10/27/2017 G.R. No. L-70987 September 29, 1988 - GREGORIO Y. LIMPIN, ET AL. v. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, ET AL.

T AL. : SEPTEMBER 198…

ChanRobles™ Virtual Law Library™ | chanrobles.com™

Like 0 Tweet Share

Search

Philippine Supreme Court Jurisprudence > Year 1988 > September 1988 Decisions > G.R. No. L-70987
September 29, 1988 - GREGORIO Y. LIMPIN, ET AL. v. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, ET AL.:

Custom Search
Search

ChanRobles On-Line Bar Review

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. L-70987. September 29, 1988.]

GREGORIO Y. LIMPIN, and ROGELIO M. SARMIENTO, Petitioners, v. INTERMEDIATE

APPELLATE COURT and GUILLERMO PONCE, Respondents.

Danilo A. Basa for petitioner Gregorio Y. Limpin, Jr.

Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala & Cruz Law Offices for petitioner Rogelio Sarmiento.

Sycip, Salazar, Hernandez & Gatmaitan Law Offices and Eugenio C. Lindo for respondent
Guillermo Ponce.

SYLLABUS

1. CIVIL LAW; CIVIL CODE; CREDIT TRANSACTIONS; MORTGAGE RIGHT OF REDEMPTION EXISTS IN
EXTRAJUDICIAL FORECLOSURE. — Under Act 3135, after an extrajudicial foreclosure, a mortgager has
the right of redemption which he may exercise within one year from the registration of the sheriff’s
certificate of sale.

2. SPECIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION; FORECLOSURE OF MORTGAGE; NO RIGHT OF REDEMPTION

EXISTS; EXCEPTION. — There is no right of redemption in judicial foreclosure, except where the
mortgagee is the Philippine National Bank, or a bank or banking institution (Rule 68, Sec. 3, Rules of
Court; Acts Nos. 2747 and 2938; Republic Act No. 337).

DebtKollect Company, Inc.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; EQUITY REDEMPTION, IN JUDICIAL FORECLOSURE; PERIOD TO REDEEM. — While
there is no right of redemption in judicial foreclosure, there is in favor of the mortgagor an equity of
redemption. An equity of redemption is the right of the mortgagor to extinguish the mortgage and retain
ownership of the property by paying the secured debt within the 90-day period after the judgment
becomes final, in accordance with Rule 68, or even after the foreclosure sale but prior to its confirmation.

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; JUNIOR ENCUMBRANCES HAVE RIGHT OF EQUITY OF REDEMPTION. — The equity of
redemption pertaining to the mortgagor is the same right that may be exercised by the mortgagor’s
successor in interest or third persons acquiring rights over the mortgaged property subordinate to the
mortgagee’s lien.

5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; UNFORECLOSED EQUITY OF REDEMPTION, RETAINED BY PARTIES NOT
IMPLEADED. — Where a subsequent or junior lienholder is not impleaded in the foreclosure proceedings,
any judgment in favor of the mortgagee is not binding upon him, he retains what is known as an
unforeclosed equity of redemption and a separate foreclosure proceeding should be brought to require
him to redeem from the first mortgagee or the party acquiring title to the mortgaged property at the
foreclosure sale within 90 days under penalty of losing said prerogative.

6. ID.; ID.; ID.; EQUITY OF REDEMPTION; GRANT OF EXTENSION MUST BE CLEAR AND UNEQUIVOCAL.
— The fact that private respondent recognized petitioners’ equity of redemption does not prevent the
redemption from lapsing where such recognition was made when there was as yet no order confirming
ChanRobles Intellectual Property the sale and private respondent’s equity of redemption still existed. Moreover, even assuming that a
Division period to redeem may be extended by the act of the party who would have been benefited by the

