaneous death. 8

Let it not be said that the contention lacks remarkableness nevertheless, it is a legal proposition that The accused have gone through trial without any objection thereover. Exceptions relative to
can here hardly be accepted. The amended information reads: the statement or recital of fact constituting the offense charged ought be presented before
the trial court; if none is taken and the defective or even omitted averments are supplied by
competent proof, it would not be error for an appellate court to reject those exceptions on
The undersigned 1st Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Camarines Sur accuses appeal.9
JOSE SANDIGAN, ALIPIO SANTIANO, ARMIE PILLUETA and JOVY
CHANCO of the crime of KIDNAPPING WITH MURDER, defined and
penalized under Article 267 and Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, The issue is next posed: When a complex crime has been charged in an information and the evidence
committed as follows: fails to support the charge on one of the component offenses, can the defendant still be separately
convicted of the other offense? The question has long been answered in the affirmative. In United
States vs. Lahoylahoy and Madanlog, 10 the Court has ruled to be legally feasible the conviction of
That on or about the 27th day of December 1993 between an accused on one of the offenses included in a complex crime charged, when properly established,
6:00 o'clock to 7:00 o'clock in the evening at Barangay despite the failure of evidence to hold the accused guilty of the other charge.
Palestina, Municipality of Pili, Province of Camarines Sur,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating Art. 267 of the Revised Penal Code, prior to its amendment by Section 8 of Republic Act 7659, 11
and mutually helping one another with intent to kill, with reads:
treachery, superior strength and evident premeditation, did
then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously abduct, Art. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. — Any private individual
kidnap, and bring into a secluded place at Palestina, Pili, who shall kidnap or detain another; or in any other manner deprive him of his
Camarines Sur, one RAMON JOHN DY KOW, JR. and while liberty, shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death;
thereat attack and shoot with firearm the said Ramon John Dy
Kow, Jr. for several times hitting him on the different parts of 1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than five days.
his body causing his instantaneous death.
2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority.
That as a consequence of the death of the victim Ramon John
Dy Kow, Jr. his heirs suffered damages. 6
3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person
kidnapped or detained; or if threats to kill him shall have been made.
The information is not so wanting as to render it legally inadequate for the purpose it has been
intended by the prosecution. It should be sufficient for an information to distinctly state the statutory
designation of the offense and the acts or omissions complained of as being constitutive of that 4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, female, or a public
offense.7 A reading of the amended information readily reveals that the charge is for "kidnapping officer.
with murder, defined and penalized under Article 267 (Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention) and

11
The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was committed for 4. Witness Don Gumba was positive when he declared that he saw the victim at
the purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any other person, even if none about 8:00 o'clock in the evening of December 27, 1993 with appellant Chanco
of the circumstances above mentioned were present in the commission of the on its way towards the direction of Palestina, Pili, Camarines Sur where the
offense. victim was found dead. 14

The elements of the offense, here adequately shown, are (a) that the offender is a private The fact alone that appellant Pillueta is "an organic member of the NARCOM" and appellant
individual; (b) that he kidnaps or detains another, or in any other manner deprives the latter Sandigan a regular member of the PNP would not exempt them from the criminal liability for
of his liberty; (c) that the act of detention or kidnapping is illegal; and (d) that, in the kidnapping. 15 It is quite clear that in abducting and taking away the victim, appellants did so neither
commission of the offense, any of the following circumstances is present, i.e., (i) that the in furtherance of official function nor in the pursuit of authority vested in them. It is not, in fine, in
kidnapping or detention lasts for more than 5 days, or (ii) that it is committed simulating relation to their office, but in purely private capacity that they have acted in concert with their co-
public authority, or (iii) that any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person appellants Santiano and Chanco.
kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him are made, or (iv) that the person kidnapped or
detained is a minor, female, or a public officer. 12 The crime of kidnapping cannot be here absorbed by the charge of murder since the detention of the
victim is not shown to have been for the purpose of liquidating him. Appellants themselves, in fact,
Prosecution witness William Rañola testified that he had seen the victim being accosted, held and all deny having killed the victim. And while the evidence may have thus been found to be wanting by
thereafter dragged to the NARCOM office by appellants Santiago and Sandigan. Inside the the trial court so as to equally hold appellants responsible for the death of the victim, the Court is
NARCOM office the victim was mauled by Santiano. For several minutes, Santiano continued to conviced that the court a quo did not err in making them account for kidnapping. The circumstances
batter him with punches while Pillueta stood by the door and so acted as the "lockout." The heretofore recited indicate the attendance of conspiracy among the appellants thereby making them
appellants then took the victim away on a trimobile owned and driven by Chanco. Rañola positively each liable for the offense.
identified the fatigue jacket worn by the victim on the evening of his abduction on 27 December 1993
and when his lifeless body was found in the morning of 28 December 1993. Don Gumba The claim of appellants that they cannot be held liable for indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00
corroborated Rañola's testimony. Gumba was positive that he had seen the victim at around eight because the prosecution did not present evidence to prove damages is without merit. The indemnity
o'clock in the evening of 27 December 1993 with appellants Santiano and Pillueta on board the awarded by the trial court clearly refers to the civil indemnity for the offense 16 and not for actual
trimobile driven by appellant Chanco on its way towards the direction of Palestina, Pili, Camarines damages sustained.
Sur, where, the following morning the victim was found dead evidently after succumbing to several
gunshot wounds.
SO ORDERED.
Appellants have not shown any nefarious motive on the part of the witnesses that might have
influenced them to declare falsely against appellants; the Court sees no justification to thereby deny
faith and credit to their testimony. 13 The Court likewise shares the view of the Solicitor General in
pointing out that —

1. There is no question that the victim, who was on the date in question detained
at the Naga City Jail, asked permission from the jail trustee in order to buy viand
outside. It was while he was emerging from the PNP store that he was accosted
by appellants Santiano and Sandigan.

2. From the moment that the victim was accosted in Naga City, he was at first
dragged to the NARCOM Office where he was mauled. This circumstance
indicated the intention to deprive him of his liberty for sometime, an essential
element of the crime of kidnapping.

3. The victim did not only sustain serious physical injuries but likewise died as
indicated in the autopsy report, thus, belying appellants' claim that none of the
circumstances in Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code was present.

12
Avenue, Manila, without bail, none having been recommended in the information and none fixed in
the arrest warrant. The following morning, February 28, 1990, he was brought to Camp Tomas
Karingal in Quezon City where he was given over to the custody of the Superintendent of the
Northern Police District, Brig. Gen. Edgardo Dula Torres.3
(48.) G.R. No. 92163 June 5, 1990
On the same date of February 28, 1990, Senator Enrile, through counsel, filed the petition for habeas
corpus herein (which was followed by a supplemental petition filed on March 2, 1990), alleging that
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, he was deprived of his constitutional rights in being, or having been:
petitioner
vs.
JUDGE JAIME SALAZAR (Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City [Br. (a) held to answer for criminal offense which does not exist in the statute books;
103], SENIOR STATE PROSECUTOR AURELIO TRAMPE, PROSECUTOR FERDINAND
R. ABESAMIS, AND CITY ASSISTANT CITY PROSECUTOR EULOGIO MANANQUIL, (b) charged with a criminal offense in an information for which no complaint was
NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION DIRECTOR ALFREDO LIM, BRIG. GEN. initially filed or preliminary investigation was conducted, hence was denied due
EDGAR DULA TORRES (Superintendent of the Northern Police District) AND/ OR ANY AND process;
ALL PERSONS WHO MAY HAVE ACTUAL CUSTODY OVER THE PERSON OF JUAN
PONCE ENRILE, respondents. (c) denied his right to bail; and

G.R. No. 92164 June 5, 1990 (d) arrested and detained on the strength of a warrant issued without the judge
who issued it first having personally determined the existence of probable cause.
SPS. REBECCO E. PANLILIO AND ERLINDA E. PANLILIO, petitioners, 4
vs.
PROSECUTORS FERNANDO DE LEON, AURELIO C. TRAMPE, FFRDINAND R. The Court issued the writ prayed for, returnable March 5, 1990 and set the plea for hearing on March
ABESAMIS, AND EULOGIO C. MANANQUIL, and HON. JAIME W. SALAZAR, JR., in his 6, 1990. 5 On March 5, 1990, the Solicitor General filed a consolidated return 6 for the respondents
capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 103, respondents. in this case and in G.R. No. 92164 7 Which had been contemporaneously but separately filed by two
of Senator Enrile's co-accused, the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio, and raised similar
NARVASA, J.: questions. Said return urged that the petitioners' case does not fall within the Hernandez ruling
because-and this is putting it very simply-the information in Hernandez charged murders and other
Thirty-four years after it wrote history into our criminal jurisprudence, People vs. Hernandez 1 once common crimes committed as a necessary means for the commission of rebellion, whereas the
more takes center stage as the focus of a confrontation at law that would re-examine, if not the information against Sen. Enrile et al. charged murder and frustrated murder committed on the
validity of its doctrine, the limits of its applicability. To be sure, the intervening period saw a number occasion, but not in furtherance, of rebellion. Stated otherwise, the Solicitor General would
of similar cases 2 that took issue with the ruling-all with a marked lack of success-but none, it would distinguish between the complex crime ("delito complejo") arising from an offense being a necessary
Beem, where season and circumstance had more effectively conspired to attract wide public attention means for committing another, which is referred to in the second clause of Article 48, Revised Penal
and excite impassioned debate, even among laymen; none, certainly, which has seen quite the kind Code, and is the subject of the Hernandez ruling, and the compound crime ("delito compuesto")
and range of arguments that are now brought to bear on the same question. arising from a single act constituting two or more grave or less grave offenses referred to in the first
clause of the same paragraph, with which Hernandez was not concerned and to which, therefore, it
should not apply.
The facts are not in dispute. In the afternoon of February 27, 1990, Senate Minority Floor Leader
Juan Ponce Enrile was arrested by law enforcement officers led by Director Alfredo Lim of the
National Bureau of Investigation on the strength of a warrant issued by Hon. Jaime Salazar of the The parties were heard in oral argument, as scheduled, on March 6, 1990, after which the Court
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City Branch 103, in Criminal Case No. 9010941. The warrant had issued its Resolution of the same date 8 granting Senator Enrile and the Panlilio spouses provisional
issued on an information signed and earlier that day filed by a panel of prosecutors composed of liberty conditioned upon their filing, within 24 hours from notice, cash or surety bonds of
Senior State Prosecutor Aurelio C. Trampe, State Prosecutor Ferdinand R. Abesamis and Assistant P100,000.00 (for Senator Enrile) and P200,000.00 (for the Panlilios), respectively. The Resolution
City Prosecutor Eulogio Mananquil, Jr., charging Senator Enrile, the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda stated that it was issued without prejudice to a more extended resolution on the matter of the
Panlilio, and Gregorio Honasan with the crime of rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated provisional liberty of the petitioners and stressed that it was not passing upon the legal issues raised
murder allegedly committed during the period of the failed coup attempt from November 29 to in both cases. Four Members of the Court 9 voted against granting bail to Senator Enrile, and two 10
December 10, 1990. Senator Enrile was taken to and held overnight at the NBI headquarters on Taft against granting bail to the Panlilios.

13
The Court now addresses those issues insofar as they are raised and litigated in Senator Enrile's There is one other reason-and a fundamental one at that-why Article 48 of our
petition, G.R. No. 92163. Penal Code cannot be applied in the case at bar. If murder were not complexed
with rebellion, and the two crimes were punished separately (assuming that this
The parties' oral and written pleas presented the Court with the following options: could be done), the following penalties would be imposable upon the movant,
namely: (1) for the crime of rebellion, a fine not exceeding P20,000 and prision
mayor, in the corresponding period, depending upon the modifying circumstances
(a) abandon Hernandez and adopt the minority view expressed in the main present, but never exceeding 12 years of prision mayor, and (2) for the crime of
dissent of Justice Montemayor in said case that rebellion cannot absorb more murder, reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death, depending upon the
serious crimes, and that under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code rebellion modifying circumstances present. in other words, in the absence of aggravating
may properly be complexed with common offenses, so-called; this option was circumstances, the extreme penalty could not be imposed upon him. However,
suggested by the Solicitor General in oral argument although it is not offered in under Article 48 said penalty would have to be meted out to him, even in the
his written pleadings; absence of a single aggravating circumstance. Thus, said provision, if construed
in conformity with the theory of the prosecution, would be unfavorable to the
(b) hold Hernandez applicable only to offenses committed in furtherance, or as a movant.
necessary means for the commission, of rebellion, but not to acts committed in
the course of a rebellion which also constitute "common" crimes of grave or less Upon the other hand, said Article 48 was enacted for the purpose of favoring the
grave character; culprit, not of sentencing him to a penalty more severe than that which would be
proper if the several acts performed by him were punished separately. In the
(c) maintain Hernandez as applying to make rebellion absorb all other offenses words of Rodriguez Navarro:
committed in its course, whether or not necessary to its commission or in
furtherance thereof. La unificacion de penas en los casos de concurso de delitos a
que hace referencia este articulo (75 del Codigo de 1932),
On the first option, eleven (11) Members of the Court voted against abandoning Hernandez. Two (2) esta basado francamente en el principio pro reo.' (II Doctrina
Members felt that the doctrine should be re-examined. 10-A In the view of the majority, the ruling Penal del Tribunal Supremo de Espana, p. 2168.)
remains good law, its substantive and logical bases have withstood all subsequent challenges and no
new ones are presented here persuasive enough to warrant a complete reversal. This view is We are aware of the fact that this observation refers to Article 71 (later 75) of the
reinforced by the fact that not too long ago, the incumbent President, exercising her powers under the Spanish Penal Code (the counterpart of our Article 48), as amended in 1908 and
1986 Freedom Constitution, saw fit to repeal, among others, Presidential Decree No. 942 of the then in 1932, reading:
former regime which precisely sought to nullify or neutralize Hernandez by enacting a new provision
(Art. 142-A) into the Revised Penal Code to the effect that "(w)hen by reason, or on the occasion, of
any of the crimes penalized in this Chapter (Chapter I of Title 3, which includes rebellion), acts Las disposiciones del articulo anterior no son aplicables en el
which constitute offenses upon which graver penalties are imposed by law are committed, the penalty caso de que un solo hecho constituya dos o mas delitos, o
for the most serious offense in its maximum period shall be imposed upon the offender."' 11 In thus cuando el uno de ellos sea medio necesario para cometer el
acting, the President in effect by legislative flat reinstated Hernandez as binding doctrine with the otro.
effect of law. The Court can do no less than accord it the same recognition, absent any sufficiently
powerful reason against so doing. En estos casos solo se impondra la pena correspondiente al
delito mas grave en su grado maximo, hasta el limite que
On the second option, the Court unanimously voted to reject the theory that Hernandez is, or should represents la suma de las que pudieran imponerse, penando
be, limited in its application to offenses committed as a necessary means for the commission of separadamente los delitos.
rebellion and that the ruling should not be interpreted as prohibiting the complexing of rebellion with
other common crimes committed on the occasion, but not in furtherance, thereof. While four Cuando la pena asi computada exceda de este limite, se
Members of the Court felt that the proponents' arguments were not entirely devoid of merit, the sancionaran los delitos por separado. (Rodriguez Navarro,
consensus was that they were not sufficient to overcome what appears to be the real thrust of Doctrina Penal del Tribunal Supremo, Vol. II, p. 2163)
Hernandez to rule out the complexing of rebellion with any other offense committed in its course
under either of the aforecited clauses of Article 48, as is made clear by the following excerpt from the and that our Article 48 does not contain the qualification inserted in said
majority opinion in that case: amendment, restricting the imposition of the penalty for the graver offense in its

14
maximum period to the case when it does not exceed the sum total of the of rhetoric. Read in the context of Hernandez, the information does indeed charge the petitioner with
penalties imposable if the acts charged were dealt with separately. The absence of a crime defined and punished by the Revised Penal Code: simple rebellion.
said limitation in our Penal Code does not, to our mind, affect substantially the
spirit of said Article 48. Indeed, if one act constitutes two or more offenses, there Was the petitioner charged without a complaint having been initially filed and/or preliminary
can be no reason to inflict a punishment graver than that prescribed for each one investigation conducted? The record shows otherwise, that a complaint against petitioner for simple
of said offenses put together. In directing that the penalty for the graver offense rebellion was filed by the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation, and that on the strength of
be, in such case, imposed in its maximum period, Article 48 could have had no said complaint a preliminary investigation was conducted by the respondent prosecutors, culminating
other purpose than to prescribe a penalty lower than the aggregate of the penalties in the filing of the questioned information. 14 There is nothing inherently irregular or contrary to law
for each offense, if imposed separately. The reason for this benevolent spirit of in filing against a respondent an indictment for an offense different from what is charged in the
article 48 is readily discernible. When two or more crimes are the result of a initiatory complaint, if warranted by the evidence developed during the preliminary investigation.
single act, the offender is deemed less perverse than when he commits said
crimes thru separate and distinct acts. Instead of sentencing him for each crime
independently from the other, he must suffer the maximum of the penalty for the It is also contended that the respondent Judge issued the warrant for petitioner's arrest without first
more serious one, on the assumption that it is less grave than the sum total of the personally determining the existence of probable cause by examining under oath or affirmation the
separate penalties for each offense. 12 complainant and his witnesses, in violation of Art. III, sec. 2, of the Constitution. 15 This Court has
already ruled, however, that it is not the unavoidable duty of the judge to make such a personal
examination, it being sufficient that he follows established procedure by personally evaluating the
The rejection of both options shapes and determines the primary ruling of the Court, which is that report and the supporting documents submitted by the prosecutor.16 Petitioner claims that the warrant
Hernandez remains binding doctrine operating to prohibit the complexing of rebellion with any other of arrest issued barely one hour and twenty minutes after the case was raffled off to the respondent
offense committed on the occasion thereof, either as a means necessary to its commission or as an Judge, which hardly gave the latter sufficient time to personally go over the voluminous records of
unintended effect of an activity that constitutes rebellion. the preliminary investigation. 17 Merely because said respondent had what some might consider only
a relatively brief period within which to comply with that duty, gives no reason to assume that he had
This, however, does not write finis to the case. Petitioner's guilt or innocence is not here inquired into, not, or could not have, so complied; nor does that single circumstance suffice to overcome the legal
much less adjudged. That is for the trial court to do at the proper time. The Court's ruling merely presumption that official duty has been regularly performed.
provides a take-off point for the disposition of other questions relevant to the petitioner's complaints
about the denial of his rights and to the propriety of the recourse he has taken. Petitioner finally claims that he was denied the right to bail. In the light of the Court's reaffirmation
of Hernandez as applicable to petitioner's case, and of the logical and necessary corollary that the
The Court rules further (by a vote of 11 to 3) that the information filed against the petitioner does in information against him should be considered as charging only the crime of simple rebellion, which
fact charge an offense. Disregarding the objectionable phrasing that would complex rebellion with is bailable before conviction, that must now be accepted as a correct proposition. But the question
murder and multiple frustrated murder, that indictment is to be read as charging simple rebellion. remains: Given the facts from which this case arose, was a petition for habeas corpus in this Court
Thus, in Hernandez, the Court said: the appropriate vehicle for asserting a right to bail or vindicating its denial?

In conclusion, we hold that, under the allegations of the amended information The criminal case before the respondent Judge was the normal venue for invoking the petitioner's
against defendant-appellant Amado V. Hernandez, the murders, arsons and right to have provisional liberty pending trial and judgment. The original jurisdiction to grant or deny
robberies described therein are mere ingredients of the crime of rebellion bail rested with said respondent. The correct course was for petitioner to invoke that jurisdiction by
allegedly committed by said defendants, as means "necessary" (4) for the filing a petition to be admitted to bail, claiming a right to bail per se by reason of the weakness of the
perpetration of said offense of rebellion; that the crime charged in the evidence against him. Only after that remedy was denied by the trial court should the review
aforementioned amended information is, therefore, simple rebellion, not the jurisdiction of this Court have been invoked, and even then, not without first applying to the Court of
complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder, arsons and robberies; that the Appeals if appropriate relief was also available there.
maximum penalty imposable under such charge cannot exceed twelve (12) years
of prision mayor and a fine of P2H,HHH; and that, in conformity with the policy Even acceptance of petitioner's premise that going by the Hernandez ruling, the information charges
of this court in dealing with accused persons amenable to a similar punishment, a non-existent crime or, contrarily, theorizing on the same basis that it charges more than one offense,
said defendant may be allowed bail. 13 would not excuse or justify his improper choice of remedies. Under either hypothesis, the obvious
recourse would have been a motion to quash brought in the criminal action before the respondent
The plaint of petitioner's counsel that he is charged with a crime that does not exist in the statute Judge. 18
books, while technically correct so far as the Court has ruled that rebellion may not be complexed
with other offenses committed on the occasion thereof, must therefore be dismissed as a mere flight
15
There thus seems to be no question that All the grounds upon which petitioner has founded the present-day rebels are less impelled by love of country than by lust for power and have become no
present petition, whether these went into the substance of what is charged in the information or better than mere terrorists to whom nothing, not even the sanctity of human life, is allowed to stand in
imputed error or omission on the part of the prosecuting panel or of the respondent Judge in dealing the way of their ambitions. Nothing so underscores this aberration as the rash of seemingly senseless
with the charges against him, were originally justiciable in the criminal case before said Judge and killings, bombings, kidnappings and assorted mayhem so much in the news these days, as often
should have been brought up there instead of directly to this Court. perpetrated against innocent civilians as against the military, but by and large attributable to, or even
claimed by so-called rebels to be part of, an ongoing rebellion.
There was and is no reason to assume that the resolution of any of these questions was beyond the
ability or competence of the respondent Judge-indeed such an assumption would be demeaning and It is enough to give anyone pause-and the Court is no exception-that not even the crowded streets of
less than fair to our trial courts; none whatever to hold them to be of such complexity or our capital City seem safe from such unsettling violence that is disruptive of the public peace and
transcendental importance as to disqualify every court, except this Court, from deciding them; none, stymies every effort at national economic recovery. There is an apparent need to restructure the law
in short that would justify by passing established judicial processes designed to orderly move on rebellion, either to raise the penalty therefor or to clearly define and delimit the other offenses to
litigation through the hierarchy of our courts. Parenthentically, this is the reason behind the vote of be considered as absorbed thereby, so that it cannot be conveniently utilized as the umbrella for every
four Members of the Court against the grant of bail to petitioner: the view that the trial court should sort of illegal activity undertaken in its name. The Court has no power to effect such change, for it
not thus be precipitately ousted of its original jurisdiction to grant or deny bail, and if it erred in that can only interpret the law as it stands at any given time, and what is needed lies beyond
matter, denied an opportunity to correct its error. It makes no difference that the respondent Judge interpretation. Hopefully, Congress will perceive the need for promptly seizing the initiative in this
here issued a warrant of arrest fixing no bail. Immemorial practice sanctions simply following the matter, which is properly within its province.
prosecutor's recommendation regarding bail, though it may be perceived as the better course for the
judge motu proprio to set a bail hearing where a capital offense is charged.19 It is, in any event, WHEREFORE, the Court reiterates that based on the doctrine enunciated in People vs. Hernandez,
incumbent on the accused as to whom no bail has been recommended or fixed to claim the right to a the questioned information filed against petitioners Juan Ponce Enrile and the spouses Rebecco and
bail hearing and thereby put to proof the strength or weakness of the evidence against him. Erlinda Panlilio must be read as charging simple rebellion only, hence said petitioners are entitled to
bail, before final conviction, as a matter of right. The Court's earlier grant of bail to petitioners being
It is apropos to point out that the present petition has triggered a rush to this Court of other parties in merely provisional in character, the proceedings in both cases are ordered REMANDED to the
a similar situation, all apparently taking their cue from it, distrustful or contemptuous of the efficacy respondent Judge to fix the amount of bail to be posted by the petitioners. Once bail is fixed by said
of seeking recourse in the regular manner just outlined. The proliferation of such pleas has only respondent for any of the petitioners, the corresponding bail bond flied with this Court shall become
contributed to the delay that the petitioner may have hoped to avoid by coming directly to this Court. functus oficio. No pronouncement as to costs.

Not only because popular interest seems focused on the outcome of the present petition, but also SO ORDERED.
because to wash the Court's hand off it on jurisdictional grounds would only compound the delay that
it has already gone through, the Court now decides the same on the merits. But in so doing, the Court Cruz, Gancayco and Regalado, JJ., concur.
cannot express too strongly the view that said petition interdicted the ordered and orderly progression
of proceedings that should have started with the trial court and reached this Court only if the relief
appealed for was denied by the former and, in a proper case, by the Court of Appeals on review. Medialdea, J., concurs in G.R. No. 92164 but took no part in G.R. No. 92163.

Let it be made very clear that hereafter the Court will no longer countenance, but will give short Cortes and Griño-Aquino, JJ., are on leave.
shrift to, pleas like the present, that clearly short-circuit the judicial process and burden it with the
resolution of issues properly within the original competence of the lower courts. What has thus far
been stated is equally applicable to and decisive of the petition of the Panlilio spouses (G.R. No.
92164) which is virtually Identical to that of petitioner Enrile in factual milieu and is therefore
determinable on the same principles already set forth. Said spouses have uncontestedly pleaded 20
that warrants of arrest issued against them as co-accused of petitioner Enrile in Criminal Case No.
90-10941, that when they appeared before NBI Director Alfredo Lim in the afternoon of March 1,
1990, they were taken into custody and detained without bail on the strength of said warrants in
violation-they claim-of their constitutional rights.

It may be that in the light of contemporary events, the act of rebellion has lost that quitessentiany
quixotic quality that justifies the relative leniency with which it is regarded and punished by law, that
16
On October 27, 1992, the Sandiganbayan (First Division), of which Presiding Justice Garchitorena is
a member, set the criminal case for arraignment on November 13, 1992 at 8:00 A.M. (Rollo, p. 42)

On November 6, 1992, petitioner moved to defer the arraignment on the grounds that there was a
pending motion for inhibition, and that petitioner intended to file a motion for a bill of particulars
(Rollo, pp. 43-44).
(49) G.R. No. 109266 December 2, 1993
On November 9, 1992, the Sandiganbayan (First Division) denied the motion to defer the
arraignment (Rollo, p. 45).
MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. JUSTICE FRANCIS GARCHITORENA, SANDIGANBAYAN (First Division) and On November 10, 1992, petitioner filed a motion for a bill of particulars (Rollo, pp. 47-48). The
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. motion stated that while the information alleged that petitioner had approved the application or
legalization of "aliens" and gave them indirect benefits and advantages it lacked a list of the favored
aliens. According to petitioner, unless she was furnished with the names and identities of the aliens,
Amado M. Santiago, Jr. for petitioner. she could not properly plead and prepare for trial.

The Solicitor General for the People of the Philippines. On November 12, 1992 and upon motion of petitioner in G.R.
No. 107598 (Miriam Defensor Santiago v. Sandiganbayan, et al.), we directed the Sandiganbayan
QUIASON, J.: (First Division) to reset the arraignment to a later date and to dispose of the two incidents pending
before it (Re: disqualification of Presiding Justice Garchitorena and the motion for the bill of
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court to set aside: (a) the particulars).
Resolution dated March 3, 1993 in Criminal Case
No. 16698 of the Sandiganbayan (First Division) and to declare Presiding Justice Francis At the hearing on November 13, 1992 on the motion for a bill of particulars, the prosecution stated
Garchitorena of the Sandiganbayan, disqualified from acting in said criminal case; and (b) the categorically that they would file only one amended information against petitioner.
Resolution of said court promulgated on
March 14, 1993, which deemed as "filed" the 32 Amended Informations against petitioner (Rollo, pp. However, on December 8, 1992, the prosecution filed a motion to
2-35 and pp. 36-94). admit the 32 Amended Informations (Criminal Cases Nos. 18371 to 18402; Rollo, pp. 61-126).

On May 1, 1991, petitioner was charged in Criminal Case No. 16698 of the Sandiganbayan with On March 3, 1993, Presiding Justice Garchitorena issued the questioned Resolution dated March 11,
violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and 1993, denying the motion for his disqualification (Rollo, pp. 151-164).
Corrupt Practices Act, allegedly committed by her favoring "unqualified" aliens with the benefits of
the Alien Legalization Program (Rollo, p. 36).
On March 14, 1993, the Sandiganbayan (First Division) promulgated a resolution, admitting the 32
Amended Informations and ordering petitioner to post the corresponding bail bonds within ten days
On May 24, 1991, petitioner filed with us a petition for certiorari and prohibition, docketed as G.R. from notice (Rollo, pp. 165-185). Petitioner's arraignment on the 32 Amended Informations was set
No. 99289-99290 (Santiago v. Vasquez, 205 SCRA 162 [1992]), to enjoin the Sandiganbayan from for
proceeding with Criminal Case No. 16698 on the ground that said case was intended solely to harass April 12, 1993 at 8:00 A.M. (Rollo, p. 186).
her as she was then a presidential candidate. She alleged that this was in violation of Section 10,
Article IX-C of the Constitution which provides that "(b)ona fide candidates for any public office
shall be free from any form of harassment and discrimination." The petition was dismissed on Hence, the filing of the instant petition.
January 13, 1992.
Acting on the petition for the issuance of a restraining order, we issued the Resolution dated March
On October 16, 1992, petitioner filed a motion for inhibition of Presiding Justice Garchitorena, which 25, 1993, ordering Presiding Justice Garchitorena "to CEASE and DESIST from sitting in the case
motion was set for hearing on November 13, 1992 at 8:00 A.M. (Rollo, pp. 38-41). until the question of his disqualification is finally resolved by this Court and from enforcing the
resolution dated March 11, 1993, ordering petitioner to post bail bonds for the 32 Amended

17
Informations and from proceeding with the arraignment on That on or about October 17, 1988, or for sometime prior or subsequent thereto,
April 12, 1993" (Rollo, p. 194). in Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
accused Miriam Defensor-Santiago, being then the Commissioner of the
Re: Disqualification of the Sandiganbayan Presiding Justice Commission on Immigration and Deportation, with evident bad faith and
manifest partiality, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally
approve the application for legalization of aliens who arrived in the Philippines
The petition for disqualification of Presiding Justice Garchitorena is based on the publication of is after January 1, 1984 in violation of Executive Order No. 324 dated April 13,
letter in the July 29, 1992 issue of the Philippine Star, which to petitioner "prejudged" the validity of 1988 which does not allow the legalization of the same, thereby causing undue
the information filed injury to the government and giving unwarranted benefits and advantages to said
against her. Petitioner claims that Presiding Justice Garchitorena "cannot be expected to change the aliens in the discharge of the official and administrative functions of said accused
conclusions he has subconsciously drawn in his public statements . . . when he sits in judgment on the (Rollo, p. 36).
merits of the case . . ." (Rollo, pp. 16-17).
It appears that petitioner tried to leave the country without first securing the permission of the
The letter in question was written in response to an item in Teodoro Benigno's column in the July 22, Sandiganbayan, prompting it to issue the hold-departure order which Benigno viewed as uncalled for.
1992 issue of the Philippine Star, criticizing the Sandiganbayan for issuing on July 11, 1992 a hold- The letter of Presiding Justice Garchitorena, written in defense of the dignity and integrity of the
departure order against petitioner. Benigno wrote that said order reflected a "perverse morality" of the Sandiganbayan, merely stated that all persons facing criminal charges in court, with no exception,
Sandiganbayan and the lack of "legal morality" of its Presiding Justice, thus: have to secure permission to leave the country. Nowhere in the letter is the merit of the charge against
petitioner ever touched. Certainly, there would have been no occasion for the letter had Benigno not
I cannot, for example accept the legal morality of Sandiganbayan Justice Francis written his diatribe, unfair at that, against the Sandiganbayan.
Garchitorena who would stop Miriam Defensor Santiago from going abroad for a
Harvard scholarship because of graft charges against her. Some of the most Notwithstanding petitioner's misgiving, it should be taken into consideration that the Sandiganbayan
perfidious Filipinos I know have come and gone, left and returned to these shores sits in three divisions with three justices in each division. Unanimity among the three members is
without Mr. Garchitorena kicking any kind of rumpus. Compared to the mandatory for arriving at any decision of a division (P.D. No. 1606, Sec. 5). The collegiate character
peccadilloes of this country's outstanding felons, what Miriam is accused of is of the Sandiganbayan thus renders baseless petitioner's fear of prejudice and bias on the part of
kindergarten stuff. The Sandiganbayan Supremo got a lot of headlines for Presiding Justice Garchitorena (Paredes v. Gopengco, 29 SCRA 688 [1969] ).
stopping Miriam but I contend this is the kind of perverse morality we can do
without (Rollo, p. 156).
Re: Claim of denial of due process
The portion of the letter of Presiding Justice Garchitorena, which petitioner finds objectionable, reads
as follows: Petitioner cannot complain that her constitutional rights to due process were violated by reason of the
delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation. According to her, while the offense was
allegedly committed "on or before October 17, 1988", the information was filed only on May 9, 1991
(c) Mrs. Santiago has never informed any court where her cases are pending of and the amended informations on December 8, 1992 (Rollo, p. 14).
her intention to travel, whether the Regional Trial Court where she is charged
with soliciting donations from people transacting with her office at Immigration
or before the Sandiganbayan where she is charged with having favored Tatad v. Sandiganbayan, 159 SCRA 70 [1988] is inapplicable to petitioner's case. In Tatad, there
unqualified aliens with the benefits of the Alien Legalization Program nor even indeed was an unexplained inaction on the part of the public prosecutors inspite of the simplicity of
the Supreme Court where her petition is still pending (Rollo, p. 158). the legal and factual issues involved therein.

In particular, petitioner considered as prejudgment the statement of Presiding Justice Garchitorena In the case at bench, there was a continuum of the investigatory process but it got snarled because of
that petitioner had been charged before the Sandiganbayan "with having favored unqualified aliens the complexity of the issues involved. The act complained of in the original information came to the
with the benefits of the Alien Legalization Program." attention of the Ombudsman only when it was first reported in the January 10, 1989 issue of the
Manila Standard. Immediately thereafter, the investigatory process was set in motion. The
investigation was first assigned to Special Prosecutor Gualberto dela Llana but on request of
The statement complained of was just a restatement of the Information filed against petitioner in petitioner herself the investigation was first assigned to Special Prosecutor Gualberto dela Llana but
Criminal Case No. 16698 in connection with which the hold-departure order was issued. Said on request of petitioner herself the investigation was re-assigned to the Office of the Deputy
Information specified the act constituting the offense charged, thus: Ombudsman for Luzon. The case was handled by a panel of four prosecutors, who submitted a draft
resolution for the filing of the charges on March 29, 1990. The draft resolution had to undergo the
18
hierarchy of review, normal for a draft resolution with a dissenting vote, until it reached the No. 3019. These are: (a) by causing undue injury to any party, including the Government; and (b) by
Ombudsman in March 1991. giving any private party any unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference.

We note that petitioner had previously filed two petitions before us involving Criminal Case No. In Uy v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 100334, December 5, 1991, we held:
16698 (G.R. Nos. 99289-99290; G.R.
No. 107598). Petitioner has not explained why she failed to raise the issue of delay in the preliminary The use of the distinctive term "or" connotes that either act qualifies as a
investigation and the filing of the information against her in those petitions. a piece-meal presentation violation of Section 3 (a). In other words the act of giving any private party any
of issues, like the splitting of causes of action, is self-defeating. unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference is not an indispensable element of
the offense of "causing any undue injury to any party" as claimed by petitioners
Petitioner next claims that the Amended Informations did not charge any offense punishable under although there may be instances where both elements concur.
Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019 because the official acts complained of therein were authorized under
Executive Order No. 324 and that the Board of Commissioners of the Bureau of Investigation Re: Delito continuado
adopted the policy of approving applications for legalization of spouses and unmarried, minor
children of "qualified aliens" even though they had arrived in the Philippines after December 31,
1983. she concludes that the Sandiganbayan erred in not granting her motion to quash the Be that as it may, our attention was attracted by the allegation in the petition that the public
informations (Rollo, pp. 25-31). prosecutors filed 32 Amended Informations against petitioner, after manifesting to the Sandiganbayan
that they would only file one amended information (Rollo, pp. 6-61). We also noted that petitioner
questioned in her opposition to the motion to admit the 32 Amended Informations, the splitting of the
In a motion to quash, the accused admits hypothetically the allegations of fact in the information original information (Rollo, pp. 127-129). In the furtherance of justice, we therefore proceed to
(People v. Supnad, 7 SCRA 603 [1963] ). Therefore, petitioner admitted hypothetically in her motion inquire deeper into the validity of said plant, which petitioner failed to pursue with vigor in her
that: petition.

(1) She was a public officer; We find that, technically, there was only one crime that was committed in petitioner's case, and
hence, there should only be one information to be file against her.
(2) She approved the application for legalization of the stay of aliens, who arrived
in the Philippines after January 1, 1984; The 32 Amended Informations charge what is known as delito continuado or "continued crime" and
sometimes referred to as "continuous crime."
(3) Those aliens were disqualified;
In fairness to the Ombudsman's Office of the Special Prosecutor, it should be borne in mind that the
(4) She was cognizant of such fact; and concept of delito continuado has been a vexing problem in Criminal Law — difficult as it is to define
and more difficult to apply.
(5) She acted in "evident bad faith and manifest partiality in the execution of her
official functions." According to Cuello Calon, for delito continuado to exist there should be a plurality of acts
performed during a period of time; unity of penal provision violated; and unity of criminal intent or
The foregoing allegations of fact constitute the elements of the offense defined in Section 3 (e) of purpose, which means that two or more violations of the same penal provisions are united in one and
R.A. No. 3019. same instant or resolution leading to the perpetration of the same criminal purpose or aim
(II Derecho Penal, p. 520; I Aquino, Revised Penal Code, 630, 1987 ed.).
The claims that the acts complained of were indeed authorized under Executive Order No. 324, that
petitioner merely followed in good faith the policy adopted by the Board of Commissioners and that According to Guevarra, in appearance, a delito continuado consists of several crimes but in reality
the aliens were spouses or unmarried minor children of persons qualified for legalization of stay, are there is only one crime in the mind of the perpetrator (Commentaries on the Revised Penal Code,
matters of defense which she can establish at the trial. 1957 ed., p. 102; Penal Science and Philippine Criminal Law, p. 152).

Anent petitioner's claim that the Amended Informations did not allege that she had caused "undue Padilla views such offense as consisting of a series of acts arising from one criminal intent or
injury to any party, including the Government," there are two ways of violating Section 3 (e) of R.A. resolution (Criminal Law, 1988 ed. pp. 53-54).

19
Applying the concept of delito continuado, we treated as constituting only one offense the following e.g. violation of R.A. No. 145 penalizing the charging of fees for services rendered following up
cases: claims for war veteran's benefits (People v. Sabbun, 10 SCRA 156 [1964] ).

(1) The theft of 13 cows belonging to two different owners committed by the Under Article 10 of the Revised Penal Code, the Code shall be supplementary to special laws, unless
accused at the same time and at the same period of time (People v. Tumlos, 67 the latter provide the contrary. Hence, legal principles developed from the Penal Code may be applied
Phil. 320 [1939] ). in a supplementary capacity to crimes punished under special laws.

(2) The theft of six roosters belonging to two different owners from the same The question of whether a series of criminal acts over a period of time creates a single offense or
coop and at the same period of time (People v. Jaranillo, 55 SCRA 563 [1974] ). separate offenses has troubled also American Criminal Law and perplexed American courts as shown
by the several theories that have evolved in theft cases.
(3) The theft of two roosters in the same place and on the same occasion (People
v. De Leon, 49 Phil. 437 [1926] ). The trend in theft cases is to follow the so-called "single larceny" doctrine, that is, the taking of
several things, whether belonging to the same or different owners, at the same time and place
(4) The illegal charging of fees for services rendered by a lawyer every time he constitutes but one larceny. Many courts have abandoned the "separate larceny doctrine," under
collects veteran's benefits on behalf of a client, who agreed that the attorney's which there is a distinct larceny as to the property of each victim. Also abandoned was the doctrine
fees shall be paid out of said benefits (People v. Sabbun, 10 SCRA 156 [1964] ). that the government has the discretion to prosecute the accused or one offense or for as many distinct
The collection of the legal fees were impelled by the same motive, that of offenses as there are victims (annotation, 37 ALR 3rd 1407, 1410-1414).
collecting fees for services rendered, and all acts of collection were made under
the same criminal impulse (People v. Lawas, 97 Phil. 975 [1955] ). The American courts following the "single larceny" rule, look at the commission of the different
criminal acts as but one continuous act involving the same "transaction" or as done on the same
On the other hand, we declined to apply the concept to the following cases: "occasion" (State v. Sampson, 157 Iowa 257, 138 NW 473; People v. Johnson, 81 Mich. 573, 45 NW
1119; State v. Larson, 85 Iowa 659, 52 NW 539).
(1) Two estafa cases, one of which was committed during the period from
January 19 to December 1955 and the other from January 1956 to July 1956 An American court held that a contrary rule would violate the constitutional guarantee against putting
(People v. Dichupa, 113 Phil. 306 [1961] ). The said acts were committed on two a man in jeopardy twice for the same offense (Annotation, 28 ALR 2d 1179). Another court observed
different occasions. that the doctrine is a humane rule, since if a separate charge could be filed for each act, the accused
may be sentenced to the penitentiary for the rest of his life (Annotation, 28 ALR 2d 1179).
(2) Several malversations committed in May, June and July, 1936, and
falsifications to conceal said offenses committed in August and October 1936. In the case at bench, the original information charged petitioner with performing a single criminal act
The malversations and falsifications "were not the result of only one purpose or — that of her approving the application for legalization of aliens not qualified under the law to enjoy
of only one resolution to embezzle and falsify . . ." (People v. Cid, 66 Phil. 354 such privilege.
[1938] ).
The original information also averred that the criminal act : (i) committed by petitioner was in
(3) Two estafa cases, one committed in December 1963 involving the failure of violation of a law — Executive Order No. 324 dated
the collector to turn over the installments for a radio and the other in June 1964 April 13, 1988, (ii) caused an undue injury to one offended party, the Government, and (iii) was done
involving the pocketing of the installments for a sewing machine (People v. on a single day, i.e., on or about October 17, 1988.
Ledesma, 73 SCRA 77 [1976] ).
The 32 Amended Informations reproduced verbatim the allegation of the original information, except
(4) 75 estafa cases committed by the conversion by the agent of collections from that instead of the word "aliens" in the original information each amended information states the
customers of the employer made on different dates (Gamboa v. Court of Appeals, name of the individual whose stay was legalized.
68 SCRA 308 [1975]).
At the hearing of the motion for a bill of particulars, the public prosecutors manifested that they
The concept of delito continuado, although an outcry of the Spanish Penal Code, has been applied to would file only one amended information embodying the legalization of stay of the 32 aliens. As
crimes penalized under special laws, stated in the Order dated November 12, 1992 of the Sandiganbayan (First Division):

20
On the matter of the Bill of Particulars, the prosecution has conceded
categorically that the accusation against Miriam Defensor Santiago consists of
one violation of the law represented by the approval of the applications of 32
foreign nationals for availment (sic) of the Alien Legalization Program. In this
respect, and responding directly to the concerns of the accused through counsel,
the prosecution is categorical that there will not be 32 accusations but only one . .
. (Rollo, p. 59).

The 32 Amended Informations aver that the offenses were committed on the same period of time, i.e.,
on or about October 17, 1988. The strong probability even exists that the approval of the application
or the legalization of the stay of the 32 aliens was done by a single stroke of the pen, as when the
approval was embodied in the same document.

Likewise, the public prosecutors manifested at the hearing the motion for a bill of particulars that the
Government suffered a single harm or injury. The Sandiganbayan in its Order dated November 13,
1992 stated as follows:

. . . Equally, the prosecution has stated that insofar as the damage and prejudice to
the government is concerned, the same is represented not only by the very fact of
the violation of the law itself but because of the adverse effect on the stability and
security of the country in granting citizenship to those not qualified (Rollo, p. 59).

WHEREFORE, the Resolution dated March 3, 1993 in Criminal Case No. 16698 of the
Sandiganbayan (First Division) is AFFIRMED and its Resolution dated March 11, 1993 in Criminal
Case No. 16698 is MODIFIED in the sense that the Office of the Special Prosecutor of the Office of
the Ombudsman is directed to consolidate the 32 Amended Informations (Criminal Cases Nos. 18371
to 18402) into one information charging only one offense under the original case number, i.e., No.
16698. The temporary restraining order issued by this Court on March 25, 1993 is LIFTED insofar as
to the disqualification of Presiding Justice Francis Garchitorena is concerned.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo and Puno, JJ.,
concur.

21
(50) G.R. No. 137953-58 April 11, 2002 reclusion perpetua, and to indemnify Mary Rose dela Torre in the amount of
₱50,000.00 as and by way of civil damages.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellant,
vs. "5) In Crim. Case No. RTC 2183-I – of the crime of Rape, defined and penalized
WILFREDO DELA TORRE, appellee. under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, is sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua, and to indemnify Mary Rose dela Torre in the amount of
PANGANIBAN, J.: ₱50,000.00 as and by way of civil damages.1âwphi1.nêt

The prosecution cannot appeal a decision in a criminal case whether to reverse an acquittal or to "6) In Crim. Case No. RTC 2184-I – of the crime of Rape, defined and penalized
increase the penalty imposed in a conviction. under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, is sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua, and to indemnify Mary Rose dela Torre in the amount of
₱50,000.00 as and by way of civil damages."4
The Case
The two Amended Informations for acts of lasciviousness, dated July 1, 1997, were similarly worded
The prosecution appeals the March 31, 1998 Decision1 and June 3, 1998 Order2 issued by the as follows:
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iba, Zambales (Branch 69)3 in Criminal Cases Nos. 2179-I, 2180-I,
2181-I, 2182-I, 2183-I and 2184-I. The assailed Decision convicted Wilfredo Dela Torre of two
counts of acts of lasciviousness and four counts of rape, while the challenged Order denied the "That on or about the 30th day of September, 1996 at Brgy. Guisguis, municipality of Sta.
Motion for Reconsideration filed by plaintiff (now appellant). Cruz, Province of Zambales, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said accused, being the father of one Mary Rose de la Torre, actuated by lust and
by means of coercion, threats, intimidation and other consideration, did then and there
The dispositive portion of the Decision is reproduced hereunder: wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit acts of lasciviousness on the person of Mary
Rose de la Torre, a minor of 11 years old, to the damage and prejudice of the said Mary
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused Wilfredo dela Torre is found GUILTY Rose de la Torre."5
beyond reasonable doubt as follows:
The other Information6 charged appellee with the same crime against the same victim on a different
"1) In Crim. Case No. RTC 2179-I – of the crime of Acts of Lasciviousness, date, October 10, 1996.
defined and penalized under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code, is sentenced
to suffer an imprisonment of six (6) months and one (1) day to two (2) years of On the other hand, the four Informations charging him with rape, dated July 1, 1997, similarly read as
prision correccional, and to indemnify Mary Rose dela Torre in the amount of follows:
₱10,000.00 as and by way of civil damages.
"That on or about the 18th day of October, 1996 at Brgy. Guisguis, municipality of Sta.
"2) In Crim. Case No. RTC 2180-I – of the crime of Acts of Lasciviousness, Cruz, Province of Zambales, Philippine[s], and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
defined and penalized under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code, is sentenced Court, the said accused, being the father of one Mary Rose de la Torre, with lewd design by
to suffer an imprisonment of six (6) months and one (1) day to two (2) years of means of coercion, threats, intimidation and other consideration, did then and there
prision correccional, and to indemnify Mary Rose dela Torre in the amount of wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, have carnal knowledge with one Mary Rose de la
₱10,000.00 as and by way of civil damages. Torre, a minor of 11 years old, without her consent and against her will, to the damage and
prejudice of the latter."7
"3) In Crim. Case No. RTC 2181-I – of the crime of Rape, defined and penalized
under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, is sentenced to suffer the penalty of The three other Amended Informations recited the same allegations on different dates: November 1,8
reclusion perpetua, and to indemnify Mary Rose dela Torre in the amount of November 129 and December 23,10 1996. When arraigned on August 13, 1997, appellee pleaded11
₱50,000.00 as and by way of civil damages. not guilty12 to all six (6) Informations. After trial in due course, the RTC rendered the challenged
Decision.
"4) In Crim. Case No. RTC 2182-I – of the crime of Rape, defined and penalized
under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, is sentenced to suffer the penalty of Appellee did not appeal, but the prosecution filed a Notice of Appeal13 dated June 9, 1998.

22
The Facts On the other hand, appellee’s statement of facts,16 as contained in his Brief,17 is reproduced as
follows:
Appellant’s Version
"Appellee WILFREDO DELA TORRE had three (3) children with Melinda Torre, namely:
In its Brief,14 the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) presents the prosecution’s version of the Mary Rose, Mark Anthony and Mark Ronnil. Melinda left her family when Mary Rose was
facts as follows: about seven (7) years old bringing with her Mark Ronnil. The victim lived with her father
and brother Mark Anthony in Sta. Cruz, Zambales.
"Appellee Wilfredo dela Torre had a common-law relationship with Melinda dela Torre.
The latter gave birth to three children, Mary Rose, Mark Anthony, and Mark Domil. When "Felina Sobrevilla, teacher of Mary Rose, noticed sudden changes in her behavior and
Mary Rose was about seven (7) years old, her mother left the conjugal abode with Mark when confronted, the latter admitted that she was sexually abused by her father. Her head
Domil, leaving her and sibling Mark Anthony in the care of appellee, who resided with his teacher informed her Aunt Elpidia Balindo about the sexual abuses. They referred the case
progeny in a one-room hut in Sitio Pao, Guis-guis, Sta. Cruz, Zambales. to the DSWD who took her under its custody.

"Mary Rose and her brother Mark Anthony studied at the Guinabon Elementary School. "Mary Rose testified that her father committed sexual abuses on her on the following dates:
She was the brightest in her class, even though because of their poverty, she had to walk September 30, 1996, October 10, 1996, October 18, 1996, November 01, 1996, November
from their hut to the school everyday. 12, 1996 and December 23, 1996.

"In January of 1997, Felita Sobrevilla, noticed a sudden change in the behavior and "Appellee, on the other hand denies vehemently the charges being imputed on him by her
performance of Mary Rose, who was twelve-year[s] old at th[at] time. The latter appeared daughter and said that the only reason he can think of why the daughter filed the charges is
sleepy, hungry and snobbish. She also urinated on her panty. When confronted by Generosa because he did not allow her to stay with her teacher, Mrs. Sobrevilla."18 (Citations
Mayo, the head teacher, Mary Rose admitted to her that she was abused repeatedly by omitted)
appellee. Mayo informed Elpidia Balindo, the aunt of Mary Rose, about the abuses. They
then decided to refer the matter to the Department of Social Welfare and Development Ruling of the Trial Court
(DSWD), who took Mary Rose under its custody.
The RTC ruled that "it was duly established that accused Wilfredo committed acts of lasciviousness
"It turned out that on September 30, 1996, Mary Rose was about to sleep when appellee against Mary Rose on 30 September 1996 and 10 October 1996, and had carnal knowledge [of] Mary
told her, ‘anak puwede ba nating subukan?’ She did not understand what that meant and Rose on 18 October 1996, 01 November 1996, 12 November 1996 and 23 December 1996."19
continued to sleep. Appellee then placed himself on top of Mary Rose. After removing her Further, the trial court added that the moral ascendancy of appellee over the victim was equivalent to
shorts as well as his shorts, he poked his penis into her organ. He also kissed and embraced intimidation. It did not give any probative value to his uncorroborated and unsubstantiated defenses
Mary Rose, who just wept. The same incident was repeated in the evening of October 10, of denial and alibi.
1996.
However, the court a quo refused to impose the supreme penalty of death on appellee. It maintained
"In the evening of October 18, 1996, appellee was able to insert his penis into the vagina of that there were circumstances that mitigated the gravity of the offenses, as follows:
Mary Rose. After the act, her whole body ached. She started to fear appellee. He also had
sexual intercourse with his minor daughter on three more occasions, that is, on November 1 "1. As testified to (supra) there was absence of any actual, physical violence or intimidation
and 12 and December 23, 1996. in the commission of the acts complained of.