http://www.chanrobles.com/cralaw/1988septemberdecisions.php?id=779 1/5
10/27/2017 G.R. No. L-70987 September 29, 1988 - GREGORIO Y. LIMPIN, ET AL. v. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, ET AL. : SEPTEMBER 198…
September-1988 Jurisprudence
G.R. No. 76001 September 5, 1988 - PRODUCERS
BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION, ET AL.
G.R. No. L-31600 September 12, 1988 -
PRUDENTIAL BANK & TRUST CO. v. COMMUNITY
BUILDERS CO., INC., ET AL.
G.R. No. L-48762 September 12, 1988 - REPUBLIC
OF THE PHIL. v. SEGUNDO M. ZOSA
G.R. No. 76768 September 12, 1988 - CARLOS
KENG SENG v. LORENZO DE LA CRUZ, ET AL.
G.R. No. 80228 September 12, 1988 - PEOPLE OF
THE PHIL. v. NESTOR FERNANDEZ
G.R. No. L-57519 September 13, 1988 - DELFIN
ORODIO v. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
G.R. No. L-46881 September 15, 1988 - PEOPLE OF
THE PHIL. v. MARIANO CASTAÑEDA, JR.
G.R. No. L-47821 September 15, 1988 - BENITO
ROSALES, ET AL. v. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
G.R. No. 77090 September 16, 1988 - DIOSDADO
ESPADERA, ET AL. v. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
G.R. No. L-29320 September 19, 1988 - FELIPE
SEGURA, ET AL. v. NICOLAS SEGURA, ET AL.
G.R. No. L-44264 September 19, 1988 - HEDY Y.
GAN v. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
G.R. No. L-45388 September 19, 1988 - TACIANA B.
ESPEJO v. WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION
COMMISSION, ET AL.
G.R. No. L-47646 September 19, 1988 - PEOPLE OF
THE PHIL. v. CESAR R. MARAVILLA, ET AL.
G.R. Nos. L-48728-29 September 19, 1988 -
PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. ALBERTO RAMOS
G.R. No. L-60764 September 19, 1988 - PEOPLE OF
THE PHIL. v. ROBERTO BARDON, ET AL.
G.R. No. 71142 September 19, 1988 - PEOPLE OF
THE PHIL. v. LOPE MARALIT, ET AL.
G.R. No. 73794 September 19, 1988 - ETERNAL
GARDENS MEMORIAL PARKS CORPORATION v.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, ET AL.
G.R. No. 74711 September 19, 1988 - NATIONAL
STEEL CORPORATION v. NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION, ET AL.
G.R. No. 75395 September 19, 1988 - ESTELITO
BAGADIONG, ET AL. v. PLACIDA VDA. DE ABUNDO
G.R. No. 77210 September 19, 1988 - MARCOPPER
MINING CORPORATION v. LIWANAG PARAS BRIONES,
ET AL.
http://www.chanrobles.com/cralaw/1988septemberdecisions.php?id=779
expiration, the grant of such extension must be clear and unequivocal.
7. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; DUE PROCESS; PETITIONER WHO APPEALED THE
QUESTIONED DECISION CANNOT CLAIM DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS. — Since petitioner has appealed to
this court the decision of the court of appeals ordering the trial court to confirm the judicial foreclosure,
he cannot now claim that he was denied due process for alleged lack of notice. The denial of the appeal
sufficiently alerted him that confirmation could come at any time after the finality of this Court’s decision.
DECISION
NARVASA, J.:
Once again the parties are before this Court; this time, for a determination of whether or not the equity
of redemption recognized in favor of petitioner Rogelio M. Sarmiento in this Court’s judgment
promulgated on January 30, 1987, still subsists and may be exercised, more than a year after that
judgment had become final and executory. chanrobles virtualawlibrary chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph
The proceedings concern two (2) lots, then covered by TCTs Nos. 92836 and 92837, which, together with
two (2) others, were originally mortgaged in 1973 to herein private respondent Ponce by their former
owners, the Spouses Jose and Marcelina Aquino. These two lots were afterwards sold in 1978 by the
same Aquino Spouses to Butuan Bay Wood Export Corporation. Against this corporation herein petitioner
Limpin obtained a money judgment in 1979; and to satisfy the judgment, the two lots were levied on and
sold at public auction in 1980, Limpin being the highest bidder. Limpin later sold the lots to his co-
petitioner, Sarmiento.
Earlier however — or a day before levy was made on the two lots in execution of the judgment against