"A medical examination conducted by Dr. Milagrina Mayor, Rural Health Physician of Sta. xxx xxx xxx
Cruz, Zambales, on Mary Rose revealed that her vagina admitted one finger with ease. She
was no longer a virgin. Her hymen was broken with healed lacerations at the 3:00, 6:00 and
9:00 nine o’clock positions. The girl also suffered from urinary tract infection."15 "2. The abandonement by Melinda (common-law wife of accused Wilfredo and mother of
(Citations omitted) Mary Rose) when Mary Rose was seven (7) years old leaving behind Wilfredo, Mary Rose
and her brother, Mark Anthony.
Appellee’s Version
"3. The extreme poverty on the life of Wilfredo, Mary Rose and Mark Anthony.
23
"4. After the mother of Mary Rose left the conjugal home, for more than five (5) years, penalty imposed upon the accused for this runs afoul of the right of the accused against double
Wilfredo, Mary Rose and Mark Anthony were living together as a family and Mary Rose jeopardy."25 It added:
was never molested by her father.
"This Court has not just once ruled that where the accused after conviction by the trial court
"5. There is reason to deprive Wilfredo of the love of her daughter Mary Rose but there is did not appeal his conviction, an appeal by the government seeking to increase the penalty
no reason to deprive Mark Anthony of the love of his father considering that both Mary imposed by the trial court places the accused in double jeopardy and should therefore be
Rose and Mark Anthony have no one to call as a mother."20 dismissed."26

Hence, this appeal.21 This doctrine was applied as early as 1904 in Kepner v. United States27 (hereinafter "Kepner"), as
follows:
The Issue
"The Court of First Instance, having jurisdiction to try the question of the guilt or
In this appeal, the solicitor general assigns this single error for our consideration: innocence of the accused, found Kepner not guilty; to try him again upon the merits, even
in an appellate court, is to put him a second time in jeopardy for the same offense."28
"The Court a quo erred in penalizing appellee with reclusion perpetua in each of the four
indictments for rape, instead of imposing the supreme penalty of death as mandated by The Kepner doctrine was clarified in a 1987 case.29 Speaking through Justice Isagani A. Cruz, the
R.A. No. 7659."22 Court explained that an "appeal of the prosecution from a judgment of acquittal (or for the purpose of
increasing the penalty imposed upon the convict) would place him in double jeopardy."30
The Court’s Ruling
Double jeopardy provides three related protections: (1) against a second prosecution for the same
offense after acquittal, (2) against a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction, and (3)
The appeal has no merit. against multiple punishments for the same offense.31

Lone Issue: Although Kepner technically involved only a single proceeding, the Court regarded the practice as
equivalent to two separate trials, and the evil that the Court saw in the procedure was plainly that of
Propriety of Appeal by the Prosecution multiple prosecution.32

The prosecution asks this Court to modify the RTC Decision by imposing the supreme penalty of The ban on double jeopardy is deeply rooted in jurisprudence. The doctrine has several avowed
death on the accused. It argues that it has proven that the victim is the daughter of the accused, and purposes. Primarily, it prevents the State from using its criminal processes as an instrument of
that she was below eighteen (18) years old when the rapes took place. As a consequence, the trial harassment to wear out the accused by a multitude of cases with accumulated trials.33 It also serves
court should have imposed the penalty of death pursuant to Section 11 of RA 7659.23 the additional purpose of precluding the State, following an acquittal, from successively retrying the
defendant in the hope of securing a conviction.34 And finally, it prevents the State, following
Under Section 1, Rule 122 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, any party may appeal from a conviction, from retrying the defendant again in the hope of securing a greater penalty.35
judgment or final order, unless the accused will be placed in double jeopardy. This provision is
substantially the same as that provided by the 1985 Rules.1âwphi1.nêt Being violative of the right against double jeopardy, the instant appeal filed by the prosecution cannot
prosper. The rule is clear -- the prosecution cannot appeal on the ground that the accused should have
The question now is whether an increase in the penalty imposed by the lower court will violate the been given a more severe penalty.36
right of the accused against double jeopardy.1âwphi1.nêt
Besides, even assuming that the penalties imposed by the RTC were erroneous, these cannot be
In several cases, this Court has already definitively ruled on this issue. Recently, in People v. corrected by this Court on an appeal by the prosecution. Said the Court:
Leones,24 it unmistakably declared that "[w]hile it is true that this Court is the Court of last resort,
there are allegations of error committed by a lower court which we ought not to look into to uphold "Whatever error may have been committed by the lower court was merely an error of
the right of the accused. Such is the case in an appeal by the prosecution seeking to increase the judgment and not of jurisdiction. It did not affect the intrinsic validity of the decision. This

24
is the kind of error that can no longer be rectified on appeal by the prosecution no matter
how obvious the error may be."37

The only way to nullify an acquittal or to increase the penalty is through a proper petition for
certiorari to show grave abuse of discretion. This was explained in People v. CA and Maquiling38 as
follows:

"While certiorari may be used to correct an abusive acquittal, the petitioner in such
extraordinary proceeding must clearly demonstrate that the lower court blatantly abused its
authority to a point so grave as to deprive it of its very power to dispense justice. On the
other hand, if the petition, regardless of its nomenclature, merely calls for an ordinary
review of the findings of the court a quo, the constitutional right against double jeopardy
would be violated. Such recourse is tantamount to converting the petition for certiorari into
an appeal, contrary to the express injunction of the Constitution, the Rules of Court and
prevailing jurisprudence on double jeopardy."39

WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DENIED. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Melo, Vitug, Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Carpio, JJ., concur.

25
(51) G.R. Nos. 100382-100385 March 19, 1997 In the evening of March 22, 1987, the 117th PC stationed at Aparri, Cagayan,
under then Lt. James Andres Melad, sponsored a cock derby, under the name of
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, Jose Ting, at the Octagon Cockpit Arena located at Aparri, Cagayan.
vs.
MARIO TABACO, accused-appellant. This being so, peace officers in uniform with long firearms were assigned as
guards to maintain peace and order at the cockpit arena namely: (1) Sgt. Benito
Raquepo; (2) CIS Roque P. Datugan, both from the 117th PC and (3) Pat. Andres
Semana, INP, Aparri, Cagayan. Accused Mario Tabaco who was in civilian
clothes claims to have been also assigned by his Commanding Officer of 117th
HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.: PC, to verify the presence of NPAs and assist in the protection of VIPs in the
cockpit arena, bringing with him his M-14 issued firearm.
In four related informations, Mario Tabaco was charged with four counts of Murder for
shooting to death on March 22, 1987 Capt. Oscar Tabulog (Criminal Case No. 10-259), Ex- Other peace officers who came to participate were: (1) Policeman Mariano
Mayor Jorge Arreola (Criminal Case No. 10-270), Felicito Rigunan (Criminal Case No. 10-284) Retreta of INP, Buguey, Cagayan, who arrived with the deceased Jorge Siriban
and Pat. Romeo Regunton (Criminal Case No. 10-317). Except for the names of the victims, the and Licerio Antiporda, Jr., Licerio Antiporda II; (2) Sgt. Rogelio Ferrer of 117th
informations in these four (4) cases identically read: PC Company; (3) Policeman Romeo Regunton (deceased) who was also armed,
arrived in company with the deceased Ex-Mayor Arreola; (4) Fireman Rogelio
That on or about March 22, 1987, in the Municipality of Aparri, Province of Guimmayen, INP Buguey; (5) Pat. Barba; and (6) CIC PC Paragas.
Cagayan, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
accused Mario Tabaco, armed with a gun, with intent to kill, with evident At about nine (9) o'clock in the evening of same date, the group of the late Mayor
premeditation and with treachery, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully Jorge Arreola of Buguey, Cagayan, arrived at the cockpit arena. His companions
and feloniously assault, attack and shoot one [name], inflicting upon him were (1) Antonio Villasin; (2) Rosario Peneyra; (3) victim Loreto Pita, Jr. and/or
several wounds which caused his death. five (5) of them including the Mayor. They occupied and were (4th row) north
western part cockpit-gate. Others seated with the Mayor were: (1) the late Capt.
Contrary to Law. 1 Oscar Tabulog; (2) the late Pat. Romeo Regunton, who was at the back of the
mayor; (3) the late Felicito Rigunan. The accused CIC Tabaco was seated on the
In Criminal Case No. 10-316, accused was charged in the following information with the complex arm of the bench situated at the lower portion of the arena about more than three
crime of Homicide and Frustrated Homicide for shooting to death Jorge Siriban, Jr. and the wounding (3) meters away, (infront and a little bit in the west), from the place where the late
of Sgt. Benito Raquepo: Mayor and his group were seated (at the 4th row of seats upper portion). During
the ocular inspection conducted, the Court noticed the distance to be more than
three (3) meters, and/or probably 4-5 meters.
That on or about March 22, 1987, in the municipality of Aparri, province of
Cagayan, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused,
Mario Tabaco, armed with a gun, with intent to kill, did then and there wilfully, At about ten (10) o'clock 1987, while the accused Mario Tabaco was seated as
unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack and shoot Jorge Siriban, Jr., and S/Sgt. described above, he suddenly without warning or provocation, shot the late
Benito Raquepo, inflicting upon them wounds on their bodies, which wounds mayor Jorge Arreola, with his M-14 rifle, followed by several successive burst of
sustained by Jorge Siriban, Jr., caused his death. gunfire, resulting in the shooting to death of the late Mayor Arreola, Capt. Oscar
Tabulog, Felicito Rigunan and Pat. Romeo Regunton, although the latter
managed to run passing through the western gate near the gaffers cage but was
That the accused had performed all the acts of execution (with respect to the chased by accused Tabaco. Regunton was later found dead inside the canteen of
victim Sgt. Benito Raquepo) which would have produced the crime of Homicide Mrs. Amparo Go inside the Octagon cockpit arena.
as a consequence but which nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes
independent of his own will.2
Pat. Mariano Retreta of INP Buguey, who was then at the Co's canteen, saw the
accused going out rushing from the cockpit arena, at a distance of one meter. Pat.
All cases were consolidated before Branch 10 of the Regional Trial Court of Aparri, Cagayan. Retreta is a relative and neighbor of the accused Tabaco in Buguey, Cagayan. He
tried to pacify Tabaco telling him "what is that that happened again Mario."
The mass of evidence for the prosecution, as found by the trial court, is as follows: Meanwhile, Sgt. Benito Raquepo of 117th PC, and one of those assigned to
26
maintain peace and order at the Octagon cockpit arena, who was at the canteen muzzle pointed downwards. As he (accused) rushed towards the main gate of the
taking snacks, heard five (5) successive gun reports coming from inside the cockpit arena, Mariano Retreta and Sgt. Benito Raquepo saw him and who told
cockpit arena. In a little while, he saw the accused Tabaco coming from inside the him, (accused) to relax lang. Accused testified that when Mariano Retreta and
cockpit arena. Raquepo advised Tabaco — "Mario relax ka lang" — "Mario keep Sgt. Benito Raquepo told him to relax lang, he all the time thought that the gun
calm." They stood face to face holding their rifles and when Tabaco pointed his reports fired inside the cockpit arena was nothing to said persons. Accused
gun towards Sgt. Raquepo, Pat. Retreta grappled for the possession of the gun to however, insisted to go out, but in so doing, Mariano Retreta pressed the gun
disarm Tabaco, and in the process, the gun went off hitting Sgt. Raquepo and also which he was holding downwards and grabbed said gun from accused. As the gun
the late Jorge Siriban who happened to be near Raquepo. Siriban died on the spot was pressed by Mariano Retreta, said gun went off, hitting Sgt. Benito Raquepo
while Raquepo survived his wounds on his legs due to adequate medical and the death of Jorge Siriban, Jr. That because of such incident, accused had to
treatment. run away, out of fear to Sgt. Benito Raquepo and the family of Jorge Siriban who
may lay the blame on him. The following morning, accused surrendered to the
There were other persons injured that evening namely: (1) Antonio Chan — police authorities of Lallo, Cagayan, who happened to pass by, not on account of
injured on his right foot; (2) Salvador Berbano — injured on his right forearm the death of Ex-Mayor Jorge Arreola, Capt. Oscar Tabulog, Felicito Rigunan and
and on his right abdomen and (3) Rosario Peneyra on his Face and right shoulder. Oscar Regunton which he did not know at the time he surrendered, but on
But, the three, did not file their complaints. 3 account of the death of Jorge Siriban, Jr. and the injury sustained by Sgt. Benito
Raquepo.4
Upon the other hand, the evidence for the defense as stated in the Brief for the Accused-appellant is
as follows: After trial, the court a quo, in a joint decision dated January 14, 1991, found accused-appellant guilty
as charged on all counts. In giving credence to the version of the prosecution over that of accused-
appellant, it found that:
Ordered by his commanding officer in the 117th PC Company to assist in the
maintenance of peace and order at the Octagon Cockpit Arena located at
Talungan, Aparri, Cagayan on March 22, 1987, accused Mario Tabaco with his From the evidence adduced, it is easily discernible that the prosecution and
officially issued M-14 rifle and with the basic load of ammunition went to the defense cannot agree on what actually transpired that night of March 22, 1987, at
Octagon Cockpit arena on March 22, 1987 in compliance to the orders of a the Octagon Cockpit Arena, Aparri, Cagayan leading to the shooting to death of
superior officer arriving thereat at about 12:00 o'clock noon, more or less. He subject victims. For, while the prosecution maintains that it was the accused
directly went inside the cockpit arena to make some observations and found out Mario Tabaco who shot the victims, the defense insists that he is not the assailant,
that there were several persons inside the said cockpit who were in possession of but somebody else or others, since the accused merely fired a warning shot
firearms, some short and some long, and were seen in different places and/or upwards the roof of the cockpit arena.
corners of the cockpit. Accused did not bother to verify as to why the said
persons were allowed to carry their firearms because of his impressions that if In fine, the Court is called upon to resolve the issue of credibility versions.
they did not have the authority, the guards of the main gate of the cockpit would "Where there are directly conflicting versions of the same incident, the Court, in
surly have confiscated the same from them. It was his belief then that they may its search for the truth, perforce has to look for some facts and circumstances
have come from other agencies of the government, assigned to help in the which can be used as valuable tools in evaluating the probability or improbability
maintenance of peace and order in the cockpit. Accused thus seated himself at the of a testimony for after all, the element of probability is always involved in
lowermost seat (first step) of the slanted bleachers of the Octagon Cockpit arena weighing testimonial evidence. (Carolina Industries, Inc. vs. CMS Stock
on March 22, 1987. Brokerage, Inc., et al., L-46908, May 17, 1980, 97 SCRA 734; Lacsan vs. Court
of Appeals, et al., L-46485, November 21, 1979, 94 SCRA 461, both citing the
At about 9:00 o'clock that very night of March 22, 1987, while accused was case of People vs. Boholst Caballero, L-2349, November 25, 1974, 61 SCRA
seated at the lowermost seat of the slanted bleachers of the Octagon Cockpit 180).
arena, he heard a gun report fired atop his head. Having been officially assigned
to help in the maintenance of peace and order in the cockpit and that his presence Towards this end, the prosecution presented three (3) eyewitnesses, namely:
must be known, his immediate reaction upon hearing the gun report was to fire a Antonio Villasin, Rosario Peneyra and Fireman Rogelio Guimmayen in the
warning shot in the air and directed to the ceiling and/or roof of the Octagon shooting to death of the deceased victims, Ex-Mayor Jorge Arreola, Capt. Oscar
cockpit arena. After firing a warning shot, his warning was answered by burst of Tabulog, Romeo Regunton and Felicito Rigunan. Also, the prosecution presented
gun fire coming from different directions inside the cockpit arena, for which Sgt. Benito Raquepo, Pat. Mariano Retreta and PC Sgt. Rogelio Ferrer, and three
reason, he forced to leave and rush outside, holding his M-14 rifle with the (3) eyewitnesses in the shooting to death of Jorge Siriban and the wounding of

27
Sgt. Raquepo. So too, the prosecution presented PC Sgt. Antonio Domingo, Pat. Q: You likewise mentioned in your direct examination that when you surrendered
Andres Semana, PC Sgt. Jose Algeria and Pat. Merlin Bautista, as corroborative this gun, M-14, and this magazine, there were no live ammunitions in the
witnesses in both situational cases/incidents. As well stated in the above findings magazine?
of facts, prosecution witnesses Antonio Villasin and Rosario Peneyra actually saw A: There were two remaining bullets, sir.
the accused Mario Tabaco stood up from his seat at the lower front row and in Q: How many bullets in all?
port arm position directed his M-14 rifle towards the place of the late Mayor A: Twenty, sir.
Arreola, and his group at the 4th row upper portion of the bleachers and fired Q: You said you heard first seven gun reports?
three successive automatic gun shots that felled Mayor Jorge Arreola, Capt. Oscar A: Yes, sir I heard seven gun reports. (TSN, continuation of direct examination,
Tabulog, Pat. Romeo Regunton and one Felicito Rigunan. This was corroborated Sgt. Ferrer, May 14, 1990 session, Stenographer L. Tamayo).
by prosecution witness Fireman Rogelio Guimmayen who was then ten (10) MORE, there is evidence that empty/spent shells of bullets were found inside the
meters away from the accused, which was not far, considering that the cockpit cockpit arena (Exh. "R" & "R-l", pp. 157-158, record).
arena was well lighted at that time. ATTY. ARRIOLA:
Q: Showing to you Exh. "R", do you know whose picture is this?
Not only that, immediately after the gun burst of automatic fire, the accused was A: Picture of spent shells.
seen coming out rushing from inside the cockpit arena by INP Pat. Mariano Q: How about Exh. "R-l", do you know what is this?
Retreta and PC Sgt. Raquepo, the former being a relative and neighbor, pacified A: The same, sir spent shells. (TSN, PC/CIS Sgt. Investigator Jose Algeria, p. 29,
accused Tabaco, telling — "what is that happened again Mario," while the latter Oct. 1, 1990 session, Stenographer L. Tamayo).
told him — "Mario relax ka lang keep calm." After which Mariano Retreta
grappled for the possession of the gun assisted by PC Sgt. Rogelio Ferrer when Finally, another circumstance which maybe considered as adverse against the
Tabaco refused to stop. Sgt. Ferrer got the gun M-14 and surrendered it to his accused, is the fact that he was really arrested and not that he voluntarily
Commanding Officer, as corroborated by Sgt. Antonio Domingo, while in the surrendered as appearing in the INP Lallo Police Blotter, as testified to by Pat.
process of disarming the accused Mario Tabaco, when the gun went of, hitting the Melin Bautista (Exh. "S", p. 188, record).
deceased victim Jorge Siriban and Sgt. Raquepo. 5
Furthermore, it appears that the same accused Mario Tabaco, has still a pending
The accused admitted that the M-14 rifle which he brought with him to the cockpit arena was heavily case for murder before Branch 6, of this Court. (Exh. "T", p. 187, record).
loaded, but when the gun was taken from his possession by Pat. Retreta and PC Sgt. Ferrer, the gun's
magazine was already empty. The Court is impressed with the testimonies of the three prosecution
eyewitnesses namely: Antonio Villasin, Rosario Peneyra and INP Fireman
The court a quo said further: Rogelio Guimmayen who narrated their versions of the incident with ring of
truth, which are both clear and convincing, in regard to the shooting to death by
accused Mario Tabaco of the deceased victims Ex-Mayor Jorge Arreola (Crim.
ATTY. VILLENA: Case No. 10-270), Capt. Oscar Tabulog (Crim. Case No. 1259), Pat Romeo
Q: When you took that M-14 from the accused, do you remember if it had a magazine Regunton (Crim. Case No. 10-317) and the late Felicito Rigunan (Crim. Case No.
that time? 10-284).
A: Yes, sir with magazine.
Q: Do you have the magazine now?
A: It is with 117th PC Company, sir. Such positive testimonies were corroborated by the testimonies of PC Sgt.
Q: After taking that M-14 from the accused, did you examine the rifle? Raquepo, PC Sgt. Ferrer and Pat. Mariano Retreta, who saw the accused rushing
A: Yes, sir, I examined it. outside the cockpit arena holding his M-14 rifle, immediately after the burst of
Q: Did you examine the magazine of that rifle? successive and automatic gunfire inside the cockpit arena. Although they have
A: Yes, sir. not seen the accused shoot the four victims (Arreola, Tabulog, Rigunan and
Q: Did you examine if there are live bullets? Regunton), yet their corroborative testimonies constitute sufficient combination
A: No live bullets, sir. (TSN, direct examination, Sgt. Ferrer, pp. 44-45, March 26, 1990 of all circumstances, so as to produce a conviction of guilt beyond reasonable
session, stenographer L. Tamayo). doubt. (People vs. Pimentel, 147 SCRA 251; People vs. Trinidad, 162 SCRA
Further, Sgt. Ferrer continued: 714), even as such circumstances proved reasonable leads to the conclusion
PROSECUTOR ATAL: pointing to the accused Tabaco, to the exclusion of all others, as the author of the
crime. (People vs. Magallanes, 147 SCRA 92; People vs. Macatana, 161 SCRA
235). And, in the face of all these circumstances, the burden of proof to establish
28
his innocence LIES on the accused, as the ONUS PROBANDI from that moment a possibility that the victim Arreola, probably bent forward and the bullet
is now shifted to the accused. (Dulpo vs. Sandiganbayan, 150 SCRA 138). A ricocheted.
resort to circumstantial evidence is in the very nature of things, a necessity, and
as crimes are usually committed in secret and under conditions where It must be noted that the seats in the upper bleachers where the group of the late
concealment is highly probable, and to require direct testimony would in many Mayor stayed were all cemented including their back rests and the bullets fired
cases result in freeing criminals and would deny the proper protection of society. from the gun of the accused must have rebounded or deflected from surface to
(People vs. ROA, 167 SCRA 116). surface, on the cemented back rests and seats hitting wound No. 2, on the body of
the Mayor and the bodies of Romeo Regunton and Felicito Rigunan. The bullets
As to the death of Jorge Siriban (Crim. Case No. 10-316) and the wounding of RICOCHETED, at the place where the group of the Mayor stayed. Anent the
Sgt. Raquepo, there is no adventure of doubt, that accused Mario Tabaco was the cemented railguard dividing the lower and upper bleachers, the same is not too
author of the crime charged and thus be held responsible for the same. The high so as to obviate the possibility of hitting the group of the late Mayor Arreola,
evidence adduced in this case is overwhelming, coming no less from accused's especially as in this case, when the accused stood up from his seat and fired at his
brothers PC personnel, who, aside from their direct testimonies, are entitled to the victims. Witness Rosario Peneyra testified that his wound on his face and right
settled rule that they have regularly performed their official duty. (Section 5(M), abdomen must have been caused by the debris of the said cemented railguard
Rule 131, Revised Rules of Court). which was hit by the bullets.

Accordingly, the Court is not impressed with the defense put up by the accused, In the case of the death of Jorge Siriban, there is not much dispute as the evidence
even as it does not inspire confidence, hence, the same deserves no credence. adduced is overwhelming and even the defense admits that Siriban died due to
gunshot wounds — inflicted upon him during the grappling of the subject gun
The accused contends that he merely fired his gun up towards the roof, and that (Exh. "K").
he could have not shot the four (4) deceased victims with the group of Ex-Mayor
Arreola considering the elevation of the 4th step or row in the upper bleachers of The Court believes in the reliability and intrinsic credibility of the prosecution
the cockpit arena, in relation to where the accused was, the front row, in much witnesses, there being no competent evidence presented for them to falsely testify
lower elevation. The accused further contends that he could not have shot against the accused. There is no issue of motive, as the accused was clearly and
aforesaid victims, as maybe gleaned from the testimony of Dr. Rivera, especially positively identified.
to wound No. 2, inflicted upon the body of the late Mayor Arreola.
All told, the Court believes and so holds that herein accused Mario Tabaco is the
The Court believes otherwise. In the first place, the three (3) eyewitnesses author/culprit in the shooting to death of the deceased victims, Jorge Arreola,
Antonio Villasin, Rosario Peneyra and INP Fireman Rogelio Guimmayen, Oscar Tabulog, Felicito Rigunan and Romeo Regunton, as well as the deceased
testified that they saw the accused stood up from his seat and directed his gun M- Jorge Siriban and the wounding of Benito Raquepo. 6
14 towards the group of Ex-Mayor Arreola who were then at the upper 4th row of
cemented seats at the bleachers. They could have been inaccurate of the distance The dispositive part of the decision reads:
of meters, as it could have been around 5 meters from where the accused stood
up, which is a little bit west of the group of Ex-Mayor Arreola, who were then
facing south, face to face with the accused. This is true and the same will jibe WHEREFORE, prescinding from the foregoing, and fortified by the balm of
with the findings of Dr. Rivera, where the gun shot wounds inflicted upon the clear judicial conscience, the Court finds the accused Mario Tabaco guilty
body of the late Capt. Tabulog, were on the left portion of his forehead front to beyond reasonable doubt of all the crimes charged against him:
back (Wound No. 1); Wound No. 2, in his left temple; Wound No. 3, below his
right clavicle of his right shoulder and Wound No. 4, on his left thigh downward. 1. In Criminal Cases Nos. (a) 10-259 (Oscar Tabulog); (b) No. 10-270 (Jorge
Arreola); (c) 10-284 (Felicito Rigunan); and (d) 10-317 (Romeo Regunton),
In the case of the late Mayor Arreola his wounds are: Wound No. 1, is on the left involving four (4) murder victims, but declared to have been prosecuted in one
side of his head above the hairline; Wound No. 2, right base of his neck and Information; the same being a complex crime under Art. 248, Revised Penal
exited at the upper shoulder base through and through. Wound No. 3, was on his Code, the accused Mario Tabaco is sentenced to a single penalty of RECLUSION
left lower abdomen and his lower back as exit for wound Nos. 1 and 2, the PERPETUA, in its maximum period, with all the accessory penalties provided for
relative position of the assailant and the victim is face to face, so with Wound No. by law, and to pay the heirs of the deceased victims — Oscar Tabulog, Felicito
3. For wound No. 2, the point of entry is higher than the point of exit, but there is Rigunan and Romeo Regunton, the amount of P50,000.00 each for a total of

29
P150,000.00 subject to the lien herein imposed for payment of the appropriate (3) The trial court erred in not giving credence to the testimony of accused-
docket fees if collected, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. appellant Tabaco.
However, in Criminal Case No. 10-270, the accused Mario Tabaco is further
ordered to pay the heirs of the late Mayor Jorge Arreola, the grand total amount The pivotal issue presented in this case is one of credibility. Time and again, we have ruled that when
of P633,500.00, by way of total civil liability, subject to the lien herein imposed the issue hinges on the credibility of witnesses vis-a-vis the accused's denials, the trial court's findings
for payment of the appropriate docket fees, in case of successful collection, both with respect thereto are generally not disturbed on appeal, 8 unless there appears in the record some
without subsidiary imprisonment in case insolvency. fact or circumstance of weight and influence which has been overlooked or the significance of which
has been misinterpreted. 9 The reason for the rule is eloquently stated in the case of People vs. de
2 In Criminal Case No. 10-316 for Homicide with Frustrated Homicide, the Guzman, 10 thus:
accused Mario Tabaco is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging
from, ten (10) years and one (1) day Prision Mayor as MINIMUM, to Seventeen In the resolution of factual issues, the court relies heavily on the trial court for its
(17) years, Four (4) months, one (1) day of RECLUSION TEMPORAL as evaluation of the witnesses and their credibility. Having the opportunity to
MAXIMUM, and to pay the heirs of the deceased Jorge Siriban, the amount of observe them on the stand, the trial judge is able to detect that sometimes thin
P50,000.00, by way of death indemnity, plus P30,000.00 to Sgt. Benito Raquepo, line between fact and prevarication that will determine the guilt or innocence of
by way of medical expenses incurred, subject to the lien herein imposed for the accused. That line may not be discernible from a mere reading of the
payment of the appropriate docket fees in case of successful collection; both impersonal record by the reviewing court. The record will not reveal those tell-
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. tale signs that will affirm the truth or expose the contrivance, like the angry flush
of an insisted assertion or the sudden pallor of a discovered lie or the tremulous
3. The M-14 rifle (Exh. "K" and "K-2") the corpus delicti, presently deposited mutter of a reluctant answer or the forthright tone of a ready reply. The record
with 117th PC Company, Aparri, Cagayan, is hereby ordered forfeited in favor of will not show if the eyes have darted in evasion or looked down in confession or
the government; Perforce, the Commanding Officer of the 117th PC, Aparri, gazed steadily with a serenity that has nothing to distort or conceal. The record
Cagayan, is peremptorily ordered to deposit to the Acting Branch Clerk of Court will not show if tears were shed in anger, or in shame, or in remembered pain, or
of this court, the said M-14 rifle with magazines, for proper disposition in in feigned innocence. Only the judge trying the case can see all these and on the
accordance with law and the rules. basis of his observations arrive at an informed and reasoned verdict. 11

4. The accused to pay the costs. After a careful examination of the records, we find no ground or reason to set aside or disturb the trial
court's assessment of credibility of the eyewitnesses when they testified pointing to accused-appellant
5. In the service hereof, the accused shall be entitled to the full length of time, he as the assailant in the shooting of the group of Ex-Mayor Arreola and his companions.
underwent preventive imprisonment (March 23, 1987), provided he voluntarily
agreed in writing to abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted 1. Eyewitnesses Antonio Villasin and Rosario Peneyra, who were with the group of Ex-Mayor
prisoners, otherwise, he shall be credited to only four-fifth (4/5) thereof. (Art. 29, Arreola on that fateful night of March 22, 1989, categorically testified that it was accused-appellant,
NCC; as amended by RA 6127, June 17, 1970; U.S. vs. Ortencio, 38 Phil. 341; whom they positively identified in court, who fired his M-14 Rifle at their direction hitting the ex-
People vs. Chavez, 126 SCRA 1). mayor and his companions.

SO ORDERED. 7 (Emphasis ours) Villasin's testimony on this point is as follows:

Notwithstanding the single penalty imposed by the trial court, accused still interposed the present COURT:
appeal on the following grounds: Q: You heard gun report, what can you say?
A: I saw that he was the one who made the gun report, sir.
(1) The trial court erred in convicting Mario Tabaco of the crime of murder in ATTY ARRIOLA:
connection with the deaths of Oscar Tibulog, Jorge Arreola, Felicito Rigunan, and Q: Who was that "he" you are referring to?
Romeo Regunton. A: Mario Tabaco, sir. (p. 19, tsn, March 19, 1990)
Q: Why do you say that Mario Tabaco was the one from whom those gun reports
come from?
(2) The trial court erred in holding Mario Tabaco liable for homicide on the death A: Because he was the only person from whom I saw a gun, sir.
of Jorge Siriban and the injury sustained by Benito Raquepo. Q: What did you do also upon hearing those gun reports?
30
A: I had to seek shelter, sir. A: We were sitting at the backrest of the 4th seat, sir.
Q: What happened to Ex-Mayor Arreola? Q: Where were you facing?
A: He was hit, sir. A: We were facing south the arena.
PROSECUTOR MIGUEL: Q: Where did the first gun shot came from?
Q: You said that the accused shot Ex-Mayor Arreola, what kind of weapon did he A: It came from Mario Tabaco, sir.
use if you know? Q: From what direction?
A: M-14, sir. A: Infront of us, sir.
xxx xxx xxx Q: Where was he, was he in your front?
Q: After the incident (precedent) have you come to learn what happened to A: He was in the first row of seats.
Regunton? Q: After the first gun shot, what happened?
A: I came to know that he was dead, sir. A: Somebody was killed, sir.
Q: Was that all you gathered? Q: Who was that?
A: Also Capt. Tabulog, sir. A: Ex-Mayor Arreola, sir.
xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx
Q: How many shots did you hear? COURT:
A: Three (3) shots, sir. Q: How many gun shot reports did you hear?
Q: All those three (3) shots were directed to Ex-Mayor? A: Many, sir.
A: Yes, sir. ATTY. VILLENA:
Q: You heard three shots according to you, was that successive or automatic? Q: You said that you heard more gun shots, can you tell the nature, was there in
A: Successive, sir. succession or automatic?
Q: You were seated at the left side of Ex-Mayor Arreola, who was seated on his A: Automatic, sir.
right side? xxx xxx xxx
A: None, sir. Q: Can you tell us your previous occupation?
xxx xxx xxx A: An army man, sir.
Q: Mr. witness, you said that you saw the deceased holding a gun when you first Q: How long have you been employed with the army?
heard gun shot, will you please describe the stands (position) of the accused? A: Five (5) years, sir.
A: Like this. (The witness demonstrated that the accused was standing on a forth Q: As an army before, have you ever been handled an M-14?
(port) arm position). A: Yes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx Q: Can you tell us if you are familiar with a M-14 being fired?
Q: What did he do with the gun when you saw him? A: Yes, sir.
A: He fired the gun, sir. Q: Now, you said earlier that you heard many more shots after you run, would
Q: To what the gun was directed when he fired the gun? you say that these gun shots you heard were fired from M-14 rifle?
A: To Ex-Mayor Arreola, sir. A: Those are that came from M-14, sir.
ATTY. VILLENA: Q: Where were you at the time when you heard the automatic gun shot?
Q: You said earlier that after the incident you left the cockpit and returned, when A: I was outside the cockpit, sir. 12
you returned, what did you see? On cross-examination by the defense counsel, witness Villasin testified, thus:
A: I saw two dead persons, sir. ATTY. CONSIGNA:
Q: Whose cadavers were these that you saw? Q: You said that after the first gun shot or gun report, Mr. Tabaco was on the first
A: The cadavers of Ex-Mayor Arreola and Capt. Tabulog, sir. seat downward, is it not?
Q: How far was the cadaver of Tabulog to Arreola? A: Mr. Tabaco placed his left foot on the first seat aiming his gun, sir.
A: Less than a meter, sir. Q: Directly toward the first seat, is that what you mean?
xxx xxx xxx A: It was directed to Ex-Mayor Arreola.
Q: When you saw the corpse of Capt. Tabulog, can you identify the person xxx xxx xxx
passing as you mentioned? Q: I want to make it clear, Mr. witness, it was the first gun that you went to hide
A: They have similarity, sir. yourself at the gate of the cockpit, is that correct?
xxx xxx xxx A: After the 3rd gun shot, sir.
Q: When you heard first gun shot, can you tell the position of Arreola, you and Q: And these three (3) gun reports, they were in a single successive shot, is it not
your companions? Mr. witness?
31
A: Yes, sir. Q: What kind of firearm?
xxx xxx xxx A: M-14, sir.
Q: That person who allegedly passed by you or infront of you prior to the first Q: And do you know if Mayor Arreola was hit when Mario Tabaco shot him?
gun report, did you notice if he had a gun with him? A: Yes, sir.
A: He passed by our back, sir. Q: How do you know that Mayor Arreola was hit?
xxx xxx xxx A: Because I saw it, sir.
Q: And that person according to you was still there when the late Mayor Arreola Q: What did you do also?
was shot? A: When Mayor Arreola was already dead, I sought cover because I was also
A: He was directly behind him when the gun reports were made, sir. wounded.
Q: You mean to say the first gun report? Q: Do you know what happened also to Romeo Regunton?
A: Yes, sir. A: Yes, sir.
Q: And that first gun report was hit Ex-Mayor Arreola? Q: What happened to him?
A: The three gun reports hit the Mayor, sir. 13 A: When I was wounded he also said, "uncle I was also wounded."
For his part, Peneyra testified as follows: Q: What did you tell when he told you that?
ATTY. ARRIOLA A: I told him, "you seek cover also my son".
Q: Do you remember what particular place of the cockpit when you go with Q: How did Romeo Regunton took cover?
Mayor Arreola? A: He moved slowly by dragging his body along the ground, sir.
A: Yes, sir. xxx xxx xxx
Q: What part of the cockpit? Q: By the way, how far were you from Mario Tabaco who fired upon the person
A: We went up to the bleacher, sir. of Mayor Arreola?
Q: Do you remember how the bleachers were arranged inside the cockpit? A: Probably more than 3 meters, sir. 14
A: Yes, sir. On cross-examination, this witness testified as follows:
Q: How were they arranged? ATTY. CONSIGNA:
A: In rows, step by step, sir. Q: When for the first time when you were already in the cockpit arena did you
COURT: see the accused Mario Tabaco?
Q: How many rows? A: Before the shooting, sir.
A: Four rows, sir. Q: And approximately how many minutes or seconds did you see Mario Tabaco
ATTY. ARRIOLA: for the first time prior to the shooting incident?
Q: And what row did you stay together with the late Mayor Arreola? A: Probably 5 minutes before, sir.
A: The late Mayor Arreola and Antonio Villasin took the 4th step, sir. Q: And in that place of the cockpit arena have you seen the accused herein Mario
Q: And how about you? Tabaco?
A: We stood at their back west of them, sir. A: He sat on the first row of the seats.
Q: By the way, can you tell to the court what were your respective position of the Q: And sitting on the first row of the bleachers, on what part of the cockpit arena
place where you stayed? did Mario Tabaco, the accused sit?
A: The late Mayor Arreola and Antonio Villasin sat at the backrest of the fourth A: He sat a little bit west of us, sir.
step, sir. COURT:
Q: And how about you, where did you stay also? Q: How far?
A: I stood at the right back of Mayor Arreola, sir. A: Probably more than 3 meters, sir.
Q: And how about Romeo Regunton? Q: A little bit to the west, do I get from you that he was seated on the western part
A: He also stayed at the back of Mayor Arreola, sir. of the cockpit?
xxx xxx xxx A: A little to the west, sir.
Q: While you were in that position together with your companions, do you Q: An you together with the late Mayor Arreola were also on the western part of
remember if there was untoward incident that happened? the cockpit?
A: Yes, sir. A: We were on the northwest.
Q: What was that untoward incident that happened? Q: Mario Tabaco, therefore, the accused in these cases was not directly in front of
A: That was the time when Mario Tabaco shot the late Mayor Arreola, sir. you?
Q: Do you know what did Mario Tabaco use in shooting the late Arreola? A: A little bit west of us, sir.
A: Yes, sir.
32
Q: It was on that position of the accused Mario Tabaco and your position with the Q: Where was he at that specific time and place?
late Arreola on the northwest when you according to you saw Mario Tabaco A: Inside the cockpit, sir.
fired his gun, is that what you mean? Q: Where were you also?
A: Yes, sir. A: I was at the stairs, sir.
Q: That the accused Mario Tabaco was on the first row when he allegedly shot on Q: When you saw him what happened if any?
Mayor Arreola who was on 4th row, is that what you mean? xxx xxx xxx
A: Mario Tabaco stood up and faced us, sir. A: When he entered he stopped and then the gun fired and that was the time when I
Q: So while Mario Tabaco stood up and faced towards the direction where you got down, sir.
were together with the late Mayor Arreola still Mario Tabaco was on the floor Q: Did you see to whom he was directing the gun?
of the cockpit arena? A: It was directed to the Mayor's place, sir.
A: Yes, sir, on the cemented floor. Q: How far was the Mayor from the accused Mario Tabaco?
Q: And immediately after you heard the first shot coming from the accused Mario A: More or less three (3) meters only. There was only one bench between them, sir.
Tabaco considering that you were right behind the late Mayor Arreola, as you Q: Did you see the accused firing his gun towards the Mayor?
have stated in your direct examination you immediately sought cover? A: With his first shot which was directed to the Mayor that was the time I got down
A: I only lay flat to the floor of the cockpit when Mario Tabaco fired three (3) to hide myself, sir. 16
shots. On cross-examination, this witness testified as follows:
xxx xxx xxx ATTY. CONSIGNA:
Q: At the time you laid flat facing down and you did not come to know that Q: So, it was at the time you were inside the cockpit arena that you heard gunfire?
Mayor Arreola was dead already? A: Yes, sir.
A: Why not, the first and second shots, I know him that he was already dead. Q: And you did not see who fired that gunfire while you were inside the cockpit
Q: And the three (3) shots that you heard were all directed towards Mayor arena?
Arreola? A: When I was inside, I saw Mario Tabaco pointing a gun to the Mayor and the gun
A: Yes, sir, in our place. went off and that's the time I took cover, sir.
xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx
COURT: Q: And that was the last time you heard burst of gunfire inside the cockpit arena?
Q: To whom the 3rd shot directed? A: When I went outside, I heard shots inside and outside. 17
A: In our place, sir.
Q: No person was involved on the 3rd shot? Set over against the foregoing positive and categorical testimonial declaration of the above-named
A: That was also the time when Romeo Regunton came toward me and told me eyewitnesses for the prosecution is the accused-appellant's bare denial of the charges against him. As
that he was also hit. between the positive identification of the accused by the prosecution witnesses and the bare denial of
xxx xxx xxx accused, the choice is not difficult to make. For, it is a settled rule that positive identification by the
COURT: prosecution witnesses of the accused as perpetrator of the crime is entitled to greater weight than his
Q: You don't know the person who shot him? bare denial and explanation. 18
A: It was Mario Tabaco because he was still firing then, sir.
Q: You do not know the person who shot him?
A: It was Mario Tabaco because he was still firing then, sir. 15 Likewise, there is no evidence from the record, as none was adduced by accused-appellant, of any ill-
motive on the part of the prosecution witnesses as to why would they testify adversely against
The above testimonies of Villasin and Peneyra pointing to accused-appellant as the assailant in the accused-appellant in the way that they did. Well settled is the rule that where there is no evidence and
shooting of the ex-mayor and his companions were corroborated further by the testimony of another nothing to indicate, that the principal witnesses for the prosecution were actuated by improper
eyewitness in the person of Rogelio Guimmayen. His account of the incident is as follows: motive, the presumption was that they were not so actuated and their testimonies are entitled to full
faith and credit. 19
PROSECUTOR ABAD:
2. Accused-appellant contends that eyewitnesses Villasin and Peneyra were not telling the truth when
they testified that it was accused-appellant who was the assailant in the shooting of Ex-Mayor
xxx xxx xxx Arreola and his companions considering that Dr. Rivera, who examined the cadaver of Ex-mayor
Arreola, testified that the trajectory of the bullets that hit the ex-mayor shows that the assailant was
Q: How far were you from Tabaco when you saw him holding that gun? on the same level as the ex-mayor, and the trajectory of the third bullet shows that the assailant was at
A: More or less ten (10) meters, sir. a higher level as the point of entry was higher than the point of exit. Appellant states that he was
33
seated at the first row which was the lowest while the ex-mayor and his companions were seated at Accused-appellant claims that he did not have the criminal intent to kill Siriban or wound Sgt.
the fourth row which was the highest. This contention, however, is untenable. Raquepo, and that the gun would not have been fired in the first place had Mario Retreta, for no
apparent reason, not tried to grab the gun from him, are without merit.
Eyewitnesses Villasin and Peneyra testified that accused-appellant was at the first row of seats of the
slanted bleachers of the cockpit arena, when he stood up, stepped on one of the seats, aimed his rifle Retreta testified that he grabbed the gun from accused-appellant because the latter changed his gun
at Ex-Mayor Arreola and his companions and fired at them. 20 from port arm position to horizontal position, and at that instance he thought accused-appellant might
harm Sgt. Raquepo. 22
The above-quoted testimonies explain very well why two gunshot wounds found on the cadaver of
Ex-mayor Arreola appear to have been inflicted while he and his assailant were face to face and at the Furthermore, even assuming that he lacked criminal intent in the killing of Sgt. Raquepo and the
same level. near-fatal wounding of Siriban, his claim of innocence cannot be sustained. His undisputed act of
firing the gun, which is by itself felonious in total disregard of the consequences it might produce, is
Upon the other hand, according to Dr. Rivera, one of the gunshot wounds of Ex-Mayor Arreola had a equivalent to criminal intent.
point of entry higher than the point of exit because he must have already been lying down when his
wound was inflicted. 21 Accused-appellant cannot evade responsibility for his felonious acts, even if he did not intend the
consequences thereof for, in accordance with Art. 4 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability is
Well established, too, from the evidence on record is accused-appellant's liability for the death of incurred by any person committing a felony although the wrongful act done be different from that
Jorge Siriban, Jr. and the near-fatal wounding of Sgt. Benito Raquepo. which he intended.

Not seriously disputed by accused-appellant are the testimonies of Sgt. Benito Raquepo and We note that while the accused was found guilty in all four (4) murder charges and the penalty of
policeman Mario Retreta. Sgt. Benito Raquepo testified that at about 9:00 o'clock in the evening of reclusion perpetua should have been imposed on him in all four (4) murder charges, the trial court
March 22, 1987 while he was taking his snacks at the canteen of Co located at the left side of the gate imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua for all four murder charges. The trial court explained the
of the cockpit arena, he heard five successive gun reports coming from inside the cockpit arena. single sentence for four murder charges in this wise:
While he was on his way inside the cockpit arena, he saw the accused-appellant coming from inside
the cockpit arena. He told the accused "Mario relax ka lang", after which the accused pointed his gun Whether or not the criminal cases Nos. 259, 270, 284 and 317, involving the
at him. At that point in time, Mario Retreta who was among the persons near Mario Tabaco, grabbed killings of Oscar Tabulog, Jorge Arreola, Felicito Rigunan and Romeo Regunton,
the gun from the latter. It was at that point when the gun went off hitting him on the right thigh and respectively, should have been prosecuted under only one Information.
the bullet exiting on his left thigh. He also saw that Jorge Siriban, who was then about three meters
away from his left side, was hit at his testicles. The law provides:

Mario Retreta, a policeman and relative of accused-appellant, on the other hand corroborated in part Art. 48. Penalty for complex crimes.
the testimony of Sgt. Raquepo. He testified that at about 10:00 o'clock in the evening of March 22,
1987, he was at the canteen of Mrs. Co. While thereat, he saw accused-appellant rushing out from the
cockpit arena. Before he saw accused-appellant, he heard a gun report from inside the cockpit arena. When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave
He was then about one meter away from accused-appellant when he noticed Sgt. Raquepo whom he felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for
is acquainted with, and Jorge Siriban who was then standing at the gate of the cockpit arena. Sgt. committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime
Raquepo was facing accused-appellant and at that distance and position, he heard Sgt. Raquepo said: shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum
"Mario keep calm". He also told accused-appellant: "What is that happened again, Mario." When he period. (as amended by Art. No. 400). (Art. 48, Revised Penal
saw accused-appellant change his gun position from port arm to horizontal position, he got near Code).
accused-appellant and pressed down the muzzle of the gun when accused appellant squeezed the
trigger hitting Sgt. Raquepo on both thighs and also Jorge Siriban. A certain Sgt. Ferrer joined in the Read as it should be, this article provides for two clauses of crimes where a single
grapple and was able to take away the gun from accused-appellant. penalty is to be imposed; first, where the single act constitutes two or more grave
or less grave felonies (delito compuesto); and second, when the offense is a
Sgt. Raquepo survived the gunshot wounds due to adequate medical assistance but Siriban was not as necessary means for committing the other. (delito complejo) and/or complex
lucky. proper (People vs. Pineda, 20 SCRA 748).

34
In the cases at bar, the Provincial Prosecutor filed four (4) separate Informations arena, and causing wounds on his face and on his right shoulder. Additionally, we
of murder, which should have been otherwise, as the shooting to death of the four have the used/spent empty shells (Exh. "R" and "R-1"). 23
(4) victims should have been prosecuted under one information, involving four
(4) murder victims. We hold that the trial court was in error in imposing only a single penalty of reclusion perpetua for
all four murder cases. The trial court holding that a complex crime was committed since "the
The evidence shows that the four (4) victims were FELLED by one single evidence shows that the four (4) victims were FELLED by one single shot/burst of fire and/or
shot/burst of fire and/or successive automatic gun fires, meaning continuous. successive automatic gun fires, meaning continuous (emphasis ours) 24 does not hold water.
Hence, it is a complex crime involving four murdered victims, under the first
category, where a single act of shooting constituted two or more grave or less Of course, to justify the penalty imposed, the trial court relied on the doctrines enunciated in People
grave felonies (delito compuesto), as decided in the cases of People vs. Dama, vs. Pama 25 (not People vs. Dama, as cited by the trial court), People vs. Lawas, 26 and People vs.
CA 44 O.G. 3339; People vs. Lawas, 97 Phil. 975; People vs. Pineda, L-26222, Pineda. 27
July 21, 1967, 20 SCRA 748.
The trial court misappreciated the facts in People vs. Pama. In said case, there was only one bullet
Paraphrasing a more recent decision of the Supreme Court, we say — as the which killed two persons. Hence, there was only a single act which produced two crimes, resulting in
deaths of Oscar Tahulug, Jorge Arreola, Felicito Rigunan and Romeo Regunton, a specie of complex crime known as a compound crime, wherein a single act produces two or more
in Criminal Cases Nos. 259, 270, 284 and 317 respectively, were the result of one grave or less grave felonies. In the case at bench, there was more than one bullet expended by the
single act of the accused Mario Tabaco, (People vs. Guillen, 85 Phil. 307) the accused-appellant in killing the four victims. The evidence adduced by the prosecution show that
penalty — is the penalty imposed for the more serious offense. The more serious Tabaco entered the cockpit with a fully loaded M-14 sub-machine gun. 28 He fired the weapon,
offense is murder, the killing have been attended by TREACHERY because the which contained 20 rounds of bullets in its magazine, continuously. When the rifle was recovered
victims were completely taken by surprise and had no means of defending from Tabaco, the magazine was already empty. Moreover, several spent shells were recovered from
themselves against Mario Tabaco's sudden attack. The penalty is imposable in its the scene of the crime. Hence, the ruling enunciated in People vs. Pama cannot be applied. On the
maximum degree (People vs. Fernandez, 99 Phil. 515), but as the death penalty is contrary, what is on all fours with the case at bench is the ruling laid down in People vs. Desierto. 29
no longer permitted the same is hereby reduced to a single Penalty of The accused in that case killed five persons with a Thompson sub-machine gun, an automatic firearm
RECLUSION PERPETUA for the four (4) murders. (People vs. Herson which, like the M-14, is capable of firing continuously. As stated therein:
Maghanoy, GR Nos. 67170-72, December 15, 1989).
In the case at bar, Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code is not applicable because
Accordingly, in Criminal Case No. 10-316, for homicide with Frustrated the death of each of the five persons who were killed by appellant and the
Homicide and it appearing also that the death of Jorge Siriban and the wounding physical injuries inflicted upon each of the two other persons injured were not
of Benito Raquepo, was the result of one single act of the accused Tabaco, the caused by the performance by the accused of one simple act as provided for by
applicable penalty is the penalty imposed for the more serious offense. The more said article. Although it is true that several successive shots were fired by the
serious offense is HOMICIDE, to be imposed in its maximum degree of accused in a short space of time, yet the factor which must be taken into
reclusion temporal, which is 17 years, 4 months, 1 day to 20 years. There being consideration is that, to each death caused or physical injuries inflicted upon the
no modifying circumstances and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the victims, corresponds a distinct and separate shot fired by the accused, who thus
penalty that should be imposed, and which is hereby imposed, upon the accused made himself criminally liable for as many offenses as those resulting from every
Mario Tabaco is 10 years and 1 day of Prision Mayor as the minimum, to 17 single act that produced the same. Although apparently he perpetrated a series of
years, 4 months, 1 day of Reclusion Temporal, as maximum, plus P30,000.00 offenses successively in a matter of seconds, yet each person killed and each
actual damages for medical expenses of Benito Raquepo. person injured by him became the victim, respectively, of a separate crime of
homicide or frustrated homicide. Except for the fact that five crimes of homicide
It was duly proved beyond doubt that the gun (Exhs. "K", SN No. 1492932, "K- and two cases of frustrated homicide were committed successively during the
2" — magazine of M-14 and Exh. "L" — Memo Receipt of M-14 issued to tragic incident, legally speaking there is nothing that would connect one of them
Tabaco), used by the accused, is admittedly an automatic powerful weapon, more with its companion offenses. (emphasis ours)
powerful than an M-16 armalite rifle. It is so powerful that the bullets can
penetrate even more than five (5) persons resulting to their deaths. And, this was In Desierto, although the burst of shots was caused by one single act of pressing the trigger
proven when, according to witness Rosario Peneyra, the bullets even destroyed of the Thompson sub-machine gun, in view of its special mechanism, the person firing it
the cemented rail guard separating the lower and upper bleachers of the cockpit has only to keep pressing the trigger with his finger and it would fire continually. Hence, it

35
is not the act of pressing the trigger which should produce the several felonies, but the
number of bullets which actually produced them. 30

The trial court also misread People vs. Pineda. 31 True, the case of Pineda provided us with a
definition of what a complex crime is. But that is not the point. What is relevant is that Art. 48, was
not applied in the said case because the Supreme Court found that there were actually several
homicides committed by the perpetrators. Had the trial court read further, it would have seen that the
Supreme Court in fact recognized the "deeply rooted . . . doctrine that when various victims expire
from separate shots, such acts constitute separate and distinct crimes." 32 Clarifying the applicability
of Art. 48 of the Revised Penal Code, the Supreme Court further stated in Pineda that "to apply the
first half of Article 48, . . . there must be singularity of criminal act; singularity of criminal impulse is
not written into the law." 33 (emphasis supplied) The firing of several bullets by Tabaco, although
resulting from one continuous burst of gunfire, constitutes several acts. Each person, felled by
different shots, is a victim of a separate crime of murder. There is no showing that only a single
missile passed through the bodies of all four victims. The killing of each victim is thus separate and
distinct from the other. In People vs. Pardo 34 we held that:

Where the death of two persons does not result from a single act but from two
different shots, two separate murders, and not a complex crime, are committed.

Furthermore, the trial court's reliance on the case of People vs. Lawas 35 is misplaced. The doctrine
enunciated in said case only applies when it is impossible to ascertain the individual deaths caused by
numerous killers. In the case at bench, all of the deaths are attributed, beyond a shadow of a doubt, to
the accused-appellant.

Consequently, the four murders which resulted from a burst of gunfire cannot be considered a
complex crime. They are separate crimes. The accused-appellant must therefore be held liable for
each and every death he has caused, and sentenced accordingly to four sentences of reclusion
perpetua.

WHEREFORE, no reversible error having been committed by the trial court in finding accused-
appellant guilty of four (4) counts of Murder and one (1) count of Homicide with Frustrated
Homicide, the judgment appealed from should be, as it is, hereby AFFIRMED, with the
MODIFICATION that four sentences of reclusion perpetua be hereby imposed.

Costs against accused-appellant.

SO ORDERED.

Padilla, Bellosillo, Vitug and Kapunan, JJ., concur.

36
(52) G.R. No. L-47941 December 7, 1940 ground that the latter is disqualified under paragraph (b) of section 94 of Commonwealth Act No.
357. After hearing, the court below rendered it decision on November 28, 1940, the dispositive
MIGUEL CRISTOBAL, petitioner, portion of which reads as follows:
vs.
ALEJO LABRADOR, ET AL., respondents Without going further into a discussion of all the other minor points and questions raised by
the petitioner, the court declares that the pardon extended in favor of the respondent on
Victoriano Yamson for petitioner. December 24, 1939, has had the effect of excluding the respondent from the
E. Voltaire Garcia for respondent Santos. disqualification created by section 94, subsection (b) of the New Election Code. The
petition for exclusion of the respondent Teofilo C. Santos should be, as it hereby is, denied.
Let there be no costs.

Petitioner Cristobal has filed the present petition for certiorari in which he impugns the decision of
LAUREL, J.: the court below on the several grounds stated in the petition.

This is the petition for a writ of certiorari to review the decision of the Court of First Instance of It is the contention of the petitioner that the pardon granted by His Excellency, the President of the
Rizal in its election case No. 7890, rendered on November 28, 1940, sustaining the right of Teofilo C. Philippines, to the respondent, Teofilo C. Santos, did not restore the said respondents to the full
Santos to remain in the list of registered voters in precinct No. 11 of the municipality of Malabon, enjoyment of his political rights, because (a) the pardoning power of the Chief Executive does not
Province of Rizal. apply to legislative prohibitions; (b) the pardoning power here would amount to an unlawful exercise
by the Chief Executive of a legislative function, and (c) the respondent having served his sentence
The antecedents which form the factual background of this election controversy are briefly narrated and all the accesory penalties imposed by law, there was nothing to pardon. All these propositions
as follows: involve an inquiry into the primary question of the nature and extent of the pardoning power vested
in the Chief Executive of the Nation by the Constitution.
On March 15, 1930, the Court of First Instance of Rizal found Teofilo C. Santos, respondent herein,
guilty of the crime of estafa and sentenced him to six months of arresto mayor and the accesories Paragraph 6 of section 11 of Article VII of our Constitution, provides:
provided by law, to return to the offended parties, Toribio Alarcon and Emilio Raymundo the
amounts P375 and P125, respectively, with subsidiary imprisonment in the case of insolvency, and to (6) The President shall have the power to grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and
pay the costs. On appeal, this court, on December 20, 1930, confirmed the judgment of conviction. to remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction, for all offenses, except in cases of
Accordingly, he was confined in the provincial jail of Pasig, Rizal, from March 14, 1932 to August impeachment, upon such conditions and with such restrictions and limitations as may be
18, 1932 and paid the corresponding costs of trial. As to his civil liability consisting in the return of deem proper to impose. He shall have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of
the two amounts aforestated, the same was condoned by the complaints. Not withstanding his the National Assembly.
conviction, Teofilo C. Santos continued to be a registered elector in the municipality of Malabon,
Rizal, and was, for the period comprised between 1934 and 1937, seated as the municipality of
Malabon, Rizal, and was, for the period comprised between 1934 and 1937, seated as the municipal It should be observed that there are two limitations upon the exercise of this constitutional
president of that municipality. On August 22, 1938, Commonwealth Act No. 357, otherwise known as prerogative by the Chief Executive, namely: (a) that the power be exercised after convictions; and (b)
the Election Code, was approved by the national Assembly, section 94, paragraph (b) of which that such power does not extend to cases of impeachment. Subject to the limitations imposed by the
disqualifies the respondent from voting for having been "declared by final judgment guilty of any Constitution, the pardoning power does not extend to cases of impeachment. Subject to the
crime against the property." In view of this provision, the respondent forth with applied to his limitations imposed by the Constitution, the pardoning power cannot be restricted or controlled by
Excellency, the President for an absolute pardon, his petition bearing date of August 15, 1939. Upon legislative action. It must remain where the sovereign authority has placed it and must be exercised
the favorable recommendation of the Secretary of Justice, the Chief Executive, on December 24, by the highest authority to whom it is entrusted. An absolute pardon not only blots out the crime
1939, granted the said petition, restoring the respondent to his "full civil and political rights, except committed, but removes all disabilities resulting from the convictions. In the present case, the
that with respect to the right to hold public office or employment, he will be eligible for appointment disability is the result of conviction without which there would no basis for disqualification from
only to positions which are clerical or manual in nature and involving no money or property voting. Imprisonment is not the only punishment which the law imposes upon those who violate its
responsibility." command. There are accessory and resultant disabilities, and the pardoning power likewise extends to
such disabilities. When granted after the term of imprisonment has expired, absolute pardon removes
all that is left of the consequences of conviction. In the present case, while the pardon extended to
On November 16, 1940, the herein petitioner, Miguel Cristobal, filed a petition for the exclusion of respondent Santos is conditional in the sense that "he will be eligible for appointment only to
the name of Teofilo C. Santos from the list of voters in precinct No. 11 of Malabon, Rizal, on the positions which are clerical or manual in nature involving no money or property responsibility," it is
37
absolute insofar as it "restores the respondent to full civil and political rights." (Pardon, Exhibit 1,
extended December 24, 1939.) While there are cases in the United States which hold that the
pardoning power does not restore the privilege of voting, this is because, as stated by the learned
judge below, in the United States the right of suffrage is a matter exclusively in the hands of the State
and not in the hands of the Federal Government (Decision, page 9). Even then, there are cases to the
contrary (Jones vs. Board of Registrars, 56 Miss. 766; Hildreth vs. Health, 1 Ill. App. 82). Upon the
other hand, the suggestion that the disqualification imposed in paragraph (b) of section 94 of
Commonwealth Act No. 357, does not fall within the purview of the pardoning power of the Chief
Executive, would lead to the impairment of the pardoning power of the Chief Executive, not
contemplated in the Constitution, and would be no way of restoring the political privilege in a case of
this nature except through legislative action.

The petition for certiorari is denied, with costs against the petitioner. So ordered.

Avanceña, C.J., Imperial, and Diaz, JJ., concur.

38
(53) G.R. No. 105673 July 26, 1996 victim's body was covered with cut grass. Her skirt was raised upward; her panty had been
removed and was found near the body.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. Post-mortem examination conducted by Dr. Marcelito B. Abas, Municipal Health Officer of
ANTONIO MAGANA, accused-appellant. Labo, Camarines Norte, showed that the victim sustained hacking wounds on the neck,
hematomas on the head, body and left arm, and multiple laceration of the hymen. The cause
of death was "shock hemorrhagic due to the hacking wound on the neck". The time of death
was estimated at approximately 12 to 24 hours prior to the time of autopsy.
PANGANIBAN, J.:p
After the burial of the victim, De Austria revealed to the Sta. Marias what he witnessed that
fateful morning. Accordingly, on March 7, 1991, an Information was filed charging
Circumstantial evidence adduced by the prosecution in this case was more than sufficient to appellant with rape with homicide. It reads:
convict the accused-appellant of rape with homicide. But beyond affirming the correctness
of the trial court's decision and reiterating familiar legal doctrines, we declare that in this
instance, the ruthlessness and viciousness exhibited by appellant in carrying out his That on or about 7:00 o'clock in the morning of January 14, 1991, at
dastardly design upon a hapless minor most certainly warrants the imposition of the Mahawanhawan, Municipality of Labo, Province of Camarines Norte,
severest punishment possible. We also note with considerable frustration and anxiety that Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
this case is only one among a host of others, constituting a veritable floodtide of crime and accused, armed with a bolo and with the use of a piece of wood, and by means of
immorality which seemingly signals an unstoppable regression to the law of the jungle, violence and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
where anyone is free to grab and take whatever he pleases. feloniously have carnal knowledge with one ODETTE STA. MARIA, a girl of 14
years old (sic), against the latter's will; that on or after the commission of said
offense, said accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
This is an appeal taken from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Daet, Camarines with deliberate intent to kill and with evident premeditation and taking advantage
Norte, Fifth Judicial Region, Branch 38,1 in Criminal Case No. 6919 entitled "People vs. of his superior strength, assault, attack, hack and hit said Odette Sta. Maria,
Antonio Magana". The trial court found the accused (appellant herein) guilty beyond thereby inflicting upon the latter serious and mortal wounds which were the
reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of rape with homicide and sentenced him to proximate cause of the death of said Odette Sta. Maria, to the damage and
"imprisonment for life (Reclusion Perpetua)".2 prejudice of the heirs of the victim.

The Facts All contrary to law, and with the aggravating circumstances that the said offense
was committed in uninhabited place being a grassy area and the victim not
At about 6:00 a.m. of January 14, 1991, 14-year old Odette Sta. Maria left for school, as having given provocation for the offense.3
usual taking the feeder road which is about 2 1/2 km. from Sierra Bros. From there, she
would have gotten a ride to school. On February 7, 1992, the trial court found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt:

At about 7:00 a.m. that morning, Danilo De Austria saw accused-appellant "strangling the WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds accused Antonio Magana
victim" with his left arm by the side of the feeder road. De Austria was about to untie his guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of Rape with
carabao before reporting the incident to the authorities, but he was immediately accosted by Homicide and hereby sentences him to the penalty of DEATH. However, in view
the appellant who poked a knife at him, threatening to kill him if the family of the victim of the suspension of the death penalty, accused is hereby sentenced (sic)
would come to know of the matter. imprisonment for life (Reclusion Perpetua). And, he is hereby ordered to
indemnify the heirs of the deceased the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS
The victim's mother, Lucia Sta. Maria, got worried when at 5:00 p.m., her daughter was not (P50,000.00) for her death, THIRTY-NINE THOUSAND PESOS (39,000.00) as
with the other kids returning from school. She and her husband started to ask around for liquidated damages, TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (P20,000.00) as moral
Odette, and learned that she did not even make it to school that day. Together with De damages and TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00) as exemplary damages.4
Austria and some neighbors, they searched for Odette. At about 9:00 p.m., they found the
body of the girl sprawled on the ground some twenty meters from the site of that morning's Hence, this appeal.
incident. The body was muddy, the face swollen, with hack wounds on the neck. Half of the

39
Version of the Prosecution way". The victim informed her that appellant would look at her that way everytime they
met.14
The prosecution's theory is that on that fatal morning appellant was lying in wait for the
victim, and when she passed by on her way to school, appellant forced her to go with him Fe Caramoan Juanson, a neighbor, testified that while she was grazing her carabao, she saw
by strangling or choking her and threatening her with a bladed weapon, the same one used appellant standing on the feeder road at about 6:30 a.m. that day. Appellant, who was
on De Austria. Then, he forced himself on her. Afterwards, he hacked her neck, thereby wearing a faded jacket, appeared uneasy, looking left and right and towards the hinterland
killing her. He attempted to hide the body of the victim by covering it with cut grass. He of the barangay, seemingly waiting for somebody. 15 The place where she saw appellant
also threatened to kill De Austria to prevent the latter from telling on him. waiting was very near the place where the body of the victim was recovered.16

The prosecution presented the testimonies of the following witnesses: Dr. Marcelito Abas, Antonio Vasquez, martial arts instructor of the victim's brother-in-law, spent the night of
Municipal Health Officer of Labo, Camarines Norte, Danilo de Austria, Lucia Sta. Maria, January 13, 1991 at the house of the Sta. Marias, and left at about 6:10 a.m. the following
Fe Caramoan Juanson, and Antonio Vasquez. morning to go back to Labo. He took the feeder road and saw the appellant, whom he met
many times and knew by face and whom he positively identified in court, standing quite
Dr. Abas testified that the victim sustained a hacking wound on the right side of the neck; near the place where the victim's body was subsequently recovered. Appellant appeared to
an incised wound above the first wound parallel to each other; multiple hematomas of both be uneasy and was pacing back and forth; he seemed to be looking for something. The
eyes, both cheeks, left forehead, and left chin; "multiple hematomas right chest, both witness noticed that appellant wore a faded brown jacket at that time.17
scapular region (sic) of the back, left upper extremity posterior aspect with fracture of both
radius and ulna, middle portion;" and multiple laceration of the hymen at 4, 6 and 8 Version of the Defense
o'clock.5 Also, when he conducted the autopsy, the victim was not wearing underwear. 6
Dr. Abas was of the opinion that the victim died approximately 12 to 24 hours before the The defense's theory consists of establishing an alibi for appellant and implicating Danilo
post-mortem examination which was conducted at 8:30 a.m. of January 15, 1991, and that De Austria as the perpetrator of the crime. The following witnesses were presented, viz.,
death could have occurred at about 7:00 a.m. of January 14, 1991. 7 The hacking wound, he Merly Mahipos, Wilfredo Chavez, Jaime Chavez, Jovita Paquita, and the appellant himself.
said, was caused by a sharp instrument, but the hematomas were inflicted with a blunt
instrument. He also testified that the multiple lacerations in the victim's hymen, which were
probably inflicted just before the hacking, indicated the possibility of rape.8 Mahipos, 35, married and a resident of Sierra Bros, testified that on January 14, 1991, at
about 6:30 a.m., while she and her husband were walking from Sierra Bros to
Mahawanhawan, a distance of two kilometers (about thirty minutes on foot) they met the
Danilo De Austria, a farmer and resident of Mahawanhawan, Labo, Camarines Norte, was victim and Danilo De Austria.18 The latter were not yet halfway on the road to Sierra Bros
familiar with both the appellant and the victim. He testified that on that fateful morning, at and about 50 meters from the house of Mahipos' parents. The victim was walking ahead of
about 7:00 a.m., while he was walking along the feeder road towards the ricefields in De Austria by about seven (7) arms length.19 She asked the victim why she was alone and
Barangay Mahawanhawan, he espied the appellant and the victim some forty meters ahead the victim only smiled. De Austria walked fast and carried a bolo ("sinampalok") about
of him. 9 He was shocked to see appellant strangling the victim with his left arm.10 Before eighteen inches long. 20 He was wearing a white T-shirt and black short pants. She did not
he could make a move, appellant blocked his way, poked a double-bladed weapon at him see appellant, however.
and threatened to kill him if he told the Sta. Marias of the incident. He said, "Yes, yes"
because he was "over-frightened" of the appellant. He knew appellant to be abusive
whenever he was drunk.11 Wilfredo Chavez, 31, married, a farmer and resident of Mahawanhawan, testified that at
about 6:00 a.m. of January 14, 1991, while he was at home, he saw De Austria and the
victim pass by, with the victim ahead of De Austria by about seven (7) arms length.21 He
De Austria further testified that the vicinity where he saw appellant assaulting the victim did not see appellant that morning.
was uninhabited, and that cries for help would go unheard; that the person working the
ricefields in that area was none other than accused-appellant himself; and that the body of
the victim was found in a grassy area five meters from the feeder road, and about twenty Jaime Chavez, 42, married, a farmer and likewise a resident of Mahawanhawan, testified
meters from where the victim was seen being strangled.12 De Austria also revealed that that on that day, at about 6:30 a.m., he was in his house situated beside the feeder road,
some ten days after the killing, both he and the appellant were abducted and interrogated by waiting for his co-laborers to arrive, as they were supposed to go gold panning at Jose
the NPA, and that he heard appellant admit to the NPAs that he had raped the girl.13 Panganiban, Camarines Norte. He saw the victim (in her school uniform) pass by, followed
closely by De Austria at about 6:30 a.m.22 After five (5) minutes, Mahipos and her
husband passed by, going the other way. He further testified that appellant came to his
Lucia Sta. Maria, mother of the victim, testified that about a week before her daughter's house at about 7:00 a.m. and asked that he be included in the gold panning activity.
death, they met appellant, and Odette complained that appellant was staring at her in a "bad
40
Appellant stayed in his house for an hour and left at around 8:00 a.m. together with The Court's Ruling
Kagawad Jovita Paquita to buy cigarettes at Sierra Bros.23 He later saw appellant in Sierra
Bros at about 9:00 a.m. He also testified that the place where appellant worked was about First Issue: Credibility of Appellant's Defense
half a kilometer from the place where the body of Odette was recovered.24
We cannot agree with appellant's contention to the effect that the defense built a more
Jovita Paquita, 47, married and resident of Mahawanhawan, testified that she saw appellant credible case than the prosecution, and that its story is consistent with ordinary human
at Chavez' house at past 8:00 a.m. that morning. She and appellant walked together to experience. In essence, the defense's theory is that, although appellant was in
Sierra Bros. There, they parted ways.25 Mahawanhawan, he could not have been at the scene of the crime that fatal morning, and
that someone else (De Austria) was present thereat.
Appellant testified that on that day, after taking breakfast at about 6:30 a.m., he went to his
mother's house, (which is near the feeder road and about 50 meters from his own house26), As pointed out by the Solicitor General,32 appellant's alibi itself showed that he was at or
where he stayed for about 15 minutes, then left by about 7:00 a.m. to see Kagawad Jaime very near the place where witness De Austria said he saw him at the time of the
Chavez. 27 Chavez' house is approximately 330 meters from appellant's house.28 After commission of the felony. By appellant's own admission, he was in the same barangay on
about five minutes, he went to the Mahawanhawan Elementary School to buy cigarettes. the date and time when the crime occurred. the places where appellant claimed to have
Unable to buy any there, he returned to Chavez' place and thereafter went to Sierra Bros at gone that morning are, as found by the trial court, "within walking distance" of each other.
8:00 a.m. He bought cigarettes at Sierra Bros, then returned to his house, arriving there at Thus, the court a quo held ". . . that despite (the) variance in testimony as to time and
around 9:30 a.m.29 Later, he made copra at his parent's land, then spent the rest of the day others, it is not physically impossible for accused to be at the scene of the crime. . . ."
at his house, which is only 500 meters from the grassy place where the body of the victim Therefore, his alibi is inherently wake and hardly credible.
was found.30
In jurisprudence, alibi is generally considered a weak defense because of the facility with
The Issues which it can be fabricated.33 Thus, courts have always looked upon it with suspicion and
have received it with caution. It is a well-settled rule that in order for an alibi to prevail, the
The appellant charges that the trial court erred: defense must establish by positive, clear and satisfactory proof that it was physically
impossible for the accused to have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its
1. In failing to give due credence to the accused's defenses; commission, and not merely that the accused was somewhere else.34

2. In giving undue credence to the testimonies of the prosecution's witnesses; To cite only one example, this Court, in People vs. Cruz,35 computed distances to show
that, contrary to the allegation of the accused, it was not physically impossible for him to be
at the scene of the crime:
3. . . . (In convicting) the accused despite the failure of the prosecution to prove
the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt;
. . . In the case at bar, the distance between his father's farm and the resthouse on
the other hand, and the distance between the said boundary and the resthouse, on
4. In convicting the accused of . . . Rape with Homicide although the prosecution the other, which are 2 and 1/2 kilometers, respectively, are not such distances as
have (sic) only proven a case for Homicide; were physically impossible for accused to negotiate or traverse; in fact, per his
own testimony, he was able to travel from his father's farm to the said boundary
5. In not considering that based on the evidences (sic) presented (by) both the to play basketball that same day. Besides, the house of accused's parents where he
prosecution and the defense, it is Danilo De Austria and not the accused, who is was living was only 200 to 250 meters away from the resthouse, which distance
probably guilty of the offense charged.31 accused could have easily negotiated . . . .

all of which may be summed up as questioning the trial court's assessment of the credibility Aside from its inherent weakness, accused-appellant's alibi cannot overcome the positive
of witnesses and its appreciation of the weight and sufficiency of the prosecution's identification by witness De Austria of appellant as the one straggling the victim that fatal
evidence, vis-a-vis that of the defense. morning.

The Solicitor General adds that the trial court erred when it equated life imprisonment with Second Issue: Credibility of Persecution Witnesses
reclusion perpetua in the dispositive portion of the decision.
41
Hewing to the general rule in criminal law that the guilt of an accused is not determined by Q: Now, Mr. Witness, do you still recall where were you
the weakness of defense's case but by the strength of that of the prosecution, appellant also sometime on January 14, 1991, at about 7:00 o'clock in the
tries to attack the credibility of the prosecution witnesses. morning?

Appellant points to the fact that the witnesses for the prosecution are related to the victim xxx xxx xxx
and one another. But then, such purported "defect" cannot be ascribed solely to the
witnesses of the prosecution. Among the witnesses of the defense, we find that Mahipos is A: I was walking towards the ricefield.
appellant's "kinakapatid",36 while the Chavezes are related to appellant by affinity,3 7 and
Paquita admitted that appellant is the "godson of (her) in-law".38
Q: Where?
Relationship can put the testimony of a witness in doubt, but it cannot adversely affect
credibility by itself.39 It is a familiar rule of law that the assessment of witnesses' A: On the feeder road.
credibility by the trial court is accorded great respect because it is in the best position to
observe and evaluate their demeanor at the time they gave their testimony.40 As will be xxx xxx xxx
shown later, this Court sees no reason to rule otherwise.
Q: While walking on the feeder road of Mahawan-hawan on
Perhaps from sheer desperation, appellant advances an incredible theory: the spouses Sta. that particular date and time, do you remember if you have
Maria, parents of the victim, were trying to cover up their involvement with the New seen anybody on that time while walking?
People's Army by blaming appellant for the crime. Aside from failing to prove such alleged
involvement, accused could not point to any believable reason why the victim's parents xxx xxx xxx
would supposedly forego seeking justice for the rape and killing of their daughter merely in
order to allay some vague suspicion about their ideological learnings.
A: Antonio Magana, sir.
On the other hand, it is not also logical to conclude (as accused-appellant would have us
do) that Juanson was lying because she, and not her husband, happened to be grazing their Q: Who else?
carabao that morning when she saw appellant on the feeder road. Likewise, the defense was
too obviously clutching at straws when they tried to fault Vasquez, who happens to be a A: And Odette.
martial arts instructor, for not having accompanied the victim that day on her way to
school. He was only a guest of the victim's brother-in-law, not even of the Sta. Marias, and
xxx xxx xxx
we cannot see how he could have been held responsible in any manner for assuring the
safety of the victim.
PROS. VILLAFUERTE
Further, the defense contends that the testimony of De Austria is inconsistent with logic and
human experience. He testified that he saw appellant strangling the victim, but there was no Q: In what manner did you see this Odette Sta. Maria and this
sign of strangulation according to Dr. Abas. Also, he was threatened by appellant with a Antonio Magana?
double-bladed weapon, but no such weapon was presented in court. And instead of
reporting the strangling incident to the authorities at once, he opted to untie his carabao A: I was behind them.
first.
Q: Behind whom?
The Court finds that these circumstances do not destroy the credibility of De Austria. On
direct examination, he testified as follows:
A: Behind Odette and Antonio Magana.

PROS. VILLAFUERTE
Q: And what did you see?

42
A: I saw Magana strangling Odette Sta. Maria. Q: You said that you were shocked because of what you saw,
what did you do?
Q: In what manner did you see Antonio Magana strangling
Odette Sta. Maria? A: My plan was to untie the carabao and to report the matter
afterwards, but he blocked my way.
A: He was ahead of me and I was behind her.
Q: What did you do when you were blocked by him?
Q: Do you mean to say that Odette was also walking in that
feeder road? A: He poked a double bladed weapon on me.

A: When I saw the two (2) they were no longer walking. Q: Did he say anything to you?

Q: And you said that Antonio Magana was some sort of A: That once the Sta. Marias knew about this thing, he was
strangling Odette Sta. Maria. How was Antonio Magana going to kill me. "Don't expect to live!"
strangling Odette Sta. Maria?
Q: How did you receive that message?
A: Using his left arm, sir.
A: When he poked a bladed weapon.
Q: Add that left arm was wrapped around the neck of Odette
Sta. Maria? Q: When those words were uttered to you, what did you feel?

A: Yes, sir.41 A: Because I was overfrightened, I said, "Yes, Yes".

The absence of signs of strangulation does not change in the slightest the fact that the Q: Are you afraid of Antonio Magana?
victim was attacked and killed. Even though the weapon used in the killing was not
presented in court, still it does not disprove the use of force and violence, as the fatal hack
wounds on the cadaver which, according to Dr. Abas, 42 were caused by such a weapon, A: Yes, sir.
sufficiently establish this point.
Q: Why?
In People vs. Cortes, supra, this Court held that delay in reporting a crime does not detract
from the veracity of the testimony as long as it is explained. Such delay could be ascribed A: Because when he gets drank (sic), he becomes abusive.
to fear of reprisal or reticence to get involved. In this case, the reason was clearly fear, as
appellant threatened De Austria with harm unless the latter kept quiet. De Austria knew the Q: You have personal knowledge on that?
accused to be abusive (even violent) when drunk. Furthermore, their relative ages also
provide basis for De Austria's fear. While the accused is 42 years of age,43 De Austria is a
young man of 19 years.44 On direct examination, De Austria stated: A: Yes, sir.45

Q: And what did you do when you saw this thing that you While the reactions of eyewitnesses to a crime may vary, and even if De Austria's reaction
have just said? may not be typical or expected of a very credible witness, still, the same cannot be
considered damaging to his credibility. The trial court accepted his testimony and this Court
sees no reason not to.
A: I was shocked and I did not do anything.

Third Issue: Case Against De Austria


xxx xxx xxx
43
In a facetious attempt to throw the blame on De Austria and to discredit him, the defense A: He was uneasy, looking both sides and looking towards the interland
presented witnesses who claimed that they saw De Austria trailing the victim by a few (sic) of the barangay.51
arms' length on the feeder road that morning; one witness added that De Austria had with Q: Do you know the place where the body of Odette Sta. Maria was
him a "sinampalok" (bolo) about eighteen inches long. recovered?
A: Yes, sir.
The Court cannot bring itself to believe such story. While cross-examining De Austria, the Q: Do you know when she was allegedly raped and killed?
defense tried but failed to elicit an admission that he was courting the victim.46 Nothing A: Yes, sir.
else was presented to show improper motive on his part. Viewed against De Austria's clear Q: What date was that?
and categorical testimony that he saw appellant strangling the victim, the testimonies of the A: January 14.
defense witnesses merely ascribe to De Austria a vague and equivocal act which cannot by Q: 1991?
any stretch of the imagination be made the basis for imputing to him the authorship of the A: Yes, sir.
crime. xxx xxx xxx
Q: On the same day that you saw Antonio Magana seemingly waiting for
somebody at about 6:30 o'clock in the morning?
Fourth Issue: Sufficiency of Circumstantial Evidence ATTY. MAGANA:
Misleading, Your Honor. The witness had not testified that she has seen
The evidence of the prosecution is undeniably circumstantial in nature. This is true of most Antonio Magana waiting for somebody.
rape and rape-cum-homicide cases. The Court, in previous decisions, always took this into FISCAL VILLAFUERTE:
consideration.4 7 In many cases, the victim, usually the sole witness, is killed. In People vs. I did not mention any name.
Masongsong,48 we held that rape is usually done with the least possibility of being seen by COURT:
the public, as in fact, the presence of eyewitnesses might even raise serious doubts. Witness may answer.
WITNESS:
The present case is no different, built as it is upon circumstantial evidence presented A: Yes, sir.
through the prosecution witnesses. Dr. Abas testified that the victim died from hack wounds FISCAL VILLAFUERTE:
on the neck and that her hymen sustained lacerations, showing the victim was violated and Q: That place where you saw Antonio Magana in the early morning of
violently killed. He opined that the victim was raped before she was hacked to death. Dr. January 14, 1991, do you know how far is it from the very place also
Abas' approximation of the time of death was corroborated by the testimonies of De where the body of Odette Sta. Maria was found on the night of same
Austria, Juanson and Vasquez.49 Lucia Sta. Maria testified that she found her daughter's day, at more or less 6:30?
body with skirt raised and without underwear. De Austria positively identified appellant as WITNESS:
the person strangling the victim that morning. Juanson and Vasquez confirmed that they A: I could not give a good estimate but it is only very near were the
also saw appellant look uneasy, walking back and forth as if waiting for somebody by the cadaver was found.
feeder road that morning. xxx xxx xxx
Q: And in the place where you said Antonio Magana was looking, was he
looking in that direction where a resident at the house where Odette
Juanson on direct examination said: Sta. Maria is residing will be coming from?
A: Yes, sir.52
Q: On January 14, 1991, do you recall having seen Antonio Magana? Vasquez on direct examination corroborates. He said:
A: Yes, sir. Q: Mr. Witness, what time did you return to Labo on January 14, 1991?
Q: What time on January 14, 1991 have you seen Antonio Magana? A: About 6:10 in the morning.
A: I could not tell exactly what time but it was in the morning of January Q: Did you check your watch?
14, 1991. A: Yes, sir.53
Q: Can you, more or less, approximate the time? Q: In that early morning of January 14, do you recall if you have seen
A: To my estimate, more or less 6:30 in the morning. Antonio Magana?
Q: Where did you see Antonio Magana on that date and time? A: Yes, sir.
A: He was standing at the feeder road.50 Q: Where?
Q: You said you saw Antonio Magana standing on the feeder road while A: The place where I saw him on January 14, 1991, Antonio Magana was
you were grazing your carabao. What did you notice from Antonio quite near the place where we recovered the body of Odette Sta. Maria.
Magana, if any? xxx xxx xxx
44
Q: And what did you notice at him when you glanced at him? intercourse took place. This is further corroborated by Lucia who saw the cadaver without
A: I don't understand why he is acting uneasy.54 underwear and with skirt raised.
Motive was established by Lucia Sta. Maria who testified that her daughter
told her one week prior to the incident that appellant would always look Again, we find the chain of circumstances unerringly leading to one solitary conclusion:
at her in a "bad way" whenever they met. On direct examination she appellant was the perpetrator of this despicable crime.
said:
Q: During the death, as a result of the death of Odette Sta. Maria, did you
have any suspect as to who could have done this to your daughter? Life Imprisonment Is Not Reclusion Perpetua
A: I am suspecting the accused Antonio Magana because one week before
she died, we met him. The Solicitor General points out the error of the trial court in equating reclusion perpetua
Q: When you said you met Antonio Magana, what happened then? with life imprisonment when it sentenced the accused "to the penalty of DEATH. However,
A: My daughter held my hand, and she was trembling all over. in view of the suspension of the death penalty, accused is hereby sentenced to
Q: What was your reaction when you noticed this to Odette? imprisonment for life (Reclusion
A: I asked her why she was behaving like that, she told me that Antonio perpetua). . . . ."59
Magana was staring at her in a bad way.
Q: Did you ask your daughter how she had seen the accused staring at her? This Court distinguished between the two penalties in its previous decisions. Recently, in
A: That everytime she went to school and back home, and whenever she People vs. Lascuna,60 the Court noted that such distinction had been made as early as 1948
met Antonio Magana, she informed me that Antonio Magana stared bad in People vs. Mobe, 81 Phil 167. In People vs. Baguio,61 the Court made the following
at her. differentiations:
Q: In other words, Odette had that fear over the looks of Antonio Magana?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And when she told you that, what did you tell her, if any? The Code (Revised Penal Code) does not prescribe the penalty of life
A: I did not mind it, sir, I said it might be natural on his part. imprisonment for any of the felonies therein defined, that penalty being
Q: This incident happened a week before she died? invariably imposed for serious offenses penalized not by the . . . Code but by
A: Yes, sir.55 special law. Reclusion perpetua entails imprisonment for at least thirty (30) years,
Taken together, these pieces of circumstantial evidence are sufficient to convict the after which the convict becomes eligible for pardon. It also carries with it
appellant of the crime charged, (a) there being more than one circumstance; (b) the facts accessory penalties, namely: perpetual special disqualification, etc. It is not the
from which the inference is derived having been duly proven; and (c) the combination of same as life imprisonment which, for one thing, does not carry with it any
all the circumstances being such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.56 accessory penalty, and for another, does not appear to have any definite extent or
Considered as a whole, they constitute an unbroken chain leading to one fair and duration.
reasonable conclusion — that appellant was the author of the crime.
At the risk of being repetitive, this Court enjoins trial judges to keep the foregoing in mind
It is doctrinal that the requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal law does and apply the correct penalty. We further caution them against lapsing into the same error.
not mean such a degree of proof, as excluding the possibility of error, produces absolute
certainty. Only moral certainty is required or that degree of proof which produces In the instant case, the proper penalty is reclusion perpetua because the imposition of the
conviction in an unprejudiced mind.57 This was sufficiently established in the case at bar. death penalty under the Revised Penal Code (in Article 335 thereof, as amended by R.A.
2632 and R.A. 4111, when by reason or on the occasion of rape, a homicide is committed),
Fifth Issue: Rape Despite Absence of Spermatozoa was prohibited by the Constitution at the time the offense was committed. So too, we delete
the award of liquidated damages inasmuch as there was pre-agreement on any such
damages.
The defense harps on the absence of spermatozoa during autopsy as proving that no rape
was committed.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby AFFIRMS with modifications the assailed Decision. We
uphold the conviction of appellant for the crime of rape with homicide and the order to
The Court disagrees. It has been long settled that absence of spermatozoa does not indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the amount of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) for
necessarily mean that rape was not committed; the slightest penetration of the female organ her death, twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) as moral damages and ten thousand pesos
is enough.58 The lacerations of the victim's hymen sufficiently established that sexual (P10,000.00) as exemplary damages. We herewith modify the sentence imposed to
reclusion perpetua.
45
SO ORDERED. The issue, therefore, as posed in the petition is: Was the Court of First Instance of Manila with
jurisdiction to try and decide the case and to impose the sentence upon the petitioner, for the offense
(54) G.R. No. L-28519 February 17, 1968 with which he was charged — evasion of service of sentence?

RICARDO PARULAN, petitioner, Section 14, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
vs.
DIRECTOR OF PRISONS, respondent. Place where action is to be instituted. — (a) In all criminal prosecutions the action
shall be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality of province where the offense
Ricardo Parulan for and in his own behalf as petitioner. was committed or any of the essential ingredients thereof took place.
Office of the Solicitor General for respondent.
There are crimes which are called transitory or continuing offenses because some acts material
RESOLUTION and essential to the crime occur in one province and some in another, in which case, the rule is settled
that the court of either province where any of the essential ingredients of the crime took place has —
jurisdiction to try the case.1 As Gomez Orbaneja opines —
ANGELES, J.:
Que habiendo en el delito continuado tantos resultados como hechos independientes
On petition for a writ of habeas corpus, filed by Ricardo Parulan, directed to the Director of en sentido natural, el principio del resultado no basta para fijar el forum delicti commisi, y
the Bureau of Prisons, praying that the latter be ordered "to release immediately and without delay ha de aceptarse que el delito se comete en cualquiera de los lugares donde se produzca uno
the body of the petitioner from unlawful and illegal confinement", anchoring the relief prayed for on de pesos plurales resultados.2
certain allegations in the petition, to the effect that petitioner's confinement in the state penitentiary at
Muntinglupa, Rizal, under the administrative and supervisory control of the respondent Director of
Prisons, is illegal, for the reason that the sentence of conviction imposed upon said petitioner for the There are, however, crimes which although all the elements thereof for its consummation may
crime of evasion of service of sentence, penalized under Article 157 of the Revised Penal Code, was have occurred in a single place, yet by reason of the very nature of the offense committed, the
rendered by a court without jurisdiction over his person and of the offense with which he was violation of the law is deemed to be continuing. Of the first class, the crime of estafa or malversation 3
charged. and abduction 4 may be mentioned; and as belonging to the second class are the crimes of kidnapping
and illegal detention where the deprivation of liberty is persistent and continuing from one place to
another 5 and libel where the libelous matter is published or circulated from one province to another. 6
It appears that the petitioner, as alleged in the petition, was confined in the state penitentiary at To this latter class may also be included the crime of evasion of service of sentence, when the
Muntinglupa, Rizal, serving a sentence of life imprisonment which, however, was commuted to prisoner in his attempt to evade the service of the sentence imposed upon him by the courts and thus
twenty (20) years by the President of the Philippines. In October, 1964, he was transferred to the defeat the purpose of the law, moves from one place to another; for, in this case, the act of the
military barracks of Fort Bonifacio (formerly Fort Wm. McKinley) situated at Makati, Rizal, under escaped prisoner is a continuous or series of acts, set on foot by a single impulse and operated by an
the custody of the Stockade Officer of the said military barracks. In that month of October, 1964, unintermittent force, however long it may be. It may not be validly said that after the convict shall
while still serving his prison term as aforesaid, he effected his escape from his confinement. have escaped from the place of his confinement the crime is fully consummated, for, as long as he
Petitioner was recaptured in the City of Manila. Prosecuted for the crime of evasion of service of continues to evade the service of his sentence, he is deemed to continue committing the crime, and
sentence, penalized under Article 157 of the Revised Penal Code, before the Court of First Instance of may be arrested without warrant, at any place where he may be found. Rule 113 of the Revised Rules
Manila, after due trial, petitioner was found guilty of the offense charged and sentenced accordingly of Court may be invoked in support of this conclusion, for, under section 6[c] thereof, one of the
with the imposable penalty prescribed by law, on August 3, 1966. instances when a person may be arrested without warrant is where he has escaped from confinement.
7
Undoubtedly, this right of arrest without a warrant is founded on the principle that at the time of the
Assuming the correctness of the facts as alleged in the petition, and on the basis thereof, we arrest, the escapee is in the continuous act of committing a crime — evading the service of his
shall proceed to discuss the merits of the case regarding the validity and legality of the decision sentence.
sentencing the petitioner to a prison term for the crime of evasion of sentence.
WHEREFORE, the writ is denied. Without costs.
Settled is the rule that for deprivation of any fundamental or constitutional rights, lack of
jurisdiction of the court to impose the sentence, or excessive penalty affords grounds for relief by Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro and
habeas corpus. Fernando, JJ., concur. 1äwphï1.ñët

46
(55) G.R. No. 179187 July 14, 2009 AAA having failed to return home by noon of January 14, 2004, her stepfather BBB went to her
school to inquire. As nobody knew her whereabouts, BBB decided to report the matter to the Las
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, Piñas City Police Station. A neighbor then informed him that he saw appellant sitting by a tree at the
vs. same time that AAA was on her way to school.
RENATO TALUSAN y PANGANIBAN, Appellant.
BBB thereupon went around the community to elicit information about appellant. A former co-
DECISION worker of appellant gave BBB an address in Imus, Cavite, prompting BBB to report on January 22,
2004 to the Imus Police Station the disappearance of AAA.
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
At dawn of the following day, January 23, 2004, appellant, who was with AAA, was apprehended.
1
By Decision of May 25, 2007, the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction by the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 199 of Las Piñas City of Renato Talusan y Panganiban (appellant) of For inquest purposes, Dr. Pierre Paul Carpio, medico-legal officer of the Philippine National Police
kidnapping with rape of AAA,2 a minor of six years. (PNP) Crime Laboratory, conducted an initial medico-legal examination which revealed the
following
The Information filed against appellant, together with one "Eljoy Salonga," reads:
Findings:
That during the period from January 15, 2004 up to January 23. 2004, in the City of Las Pinas,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, - Hymen: Deep fresh 3’ & 9’o’clock position
conspiring and confederating together with one ELJOY SALONGA, whose true identity and present
whereabout is still unknown, without legal authority or justifiable motive, did then and there - Vestibule congested
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnap, carry away, detain and deprive AAA, a SIX (6) year old,
minor, of her liberty, against her will and consent, and the said detention lasted for eight (8) days, and Conclusion:
while accused RENATO TALUSAN y PANGANIBAN @ Nato, @ Roxell B. Verga, Jr., was in
custody of AAA and armed with a gun, by means of force, threat, or intimidation, did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously inserted his finger into the vagina of AAA for several instances - Subject compatible with recent loss of virginity
against her will and consent thereby subjecting her to sexual abuse, which is prejudicial to her
physical and psychological development. - There are no ext. signs of application of any form of trauma 4 (Emphasis supplied)

CONTRARY TO LAW.3 Hence, the filing of the Information for kidnapping with rape.

Salonga’s "true identity and . . . whereabout[s]" were, as stated in the Information, unknown. Upon arraignment, appellant, with the assistance of his counsel de oficio, entered a plea of guilty. The
lower court thereupon conducted a searching inquiry into the voluntariness of appellant’s plea, and
From the evidence for the prosecution, the following version is gathered: despite repeated questions and just as repeated answers showing that appellant understood his plea
and its consequences, the trial court still ordered the prosecution to, as it did, present evidence.
In the early morning of January 14, 2004, as AAA was on her way to school, appellant, who was
sitting by a tree in Las Piñas, pulled her aside and cajoled her into joining him by telling her that they Finding for the prosecution, the trial court, noting that AAA’s "detailed account of her ordeal is a
would go to Jollibee. AAA obliged as she knew appellant to be a fellow attendee of Sunday Bible manifestation of her honesty and forthrightness,"5 convicted appellant, disposing in its Decision of
classes. Appellant brought AAA, however, to a house in Imus, Cavite occupied by one El Joy June 7, 2004 as follows:
Salonga and two unidentified individuals to whom he introduced her as his daughter.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing discussions and finding the guilt of the accused beyond
AAA was thereafter under appellant’s control and custody for eight days during which he abused her reasonable doubt by his voluntary and spontaneous plea of guilty, while the undersigned Presiding
by inserting his finger inside her vagina on a daily basis before breakfast, despite her resistance. Judge does not believe in the imposition of death penalty as a form of punishment, nevertheless, in
obedience to the law which is his duty to uphold, this Court finds the accused, RENATO TALUSAN

47
y PANGANIBAN, GUILTY, beyond reasonable doubt for the special complex crime of 1. Ascertain from the accused himself (a) how he was brought into the custody of the law;
KIDNAPPING with RAPE and hereby sentences him to suffer the supreme penalty of DEATH. (b) whether he had the assistance of a competent counsel during the custodial and
preliminary investigations; and (c) under what conditions he was detained and interrogated
The Court did not consider the mitigating circumstance of voluntary plea of guilty because the during the investigations. This is intended to rule out the possibility that the accused has
penalty imposable is single and indivisible and this is regardless of its presence. x x x been coerced or placed under a state of duress either by actual threats of physical harm
coming from malevolent quarters or simply because of the judge's intimidating robes.
Accused is hereby ordered to pay the victim AAA, the amount of P50,000.00 by way of civil
indemnity and an additional amount of P50,000.00 by way of moral damages which by case law is 2. Ask the defense counsel a series of questions as to whether he had conferred with, and
automatically awarded to rape victims without need of proof. x x x completely explained to, the accused the meaning and consequences of a plea of guilty.

SO ORDERED.6 (Emphasis in the original; underscoring supplied) 3. Elicit information about the personality profile of the accused, such as his age, socio-
economic status, and educational background, which may serve as a trustworthy index of
his capacity to give a free and informed plea of guilty.
The case was forwarded to this Court on automatic review due to the death penalty imposed. Per
People v. Mateo,7 however, the Court referred the case to the Court of Appeals by Resolution of
November 22, 2005 for intermediate disposition. 4. Inform the accused the exact length of imprisonment or nature of the penalty under the
law and the certainty that he will serve such sentence. For not infrequently, an accused
pleads guilty in the hope of a lenient treatment or upon bad advice or because of promises
By Decision of May 25, 2007, the Court of Appeals, upholding with modification appellant’s of the authorities or parties of a lighter penalty should he admit guilt or express remorse. It
conviction, disposed as follows: is the duty of the judge to ensure that the accused does not labor under these mistaken
impressions because a plea of guilty carries with it not only the admission of authorship of
WHEREFORE, the decision dated 07 June 2004 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 199, Las Pinas the crime proper but also of the aggravating circumstances attending it, that increase
City is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellant Renato Talusan y Panganiban @ punishment.
Natol @ Roxell B. Vergara, Jr. is sentenced to reclusion perpetua, conformably with R.A. No. 9346,
without eligibility for parole and is ordered to indemnify the AAA the following: (a) ₱50,000.00 as 5. Inquire if the accused knows the crime with which he is charged and fully explain to him
civil indemnity; and (b) ₱50,000.00 as moral damages. the elements of the crime which is the basis of his indictment. Failure of the court to do so
would constitute a violation of his fundamental right to be informed of the precise nature of
Costs de oficio. (Underscoring supplied) the accusation against him and a denial of his right to due process.

SO ORDERED.8 6. All questions posed to the accused should be in a language known and understood by the
latter.
By Resolution of December 3, 2007, the Court required the parties to simultaneously file their
respective Supplemental Briefs if they so desired within thirty (30) days from notice. 9 In compliance, 7. The trial judge must satisfy himself that the accused, in pleading guilty, is truly guilty.
the parties submitted their respective Manifestations that the Appeal Briefs they had earlier filed The accused must be required to narrate the tragedy or reenact the crime or furnish its
would suffice. missing details.11

In his lone assignment of error, appellant faults the trial court for convicting him on the basis of an There is thus no hard and fast rule as to how a judge may conduct a "searching inquiry." As long as
improvident plea of guilt as it failed, so he claims, to judiciously follow the guidelines set forth in the voluntary intent of the accused and his full comprehension of the consequences of his plea are
People v. Pastor.10 ascertained, as was done in the present case, the accused’s plea of guilt is sustained. Consider the
following transcript of stenographic notes of the proceedings taken during appellant’s arraignment:
The appeal is bereft of merit.
ATTY. CABARDO
In Pastor, the Court, holding that "there is no definite and concrete rule as to how a trial judge must
conduct a ‘searching inquiry,’" nevertheless came up with the following guidelines: Accused is ready for arraignment, Your Honor.

48
COURT A Yes, Your Honor.

Arraign the accused in Tagalog. Q Is it the understanding of the Court that Atty. Cabardo explained to you fully your rights
under the Constitution before you plead Guilty to the Criminal Information?
(Accused is arraigned and he pleads Guilty to the Criminal Information)
A Yes, Your Honor.
COURT
Q Do you know Mr. Talusan that, if you will plead Guilty to the Criminal Information, this
What is his plea? He’s pleading guilty? Court will immediately sentence you and confine you at the National Penitentiary?

COURT INTERPRETER A Yes, Your Honor.

Yes, Your Honor. Q Did Atty. Cabardo exert pressure on you or influence you so that you will plead Guilty to
the Criminal Information?
COURT
A No, Your Honor.
This Court will conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness of his plea.
Q Are you saying, Mr. Talusan that you are doing this voluntarily, freely and of your own
volition?
Q Mr. Renato Talusan, what is your educational attainment?
A Yes, Your Honor.
ACCUSED
Q Did Fiscal assigned in this Court, State Prosecutor Napoleon A. Monsod intimidate you
A I reached 2nd year High School, Your Honor. or exert pressure on you so that you will plead Guilty to the Criminal Information?

Q Do you know how to read and write? A No, Your Honor.

A Yes, Your Honor. COURT

Q What is your occupation? Please speak louder.

A I’m a driver, Your Honor. ACCUSED

Q When you were arraigned today, you pleaded Guilty as charged in the Criminal A No, Your Honor.
Information. Did you plead Guilty voluntarily, freely without anyone forcing or
intimidating you?
COURT
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Did anyone outside or inside of this courtroom threaten you, exert pressure on you so
that you will plead Guilty as charged to the Criminal Information?
Q Did Atty. Cabardo, your counsel explained [sic] to you the effects and consequences if
you will plead Guilty to the Criminal Information as charged?
A None, Your Honor.

49
Q So, it is therefore true that on January 15, 2004 up to January 23, 2004, you kidnapped, Where the law provides a single penalty for two or more component offenses, the resulting crime is
detained one AAA, a six (6) year old minor against her will and consent? called a special complex crime. Some of the special complex crimes under the Revised Penal Code
are (1) robbery with homicide, (2) robbery with rape, (3) kidnapping with serious physical injuries,
A Yes, Your Honor. (4) kidnapping with murder or homicide, and (5) rape with homicide. In a special complex crime, the
prosecution must necessarily prove each of the component offenses with the same precision that
would be necessary if they were made the subject of separate complaints. As earlier mentioned, R.A.
Q And that while in your custody, by means of force intimidation, you inserted your finger No. 7659 amended Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code by adding thereto this provision: "When
inside the vagina of the said minor for several instances against her will? the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention, or is raped, or is subjected to torture or
dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed; and that this provision gives rise to a
A Yes, Your Honor. special complex crime. (Italics in the original; underscoring supplied)1avvphi1

Q For the last time, Mr. Renato Talusan, despite the admonition given to you by this Court, A review of the evidence for the prosecution shows that the actual confinement, restraint and rape of
do you still insist and reiterate your pleading Guilty to the Criminal Information as charged AAA were proven.
for Kidnapping with Multiple Rape?
Thus, AAA, a minor whose testimony is given full faith and credit, youth and immaturity being
A Yes, Your Honor. generally badges of truth and sincerity,16 declared:

COURT Q: Did you go voluntarily with the accused?


A: He forced me, Your Honor.
The Court is convinced. I admire you Mr. Talusan for taking the responsibilities and I hope Q: Why did you say that the accused forced you to go with him, what did the accused do to
that you will be completely reformed. you?
A: He told me that we are going to Jollibee but it turned out that it was not true.
Q: When you went with the accused and boarded a tricycle, you really wanted to go to
ACCUSED Jollibee, is that the understanding of the Court?
A: I did not want to, Your Honor.
Yes, Your Honor. Q: What did you do when you say that you do not want to go with the accused?
A: Nothing, Your Honor.
Q: Did you cry?
COURT
A: Yes, Your Honor.
Q: How did you cry?
Fiscal, inspite of [sic] the fact that the accused has pleaded Guilty as charged in the A: I was just crying, Your Honor.17
Criminal Information, I am directing the Prosecution to present evidence to determine the xxxx
culpability of the accused.12 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) Q: Can you remember how many nights and days you have not seen your mother and
father?
But even assuming arguendo that appellant entered an improvident plea of guilt when arraigned, A: Yes, sir.
there is no compulsion to remand the case to the trial court for further reception of evidence. While Q: How many nights?
the Court has set aside convictions based on improvident pleas of guilt in capital offenses, which A: Eight (8) nights, sir.
pleas had been the sole basis of the judgment, where the trial court receives evidence to determine Q: After you were brought to the wake, where there is a dead person and at the club, where
precisely whether the accused erred in admitting his guilt, the manner in which the plea is made loses else were you taken by Kuya Renato?
legal significance for the simple reason that the conviction is, independently of the plea, based on A: At coastal mall, sir.
evidence proving the commission by the accused of the offense charged. Q: A while ago, AAA, you said that kuya Renato abused you and Kuya Renato inserted his
penis in your vagina, do you recall that?
A: Yes, sir.
In the present case, even without the plea of guilt of appellant, the evidence presented by the
Q: Which was inserted, his penis or his finger?
prosecution supports his guilt beyond reasonable doubt13 of the special complex crime of kidnapping
A: His finger, sir.
with rape under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659. 14
xxxx
Thus in People v. Larrañaga15 the Court held:
50
Q: When it was inserted inside, did you cry?

A: Yes, sir.
Q: What did you say to Kuya Renato?
A: I told him that it was painful. 18
AAA’s stepfather BBB testified on her disappearance for eight days and the measures he took in
order to recover her. And the initial medico-legal report conducted for inquest purposes shows that
AAA suffered deep fresh lacerations in her hymen which are "compatible with recent loss of
virginity."

The qualifying circumstance of minority was alleged and established with the presentation of AAA’s
certificate of live birth, hence, the death penalty imposed by the trial court is in order. In view,
however, of the enactment in the interim of Republic Act 9346, "An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of
Death Penalty in the Philippines," the appellate court correctly modified the sentence to reclusion
perpetua, without eligibility for parole.

A word on the award of civil indemnity and moral damages. In accordance with prevailing
jurisprudence, the award of civil indemnity, which is mandatory upon a finding of the fact of rape,
and the award of moral damages even without need of proof as it is presumed that the victim suffered
moral injuries,19 are both increased from ₱50,000 to ₱75,000.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of May 25, 2007 of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION in that the separate awards of civil indemnity and moral damages are increased
from ₱50,000 to ₱75,000. In all other respects, the Decision is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES


Associate Justice

51
SPECIFICATION 1: In that MAJOR GENERAL CARLOS FLORES GARCIA 0-5820 ARMED
FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, person subject to military law, did, on or about 16 March 2004,
(56)G.R. No. 198554 July 30, 2012 knowingly, wrongfully and unlawfully fail to disclose/declare all his existing assets in his Sworn
Statement of Assets and Liabilities and Net Worth for the year 2003 as required by Republic Act No.
3019, as amended in relation to Republic Act 6713, such as the following: cash holdings with the
MAJOR GENERAL CARLOS F. GARCIA, AFP (RET.), Petitioner, Armed Forces Police Savings and Loans Association, Inc. (AFPSLAI) in the amount of six million
vs. five hundred [thousand] pesos (P6,500,000.00); cash dividend received from AFPSLAI from June
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, representing the OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT; THE 2003 to December 2003 in the amount of one million three hundred sixty-five thousand pesos
SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE VOLTAIRE T. GAZMIN; THE CHIEF OF STAFF, (P1,365,000.00); dollar peso deposits with Land Bank of the Philippines, Allied Banking
ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, GEN. EDUARDO SL. OBAN, JR., and LT. GEN. Corporation, Banco de Oro Universal Bank, Bank of Philippine Islands, United Coconut Planter's
GAUDENCIO S. PANGILINAN, AFP (RET.), DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF CORRECTIONS, Bank and Planter's Development Bank; motor vehicles registered under his and his wife’s names such
Respondents. as 1998 Toyota Hilux Utility Vehicle with Plate Nr. WRY-843, Toyota Car with Plate Nr. PEV-665,
Toyota Previa with Plate Nr. UDS-195, 1997 Honda Civic Car with Plate Nr. FEC 134, 1997
DECISION Mitsubishi L-300 Van with Plate Nr. FDZ 582 and 2001 Toyota RAV 4 Utility Vehicle with Plate Nr.
FEV-498, conduct unbecoming an officer and gentleman.
PERALTA, J.:
SPECIFICATION 2: In that MAJOR GENERAL CARLOS FLORES GARCIA 0-5820 ARMED
For resolution of this Court is the Petition for Certiorari dated September 29, 2011 under Rule 65, FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, person subject to military law, did, on or about 11 March 2003,
Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure which seeks to annul and set aside the knowingly, wrongfully and unlawfully fail to disclose/declare all his existing assets in his Sworn
Confirmation of Sentence dated September 9, 2011, promulgated by the Office of the President. Statement of Assets and Liabilities and Net worth for the year 2002 as required by Republic Act No.
3019, as amended in relation to Republic Act 6713, such as the following: his cash holdings with the
Armed Forces Police Savings and Loans Association, Inc. (AFPSLAI) in the amount of six million
The facts, as culled from the records, are the following: five hundred [thousand] pesos (P6,500,000.00); cash dividend received form AFPSLAI in June 2002
and December 2002 in the total amount of one million four hundred thirty-five thousand pesos
On October 13, 2004, the Provost Martial General of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), Col. (1,435,000.00), dollar and peso deposits with Land Bank of the Philippines, Allied Banking
Henry A. Galarpe, by command of Vice-Admiral De Los Reyes, issued a Restriction to Quarters1 Corporation, Banco de Oro Universal Bank, Bank of the Philippine Islands, United Coconut Planter's
containing the following: Bank and Planter's Development Bank; motor vehicles registered under his and his wife’s names such
as 1998 Toyota Hilux Utility Vehicle with Plate Nr. WRY-843, Toyota Car with Plate Nr. PEV-665,
Toyota Previa with Plate Nr. UDS-195, 1997 Honda Civic Car with Plate Nr. FEC-134, 1997
1. Pursuant to Article of War 70 and the directive of the Acting Chief of Staff, AFP to the
Mitsubishi L-300 Van with Plate Nr. FDZ-582, and 2001 Toyota RAV 4
undersigned dtd 12 October 2004, you are hereby placed under Restriction to Quarters
under guard pending investigation of your case.
Utility Vehicle with Plate Nr. FEV-498, conduct unbecoming an officer and gentleman.
2. You are further advised that you are not allowed to leave your quarters without the
expressed permission from the Acting Chief of Staff, AFP. SPECIFICATION 3: In that MAJOR GENERAL CARLOS FLORES GARCIA 0-5820 ARMED
FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, person subject to military law, did, while in the active military
service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, knowingly, wrongfully and unlawfully violate his
3. In case you need immediate medical attention or required by the circumstance to be
solemn oath as a military officer to uphold the Constitution and serve the people with utmost loyalty
confined in a hospital, you shall likewise be under guard.
by acquiring and holding the status of an immigrant/permanent residence of the United

Thereafter, a Charge Sheet dated October 27, 2004 was filed with the Special General Court Martial
States of America in violation of the State policy governing public officers, thereby causing dishonor
NR 2 presided by Maj. Gen. Emmanuel R. Teodosio, AFP, (Ret.), enumerating the following
and disrespect to the military professional and seriously compromises his position as an officer and
violations allegedly committed by petitioner:
exhibits him as morally unworthy to remain in the honorable profession of arms.