Butuan Bay Wood Export Corporation — Ponce had initiated judicial proceedings for the foreclosure of the
mortgage over said two (2) lots (together with the two (2) others mortgaged to him). Judgment was
rendered in his favor and became final; and at the ensuing foreclosure sale, the lots were acquired by
Ponce himself as highest bidder. Ponce then moved for confirmation of the foreclosure sale, but the Court
confirmed the sale of only two lots, refusing to do so as regards the two which had been subject of the
execution sale in Limpin’s favor (i.e., those covered by TCTs Nos. 92836 and 92837). chanrobles law library
It was to resolve the resulting dispute that Ponce instituted a special civil action in the Intermediate
Appellate Court, impleading Limpin and Sarmiento as indispensable parties respondents. That Court
rendered judgment on February 28, 1985 in Ponce’s favor; Limpin and Sarmiento appealed; this Court
denied their appeal.
The judgment of this Court of January 30, 1987 dismissed Sarmiento’s and Limpin’s petition for review on
certiorari of the Appellate Court’s decision of February 28, 1985. It in effect affirmed the latter’s decision
which inter alia ordered the Trial Court "to confirm the sale (of the lots formerly covered by TCT Nos.
92836 and 92837) and issue a writ of possession to . . . (Guillermo Ponce) with respect to the aforesaid
lots, subject to the equity of redemption of the respondent Rogelio V. Sarmiento," 1 Applying the doctrine
laid down in Santiago v. Dionisio, a 1953 decision of this Court, 2 the Intermediate Appellate Court’s
decision declared that "the sale to Ponce, as the highest bidder in the foreclosure sale of the two lots in
question should have been confirmed, subject to Limpin’s (and now Sarmiento’s) equity of redemption." cralaw
virtua1aw library
This Court’s aforesaid judgment also clearly and categorically sustained the exercise by the Appellate
Court of jurisdiction over the persons of Rogelio M. Sarmiento and Gregorio Limpin. 3 There can thus be
no question that the petitioners herein, said Rogelio Sarmiento and Gregorio Limpin, were affected and
are bound by the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court, and that of this Court affirming it. chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
Rogelio M. Sarmiento, particularly, was aware that the Trial Court had the ministerial duty to execute the
Appellate Court’s decision, i.e., to confirm the sale and issue a writ of possession as regards the aforesaid
lots, subject to the equity of redemption explicitly recognized in his favor in the decisions mentioned. He
knew that he had the prerogative to exercise his equity of redemption, if not from the moment that the
judgment of this Court became final and executory, 4 at least until the Court a quo, presided over by
Hon. Antonio Solano, subsequently confirmed the sale and issued a writ of possession in favor of
Guillermo Ponce in June, 1987. 5
He did not try to exercise that right before, at or about the time of the confirmation of the foreclosure
sale by Judge Solano. Instead, he instituted no less than two (2) actions in the same Regional Trial Court
— which were assigned to another branch, presided over by Hon. Teodoro Beltran — attempting to
relitigate precisely the same issues which this Court and the Intermediate Appellate Court had already
passed upon and resolved adversely to him. For doing so — for trifling with and abusing the processes of
the courts, and thus unwarrantedly delaying execution of the final and executory judgment against him
— he and his counsel were both found guilty of contempt and correspondingly punished by this Court, by
Resolution dated May 5, 1988. The same resolution also decreed the dismissal of the complaints in both
cases and the nullification and setting aside of the restraining or injunctive orders of Judge Beltran. chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
It was not until March 11, 1988 — nine months or so after entry of the judgment recognizing his equity
of redemption as successor-in-interest of the original mortgagors — that Sarmiento finally bestirred