CHARGE 1: VIOLATION OF THE 96TH ARTICLE OF WAR (CONDUCT UNBECOMING AN


CHARGE II: VIOLATION OF THE 97TH ARTICLE OF WAR (CONDUCT PREJUDICIAL TO
OFFICER AND GENTLEMAN).
GOOD ORDER AND MILITARY DISCIPLINE).

52
SPECIFICATION 1: In that MAJOR GENERAL CARLOS FLORES GARCIA 0-5820 ARMED On Specification 1 of Charge 2 – Guilty
FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, person subject to military law, did, on or about 16 March 2004,
knowingly, wrongfully and unlawfully make untruthful statements under oath of his true assets in his On Specification 2 of Charge 2 – Guilty
Statement of Assets and Liabilities and Net worth for the year 2003 as required by Republic Act No.
3019, as amended in relation to Republic Act 6713, conduct prejudicial to good order and military
discipline. And again in closed session upon secret written ballot 2/3 all the members are present at the time the
votes was taken concurrently sentences you to be dishonorably [discharged] from the service, to
forfeit all pay and allowances due and to become due and to be confined at hard labor at such place
SPECIFICATION NO. 2: In that MAJOR GENERAL CARLOS FLORES GARCIA 0-5820 ARMED the reviewing authority may direct for a period of two (2) years. So ordered. (Emphases supplied)
FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, person subject to military law, did, on or about 11 March 2003,
knowingly, wrongfully and unlawfully make untruthful statements under oath of his true assts in his
Statement of Assets and Liabilities and Net worth for the year 2002 as required by Republic Act No. Afterwards, in a document6 dated March 27, 2006, the Staff Judge Advocate stated the following
3019, as amended in relation to Republic Act 6713, conduct prejudicial to good order and military recommended action:
discipline.
IV. RECOMMENDED ACTION:
Petitioner, upon arraignment on November 16, 2004, pleaded not guilty on all the charges.
The court, after evaluating the evidence, found accused: GUILTY on Charge 1, GUILTY on
The Office of the Chief of Staff, through a Memorandum2 dated November 18, 2004, directed the Specification 1 on Charge 1 – except the words dollar deposits with Land Bank of the Philippines,
transfer of confinement of petitioner from his quarters at Camp General Emilio Aguinaldo to the dollar and peso deposits with Allied Banking Corporation, Banco de Oro Universal Bank, Bank of
ISAFP Detention Center. On the same day, petitioner, having reached the age of fifty-six (56), the Philippine Islands, United Coconut Planter's Bank and Planter's Development Bank; GUILTY on
compulsorily retired from military service after availing of the provisions of Presidential Decree Charge 1, Specification 2 except the words dollar deposits with Land Bank of the Philippines, dollar
(P.D.) No. 1650,3 amending Sections 3 and 5 of P.D. 1638, which establishes a system of retirement and peso deposits with Allied Banking Corporation, Banco de Oro Universal Bank, Bank of the
for military personnel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Philippine Islands, United Coconut Planters Bank and Planter's Development Bank; GUILTY on
Specification 3 of Charge 1; GUILTY on Charge 2 and all its specifications. The sentence imposed by
the Special GCM is to be dishonorably discharged from the service, to forfeit all pay and allowances
Pursuant to a Resolution4 dated June 1, 2005 of the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan, petitioner due and to become due; and to be confined at hard labor at such place the reviewing authority may
was transferred from the ISAFP Detention Center to the Camp Crame Custodial Detention Center. direct for a period of two (2) years. As it is, the sentence is proper and legal. Recommend that the
sentence be approved. The PNP custodial facility in Camp Crame, Quezon City, is the appropriate
After trial, at the Special General Court Martial No. 2, on December 2, 2005, the findings or the place of confinement. The period of confinement from 18 October 2004 shall be credited in his favor
After-Trial Report5 of the same court was read to the petitioner. The report contains the following and deducted from the two (2) years to which the accused was sentenced. Thus, confinement will
verdict and sentence: expire on 18 October 2006. Considering that the period left not served is less than one (1) year,
confinement at the National Penitentiary is no longer appropriate.
MGEN CARLOS FLORES GARCIA 0-5820 AFP the court in closed session upon secret written
ballot 2/3 of all the members present at the time the voting was taken concurring the following 4. To carry this recommendation into effect, a draft "ACTION OF THE REVIEWING
findings. Finds you: AUTHORITY" is hereto attached.

On Specification 1 of Charge 1 – Guilty except the words dollar deposits with Land Bank of the In an undated document,7 the AFP Board of Military Review recommended the following action:
Phils, dollar peso deposits with Allied Bank, Banco de Oro, Universal Bank, Bank of the Philippine
Island, United Coconut Planters Bank and Planters Development Bank. 8. RECOMMENDED ACTION:

On Specification 2 of Charge 1 – Guilty except the words dollar deposits with Land Bank of the A. Only so much of the sentence as provides for the mandatory penalty of dismissal from
Phils, dollar peso deposits with Allied Bank, Banco de Oro, Universal Bank, Bank of the Philippine the military service and forfeiture of pay and allowances due and to become due for the
Island, United Coconut Planters Bank and Planters Development Bank. offenses of violation of AW 96 (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman) and for
violation of AW 97 (Conduct Prejudicial to Good Order and Military Discipline) be
On Specification 3 of Charge 1 – Guilty imposed upon the Accused.

53
B. The records of the instant case should be forwarded to the President thru the Chief of petition for habeas corpus. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration13 dated November 15, 2011,
Staff and the Secretary of National Defense, for final review pursuant to AW 47, the but was denied14 by this Court on December 12, 2011.
Accused herein being a General Officer whose case needs confirmation by the President.
Petitioner enumerates the following grounds to support his petition:
C. To effectuate the foregoing, attached for CSAFP's signature/approval is a proposed 1st
GROUNDS
Indorsement to the President, thru the Secretary of National Defense, recommending approval of the
attached prepared "ACTION OF THE PRESIDENT." A.

After six (6) years and two (2) months of preventive confinement, on December 16, 2010, petitioner THE JURISDICTION OF THE GENERAL COURT MARTIAL CEASED IPSO FACTO UPON
was released from the Camp Crame Detention Center.8 THE RETIREMENT OF PETITIONER, FOR WHICH REASON THE OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION IN ISSUING THE CONFIRMATION OF
The Office of the President, or the President as Commander-in-Chief of the AFP and acting as the SENTENCE, AND PETITIONER'S ARREST AND CONFINEMENT PURSUANT THERETO IS
Confirming Authority under the Articles of War, confirmed the sentence imposed by the Court ILLEGAL, THUS WARRANTING THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS.
Martial against petitioner. The Confirmation of Sentence,9 reads in part:
B.
NOW, THEREFORE, I, BENIGNO S. AQUINO III, the President as Commander-in-Chief of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, do hereby confirm the sentence imposed by the Court Martial in the EVEN ASSUMING FOR THE SAKE OF ARGUMENT THAT PETITIONER REMAINED
case of People of the Philippines versus Major General Carlos Flores Garcia AFP: AMENABLE TO COURT MARTIAL JURISDICTION AFTER HIS RETIREMENT, THE OFFICE
OF THE PRESIDENT ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN IMPOSING THE
a) To be dishonorable discharged from the service; SENTENCE OF TWO (2) YEARS CONFINEMENT WITHOUT ANY LEGAL BASIS, FOR
WHICH REASON PETITIONER'S ARREST AND CONFINEMENT IS ILLEGAL, THUS
b) To forfeit all pay and allowances due and to become due; and WARRANTING THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS.

c) To be confined for a period of two (2) years in a penitentiary. C.

FURTHER, pursuant to the 48th and 49th Articles of War, the sentence on Major General Carlos EVEN ASSUMING FOR THE SAKE OF ARGUMENT THAT THE PENALTY OF TWO (2)
Flores Garcia AFP shall not be remitted/mitigated by any previous confinement. Major General YEARS CONFINEMENT MAY BE IMPOSED IN ADDITION TO THE PENALTIES OF
Carlos Flores Garcia AFP shall serve the foregoing sentence effective on this date. DISMISSAL AND FORFEITURE, THE SENTENCE HAD BEEN FULLY SERVED IN VIEW OF
PETITIONER'S PREVENTIVE CONFINEMENT WHICH EXCEEDED THE 2-YEAR
SENTENCE, AND THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT HAS NO AUTHORITY TO REPUDIATE
DONE, in the City of Manila, this 9th day of September, in the year of our Lord, Two Thousand and SAID SERVICE OF SENTENCE, FOR WHICH REASON PETITIONER'S ARREST AND
Eleven. CONFINEMENT DESPITE FULL SERVICE OF SENTENCE IS ILLEGAL, THUS
WARRANTING THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS.15
Consequently, on September 15, 2011, respondent Secretary of National Defense Voltaire T. Gazmin,
issued a Memorandum10 to the Chief of Staff, AFP for strict implementation, the Confirmation of In view of the earlier resolution of this Court denying petitioner's petition for habeas corpus, the
Sentence in the Court Martial Case of People of the Philippines Versus Major General Carlos Flores above grounds are rendered moot and academic. Thus, the only issue in this petition for certiorari
Garcia AFP. under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, which was properly filed with this

On September 16, 2011, petitioner was arrested and detained, and continues to be detained at the Court, is whether the Office of the President acted with grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack
National Penitentiary, Maximum Security, Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa City.11 or excess of jurisdiction, in issuing the Confirmation of Sentence dated September 9, 2011.

Aggrieved, petitioner filed with this Court the present petition for certiorari and petition for habeas In its Comment16 dated October 27, 2011, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) lists the
corpus, alternatively. However, this Court, in its Resolution12 dated October 10, 2011, denied the following counter-arguments:
54
I. EXECUTIVE BRANCH. THEREFORE, THE HONORABLE COURT IS THE ONLY
APPROPRIATE COURT WHERE HIS ACT MAY BE IMPUGNED, AND NOT IN THE LOWER
PETITIONER'S DIRECT RECOURSE TO THE HONORABLE COURT VIOLATES THE COURTS, I.E., REGIONAL TRIAL COURT ("RTC") OR THE COURT OF APPEALS ("CA"), AS
DOCTRINE OF HIERARCHY OF COURTS; HENCE, THE PETITION SHOULD BE THE OSG ERRONEOUSLY POSTULATES.
OUTRIGHTLY DISMISSED.
(B)
II.
ALTHOUGH THE GENERAL COURT MARTIAL ("GCM") RETAINED JURISDICTION "OVER
THE GENERAL COURT MARTIAL RETAINED JURISDICTION OVER PETITIONER DESPITE THE PERSON" OF PETITIONER EVEN AFTER HE RETIRED FROM THE ARMED FORCES
HIS RETIREMENT DURING THE PENDENCY OF THE PROCEEDINGS AGAINST HIM OF THE PHILIPPINES ('AFP"), HOWEVER, HIS RETIREMENT, CONTRARY TO THE STAND
SINCE THE SAID TRIBUNAL'S JURISDICTION HAD ALREADY FULLY ATTACHED PRIOR OF THE OSG, SEVERED HIS "JURAL RELATIONSHIP" WITH THE MILITARY, THEREBY
TO PETITIONER'S RETIREMENT. PLACING HIM BEYOND THE SUBSTANTIVE REACH OF THE AFP'S COURT MARTIAL
JURISDICTION.
III.
(C)
THE CONFIRMATION ISSUED BY THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT DIRECTING
PETITIONER TO BE CONFINED FOR TWO (2) YEARS IN A PENITENTIARY IS UNDER ART. 29, REVISED PENAL CODE ("RPC"), PETITIONER'S COURT MARTIAL
SANCTIONED BY C. A. NO. 408 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 178, PURSUANT TO THE SENTENCE OF TWO (2) YEARS IN CARCERATION HAD ALREADY BEEN SERVED IN
PRESIDENT'S CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY AS THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE FULL SINCE HE HAD ALREADY SUFFERED PREVENTIVE IMPRISONMENT OF AT LEAST
AFP. SIX (6) YEARS BEFORE THE SENTENCE COULD BE CONFIRMED, WHICH MEANS THAT
THE PRESIDENT HAD NO MORE JURISDICTION WHEN HE CONFIRMED IT, THEREBY
RENDERING THE "CONFIRMATION OF SENTENCE" A PATENT NULLITY, AND,
IV. CONSEQUENTLY, INVALIDATING THE OSG'S POSITION THAT THE PRESIDENT STILL
HAD JURISDICTION WHEN HE CONFIRMED THE SENTENCE.19
PETITIONER'S RIGHT TO A SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF HIS CASE WAS NOT VIOLATED IN
THIS CASE. Petitioner raises the issue of the jurisdiction of the General Court Martial to try his case. According to
him, the said jurisdiction ceased ipso facto upon his compulsory retirement. Thus, he insists that the
V. Office of the President had acted without jurisdiction in issuing the confirmation of his sentence.

THE IMPOSITION OF THE PENALTY OF TWO (2) YEARS CONFINEMENT ON PETITIONER This Court finds the above argument bereft of merit.
BY THE GCM, AND AS CONFIRMED BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES, IS VALID.
Article 2 of the Articles of War20 circumscribes the jurisdiction of military law over persons subject
VI. thereto, to wit:

ACCORDINGLY, PUBLIC RESPONDENTS DID NOT ACT WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF Art. 2. Persons Subject to Military Law. - The following persons are subject to these articles and shall
DISCRETION IN ISSUING AND IMPLEMENTING THE CONFIRMATION OF SENTENCE.17 be understood as included in the term "any person subject to military law" or "persons subject to
military law," whenever used in these articles:
Petitioner, in his Reply18 dated January 20, 2012, disagreed with the arguments raised by the OSG
due to the following: (a) All officers and soldiers in the active service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines or
of the Philippine Constabulary; all members of the reserve force, from the dates of their call
(A) to active duty and while on such active duty; all trainees undergoing military instructions;
and all other persons lawfully called, drafted, or ordered into, or to duty or for training in,
the said service, from the dates they are required by the terms of the call, draft, or order to
THE CONFIRMATION OF THE COURT MARTIAL SENTENCE IS AN ACT BY THE obey the same;
PRESIDENT, AS THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, AND NOT MERELY AS THE HEAD OF THE
55
(b) Cadets, flying cadets, and probationary second lieutenants; Thus, military jurisdiction has fully attached to Gen. Gudani inasmuch as both the acts complained of
and the initiation of the proceedings against him occurred before he compulsorily retired on 4
(c) All retainers to the camp and all persons accompanying or serving with the Armed October 2005. We see no reason to unsettle the Abadilla doctrine. The OSG also points out that under
Forces of the Philippines in the field in time of war or when martial law is declared though Section 28 of Presidential Decree No. 1638, as amended, "an officer or enlisted man carried in the
not otherwise subject to these articles; retired list of the Armed Forces of the Philippines shall be subject to the Articles of War x x x" To this
citation, petitioners do not offer any response, and in fact have excluded the matter of Gen. Gudani's
retirement as an issue in their subsequent memorandum.23
(d) All persons under sentence adjudged by courts-martial.
It is also apt to mention that under Executive Order No. 178, or the Manual for Courts-Martial, AFP,
(As amended by Republic Acts 242 and 516). the jurisdiction of courts-martial over officers, cadets, soldiers, and other military personnel in the
event of discharge or other separation from the service, and the exceptions thereto, is defined thus:
It is indisputable that petitioner was an officer in the active service of the AFP in March 2003 and
2004, when the alleged violations were committed. The charges were filed on October 27, 2004 and 10. COURT-MARTIAL – Jurisdiction in general – Termination – General Rules – The general rule is
he was arraigned on November 16, 2004. Clearly, from the time the violations were committed until that court-martial jurisdiction over officers, cadets, soldiers and others in the military service of the
the time petitioner was arraigned, the General Court Martial had jurisdiction over the case. Well- Philippines ceases on discharge or other separation from such service, and that jurisdiction as to any
settled is the rule that jurisdiction once acquired is not lost upon the instance of the parties but offense committed during a period of service thus terminated is not revived by a reentry into the
continues until the case is terminated.21 Therefore, petitioner's retirement on November 18, 2004 did military service.
not divest the General Court Martial of its jurisdiction. In B/Gen. (Ret.) Francisco V. Gudani, et al. v.
Lt./Gen. Generoso Senga, et al.,22 this Court ruled that:
Exceptions – To this general rule there are, however, some exceptions, among them the following:
This point was settled against Gen. Gudani's position in Abadilla v. Ramos, where the Court declared
that an officer whose name was dropped from the roll of officers cannot be considered to be outside xxxx
the jurisdiction of military authorities when military justice proceedings were initiated against him
before the termination of his service. Once jurisdiction has been acquired over the officer, it In certain case, where the person's discharge or other separation does not interrupt his status as a
continues until his case is terminated. Thus, the Court held: person belonging to the general category of persons subject to military law, court-martial jurisdiction
does not terminate. Thus, where an officer holding a reserve commission is discharged from said
The military authorities had jurisdiction over the person of Colonel Abadilla at the time of the alleged commission by reason of acceptance of a commission in the Regular Force, there being no interval
offenses. This jurisdiction having been vested in the military authorities, it is retained up to the end of between services under the respective commissions, there is no terminating of the officer's military
the proceedings against Colonel Abadilla. Well-settled is the rule that jurisdiction once acquired is not status, but merely the accomplishment of a change in his status from that of a reserve to that of a
lost upon the instance of the parties but continues until the case is terminated. regular officer, and that court-martial jurisdiction to try him for an offense (striking enlisted men for
example) committed prior to the discharge is not terminated by the discharge. So also, where a
dishonorable discharged general prisoner is tried for an offense committed while a soldier and prior
Citing Colonel Winthrop's treatise on Military Law, the Court further stated: to his dishonorable discharge, such discharge does not terminate his amenability to trial for the
offense. (Emphases supplied.)
We have gone through the treatise of Colonel Winthrop and We find the following passage which
goes against the contention of the petitioners, viz. — Petitioner also asserts that the General Court Martial's continuing jurisdiction over him despite his
retirement holds true only if the charge against him involves fraud, embezzlement or
3. Offenders in general — Attaching of jurisdiction. It has further been held, and is now settled law, misappropriation of public funds citing this Court's ruling in De la Paz v. Alcaraz,et al.24 and Martin
in regard to military offenders in general, that if the military jurisdiction has once duly attached to v. Ve r.25 However, this is not true. The OSG is correct in stating that in De la Paz,26 military
them previous to the date of the termination of their legal period of service, they may be brought to jurisdiction over the officer who reverted to inactive status was sustained by this Court because the
trial by court-martial after that date, their discharge being meanwhile withheld. This principle has violation involved misappropriation of public funds committed while he was still in the active
mostly been applied to cases where the offense was committed just prior to the end of the term. In military service, while in Martin,27 military jurisdiction was affirmed because the violation pertained
such cases the interests of discipline clearly forbid that the offender should go unpunished. It is held to illegal disposal of military property. Both cited cases centered on the nature of the offenses
therefore that if before the day on which his service legally terminates and his right to a discharge is committed by the military personnel involved, justifying the exercise of jurisdiction by the courts-
complete, proceedings with a view to trial are commenced against him — as by arrest or the service martial. On the other hand, in the present case, the continuing military jurisdiction is based on prior
of charges, — the military jurisdiction will fully attach and once attached may be continued by a trial attachment of jurisdiction on the military court before petitioner's compulsory retirement. This
by court-martial ordered and held after the end of the term of the enlistment of the accused x x x continuing jurisdiction is provided under Section 1 of P.D. 1850,28 as amended, thus:
56
Section 1. Court Martial Jurisdiction over Integrated National Police and Members of the Armed view of his preventive confinement which had exceeded two (2) years. Therefore, according to him,
Forces. - Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding – (a) uniformed members of the the Office of the President no longer has the authority to order his confinement in a penitentiary. On
Integrated National Police who commit any crime or offense cognizable by the civil courts shall the other hand, the OSG opines that petitioner cannot legally demand the deduction of his preventive
henceforth be exclusively tried by courts-martial pursuant to and in accordance with Commonwealth confinement in the service of his imposed two-year confinement in a penitentiary, because unlike our
Act No. 408, as amended, otherwise known as the Articles of War; (b) all persons subject to military Revised Penal Code29 which specifically mandates that the period of preventive imprisonment of the
law under article 2 of the aforecited Articles of War who commit any crime or offense shall be accused shall be deducted from the term of his imprisonment, the Articles of War and/or the Manual
exclusively tried by courts-martial or their case disposed of under the said Articles of War; Provided, for Courts-Martial do not provide for the same deduction in the execution of the sentence imposed by
that, in either of the aforementioned situations, the case shall be disposed of or tried by the proper the General Court Martial as confirmed by the President in appropriate cases.
civil or judicial authorities when court-martial jurisdiction over the offense has prescribed under
Article 38 of Commonwealth Act Numbered 408, as amended, or court-martial jurisdiction over the On the above matter, this Court finds the argument raised by the OSG unmeritorious and finds logic
person of the accused military or Integrated National Police personnel can no longer be exercised by in the assertion of petitioner that Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code can be made applicable in the
virtue of their separation from the active service without jurisdiction having duly attached beforehand present case.
unless otherwise provided by law: Provided further, that the President may, in the interest of justice,
order or direct, at any time before arraignment, that a particular case be tried by the appropriate civil
court. (Emphasis supplied.) The OSG maintains that military commissions or tribunals are not courts within the Philippine
judicial system, citing Olaguer, et al. v. Military Commission No. 4,30 hence, they are not expected
to apply criminal law concepts in their implementation and execution of decisions involving the
Having established the jurisdiction of the General Court Martial over the case and the person of the discipline of military personnel. This is misleading. In Olaguer, the courts referred to were military
petitioner, the President, as Commander-in-Chief, therefore acquired the jurisdiction to confirm commissions created under martial law during the term of former President Ferdinand Marcos and
petitioner's sentence as mandated under Article 47 of the Articles of War, which states: was declared unconstitutional by this Court, while in the present case, the General Court Martial
which tried it, was created under Commonwealth Act No. 408, as amended, and remains a valid
Article 47. Confirmation – When Required. - In addition to the approval required by article forty- entity.
five, confirmation by the President is required in the following cases before the sentence of a court-
martial is carried into execution, namely: In Marcos v. Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines,31 this Court ruled that a court-martial
case is a criminal case and the General Court Martial is a "court" akin to any other courts. In the same
(a) Any sentence respecting a general officer; case, this Court clarified as to what constitutes the words "any court" used in Section 1732 of the
1935 Constitution prohibiting members of Congress to appear as counsel in any criminal case in
(b) Any sentence extending to the dismissal of an officer except that in time of war a which an officer or employee of the Government is accused of an offense committed in relation to his
sentence extending to the dismissal of an officer below the grade of brigadier general may office. This Court held:
be carried into execution upon confirmation by the commanding general of the Army in the
field; We are of the opinion and therefore hold that it is applicable, because the words "any court" includes
the General Court-Martial, and a court-martial case is a criminal case within the meaning of the
(c) Any sentence extending to the suspension or dismissal of a cadet, probationary second above quoted provisions of our Constitution.
lieutenant; and
It is obvious that the words "any court," used in prohibiting members of Congress to appear as
(d) Any sentence of death, except in the case of persons convicted in time of war, of counsel "in any criminal case in which an officer or employee of the Government is accused of an
murder, mutiny, desertion, or as spies, and in such excepted cases of sentence of death may offense committed in relation to his office," refers, not only to a civil, but also to a military court or a
be carried into execution, subject to the provisions of Article 50, upon confirmation by the Court-Martial. Because, in construing a Constitution, "it must be taken as established that where
commanding general of the Army in the said field. words are used which have both a restricted and a general meaning, the general must prevail over the
restricted unless the nature of the subject matter of the context clearly indicates that the limited sense
is intended." (11 American Jurisprudence, pp. 680-682).
When the authority competent to confirm the sentence has already acted as the approving authority
no additional confirmation by him is necessary. (As amended by Republic Act No. 242). (Emphasis
supplied.) In the case of Ramon Ruffy vs. Chief of Staff of the Philippine Army,* 43 Off. Gaz., 855, we did not
hold that the word "court" in general used in our Constitution does not include a Court-Martial; what
we held is that the words "inferior courts" used in connection with the appellate jurisdiction of the
In connection therewith, petitioner argues that the confirmation issued by the Office of the President Supreme Court to "review on appeal certiorari or writ of error, as the law or rules of court may
directing him to be confined for two (2) years in the penitentiary had already been fully served in provide, final judgments of inferior courts in all criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is death
57
or life imprisonment," as provided for in section 2, Article VIII, of the Constitution, do not refer to The fact that a judgment of conviction, not of acquittal, rendered by a court-martial must be approved
Courts-Martial or Military Courts. by the reviewing authority before it can be executed (Article of War 46), does not change or affect the
character of a court-martial as a court. A judgment of the Court of First Instance imposing death
Winthrop's Military Law and Precedents, quoted by the petitioners and by this Court in the case of penalty must also be approved by the Supreme Court before it can be executed.
Ramon Ruffy et al vs. Chief of Staff of the Philippine Army, supra, has to say in this connection the
following: That court-martial cases are criminal cases within the meaning of Section 17, Article VI, of the
Constitution is also evident, because the crimes and misdemeanors forbidden or punished by the
Notwithstanding that the court-martial is only an instrumentality of the executive power having no Articles of War are offenses against the Republic of the Philippines. According to section 1,
relation or connection, in law, with the judicial establishments of the country, it is yet, so far as it is a
court at all, and within its field of action, as fully a court of law and justice as is any civil tribunal. As Rule 106, of the Rules of Court, a criminal action or case is one which involves a wrong or injury
a court of law, it is bound, like any court, by the fundamental principles of law, and, in the absence of done to the Republic, for the punishment of which the offender is prosecuted in the name of the
special provision of the subject in the military code, it observes in general the rules of evidence as People of the Philippines; and pursuant to Article of War 17, "the trial advocate of a general or special
adopted in the common-law courts. As a court of justice, it is required by the terms of its statutory court-martial shall prosecute (the accused) in the name of the People of the Philippines."
oath, (art. 84.) to adjudicate between the U.S. and the accused "without partiality, favor, or affection,"
and according, not only to the laws and customs of the service, but to its "conscience," i.e. its sense of Winthtrop, in his well known work "Military Law and Precedents' says the following:
substantial right and justice unaffected by technicalities. In the words of the Attorney General, court-
martial are thus, "in the strictest sense courts of justice. (Winthrop's Military Law and Precedents,
Vol. 1 and 2, 2nd Ed., p. 54.) In regard to the class of courts to which it belongs, it is lastly to be noted that the court-martial is
strictly a criminal court. It has no civil jurisdiction whatever; cannot enforce a contract, collect a debt,
or award damages in favor of an individual. . . . Its judgment is a criminal sentence not a civil verdict;
In re Bogart, 3 Fed. Cas., 796, 801, citing 6 Op. Attys. Gen. 425, with approval, the court said: its proper function is to award punishment upon the ascertainment of guilt. (Winthrop's Military Law
and Precedents, Vols. 1 & 2, 2nd Ed., p. 55.)
In the language of Attorney General Cushing, a court-martial is a lawful tribunal existing by the same
authority that any other exists by, and the law military is a branch of law as valid as any other, and it In N. Y. it was held that the term "criminal case," used in the clause, must be allowed some meaning,
differs from the general law of the land in authority only in this: that it applies to officers and soldiers and none can be conceived, other than a prosecution for a criminal offense. Ex parte Carter. 66 S. W.
of the army but not to other members of the body politic, and that it is limited to breaches of military 540, 544, 166 No. 604, 57 L.R.A. 654, quoting People vs. Kelly, 24 N.Y. 74; Counselman vs.
duty. Hitchcock, 12 S. Ct. 195; 142 U.S. 547, L. Ed. 111o. (Words and Phrases, Vol. 10, p. 485.)

And in re Davison, 21 F. 618, 620, it was held: Besides, that a court-martial is a court, and the prosecution of an accused before it is a criminal and
not an administrative case, and therefore it would be, under certain conditions, a bar to another
That court-martial are lawful tribunals existing by the same authority as civil courts of the United prosecution of the defendant for the same offense, because the latter would place the accused in
States, have the same plenary jurisdiction in offenses by the law military as the latter courts have in jeopardy, is shown by the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Grafton
controversies within their cognizance, and in their special and more limited sphere are entitled to as vs. United States, 206 U. S. 333; 51 Law. Ed., 1088, 1092, in which the following was held:
untrammelled an exercise of their powers.
If a court-martial has jurisdiction to try an officer or soldier for a crime, its judgment will be accorded
And lastly, American Jurisprudence says: the finality and conclusiveness as to the issues involved which attend the judgments of a civil court in
a case of which it may legally take cognizance; x x x and restricting our decision to the above
SEC. 99. Representation by Counsel. — It is the general rule that one accused of the crime has the question of double jeopardy, we judge that, consistently with the above act of 1902, and for the
right to be represented before the court by counsel, and this is expressly so declared by the statues reasons stated, the plaintiff in error, a soldier in the Army, having been acquitted of the crime of
controlling the procedure in court-martial. It has been held that a constitutional provision extending homicide, alleged to have been committed by him in the Philippines, by a military court of competent
that right to one accused in any trial in any court whatever applies to a court-martial and gives the jurisdiction, proceeding under the authority of the United States, could not be subsequently tried for
accused the undeniable right to defend by counsel, and that a court-martial has no power to refuse an the same offense in a civil court exercising authority in that territory.33 (Emphasis supplied.)
attorney the right to appear before it if he is properly licensed to practice in the courts of the state.
(Citing the case of State ex rel Huffaker vs. Crosby, 24 Nev. 115, 50 Pac. 127; 36 American Hence, as extensively discussed above, the General Court Martial is a court within the strictest sense
Jurisprudence 253) of the word and acts as a criminal court. On that premise, certain provisions of the Revised Penal

58
Code, insofar as those that are not provided in the Articles of War and the Manual for Courts-Martial, Should the Accused be released from confinement upon lawful orders by the Sandiganbayan before
can be supplementary. Under Article 10 of the Revised Penal Code: the expiration of his sentence adjudged by the military court, the Provost Marshal General shall
immediately take custody over the Accused, who shall be transferred to and serve the remaining
Art. 10. Offenses not subject to the provisions of this Code. - Offenses which are or in the future may unserved portion thereof at the ISAFP detention facility in Camp General Emilio Aguinaldo, Quezon
be punishable under special laws are not subject to the provisions of this Code. This Code shall be City.36 (Emphasis supplied.)
supplementary to such laws, unless the latter should specially provide the contrary.
Nevertheless, the application of Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code in the Articles of War is in
A special law is defined as a penal law which punishes acts not defined and penalized by the Revised accordance with the Equal Protection Clause of the 1987 Constitution. According to a long line of
Penal Code.34 In the present case, petitioner was charged with and convicted of Conduct decisions, equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be
Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman (96th Article of War) and Violation of the 97th Article of treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed.37 It requires public bodies and
War, or Conduct Prejudicial to Good Order and Military Discipline, both of which are not defined institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner.38 The purpose of the equal
and penalized under the Revised Penal Code. The corresponding penalty imposed by the General protection clause is to secure every person within a state's jurisdiction against intentional and
Court Martial, which is two (2) years of confinement at hard labor is penal in nature. Therefore, arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of a statute or by its improper
absent any provision as to the application of a criminal concept in the implementation and execution execution through the state's duly-constituted authorities.39 In other words, the concept of equal
of the General Court Martial's decision, the provisions of the Revised Penal Code, specifically Article justice under the law requires the state to govern impartially, and it may not draw distinctions
29 should be applied. In fact, the deduction of petitioner's period of confinement to his sentence has between individuals solely on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective.40
been recommended in the Staff Judge Advocate Review, thus: It, however, does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons or things without
distinction. What it simply requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid
classification. Indeed, the equal protection clause permits classification. Such classification, however,
x x x Recommend that the sentence be approved. The PNP custodial facility in Camp Crame, Quezon to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) the classification
City, is the appropriate place of confinement. The period of confinement from 18 October 2004 shall rests on substantial distinctions; (2) it is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) it is not limited to
be credited in his favor and deducted from the two (2) years to which the accused was sentenced. existing conditions only; and (4) it applies equally to all members of the same class.41 "Superficial
Thus, confinement will expire on 18 October 2006. Considering that the period left not served is less differences do not make for a valid classification."42 In the present case, petitioner belongs to the
than one (1) year, confinement at the National Penitentiary is no longer appropriate.35 (Emphasis class of those who have been convicted by any court, thus, he is entitled to the rights accorded to
supplied.) them. Clearly, there is no substantial distinction between those who are convicted of offenses which
are criminal in nature under military courts and the civil courts. Furthermore, following the same
The above was reiterated in the Action of the Reviewing Authority, thus: reasoning, petitioner is also entitled to the basic and time-honored principle that penal statutes are
construed strictly against the State and liberally in favor of the accused.43 It must be remembered
In the foregoing General Court-Martial case of People of the Philippines versus MGEN. CARLOS F. that the provisions of the Articles of War which the petitioner violated are penal in nature.
GARCIA 0-5820 AFP (now Retired), the verdict of GUILTY is hereby approved.
The OSG is correct when it argued that the power to confirm a sentence of the President, as
The sentence to be dishonorably discharged from the service; to forfeit all pay and allowances due Commander-in-Chief, includes the power to approve or disapprove the entire or any part of the
and to become due; and to be confined at hard labor at such place as the reviewing authority may sentence given by the court martial. As provided in Article 48 of the Articles of War:
direct for a period of two (2) years is also approved.
Article 48. Power Incident to Power to Confirm. - The power to confirm the sentence of a court-
Considering that the Accused has been in confinement since 18 October 2004, the entire period of his martial shall be held to include:
confinement since 18 October 2004 will be credited in his favor. Consequently, his two (2) year
sentence of confinement will expire on 18 October 2006. (a) The power to confirm or disapprove a finding, and to confirm so much only of a finding
of guilty of a particular offense as involves a finding of guilty of a lesser included offense
The proper place of confinement during the remaining unserved portion of his sentence is an official when, in the opinion of the authority having power to confirm, the evidence of record
military detention facility.1âwphi1 However, the Accused is presently undergoing trial before the requires a finding of only the lesser degree of guilt;
Sandiganbayan which has directed that custody over him be turned over to the civilian authority and
that he be confined in a civilian jail or detention facility pending the disposition of the case(s) before (b) The power to confirm or disapprove the whole or any part of the sentence; and
said Court. For this reason, the Accused shall remain confined at the PNP's detention facility in Camp
Crame, Quezon City. The Armed Forces of the Philippines defers to the civilian authority on this (c) The power to remand a case for rehearing, under the provisions of Article 50. (Emphasis
matter. supplied.)
59
In addition, the President also has the power to mitigate or remit a sentence. Under Article 49 of the the President, petitioner took any positive action to assert his right to a speedy disposition of his case.
Articles of War: This is akin to what happened in Guerrero v. Court of Appeals,47 where, in spite of the lapse of more
than ten years of delay, the Court still held that the petitioner could not rightfully complain of delay
Article 49. Mitigation or Remission of Sentence. - The power to order the execution of the sentence violative of his right to speedy trial or disposition of his case, since he was part of the reason for the
adjudged by a court-martial shall be held to include, inter alia, the power to mitigate or remit the failure of his case to move on towards its ultimate resolution. The Court held, inter alia:
whole or any part of the sentence.
In the case before us, the petitioner merely sat and waited after the case was submitted for resolution
Any unexpected portion of a sentence adjudged by a court-martial may be mitigated or remitted by in 1979. It was only in 1989 when the case below was reraffled from the RTC of Caloocan City to the
the military authority competent to appoint, for the command, exclusive of penitentiaries and RTC of Navotas-Malabon and only after respondent trial judge of the latter court ordered on March
Disciplinary Barracks of the Armed Forces of the Philippines or Philippine Constabulary, in which 14, 1990 the parties to follow-up and complete the transcript of stenographic notes that matters
the person under sentence is held, a court of the kind that imposed the sentence, and the same power started to get moving towards a resolution of the case. More importantly, it was only after the new
may be exercised by superior military authority; but no sentence approved or confirmed by the trial judge reset the retaking of the testimonies to November 9, 1990 because of petitioner's absence
President shall be remitted or mitigated by any other authority, and no approved sentence of loss of during the original setting on October 24, 1990 that the accused suddenly became zealous of
files by an officer shall be remitted or mitigated by any authority inferior to the President, except as safeguarding his right to speedy trial and disposition.
provided in Article 52.
xxxx
When empowered by the President to do so, the commanding general of the Army in the field or the
area commander may approve or confirm and commute (but not approve or confirm without In the present case, there is no question that petitioner raised the violation against his own right to
commuting), mitigate, or remit and then order executed as commuted, mitigated, or remitted any speedy disposition only when the respondent trial judge reset the case for rehearing. It is fair to
sentence which under those Articles requires the confirmation of the President before the same may assume that he would have just continued to sleep on his right − a situation amounting to laches −
be executed. (As amended by Republic Act No. 242). had the respondent judge not taken the initiative of determining the non-completion of the records
and of ordering the remedy precisely so he could dispose of the case. The matter could have taken a
Thus, the power of the President to confirm, mitigate and remit a sentence of erring military different dimension if during all those ten years between 1979 when accused filed his memorandum
personnel is a clear recognition of the superiority of civilian authority over the military. However, and 1989 when the case was reraffled, the accused showed signs of asserting his right which was
although the law (Articles of War) which conferred those powers to the President is silent as to the granted him in 1987 when the new constitution took effect, or at least made some overt act (like a
deduction of the period of preventive confinement to the penalty imposed, as discussed earlier, such motion for early disposition or a motion to compel the stenographer to transcribe stenographic notes)
is also the right of an accused provided for by Article 29 of the RPC. that he was not waiving it. As it is, his silence would have to be interpreted as a waiver of such right.

As to petitioner's contention that his right to a speedy disposition of his case was violated, this Court While this Court recognizes the right to speedy disposition quite distinctly from the right to a speedy
finds the same to be without merit. trial, and although this Court has always zealously espoused protection from oppressive and
vexatious delays not attributable to the party involved, at the same time, we hold that a party's
individual rights should not work against and preclude the people's equally important right to public
No less than our Constitution guarantees the right not just to a speedy trial but to the speedy justice. In the instant case, three people died as a result of the crash of the airplane that the accused
disposition of cases.44 However, it needs to be underscored that speedy disposition is a relative and was flying. It appears to us that the delay in the disposition of the case prejudiced not just the accused
flexible concept. A mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved is not sufficient. Particular but the people as well. Since the accused has completely failed to assert his right seasonably and
regard must be taken of the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case.45 In determining whether inasmuch as the respondent judge was not in a position to dispose of the case on the merits due to the
or not the right to the speedy disposition of cases has been violated, this Court has laid down the absence of factual basis, we hold it proper and equitable to give the parties fair opportunity to obtain
following guidelines: (1) the length of the delay; (2) the reasons for such delay; (3) the assertion or (and the court to dispense) substantial justice in the premises.48
failure to assert such right by the accused; and (4) the prejudice caused by the delay.46
Time runs against the slothful and those who neglect their rights.49 In fact, the delay in the
In this case, there was no allegation, whatsoever of any delay during the trial. What is being confirmation of his sentence was to his own advantage, because without the confirmation from the
questioned by petitioner is the delay in the confirmation of sentence by the President. Basically, the President, his sentence cannot be served.
case has already been decided by the General Court Martial and has also been reviewed by the proper
reviewing authorities without any delay. The only thing missing then was the confirmation of
sentence by the President. The records do not show that, in those six (6) years from the time the Anent petitioner's other arguments, the same are already rendered moot and academic due to the
decision of the General Court Martial was promulgated until the sentence was finally confirmed by above discussions.1âwphi1

60
Grave abuse of discretion means such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent
to lack of jurisdiction. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough. It must be grave abuse of discretion, as
when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal
hostility, and must be so patent and so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a
virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.50 Thus, applying,
the earlier disquisitions, this Court finds that the Office of the President did not commit any grave
abuse of discretion in issuing the Confirmation of Sentence in question.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari dated September 29, 2011 of Major General Carlos F.
Garcia, AFP (Ret.) is hereby DISMISSED. However, applying the provisions of Article 29 of the
Revised Penal Code, the time within which the petitioner was under preventive confinement should
be credited to the sentence confirmed by the Office of the President, subject to the conditions set
forth by the same law.

SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate justice

(57) G.R. No. 176504 September 3, 2008

FERDINAND A. CRUZ, petitioner,


vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
61
Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which assails addressed to Luningning Morando to explain her side regarding the allegation of Ferdinand that she
the Decision1 dated 27 April 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 27661 which affirmed received the P15,000.00; Exhibit "G"- Inter-Office Memorandum prepared by Luningning Morando
the Decision2 and the Order3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 140, finding dated 9 November 1996, denying the allegation that she received the amount of P15,000.00 from
petitioner Ferdinand A. Cruz (Ferdinand) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Qualified Ferdinand; Exhibit "H"- Inter-Office Memorandum dated 11 November 1996, issued by Juanito Tan
Theft. for Ferdinand to further explain his side in light of Luningning Morando’s denial that she received the
amount. It also advised Ferdinand to wait for the verification and computation of his claim for
On 10 July 1997, an Information was filed before the RTC of Makati City charging Ferdinand with reimbursements; Exhibit "I"- Formal Demand Letter dated 25 November 1996, addressed to
Qualified Theft. The accusatory portion of the Information reads: Ferdinand and issued by the legal counsel of Porta-Phone Rentals, Inc., asking the former to return to
the company the subject amount; Exhibit "J"- the Affidavit of Complaint executed by Juanito Tan
against Ferdinand; Exhibit "K"- the Collection List dated 30 October 1996, showing that Ferdinand
That on or about the 25th day of October 1996, in the City of Makati, Metro Manila, received from Hemisphere the amount of P15,000.00, and the same was not turned over to Catherine;
Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named Exhibit "L"- Reply-Affidavit dated 5 February 1997, executed by Juanito M. Tan, Jr.; Exhibit "M"-
accused, being then employed as Marketing Manager of Porta-Phone Rentals, Inc. with the Sur-Rejoinder Affidavit of Juanito M. Tan, Jr. dated 21 February 1997.
office address located at 3/F ENZO Bldg., Sen. Gil Puyat Avenue, Makati City, herein
represented by Juanito M. Tan, Jr. and had access to the funds of the said corporation, with
intent to gain and without the knowledge and consent of said corporation, with grave abuse The collective evidence adduced by the prosecution shows that at around 5:30 p.m. of 25 October
of confidence, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry 1996, in the City of Makati, Ferdinand, who is a Marketing Manager of Porta-Phone, a domestic
away the amount of P15,000.00 belonging to said Porta-Phone Rentals, Inc., to the damage corporation engaged in the lease of cellular phones and other communication equipment, went to the
and prejudice of the latter in the aforesaid amount of P15,000.00.4 office of Porta-Phone located on the third floor of Enzo Building, Senator Gil Puyat Avenue, and took
hold of a pad of official receipts from the desk of Catherine, Porta-Phone’s collection officer. With
the pad of official receipts in his hands, Ferdinand proceeded to his client, Hemisphere, and delivered
The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 97-945. During the arraignment on 22 August 1997, articles of communication equipment. Although he was not an authorized person to receive cash and
Ferdinand, with the assistance of counsel de parte, entered a plea of not guilty. 5 Thereafter, trial on issue receipts for Porta-Phone, Ferdinand received from Hemisphere the amount of P15,000.00 as
the merits ensued. refundable deposit for the aforesaid equipment. On 26 October 1996, Ferdinand went to Porta-Phone
and returned the pad of receipts, but failed to deliver the cash he received from Hemisphere. On 28
At the trial, the prosecution presented the following witnesses: (1) Juanito M. Tan, Jr., the General October 1996, the next working day, Catherine checked the booklet of official receipts and found that
Manager of Porta-Phone Rentals, Inc. (Porta Phone) when the incident in question took place. He one of the official receipts was missing. The green duplicate of the missing official receipt, however,
testified that Ferdinand appropriated for himself the amount of P15,000.00, an amount which should showed that Ferdinand received the amount of P15,000.00 from Hemisphere. Upon learning of
have been remitted to the company; (2) Catherine Villamar (Catherine), the Credit and Collection Ferdinand’s receipt of the said amount, Catherine confronted Ferdinand, who answered that he
Officer of Porta-Phone, who discovered that Ferdinand issued a receipt for P15,000.00 from deposited the amount to his personal bank account. Catherine then instructed Ferdinand to remit the
Hemisphere-Leo Burnett (Hemisphere), and who also testified that Ferdinand misappropriated the amount the next day.6 Catherine reported the incident to the accounting supervisor, Luningning
amount for his own benefit and, when she confronted him, said he had unpaid reimbursements from Morando, who, in turn, reported the same to the General Manager, Junito Tan. The following day,
the company; (3) Luningning Morando, the accounting supervisor of Porta-Phone, corroborated the Ferdinand went to the office but did not deliver the amount to Catherine, reasoning that Porta-Phone
alleged fact that Ferdinand received the amount and did not turn over the same to the company; and still owed him unpaid reimbursements.7 This incident came to the knowledge of Chief Executive
(4) Wilson J. So, Chief Executive Officer of Porta-Phone, who testified that meetings were held to Officer Wilson So. Thus, on 30 October 1996, Wilson So invited Ferdinand, Juanito and Luningning
demand from Ferdinand the subject sum of money. to a meeting. In the meeting, Wilson So demanded that Ferdinand return the collection. Ferdinand
refused to turn over the amount to the company. He would return the amount only upon his receipt of
As documentary evidence, the prosecution offered the following: Exhibit "A" - Official Receipt No. his reimbursements from the company. Since Ferdinand adamantly withheld the collected amount,
2242, the receipt in which Ferdinand acknowledged that he received the amount of P15,000.00 from Juanito issued a demand letter dated 7 November 1996, ordering the former to deliver the amount to
Hemisphere; Exhibit "B" - the Minutes of the Meeting held on 30 October 1996 attended by Wilson the company. Ferdinand answered, this time claiming that he had already remitted the amount to
So, Juanito Tan, Luningning Morando and Ferdinand, wherein Wilson So asked Ferdinand the reason Luningning. With this, Juanito issued a memorandum dated 8 November 1996, addressed to
for the former’s refusal to remit the P15,000.00 to the company, and Ferdinand answered that there Luningning asking her to explain her side regarding the allegation of Ferdinand that she received the
was no need to turn over the said amount because he had outstanding reimbursements from the P15,000.00. Luningning completely denied having received the amount from Ferdinand. Juanito then
company in the amount of P8,518.08; Exhibit "C" - the Resignation Letter of Ferdinand; Exhibit "D" issued another letter to Ferdinand to further explain his side in view of Luningning’s denial that she
- the Inter-Office Demand Letter dated 7 November 1996, addressed to Ferdinand from Juanito M. received the amount. In the letter, Juanito also advised Ferdinand to wait for the verification and
Tan, Jr. requiring the former to return the amount of P15,000.00; Exhibit "E" - the Handwritten computation of his claim for reimbursements. With the conflicting claims of Luningning and
Explanation of Ferdinand dated 8 December 1996, that he remitted the amount to Luningning Ferdinand, another meeting was set on 14 November 1996. In that meeting Luningning again denied
Morando; Exhibit "F"- Inter-Office Memorandum dated 8 November 1996, issued by Juanito Tan and having received the amount. Ferdinand did not appear in the meeting. Later, a formal demand letter

62
was issued to Ferdinand by Porta-Phone’s legal counsel, which letter went unheeded. Several Theft was absent. With regard to the second ground, Ferdinand argued that newly discovered
attempts to reach Ferdinand proved to be futile. This prompted the company to file a criminal evidence, i.e., the testimony of a certain Marilen Viduya, could change the judgment on the case. The
complaint against Ferdinand. RTC granted the motion based on the second ground, and set aside its 30 June 2001 decision.

The defense alleged that the amount involved was already turned over to the company through Marilen Viduya, a former employee of Hemisphere, testified that she asked Ferdinand to affix his
Luningning. To substantiate this, the defense presented Ferdinand as its only witness. signature to an acknowledgement receipt for the amount of P15,000.00, which was the refundable
deposit of Hemisphere for the equipment delivered, because Ferdinand did not bring with him the
Ferdinand testified that on 25 October 1996, he delivered to Hemisphere several communication official receipt of Porta-Phone. She also averred that Luningning went to Hemisphere and conducted
gadgets and received from the same the amount of P15,000.00 as refundable deposit (the amount an inventory of the delivered communication items. Luningning admitted to her that the P15,000.00
required by Porta-Phone from its lessor-client to answer for the damage that may befall the items was already remitted to Porta-Phone.
leased) for the delivered items. Since he did not bring with him the official receipt of Porta-Phone, he
merely acknowledged having received the amount in an Acknowledgement Receipt issued by In an Order9 dated 15 July 2003, the RTC declared that it did not find the testimony of Marilen
Hemisphere. Considering that it was already late in the afternoon when he delivered the Viduya persuasive. It revived and reinstated its 30 June 2001 decision convicting Ferdinand of the
communication items, Ferdinand brought the said amount home. The following day, he went to the crime charged.
company’s accounting supervisor, Luningning, to turn over to her the amount. Luningning received
the money and instructed Ferdinand to fill up the details of the transaction in Official Receipt No. Dissatisfied, Ferdinand appealed the judgment to the Court of Appeals.
2242. When Ferdinand asked Luningning to affix her signature to the official receipt to acknowledge
that she received the amount, the latter declined and instead asked the former to affix his signature,
since it was he who closed the deal. The Court of Appeals, on 27 April 2006, promulgated its Decision affirming the decision of the RTC,
thus:
Later, on 28 October 1996, Catherine approached him and asked him to affix his signature to the
triplicate copy of Official Receipt No. 2242. WHEREFORE, the present appeal is DENIED. The 30 June 2001 Decision of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 140, in Makati City, is hereby AFFIRMED. 10
Ferdinand admitted that he attended the meeting of 30 October 1996 with Juanito, Luningning and
Wilson So. He, however, claimed that the discussion centered on his entitlement to reimbursements Ferdinand filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the Court of Appeals in a
from the company. Thereupon, Wilson So got angry with him and asked him to resign, owing to his Resolution dated 4 October 2006.
persistent claim for reimbursement. After this, the company withheld his salary, prompting him to file
a labor case against the same on 4 November 1996. Hence, the instant petition.

On 30 June 2001, the RTC rendered a decision finding Ferdinand guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Ferdinand contends that he was denied due process as his trial was pursued without prior clearance
the crime charged. The decretal portion of the RTC decision reads: from the Department of Labor pursuant to Department of Justice (DOJ) Circular No. 16 which
allegedly states that "clearance must be sought from the Ministry of Labor and /or the Office of the
WHEREFORE, finding the accused FERDINAND A. CRUZ, GUILTY beyond reasonable President before taking cognizance of complaints for preliminary investigation and the filing in court
doubt for the crime of QUALIFIED THEFT, he is hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment of the corresponding information of cases arising out of, or related to, a labor dispute." He avers that
of TEN (10) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor as minimum to FOURTEEN (14) this circular is designed to avoid undue harassment that the employer may use to cow employees
YEARS, EIGHT (8) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of reclusion temporal, as maximum; to from pursuing money claims against the former.
indemnify the offended party in the amount of FIFTEEN THOUSAND (P15,000.00)
PESOS and to pay the costs.8 He also argues that due process was not accorded since he was indicted for qualified theft, even as he
was initially investigated for estafa/falsification of private documents. It must be noted that the
On 2 August 2001, Ferdinand filed a Motion for New Trial on two grounds: (1) absence of a original indictment was for estafa/falsification of private documents but later the prosecutor found it
preliminary investigation for the crime of qualified theft; and (2) newly discovered evidence. Anent proper to charge him with qualified theft. According to him although he was given the chance to file
the first ground, it must be noted that in the beginning, Ferdinand was being indicted for counter-affidavits on the charge of estafa/falsification of private documents, he was not given the
Estafa/Falsification of Private Document. The prosecutor later found that the proper charge should be opportunity to answer during the preliminary investigation of the crime of qualified theft.
for Qualified Theft. Ferdinand argued that since his counter-affidavits were for the charge
Estafa/Falsification of Private Document, he claimed that preliminary investigation for Qualified

63
Finally, Ferdinand maintains that his guilt was not established beyond reasonable doubt, absent parted with the same. The Court of Appeals incisively pointed out that it was implausible for
evidence of the presence of the elements of the crime charged and given the weakness of the evidence Ferdinand to have acceded to executing an acknowledgment receipt in favor of Hemisphere so as to
proffered by the prosecution. give the latter protection from his company, and yet he did not ask for some kind of receipt when he
allegedly turned over the money to Luningning. Quite specious is Ferdinand’s argument that he
Ferdinand’s arguments are not meritorious. would not have had in his possession a copy of Official Receipt No. 2242, had he not delivered the
amount to Luningning. Ferdinand acquired the receipt, not because he remitted the amount, but
because he took a sheet from a booklet of receipts containing Official Receipt number 2242 and
The settled rule is that when an accused pleads to the charge, he is deemed to have waived the right to issued the same to Hemisphere despite his lack of authority to do so, to maliciously induce the client
preliminary investigation and the right to question any irregularity that surrounds it. 11 In the instant into believing that he would remit the amount to Porta-Phone.
case, Ferdinand did not present evidence that arraignment was forced upon him. On the contrary, he
voluntarily pleaded to the charge and actively participated in the trial of the case.
The collected amount belonged to Porta-Phone and not to Ferdinand. When he received the same, he
was obliged to turn it over to the company since he had no right to retain it or to use it for his own
Besides, the prior clearance requirement before taking cognizance of complaints under the cited DOJ benefit, because the amount was a refundable deposit for the communication items leased out by
circular is not applicable to the case of Ferdinand. The RTC found that the money claim which the Porta-Phone to Hemisphere. As he had kept it for himself while knowing that the amount was not his,
Labor Arbiter awarded to Ferdinand covered only his salary during the month of November 1996. It the presence of the element of unlawful taking is settled.
must be noted that the crime attributed to Ferdinand was committed on 25 October 1996 before
Ferdinand was entitled to the money claim. In other words, the crime was first committed before the
accrual of the money claim. This being the case, it is not remote that it was Ferdinand who used the Intent to gain (animus lucrandi) is presumed to be alleged in an information, in which it is charged
labor case, which he filed before the Labor Arbiter, to have leverage against the company in the that there was unlawful taking (apoderamiento) and appropriation by the offender of the things
criminal case. subject of asportation.13 In this case, it was apparent that the reason why Ferdinand took the money
was that he intended to gain by it. In the meeting held on 30 October 1996, Ferdinand admitted
having received the amount and kept it until his reimbursements from the company would be released
It is not correct for Ferdinand to claim that preliminary investigation on the charge of qualified theft to him. Thus, in the initial hearing of 23 September 1997, Ferdinand’s counsel made this declaration:
was not accorded him. The truth is, Ferdinand was able to answer the initial charge of
estafa/falsification of private documents through his counter-affidavits. Based on the same complaint
affidavit and the same sets of evidence presented by the complainant, the prosecutor deemed it proper Court: By the way pañero, what is the defense of the accused?
to charge Ferdinand with qualified theft. Since the same allegations and evidence were proffered by
the complainant in the qualified theft, there is no need for Ferdinand to be given the opportunity to xxxx
submit counter-affidavits anew, as he had already answered said allegations when he submitted
counter-affidavits for the original indictment of estafa/falsification of private documents. Atty. Dizon: Denial your honor. Denial. While it is true that he did not return that
P15,000.00 pesos, it is because the company owes the accused more than P20,000.00.14
The RTC correctly convicted Ferdinand of the crime of qualified theft.
In the course of his testimony, Ferdinand claimed that he had remitted the amount to Luningning.
The elements of the crime of theft are the following: (1) there was a taking of personal property; (2) This insistent claim for reimbursements by Ferdinand would in fact show that he had the intention to
the property belongs to another; (3) the taking was without the consent of the owner; (4) the taking take the subject money; hence, intent to gain is made more manifest.
was done with intent to gain; and (5) the taking was accomplished without violence or intimidation
against the person or force upon things.12 Under Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code, theft is Ferdinand’s lack of authority to receive the amount is apparent, because he is not one of the
qualified when it is, among others, committed with grave abuse of confidence, to wit: collection officers authorized to collect and receive payment, thus:

ART. 310. Qualified theft. - The crime of theft shall be punished by the penalties next Atty. Salvador: You made mention of collectibles, who is authorized by the company to
higher by two degrees than those respectively specified in the next preceding article, if collect the collectibles?
committed x x x with grave abuse of confidence x x x.
Witness: My accounting group is the only group authorized to make collections for and on
The prosecution established, beyond the shadow of doubt that Ferdinand took and kept the fifteen behalf of the company.
thousand peso-collection from the company’s client. Although Ferdinand insists he remitted the
amount personally to Luningning, this claim is self-serving. If indeed he personally delivered the
P15,000.00, he would have at least required Luningning to acknowledge the receipt thereof before he Atty. Salvador: Can you give the names of this accounting group that you have mentioned?
64
Witness: Yes sir, the group is composed of : Cathy Villamar; Dull Abular; and Evic Besa. its medium and maximum periods. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum shall be
prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its minimum period or within the
Atty. Salvador: Is the accused part of the group? range of 10 years and 1 day to 14 years and 8 months. There being neither aggravating nor mitigating
circumstance in the commission of the offense, the maximum period of the indeterminate sentence
shall be within the range of 16 years, 5 months and 11 days to 18 years, 2 months and 20 days. The
Witness: No sir.15 minimum penalty imposed by the RTC is correct. However, the maximum period imposed by RTC
should be increased to 16 years, 5 months and 11 days.
The lack of consent by the owner of the asported money is manifested by the fact that Porta-Phone
consistently sought the return of the same from Ferdinand in the meetings held for this purpose and in WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 27 April 2006 in CA-G.R. CR No.
the various letters issued by the company. 27661 finding Ferdinand A. Cruz GUILTY of the crime of Qualified Theft is hereby AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATION. Ferdinand A. Cruz is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty
As a marketing manager of Porta-Phone, Ferdinand made use of his position to obtain the refundable of 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor, as minimum, to 16 years, 5 months and 11 days of reclusion
deposit due to Porta-Phone and appropriate it for himself. He could not have taken the amount had he temporal, as maximum.
not been an officer of the said company. Clearly, the taking was done with grave abuse of confidence.
SO ORDERED.
Ferdinand likewise assails the testimony of prosecution witness Juanito, who retracted his affidavit of
desistance in favor of the former and explained on the witness stand that he had agreed to execute the Ynares-Santiago, Chairperson, Austria-Martinez, Nachura, Reyes, JJ., concur.
same due to personal favors bestowed on him by Ferdinand. Ferdinand asserts that Juanito’s
retraction should not be given credence. This contention is unconvincing. As aptly discussed by the
Court of Appeals:

[W]hile his desistance may cast doubt on his subsequent testimony, We are not unmindful
that he was in fact grilled by the defense regarding his motives in revoking his earlier
desistance and he remained steadfast in his testimony that [Ferdinand] was never
authorized by Porta-Phone to collect payments and that during the meeting of 30 October
1996, [Ferdinand] refused to return the money. Rather than destroy his credibility, the
defense’s grilling regarding the reasons for his filing his earlier desistance even
strengthened the value of his testimony for he only executed the same because of some
personal favors from [Ferdinand]. And while [Ferdinand] suggests that subsequent
revocation of his desistance in open court may be due this time to favors extended by Porta-
Phone cannot be sustained when taken together with the fact that [Juanito] was long been
separted from Porta-Phone when he testified. In fact Porta-Phone’s CEO did not even have
kind words for [Juanito] when the former testified. x x x.16

In sum, this Court, yields to the factual findings of the trial court which were affirmed by the Court of
Appeals, there being no compelling reason to veer away from the same. This is in line with the
precept stating that when the trial court’s findings have been affirmed by the appellate court, said
findings are generally conclusive and binding upon this Court. 17 (58) G.R. No. L-33254 & G.R. No. L-33253 January 20, 1978

The RTC imposed on petitioner the indeterminate penalty of Ten (10) Years and One (1) Day of THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
prision mayor as minimum to Fourteen (14) Years, Eight (8) Months and One (1) Day of reclusion vs.
temporal, as maximum. Under Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for Qualified Theft LICERIO P. SENDAYDIEGO, JUAN SAMSON and ANASTACIO QUIRIMIT, defendants.
is two degrees higher than that specified in Article 309. Paragraph 1 of Article 309 provides that if the JUAN SAMSON and defendant-appellant.
value of the thing stolen is more than P12,000.00 but does not exceed P22,000.00, the penalty shall
be prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods. In this case, the amount stolen was
P15,000.00. Two degrees higher than prision mayor minimum and medium is reclusion temporal in
65
PROVINCE OF PANGASINAN, offended party-appellee, Paragraph 5 is a certification signed by the provincial treasurer that the account mentioned in the
vs. provincial engineer's certification "was paid in the amount and on the date shown below and is
HEIRS OF LICERIO P. SENDAYDIEGO, defendants-appellants. * chargeable as shown in the summary hereof. ... ." It may be noted that the provincial treasurer signs
two part of the voucher.
Norberto J. Quisumbing for appellant Sendaydiego.
Following paragraph 5, and as referred to therein, is the receipt of the signed by the creditor. As
Donato & Rillera for appellant Samson. accomplished in Exhibit K, the receipt reads (it was signed according to the prosecution by Juan
Samson, a point which is disputed by him):
Office of the Solicitor General for appellee.
Received this 31st day of March, 1969, from L P. Sendaydiego, Province of
Pangasinan the sum of seven hundred twenty-seven pesos & 52/100 (16,727.52)
in full payment of the above stated account, which I hereby certify to be correct.
Paid by Check No. .................................
AQUINO, J.:
CARRIED CONSTR. SUPPLY CO. By: (Sgd.) JUAN SAMSON
In these three cases of malversation through falsification, the prosecution's theory is that in 1969
Licerio P. Sendaydiego, the provincial treasurer of Pangasinan, in conspiracy with Juan Samson y According to the prosecution, Samson also signed on the left margin of the six vouchers below the
Galvan, an employee of a lumber and hardware store in Dagupan City, and with Anastacio Quirimit, stamped words: "Presented to Prov. Treasurer. By Juan Samson."
the provincial auditor, as an accomplice, used six (6) forged provincial vouchers in order to embezzle
from the road and bridge fund the total sum of P57,048.23.
Voucher No. 10724 (Exh. K). — This Provincial voucher, dated February 28, 1969, evidences the
payment of PI 6,727.52 to the Carried Construction Supply Co. of Dagupan City for lumber and
The provincial voucher in these cases has several parts. In the upper part with the legend "ARTICLE hardware materials supposedly used in the repair of the bridge in Barrio Libertad at the Umingan-
OR SERVICE" the nature of the obligation incurred is indicated. That part is supposed to be signed Tayug road in Pangasinan along the Nueva Ecija boundary (Exh. K). The voucher makes reference to
by two officials of the provincial engineer's office and by the governor's representative. invoice No. 3327 and other supporting papers.

The middle part of the voucher contains five numbered printed paragraphs. Paragraph 1 is a The falsity of that provincial voucher is proven by the following intances:
certificate to be signed by the creditor. It is stated therein that the creditor vouches that the expenses
"were actually and necessarily incurred". In the instant cases paragraph 1 was not signed presumably
because it is not relevant to the purchase of materials for public works projects. (a) That there was no project for the repair of the bridge at Barrio Libertad (P. 1; Exh. Z).

Paragraph 2 is a certification that the expenses are correct and have been lawfully incurred. It is (b) That the amount of P16,727.52 was never received by the Carried Construction Supply Co The
signed by the provincial engineer. alleged official receipt No. 3025 of the company dated March, 1969 (Exh. K-6) is forged.

Paragraph 3 contains these words: "Approved for pre-audit and payment, appropriations and funds (c) That the lumber and materials mentioned in Exhibit K were never delivered by the company to the
being available therefore." This is signed by the provincial treasurer. provincial government

Paragraph 4 is a certification which, as filed up in Exhibit K, Voucher No. 10724 dated February 28, (d) That in the provincial voucher, Exhibit K, and in the supporting requisition and issue voucher
1969, reads: (RIV) No. 2206 dated January 29, 1969 (Exh. A), covering the same lumber and hardware ma the
signatures of the following office were forged: Salvador F. Oropilla senior civil engineer; Rodolfo P.
Mencias, supervising civil engineer Victoriano M. Sevilleja, acting provincial engineer, and Ricardo
I certify that this voucher has been pre-audited and same may be paid in the B. Probincias, chief of equipment of the governor's office. These four office denied that their
amount of sixteen thought seven hundred twenty-seven and 52/100 (P16,727.52) signatures in the two vouchers, Exhibits A and B, are their genuine signatures.
in cash or in check, provided there is sufficient fund cover the payment.

This is signed by the auditor.


66
(e) That the imprint of the rubber stamp on Exhibits A and B, containing the words "Approved: For (5) Voucher No. 11872 dated April 15, 1969 evidencing the Payment of
and By Authority of the Governor (signed) Ricardo B. Primicias, Chief of Equipment", is not the P4,501.38 for lumber and hardware materials allegedly used in the repair of the
imprint of the genuine rubber stamp used in Primicias office. Baracbac bridge at the Umingan-Guimba Road (Exh. S).

(f) That charge invoice No. 3327 of the Carried Construction Supply Co. dated February 18, 1969, As in the case of voucher No. 10724 (Exh. K), Oropilla, Mencias, and Primicias declared that their
containing a description and the prices of the lumber and hardware material (Exh. B), is fake because, signatures in the said five vouchers are not their genuine signatures. Samson, who hand-carried the
according to Ambrosio Jabanes, the company's assistant manager, the company's invoice No. 3327 said vouchers for processing, did not turn over to the provincial auditor's office the papers supporting
was issued to the Mountain Agricultural College (Exh. II-1). Oropilla denied that his alleged the said vouchers after the vouchers had been pre-audited. Hence, those supporting papers could not
signature on Exhibit B is his signature. be presented in evidence.

(g) That three other documents, supporting the provincial voucher (Exh. K), were also forged. Those Jabanes, the aforementioned assistant manager of the Carried Construction Supply Co., testified that
documents are the taxpayer's cate dated February 10, 1969 (Exh. C) stating that no tax is due on the the lumber and hardware materials mentioned in the five vouchers were never delivered by his
goods sold in the fake invoice No. 3327 and the two certificates as to the samples of lumber allegedly company to the provincial government. The charge invoices mentioned in the said vouchers were
purchased from the Carried Construction Supply Co., (Exh. D and E). Narciso P. Martinez, a district cancelled invoices issued to the Mountain Agricultural College. The projected repairs of the bridges
forester, denied that his signatures in Exhibits D and E are his signatures. were fictitious.

(h) That Angelo C. Manuel the checker of the provincial auditor's office, denied that his signature on The company's cashier testified that the company never received the payments for the lumber and
the left margin is his signature (Exh. A-10). hardware materials. The receipts evidencing payments (Exh. K-6, KK to KK-4 are fake official
receipts. The cashier produced in court the genuine official receipts (Exh. LL to LL-7) bearing the
The forged character of provincial voucher No. 10724 (Exh. K) is incontrovertible. serial numbers of the fake receipts. The genuine receipts do not refer to transactions with the
provincial government.
Other five forged voucher. — Five other provincial vouchers evidencing supposed payments of
certain amounts to the Carried Construction Supply Co. for lumber and hardware materials Samson played a stellar role in the processing of the six vouchers. He used to be an employee of the
supposingly used in the repair of other bridges were also falsified. These five vouchers are the pro treasurer's office. He resigned and worked with several firms doing business with the provincial
following: government. In 1969 he was the collector of the Carried Construction Supply Co. He represented that
firm in its dealings with the offices of the governor, provincial auditor, provincial engineer and
provincial treasurer. He was personally known to those provincial officials and the employees of their
(1) Voucher No. 11995 dated April 29, 1969 evidencing the payment of offices (21-22 Sendaydiego's brief).
P14,571.81 for number and hardware materials allegedly used in the repair of
Bayaoas bridge at the Urbiztondo-Pasibi Road (Exh. O).
The six (6) forged provincial vouchers, with their respective supporting papers, were hand-carried by
Samson. He delivered the papers to Carmencita Castillo, the ledger clerk in the provincial engineer's
(2) Voucher No. 11869 dated April 15, 1969 evidencing the payment of office, for recording and for her signature (Ekh. DD).
P5,187.28 'or lumber and hardware materials allegedly used in the repair of the
Panganiban bridge at the UminganTayug Road (Exh. P)
Thereafter, Samson brought the papers to the provincial treasurer's office. Marcelo Crusade, a laborer
in that office who performed the chore of recording the vouchers and payrolls, recorded Vouchers
(3) Voucher No. 11870 dated April 28, 1969 evidencing the payment of Nos. 11869, 11871 and 11872 (Exh. P, R and S). Crusadas initials appear on the upper lefthand corner
P6,290.60 for lumber and hardware materials allegedly used in the repair of the of the said vouchers with the date 4/17/69.
Cabatuan bridge at the Umingan-Guimba Road (Exh. Q).
Samson signed on the left margin of the vouchers to indicate that he presented them to the provincial
(4) Voucher No. 11871 dated April 15, 1969 evidencing the payment of t r's office. Crusade said that after Samson had presented the said papers to him, Samson brought
P9,769.64 for lumber and hardware materials allegedly used in the repair of the them to Ricardo Baraan, the book-keeper of the provincial treasurer's office for processing and for the
Casabar bridge at the Binalonan-San Manuel Road (Exh. R). latter's signature (Exh. WW).

From Baraan's office, Samson hand-carried the vouchers to the provincial auditor's office. He asked
Virginia Cruz, a clerk to record the same (Exh. CC).
67
Afterwards, Samson asked Donato Rosete the assistant provincial treasurer, to initialled the voucher (3) In Criminal Case No. 23351, an indeterminate sentence of twelve years, ten
After Rosete had initialled the vouchers, Samson went to the provincial treasurer's office where the months and twenty-one days, as minimum, to eighteen year two months and
amounts covered by the voucher were paid by Sendaydiego to him in cash (instead of by check) as twenty-one days of reclusion temporal as maximum , and a fine of P14,571.81
representative of the Carried Construction Supply Co. (Exh. EE). He received the payments on and to indemnify solidarity the provincial government of Pangasinan in the same
March 31 and April 29 and 28 (four payments on that date) as shown on the face of the vouchers. amount.

The signature of Sendaydiego and Quirimit, the auditor, on the said six vouchers are admittedly Sendaydiego and Samson appealed to this Court.
authentic. Sendaydiego signed the vouchers ahead of Rosete, his assistant. Sendaydiego's defense is
that he signed the vouchers in the honest belief that the signatures therein of the provincial office Sendaydiego died on October 5, 1976. His appeal as to his criminal liability was dismissed. Death
concerned were genuine because the voucher had been pre-audited and approved by the auditor. extinguished his criminal liability remained. The resolution of July 8, 1977 dismissing Sendaydiego's
appeal read s follows:
Samson denied the authenticity of his two signatures on each of the six vouchers showing that he
received from Sendaydiego the amounts covered thereby as representative of the lumber and The death of appellant Sendaydiego during the pendency of his appeal or before
hardware firm (Exh. OO to TT) and that he presented the vouchers to the provincial s treasurer 's the judgment of conviction rendered against him by the lower court became final
office (Exh. 6-12 — Samson). Sendaydiego testified that Samson's signatures are genuine. and executory extinguished his criminal liability meaning his obligation to serve
the personal or imprisonment penalties and his liability to pay the fines or
In connection with the six vouchers, Sendaydiego, Samson and Quirimit were charged with pecuniary penalties (Art. 89[1], Revised Penal Code; 1 Viada, Codigo Penal, 4th
malversation through falsification in three docketed as follows: Ed., 565).

1. Criminal Case No. 23349 involving provincial voucher No. 10724 dated The claim of complainant Province of Pangasinan for the civil liability survived
February 28, 1969 in the sum of P16,7Z7.52 (Exh. X), L-33252. Sendaydiego because his death occurred after final judgment was rendered by the
Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, which convicted him of three complex
2. Criminal Case No. 23350 involving provincial vouchers Nos. 11869, 11870, crimes of malversation through falsification and ordered him to indemnify the
11871 dated April 15 (two dates) 28 and 15, 1969 for the respective amounts of Province in the total sum of P61,048.23 (should be P57,048.23).
P5,187.28, P6,290.60, P9,769-64 and P4,501.38 (four vouchers, Exh. P, Q, R and
S), now L-33253. The civil action for the civil liability is deemed impliedly instituted with the
criminal action in the absence of express waiver or its reservation in a separate
3. Criminal Case No. 23351 involving provincial voucher No. 11955 dated April action (Sec. 1, Rule 111 of the Rules of court). The civil action for the civil
29, 1969 in the sum of P14,571.81 (Exh. O), now L-33254. liability is separate and distinct from the criminal action (People and Manuel vs.
Coloma, 105 Phil. 1287; Roa vs. De la Cruz, 107 Phil. 8).
After trial the lower court acquitted the auditor, Quirimit and found Sendaydiego and Samnson guilty
of malversation through falsification of public or official documents imposing each of the following When the action is for the recovery of money and the defendant dies before final
penalties: judgment in the Court of First Instance, it shall be dismissed to be prosecuted in
the manner especially provided' in Rule 87 of the Rules of Court (Sec. 21, Rule 3
of the Rules of Court).
(1) In Criminal Case No. 23349, an indeterminate sentence of twelve years, ten
months and twenty-one-days, as minimum, to eighteen years, two months and
twenty-one days of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and a fine of P16,727.52 The implication is that, if the defendant dies after a money judgment had been
and to indemnify solidarity the provincial government of Pangasinan in the same rendered against him by the Court of First Instance, the action survives him. It
amount; may be continued on appeal (Torrijos vs. Court of Appeals, L-40336, October 24,
1975; 67 SCRA 394).
(2) In Criminal Case No. 23350, the penalty of reclusion perpetua and a fine of
P29,748.90 and to indemnify solidarily the provincial government of Pangasinan The accountable public officer may still be civilly liable for the funds improperly
in the same amount; and disbursed although he has no criminal liability (U S. vs. Elvina, 24 Phil. 230;
Philippine National Bank vs. Tugab, 66 Phil. 583).

68
In view of the foregoing, notwithstanding the dismissal of the appeal of the Another defense counsel filed a written motion to inhibit Millora and the others as private
deceased Sendaydiego insofar as his criminal liability is concerned, the Court prosecutors. The lower court denied the motion in its order of June 18, 1969 (p. 40, Record of
Resolved to continue exercising appellate jurisdiction over his possible civil Criminal Case No. 23350).
liability for the money claims of the Province of Pangasinan arising from the
alleged criminal acts complained of, as if no criminal case had been instituted After the termination of the p investigation conducted by the lower court, the provincial fiscal of
against him, thus making applicable, in determining his civil liability, Article 30 Pangasinan and the city final of Dagupan City filed three informations against the accused all dated
of the Civil Code (Note: The lower court had issued an order of attachment November 4, 1969.
against him on January 13, 1970 for the sum of P36,487 and in the brief for said
appellant, there is no specific assignment of error affecting the civil liability fixed
by the trial court.) and, for that purpose, his counsel is directed to inform this At the commencement of the trial on February 23, 1970 the city fiscal, an assistant provincial fiscal
Court within ten (10) days of the names and addresses of the decedent's heirs or and Atty. Millora, the private prosecutor, appeared for the prosecution. The city fiscal moved "that the
whether or not his estate is under administration and has a duly appointed judicial private prosecutor (Millora) be authorized to conduct the examination subject to our (the fiscal's)
administrator. Said heirs or administrator will be substituted for the deceased control and supervision". The trial court granted the motion (7 tsn).
insofar as the civil action for the civil liability is concerned (Secs. 16 and 17,
Rule 3, Rules of Court). According to Sendaydiego's brief, he had a wife and ten At the hearing on April 23, 1970 the same city fiscal moved that Atty. Urbiztondo be authorized to
children named Arturo, Licerio, Jr., Prospero, Regulo, Eduardo, Cesar, Nola, examine the prosecution witnesses under his supervision and control The trial court granted the
Aida, Wilfredo and Manolo (deceased). motion (155 tsn).

The title of this case should be amended to show its civil aspect by adding thereto The record shows that at every hearing the provincial fiscal, the city fiscal or an assistant fiscal were
the following. Province of Pangasinan vs. Heirs of Licerio P. Sendaydiego. present together with the private prosecutor.

Sendaydiego's appeal will be resolved only for the purpose of showing his criminal liability which is Under the foregoing circumstances, we believe that there was substantial compliance with the rule
the basis of the civil liability for which his estate would be liable for which his estate would be liable. that the criminal action should be "prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal" and that
"the provincial fiscal shall represent the province" in any court (Sec.4, Rule 110, Rules of Court; sec.
Sendaydiedo's appeal; civil liability of his estate. — In view of Sendaydiego's death, it is not 1683, Revised Administrative Code).
necessary to resolve his first two assignments of error, wherein he assails the imposition of reclusion
perpetua as a cruel and unusual penalty and wherein it is argued that there is no complex crime of The observation of Sendaydiego's counsel, that the imposition of reclusion perpetua "could have
malversation through falsification committed by negligence. been the result of the undue publicity, prejudgment, bias and political interest which attended the
proceedings ", is not well-founded. The trial court's decision dispels any doubt as to its impartiality.
In the third assignment of error, it is contended that the trial court erred in allowing private The evidence in the three cases is mainly documentary. The unassailable probative value of the
prosecutors Millora and Urbiztondo to prosecute the case thereby allegledly subjecting the accused to documents involved rather than bias and prejudice, was the decisive factor on which the trial court
proceedings marked by undue publicity, pre-judgment, bias and political self-interest. anchored the judgment of conviction.

Atty. Vicente D. Millora, a senior member of the provincial board actually handled the prosecution of Moreover, as already adverted to, Sendaydiego's death had rendered moot the issue as to the propriety
the case from the preliminary investigation, which started on June 5, 1969, up to the termination of of the imposition of reclusion perpetua. And, as will be shown later, reclusion perpetua cannot be
the trial on July 29, 1970. imposed in these cases because the crimes committed were not complex.

At the commencement of the preliminary investigation, the counsel for the accused auditor inquired The other seven assigmments of error made by Sendaydiego's counsel refer to the trial court's
whether Atty. Millora was authorized by the provincial board to act as private prosecutor in conclusion that Sendaydiego and Samson are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of malversation through
representation of the province of Pangasinan, the offended party. Atty. Millora replied that there was falsification or, specifically, that the provincial treasurer, in signing the six vouchers, evinced "malice
a board resolution designating him as a private prosecutor. or fraud and that there must have been connivance between" the two.

The acting provincial commander, who filed the complaints manifested to the trial court that he had Several lances indicate that Sendaydiego conspired with Samson. Donato N. Rosete, the assistant
authorized Atty. Millora to act as private prosecutor (4-8 tsn June 5, 1969). provincial treasurer, testified that, contrary to the usual procedure, he affixed his initial to paragraph 3
of the vouchers after Sendaydiego had signed it. Rosete adhered to that unusual procedure because
the interested party, Samson who hand-carried the vouchers, approached Rosete after he (Samson)
69
had conferred with the provincial treasurer and Samson told Rosete to initial the voucher because it Rosete was in a position to state that the cash payments were made to Samson in the treasurers inner
was areglado na (already settled) since the treasurer had already signed the voucher (54 tsn July 3, office because his table was near the main door of the treasurers office or was about fifteen meters
1969). away (18 tsn). Rosete always knew when the cashier went to the treasurers office because the cashier
was oned by means of a buzzer (long buzz), and when the cashier came out of the treasurer's office,
Rosete's testimony and affidavit confute appellant Sendaydiego's contention that the trial court erred he would be holding the voucher (12-13 tsn).
in finding that he signed the questioned vouchers before Rosete had placed his initial in them. After
the treasurer had signed the voucher, Rosete's duty to initial it was only ministerial (75 tsn July 3, Sendaydiego's counsel that no gross negligence can be imputed to the treasurer (malversation is a
1969). crime which can be committed by means of dolo or culpa and the penalty in either case is the same).
This argument does not deserve serious consideration because the facts proven by the prosecution
The bookkeeper in the treasurer's office testified that he indicated in the vouchers that the amounts show that he had a tieup with Samson and that he acted maliciously in signing the six questioned
covered thereby should be paid in cash. That indication was made by means of the symbol "A-1-1" vouchers.
placed at the bottom of the vouchers under the column "Account Number". The bookkeeper was in.
instructed by Samson to place that symbol Samson told him that he (Samson) had an understanding The last contention put forward for Sendaydiego is that, because the trial court acquitted the auditor,
with Treausrer Sendaydiego that the payment should be made in cas. There were instances when the then the treasurer's exoneration follows as a matter of course. We see no merit in that contention
treasurer insisted on payment by check to creditors other than Juan Samson. because the evidence for the prosecution against Sendaydiego is not the same as its evidence against
the auditor. For that reason the auditor was charged only as an accomplice, whereas, the treasurer was
The cash payments were made to Samson in the inner office of the provincial treasurer where the charged as a principal. The auditor based his defense on the undeniable fact that the treasurer had
cashier was summoned to make the cash payments (11-12 ton July 9, 1969; p. 11, Exh. EE). As noted approved the six vouchers "for pre-audit and payment" before they were passed upon by the auditor.
by the trial court, it was unusual that the payments should be made in the treasurer's office when that In short, the auditor was misled by the treasurer's certification which the auditor apparently assumed
was a ministerial chore of the cashier. to have been made in good faith when in truth it was made in bad faith.

The cash payments were made to Samson even if Samson had no power of attorney from the Carried We are convinced after a minutiose examination of the documentary and oral evidence and an
Construction Supply Co. authorizing him to receive the payments. The space in the vouchers for the unprejudiced consideration of the arguments of Sendaydiego's counsel that his criminal liability was
signature of the witness, who should be present when the payments were received, was blank. The established beyond reasonable doubt and, therefore, the civil liability fo his estate for the amounts
treasurer did not bother to have a witness to attest to the payments or to require the exhibition of malversed was duly substantial.
Samson's residence certificate.
Samson's appeal. — Samson's brief has no statement of facts. He contends that the trial court erred in
Another apt observation of the trial court is that the forged character of the six vouchers would have disregarding the expert testimony that his signatures on the vouchers are not his signature; in finding
been unmasked by the supposed creditor, Carried Construction Supply Co., if the payments had been that he forged the vouchers and received the proceeds thereof, and in relying on circumstantial
made by means of checks. The company on receiving the checks would have returned them to the evidence as proof of conspiracy.
treasurer because it knew that there was no reason to make any payments at all. The trial court said
that the cash payments prove Sendaydiego's collusion with Samson. As a preliminary issue, Samson argues that Judge Eloy B. Bello should have inhibited himself "in
fairness to the accused, in the interest of justice, and as a gesture of delivadeza" because he had
Sendaydiego's counsel assails the lower court's finding that there was a conspiracy between the conducted the preliminary investigation.
provincial and Samson as shown by the fact that the amounts covered by the vouchers were paid to
Samson by the cashier in the treasurer's inner office. That point was testified to by Rosete, the Our searching study of the recrod fails to sustain Samson's insinuation that he was prejudiced by the
assistant provincial treasurer. fact that Judge, who conducted the preliminary investigation, was the one who tried the case and
convicted him. Judge Bello tried the case fairly. His conduct of the trial does not show that he had
The cashier, Napoleon Ulanday, would have been the beet witness on how and where the payments already prejudged their guilt.
were made. However, Ulanday died before the preliminary investigation was started. On May 27,
1969, after the anomalies were unearthed, he wrote a letter to the provincial , stating that he paid to Section 13, Rule 112 of the Rules of court, in allowing a Court of First Instance to conduct a
Samson the amounts covered by five vouchers in the of Salazar K. Misal and Josefina E. Pulido (Exh. preliminary investigation, does not disqualify it from trying the case after it had found probable cause
13). and after the fiscal, as directed by the Court, had filed the corresponding information. The rule
assumes that the Judge, who conducted the preliminary investigation, could impartially try the case
on the merits.

70
We cannot assume that judges as a rule are opinionated and narrow-minded insomuch that they would Sendaydiego himself testified that the questioned signatures of Samson in the six vouchers were
invariably be iron-bound by their findings at the preliminary investigation. Samson's signatures (94-99 tsn July 31, 1969).

The case of a Judge of the Court of First Instance, who conducts a preliminary investigation and then Fernandez, the handwriting expert, declared that the questioned signatures of Samson in the vouchers
tries the case on the merits, is similar to a situation where an inferior court conducts a preliminary were written by only one person (264-265 tsn July 16, 1970).
investigation of a grave or less grave offense falling within the concurrent jurisdiction of the Court of
First Instance and tghe inferior court. In such a case, the inferior court after terminating the The evidence conclusively proves that Samson, as the representative or collector of the supposed
preliminary investigation is not obligated (por delivadeza) to remand the case to the Court of First creditor, Carried Construction Supply Co., hand-carried the vouchers in question to the offices of the
Instance for trial. The inferior court has the option to try the case on the merits (People vs. Palmon, provincial engineer, treasurer and auditor and then back to the treasurer's office for payment. He
86 Phil. 350; Natividad vs. Robles, 87 Phil. 834; People vsw. Colicio, 88 Phil. 196). The assumption actually received the cash payments. Under those circumstances, Samson is presumed to be the forger
is that the inferior court can try the case without any ingrained bias or undue prejudice. of the vouchers.

Samson sought to prove, through Lieutenant Colonel Jose G. Fernandez, retired chief of the The rule is that if a person had in his possession a falsified document and be made use of it (uttered
Constabulary crime laboratory, a handwriting expert, that his signatures on the vouchers are not his it), taking advantage of it and profiting thereby, the presumption is that he is the material author of
signatures. the falsification. This is especially true if the use or uttering of the forged documents was so closely
connected in time with the forgery that the user or possessor may be proven to have the capacity of
Fernandez found that the questioned signatures and the alleged genuine signatures (exemplars) of committing the forgery, or to have close connection with the forgers, and therefore, had complicity in
Samson have fundamental differences. The expert concluded that the questioned signatures and the the forgery. (U.S. vs. Castillo, 6 Phil., 453; People vs. De Lara, 45 Phil. 754; People vs. Domingo, 49
exemplar signatures of Samson were not written by one and the same person (Exh. 20). Phil. 28; People vs. Astudillo, 60 Phil. 338 People vs. Manansala, 105 Phil. 1253).

After examining the questioned and genuine signatures and analysing the evidence and contentions of In the absence of a satisfactory explanation, one who is found in possession of a forged document and
the parties, we find that the expert is correct in declaring that (as admitted by the trial court) there are who used or uttered it is presumed to be the forger (Alarcon vs. Court of Appeals, L-21846, March
radical differences between the questioned and authentic signatures. 31, 1967, 19 SCRA 688; People vs.Caragao, L-28258, December 27, 1969, 30 SCRA 993).

But the expert is in error in concluding that Samson did not forge the questioned signatures or in Samson's use of one form of signature for his crooked transactions with the provincial government
implying that Samson had no hand in the writing thereof. and another form of signatures of his valid transactions or papers shows the deviousness of the
falsifications perpetrated in these cases. (Note that Sendaydiego signed the certification in the first
The truth is that Samson used two forms of signature. His supposed genuine signatures found in his voucher, Exhibit K, stating that proceeds thereof were paid to
residence certificates, income tax returns and the genuine office receipt of the Carried Construction
Supply Co. are "in an arcade form or rounded form of writing". The surname Samson is encircled. Samson but Sendaydiego did not sign the same certification in the other five forged vouchers,
Exhibits O, P, Q, R and S).
On the other hand, the questioned signatures used in Samson's transactions with the provincial
government are in angular form; his surname is not encircled, and the questioned signatures terminate As to the question of conspiracy, the statement of Samson's on page 19 of his brief, that "the trial
in angular and horizontal strokes. court made absolutely no finding of any supposed conspiracy' between Samson and Sendaydiego, is
not correct.
Samson was consistent in his fakeries. Knowing that the six vouchers evidenced fictitious
transactions, he used therein his fake signature, or the signature which is different from his signature We have already noted that the trial court explicitly stated that the circumstance that Sendaydiego
in genuine documents. He used his forged signatures in the six fake official receipts of the Carried signed the six vouchers ahead of his assistant shows that there was "malice or fraud" on the part of
Construction Supply Co., stating that the amounts covered by the six vouchers were received by him Sendaydiego and that there was conivance between Samson and Sendaydiego when the proceeds of
(Exh. K-6, KK to KK-4). the expert admitted that a person may have two forms of signature (186 tsn the vouchers were paid to Samson in Sendaydiego's inner office, instead of in the cashier's office (p.
July 16, 1970). 23, 26, Decision, Appendix to Samson's brief). The trial court said that the fact that Sendaydiego
allowed payment in cash shows "his collission with Samson (Ibid, p. 26).
Signatures may be deliberately disguised with the dishonest intention of denying the same as and
when necessary (Mehta, Identification of Handwriting and Cross Examination of Experts, pp. 4th
Ed., 1970, p. 224; Harrison, Suspect Documents 418-419).
71
Samson's contention that the trial court merely conjectured that he had received the proceeds of the The unavoidable conclusion is that Sendaydiego and Samson were in cahoots to defraud the
vouchers is not well taken. The trial court's finding on that point is based on very strong provincial government and to camouflage the defraudation by means of the six vouchers which have
circumstantial evidence (assuming that it was not proven that Samson signed the vouchers). some genuine features and which appear to be extrinsically authentic but which were intrinsically
fake.
Samson vehemently argues that there is no evidence that the total sum of P57,048. 23 paid under the
six vouchers "was really misappropriated". He asserts that the six vouchers are genuine (although he Penalties. — The trial court and the assumed that three complex crimes of malversation through
contends that his signatures thereon are forgeries) and that there is no proof that the amounts covered falsification of public documents were committed in this case. That assumption is wrong.
thereby were not paid for the construction materials shown in the six vouchers were never delivered
by the company (Exh. HH). The crimes committed in these three cases are not complex. Separate crimes of falsification and
malversation were committed. These are not cases where the execution of a single act constitutes two
These contentions appear to be untenable in thelight of the declaration of Jabanes, the assistant grave or less grave felonies or where the falsification was used as a means to commit malversation.
manager of Carried Construction Supply Co., the alleged supplier, that the materials shown in the six
vouchers were never delivered by the company (Exh. HH). In the six vouchers the falsification was used to conceal the malversation. It is settled that if the
falsification was resorted to for the purpose of hiding the malversation, the falsification and
And Leticia Sevilleja (wife of the provincial engineer), who was employed as cashier of the carried malversation are separate offenses (People vs. Cid, 66 Phil 354; People vs. Villanueva, 58 Phil. 671;
Construction Supply Co., denied that Samson turned over to the company the proceeds of the six People vs. Geralde 52 Phil. 1000; People vs. Regis, 67 Phil. 43).
vouchers which he was supposed to have collected for the company from Sendaydiego. The six
vouchers appear to be fake principally because they evidence fictitious sales of construction In the Regis case, supra where the modus operandi is similar to the instant cases, the municipal
materials. treasurer made it appear in two official payrolls dated April .30 and May 2, 1931 that some persons
worked as laborers in a certain street project at Pinamungahan, Cebu. In that way, the two amounts
Under the said circumstances, it cannot be contended that there was no malversation after covered by the payrolls, P473.70 and P271.60, were appropriated and taken from the municipal
Sendaydiego admtte that Samson acknowledged in the six vouchers that he received from Treasurer funds. As a matter of fact, no such work was done in the said street project and the persons mentioned
Sendaydiego the total sum of P57,048.23. in both payrolls had not performed any labor.

The assertion of Samson's counsel on pgae 29 of his brief, that the finding as to his guilt is based on a It was held in the Regis case, that the falsification and malversation did not constitute a complex
shaky foundation or is predicated on circumstances which wre not proven, is not correct. crime because the falsifications were not necessary means for the co on of the malversations. Each
falsification and each malversation constituted independent offenses which must be punished
Recapitulations. — In resume, it appears that the provincial treasurer wants to base his exculpation separately.
on his belief that in the six vouchers the signatures of Samson and the officials in the provincial
engineer's office appeared to be genuine and on the fact that the auditor had approved the vouchers. The municipal treasurer was convicted of two falsifications and two malversations. Four distinct
The tresurer claimed that he acted in good faith in approving the payments of the proceeds of the penalties were imposed.
vouchers to Samson as the representative of the supplier, Carried Construction Co.
In the instant cases, the provincial , as the custodian than of the money forming part of the road and
On the other hand, Samson, by impugning his signatures in the vouchers, denied that he received the bridge could have malversed or misappropriated it without falsifiying any voucher. The falsification
said amounts from the cashier of the treasurer's office. was used as a device to prevent detection of the malversation.

These conflicting versions of the treasurer and Samson have to be resolved in the light of the The falsifications cannot be regarded as constituting one continuing offense impelled by a single
inexpugnable fact that Samson had hand-carried the voucehrs and followed up their processing in the criminal impulse.
offices of the provicial government the construction materials described in the six vouchers and
denied having received from Samson the prices of the alleged sales. Each falsification of a voucher constitutes one crime. The falsification of six vouchers constitutes six
separate or distinct offenses (People vs. Madrigal-Gonzales, 117 Phil. 956).
The result is the Samson's denial of his signatures in the six vouchers and in the six receipts (Exh. K-
6 and KK to KK-4) and the provicial treasurer's pretension of having acted in good faith or having And each misappropriation as evidenced by a provincial voucher constitutes a separate crimes of
committed an honest mistake have to be disbelieved. malversation were committed. Appellant Samson is a co-principal in each of the said twelve offenses.
72
As already stated, he is presumed to be the author of the falsification because he was in possession of For the malversation of the sum of P16,727.52 covered by voucher No. 10724 (Exh. K), Samson is
the forged vouchers and he used them in order to receive public monies from the provincial treasurer. sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of twelve (12) years of prision mayor maximum, as minimum,
to seventeen (17) years of reclusion temporal medium, as maximum; to pay a fine in the amount of
He is a co-principal in the six crimes of malversation because he conspired with the provincial P16,727.52, and to indemnify the province of Pangasinan in the same amount (Criminal Case NO.
treasurer in committing those offenses. The trial court correctly ruled that a private person conspiring 23349, L-33252).
with an accountable public officer in committing malversation is also guilty of malversation (People
vs. Rodis, 105 Phil. 1294; U.S. vs. Ponte, 20 Phil. 379; U.S. vs. Dato and Lustre, 37 Phil. 359; U.S. For the malversation of the sum of P14,571.81 covered by voucher No. 11995 (Exh. O), Samson is
vs. Dowdell, 11 Phil. 4; People vs. Caluag, 94 Phil. 457). sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of twelve (12) years of prision mayor maximum, as minimum,
to seventeen (17) years of reclusion temporal medium, as maximum; to pay a fine in the sum of
Note that a different rule prevails with respect to a stranger taking part in the commission of parricide P14,571.81, and to indemnify the province of Pangasinan in the same amount (Criminal Case No.
or qualified theft. In such cases, the stranger is not guilty of parricide or qualfied theft but only of 23351, L-33254).
murder or homicide, as the case may be, and simple theft, by reason of paragraph 3, article 62 of the
Revised Penal Code (People vs. Patricio, 46 Phil. 245). For the malversation of the sum of P6,290.60 covered by voucher No. 11870 (Exh. Q), Samson is
sentenced to an indertiminate penalty of nine (9) years of prision mayor medium, as minimum, to
Falsification of a public document committed by a private person is punished in article 172(1) of the thirteen (13) years of reclusion temporal minimum, as maximum; to pay a fine of P6,290.60, and to
Revised Penal Code by prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine of not indemnify the province of Pangasinan in the same amount (Criminal Case No. 23350, L-33253).
more than P5,000.
For the malversation of the sum of P9,769.64 covered by voucher No. 11871 (Exh. R), Samson is
For the malversation of the sum of P5,187.28 and P4,501.38, respectively covered by vouchers Nos. sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of nine (9) years of prision mayor medium, as minimum, to
11869 and 11872 (Exh. P and S), the penalty provided in paragraph 2 of article of the Revised Penal thirteen (13) years of reclusion temporal minimum, as maximum; to pay a fine of P9,769.64, and to
Code is prision mayor minimum and medium. indemnify the province of Pangasinan in the same amount (Criminal Case No. 23350, L-33253).

For the malversation of the sums of P6,290.60 andP9,769.64, respectively covered by vouchers Nos. For the malversation of the sum of P5,187.28, covered by voucher No. 11869 (Exh. P), Samson is
1187 and11871 (Exh. Q and R) the penalty provided in paragraph 3 of article 217 is prision mayor sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of five (5) years of prision correccional maximum, as
maximum to reclusion temporal minimum. minimum, to eight (8) of prision mayor minimum, as maximum; to pay a fine of P5,187.28, and to
indemnify the province of Pangasinan in the same amount (Criminal Case No. 23350, L-33253).
For the malversation of the sums of P16,727.52 and 10995 (Exh. K and O), the penalty provided in
paragraph 4 of article 217 is reclusion temporal medium and maximum. For the malversation of the sum of P4,501.38 covered by voucher no. 11872 (Exh. S), Samson is
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of five (5) years of prision correccional maximum, as
minimum, to eight (8) years of prision mayor minimum, as maximum; to pay a fine of P4,501.38, and
In each of the malversation cases, a fine equal to the amount malversed should be added to the to indemnify the province of Pangasinan in the same amount (Criminal Case No. 23350, L-33253).
imprisonment penalty.
In the service of the twelve penalties meted to Samson, the threefold limit provided for in article 70
In the twelve cases the penalty should be imposed in the medium peiod since there are no modifying of the Revised Penal Code should be observed (People vs. Escares, 102 Phil. 677), meaning that the
circumstances (Arts. 64[1] and 685, Revised Penal Code). Samson is entitled to an indeterminate maximum penalty that he should serve is three times the indeterminate sentence of twelve (12) years
sentence. to seventeen (17) years, the severest penalty imposed on him, or thirty-six (36) years to fifty-one (51)
years (see People vs. Peñas, 68 Phil. 533).
WHEREFORE, Samson is convicted of six crimes of falsification of a public document and six
crimes of malversation. The maximum duration of his sentences should not exceed forty (40) years (Penultimate par. of art.
70; People vs. Alisub, 69 Phil. 362; People vs. Concepcion, 59 Phil. 518, 68 Phil. 530 and 69 Phil.
In lieu of the penalties imposed by the trial court, he is sentenced to the following penalties: 58).

For each of the six falsification of the vouchers (Exh. K, O, P, Q, R and S), Samson is sentenced to an The estate of the late Licerio P. Sendaydiego is ordered to indemnify the province of Pangasinan in
indeterminate penalty of two (2) years of prison correccional minimum, as minimum, to four (4) the sum of P57,048.23.
years of prision correccional medium, as maximum, and to pay a fine of three thousand pesos.
73
Samson and the said estate are sojidarily liable for the said indemnity (Art. 110, Revised Penal Code).
Samson should pay one-half of the costs.

SO ORDERED.

Antonio, Concepcion, Jr., and Santos, JJ., concur.

Fernando, J., took no part.

(59) G.R. No. 125066 July 8, 1998

ISABELITA REODICA, petitioner,

vs.

COURT OF APPEALS, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:


74
On the evening of 17 October 1987, petitioner Isabelita Reodica was driving a van along Doña [t]o suffer imprisonment of six (6) months of arresto mayor, and to pay the
Soledad Avenue, Better Living Subdivision, Parañaque, Metro Manila. Allegedly because of her complainant, Norberto Bonsol y Atienza, the sum of Thirteen Thousand Five
recklessness, her van hit the car of complainant Norberto Bonsol. As a result, complainant sustained Hundred Forty-Two (P13,542), Philippine Currency, without subsidiary
physical injuries, while the damage to his car amounted to P8,542.00. impairment in case of insolvency; and to pay the costs. 4

Three days after the incident, or on 20 October 1987, the complainant filed an Affidavit of Complaint The trial court justified imposing a 6-month prison term in this wise:
1 against petitioner with the Fiscal's Office.
As a result of the reckless imprudence of the accused, complainant suffered slight
On 13 January 1988, an information 2 was filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati physical injuries (Exhs. D, H and I). In view of the resulting physical injuries, the
(docketed as Criminal Case No. 33919) charging petitioner with "Reckless Imprudence Resulting in penalty to be imposed is not fine, but imprisonment (Gregorio, Fundamental of
Damage to Property with Slight Physical Injury." The information read: Criminal Law Review, Eight Edition 1988, p. 711). Slight physical injuries thru
reckless imprudence is now punished with penalty of arresto mayor in its
The undersigned 2nd Asst. Fiscal accuses Isabelita Reodica of the crime of maximum period (People v. Aguiles, L-11302, October 28, 1960, cited in
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with Slight Physical Gregorio's book, p. 718). 5
Injury as follows:
As to the sum of P13,542.00, this represented the cost of the car repairs (P8,542.00) and
That on or about the 17th day of October, 1987 in the medical expenses (P5,000.00).
Municipality of Parañaque, Metro Manila, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the Petitioner appealed from the decision to the Court of Appeals, which docketed the case as CA-G.R.
abovementioned accused, Isabelita Velasco Reodica, being CR No. 14660. After her motions for extension of time to file her brief were granted, she filed a
then the driver and/or person in charge of a Tamaraw bearing Motion to Withdraw Appeal for Probation Purposes, and to Suspend, Ex Abundanti Cautela, Period
plate no. NJU-306, did then and there willfully, unlawfully for Filing Appellant's Brief. However, respondent Court of Appeals denied this motion and directed
and feloniously drive, manage and operate the same in a petitioner to file her brief. 6
reckless, careless, negligent and imprudent manner, without
regard to traffic laws, rules and regulations and without After passing upon the errors imputed by petitioner to the trial court, respondent Court of Appeals
taking the necessary care and precaution to avoid damage to rendered a decision 7 on 31 January 1996 affirming the appealed decision.
property and injuries to person, causing by such negligence,
carelessness and imprudence the said vehicle to bump/collide
with a Toyota Corolla bearing plate no. NIM-919 driven and Petitioner subsequently filed a motion for reconsideration 8 raising new issues, thus:
owned by Norberto Bonsol, thereby causing damage
amounting to P8,542.00, to the damage and prejudice of its NOW THAT AN ACQUITTAL SEEMS IMPOSSIBLE, MAY WE REVISIT
owner, in the aforementioned amount of P8,542.00. THE PENALTY AND MOVE THAT IT BE REVIEWED AND SET ASIDE
SINCE IT IS RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED TO BE ERROR TO COMPLEX
That as further consequence due to the strong impact, said DAMAGE TO PROPERTY AND SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES, AS BOTH
Norberto Bonsol suffered bodily injuries which required ARE LIGHT OFFENSES, OVER WHICH THE RESPONDENT COURT HAD
medical attendance for a period of less that nine (9) days and NO JURISDICTION AND EVEN ASSUMING SUCH JURISDICTION, IT
incapacitated him from performing his customary labor for CANNOT IMPOSE A PENALTY IN EXCESS OF WHAT IS AUTHORIZED
the same period of time. BY LAW. 9

Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial then ensued. xxx xxx xxx

On 31 January 1991, the RTC of Makati, Branch 145, rendered a decision 3 convicting petitioner of REVERSAL OF THE DECISION REMAINS POSSIBLE ON GROUNDS OF
the "quasi offense of reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property with slight physical PRESCRIPTION OR LACK OF JURISDICTION. 10
injuries," and sentencing her:

75
In its Resolution of 24 May 1996, the Court of Appeals denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration DECISION NOTWITHSTANDING
for lack of merit, as well as her supplemental motion for reconsideration. Hence, the present petition THE DEFENSE OF PRESCRIPTION
for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court premised on the following grounds: AND LACK OF JURISDICTION.

RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS' DECISION DATED JANUARY 31, Anent the first ground, petitioner claims that the courts below misquoted not only the title, but
1996 AND MORE SO ITS RESOLUTION DATED MAY 24, 1996, ARE likewise the ruling of the case cited as authority regarding the penalty for slight physical injuries
CONTRARY TO LAW AND GROSSLY ERRONEOUS IN THAT THEY through reckless imprudence. Concretely, the title of the case was not People v. Aguiles, but People v.
IMPOSED A PENALTY IN EXCESS OF WHAT IS AUTHORIZED BY LAW Aguilar; while the ruling was that the penalty for such quasi offense was arresto menor — not
FOR THE CRIME OF RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE RESULTING IN SLIGHT arresto mayor.
PHYSICAL INJURIES, ON THE BASIS OF A CLERICAL ERROR IN A
SECONDARY SOURCE. As regards the second assigned error, petitioner avers that the courts below should have pronounced
that there were two separate light felonies involved, namely: (1) reckless imprudence with slight
A. IN THE CASE OF PEOPLE V. physical injuries; and (2) reckless imprudence with damage to property, instead of considering them a
AGUILAR, 11 THE SAME CASE complex crime. Two light felonies, she insists, "do not . . . rate a single penalty of arresto mayor or
WHERE THE COURT A QUO BASED imprisonment of six months," citing Lontok v. Gorgonio, 12 thus:
ITS FINDING OF A PENALTY WHEN
IT AFFIRMED THE DECISION OF Where the single act of imprudence resulted in double less serious physical
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, injuries, damage to property amounting to P10,000.00 and slight physical
WHAT WAS STATED IN THE injuries, a chief of police did not err in filing a separate complaint for the slight
ORIGINAL TEXT OF SAID CASE IS physical injuries and another complaint for the lesiones menos graves and
THAT THE PENALTY FOR SLIGHT damage to property (Arcaya vs. Teleron, L-37446, May 31, 1974, 57 SCRA 363,
PHYSICAL INJURIES THROUGH 365).
RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE IS
ARRESTO MENOR AND NOT
ARRESTO MAYOR. IT IS GRAVE The case of Angeles vs. Jose, 96 Phil. 151, cited by investigating fiscal, is
ERROR FOR THE RESPONDENT different from the instant case because in that case the negligent act resulted in
COURT TO PUNISH PETITIONER the offenses of lesiones menos graves and damage to property which were both
MORE THAN SHE SHOULD OR less grave felonies and which, therefore, constituted a complex crime.
COULD BE PUNISHED BECAUSE OF
A CLERICAL ERROR COPIED FROM In the instant case, following the ruling in the Turla case, the offense of lesiones
A SECONDARY SOURCE. leves through reckless imprudence should have been charged in a separate
information.
B. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF
APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS She then suggests that "at worst, the penalties of two light offenses, both imposable in their
DISCRETION WHEN IT COMPLEXED maximum period and computed or added together, only sum up to 60 days imprisonment
THE CRIME OF RECKLESS and not six months as imposed by the lower courts."
IMPRUDENCE RESULTING IN
DAMAGE TO PROPERTY AND On the third assigned error, petitioner insists that the offense of slight physical injuries through
SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES reckless imprudence, being punishable only by arresto menor, is a light offense; as such, it prescribes
IMPOSING A SINGLE EXCESSIVE in two months. Here, since the information was filed only on 13 January 1988, or almost three
PENALTY IN ITS ELLIPTICAL months from the date the vehicular collision occurred, the offense had already prescribed, again
RESOLUTION OF MAY 24, 1996. citing Lontok, thus:

C. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF In the instant case, following the ruling in the Turla case, the offense of lesiones
APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN leves through reckless imprudence should have been charged in a separate
IT AFFIRMED THE TRIAL COURT'S information. And since, as a light offense, it prescribes in two months, Lontok's
76
criminal liability therefor was already extinguished (Arts. 89[5], 90 and 91, Petitioner finally avers that People v. Cuaresma 23 should not be given retroactive effect; otherwise,
Revised Penal Code in relation to sec. 2[e] and [f], Rule 117, Rules of Court). it would either unfairly prejudice her or render nugatory the en banc ruling in Zaldivia 24 favorable
The trial court committed a grave abuse of discretion in not sustaining Lontok's to her.
motion to quash that part of the information charging him with that light offense.
The pleadings thus raise the following issues:
Petitioner further claims that the information was filed with the wrong court, since
Regional Trial Courts do not deal with arresto menor cases. She submits that damage to I. Whether the penalty imposed on petitioner is correct.
property and slight physical injuries are light felonies and thus covered by the rules on
summary procedure; therefore, only the filing with the proper Metropolitan Trial Court
could have tolled the statute of limitations, this time invoking Zaldivia v. Reyes. 13 II. Whether the quasi offenses of reckless imprudence
resulting in damage to property in the amount of P8,542.00
and reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries
In its Comment filed on behalf of public respondents, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) are light felonies.
agrees with petitioner that the penalty should have been arresto menor in its maximum period,
instead of arresto mayor, pursuant to Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code.
III. Whether the rule on complex crimes under Article 48 of
the Revised Penal Code applies to the quasi offenses in
As to the second assigned error, the OSG contends that conformably with Buerano v. Court of question.
Appeals, 14 which frowns upon splitting of crimes and prosecution, it was proper for the trial court to
"complex" reckless imprudence with slight physical injuries and damage to property because what
the law seeks to penalize is the single act of reckless imprudence, not the results thereof; hence, there IV. Whether the duplicity of the information may be
was no need for two separate informations. questioned for the first time on appeal.

To refute the third assigned error, the OSG submits that although the Municipal Trial Court had V. Whether the Regional Trial Court had jurisdiction over the
jurisdiction to impose arresto menor for slight physical injuries, the Regional Trial Court properly offenses in question.
took cognizance of this case because it had the jurisdiction to impose the higher penalty for the
damage to property, which was a fine equal to thrice the value of P8,542.00. On this score, the OSG VI. Whether the quasi offenses in question have already
cites Cuyos v. Garcia. 15 prescribed.

The OSG then debunks petitioner's defense of prescription of the crime, arguing that the prescriptive I. The Proper Penalty
period here was tolled by the filing of the complaint with the fiscal's office three days after the
incident, pursuant to People v. Cuaresma 16 and Chico v. Isidro. 17 We agree with both petitioner and the OSG that the penalty of six months of arresto mayor imposed
by the trial court and affirmed by respondent Court of Appeals is incorrect. However, we cannot
In her Reply to the Comment of the OSG, petitioner expressed gratitude and appreciation to the OSG subscribe to their submission that the penalty of arresto menor in its maximum period is the proper
in joining cause with her as to the first assigned error. However, she considers the OSG's reliance on penalty.
Buerano v. Court of Appeals 18 as misplaced, for nothing there validates the "complexing" of the
crime of reckless imprudence with physical injuries and damage to property; besides, in that case, Art. 365 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
two separate informations were filed — one for slight and serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence and the other for damage to property through reckless imprudence. She then insists that
in this case, following Arcaya v. Teleron 19 and Lontok v. Gorgonio, 20 two informations should have Art. 365. Imprudence and negligence. — Any person who, by reckless
been filed. She likewise submits that Cuyos v. Garcia 21 would only apply here on the assumption imprudence, shall commit any act which, had it been intentional, would constitute
that it was proper to "complex" damage to property through reckless imprudence with slight physical a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to
injuries through reckless imprudence. Chico v. Isidro 22 is likewise "inapposite," for it deals with prision correccional in its medium period; if it would have constituted a less
attempted homicide, which is not covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure. grave felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods
shall be imposed; if it would have constituted a light felony, the penalty of
arresto menor in its maximum period shall be imposed.

77
Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an act which paragraph, then the sixth paragraph of Article 365 would apply, i.e., the penalty next lower in degree,
would otherwise constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto which is arresto menor in its maximum period to arresto mayor in its minimum period or
mayor in its medium and maximum periods; if it would have constituted a less imprisonment from 21 days to 2 months. Accordingly, the imposable penalty for reckless imprudence
serious felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum period shall be resulting in damage to property to the extent of P8,542.00 would be arresto mayor in its minimum
imposed. and medium periods, which could be anywhere from a minimum of 1 month and 1 day to a maximum
of 4 months, at the discretion of the court, since the fifth paragraph of Article 365 provides that in the
When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only resulted in imposition of the penalties therein provided "the courts shall exercise their sound discretion without
damage to the property of another, the offender shall be punished by a fine regard to the rules prescribed in article 64."
ranging from an amount equal to the value of said damages to three times such
value, but which shall in no case be less than 25 pesos. II. Classification of the Quasi Offense in Question.

A fine not exceeding 200 pesos and censure shall be imposed upon any person Felonies committed not only by means of deceit (dolo), but likewise by means of fault (culpa). There
who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall cause some wrong which, if is deceit when the wrongful act is performed with deliberate intent; and there is fault when the
done maliciously, would have constituted a light felony. wrongful act results from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight or lack of skill. 26

In the imposition of these penalties, the courts shall exercise their sound As earlier stated, reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries is punishable by public
discretion, without regard to the rules prescribed in Article 64. censure only. Article 9, paragraph 3, of the Revised Penal Code defines light felonies as infractions of
law carrying the penalty of arresto menor or a fine not exceeding P200.00, or both. Since public
The provisions contained in this article shall not be applicable: censure is classified under Article 25 of the Code as a light penalty, and is considered under the
graduated scale provided in Article 71 of the same Code as a penalty lower than arresto menor, it
follows that the offense of reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries is a light felony.
1. When the penalty provided for the offense is equal to or lower than those
provided in the first two paragraphs of this article, in which case the courts shall
impose the penalty next lower in degree than that which should be imposed in the On the other hand, reckless imprudence also resulting in damage to property is, as earlier discussed,
period which they may deem proper to apply. penalized with arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods. Since arresto mayor is a
correctional penalty under Article 25 of the Revised Penal Code, the quasi offense in question is a
less grave felony — not a light felony as claimed by petitioner.
According to the first paragraph of the aforequoted Article, the penalty for reckless imprudence
resulting in slight physical injuries, a light felony, is arresto menor in its maximum period, with a
duration of 21 to 30 days. If the offense of slight physical injuries is, however, committed III. Applicability of the Rule on Complex Crimes.
deliberately or with malice, it is penalized with arresto menor under Article 266 of the Revised Penal
Code, with a duration of 1 day to 30 days. Plainly, the penalty then under Article 266 may be either Since criminal negligence may, as here, result in more than one felony, should Article 48 of the
lower than or equal to the penalty prescribed under the first paragraph of Article 365. This being the Revised Code on complex crimes be applied? Article 48 provides as follows:
case, the exception in the sixth paragraph of Article 365 applies. Hence, the proper penalty for
reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries is public censure, this being the penalty next Art. 48. Penalty for complex crimes. — When a single act constitutes two or
lower in degree to arresto menor. 25 more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is necessary a means for
committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the
As to reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property in the amount of P8,542.00, the third same to be applied in its maximum period.
paragraph of Article 365, which provides for the penalty of fine, does not apply since the reckless
imprudence in this case did not result in damage to property only. What applies is the first paragraph Clearly, if a reckless, imprudent or negligent act results in two or more grave or less grave felonies, a
of Article 365, which provides for arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods (1 month and 1 complex crime is committed. However, in Lontok v. Gorgonio, 27 this Court declared that where one
day to 4 months) for an act committed through reckless imprudence which, had it been intentional, of the resulting offenses in criminal negligence constitutes a light felony, there is no complex crime,
would have constituted a less grave felony. Note that if the damage to the extent of P8,542.00 were thus:
caused deliberately, the crime would have been malicious mischief under Article 329 of the Revised
Penal Code, and the penalty would then be arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods (2
months and 1 day to 6 months which is higher than that prescribed in the first paragraph of Article Applying article 48, it follows that if one offense is light, there is no complex
365). If the penalty under Article 329 were equal to or lower than that provided for in the first crime. The resulting offenses may be treated as separate or the light felony may
be absorbed by the grave felony. Thus, the light felonies of damage to property
78
and slight physical injuries, both resulting from a single act of imprudence, do The criminal jurisdiction of the lower courts was then determined by the duration of the
not constitute a complex crime. They cannot be charged in one information. They imprisonment and the amount of fine prescribed by law for the offense charged. The question thus
are separate offenses subject to distinct penalties (People vs. Turla, 50 Phil. 1001; arises as to which court has jurisdiction over offenses punishable by censure, such as reckless
See People vs. Estipona, 70 Phil. 513). imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries.

Where the single act of imprudence resulted in double less serious physical In Uy Chin Hua v. Dinglasan, 32 this Court found that a lacuna existed in the law as to which court
injuries, damage to property amounting to P10,000 and slight physical injuries, a had jurisdiction over offenses penalized with destierro, the duration of which was from 6 months and
chief of police did not err in filing a separate complaint for the slight physical 1 day to 6 years, which was co-extensive with prision correccional. We then interpreted the law in
injuries and another complaint for the lesiones menor graves and damage to this wise:
property [Arcaya vs. Teleron, L-37446, May 31, 1974, 57 SCRA 363, 365].
Since the legislature has placed offenses penalized with arresto mayor under the
Hence, the trial court erred in considering the following felonies as a complex crime: the less grave jurisdiction of justice of the peace and municipal courts, and since by Article 71
felony of reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property in the amount of P8,542.00 and the of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 3 of Commonwealth Act No.
light felony of reckless imprudence resulting in physical injuries. 217, it has placed destierro below arresto mayor as a lower penalty than the
latter, in the absence of any express provision of law to the contrary it is logical
IV. The Right to Assail the Duplicity of the Information. and reasonable to infer from said provisions that its intention was to place
offenses penalized with destierro also under the jurisdiction of justice of the
peace and municipal courts and not under that of courts of first instance.
Following Lontok, the conclusion is inescapable here, that the quasi offense of reckless imprudence
resulting in slight physical injuries should have been charged in a separate information because it is
not covered by Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. However, petitioner may no longer question, at Similarly, since offenses punishable by imprisonment of not exceeding 4 years and 2 months were
this stage, the duplicitous character of the information, i.e., charging two separate offenses in one within the jurisdictional ambit of the MeTCs, MTCs and MCTCs, it follows that those penalized with
information, to wit: (1) reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property; and (2) reckless censure, which is a penalty lower than arresto menor under the graduated scale in Article 71 of the
imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries. This defect was deemed waived by her failure to Revised Penal Code and with a duration of 1 to 30 days, should also fall within the jurisdiction of
raise it in a motion to quash before she pleaded to the information. 28 Under Section 3, Rule 120 of said courts. Thus, reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries was cognizable by said
the Rules of Court, when two or more offenses are charged in a single complaint or information and courts.
the accused fails to object to it before trial, the court may convict the accused of as many offenses as
are charged and proved and impose on him the penalty for each of them. 29 As to the reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property in the amount of P8,542.00, the same
was also under the jurisdiction of MeTCs, MTCs or MCTCs because the imposable penalty therefor
V. Which Court Has Jurisdiction Over the was arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods — the duration of which was from 1 month
Quasi Offenses in Question. and 1 day to 4 months.

The jurisdiction to try a criminal action is to be determined by the law in force at the time of the Criminal Case No. 33919 should, therefore, be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the
institution of the action, unless the statute expressly provides, or is construed to the effect that it is RTC of Makati.
intended to operate as to actions pending before its enactment. 30
VI. Prescription of the Quasi Offenses in Question.
At the time of the filing of the information in this case, the law in force was Batas Pambansa Blg.
129, otherwise known as "The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980." Section 32(2) 31 thereof Pursuant to Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code, reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical
provided that except in cases falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial injuries, being a light felony, prescribes in two months. On the other hand, reckless imprudence
Courts and of the Sandiganbayan, the Metropolitan Trial Courts (MTCs), Municipal Trial Courts resulting in damage to property in the amount of P8,542.00, being a less grave felony whose penalty
(MTCs), and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts (MCTCs) had exclusive original jurisdiction over "all is arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods, prescribes in five years.
offenses punishable with imprisonment of got exceeding four years and two months, or a fine of not
more than four thousand pesos, or both fine and imprisonment, regardless of other imposable To resolve the issue of whether these quasi offenses have already prescribed, it is necessary to
accessory or other penalties, including the civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated determine whether the filing of the complaint with the fiscal's office three days after the incident in
thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value or amount thereof." question tolled the running of the prescriptive period.

79
Art. 91 of the Revised Penal Code provides: WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The challenge decision of respondent Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 14660 is SET ASIDE as the Regional Trial Court, whose decision was
Art. 91. Computation of prescription of offenses. — The period of prescription affirmed therein, had no jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. 33919.
shall commence to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the
offended party, the authorities, or their agents, and shall be interrupted by the Criminal Case No. 33919 is ordered DISMISSED.
filing of the complaint of information, and shall commence to run again when
such proceedings terminate without the accused being convicted or acquitted, or No pronouncement as to costs.
are unjustifiably stopped by any reason not imputable to him. (emphasis
supplied)
SO ORDERED.
Notably, the aforequoted article, in declaring that the prescriptive period "shall be
interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information," does not distinguish whether the
complaint is filed for preliminary examination or investigation only or for an action on the
merits. 33 Thus, in Francisco v. Court of Appeals 34 and People v. Cuaresma, 35 this Court
held that the filing of the complaint even with the fiscal's office suspends the running of the
statute of limitations.

We cannot apply Section 9 36 of the Rule on Summary Procedure, which provides that in cases
covered thereby, such as offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding 6 months, as in the
instant case, "the prosecution commences by the filing of a complaint or information directly with the
MeTC, RTC or MCTC without need of a prior preliminary examination or investigation; provided
that in Metropolitan Manila and Chartered Cities, said cases may be commenced only by
information." However, this Section cannot be taken to mean that the prescriptive period is
interrupted only by the filing of a complaint or information directly with said courts.

It must be stressed that prescription in criminal cases is a matter of substantive law. Pursuant to
Section 5(5), Article VIII of the Constitution, this Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power, is
not allowed to diminish, increase or modify substantive rights. 37 Hence, in case of conflict between
the Rule on Summary Procedure promulgated by this Court and the Revised Penal Code, the latter
prevails.

Neither does Zaldivia control in this instance. It must be recalled that what was involved therein was
a violation of a municipal ordinance; thus, the applicable law was not Article 91 of the Revised Penal
Code, but Act. No. 3326, as amended, entitled "An Act to Establish Periods of Prescription for (60) G.R. No. 182748 December 13, 2011
Violations Penalized by Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription
Shall Begin to Run." Under Section 2 thereof, the period of prescription is suspended only when
ARNEL COLINARES, Petitioner,
judicial proceedings are instituted against the guilty party. Accordingly, this Court held that the
vs.
prescriptive period was not interrupted by the filing of the complaint with the Office of the Provincial
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
Prosecutor, as such did not constitute a judicial proceeding; what could have tolled the prescriptive
period there was only the filing of the information in the proper court.
DECISION
In the instant case, as the offenses involved are covered by the Revised Penal Code, Article 91 thereof
and the rulings in Francisco and Cuaresma apply. Thus, the prescriptive period for the quasi offenses ABAD, J.:
in question was interrupted by the filing of the complaint with the fiscal's office three days after the
vehicular mishap and remained tolled pending the termination of this case. We cannot, therefore,
uphold petitioner's defense of prescription of the offenses charged in the information in this case.
80
This case is about a) the need, when invoking self-defense, to prove all that it takes; b) what maximum probationable imprisonment under the law was only up to six years, Arnel did not qualify
distinguishes frustrated homicide from attempted homicide; and c) when an accused who appeals for probation.
may still apply for probation on remand of the case to the trial court.
Arnel appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), invoking self-defense and, alternatively, seeking
The Facts and the Case conviction for the lesser crime of attempted homicide with the consequent reduction of the penalty
imposed on him. The CA entirely affirmed the RTC decision but deleted the award for lost income in
The public prosecutor of Camarines Sur charged the accused Arnel Colinares (Arnel) with frustrated the absence of evidence to support it.3 Not satisfied, Arnel comes to this Court on petition for review.
homicide before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Jose, Camarines Sur, in Criminal Case T-
2213.1 In the course of its deliberation on the case, the Court required Arnel and the Solicitor General to
submit their respective positions on whether or not, assuming Arnel committed only the lesser crime
Complainant Rufino P. Buena (Rufino) testified that at around 7:00 in the evening on June 25, 2000, of attempted homicide with its imposable penalty of imprisonment of four months of arresto mayor,
he and Jesus Paulite (Jesus) went out to buy cigarettes at a nearby store. On their way, Jesus took a as minimum, to two years and four months of prision correccional, as maximum, he could still apply
leak by the roadside with Rufino waiting nearby. From nowhere, Arnel sneaked behind and struck for probation upon remand of the case to the trial court.
Rufino twice on the head with a huge stone, about 15 ½ inches in diameter. Rufino fell unconscious
as Jesus fled. Both complied with Arnel taking the position that he should be entitled to apply for probation in case
the Court metes out a new penalty on him that makes his offense probationable. The language and
Ananias Jallores (Ananias) testified that he was walking home when he saw Rufino lying by the spirit of the probation law warrants such a stand. The Solicitor General, on the other hand, argues that
roadside. Ananias tried to help but someone struck him with something hard on the right temple, under the Probation Law no application for probation can be entertained once the accused has
knocking him out. He later learned that Arnel had hit him. perfected his appeal from the judgment of conviction.

Paciano Alano (Paciano) testified that he saw the whole incident since he happened to be smoking The Issues Presented
outside his house. He sought the help of a barangay tanod and they brought Rufino to the hospital.
The case essentially presents three issues:
2
Dr. Albert Belleza issued a Medico-Legal Certificate showing that Rufino suffered two lacerated
wounds on the forehead, along the hairline area. The doctor testified that these injuries were serious 1. Whether or not Arnel acted in self-defense when he struck Rufino on the head with a
and potentially fatal but Rufino chose to go home after initial treatment. stone;

The defense presented Arnel and Diomedes Paulite (Diomedes). Arnel claimed self-defense. He 2. Assuming he did not act in self-defense, whether or not Arnel is guilty of frustrated
testified that he was on his way home that evening when he met Rufino, Jesus, and Ananias who were homicide; and
all quite drunk. Arnel asked Rufino where he supposed the Mayor of Tigaon was but, rather than
reply, Rufino pushed him, causing his fall. Jesus and Ananias then boxed Arnel several times on the 3. Given a finding that Arnel is entitled to conviction for a lower offense and a reduced
back. Rufino tried to stab Arnel but missed. The latter picked up a stone and, defending himself, probationable penalty, whether or not he may still apply for probation on remand of the
struck Rufino on the head with it. When Ananias saw this, he charged towards Arnel and tried to stab case to the trial court.
him with a gaff. Arnel was able to avoid the attack and hit Ananias with the same stone. Arnel then
fled and hid in his sister’s house. On September 4, 2000, he voluntarily surrendered at the Tigaon
Municipal Police Station. The Court’s Rulings

Diomedes testified that he, Rufino, Jesus, and Ananias attended a pre-wedding party on the night of One. Arnel claims that Rufino, Jesus, and Ananias attacked him first and that he merely acted in self-
the incident. His three companions were all drunk. On his way home, Diomedes saw the three defense when he hit Rufino back with a stone.
engaged in heated argument with Arnel.
When the accused invokes self-defense, he bears the burden of showing that he was legally justified
On July 1, 2005 the RTC rendered judgment, finding Arnel guilty beyond reasonable doubt of in killing the victim or inflicting injury to him. The accused must establish the elements of self-
frustrated homicide and sentenced him to suffer imprisonment from two years and four months of defense by clear and convincing evidence. When successful, the otherwise felonious deed would be
prision correccional, as minimum, to six years and one day of prision mayor, as maximum. Since the excused, mainly predicated on the lack of criminal intent of the accused. 4

81
In homicide, whether consummated, frustrated, or attempted, self-defense requires (1) that the person Thus, the prosecution must establish with certainty the nature, extent, depth, and severity of the
whom the offender killed or injured committed unlawful aggression; (2) that the offender employed victim’s wounds. While Dr. Belleza testified that "head injuries are always very serious," 12 he could
means that is reasonably necessary to prevent or repel the unlawful aggression; and (3) that the not categorically say that Rufino’s wounds in this case were "fatal." Thus:
person defending himself did not act with sufficient provocation. 5
Q: Doctor, all the injuries in the head are fatal?
If the victim did not commit unlawful aggression against the accused, the latter has nothing to A: No, all traumatic injuries are potentially treated.
prevent or repel and the other two requisites of self-defense would have no basis for being Q: But in the case of the victim when you treated him the wounds actually are not fatal on that very
appreciated. Unlawful aggression contemplates an actual, sudden, and unexpected attack or an day?
imminent danger of such attack. A mere threatening or intimidating attitude is not enough. The victim A: I could not say, with the treatment we did, prevent from becoming fatal. But on that case the
must attack the accused with actual physical force or with a weapon. 6 patient preferred to go home at that time.
Q: The findings also indicated in the medical certificate only refers to the length of the wound not the
Here, the lower courts found that Arnel failed to prove the element of unlawful aggression. He alone depth of the wound?
testified that Jesus and Ananias rained fist blows on him and that Rufino and Ananias tried to stab A: When you say lacerated wound, the entire length of the layer of scalp.
him. No one corroborated Arnel’s testimony that it was Rufino who started it. Arnel’s only other Q: So you could not find out any abrasion?
witness, Diomedes, merely testified that he saw those involved having a heated argument in the A: It is different laceration and abrasion so once the skin is broken up the label of the frontal lo[b]e,
middle of the street. Arnel did not submit any medical certificate to prove his point that he suffered we always call it lacerated wound, but in that kind of wound, we did not measure the depth. 13
injuries in the hands of Rufino and his companions.7 Indeed, Rufino had two lacerations on his forehead but there was no indication that his skull incurred
fracture or that he bled internally as a result of the pounding of his head. The wounds were not so
deep, they merely required suturing, and were estimated to heal in seven or eight days. Dr. Belleza
In contrast, the three witnesses—Jesus, Paciano, and Ananias—testified that Arnel was the aggressor. further testified:
Although their versions were mottled with inconsistencies, these do not detract from their core story. Q: So, in the medical certificate the wounds will not require surgery?
The witnesses were one in what Arnel did and when and how he did it. Compared to Arnel’s A: Yes, Madam.
testimony, the prosecution’s version is more believable and consistent with reality, hence deserving Q: The injuries are slight?
credence.8 A: 7 to 8 days long, what we are looking is not much, we give antibiotics and antit[e]tanus – the
problem the contusion that occurred in the brain.
Two. But given that Arnel, the accused, was indeed the aggressor, would he be liable for frustrated xxxx
homicide when the wounds he inflicted on Rufino, his victim, were not fatal and could not have Q: What medical intervention that you undertake?
resulted in death as in fact it did not? A: We give antibiotics, Your Honor, antit[e]tanus and suturing the wounds.
Q: For how many days did he stay in the hospital?
The main element of attempted or frustrated homicide is the accused’s intent to take his victim’s life. A: Head injury at least be observed within 24 hours, but some of them would rather go home and
The prosecution has to prove this clearly and convincingly to exclude every possible doubt regarding then come back.
homicidal intent.9 And the intent to kill is often inferred from, among other things, the means the Q: So the patient did not stay 24 hours in the hospital?
offender used and the nature, location, and number of wounds he inflicted on his victim. 10 A: No, Your Honor.
Q: Did he come back to you after 24 hours?
A: I am not sure when he came back for follow-up. 14
Here, Arnel struck Rufino on the head with a huge stone. The blow was so forceful that it knocked Taken in its entirety, there is a dearth of medical evidence on record to support the prosecution’s
Rufino out. Considering the great size of his weapon, the impact it produced, and the location of the claim that Rufino would have died without timely medical intervention. Thus, the Court finds Arnel
wounds that Arnel inflicted on his victim, the Court is convinced that he intended to kill him. liable only for attempted homicide and entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.

The Court is inclined, however, to hold Arnel guilty only of attempted, not frustrated, homicide. In Three. Ordinarily, Arnel would no longer be entitled to apply for probation, he having appealed from
Palaganas v. People,11 we ruled that when the accused intended to kill his victim, as shown by his use the judgment of the RTC convicting him for frustrated homicide.
of a deadly weapon and the wounds he inflicted, but the victim did not die because of timely medical
assistance, the crime is frustrated murder or frustrated homicide. If the victim’s wounds are not fatal,
the crime is only attempted murder or attempted homicide. But, the Court finds Arnel guilty only of the lesser crime of attempted homicide and holds that the
maximum of the penalty imposed on him should be lowered to imprisonment of four months of
arresto mayor, as minimum, to two years and four months of prision correccional, as maximum. With
this new penalty, it would be but fair to allow him the right to apply for probation upon remand of the
case to the RTC.
82
Some in the Court disagrees. They contend that probation is a mere privilege granted by the state Here, however, Arnel did not appeal from a judgment that would have allowed him to apply for
only to qualified convicted offenders. Section 4 of the probation law (PD 968) provides: "That no probation. He did not have a choice between appeal and probation. He was not in a position to say,
application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal "By taking this appeal, I choose not to apply for probation." The stiff penalty that the trial court
from the judgment of conviction."15 Since Arnel appealed his conviction for frustrated homicide, he imposed on him denied him that choice. Thus, a ruling that would allow Arnel to now seek probation
should be deemed permanently disqualified from applying for probation. under this Court’s greatly diminished penalty will not dilute the sound ruling in Francisco. It remains
that those who will appeal from judgments of conviction, when they have the option to try for
But, firstly, while it is true that probation is a mere privilege, the point is not that Arnel has the right probation, forfeit their right to apply for that privilege.
to such privilege; he certainly does not have. What he has is the right to apply for that privilege. The
Court finds that his maximum jail term should only be 2 years and 4 months. If the Court allows him Besides, in appealing his case, Arnel raised the issue of correctness of the penalty imposed on him.
to apply for probation because of the lowered penalty, it is still up to the trial judge to decide whether He claimed that the evidence at best warranted his conviction only for attempted, not frustrated,
or not to grant him the privilege of probation, taking into account the full circumstances of his case. homicide, which crime called for a probationable penalty. In a way, therefore, Arnel sought from the
beginning to bring down the penalty to the level where the law would allow him to apply for
Secondly, it is true that under the probation law the accused who appeals "from the judgment of probation.
conviction" is disqualified from availing himself of the benefits of probation. But, as it happens, two
judgments of conviction have been meted out to Arnel: one, a conviction for frustrated homicide by In a real sense, the Court’s finding that Arnel was guilty, not of frustrated homicide, but only of
the regional trial court, now set aside; and, two, a conviction for attempted homicide by the Supreme attempted homicide, is an original conviction that for the first time imposes on him a probationable
Court. penalty. Had the RTC done him right from the start, it would have found him guilty of the correct
offense and imposed on him the right penalty of two years and four months maximum.lavvphil This
If the Court chooses to go by the dissenting opinion’s hard position, it will apply the probation law on would have afforded Arnel the right to apply for probation.
Arnel based on the trial court’s annulled judgment against him. He will not be entitled to probation
because of the severe penalty that such judgment imposed on him. More, the Supreme Court’s The Probation Law never intended to deny an accused his right to probation through no fault of his.
judgment of conviction for a lesser offense and a lighter penalty will also have to bend over to the The underlying philosophy of probation is one of liberality towards the accused. Such philosophy is
trial court’s judgment—even if this has been found in error. And, worse, Arnel will now also be made not served by a harsh and stringent interpretation of the statutory provisions. 18 As Justice Vicente V.
to pay for the trial court’s erroneous judgment with the forfeiture of his right to apply for probation. Mendoza said in his dissent in Francisco, the Probation Law must not be regarded as a mere privilege
Ang kabayo ang nagkasala, ang hagupit ay sa kalabaw (the horse errs, the carabao gets the whip). to be given to the accused only where it clearly appears he comes within its letter; to do so would be
Where is justice there? to disregard the teaching in many cases that the Probation Law should be applied in favor of the
accused not because it is a criminal law but to achieve its beneficent purpose. 19
The dissenting opinion also expresses apprehension that allowing Arnel to apply for probation would
dilute the ruling of this Court in Francisco v. Court of Appeals16 that the probation law requires that One of those who dissent from this decision points out that allowing Arnel to apply for probation
an accused must not have appealed his conviction before he can avail himself of probation. But there after he appealed from the trial court’s judgment of conviction would not be consistent with the
is a huge difference between Francisco and this case. provision of Section 2 that the probation law should be interpreted to "provide an opportunity for the
reformation of a penitent offender." An accused like Arnel who appeals from a judgment convicting
In Francisco, the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Makati found the accused guilty of grave oral him, it is claimed, shows no penitence.
defamation and sentenced him to a prison term of one year and one day to one year and eight months
of prision correccional, a clearly probationable penalty. Probation was his to ask! Still, he chose to This may be true if the trial court meted out to Arnel a correct judgment of conviction. Here,
appeal, seeking an acquittal, hence clearly waiving his right to apply for probation. When the however, it convicted Arnel of the wrong crime, frustrated homicide, that carried a penalty in excess
acquittal did not come, he wanted probation. The Court would not of course let him. It served him of 6 years. How can the Court expect him to feel penitent over a crime, which as the Court now finds,
right that he wanted to save his cake and eat it too. He certainly could not have both appeal and he did not commit? He only committed attempted homicide with its maximum penalty of 2 years and
probation. 4 months.

The Probation Law, said the Court in Francisco, requires that an accused must not have appealed his Ironically, if the Court denies Arnel the right to apply for probation under the reduced penalty, it
conviction before he can avail himself of probation. This requirement "outlaws the element of would be sending him straight behind bars. It would be robbing him of the chance to instead undergo
speculation on the part of the accused—to wager on the result of his appeal—that when his reformation as a penitent offender, defeating the very purpose of the probation law.
conviction is finally affirmed on appeal, the moment of truth well-nigh at hand, and the service of his
sentence inevitable, he now applies for probation as an ‘escape hatch’ thus rendering nugatory the
appellate court’s affirmance of his conviction." 17
83
At any rate, what is clear is that, had the RTC done what was right and imposed on Arnel the correct
penalty of two years and four months maximum, he would have had the right to apply for probation.
No one could say with certainty that he would have availed himself of the right had the RTC done
right by him. The idea may not even have crossed his mind precisely since the penalty he got was not
probationable.

The question in this case is ultimately one of fairness. Is it fair to deny Arnel the right to apply for
probation when the new penalty that the Court imposes on him is, unlike the one erroneously
imposed by the trial court, subject to probation?

WHEREFORE, the Court PARTIALLY GRANTS the petition, MODIFIES the Decision dated July
31, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR 29639, FINDS petitioner Arnel Colinares GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of attempted homicide, and SENTENCES him to suffer an indeterminate
penalty from four months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two years and four months of prision
correccional, as maximum, and to pay Rufino P. Buena the amount of ₱20,000.00 as moral damages,
without prejudice to petitioner applying for probation within 15 days from notice that the record of
the case has been remanded for execution to the Regional Trial Court of San Jose, Camarines Sur, in
Criminal Case T-2213.

SO ORDERED.

(61) G.R. No. 108747 April 6, 1995

PABLO C. FRANCISCO, petitioner,


vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND THE HONORABLE MAXIMO C. CONTRERAS, respondents.

BELLOSILLO, J.:

84
Probation is a special privilege granted by the state to a penitent qualified offender. It essentially must have been uttered in the heat of anger which is a mitigating circumstance
rejects appeals and encourages an otherwise eligible convict to immediately admit his liability and analogous to passion or obfuscation.2
save the state of time, effort and expenses to jettison an appeal. The law expressly requires that an
accused must not have appealed his conviction before he can avail of probation. This outlaws the Accordingly, petitioner was sentenced "in each case to a STRAIGHT penalty of EIGHT (8)
element of speculation on the part of the accused — to wager on the result of his appeal — that when MONTHS imprisonment . . . . "3 After he failed to interpose an appeal therefrom the decision.of the
his conviction is finally affirmed on appeal, the moment of truth well-nigh at hand, and the service of RTC became final. The case was then set for execution of judgment by the MeTC which, as a
his sentence inevitable, he now applies for probation as an "escape hatch" thus rendering nugatory the consequence, issued a warrant of arrest. But·before he could be arrested petitioner filed an
appellate court's affirmance of his conviction. Consequently, probation should be availed of at the application for probation which the MeTC denied "in the light of the ruling of the Supreme Court in
first opportunity by convicts who are willing to be reformed and rehabilitated, who manifest Llamado v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No, 84850, 29 June 1989, 174 SCRA 566 . . . ."4
spontaneity, contrition and remorse.
Forthwith he went to the Court of Appeals on certiorari which on 2 July 1992 dismissed his petition
As conceptualized, is petitioner entitled to probation within the purview of P.D. 968, as amended by on the following grounds —
P.D. 1257 and P.D. 1990?
Initially, the Court notes that the petitioner has failed to comply with the
Petitioner's woes started when as President and General Manager of ASPAC Trans. Company he provisions of Supreme Court Circular No. 28-91 of September 4, 1991. Violation
failed to control his outburst and blurted — of the circular is sufficient cause for dismissal of the petition.

You employees in this office are all tanga, son of a bitches (sic), bullshit. Puro Secondly, the petitioner does not allege anywhere in the petition that he had
kayo walang utak . . . . Mga anak ng puta . . . . Magkano ba kayo . . . God damn asked the respondent court to reconsider its above order; in fact, he had failed to
you all. give the court an.opportunity to correct itself if it had, in fact, committed any
error on the matter. He is, however, required to move for reconsideration of the
Thus for humiliating his employees he was accused of multiple grave oral defamation in five (5) questioned order before filing a petition for certiorari (Sy It v. Tiangco, 4 SCRA
separate Informations instituted by five (5) of his employees, each Information charging him with 436). This failure is fatal to his cause. It is a ground for dismissal of his petition
gravely maligning them on four different days, i.e., from 9 to 12 April 1980. (Santos v. Vda. de Cerdenola, 5 SCRA 823; Acquiao v. Estenso, 14 SCRA 18;
Del Pilar Transit, Inc. v. Public Service Commission, 31-SCRA 372).
On 2 January 1990, after nearly ten (10) years, the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati, Br. 61, found
petitioner guilty of grave oral defamation in four (4) of the five (5) cases filed against him, i.e., Crim. Thirdly, it is obvious that respondent court did not commit any capricious,
Cases Nos. 105206, 105207, 105209 and 105210, sentenced him to a prison term of one (1) year and arbitrary, despotic or whimsical exercise of power in denying the petitioner's
one (l) day to one (1) year and eight (8) months of prision correccional "in each crime committed on application for probation . . . .
each date of each case, as alleqed in the information(s)," ordered him to indemnify each of the
offended parties, Victoria Gatchalian, Rowena Ruiz, Linda Marie Ayala Pigar and Marie Solis, Fourthly, the petition for probation was filed by the petitioner out of time . . . .
P10,000.00 as exemplary damages, and P5,000.00 for attorney's fees, plus costs of suit.1 He was
however acquitted in Crim. Case No. 105208 for persistent failure of the offended party, Edgar
Colindres, to appear and testify. Fifthly, the Court notes that Section 4 of PD 968 allows the trial court to grant probation after
conviction, upon an application by the defendant within the period of appeal, upon terms and
conditions and period appropriate to each case, but expressly rules out probation where an appeal has
Not satisfied with the Decision of the MeTC, and insisting on his innocence, petitioner elevated his been taken . . . . 5
case to the Regional Trial Court.
The motion for reconsideration was likewise denied.
On 5 August 1991 the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Br. 59, affirmed his conviction but appreciated
in his favor a mitigating circumstance analogous to passion or obfuscation. Thus —
In the present recourse, petitioner squirms out of each ground and seeks this Court's compassion in
dispensing with the minor technicalities which may militate against his petition as he now argues
. . . (he) was angry and shouting when he uttered the defamatory words before us that he has not yet lost his right to avail of probation notwithstanding his appeal from the
complained of . . . . he must have been angry and worried "about some missing MeTC to the RTC since "[t]he reason for his appeal was precisely to enable him to avail himself of
documents . . . as well as the letter of the Department of Tourism advising the benefits of the Probation Law because the original Decision of the (Metropolitan) Trial Court was
ASPAC about its delinquent tax of P1.2 million . . . . " the said defamatory words such that he would not then be entitled to probation." 6 He contends that "he appealed from the
85
judgment of the trial court precisely for the purpose of reducing the penalties imposed upon him by The Court is not here to be understood as giving a "strict interpretation" rather
the said court to enable him to qualify for probation." 7 than a "liberal" one to Section 4 of the Probation Law of 1976 as amended by
P.D. No. 1990. "Strict" and "liberal" are adjectives which too frequently impede a
The central issue therefore is whether petitioneris still qualified to avail of probation even after disciplined and principled search for the meaning which the law-making
appealing his conviction to the RTC which affirmed the MeTC except with regard to the duration of authority projected when it promulgated the language which we must apply. That
the penalties imposed. meaning is clearly visible in the text of Section 4, as plain and unmistakable as
the nose on a man's face. The Courtis simply·reading Section 4 as it is in fact
written. There is no need for the involved process of construction that petitioner
Petitioner is no longer eligible for probation. invites us to engage in, a process made necessary only because petitioner rejects
the conclusion or meaning which shines through the words of the statute. The
First. Probation is a mere privilege, not a right. 8 Its benefits cannot extend to those not expressly first duty of the judge is to take and apply a statute as he finds it, not as he would
included. Probation is not a right of an accused, but rather an act of grace and clemency or immunity like·it to be. Otherwise, as this Court in Yangco v. Court of First Instance warned,
conferred by the state which may be granted by the court to a seemingly deserving defendant who confusion and uncertainty will surely follow, making, we might add, stability and
thereby escapes the extreme rigors of the penalty imposed by law for the offense of which he stands continuity in the law much more difficult to achieve:
convicted. 9 It is a special prerogative granted by law to a person or group of persons not enjoyed by
others or by all. Accordingly, the grant of probation rests solely upon the discretion of the court . . . [w]here language is plain, subtle refinements which tinge
which is to be exercised primarily for the benefit of organized society, and only incidentally for the words as to give them the color of a particular judicial theory
benefit of the accused.10 The Probation Law should not therefore be permitted to divest the state or are not only unnecessary but decidedly harmful. That which
its government of any of the latter's prerogatives, rights or remedies, unless the intention of the has caused so much confusion in the law, which has made it
legislature to this end is clearly expressed, and no person should benefit from the terms of the law so difficult for the public to understand and know what the
who is not clearly within them. law is with respect to a given matter, is in considerable
measure the unwarranted interference by judicial tribunals
Neither Sec. 4 of the Probation Law, as amended, which clearly mandates that "no application for with the English language as found in statutes and contracts,
probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment cutting the words here and inserting them there, making them
of conviction," nor Llamado v. Court of Appeals 11 which interprets the quoted provision, offers any fit personal ideas of what the legislature ought to have done
ambiguity or qualification. As such, the application of the law should not be subjected to any to suit or what parties should have agreed upon, giving them
the case of petitioner. While the proposition that an appeal should not bar the accused from applying meanings which they do not ordinarily have cutting,
for probation if the appealis solely to reduce the penalty to within the probationable limit may be trimming, fitting, changing and coloring until lawyers
equitable, we are not yet prepared to accept this interpretation under existing law and jurisprudence. themselves are unable to advise their clients as to the
Accordingly, we quote Mr. Justice Feliciano speaking for the Court en banc in Llamado v. Court of meaning of a given statute or contract until it has been
Appeals— submitted to some court for its interpretation and
construction.
. . . we note at the outset that Probation Law is not a penal statute. We, however,
understand petitioner's argument to be really that any statutory language that The point in this warning may be expected to become sharper as our people's
appears to favor the accused in acriminal case should be given.a "liberal grasp of English is steadily attenuated. 12
interpretation." Courts . . . have no authority to invoke "liberal interpretation" or
"the spirit of the law" where the words of the statute themselves, and·as Therefore, that an appeal should not·bar the accused from applying for probation if the appeal is
illuminated by the history of that statute, leave no room for doubt or taken solely to reduce the penalty is simply contrary to the clear and express mandate of Sec, 4 of the
interpretation. We do not believe that "the spirit of·the law" may legitimately be Probation Law, as amended, which opens with a negativeclause, "no application for probation shall
invoked to set at naught words which have a clear and definite meaning imparted be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction."
to them by our procedural law. The "true legislative intent" must obviously be In Bersabal v. Salvador, 13 we said —
given effect by judges and all others who are charged with the application and
implementation of a statute. It is absolutely essential to bear in mind, however,
that the spirit of the law and the intent that is to be given effect are derived from By its very language, the Rule is mandatory. Under the rule of statutory
the words actually used by the law-maker, and not from some external, mystical construction. negative words and phrases are to be regarded as mandatory while
or metajuridical source independent of and transcending the words of the those in the affirmative are merely directory. . . . the use of the term "shall"
legislature.
86
further emphasizes its mandatory character and means that it is imperative, Petitioner thus proceeds on an erroneous assumption that under the MeTC Decision he could not
operating to impose a duty which may be enforced. have availed of the benefits of probation. Since he could have, although he did not, his appeal now
precludes him from applying for probation.
And where the law does not distinguish the courts should not distinguish; where the law does not
make exception the court should not except. And, even if we go along with the premise of petitioner, however erroneous it may be, that the
penalties imposed against him should be summed up, still he would not have qualified under the
Second. At the outset, the penalties imposed by the MeTC were already probationable. Hence, there Decision rendered by the RTC since if the "STRAIGHT penalty of EIGHT (8) MONTHS
was no need to appeal if only to reduce the penalties to within the probationable period. Multiple imprisonment" imposed by the RTC is multiplied sixteen (16) times, the total imposable penalty
prison terms imposed against an accused found guilty of several offenses in one decision are not, and would be ten (10) years and eight (8) months, which is still way beyond the limit of not more than six
should not be, added up. And, the sum of the multiple prison terms imposed against an applicant (6) years provided for in the Probation Law, as amended. To illustrate: 8 months multiplied by 16
should not be determinative of his eligibility for, nay his disqualification from, probation. The cases = 128 months; 128 months divided by 12 months (in a year) = 10 years and 8 months, hence,
multiple prison terms are distinct from each other, and if none of the terms exceeds the limit set out in following his argument, petitioner cannot still be eligible for probation as the total of his penalties
the Probation Law,i.e., not more than six (6) years, then he is entitled to probation, unless he is exceeds six (6) years.
otherwise specifically disqualified. The number of offenses is immaterial as long as all the penalties
imposed, taken separately, are within the probationable period. For, Sec. 9, par. (a), P.D. 968, as The assertion that the Decision of the RTC should be multiplied only four (4) times since there are
amended, uses the word maximum not total when it says that "[t]he benefits of this Decree shall not only four (4) Informations thereby allowing petitioner to qualify for probation, instead of sixteen (16)
be extended to those . . . . sentenced to serve a maximum term of imprisonment of more than six times, is quite difficult to understand. The penalties imposed by the MeTC cannot be any clearer —
years." Evidently, the law does not intend to sum up the penalties imposed but to take each penalty "one (1) year and one (1) day to one (1) year and eight (8) months of prision correccional, in each
separately and distinctly with the others. Consequently, even if petitioner was supposed to have crime committed on each date of each case, as alleged in the information(s). "Hence, petitioner
served his prison term of one (1) year and one (1) day to one (1) year and eight (8) months of prision should suffer the imposed penalties sixteen (16) times. On the other hand, the RTC affirmed, the
correccional sixteen (16) times as he was sentenced to serve the prison term for "each crime judgment of conviction and merely reduced the duration of each penalty imposed by the MeTC "in
committed on each date of each case, as alleged in the information(s)," and in each of the four (4) each case to a STRAIGHT penalty of EIGHT (8) MONTHS imprisonment" on account of a
informations, he was charged with.having defamed the four (4) private complainants on four (4) mitigating circumstance for each case, count or incident of grave oral defamation·There is no valid
different, separate days, he was still·eligible for probation, as each prison term imposed on petitioner reason therefore why the penalties imposed by the RTC should be multiplied only four (4) times, and
was probationable. not sixteen (16) times, considering that the RTC merely affirmed the MeTC as regards the culpability
of petitioner in each of the sixteen (16) cases and reducing only the duration of the penalties imposed
Fixing the cut-off point at a maximum term of six (6) years imprisonment for probation is based on therein. Thus —
the assumption that those sentenced to higher penalties pose too great a risk to society, not just
because of their demonstrated capability for serious wrong doing but because of the gravity and Premises considered, the judgment of conviction rendered by the trial court is
serious consequences of the offense they might further commit. 14 The Probation Law, as amended, AFFIRMED with modification, as follows:
disqualifies only those who have been convicted of grave felonies as defined in Art. 9 in relation to
Art. 25 of The Revised Penal Code, 15 and not necessarily those who have been convicted of WHEREFORE, the Court hereby finds the accused Pablo C. Francisco GUILTY
multiple offenses in a single proceeding who are deemed to be less perverse. Hence, the basis of the beyond reasonable doubt in each of the above entitled cases and appreciating in
disqualification is principally the gravity of the offense committed and the concomitant degree of his favor the mitigating circumstance which is analogous to passion or
penalty imposed. Those sentenced to a maximum term not exceeding six (6) years are not generally obfuscation, the Court hereby sentences the said accused in each case to a straight
considered callous, hard core criminals, and thus may avail of probation. penalty of EIGHT (8) MONTHS imprisonment, with the accessory penalties
prescribed by law; and to pay the costs. 16
To demonstrate the point, let ustake for instance one who is convicted in a single decision of, say,
thirteen (13) counts of grave oral defamation (for having defamed thirteen [13] individuals in one Nowhere in the RTC Decision is it stated or even hinted at that the accused was acquitted or absolved
outburst) and sentenced to a total prison term of thirteen (13) years, and another who has been found in any of the four (4) counts under each of the four (4) Informatfons, or that any part of thejudgment
guilty of mutilation and sentenced to six (6) years and one (l) day of prision mayor minimum as of conviction was reversed, or that any of the cases, counts or incidents was dismissed. Otherwise, we
minimum to twelve (l2) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal minimum as maximuin. will have to account for the twelve (12) other penalties imposed by the MeTC. Can we? What is clear
Obviously, the latter offender is more perverse and is disqualified from availing of probation. is that the judgment of conviction rendered by the was affirmed with the sole modification on the
duration of the penalties.

87
In fine, considering that the multiple prison terms should not be summed up but taken separately as Rule 21 and he can be validly convicted, as in the instant case, of as many crimes charged in the
the totality of all the penalties is not the test, petitioner should have immediately filed an application Information.
for probation as he was already qualified after being convicted by the MeTC, if indeed thereafter he
felt humbled, was ready to unconditionally accept the verdict of the court and admit his liability. Fourth. The application for probation was filed way beyond the period allowed by law. This is vital
Consequently, in appealing the Decision of the MeTC to the RTC, petitioner lost his right to way beyond the period allowed by law and crucial. From the records it is clear that the application for
probation. For, plainly, the law considers appeal and probation mutually exclusive remedies. 17 probation was filed "only after a warrant for the arrest of petitioner had been issued . . . (and) almost
two months after (his) receipt of the Decision" 22 of the RTC. This is a significant fact which
Third. Petitioner appealed to the RTC not to reduce or even correct the penalties imposed by the militates against the instant petition. We quote with affirmance the well-written, albeit assailed,
MeTC, but to assert his innocence. Nothing more. The cold fact is that petitioner appealed his ponencia of now Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals Nathanael P. De Pano, Jr., on the specific
conviction to the RTC not for the sole purpose of reducing his penalties to make him eligible for issue —
probation — since he was already qualified under the MeTC Decision — but rather to insist on his
innocence. The appeal record is wanting of any other purpose. Thus, in his Memorandum before the . . . the petition for probation was filed by the petitioner out of time. The law in
RTC, he raised only three (3) statements of error purportedly committed by the MeTC all aimed at his point, Section 4 of P.D. 968, as amended, provides thus:
acquittal: (a) in finding that the guilt of the accused has been established because of his positive
identification by the witness for the prosecution; (b) in giving full faith and credence to the bare
statements of the private complainants despite the absence of corroborating testimonies; and, (c)in Sec. 4. Grant of Probation. — Subject to the provisions of
not acquitting him in all the cases," 18 Consequently, petitioner insisted that the trial court committed this Decree, the trial court may, after it shall have convicted
an error in relying on his positive identification considering that private complainants could not have and sentenced a defendant, and upon application by said
missed identifying him who was their President and General Manager with whom they worked for a defendant within the period for perfecting an appeal. . . .
good number of years. Petitioner further argued that although the alleged defamatory words were place the defendant on probation . . . .
uttered in the presence of other persons, mostly private complainants, co-employees and clients, not
one of them was presented as a witness. Hence, according to petitioner, the trial court could not have Going to the extreme, and assuming that an application for probation from one
convicted him on the basis of the uncorroborative testimony of private complainants. 19 who had appealed the trial court's judgment is allowed by law, the petitioner's
plea for probation was filed out of time. In the petition is a clear statement that
Certainly, the protestations of petitioner connote profession of guiltlessness, if not complete the petitioner was up for execution of judgment before he filed his application for
innocence, and do not simply put in issue the propriety of the penalties imposed. For sure, the probation. P.D. No. 968 says that the application for probation must be filed
accused never manifested that he was appealing only for the purpose of correcting a wrong penalty "within the period for perfecting an appeal;" but in this case, such period for
— to reduce it to within the probationable range. Hence, upon interposing an appeal, more so after appeal had passed, meaning to say that the Regional Trial Court's decision had
asserting his innocence therein, petitioner should be precluded from seeking probation. By perfecting attained finality, and no appeal therefrom was possible under the law. Even
his appeal, petitioner ipso facto relinquished his alternative remedy of availing of the Probation Law granting that an appeal from the appellate court's judgment is contemplated by
the purpose of which is simply to prevent speculation or opportunism on the part of an accused who P.D. 968, in addition to the judgment rendered by the trial court, that appellate
although already eligible does not at once apply for probation, but doing so only after failing in his judgment had become final and was, in fact, up for actual execution before the
appeal. application for probation was attempted by the petitioner. The petitioner did not
file his application for probation before the finality of the said judgment;
therefore, the petitioner's attempt at probation was filed too late.
The fact that petitioner did not elevate the affirmance of his conviction by the RTC to the Court of
Appeals does not necessarily mean that his appeal to the RTC was solely to reduce his penalties.
Conversely, he was afraid that the Court of Appeals would increase his penalties, which could be Our minds cannot simply rest easy on. the proposition that an application for probation may yet be
worse for him. Besides, the RTC Decision had already become final and executory because of the granted even if it was filed only after judgment has become final, the conviction already set for
negligence, according to him, of his former counsel who failed to seek possible remedies within the execution and a warrant of arrest issued for service of sentence.
period allowed by law.
The argument that petitioner had to await the remand of the case to the MeTC, which necessarily
Perhaps it should be mentioned that at the outset petitioner, in accordance with Sec 3, par. (e), Rule must be after the decision of the RTC had become final, for him to file the application for probation
117 of the Rules of Court, 20 should have moved to quash as each of the four (4) Informations filed with the trial court, is to stretch the law beyond comprehension. The law, simply, does not allow
against him charged four (4) separate crimes of grave oral defamation, committed on four (4) probation after an appeal has been perfected.
separate days. His failure to do so however may now be deemed a waiver under Sec. 8 of the same

88
Accordingly, considering that prevailing jurisprudence treats appeal and probation as mutually
exclusive remedies, and petitioner appealed from his conviction by the MeTC although the imposed
penalties were already probationable, and in his appeal, he asserted only his innocence and did not
even raise the issue of the propriety of the penalties imposed on him, and finally, he filed an
application for probation outside the period for perfecting an appeal granting he was otherwise
eligible for probation, the instant petition for review should be as it is hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin and Regalado, JJ., concur.

(63) G.R. No. 182239 March 16, 2011

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,


vs.
HERMIE M. JACINTO, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION
89
PEREZ, J.: FFF and appellant have been neighbors since they were born. FFF’s house is along the road. That of
appellant lies at the back approximately 80 meters from FFF. To access the road, appellant has to pass
Once again, we recite the time-honored principle that the defense of alibi cannot prevail over the by FFF’s house, the frequency of which the latter describes to be "every minute [and] every hour."
victim’s positive identification of the accused as the perpetrator of the crime. 1 For it to prosper, the Also, appellant often visits FFF because they were close friends. He bore no grudge against appellant
court must be convinced that there was physical impossibility on the part of the accused to have been prior to the incident.13
at the locus criminis at the time of the commission of the crime. 2
AAA likewise knows appellant well. She usually calls him kuya. She sees him all the time – playing
Nevertheless, a child in conflict with the law, whose judgment of conviction has become final and at the basketball court near her house, fetching water, and passing by her house on his way to the
executory only after his disqualification from availing of the benefits of suspended sentence on the road. She and appellant used to be friends until the incident. 14
ground that he/she has exceeded the age limit of twenty-one (21) years, shall still be entitled to the
right to restoration, rehabilitation, and reintegration in accordance with Republic Act No. 9344, At about past 6 o’clock in the evening of 28 January 2003, FFF sent his eight-year-old daughter CCC
otherwise known as "An Act Establishing a Comprehensive Juvenile Justice and Welfare System, to the store of Rudy Hatague to buy cigarettes. AAA followed CCC. When CCC returned without
Creating the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Council under the Department of Justice, Appropriating AAA, FFF was not alarmed. He thought she was watching television at the house of her aunt Rita
Funds Therefor and for Other Purposes." Lingcay [Rita].15

Convicted for the rape of five-year-old AAA,3 appellant Hermie M. Jacinto seeks before this Court Julito went to the same store at around 6:20 in the evening to buy a bottle of Tanduay Rum. 16 At the
the reversal of the judgment of his conviction.4 store, he saw appellant place AAA on his lap.17 He was wearing sleeveless shirt and a pair of short
pants.18 All of them left the store at the same time. 19 Julito proceeded to the house of Rita to watch
The Facts television, while appellant, who held the hand of AAA, went towards the direction of the "lower area
or place."20
In an Information dated 20 March 20035 filed with the Regional Trial Court and docketed as Criminal
Case No. 1679-13-141[1],6 appellant was accused of the crime of RAPE allegedly committed as AAA recalled that appellant was wearing a chaleko (sando) and a pair of short pants21 when he held
follows: her hand while on the road near the store.22 They walked towards the rice field near the house of
spouses Alejandro and Gloria Perocho [the Perochos].23 There he made her lie down on harrowed
ground, removed her panty and boxed her on the chest.24 Already half-naked from waist down,25 he
That on or about the 28th day of January, 2003 at about 7:00 o’clock in the evening more or less, at mounted her, and, while her legs were pushed apart, pushed his penis into her vagina and made a
barangay xxx, municipality of xxx, province of xxx and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable push and pull movement.26 She felt pain and cried.27 Afterwards, appellant left and proceeded to the
Court, [Hermie M. Jacinto], with lewd design did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously Perochos.28 She, in turn, went straight home crying.29
had carnal knowledge with one AAA, a five-year old minor child.
FFF heard AAA crying and calling his name from downstairs.30 She was without slippers.31 He found
CONTRARY TO LAW, with the qualifying/aggravating circumstance of minority, the victim being her face greasy.32 There was mud on her head and blood was oozing from the back of her head. 33 He
only five years old.7 checked for any injury and found on her neck a contusion that was already turning black. 34 She had
no underwear on and he saw white substance and mud on her vagina. 35 AAA told him that appellant
On 15 July 2003, appellant entered a plea of not guilty. 8 During pre-trial,9 the defense admitted the brought her from the store36 to the grassy area at the back of the house of the Perochos; 37 that he
existence of the following documents: (1) birth certificate of AAA, showing that she was born on 3 threw away her pair of slippers, removed her panty, choked her and boxed her breast; 38 and that he
December 1997; (2) police blotter entry on the rape incident; and (3) medical certificate, upon proceeded thereafter to the Perochos.39
presentation of the original or upon identification thereof by the physician.
True enough, FFF found appellant at the house of the Perochos.40 He asked the appellant what he did
Trial ensued with the prosecution and the defense presenting witnesses to prove their respective to AAA.41 Appellant replied that he was asked to buy rum at the store and that AAA followed him. 42
versions of the story. FFF went home to check on his daughter,43 afterwhich, he went back to appellant, asked again, 44 and
boxed him.45
Evidence for the Prosecution
Meanwhile, at around 7:45 in the evening of even date, Julito was still watching television at the
The testimonies of AAA,10 her father FFF,11 and rebuttal witness Julito Apiki [Julito]12 may be house of Rita.46 AAA and her mother MMM arrived.47 AAA was crying.48 Julito pitied her, embraced
summarized in the following manner: her, and asked what happened to her, to which she replied that appellant raped her. 49 Julito left and

90
found appellant at the Perochos.50 Julito asked appellant, "Bads, did you really rape the child, the Evidence for the Defense
daughter of [MMM]?" but the latter ignored his question. 51 Appellant’s aunt, Gloria, told appellant
that the policemen were coming to which the appellant responded, "Wait a minute because I will Interposing the defense of alibi, appellant gave a different version of the story. To corroborate his
wash the dirt of my elbow (sic) and my knees."52 Julito did found the elbows and knees of appellant testimony, Luzvilla Balucan [Luzvilla] and his aunt Gloria took the witness stand to affirm that he
with dirt.53 was at the Perochos at the time of the commission of the crime. 60 Luzvilla even went further to state
that she actually saw Julito, not appellant, pick up AAA on the road. 61 In addition, Antonia Perocho
On that same evening, FFF and AAA proceeded to the police station to have the incident blottered. 54 [Antonia], sister-in-law of appellant’s aunt, Gloria,62 testified on the behavior of Julito after the rape
FFF also had AAA undergo a physical check up at the municipal health center. 55 Dr. Bernardita M. incident was revealed.63
Gaspar, M.D., Rural Health Physician, issued a medical certificate 56 dated 29 January 2003. It reads:
Appellant claimed that he lives with his aunt, not with his parents whose house stands at the back of
Injuries seen are as follows: FFF’s house.64 He denied that there was a need to pass by the house of FFF in order to access the road
or to fetch water.65 He, however, admitted that he occasionally worked for FFF, 66 and whenever he
1. Multiple abrasions with erythema along the neck area. was asked to buy something from the store, AAA always approached him. 67

2. Petechial hemorrhages on both per-orbital areas. At about 8 o’clock in the morning of 28 January 2003, appellant went to the Perochos to attend a
birthday party. At 6:08 in the evening, while the visitors, including appellant and his uncle Alejandro
Perocho [Alejandro], were gathered together in a drinking session, appellant’s uncle sent him to the
3. Hematoma over the left upper arm, lateral area store to buy Tanduay Rum. Since the store is only about 20 meters from the house, he was able to
return after three (3) minutes. He was certain of the time because he had a watch . 68
4. Hematoma over the upper anterior chest wall, midclavicular line
Appellant’s aunt, Gloria, the lady of the house, confirmed that he was in her house attending the
5. Abrasion over the posterior trunk, paravertebral area birthday party; and that appellant went out between 6 and 7 in the evening to buy a bottle of Tanduay
from the store. She recalled that appellant was back around five (5) minutes later. She also observed
6. Genital and peri-anal area soiled with debris and whitish mucoid-like material that appellant’s white shorts and white sleeveless shirt were clean. 69

7. Introitus is erythematous with minimal bleeding At 6:30 in the evening,70 Luzvilla, who was also at the party, saw appellant at the kitchen having a
drink with his uncle Alejandro and the rest of the visitors. 71 She went out to relieve herself at the side
of the tree beside the road next to the house of the Perochos. 72 From where she was, she saw Julito,
8. Hymenal lacerations at the 5 o’clock and 9 o’clock position who was wearing black short pants and black T-shirt, carry AAA. 73 AAA’s face was covered and she
was wiggling.74 This did not alarm her because she thought it was just a game. 75 Meanwhile, appellant
Impression was still in the kitchen when she returned.76 Around three (3) minutes later, Luzvilla saw Julito, now
in a white T-shirt,77 running towards the house of Rita.78 AAA was slowly following behind.79
Luzvilla followed them.80 Just outside the house, Julito embraced AAA and asked what the appellant
MULTIPLE SOFT TISSUE INJURIES
did to her.81 The child did not answer.82

HYMENAL LACERATIONS
Luzvilla also followed FFF to the Perochos. She witnessed the punching incident and testified that
appellant was twice boxed by FFF. According to her, FFF tapped the left shoulder of the appellant,
57
Upon the recommendation of Dr. Gaspar, AAA submitted herself to another examination at the boxed him, and left. FFF came in the second time and again boxed appellant. This time, he had a bolo
provincial hospital on the following day. Dr. Christine Ruth B. Micabalo, Medical Officer III of the pointed at appellant. Appellant’s uncle Alejandro, a barangay councilor, and another Civilian
provincial hospital, attended to her and issued a medico-legal certificate dated 29 January 2003, 58 the Voluntary Organization (CVO) member admonished FFF.83
pertinent portion of which reads:
On sur-rebuttal, Antonia testified that, at 7 o’clock in the evening, she was watching the television
P.E. = Findings is consistent with Dr. Bernardita M. Gaspar findings except No. 6 and 7 there is no along with other people at the house of Rita. Around 7:10, Julito, who was wearing only a pair of
bleeding in this time of examination. (sic)59 black short pants without a shirt on, entered the house drunk. He paced back and forth. After 10

91
minutes, AAA came in crying. Julito tightly embraced AAA and asked her what happened. AAA did OF RAPE"95 by invoking the principle that "if the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of
not answer. Upon Antonia’s advice, Julito released her and went out of the house. 84 two or more reasonable explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused
and the other with his guilt, then the evidence does not pass the test of moral certainty and will not
Appellant further testified that at past 7 o’clock in the evening, FFF arrived, pointed a finger at him, suffice to support a conviction."96
brandished a bolo, and accused him of molesting AAA. FFF left but returned at around 8 o’clock in
the evening. This time, he boxed appellant and asked again why he molested his daughter. 85 Our Ruling

On 26 March 2004, the Regional Trial Court rendered its decision, 86 the dispositive portion of which We sustain the judgment of conviction.
reads:
In the determination of the innocence or guilt of a person accused of rape, we consider the three well-
WHEREFORE, finding accused Hermie M. Jacinto guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape entrenched principles:
committed upon a 5-year old girl, the court sentences him to death and orders him to pay [AAA]
P75,000.000 as rape indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages. With costs 87 (1) an accusation for rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove but more difficult for the
accused, though innocent, to disprove; (2) in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape in which
The defense moved to reopen trial for reception of newly discovered evidence stating that appellant only two persons are usually involved, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with
was apparently born on 1 March 1985 and that he was only seventeen (17) years old when the crime extreme caution; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits, and
was committed on 28 January 2003.88 The trial court appreciated the evidence and reduced the cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense. 97
penalty from death to reclusion perpetua.89 Thus:
Necessarily, the credible, natural, and convincing testimony of the victim may be sufficient to convict
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the court imposing the death penalty upon the accused is amended in the accused.98 More so, when the testimony is supported by the medico-legal findings of the
order to consider the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority. The penalty impos[a]ble upon examining physician.99
the accused, therefore[,] is reduced to reclusion perpetua. xxx
Further, the defense of alibi cannot prevail over the victim’s positive identification of the perpetrator
Appealed to this Court, the case was transferred to the Court of Appeals for its disposition in view of of the crime,100 except when it is established that it was physically impossible for the accused to have
the ruling in People v. Mateo and the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court allowing an intermediate been at the locus criminis at the time of the commission of the crime. 101
review by the Court of Appeals of cases where the penalty imposed is death, reclusion perpetua, or
life imprisonment.90 I

On 29 August 2007, the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED the decision of the trial court with the A man commits rape by having carnal knowledge of a child under twelve (12) years of age even in
following MODIFICATIONS: the absence of any of the following circumstances: (a) through force, threat or intimidation; (b) when
the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or (c) by means of fraudulent
xxx that Hermie M. Jacinto should suffer the Indeterminate penalty of from six (6) years and one (1) machination or grave abuse of authority.102
day to twelve (12) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) and four (4) months of
reclusion temporal, as maximum. Appellant Hermie M. Jacinto is ordered to indemnify the victim in That the crime of rape has been committed is certain. The vivid narration of the acts culminating in
the sum of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P25,000.00 as the insertion of appellant’s organ into the vagina of five-year-old AAA and the medical findings of
exemplary damages and to pay the costs.91 the physicians sufficiently proved such fact.

On 19 November 2007, the Court of Appeals gave due course to the appellant’s Notice of Appeal. 92 AAA testified:
This Court required the parties to simultaneously file their respective supplemental briefs. 93 Both PROS. OMANDAM:
parties manifested that they have exhaustively discussed their positions in their respective briefs and xxxx
would no longer file any supplement.94 Q You said Hermie laid you on the ground, removed your panty and boxed you, what else
did he do to you?
Before the Court of Appeals, appellant argued that "THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN A He mounted me.
CONVICTING HEREIN ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT Q When Hermie mounted you, was he facing you?
92
A Yes. We see no reason to disturb the findings of the trial court on the unwavering testimony of AAA.
Q When he mounted you what did he do, did he move?
A He moved his ass, he made a push and pull movement. The certainty of the child, unusually intelligent for one so young, that it was accused, whom she
Q When he made a push and pull movement, how were your legs positioned? called "kuya" and who used to play basketball and fetch water near their house, and who was wearing
A They were apart. a sleeveless shirt and shorts at the time he raped her, was convincing and persuasive. The defense
Q Who pushed them apart? attempted to impute the crime to someone else – one Julito Apiki, but the child, on rebuttal, was
A Hermie. steadfast and did not equivocate, asserting that it was accused who is younger, and not Julito, who is
Q Did Hermie push anything at you? older, who molested her.112
A Yes.
Q What was that?
A His penis. In a long line of cases, this Court has consistently ruled that the determination by the trial court of the
Q Where did he push his penis? credibility of the witnesses deserves full weight and respect considering that it has "the opportunity to
A To my vagina. observe the witnesses’ manner of testifying, their furtive glances, calmness, sighs and the scant or full
Q Was it painful? realization of their oath,"113 unless it is shown that material facts and circumstances have been
A Yes. "ignored, overlooked, misconstrued, or misinterpreted."114
Q What was painful?
A My vagina. Further, as correctly observed by the trial court:
Q Did you cry?
A Yes.103 xxx His and his witness’ attempt to throw the court off the track by imputing the crime to someone
The straightforward and consistent answers to the questions, which were phrased and re-phrased in else is xxx a vain exercise in view of the private complainant’s positive identification of accused and
order to test that AAA well understood the information elicited from her, said it all – she had been other corroborative circumstances. Accused also admitted that on the same evening, Julito Apiki, the
raped. When a woman, more so a minor, says so, she says in effect all that is essential to show that supposed real culprit, asked him "What is this incident, Pare?", thus corroborating the latter’s
rape was committed.104 Significantly, youth and immaturity are normally badges of truth and testimony that he confronted accused after hearing of the incident from the child." 115
honesty.105

On the other hand, we cannot agree with the appellant that the trial court erred in finding his denial
Further, the medical findings and the testimony of Dr. Micabalo 106 revealed that the hymenal and alibi weak despite the presentation of witnesses to corroborate his testimony. Glaring
lacerations at 5 o’clock and 9 o’clock positions could have been caused by the penetration of an inconsistencies were all over their respective testimonies that even destroyed the credibility of the
object; that the redness of the introitus could have been "the result of the repeated battering of the appellant’s very testimony.
object;" and that such object could have been an erect male organ. 107

Appellant testified that it was his uncle Alejandro Perocho who sent him to store to buy Tanduay; that
The credible testimony of AAA corroborated by the physician’s finding of penetration conclusively he gave the bottle to his uncle; and that they had already been drinking long before he bought
established the essential requisite of carnal knowledge. 108 Tanduay at the store.

II This was contradicted by the testimony of his aunt Gloria, wife of his uncle Alejandro. On cross-
examination, she revealed that her husband was not around before, during, and after the rape incident
The real identity of the assailant and the whereabouts of the appellant at the time of the commission because he was then at work.116 He arrived from work only after FFF came to their house for the
of the crime are now in dispute. second time and boxed appellant.117 It was actually the fish vendor, not her husband, who asked
appellant to buy Tanduay.118 Further, the drinking session started only after the appellant’s errand to
The defense would want us to believe that it was Julito who defiled AAA, and that appellant was the store.119
elsewhere when the crime was committed. 109
Neither was the testimony of Luzvilla credible enough to deserve consideration.
We should not, however, overlook the fact that a victim of rape could readily identify her assailant,
especially when he is not a stranger to her, considering that she could have a good look at him during Just like appellant, Luzvilla testified that Alejandro joined the drinking session. This is contrary to
the commission of the crime.110 AAA had known appellant all her life. Moreover, appellant and AAA Gloria’s statement that her husband was at work.
even walked together from the road near the store to the situs criminus111 that it would be impossible
for the child not to recognize the man who held her hand and led her all the way to the rice field.
93
Luzvilla’s testimony is likewise inconsistent with that of sur-rebuttal witness Antonia Perocho. Ruben Nicolas, the appellant’s part-time employer, and Marites Capalad, the appellant’s sister-in-law
Antonia recalled that Julito arrived without a shirt on. This belied Luzvilla’s claim that Julito wore a and co-worker, in unison, vouched for the appellant’s physical presence in the fishpond at the time
white shirt on his way to the house of Rita. In addition, while both the prosecution, as testified to by Rachel was raped. It is, however, an established fact that the appellant’s house where the rape
AAA and Julito, and the defense, as testified to by Gloria, were consistent in saying that appellant occurred, was a stone’s throw away from the fishpond. Their claim that the appellant never left
wore a sleeveless shirt, Luzvilla’s recollection differ in that Julito wore a T-shirt (colored black and their sight the entire afternoon of December 4, 1997 is unacceptable. It was impossible for Marites
later changed to white), and, thus, a short-sleeved shirt. to have kept an eye on the appellant for almost four hours, since she testified that she, too, was very
much occupied with her task of counting and recording the fishes being harvested. Likewise, Mr.
Also, contrary to Luzvilla’s story that she saw AAA walking towards Rita’s house three (3) minutes Nicolas, who, admittedly was 50 meters away from the fishpond, could not have focused his entire
after she returned to the Perochos at 6:38 in the evening, Antonia recalled that AAA arrived at the attention solely on the appellant. It is, therefore, not farfetched that the appellant easily sneaked
house of Rita at 7:30. In this respect, we find the trial court’s appreciation in order. Thus: out unnoticed, and along the way inveigled the victim, brought her inside his house and
ravished her, then returned to the fishpond as if he never left.128 (Emphasis supplied.)1avvphi1
xxx. The child declared that after being raped, she went straight home, crying, to tell her father that
Hermie had raped her. She did not first drop into the house of Lita Lingkay to cry among strangers As in the cases above cited, the claim of the defense witnesses that appellant never left their sight,
who were watching TV, as Luzvilla Balucan would have the court believe. When the child was seen save from the 5-minute errand to the store, is contrary to ordinary human experience. Moreover,
at the house of Lita Lingkay by Julito Apiki and Luzvilla Balucan, it was only later, after she had considering that the farmland where the crime was committed is just behind the house of the
been brought there by her mother Brenda so that Lita Lingkay could take a look at her ˗ just as Julito Perochos, it would take appellant only a few minutes to bring AAA from the road near the store next
Apiki said.120 to the Perochos down the farmland and consummate the crime. As correctly pointed out by the Court
of Appeals, appellant could have committed the rape after buying the bottle of Tanduay and
immediately returned to his uncle’s house.129 Unfortunately, the testimonies of his corroborating
Above all, for alibi to prosper, it is necessary that the corroboration is credible, the same having been witnesses even bolstered the fact that he was within the immediate vicinity of the scene of the
offered preferably by disinterested witnesses. The defense failed thuswise. Its witnesses cannot crime.130
qualify as such, "they being related or were one way or another linked to each other." 121
Clearly, the defense failed to prove that it was physically impossible for appellant to have been at the
Even assuming for the sake of argument that we consider the corroborations on his whereabouts, still, time and place of the commission of the crime.
the defense of alibi cannot prosper.
All considered, we find that the prosecution has sufficiently established the guilt of the appellant
We reiterate, time and again, that the court must be convinced that it would be physically impossible beyond reasonable doubt.
for the accused to have been at the locus criminis at the time of the commission of the crime. 122
III
Physical impossibility refers to distance and the facility of access between the situs criminis and the
location of the accused when the crime was committed. He must demonstrate that he was so far away
and could not have been physically present at the scene of the crime and its immediate vicinity when In the determination of the imposable penalty, the Court of Appeals correctly considered Republic
the crime was committed.123 Act No. 9344 (Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006) despite the commission of the crime three
(3) years before it was enacted on 28 April 2006.
In People v. Paraiso,124 the distance of two thousand meters from the place of the commission of the
crime was considered not physically impossible to reach in less than an hour even by foot. 125 We recognize its retroactive application following the rationale elucidated in People v. Sarcia:131
Inasmuch as it would take the accused not more than five minutes to rape the victim, this Court
disregarded the testimony of the defense witness attesting that the accused was fast asleep when she [Sec. 68 of Republic Act No. 9344]132 allows the retroactive application of the Act to those who have
left to gather bamboo trees and returned several hours after. She could have merely presumed that the been convicted and are serving sentence at the time of the effectivity of this said Act, and who were
accused slept all throughout.126 below the age of 18 years at the time of the commission of the offense. With more reason, the Act
should apply to this case wherein the conviction by the lower court is still under review. 133
In People v. Antivola,127 the testimonies of relatives and friends corroborating that of the appellant (Emphasis supplied.)
that he was in their company at the time of the commission of the crime were likewise disregarded by
this Court in the following manner: Criminal Liability; Imposable Penalty

94
Sec. 6 of Republic Act No. 9344 exempts a child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18) Under Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code, when the offender is a minor under 18 years, the penalty
years of age from criminal liability, unless the child is found to have acted with discernment, in next lower than that prescribed by law shall be imposed, but always in the proper period. However,
which case, "the appropriate proceedings" in accordance with the Act shall be observed. 134 for purposes of determining the proper penalty because of the privileged mitigating
circumstance of minority, the penalty of death is still the penalty to be reckoned with. Thus, the
We determine discernment in this wise: proper imposable penalty for the accused-appellant is reclusion perpetua.148 (Emphasis supplied.)

Discernment is that mental capacity of a minor to fully appreciate the consequences of his unlawful Accordingly, appellant should be meted the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
act.135 Such capacity may be known and should be determined by taking into consideration all the
facts and circumstances afforded by the records in each case. 136 Civil Liability

xxx The surrounding circumstances must demonstrate that the minor knew what he was doing and We have consistently ruled that:
that it was wrong.137 Such circumstance includes the gruesome nature of the crime and the minor’s
cunning and shrewdness.138 The litmus test xxx in the determination of the civil indemnity is the heinous character of the crime
committed, which would have warranted the imposition of the death penalty, regardless of whether
In the present case, we agree with the Court of Appeals that: "(1) choosing an isolated and dark place the penalty actually imposed is reduced to reclusion perpetua.149
to perpetrate the crime, to prevent detection[;] and (2) boxing the victim xxx, to weaken her defense"
are indicative of then seventeen (17) year-old appellant’s mental capacity to fully understand the Likewise, the fact that the offender was still a minor at the time he committed the crime has no
consequences of his unlawful action.139 bearing on the gravity and extent of injury suffered by the victim and her family. 150 The respective
awards of civil indemnity and moral damages in the amount of ₱75,000.00 each are, therefore,
Nonetheless, the corresponding imposable penalty should be modified. proper.151

The birth certificate of AAA140 shows that she was born on 3 December 1997. Considering that she Accordingly, despite the presence of the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority which
was only five (5) years old when appellant defiled her on 28 January 2003, the law prescribing the effectively lowered the penalty by one degree, we affirm the damages awarded by the Court of
death penalty when rape is committed against a child below seven (7) years old 141 applies. Appeals in the amount of ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity and ₱75,000.00 as moral damages. And,
consistent with prevailing jurisprudence,152 the amount of exemplary damages should be increased
The following, however, calls for the reduction of the penalty: (1) the prohibition against the from ₱25,000.00 to ₱30,000.00.
imposition of the penalty of death in accordance with Republic Act No. 9346; 142 and (2) the
privileged mitigating circumstance of minority of the appellant, which has the effect of reducing the Automatic Suspension of Sentence; Duration; Appropriate Disposition after the Lapse of the Period
penalty one degree lower than that prescribed by law, pursuant to Article 68 of the Revised Penal of Suspension of Sentence
Code.143
Republic Act No. 9344 warrants the suspension of sentence of a child in conflict with the law
Relying on People v. Bon,144 the Court of Appeals excluded death from the graduation of penalties notwithstanding that he/she has reached the age of majority at the time the judgment of conviction is
provided in Article 71 of the Revised Penal Code.145 Consequently, in its appreciation of the pronounced. Thus:
privileged mitigating circumstance of minority of appellant, it lowered the penalty one degree from
reclusion perpetua and sentenced appellant to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and SEC. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. - Once the child who is under eighteen (18) years of age
one (1) day to twelve (12) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) at the time of the commission of the offense is found guilty of the offense charged, the court shall
months of reclusion temporal, in its medium period, as maximum.146 determine and ascertain any civil liability which may have resulted from the offense committed.
However, instead of pronouncing the judgment of conviction, the court shall place the child in
We differ. conflict with the law under suspended sentence, without need of application: Provided, however, That
suspension of sentence shall still be applied even if the juvenile is already eighteen (18) years of
In a more recent case,147 the Court En Banc, through the Honorable Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-de age or more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt. (Emphasis supplied.)
Castro, clarified:
xxxx

95
Applying Declarador v. Gubaton,153 which was promulgated on 18 August 2006, the Court of in order that he/she is given the chance to live a normal life and become a productive member of the
Appeals held that, consistent with Article 192 of Presidential Decree No. 603, as amended, 154 the community. The age of the child in conflict with the law at the time of the promulgation of the
aforestated provision does not apply to one who has been convicted of an offense punishable by judgment of conviction is not material. What matters is that the offender committed the offense when
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment.155 he/she was still of tender age.

Meanwhile, on 10 September 2009, this Court promulgated the decision in Sarcia,156 overturning the Thus, appellant may be confined in an agricultural camp or any other training facility in accordance
ruling in Gubaton. Thus: with Sec. 51 of Republic Act No. 9344.164

The xxx provision makes no distinction as to the nature of the offense committed by the child in Sec. 51. Confinement of Convicted Children in Agricultural Camps and Other Training Facilities. –
conflict with the law, unlike P.D. No. 603 and A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC. The said P.D. and Supreme A child in conflict with the law may, after conviction and upon order of the court, be made to serve
Court (SC) Rule provide that the benefit of suspended sentence would not apply to a child in conflict his/her sentence, in lieu of confinement in a regular penal institution, in an agricultural camp and
with the law if, among others, he/she has been convicted of an offense punishable by death, reclusion other training facilities that may be established, maintained, supervised and controlled by the
perpetua or life imprisonment. In construing Sec. 38 of R.A. No. 9344, the Court is guided by the BUCOR, in coordination with the DSWD.
basic principle of statutory construction that when the law does not distinguish, we should not
distinguish. Since R.A. No. 9344 does not distinguish between a minor who has been convicted of a Following the pronouncement in Sarcia,165 the case shall be remanded to the court of origin to effect
capital offense and another who has been convicted of a lesser offense, the Court should also not appellant’s confinement in an agricultrual camp or other training facility.
distinguish and should apply the automatic suspension of sentence to a child in conflict with the law
who has been found guilty of a heinous crime.157
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 29 August 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No.
00213 finding appellant Hermie M. Jacinto guilty beyond reasonable doubt of qualified rape is
The legislative intent reflected in the Senate deliberations 158 on Senate Bill No. 1402 (Juvenile Justice AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS: (1) the death penalty imposed on the appellant
and Delinquency Prevention Act of 2005) further strengthened the new position of this Court to cover is reduced to reclusion perpetua; and (2) appellant is ordered to pay the victim P75,000.00 as civil
heinous crimes in the application of the provision on the automatic suspension of sentence of a child indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages. The case is hereby
in conflict with the law. The pertinent portion of the deliberation reads: REMANDED to the court of origin for its appropriate action in accordance with Section 51 of
Republic Act No. 9344.
If a mature minor, maybe 16 years old to below 18 years old is charged, accused with, or may have
committed a serious offense, and may have acted with discernment, then the child could be SO ORDERED.
recommended by the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), by the Local Council
for the Protection of Children (LCPC), or by [Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago’s] proposed Office
of Juvenile Welfare and Restoration to go through a judicial proceeding; but the welfare, best
interests, and restoration of the child should still be a primordial or primary consideration. Even in
heinous crimes, the intention should still be the child’s restoration, rehabilitation and reintegration.
xxx (Italics supplied in Sarcia.)159

On 24 November 2009, the Court En Banc promulgated the Revised Rule on Children in Conflict
with the Law, which reflected the same position.160

These developments notwithstanding, we find that the benefits of a suspended sentence can no longer 64. G.R. No. 151085 August 20, 2008
apply to appellant. The suspension of sentence lasts only until the child in conflict with the law
reaches the maximum age of twenty-one (21) years. 161 Section 40162 of the law and Section 48163 of
the Rule are clear on the matter. Unfortunately, appellant is now twenty-five (25) years old. JOEMAR ORTEGA, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
Be that as it may, to give meaning to the legislative intent of the Act, the promotion of the welfare of
a child in conflict with the law should extend even to one who has exceeded the age limit of twenty-
one (21) years, so long as he/she committed the crime when he/she was still a child. The offender DECISION
shall be entitled to the right to restoration, rehabilitation and reintegration in accordance with the Act

96
NACHURA, J.: BBB then informed their mother MMM who in turn asked AAA.11 There, AAA confessed that
petitioner raped her three (3) times on three (3) different occasions.
Before this Court is a Petition1 for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure seeking the reversal of the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision 2 dated October 26, 2000 which The first occasion happened sometime in August 1996. MMM left her daughter AAA, then 6 years
affirmed in toto the Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City, Branch 50, dated old and son BBB, then 10 years old, in the care of Luzviminda Ortega 12 (Luzviminda), mother of
May 13, 1999, convicting petitioner Joemar Ortega4 (petitioner) of the crime of Rape. petitioner, for two (2) nights because MMM had to stay in a hospital to attend to her other son who
was sick.13 During the first night at petitioner's residence, petitioner entered the room where AAA
The Facts slept together with Luzviminda and her daughter. Petitioner woke AAA up and led her to the sala.
There petitioner raped AAA. The second occasion occurred the following day, again at the
petitioner's residence. Observing that nobody was around, petitioner brought AAA to their comfort
Petitioner, then about 14 years old,5 was charged with the crime of Rape in two separate informations room and raped her there. AAA testified that petitioner inserted his penis into her vagina and she felt
both dated April 20, 1998, for allegedly raping AAA,6 then about eight (8) years of age. The pain. In all of these instances, petitioner warned AAA not to tell her parents, otherwise, he would
accusatory portions thereof respectively state: spank her.14 AAA did not tell her parents about her ordeal.

Criminal Case No. 98-19083 The third and last occasion happened in the evening of December 1, 1996. Petitioner went to the
house of AAA and joined her and her siblings in watching a battery-powered television. At that time,
That sometime in August, 1996, in the Municipality of XXX, Province of YYY, Luzviminda was conversing with MMM. While AAA's siblings were busy watching, petitioner called
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, AAA to come to the room of CCC and BBB. AAA obeyed. While inside the said room which was
by means of force, violence and intimidation, did then and there, (sic) willfully, unlawfully lighted by a kerosene lamp, petitioner pulled AAA behind the door, removed his pants and brief,
and feloniously (sic) had carnal knowledge of and/or sexual intercourse with the said AAA, removed AAA's shorts and panty, and in a standing position inserted his penis into the vagina of
a minor, then about 6 years old, against her will. AAA.15 AAA described petitioner's penis as about five (5) inches long and the size of two (2)
ballpens. She, likewise, narrated that she saw pubic hair on the base of his penis. 16
CONTRARY TO LAW.7
This last incident was corroborated by BBB in his testimony. When BBB was about to drink water in
Criminal Case No. 98-19084 their kitchen, as he was passing by his room, BBB was shocked to see petitioner and AAA both naked
from their waist down in the act of sexual intercourse. BBB saw petitioner holding AAA and making
a pumping motion. Immediately, BBB told petitioner to stop; the latter, in turn, hurriedly left.
That on or about the 1st day of December, 1996, in the Municipality of XXX, Province of Thereafter, BBB reported the incident to his mother, MMM. 17
YYY, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, by means of force, violence and intimidation, did then and there, (sic) willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously (sic) had carnal knowledge of and/or sexual intercourse with the MMM testified that when she asked AAA about what BBB saw, AAA told her that petitioner inserted
said AAA, a minor, then about 6 years old, against her will. his fingers and his penis into her vagina. MMM learned that this was not the only incident that
petitioner molested AAA as there were two previous occasions. MMM also learned that AAA did not
report her ordeal to them out of fear that petitioner would spank her. MMM testified that when BBB
CONTRARY TO LAW.8 reported the matter to her, petitioner and Luzviminda already left her house. After waiting for AAA's
brothers to go to sleep, MMM, with a heavy heart, examined AAA's vagina and she noticed that the
Upon arraignment on September 10, 1998, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. 9 Thus, same was reddish and a whitish fluid was coming out from it. Spouses FFF and MMM were not able
trial on the merits ensued. In the course of the trial, two varying versions arose. to sleep that night. The following morning, at about four o'clock, MMM called Luzviminda and
petitioner to come to their house. MMM confronted Luzviminda about what petitioner did to her
daughter, and consequently, she demanded that AAA should be brought to a doctor for examination. 18
Version of the Prosecution

MMM, together with Luzviminda, brought AAA to Dr. Lucifree Katalbas 19 (Dr. Katalbas), the Rural
On February 27, 1990, AAA was born to spouses FFF and MMM.10 Among her siblings CCC, BBB,
Health Officer of the locality who examined AAA and found no indication that she was molested. 20
DDD, EEE and GGG, AAA is the only girl in the family. Before these disturbing events, AAA's
Refusing to accept such findings, on December 12, 1996, MMM went to Dr. Joy Ann Jocson (Dr.
family members were close friends of petitioner's family, aside from the fact that they were good
Jocson), Medical Officer IV of the Bacolod City Health Office. Dr. Jocson made an unofficial written
neighbors. However, BBB caught petitioner raping his younger sister AAA inside their own home.
report21 showing that there were "abrasions on both right and left of the labia minora and a small
laceration at the posterior fourchette." She also found that the minor injuries she saw on AAA's
97
genitals were relatively fresh; and that such abrasions were superficial and could disappear after a having sexual intercourse; upon hearing such statement, Luzviminda and MMM immediately stood
period of 3 to 4 days. Dr. Jocson, however, indicated in her certification that her findings required the up and looked for them, but both mothers did not find anything unusual as all the children were
confirmation of the Municipal Health Officer of the locality. playing and dancing in the dining area; Luzviminda and MMM just laughed at BBB's statement; the
parents of AAA, at that time, did not examine her in order to verify BBB's statement nor did they get
Subsequently, an amicable settlement22 was reached between the two families through the DAWN angry at petitioner or at them; and they peacefully left AAA's house. However, the following day,
Foundation, an organization that helps abused women and children. Part of the settlement required MMM woke Luzviminda up, saying that FFF was spanking BBB with a belt as AAA was pointing to
petitioner to depart from their house to avoid contact with AAA. 23 As such, petitioner stayed with a BBB nor to petitioner as the one who molested her. At this instance, Luzviminda intervened, telling
certain priest in the locality. However, a few months later, petitioner went home for brief visits and in FFF not to spank BBB but instead, to bring AAA to a doctor for examination. Luzviminda
order to bring his dirty clothes for laundry. At the sight of petitioner, AAA's father FFF was infuriated accompanied MMM to Dr. Katalbas who found no indication that AAA was molested. She also
and confrontations occurred. At this instance, AAA's parents went to the National Bureau of accompanied her to Dr. Jocson. After getting the results of the examination conducted by Dr. Jocson,
Investigation (NBI) which assisted them in filing the three (3) counts of rape. However, the they went to the police and at this instance only did Luzviminda learn that MMM accused petitioner
prosecutor's office only filed the two (2) instant cases. of raping AAA. Petitioner vehemently denied to Luzviminda that he raped AAA. Thereafter, MMM
and Luzviminda went to their employer who recommended that they should seek advice from the
Women's Center. At the said Center, both agreed on an amicable settlement wherein petitioner would
Version of the Defense stay away from AAA. Thus, petitioner stayed with a certain priest in the locality for almost two (2)
years. But almost every Saturday, petitioner would come home to visit his parents and to bring his
Petitioner was born on August 8, 1983 to spouses Loreto (Loreto) and Luzviminda Ortega. 24 He is the dirty clothes for laundry. Every time petitioner came home, FFF bad-mouthed petitioner, calling him
second child of three siblings ― an elder brother and a younger sister. Petitioner denied the a rapist. Confrontations occurred until an altercation erupted wherein FFF allegedly slapped
accusations made against him. He testified that: his parents and AAA's parents were good friends; Luzviminda. Subsequently, AAA's parents filed the instant cases. 29
when MMM left AAA and her brothers to the care of his mother, petitioner slept in a separate room
together with BBB and CCC while AAA slept together with Luzviminda and his younger sister; he The RTC's Ruling
never touched or raped AAA or showed his private parts to her; petitioner did not threaten AAA in
any instance; he did not rape AAA in the former's comfort room, but he merely accompanied and
helped AAA clean up as she defecated and feared the toilet bowl; in the process of washing, he may On May 13, 1999, the RTC held that petitioner's defenses of denial cannot prevail over the positive
have accidentally touched AAA's anus; on December 1, 1996, petitioner together with his parents, identification of petitioner as the perpetrator of the crime by AAA and BBB, who testified with
went to AAA's house;25 they were dancing and playing together with all the other children at the time; honesty and credibility. Moreover, the RTC opined that it could not perceive any motive for AAA's
while they were dancing, petitioner hugged and lifted AAA up in a playful act, at the instance of family to impute a serious crime of Rape to petitioner, considering the close relations of both
which BBB ran and reported the matter to MMM, who at the time was with Luzviminda, saying that families. Thus, the RTC disposed of this case in this wise:
petitioner and AAA were having sexual intercourse;26 petitioner explained to MMM that they were
only playing, and that he could not have done to AAA what he was accused of doing, as they were FOR ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court finds the accused Joemar Ortega Y Felisario
together with her brothers, and he treated AAA like a younger sister; 27 BBB was lying; AAA's parents GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as Principal by Direct Participation of the crime of
and his parents did not get angry at him nor did they quarrel with each other; petitioner and his RAPE as charged in Criminal Cases Nos. 98-19083 and 98-19084 and there being no
parents peacefully left AAA's house at about nine o'clock in the evening; however, at about four aggravating or mitigating circumstance, he is sentenced to suffer the penalty of Two (2)
o'clock in the morning, petitioner and his parents were summoned by MMM to go to the latter's Reclusion Temporal in its medium period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the
house; upon arriving there they saw BBB being maltreated by his father as AAA pointed to BBB as accused shall be imprisoned for each case for a period of Six (6) years and One (1) day of
the one who molested her; and MMM and Luzviminda agreed to bring AAA to a doctor for Prision Mayor, as minimum, to Fifteen (15) years of Reclusion Temporal, as maximum.
examination.28 The accused is condemned to pay the offended party AAA, the sum of P100,000.00 as
indemnification for the two (2) rapes (sic).
Luzviminda corroborated the testimony of her son. She testified that: her son was a minor at the time
of the incident; CCC and BBB were the children of MMM in her first marriage, while AAA and the Aggrieved, petitioner appealed the RTC Decision to the CA. 30
rest of her siblings were of the second marriage; CCC and BBB are half-brothers of AAA; when
MMM entrusted AAA and her brothers to her sometime in August of 1996, she slept with AAA and Taking into consideration the age of petitioner and upon posting of the corresponding bail bond for
her youngest daughter in a separate room from petitioner; on December 1, 1996, she was at AAA's his provisional liberty in the amount of P40,000.00, the RTC ordered the petitioner's release pending
house watching television and conversing with MMM, while FFF and Loreto were having a drinking appeal.31
spree in the kitchen; from where they were seated, she could clearly see all the children, including
petitioner and AAA, playing and dancing in the dining area; she did not hear any unusual cry or noise
at the time; while they were conversing, BBB came to MMM saying that petitioner and AAA were The CA's Ruling

98
On October 26, 2000, the CA affirmed in toto the ruling of the RTC, holding that the petitioner's allegation of the existence of rape and, consequently, the prosecution failed to prove its case; thus, the
defense of denial could not prevail over the positive identification of the petitioner by the victim presumption of innocence in favor of the petitioner subsists. Moreover, petitioner opines that like
AAA and her brother BBB, which were categorical, consistent and without any showing of ill motive. AAA, petitioner is also a child of the barrio who is innocent, unsophisticated and lacks sexual
The CA also held that the respective medical examinations conducted by the two doctors were experience. As such, it is incredible and contrary to human reason that a 13- year-old boy would
irrelevant, as it is established that the slightest penetration of the lips of the female organ commit such act in the very dwelling of AAA, whose reaction to pain, at the age of six, could not be
consummates rape; thus, hymenal laceration is not an element of rape. Moreover, the CA opined that controlled or subdued. Petitioner claims that poverty was MMM's motive in filing the instant case, as
petitioner acted with discernment as shown by his covert acts. Finally, the CA accorded great weight she wanted to extort money from the parents of the petitioner. Petitioner points out that the medical
and respect to the factual findings of the RTC, particularly in the evaluation of the testimonies of report of Dr. Jocson indicated that the abrasions that were inflicted on the genitalia of AAA were
witnesses. relatively fresh and the same could disappear within a period of 3 to 4 days. Considering that Dr.
Jocson conducted the medical examination on December 12, 1996, or after the lapse of eleven (11)
Petitioner filed his Motion for Reconsideration32 of the assailed Decision which the CA denied in its days after the alleged incident of rape, and that AAA's parents only filed the instant case after almost
Resolution33 dated November 7, 2001. a year, in order to deter Luzviminda from filing a case of slander by deed against FFF, it is not
inconceivable that MMM inflicted said abrasions on AAA to prove their case and to depart from the
initial confession of AAA that it was actually BBB who raped her. Finally, petitioner submits that
Hence, this Petition based on the following grounds: AAA and BBB were merely coached by MMM to fabricate these stories. 35

I. On the other hand, respondent People of the Philippines through the Office of the Solicitor General
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAS OVERLOOKED CERTAIN FACTS OF (OSG) contends that: the arguments raised by the petitioner are mere reiterations of his disquisitions
SUBSTANCE AND VALUE WHICH IF CONSIDERED MIGHT AFFECT THE RESULT before the CA; the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, did not rely on the testimonies of both doctors since
OF THE CASE. despite the absence of abrasions, rape is consummated even with the slightest penetration of the lips
II. of the female organ; what is relevant in this case is the reliable testimony of AAA that petitioner
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR WHEN IT raped her in August and December of 1996; even in the absence of force, rape was committed
FAILED TO APPRECIATE THE MEDICAL FINDINGS OF DR. LUCIFREE considering AAA's age at that time; as such, AAA did not have any ill motive in accusing petitioner;
KATALBAS. and it is established that the crime of rape could be committed even in the presence of other people
III. nearby. Moreover, the OSG relies on the doctrine that the evaluation made by a trial court is accorded
THE FINDINGS OF THE LOWER COURT, AFFIRMED BY THE APPELLATE COURT, the highest respect as it had the opportunity to observe directly the demeanor of a witness and to
THAT PETITIONER-APPELLANT IN FACT COMMITTED AND IS CAPABLE OF determine whether said witness was telling the truth or not. Lastly, the OSG claims that petitioner
COMMITTING THE ALLEGED RAPE WITHIN THE RESIDENCE OF THE VICTIM acted with discernment when he committed the said crime, as manifested in his covert acts. 36
WHERE SEVERAL OF THE ALLEGED VICTIM'S FAMILY MEMBERS AND THEIR
RESPECTIVE MOTHERS WERE PRESENT IS IMPROBABLE AND CONTRARY TO
HUMAN EXPERIENCE. However, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9344,37 or the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006, was
IV. enacted into law on April 28, 2006 and it took effect on May 20, 2006. 38 The law establishes a
THE HONORABLE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE FACTS SET comprehensive system to manage children in conflict with the law 39 (CICL) and children at risk40
FORTH BY THE ALLEGED VICTIM REGARDING THE CIRCUMSTANCES with child-appropriate procedures and comprehensive programs and services such as prevention,
ATTENDING THE COMMISSION OF RAPE SOMETIME IN AUGUST 1996.34 intervention, diversion, rehabilitation, re-integration and after-care programs geared towards their
development. In order to ensure its implementation, the law, particularly Section 8 41 thereof, has
created the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Council (JJWC) and vested it with certain duties and
Petitioner argues that, while it is true that the factual findings of the CA are conclusive on this Court, functions42 such as the formulation of policies and strategies to prevent juvenile delinquency and to
we are not prevented from overturning such findings if the CA had manifestly overlooked certain enhance the administration of juvenile justice as well as the treatment and rehabilitation of the CICL.
facts of substance and value which if considered might affect the result of the case. Petitioner stresses The law also
that from the testimonies of AAA and BBB, it can be deduced that penetration was achieved; thus,
AAA felt pain. Petitioner contends that assuming the allegations of AAA are true that petitioner
inserted his fingers and his penis into her vagina, certainly such acts would leave certain abrasions, provides for the immediate dismissal of cases of CICL, specifically Sections 64, 65, 66, 67 and 68 of
wounds and/or lacerations on the genitalia of AAA, taking into consideration her age at the time and R.A. No. 9344's Transitory Provisions.43
the alleged size of petitioner's penis. However, such allegation is completely belied by the medical
report of Dr. Katalbas who, one day after the alleged rape, conducted a medical examination on AAA The said Transitory Provisions expressly provide:
and found that there were no signs or indications that AAA was raped or molested. Petitioner submits
that the CA committed a grave error when it disregarded such medical report since it disproves the

99
Title VIII namely, whether the pertinent provisions of R.A. No. 9344 apply to petitioner's case, considering that
Transitory Provisions at the time he committed the alleged rape, he was merely 13 years old.

SECTION 64. Children in Conflict with the Law Fifteen (15) Years Old and Below. — In sum, we are convinced that petitioner committed the crime of rape against AAA. In a prosecution
Upon effectivity of this Act, cases of children fifteen (15) years old and below at the time for rape, the complainant's candor is the single most important factor. If the complainant's testimony
of the commission of the crime shall immediately be dismissed and the child shall be meets the test of credibility, the accused can be convicted solely on that basis. 44 The RTC, as affirmed
referred to the appropriate local social welfare and development officer. Such officer, upon by the CA, did not doubt AAA's credibility, and found no ill motive for her to charge petitioner of the
thorough assessment of the child, shall determine whether to release the child to the heinous crime of rape and to positively identify him as the malefactor. Both courts also accorded
custody of his/her parents, or refer the child to prevention programs, as provided under this respect to BBB's testimony that he saw petitioner having sexual intercourse with his younger sister.
Act. Those with suspended sentences and undergoing rehabilitation at the youth While petitioner asserts that AAA's poverty is enough motive for the imputation of the crime, we
rehabilitation center shall likewise be released, unless it is contrary to the best interest of discard such assertion for no mother or father like MMM and FFF would stoop so low as to subject
the child. their daughter to the tribulations and the embarrassment of a public trial knowing that such a
traumatic experience would damage their daughter's psyche and mar her life if the charge is not
SECTION 65. Children Detained Pending Trial. — If the child is detained pending trial, true.45 We find petitioner's claim that MMM inflicted the abrasions found by Dr. Jocson in the
the Family Court shall also determine whether or not continued detention is necessary and, genitalia of AAA, in order to extort money from petitioner’s parents, highly incredible. Lastly, it must
if not, determine appropriate alternatives for detention. If detention is necessary and he/she be noted that in most cases of rape committed against young girls like AAA who was only 6 years old
is detained with adults, the court shall immediately order the transfer of the child to a youth then, total penetration of the victim's organ is improbable due to the small vaginal opening. Thus, it
detention home. has been held that actual penetration of the victim's organ or rupture of the hymen is not required. 46
Therefore, it is not necessary for conviction that the petitioner succeeded in having full penetration,
because the slightest touching of the lips of the female organ or of the labia of the pudendum
SECTION 66. Inventory of "Locked-up" and Detained Children in Conflict with the Law. constitutes rape.47
— The PNP, the BJMP and the BUCOR are hereby directed to submit to the JJWC, within
ninety (90) days from the effectivity of this Act, an inventory of all children in conflict with
the law under their custody. However, for one who acts by virtue of any of the exempting circumstances, although he commits a
crime, by the complete absence of any of the conditions which constitute free will or voluntariness of
the act, no criminal liability arises.48 Therefore, while there is a crime committed, no criminal liability
SECTION 67. Children Who Reach the Age of Eighteen (18) Years Pending Diversion and attaches. Thus, in Guevarra v. Almodovar,49 we held:
Court Proceedings. — If a child reaches the age of eighteen (18) years pending diversion
and court proceedings, the appropriate diversion authority in consultation with the local
social welfare and development officer or the Family Court in consultation with the Social [I]t is worthy to note the basic reason behind the enactment of the exempting circumstances
Services and Counseling Division (SSCD) of the Supreme Court, as the case may be, shall embodied in Article 12 of the RPC; the complete absence of intelligence, freedom of
determine the appropriate disposition. In case the appropriate court executes the judgment action, or intent, or on the absence of negligence on the part of the accused. In
of conviction, and unless the child in conflict with the law has already availed of probation expounding on intelligence as the second element of dolus, Albert has stated:
under Presidential Decree No. 603 or other similar laws, the child may apply for probation
if qualified under the provisions of the Probation Law. "The second element of dolus is intelligence; without this power, necessary to
determine the morality of human acts to distinguish a licit from an illicit act, no
SECTION 68. Children Who Have Been Convicted and are Serving Sentences. — Persons crime can exist, and because . . . the infant (has) no intelligence, the law exempts
who have been convicted and are serving sentence at the time of the effectivity of this Act, (him) from criminal liability."
and who were below the age of eighteen (18) years at the time of the commission of the
offense for which they were convicted and are serving sentence, shall likewise benefit from It is for this reason, therefore, why minors nine years of age and below are not capable of
the retroactive application of this Act. They shall be entitled to appropriate dispositions performing a criminal act.
provided under this Act and their sentences shall be adjusted accordingly. They shall be
immediately released if they are so qualified under this Act or other applicable laws. In its Comment50 dated April 24, 2008, the OSG posited that petitioner is no longer covered by the
provisions of Section 64 of R.A. No. 9344 since as early as 1999, petitioner was convicted by the
Ostensibly, the only issue that requires resolution in this case is whether or not petitioner is guilty RTC and the conviction was affirmed by the CA in 2001. R.A. No. 9344 was passed into law in 2006,
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape as found by both the RTC and the CA. However, with and with the petitioner now approximately 25 years old, he no longer qualifies as a child as defined
the advent of R.A. No. 9344 while petitioner's case is pending before this Court, a new issue arises, by R.A. No. 9344. Moreover, the OSG claimed that the retroactive effect of Section 64 of R.A. No.
9344 is applicable only if the child-accused is still below 18 years old as explained under Sections 67
100
and 68 thereof. The OSG also asserted that petitioner may avail himself of the provisions of Section In fact, the legislative intent for R.A. No. 9344's retroactivity is even patent from the deliberations on
3851 of R.A. No. 9344 providing for automatic suspension of sentence if finally found guilty. Lastly, the bill in the Senate, quoted as follows:
the OSG argued that while it is a recognized principle that laws favorable to the accused may be
given retroactive application, such principle does not apply if the law itself provides for conditions Sections 67-69 On Transitory Provisions
for its application.
Senator Santiago. In Sections 67 to 69 on Transitory Provisions, pages 34 to 35, may I
We are not persuaded. humbly propose that we should insert, after Sections 67 to 69, the following provision:

Section 6 of R.A. No. 9344 clearly and explicitly provides: ALL CHILDREN WHO DO NOT HAVE CRIMINAL LIABILITY UNDER THIS LAW
PENDING THE CREATION OF THE OFFICE OF JUVENILE WELFARE AND
SECTION 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility. — A child fifteen (15) years of age RESTORATION (OJWR) AND THE LOCAL COUNCIL FOR THE PROTECTION OF
or under at the time of the commission of the offense shall be exempt from criminal CHILDREN (LCPC) WITHIN A YEAR, SHALL BE IMMEDIATELY TRANSFERRED
liability. However, the child shall be subjected to an intervention program pursuant to TO DSWD INSTITUTIONS, AND DSWD SHALL UNDERTAKE DIVERSION
Section 20 of this Act. PROGRAMS FOR THEM, PRIORITIZING THE YOUNGER CHILDREN BELOW 15
YEARS OF AGE AND THE LIGHTER OFFENSES.
A child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18) years of age shall likewise be
exempt from criminal liability and be subjected to an intervention program, unless he/she The only question will be: Will the DSWD have enough facilities for these adult offenders?
has acted with discernment, in which case, such child shall be subjected to the appropriate
proceedings in accordance with this Act. Senator Pangilinan, Mr. President, according to the CWC, the DSWD does not have the
capability at the moment. It will take time to develop the capacity.
The exemption from criminal liability herein established does not include exemption from
civil liability, which shall be enforced in accordance with existing laws. Senator Santiago. Well, we can say that they shall be transferred whenever the facilities are
ready.
Likewise, Section 64 of the law categorically provides that cases of children 15 years old and below,
at the time of the commission of the crime, shall immediately be dismissed and the child shall be Senator Pangilinan. Yes. Mr. President, just a clarification. When we speak here of children
referred to the appropriate local social welfare and development officer (LSWDO). What is who do not have criminal liability under this law, we are referring here to those who
controlling, therefore, with respect to the exemption from criminal liability of the CICL, is not the currently have criminal liability, but because of the retroactive effect of this measure,
CICL's age at the time of the promulgation of judgment but the CICL's age at the time of the will now be exempt. It is quite confusing.
commission of the offense. In short, by virtue of R.A. No. 9344, the age of criminal irresponsibility
has been raised from 9 to 15 years old.52
Senator Santiago. That is correct.
Given this precise statutory declaration, it is imperative that this Court accord retroactive application
to the aforequoted provisions of R.A. No. 9344 pursuant to the well-entrenched principle in criminal Senator Pangilinan. In other words, they should be released either to their parents or
law - favorabilia sunt amplianda adiosa restrigenda. Penal laws which are favorable to the accused through a diversion program, Mr. President. That is my understanding.
are given retroactive effect.53 This principle is embodied in Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code,
which provides: Senator Santiago. Yes, that is correct. But there will have to be a process of sifting before
that. That is why I was proposing that they should be given to the DSWD, which will
Art. 22. Retroactive effect of penal laws. — Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect conduct the sifting process, except that apparently, the DSWD does not have the physical
insofar as they favor the persons guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal, as this facilities.
term is defined in Rule 5 of Article 62 of this Code, although at the time of the publication
of such laws, a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving the same. Senator Pangilinan. Mr. President, conceptually, we have no argument. We will now have
to just craft it to ensure that the input raised earlier by the good Senator is included and the
We also have extant jurisprudence that the principle has been given expanded application in certain capacity of the DSWD to be able to absorb these individuals. Likewise, the issue should
instances involving special laws.54 R.A. No. 9344 should be no exception. also be incorporated in the amendment.

101
The President. Just a question from the Chair. The moment this law becomes effective, all Now, considering that laws are normally prospective, Mr. President, in their application, I
those children in conflict with the law, who were convicted in the present Penal Code, would like to suggest to the Sponsor if he could incorporate some kind of a transitory
for example, who will now not be subject to incarceration under this law, will be provision that would make this law apply also to those who might already have been
immediately released. Is that the understanding? convicted but are awaiting, let us say, execution of their penalties as adults when, in
fact, they are juveniles.
Senator Pangilinan. Yes, Mr. President.
Senator Pangilinan. Yes, Mr. President. We do have a provision under the Transitory
Senator Santiago. They would immediately fall under . . . . Provisions wherein we address the issue raised by the good Senator, specifically,
Section 67. For example, "Upon effectivity of this Act, cases of children fifteen (15)
years old and below at the time of the commission of the crime shall immediately be
Senator Pangilinan. The diversion requirements, Mr. President. dismissed and the child shall be referred to the appropriate local social welfare and
development officer." So that would be giving retroactive effect.
Senator Santiago. Yes.
Senator Pimentel. Of cases that are still to be prosecuted.
The President. But since the facilities are not yet available, what will happen to them?
Senator Pangilinan. Yes.
Senator Santiago. Well, depending on their age, which has not yet been settled . . . . .
provides, for example, for conferencing family mediation, negotiation, apologies, censure, Senator Pimentel. What about those that have already been prosecuted? I was trying to cite
et cetera. These methodologies will apply. They do not necessarily have to remain in the instance of juvenile offenders erroneously convicted as adults awaiting execution.
detention.
Senator Pangilinan. Mr. President, we are willing to include that as an additional
Senator Pangilinan. Yes, that is correct, Mr. President. But it will still require some sort of amendment, subject to style.
infrastructure, meaning, manpower. The personnel from the DSWD will have to address the
counseling. So, there must be a transition in terms of building the capacity and absorbing
those who will benefit from this measure. Senator Pimentel. I would certainly appreciate that because that is a reality that we have to
address, otherwise injustice will really be . . .
The President. Therefore, that should be specifically provided for as an amendment.
Senator Pangilinan. Yes, Mr. President, we would also include that as a separate provision.
Senator Pangilinan. That is correct, Mr. President.
The President. In other words, even after final conviction if, in fact, the offender is able to
prove that at the time of the commission of the offense he is a minor under this law, he
The President. All right. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the Santiago should be given the benefit of the law.
amendment is accepted.55
Senator Pimentel. Yes, Mr. President. That is correct.
xxxx
Senator Pangilinan. Yes, Mr. President. We accept that proposed amendment. 56
PIMENTEL AMENDMENTS
The Court is bound to enforce this legislative intent, which is the dominant factor in interpreting a
xxxx statute. Significantly, this Court has declared in a number of cases, that intent is the soul of the law,
viz.:
Senator Pimentel.
The intent of a statute is the law. If a statute is valid it is to have effect according to the
xxxx purpose and intent of the lawmaker. The intent is the vital part, the essence of the law, and
the primary rule of construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intent. The intention of

102
the legislature in enacting a law is the law itself, and must be enforced when ascertained, or below as couriers or foot soldiers in the drug trade. They claim that Republic Act No.
although it may not be consistent with the strict letter of the statute. Courts will not follow 9344 has rendered them ineffective in the faithful discharge of their duties in that they are
the letter of a statute when it leads away from the true intent and purpose of the legislature proscribed from taking into custody children 15 years old or below who openly flaunt
and to conclusions inconsistent with the general purpose of the act. Intent is the spirit which possession, use and delivery or distribution of illicit drugs, simply because their age
gives life to exempts them from criminal liability under the new law. 60

a legislative enactment. In construing statutes the proper course is to start out and follow the true The Court is fully cognizant that our decision in the instant case effectively exonerates petitioner of
intent of the legislature and to adopt that sense which harmonizes best with the context and promotes rape, a heinous crime committed against AAA who was only a child at the tender age of six (6) when
in the fullest manner the apparent policy and objects of the legislature. 57 she was raped by the petitioner, and one who deserves the law’s greater protection. However, this
consequence is inevitable because of the language of R.A. No. 9344, the wisdom of which is not
Moreover, penal laws are construed liberally in favor of the accused. 58 In this case, the plain meaning subject to review by this Court.61 Any perception that the result reached herein appears unjust or
of R.A. No. 9344's unambiguous language, coupled with clear lawmakers' intent, is most favorable to unwise should be addressed to Congress. Indeed, the Court has no discretion to give statutes a
herein petitioner. No other interpretation is justified, for the simple language of the new law itself meaning detached from the manifest intendment and language of the law. Our task is constitutionally
demonstrates the legislative intent to favor the CICL. confined only to applying the law and jurisprudence to the proven facts, and we have done so in this
case.62
It bears stressing that the petitioner was only 13 years old at the time of the commission of the
alleged rape. This was duly proven by the certificate of live birth, by petitioner's own testimony, and WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Criminal Case Nos. 98-19083 and 98-19084 filed against
by the testimony of his mother. Furthermore, petitioner’s age was never assailed in any of the petitioner Joemar F. Ortega are hereby DISMISSED. Petitioner is hereby referred to the local social
proceedings before the RTC and the CA. Indubitably, petitioner, at the time of the commission of the welfare and development officer of the locality for the appropriate intervention program.
crime, was below 15 years of age. Under R.A. No. 9344, he is exempted from criminal liability. Nevertheless, the petitioner is hereby ordered to pay private complainant AAA, civil indemnity in the
amount of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) and moral damages in the amount of One
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00). No costs.
However, while the law exempts petitioner from criminal liability for the two (2) counts of rape
committed against AAA, Section 6 thereof expressly provides that there is no concomitant exemption
from civil liability. Accordingly, this Court sustains the ruling of the RTC, duly affirmed by the CA, Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the two Houses of Congress and the Juvenile Justice and
that petitioner and/or his parents are liable to pay AAA P100,000.00 as civil indemnity. This award is Welfare Council (JJWC).
in the nature of actual or compensatory damages, and is mandatory upon a conviction for rape.

The RTC, however, erred in not separately awarding moral damages, distinct from the civil indemnity
awarded to the rape victim. AAA is entitled to moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 for each
count of rape, pursuant to Article 2219 of the Civil Code, without the necessity of additional pleading
or proof other than the fact of rape. Moral damages are granted in recognition of the victim's injury
necessarily resulting from the odious crime of rape. 59

A final note. While we regret the delay, we take consolation in the fact that a law intended to protect
our children from the harshness of life and to alleviate, if not cure, the ills of the growing number of
CICL and children at risk in our country, has been enacted by Congress. However, it has not escaped
us that major concerns have been raised on the effects of the law. It is worth mentioning that in the
Rationale for the Proposed Rule on Children Charged under R.A. No. 9165, or the Comprehensive (65) G.R. No. 117407 April 15, 1997
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, it was found that:
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
The passage of Republic Act No. 9344 or the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006 vs.
raising the age of criminal irresponsibility from 9 years old to 15 years old has IRVIN TADULAN y EPAN, accused-appellant.
compounded the problem of employment of children in the drug trade several times over.
Law enforcement authorities, Barangay Kagawads and the police, most particularly,
complain that drug syndicates have become more aggressive in using children 15 years old

103
PADILLA, J.: Upon reaching home, Maristel Cruz did not inform her mother that Irvin Tadulan
had carnal knowledge of her; but two days later, their laundry woman saw the
Accused-appellant Irvin Tadulan was charged with the crime of rape before the Regional Trial Court blood stains on her panties and told her mother about it. At first, Maristel Cruz
of Pasig, Branch 157, Metro Manila, in a complaint docketed as Criminal Case No. 92-186, alleging refused to talk when her mother asked her about the said blood stains, but when
as follows: the mother persisted in asking her, the girl cried and revealed that Irvin Tadulan
had sexual intercourse with her. The mother (Estela Santos) was shocked. She
reported the matter to her godson who immediately confronted Irvin Tadulan
That on or about the 2nd day of April, 1992 in the Municipality of Pasig, Metro relative to what he had done to Maristel Cruz. At first, Irvin Tadulan denied
Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, armed having done the act imputed to him by the said girl, but he later on admitted that
with a knife, with lewd design and by means of force, threats and intimidation, he had sexual intercourse with her.
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse
with one Maristel Cruz, a minor, nine (9) years old, without her consent and
against her will. Shortly thereafter, Irvin Tadulan's wife (Adefa Tadulan) arrived from a trip from
Cagayan de Oro City, and Estela Santos immediately informed her that her
husband, Irvin Tadulan has raped her (Estela) daughter Maristel Cruz. Estela
CONTRARY TO LAW.1 Santos further informed Adefa Tadulan that she would not take action against the
latter's husband if they would vacate the apartment unit right away. Adefa
When arraigned under the foregoing indictment, appellant pleaded not guilty to the crime attributed Tadulan later on met with Estela Santos and told her that she had driven away
to him. Thereafter, trial commenced with both prosecution and defendant presenting evidence Irvin Tadulan, but requested that she and her children be allowed to stay until
consisting of testimonies of witnesses and documentary exhibits. Saturday, April 11, 1992. Estela Santos thereafter noted, however, that Irvin
Tadulan was still coming home to the apartment unit every night despite the
The evidence presented by the prosecution tended to establish the following facts: promise of his wife that she herself would call the police should he ever come
back to the place. So, Estela Santos conferred with her cousin, a lawyer, and later
on made up her mind to file a criminal charge against Irvin Tadulan before
. . . Complainant Estela Santos owns a house at No. 6 Dr. Garcia St., in Barangay leaving for abroad, for she was then scheduled to go to the United States to fetch
Sumilang Pasig, Metro Manila where she resides with her common-law husband her mother who was ill due to a stroke.
and their minor daughter, Maristel Cruz. Behind the said house, complainant also
owns a three-door apartment building, one unit of which was rented and occupied
by accused Irvin Tadulan, his wife Adefa Tadulan and their three children name On the night of April 11, 1992, Estela Santos heard a loud noise coming from the
[sic] Dianne, Angie and Bochoy who were aged 10, 9 and 5, respectively. In 1992 apartment building, and when she inquired about it she came to know that it was
complainant's daughter, Maristel Cruz was about nine (9) year [sic] old (Exh. Irvin Tadulan creating the noise because he was kicking the door of the apartment
"A") and was in grade school. She often played with the accused's children in the unit occupied by him and his family. So, Estela Santos called up the police
vicinity of their house and the apartment building. because of her apprehension that Irvin Tadulan would create trouble due to the
quarrel that was then taking place between him and his wife. Responding
policemen soon arrived at the place in a mobile car, and because Irvin Tadulan
In the morning of April 2, 1992, at about 11:00 o'clock, Maristel Cruz was was denounced by his wife for having rape [sic] the daughter of Estela Santos,
playing with the other children when she was called by Irvin Tadulan into the the said police officers brought Irvin Tadulan to the Pasig Police Station for
latter's apartment unit. He brought the girl upstairs and told her to lie down on the questioning and also asked Estela Santos and her daughter to follow them. So,
floor. Irvin Tadulan then removed the shorts and panties of Maristel Cruz and his that same evening, Estela Santos and her daughter went to the Pasig Police
own pants and briefs. He kissed the girl and fondled her breasts and private parts. Station where they gave their respective sworn statements (Exhs. "B" & "E") and
Then he put himself on top of her and inserted his organ into her genitals. lodged their complaint against Irvin Tadulan. It was during the taking of her
Maristel Cruz felt the pain in her vagina. She pushed Irvin Tadulan away from statement before the police when Maristel Cruz also revealed that Irvin Tadulan
her and got up, but the latter poked a kitchen knife at her and told her to remain had laid with her not only on April 2, 1992. She stated that Irvin Tadulan had
lying down; and because of fear, Maristel Cruz lay [sic] down on the floor again. previously laid on top of her and first attempted to have intercourse with her
Irvin Tadulan placed himself on top of her once more, kissed and fondled her sometime in September 1, 1991, but it was not consummated because she was
breasts as before, and finally succeeded in inserting his penis into her sex organ. hurt whenever he tried to insert his penis into her vagina.
As he had intercourse with Maristel Cruz, blood oozed out of her vagina and she
felt the pain. Shortly thereafter, however, she heard her mother calling her. So,
Irvin Tadulan told her to dress up quickly and ordered her to go home. In order to determine physical signs of sexual abuse, the Pasig Police Station
made a Request For The Medico Legal Examination of Maristel Cruz to the PC
104
Crime Laboratory Service at Camp Crame, Quezon City (Exh. "F") on the After trial, the now appealed judgment was rendered by the lower court finding accused-appellant
following day, April 12, 1992, upon the written Consent For Examination (Exh. guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. The dispositive part of the decision reads as
"G") which was signed by the mother, Estela Santos. A medico-legal officer of follows:
the PCCLS examined Maristel Cruz and then issued Medico-Legal Report No.
M-0708-92 dated April 13, 1992 (Exh. "C") finding her "hymen with deep, WHEREFORE, AND IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING
healed laceration at 4 o'clock", and with the conclusion that the "Subject is in CONSIDERATIONS, this Court hereby finds accused IRVIN TADULAN guilty
non-virgin state physically". Thereafter, the Pasig Police Station forwarded the beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of RAPE defined and penalized by Article
sworn statements of Maristel Cruz and her mother, together with all the pertinent 335 of the Revised Penal Code, and he is hereby sentenced to the penalty of
papers to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal where the said minor Reclusion Perpetua, with the accessory penalties the law provides therefor.
child and her mother signed the Complaint for Rape (Exh. "D") against Irvin
Tadulan, which initiated the prosecution of the said accused in this case.2
Accused Irvin Tadulan is also hereby ordered to indemnify the offended minor
girl, Maristel Cruz in the sum of THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS (P30,000.00),
On the other hand, accused Irvin Tadulan set up the defense of alibi and pardon. In support of his with interest thereon at the legal rate of six per cent (6%) per annum from the
defense, Tadulan testified that he could not have raped Maristel Cruz in his apartment unit in filing of the complaint in this case until the same is fully paid.
Sumilang, Pasig, Metro Manila, at 11:00 o'clock in the morning of 2 April 1992 as he was then at his
place of work at the Republic Asahi Glass Corporation in Pinagbuhatan, Pasig, Metro Manila, where
he was employed as a mobile equipment operator. His testimony was corroborated by his supervisor SO ORDERED. 4
at the plant who testified that on 2 April 1992, Irvin Tadulan worked with him at the company plant
during the first shift, from 6:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m.; and that as shown in Tadulan's daily time record In this appeal, accused Irvin Tadulan assigns the following errors to the trial court:
(Exhibit "1"), said accused punched in at 5:25 a.m. and punched out at 2:31 p.m.
I
Relative to the defense of pardon or condonation, Adefa Tadulan, wife of accused-appellant, testified
that when she arrived at their apartment on 7 April 1992 from Cagayan de Oro, she learned from THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING EXCULPATORY WEIGHT TO
Estela Santos and her daughter Maristel Cruz that the latter had been raped by her husband, that she THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY THE DEFENSE.
again went to see Estela Santos and asked for forgiveness and that the latter told her: "Hayaan mo na
lang, umalis na lang kayo dito, kung and Dios nagpapatawad, tao pa kaya." Said witness also
testified that she asked Estela Santos if the accused Irvin Tadulan could just leave first while she and II
their children would vacate the apartment unit on the coming Saturday, and Estela Santos agreed; and
that pursuant to said agreement, Irvin Tadulan immediately left the apartment and she started packing THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING FULL FAITH AND CREDENCE TO
their belongings and sent their children to Cagayan de Oro in the company of her mother. THE TESTIMONIES OF PROSECUTION WITNESSES MARKED AS THEY
ARE WITH INCONSISTENCIES AND IMPROBABILITIES WHICH CAST
Adefa Tadulan further testified that on the night of 11 April 1992, her husband came home and upon SERIOUS DOUBTS AS TO THEIR TRUTHFULNESS.
learning that she had sent their children to the province, he got angry and they had a violent quarrel.
The noise created by the quarrel was heard by Estela Santos who immediately called the police; and III
on that same night, Estela Santos and Maristel Cruz lodged a complaint for rape against accused Irvin
Tadulan despite the previous understanding between Estela Santos and Adefa Tadulan that Estela
ASSUMING THAT THE PROSECUTION'S VERSION OF THE INCIDENT IS
would not take action anymore against Irvin Tadulan.
CORRECT, THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THE FACT
THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT WAS ALREADY PARDONED BY
Prior to the reception of evidence for the accused, his counsel filed a Motion to Plead Guilty to COMPLAINANTS.
Lesser Offense 3 praying that accused be allowed to plead guilty to the crime under Article 336,
Revised Penal Code, denominated as Acts of Lasciviousness. No communication having been
IV
received from the complainant with regard to said offer to plead guilty to a lesser offense, the trial
proceeded for the reception of evidence for the defense.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING ACCUSED-
APPELLANT ON GROUND OF REASONABLE DOUBT.5

105
The issues raised by accused-appellant boil down to credibility of witnesses. Santos and her daughter lodged a complaint for rape against Irvin Tadulan,
despite the previous understanding between her and Estela Santos that the latter
In rejecting the version of the accused-appellant, the trial court made the following findings and would not anymore take any action against her husband.
conclusions to which we agree.
It should be pointed out, however, as earlier narrated above, that according to
This Court finds, however, that the abovementioned testimonies of accused Irvin Estela Santos, she agreed not to file any complaint against Irvin Tadulan upon the
Tadulan and his witness cannot prevail over the more convincing testimony of the representation of his wife, Adefa Tadulan, that she had driven away her husband,
rape victim, Maristel Cruz, who positively identified the said accused as the one and her promise that if he would ever return to their apartment unit, she herself
who raped her and described in a clear and straightforward manner how she was would call for the police; that she (Estela Santos) noted, however, that Irvin
sexually abused by him. In the absence of any clear showing of ill motive that Tadulan was still coming home to their apartment unit every night; that she was
might have impelled her to impute the heinous crime of rape against the said prompted to call for police assistance because she saw Irvin Tadulan kicking the
accused, there is no reason to doubt the veracity of the declarations of the said door of the apartment during a violent quarrel with his wife on the night of April
victim in court; for as held in a case (People vs. Camasis, 189 SCRA 649), "it is 11, 1992; and that because soon after policemen arrived at the place, Adefa
hard to believe that a young unmarried woman would reveal that she was Tadulan herself informed them that her husband has raped Maristel Cruz, she
deflowered and allow the examination of her private parts and thereafter permit (Estela Santos) and her said child proceeded with the filing of their complaint for
herself to be the subject of public trial if her motive was not to bring to justice the rape against Irvin Tadulan.
person who wronged her." Also applicable here is the well-settled principle that
"alibi is unavailing as a defense where there is positive identification of the From the evidence just discussed, it would appear that the initial desistance of
perpetrator of the crime, most specially, when the said identification is made by Estela Santos from taking any action against Irvin Tadulan, was upon the
the victim of the rape herself in the absence of any motive to implicate the representation of the latter's wife Adefa Tadulan that she had driven away her
assailant". (People vs. Felipe, 191 SCRA 176, and cases therein cited). Besides, it husband, and her promise that should he ever come back to their apartment unit
has been held time and time again, that for alibi to prosper as a defense the she herself would call for the police; but that the said representation turn [sic] out
accused must show that he was so far away that he could not have been to be untrue, and the promise was not complied with because Irvin Tadulan was
physically present at the place of the crime, or its immediate vicinity at the time still coming home every night and, in fact, he and her [sic] wife had a violent
of its commission (People vs. Tasurra, 192 SCRA 266). In this case, however, it quarrel in the apartment unit on the night of April 11, 1992. Otherwise stated, the
is clear that accused Irvin Tadulan was not so situated on April 2, 1992, for desistance was subject to certain conditions which were not complied with, and
according to him he was at the plant of the Republic-Asahi Glass Corporation in for which reason Estela Santos proceeded with the filing of a criminal complaint
Barangay Pinagbuhatan, Pasig, Metro Manila — which is but a few kilometers against Irvin Tadulan. Upon such circumstances, it is clear to the mind of this
from Barangay Sumilang of the same municipality where the crime was Court that the complainant has not expressly pardoned the said accused.
committed.
Besides, there are authorities holding that pardon must be granted not only by the
Relative to the defense of pardon or condonation also set up by accused Irvin parents of an offended minor but also by the minor herself in order to be effective
Tadulan, his wife Adefa Tadulan testified that on April 7, 1992 when she arrived as an express pardon under Art. 344 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, in the case
at their apartment unit from a trip from Cagayan de Oro City, she came to know of People vs. Lacson, Jr., (C.A.) 55 O.G. 9460, we find the following words:
from both Estela Santos and her daughter, Maristel Cruz, that the latter has been "Neither must we be understood as supporting the view that the parents alone can
raped by her husband; that she again met with Estela Santos and asked for extend a valid pardon. Far from it, for we, too are of the belief that the pardon by
forgiveness, and that the said mother told her: "Hayaan mo na lang, umalis na the parents, standing alone, is inefficacious." It was also held in another case, that
lang kayo dito, kung ang Diyos ay nagpapatawad, tao pa kaya." The said wife "The express pardon of a person guilty of attempted abduction of a minor,
also testified that she asked Estela Santos if her husband could just leave first granted by the latter's parents, is not sufficient to remove criminal responsibility,
while she and their children could vacate the apartment unit on the coming but must be accompanied by the express pardon of the girl herself." (U.S. vs.
Saturday, and Estela Santos agreed; and that pursuant to the said agreement Irvin Luna, 1 Phil. 360)
Tadulan immediately left their house, after which she also sent their children to
Cagayan de Oro City in the company of her mother and then started packing-up In the present case, the supposed pardon of the accused was allegedly granted
their belongings. She further testified that on the night of April 11, 1992, only by the mother (Estela Santos) without the concurrence of the offended
however, her husband came home and quarreled with her upon knowing that she minor, Maristel Cruz. Hence, even if it be assumed for the sake of argument that
had sent their children to the province; that because of the noise their quarrel the initial desistance of the said mother from taking any action against the
created, Estela Santos called for the police; and that on that same night, Estela
106
accused, constitutes pardon, it is clear that upon the authorities cited above, such Accused-appellant tries to discredit the victim's testimony by questioning her behavior after she was
pardon is ineffective without the express concurrence of the offended minor allegedly raped by the accused in September 1991 in that she did not show any fear of the accused on
herself. 2 April 1992 when she was called by him. It should be borne in mind, in this connection, that the
victim was only a naive nine (9) year old child when the crime was committed on her. She considered
In fine, this Court concludes that the prosecution has proved the guilt of the the accused as a friend, almost like a relative, as in fact she called him "Tito Loloy." She therefore
accused Irvin Tadulan of the crime of rape charged against him, and that the unsuspectingly went near the accused when called by the latter.
defenses of alibi and pardon or condonation set up by him are lacking in merit.6
As we have stressed in a recent case —
We have consistently held that appellate courts, as a rule, will not disturb the findings of the trial
court on the credibility of witnesses. We have sustained trial courts in this respect, considering their . . . it is not proper to judge the actions of children who have undergone traumatic
vantage point in the evaluation of testimonial evidence, absent, of course, any showing of serious experience by the norms of behavior expected under the circumstances from
error or irregularity that otherwise would alter the result of the case. 7 We find no such serious error mature people. The range of emotion shown by rape victims is yet to be captured
or irregularity in the case at bar. even by the calculus. It is thus unrealistic to expect uniform reactions from rape
victims. 9
Accused-appellant alleges that the trial court gravely erred when it disregarded the defense of alibi
despite the overwhelming evidence that the accused did not leave his place of work on 2 April 1992. The victim Maristel was too young to totally comprehend the consequences of the dastardly act
According to the appellant, his immediate supervisor, Leandro Daguro, testified that he (appellant) inflicted on her by the accused-appellant.
reported for work on 2 April 1992 and was assigned in a critical area, and being the only driver at that
time a problem would have ensued had he left his post at any given time on 2 April 1992. Appellant As correctly observed by the Solicitor General: "(A)s regards the acts imputed to Estela, the delay of
likewise faults the trial court when it observed that there was no physical impossibility for him to be seven (7) days from the date of her knowledge of the rape incident on 4 April 1992 in reporting to the
at Barangay Sumilang, Pasig where the crime was committed because the court mainly focused its authorities the rape of her daughter is excusable. At that time, she was not yet certain of the steps she
attention on the fact that Barangay Pinagbuhatan is but a few kilometers away from Barangay would take considering the delicate nature of the problem they were facing" (citing People v.
Sumilang, both in Pasig, hence, appellant could have returned to his place of work after committing Danguilan, 218 SCRA 98; People v. Joaquin, Jr., 225 SCRA 179)." Besides, we have ruled that a
the crime at the time and place it occurred. Accused argues that the distance between the two delay in prosecuting the rape is not indicative of fabricated charges. 10
barangays was never an issue; that the question really is whether or not appellant left or could have
left his work at the Republic Asahi Glass Corporation in barangay Pinagbuhatan and gone home to
barangay Sumilang in the morning of 2 April 1992. Finally, the accused's denial and alibi cannot prevail over his positive identification by the victim
Maristel as her rapist. Maristel testified in a clear and straightforward manner that appellant through
force and intimidation and with use of a deadly weapon (kitchen knife), succeeded in having carnal
We are not persuaded. The testimony of Leonardo Daguro that accused could not have left his work knowledge of her. 11
as this would have resulted in a big problem at the area where appellant was working is too simple
for comfort. The same witness testified that he could not remember if a problem arose on that date
when the crime was committed and that he was supervising an average of seventeen (17) men in As for the defense that Estela Santos, as the mother of the victim Maristel, expressly pardoned him,
different sections of the raw material department so that he had to go around each section. we sustain the trial court's finding which reads as follows.

We quote with approval the following observation of the court a quo: From the evidence just discussed, it would appear that the initial desistance of
Estela Santos from taking any action against Irvin Tadulan, was upon the
representation of the latter's wife Adefa Tadulan that she had driven away her
. . . Besides, it has been held time and time again that for alibi to prosper as a husband, and her promise that should he ever come back to their apartment unit
defense the accused must show that he was so far away that he could not have she herself would call for the police; but that the said representation turned out to
been physically present at the place of the crime, or its immediate vicinity at the be untrue, and the promise was not complied with because Irvin Tadulan was still
time of its commission (People vs. Tasurra, 192 SCRA. 266) In this case, coming home every night and, in fact, he and her wife had a violent quarrel in the
however, it is not so situated on April 2, 1992, for according to him he was at the apartment unit on the night of April 11, 1992. Otherwise stated, the desistance
plant of the Republic Asahi Glass Corporation in Barangay Pinagbuhatan, Pasig, was subject to certain conditions which were not complied with, and for which
Metro Manila — which is but a few kilometers from Barangay Sumilang of the reason Estela Santos proceeded with the filing of a criminal complaint against
same municipality where the crime was committed. 8 Irvin Tadulan. Upon such circumstances, it is clear to the mind of this Court that
the complainant has not expressly pardoned the said accused.

107
Besides, there are authorities holding that pardon must be granted not only by the
parents of an offended minor but also by the minor herself in order to be effective
as an express pardon under Art. 344 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, in the case
of People vs. Lacson, Jr., (C.A.) 55 O.G. 9460, we find the following words:
"Neither must we be understood as supporting the view that the parents alone can
extend a valid pardon. Far from it, for we, too are of the belief that the pardon by
the parents, standing alone, is inefficacious." It was also held in another case, that
"The express pardon of a person guilty of attempted abduction of a minor,
granted by the latter's parents, is not sufficient to remove criminal responsibility,
but must be accompanied by the express pardon of the girl herself." (U.S. vs.
Luna, 1 Phil. 360)

In the present case, the supposed pardon of the accused was allegedly granted
only by the mother (Estela Santos) without the concurrence of the offended
minor, Maristel Cruz. Hence, even if it be assumed for the sake of argument that
the initial desistance of the said mother from taking any action against the
accused, constitutes pardon, it is clear that upon the authorities cited above, such
pardon is ineffective without the express concurrence of the offended minor
herself. 12

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision dated 4 August 1994 in Criminal Case No. 92186 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 157 of Pasig, Metro Manila, is hereby AFFIRMED, with modification
as to the indemnity for the victim which is raised to P50,000.00 from P30,000.00 to conform with
prevailing jurisprudence including the recent case of People v. Romualdo Miranda y Geronimo, et
al., G.R. No. 97425, 24 September 1996, where the victim was also a minor, as in the case at bar.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, Vitug and Kapunan, JJ., concur.

(66) G.R. No. 135457 September 29, 2000

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,


vs.
JOSE PATRIARCA, JR., alias "KA DJANGO," CARLOS NARRA, alias "KA JESSIE" and
TEN (10) JOHN DOES, accused-appellant.

108
DECISION The skeletal remains of Alfredo Arevalo were recovered in the property of a Rubuang Tolosa and
were identified by Elisa Arevalo, the mother of the victim.
BUENA, J.:
The second witness for the prosecution was Elisa Arevalo. She knew Patriarca, alias "Ka Django", as
Accused-appellant Jose Patriarca, Jr., with the aliases of "Ka Django," "Carlos Narra" and "Ka he told her on March 10, 1987 not to let her son join the military. She, however, replied that they
Jessie," appeals the decision of the Regional Trial Court at Sorsogon, Sorsogon, Branch 52, in were only seeking employment. Her son Alfredo was her companion in attending to their farm and he
Criminal Case No. 2773 entitled "People of the Philippines versus Jose Patriarca, Jr. alias 'Ka was a member of the Civilian Home Defense Force (CHDF) in their locality.
Django,' 'Carlos Narra,' 'Ka Jessie,' and 21 John Does" convicting him of murder and sentencing him
to reclusion perpetua. After she was informed by her tenant Alegria Moratelio Alcantara that her son was abducted by the
New People's Army (NPA) led by Patriarca, she reported the matter to the military and looked for
On August 16, 1990, an information for murder was filed against Jose Patriarca, Jr., alias "Ka him. She was informed by the residents of the place where the NPA passed, that they saw her son
Django," "Carlos Narra", "Ka Jessie," et al., charging them of murder committed as follows: hogtied, that her son even asked for drinking water, and complained that he was being maltreated by
the NPA. After three days of searching, a certain Walter Ricafort, an NPA member and a relative of
hers, notified her that her son Alfredo was killed by Jose Patriarca, Jr.
"That on or about the 30th day of June, 1987 at about 10:00 o'clock in the evening in the
Municipality of Donsol, Province of Sorsogon, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one In the municipal building, Nonito Malto likewise informed her of her son's death in the hands of Ka
another, armed with guns, forcibly took away ALFREDO AREVALO from his residence and brought Django. Consequently, a Death Certificate was issued by the Local Civil Registrar.
him to Sitio Abre, Mabini, Donsol, Sorsogon, and did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously with intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation, attack, assault and shoot When the skeletal remains of a man were recovered, she was able to identify them as belonging to
ALFREDO AREVALO thereby inflicting upon him mortal wounds, which directly caused his death her son by reason of the briefs found in the burial site. Her son, Alfredo Arevalo, used to print his
to the damage and prejudice of his legal heirs. name on the waistband of his briefs so that it would not get lost.

"CONTRARY TO LAW." The defense presented accused Jose Patriarca, Jr. and Francisco Derla who admitted that accused is a
member of the NPA operating in Donsol, Sorsogon, but denied ever abducting the victims in the three
Accused-appellant Jose Patriarca, Jr. was also charged with Murder for the killing of one Rudy de criminal cases filed against him.
Borja and a certain Elmer Cadag under Informations docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 2665 and
2672, respectively. On January 20, 1998, a decision was rendered convicting the accused and imposing the following
penalty:
Upon arraignment on November 25, 1993, accused-appellant, assisted by his counsel de parte,
pleaded not guilty to the crimes charged. Joint trial of the three cases was conducted considering the "WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds accused Jose Patriarca, Jr. alias Ka Django,
substantial identity of the facts and circumstances of the case. alias Carlos Narra guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder for the death of Alfredo
Arevalo and hereby sentences him to suffer an imprisonment of reclusion perpetua with all the
Prosecution witness Nonito Malto testified that on June 30, 1987, the accused, with ten (10) armed accessory provided by law and to pay the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity to the heirs of the
companions, requested permission to rest in his house, which was granted. They had with them a victim Alfredo Arevalo, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and as regards Crim.
person who was hogtied. Accused Patriarca asked that the lights in Malto's house be extinguished and Case No. 2665 and Crim. Case No. 2672, for failure of the prosecution to prove the guilt of the
Malto complied. accused beyond reasonable doubt, said Jose Patriarca alias Carlos Narra, Ka Django, is hereby
acquitted.
Around 2:00 o'clock in the early morning of July 1, 1987, Malto was awakened by a gunshot. When
he looked out, he saw Patriarca holding a gun and ordering the person who was hogtied to lie down. "In the service of his sentence, the accused shall be given full credit of his period of detention.
After several minutes, Malto heard two gunshots. He then heard the accused direct his companions to
carry away the dead man. "With cost de-oficio.

Nonito Malto, later on, learned that the dead man was Alfredo Arevalo when Patriarca went back to "SO ORDERED."1
his place, together with the military, on March 29, 1990.
109
Hence, this appeal where accused-appellant assigns the following lone error allegedly committed by Criminal Case No. 2773 was filed against him before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 52,
the trial court: Sorsogon, Sorsogon;

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF THE CRIME 'h) Liquidation of one DOMINGO DONQUILLO, a barangay captain, at Barangay
OF MURDER, AN OFFENSE COMMITTED IN PURSUANCE OR IN FURTHERANCE OF Tinanogan, Donsol, Sorsogon, on 20 September 1986 in which a (sic) Criminal Case No.
REBELLION. 2663 was filed against him.

Accused-appellant applied for amnesty under Proclamation No. 724 amending Proclamation No. 347, 'After a careful verification and evaluation on (sic) the claims of the applicant, the Local Amnesty
dated March 25, 1994, entitled "Granting Amnesty to Rebels, Insurgents, and All Other Persons Who Board concluded that his activities were done in the pursuit of his political beliefs. It thus
Have or May Have Committed Crimes Against Public Order, Other Crimes Committed in recommended on 20 May 1998 the grant of his application for amnesty.
Furtherance of Political Ends, and Violations of the Article of War, and Creating a National Amnesty
Commission." His application was favorably granted by the National Amnesty Board. Attached to 'The Commission, in its deliberation on the application on 22 October 1999, resolved to approve the
appellant's brief is the Notice of Resolution of the National Amnesty Commission (NAC) dated recommendation of the Local Amnesty Board.
November 17, 1999 which states:
'WHEREFORE, the application for amnesty of MR. JOSE NARRA PATRIARCA under
"Quoted below is a resolution of the National Amnesty Commission dated 22 October 1998.2 Proclamation No. 724 is hereby GRANTED for rebellion constituted by the acts detailed above,
provided they were committed on or before the date he was captured on 22 June 1988. Let a
'RESOLUTION NO. D-99-8683 refers to Application No. 02125 of MR. JOSE NARRA Certificate of Amnesty be issued in his favor as soon as this Resolution becomes final. It shall
PATRIARCA filed with the Local Amnesty Board of Legazpi City on 18 February 1997. become final after the lapse of fifteen (15) calendar days from receipt of this Notice, unless a Motion
for Reconsideration is filed with the Commission by any party within said period.'"3
'Applicant admitted joining the NPA in 1977. He served under the Sandatahang Yunit Pampropaganda
and participated in the following armed activities: On March 9, 2000, Hon. Alfredo F. Tadiar, Chairman of the National Amnesty Commission, wrote
'a) Encounter with the Philippine Army forces at Barangay Hirawon, Donsol, Sorsogon on the following letter to the Provincial Prosecutor of Sorsogon, Sorsogon:
14 February 1986;
'b) Encounter with elements of the Philippine Constabulary at Barangay Godon, Donsol, "Notice of Amnesty Grant to Jose N. Patriarca"
Sorsogon on 15 February 1986;
'c) Encounter with the Philippine Army forces at Barangay Banwang, Gurang, Donsol,
Sorsogon in 1987; "Pursuant to NAC Action No. 95-358-C, we are transmitting herewith the attached copy of
'd) Liquidation of ELMER CADAG an alleged military informer at Barangay Boroan, RESOLUTION NO. D-99-8683 granting amnesty to JOSE N. PATRIARCA. The grantee was
Donsol, Sorsogon, on 21 March 1987, in which a case of Murder in Criminal Case No. accused of the following cases:
2672 was filed against him before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 52, Sorsogon,
Sorsogon; "1. Murder in Criminal Case No. 2672 filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 52,
Sorsogon, Sorsogon.
'e) Liquidation of a certain RUDY DEBORJA, a thief and nuisance of the community, at
Donsol, Sorsogon, on 09 March 1984, in which a case of Murder in Criminal Case No. "2. Murder in Criminal Case No. 2665 filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 52,
2665 was filed against him before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 52, Sorsogon, Sorsogon, Sorsogon.
Sorsogon;
"3. Murder in Criminal Case No. 2664 filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 52,
'f) Liquidation of a certain ALEJANDRINO MILITANTE for his misconducts at San Sorsogon, Sorsogon.
Antonio, Donsol, Sorsogon, on 12 February 1986, in which a case of Murder in Criminal
Case No. 2664 was filed against him before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 52, Sorsogon, "4. Murder in Criminal Case No. 2773 filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 52,
Sorsogon; Sorsogon, Sorsogon.

'g) Liquidation of a certain ALFREDO AREVALO, a former member of the CHDF at Sitio
Abe (sic), Mabini, Donsol, Sorsogon, on 30 June 1987, in which a case of Murder in
110
"5. Murder in Criminal Case No. 2663 filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 52, the person released by amnesty stands before the law precisely as though he had committed no
Sorsogon, Sorsogon. offense.8

"He is currently detained at the Provincial Jail, Sorsogon, Sorsogon. Paragraph 3 of Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code provides that criminal liability is totally
extinguished by amnesty, which completely extinguishes the penalty and all its effects.
"The purpose of this transmittal is to provide you, as the chief prosecutor of the province, the
opportunity to take whatever action you may deem appropriate from receipt of this note. This grant of In the case of People vs. Casido,9 the difference between pardon and amnesty is given:
amnesty shall become final after the lapse of fifteen (15) calendar days from receipt of this Notice,
unless a Motion for Reconsideration is filed with the Commission by any party within said period. "Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive and as such it is a private act which must be pleaded and
proved by the person pardoned, because the courts take no notice thereof; while amnesty by
"Thank you for your continued support for the Peace Process."4 Proclamation of the Chief Executive with the concurrence of Congress, is a public act of which the
courts should take judicial notice. Pardon is granted to one after conviction; while amnesty is granted
The Office of the Solicitor General, in its letter dated June 23, 2000 to the National Amnesty to classes of persons or communities who may be guilty of political offenses, generally before or after
Commission, requested information as to whether or not a motion for reconsideration was filed by the institution of the criminal prosecution and sometimes after conviction. Pardon looks forward and
any party, and the action, if there was any, taken by the NAC.5 relieves the offender from the consequences of an offense of which he has been convicted, that is, it
abolishes or forgives the punishment, and for that reason it does 'not work the restoration of the rights
to hold public office, or the right of suffrage, unless such rights be expressly restored by the terms of
In his reply dated June 28, 2000, NAC Chairman Tadiar wrote, among other things, that there has the pardon,' and it 'in no case exempts the culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed
been no motion for reconsideration filed by any party.6 upon him by the sentence' (Article 36, Revised Penal Code). While amnesty looks backward and
abolishes and puts into oblivion the offense itself, it so overlooks and obliterates the offense with
Accused-appellant Jose N. Patriarca, Jr. was granted amnesty under Proclamation No. 724 dated May which he is charged that the person released by amnesty stands before the law precisely as though he
17, 1996. It amended Proclamation No. 347 dated March 25, 1994. had committed no offense."

Section 1 of Proclamation No. 724 reads thus: This Court takes judicial notice of the grant of amnesty upon accused-appellant Jose N. Patriarca, Jr.
Once granted, it is binding and effective. It serves to put an end to the appeal.10
"Section 1. Grant of Amnesty. - Amnesty is hereby granted to all persons who shall apply therefor and
who have or may have committed crimes, on or before June 1, 1995, in pursuit of their political WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of the Regional Trial Court at
beliefs, whether punishable under the Revised Penal Code or special laws, including but not limited Sorsogon, Sorsogon, Branch 52 in Criminal Case No. 2773 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
to the following: rebellion or insurrection; coup d'etat; conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion, Accused-appellant Jose N. Patriarca, Jr. is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime of murder.
insurrection, or coup d'etat; disloyalty of public officers or employees; inciting to rebellion or
insurrection; sedition; conspiracy to commit sedition; inciting to sedition; illegal assembly; illegal Pursuant to Resolution No. D-99-8683,11 Criminal Case Nos. 2663 and 2664, which are both filed in
association; direct assault; indirect assault; resistance and disobedience to a person in authority or the Regional Trial Court, Branch 53, Sorsogon, Sorsogon,12 are ordered DISMISSED. The release of
agents of such person; tumults and other disturbances of public order; unlawful use of means of Jose N. Patriarca who is presently detained at the Provincial Jail of Sorsogon is likewise ORDERED
publication and unlawful utterances; alarms and scandals; illegal possession of firearms, unless he is being detained for some other legal cause.
ammunitions, and explosives, committed in furtherance of, incident to, or in connection with the
crimes of rebellion and insurrection; and violations of Articles 59 (desertion), 62 (absence without
leave), 67 (mutiny or sedition), 68 (failure to suppress mutiny or sedition), 94 (various crimes), 96 The Director of Prisons is ordered to report within ten (10) days his compliance with this decision.
(conduct unbecoming an officer and gentleman), and 97 (general article) of the Articles of War;
Provided, That the amnesty shall not cover crimes against chastity and other crimes for personal SO ORDERED.
ends."1âwphi1
(67) G.R. No. 167571 November 25, 2008
Amnesty commonly denotes a general pardon to rebels for their treason or other high political
offenses, or the forgiveness which one sovereign grants to the subjects of another, who have LUIS PANAGUITON, JR., petitioner
offended, by some breach, the law of nations.7 Amnesty looks backward, and abolishes and puts into vs.
oblivion, the offense itself; it so overlooks and obliterates the offense with which he is charged, that

111
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, RAMON C. TONGSON and RODRIGO G. CAWILI, Tongson moved for the reconsideration of the resolution, but his motion was denied for lack of merit.
respondents.
On 15 March 1999, Assistant City Prosecutor Ma. Lelibet S. Sampaga (ACP Sampaga) dismissed the
DECISION complaint against Tongson without referring the matter to the NBI per the Chief State Prosecutor's
resolution. In her resolution,11 ACP Sampaga held that the case had already prescribed pursuant to Act
TINGA, J.: No. 3326, as amended,12 which provides that violations penalized by B.P. Blg. 22 shall prescribe after
four (4) years. In this case, the four (4)-year period started on the date the checks were dishonored, or
on 20 January 1993 and 18 March 1993. The filing of the complaint before the Quezon City
This is a Petition for Review1 of the resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated 29 October 2004 and Prosecutor on 24 August 1995 did not interrupt the running of the prescriptive period, as the law
21 March 2005 in CA G.R. SP No. 87119, which dismissed Luis Panaguiton, Jr.'s (petitioner's) contemplates judicial, and not administrative proceedings. Thus, considering that from 1993 to 1998,
petition for certiorari and his subsequent motion for reconsideration. 2 more than four (4) years had already elapsed and no information had as yet been filed against
Tongson, the alleged violation of B.P. Blg. 22 imputed to him had already prescribed. 13 Moreover,
The facts, as culled from the records, follow. ACP Sampaga stated that the order of the Chief State Prosecutor to refer the matter to the NBI could
no longer be sanctioned under Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure because the
In 1992, Rodrigo Cawili (Cawili) borrowed various sums of money amounting to P1,979,459.00 initiative should come from petitioner himself and not the investigating prosecutor. 14 Finally, ACP
from petitioner. On 8 January 1993, Cawili and his business associate, Ramon C. Tongson (Tongson), Sampaga found that Tongson had no dealings with petitioner. 15
jointly issued in favor of petitioner three (3) checks in payment of the said loans. Significantly, all
three (3) checks bore the signatures of both Cawili and Tongson. Upon presentment for payment on Petitioner appealed to the DOJ. But the DOJ, through Undersecretary Manuel A.J. Teehankee,
18 March 1993, the checks were dishonored, either for insufficiency of funds or by the closure of the dismissed the same, stating that the offense had already prescribed pursuant to Act No. 3326. 16
account. Petitioner made formal demands to pay the amounts of the checks upon Cawili on 23 May Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the DOJ resolution. On 3 April 2003, 17 the DOJ, this
1995 and upon Tongson on 26 June 1995, but to no avail.3 time through then Undersecretary Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez, ruled in his favor and declared that
the offense had not prescribed and that the filing of the complaint with the prosecutor's office
On 24 August 1995, petitioner filed a complaint against Cawili and Tongson 4 for violating Batas interrupted the running of the prescriptive period citing Ingco v. Sandiganbayan.18 Thus, the Office of
Pambansa Bilang 22 (B.P. Blg. 22)5 before the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office. During the the City Prosecutor of Quezon City was directed to file three (3) separate informations against
preliminary investigation, only Tongson appeared and filed his counter-affidavit. 6 Tongson claimed Tongson for violation of B.P. Blg. 22.19 On 8 July 2003, the City Prosecutor's Office filed an
that he had been unjustly included as party-respondent in the case since petitioner had lent money to information20 charging petitioner with three (3) counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22. 21
Cawili in the latter's personal capacity. Moreover, like petitioner, he had lent various sums to Cawili
and in appreciation of his services, he was However, in a resolution dated 9 August 2004,22 the DOJ, presumably acting on a motion for
reconsideration filed by Tongson, ruled that the subject offense had already prescribed and ordered
offered to be an officer of Roma Oil Corporation. He averred that he was not Cawili's business "the withdrawal of the three (3) informations for violation of B.P. Blg. 22" against Tongson. In
associate; in fact, he himself had filed several criminal cases against Cawili for violation of B.P. Blg. justifying its sudden turnabout, the DOJ explained that Act No. 3326 applies to violations of special
22. Tongson denied that he had issued the bounced checks and pointed out that his signatures on the acts that do not provide for a prescriptive period for the offenses thereunder. Since B.P. Blg. 22, as a
said checks had been falsified. special act, does not provide for the prescription of the offense it defines and punishes, Act No. 3326
applies to it, and not Art. 90 of the Revised Penal Code which governs the prescription of offenses
penalized thereunder.23 The DOJ also cited the case of Zaldivia v. Reyes, Jr.,24 wherein the Supreme
To counter these allegations, petitioner presented several documents showing Tongson's signatures, Court ruled that the proceedings referred to in Act No. 3326, as amended, are judicial proceedings,
which were purportedly the same as the those appearing on the checks. 7 He also showed a copy of an and not the one before the prosecutor's office.
affidavit of adverse claim wherein Tongson himself had claimed to be Cawili's business associate. 8
Petitioner thus filed a petition for certiorari25 before the Court of Appeals assailing the 9 August 2004
In a resolution dated 6 December 1995,9 City Prosecutor III Eliodoro V. Lara found probable cause resolution of the DOJ. The petition was dismissed by the Court of Appeals in view of petitioner's
only against Cawili and dismissed the charges against Tongson. Petitioner filed a partial appeal failure to attach a proper verification and certification of non-forum
before the Department of Justice (DOJ) even while the case against Cawili was filed before the
proper court. In a letter-resolution dated 11 July 1997, 10 after finding that it was possible for Tongson
to co-sign the bounced checks and that he had deliberately altered his signature in the pleadings shopping. The Court of Appeals also noted that the 3 April 2003 resolution of the DOJ attached to the
submitted during the preliminary investigation, Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuño directed the petition is a mere photocopy.26 Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the appellate court's
City Prosecutor of Quezon City to conduct a reinvestigation of the case against Tongson and to refer resolution, attaching to said motion an amended Verification/Certification of Non-Forum Shopping. 27
the questioned signatures to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). Still, the Court of Appeals denied petitioner's motion, stating that subsequent compliance with the
112
formal requirements would not per se warrant a reconsideration of its resolution. Besides, the Court Now, on the substantive aspects.
of Appeals added, the petition is patently without merit and the questions raised therein are too
unsubstantial to require consideration.28 Petitioner assails the DOJ's reliance on Zaldivia v. Reyes,35 a case involving the violation of a
municipal ordinance, in declaring that the prescriptive period is tolled only upon filing of the
In the instant petition, petitioner claims that the Court of Appeals committed grave error in dismissing information in court. According to petitioner, what is applicable in this case is Ingco v.
his petition on technical grounds and in ruling that the petition before it was patently without merit Sandiganbayan,36 wherein this Court ruled that the filing of the complaint with the fiscal's office for
and the questions are too unsubstantial to require consideration. preliminary investigation suspends the running of the prescriptive period. Petitioner also notes that
the Ingco case similarly involved the violation of a special law, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019,
The DOJ, in its comment,29 states that the Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing the petition for otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, petitioner notes. 37 He argues that
non-compliance with the Rules of Court. It also reiterates that the filing of a complaint with the sustaining the DOJ's and the Court of Appeals' pronouncements would result in grave injustice to him
Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City does not interrupt the running of the prescriptive period since the delays in the present case were clearly beyond his control. 38
for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. It argues that under B.P. Blg. 22, a special law which does not provide
for its own prescriptive period, offenses prescribe in four (4) years in accordance with Act No. 3326. There is no question that Act No. 3326, appropriately entitled An Act to Establish Prescription for
Violations of Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin,
Cawili and Tongson submitted their comment, arguing that the Court of Appeals did not err in is the law applicable to offenses under special laws which do not provide their own prescriptive
dismissing the petition for certiorari. They claim that the offense of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 has periods. The pertinent provisions read:
already prescribed per Act No. 3326. In addition, they claim that the long delay, attributable to
petitioner and the State, violated their constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases. 30 Section 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless otherwise provided in such acts,
prescribe in accordance with the following rules: (a) x x x; (b) after four years for those
The petition is meritorious. punished by imprisonment for more than one month, but less than two years; (c) x x x

First on the technical issues. Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of
the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the
institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment.
Petitioner submits that the verification attached to his petition before the Court of Appeals
substantially complies with the rules, the verification being intended simply to secure an assurance
that the allegations in the pleading are true and correct and not a product of the imagination or a The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty
matter of speculation. He points out that this Court has held in a number of cases that a deficiency in person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not
the verification can be excused or dispensed with, the defect being neither jurisdictional nor always constituting jeopardy.
fatal. 31
We agree that Act. No. 3326 applies to offenses under B.P. Blg. 22. An offense under B.P.
Indeed, the verification is merely a formal requirement intended to secure an assurance that matters Blg. 22 merits the penalty of imprisonment of not less than thirty (30) days but not more
which are alleged are true and correct–the court may simply order the correction of unverified than one year or by a fine, hence, under Act No. 3326, a violation of B.P. Blg. 22 prescribes
pleadings or act on them and waive strict compliance with the rules in order that the ends of justice in four (4) years from the commission of the offense or, if the same be not known at the
may be served,32 as in the instant case. In the case at bar, we find that by attaching the pertinent time, from the discovery thereof. Nevertheless, we cannot uphold the position that only the
verification to his motion for reconsideration, petitioner sufficiently complied with the verification filing of a case in court can toll the running of the prescriptive period.
requirement.
It must be pointed out that when Act No. 3326 was passed on 4 December 1926, preliminary
Petitioner also submits that the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition on the ground that investigation of criminal offenses was conducted by justices of the peace, thus, the phraseology in the
there was failure to attach a certified true copy or duplicate original of the 3 April 2003 resolution of law, "institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment," 39 and the prevailing
the DOJ. We agree. A plain reading of the petition before the rule at the time was that once a complaint is filed with the justice of the peace for preliminary
investigation, the prescription of the offense is halted. 40
Court of Appeals shows that it seeks the annulment of the DOJ resolution dated 9 August 2004, 33 a
certified true copy of which was attached as Annex "A." 34 Obviously, the Court of Appeals committed The historical perspective on the application of Act No. 3326 is illuminating. 41 Act No. 3226 was
a grievous mistake. approved on 4 December 1926 at a time when the function of conducting the preliminary
investigation of criminal offenses was vested in the justices of the peace. Thus, the prevailing rule at
113
the time, as shown in the cases of U.S. v. Lazada42 and People v. Joson,43 is that the prescription of the elapsed. Clearly, the delay was beyond petitioner's control. After all, he had already initiated the
offense is tolled once a complaint is filed with the justice of the peace for preliminary investigation active prosecution of the case as early as 24 August 1995, only to suffer setbacks because of the
inasmuch as the filing of the complaint signifies the DOJ's flip-flopping resolutions and its misapplication of Act No. 3326. Aggrieved parties, especially
those who do not sleep on their rights and actively pursue their causes, should not be allowed to
institution of the criminal proceedings against the accused. 44 These cases were followed by our suffer unnecessarily further simply because of circumstances beyond their control, like the accused's
declaration in People v. Parao and Parao45 that the first step taken in the investigation or examination delaying tactics or the delay and inefficiency of the investigating agencies.
of offenses partakes the nature of a judicial proceeding which suspends the prescription of the
offense.46 Subsequently, in People v. Olarte,47 we held that the filing of the complaint in the We rule and so hold that the offense has not yet prescribed. Petitioner 's filing of his complaint-
Municipal Court, even if it be merely for purposes of preliminary examination or investigation, affidavit before the Office of the City Prosecutor on 24 August 1995 signified the commencement of
should, and does, interrupt the period of prescription of the criminal responsibility, even if the court the proceedings for the prosecution of the accused and thus effectively interrupted the prescriptive
where the complaint or information is filed cannot try the case on the merits. In addition, even if the period for the offenses they had been charged under B.P. Blg. 22. Moreover, since there is a definite
court where the complaint or information is filed may only proceed to investigate the case, its finding of probable cause, with the debunking of the claim of prescription there is no longer any
actuations already represent the initial step of the proceedings against the offender, 48 and hence, the impediment to the filing of the information against petitioner.
prescriptive period should be interrupted.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated 29 October
In Ingco v. Sandiganbayan49 and Sanrio Company Limited v. Lim,50 which involved violations of the 2004 and 21 March 2005 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The resolution of the Department of
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019) and the Intellectual Property Code (R.A. No. Justice dated 9 August 2004 is also ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The Department of Justice is
8293), which are both special laws, the Court ruled that the ORDERED to REFILE the information against the petitioner.

prescriptive period is interrupted by the institution of proceedings for preliminary investigation No costs.
against the accused. In the more recent case of Securities and Exchange Commission v. Interport
Resources Corporation, et al.,51 the Court ruled that the nature and purpose of the investigation
conducted by the Securities and Exchange Commission on violations of the Revised Securities Act, 52
another special law, is equivalent to the preliminary investigation conducted by the DOJ in criminal
cases, and thus effectively interrupts the prescriptive period.

The following disquisition in the Interport Resources case53 is instructive, thus:

While it may be observed that the term "judicial proceedings" in Sec. 2 of Act No. 3326
appears before "investigation and punishment" in the old law, with the subsequent change
in set-up whereby the investigation of the charge for purposes of prosecution has become
the exclusive function of the executive branch, the term "proceedings" should now be
understood either executive or judicial in character: executive when it involves the
investigation phase and judicial when it refers to the trial and judgment stage. With this
clarification, any kind of investigative proceeding instituted against the guilty person which
may ultimately lead to his prosecution should be sufficient to toll prescription. 54

Indeed, to rule otherwise would deprive the injured party the right to obtain vindication on account of
delays that are not under his control.55 A clear example would be this case, wherein petitioner filed his
complaint-affidavit on 24 August 1995, well within the four (4)-year prescriptive period. He likewise
timely filed his appeals and his motions for reconsideration on the dismissal of the charges against

Tongson. He went through the proper channels, within the prescribed periods. However, from the
time petitioner filed his complaint-affidavit with the Office of the City Prosecutor (24 August 1995)
up to the time the DOJ issued the assailed resolution, an aggregate period of nine (9) years had

114

You might also like