himself to attempt to exercise his unforeclosed equity of redemption. On that day he filed a motion with
the Court presided over by Hon. Judge Antonio Solano, manifesting that he would exercise the right and
asked the Court to fix the redemption price. 6 The Court opined that "this should be the subject of the
agreement between Ponce and Sarmiento." 7
Sarmiento then wrote to Ponce on March 23, 1988 offering "P2.6 million as redemption price for the two
lots originally covered by TCTs Nos. 92836 and 92837, now 307100 and 307124." 8 Ponce’s answer,
dated March 25, 1988, rejected the offer and averred "that the period within which x x (Sarmiento) could
have exercised such right . . . (had) lapsed." 9 Sarmiento reacted by filing a motion with the Solano
Court, dated March 29, 1988, asking it to "fix the redemption price . . . and that the implementation of
the writ of possession be provisionally deferred." 10 An opposition was promptly filed by Ponce under
date of May 4, 1988 11 in which he argued that "Sarmiento’s right to exercise his equity of redemption
over those lots had long expired," the opportunity to exercise it having presented itself but not availed
of" (i) after . . . default in the performance of the conditions of the mortgage and (ii) before the Sheriff s
sale of the property and the judicial confirmation thereof" According to Ponce, "from October 17, 1982, .
. . (when) Sarmiento’s predecessors-in-interest defaulted in their obligations over the mortgaged
properties, up to June 17, 1987, when this . . . (Trial) Court confirmed the auction sale of those
properties, Sarmiento could (and should) have exercised his ‘equity of redemption.’" Judge Solano did not
share this view, and ruled accordingly. 12
The issue has been brought to this Court for resolution by Ponce’s "Motion for Clarification" dated May 27,
1988 and "Supplemental Motion . ." dated June 13, 1988, as to which Sarmiento has submitted a
Comment dated June 17, 1988. To the comment a reply has been presented by Ponce under date of
August 3, 1988.
Ponce states 13 that the term, equity of redemption, means "the right of the mortgagor to redeem the
mortgaged property after his default in the performance of the conditions of the mortgage but before the
2/5
10/27/2017 G.R. No. L-70987 September 29, 1988 - GREGORIO Y. LIMPIN, ET AL. v. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, ET AL. : SEPTEMBER 198…
G.R. Nos. 78535-36 September 19, 1988 - MANUEL
DY v. MATILDE SACAY
G.R. No. L-32684 September 20, 1988 - RAMON
TUMBAGAHAN v. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
G.R. No. L-59097 September 20, 1988 - PEOPLE OF
PHIL. v. ARSENIO D. TOLENTINO
G.R. No. 73418 September 20, 1988 - PELICULA
SABIDO, ET AL. v. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT,
ET AL.
G.R. No. 80006 September 21, 1988 - APOLONIA
BAUTISTA, ET AL. v. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
G.R. No. 80294-95 September 21, 1988 - CATHOLIC
VICAR APOSTOLIC OF THE MOUNTAIN PROVINCE v.
COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
G.R. No. 80992 September 21, 1988 - EDWIN
REANO, ET AL. v. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
G.R. No. L-36413 September 26, 1988 - MALAYAN
INSURANCE CO., INC. v. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
G.R. No. L-39910 September 26, 1988 - CECILIA
TEODORO DAYRIT, ET AL. v. FERNANDO A CRUZ
G.R. Nos. L-49762-64 September 26, 1988 - extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage. No such right is recognized in a judicial foreclosure except only
RANULFO PAMPARO v. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
G.R. No. L-68357 September 26, 1988 - SAMAHAN
NG MGA NANGUNGUPAHAN SA AZCARRAGA TEXTILE,
ET AL. v. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
G.R. No. L-68992 September 26, 1988 - PEOPLE OF
THE PHIL. v. FAUSTINO PACNIS
G.R. No. L-68993 September 26, 1988 - PEOPLE OF
THE PHIL. v. RUDY DOMINGO, ET AL.
G.R. Nos. L-69205-06 September 26, 1988 -
NUWHRAIN-BONANZA RESTAURANT CHAPTER v.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, ET AL.
G.R. No. L-69934 September 26, 1988 - PEOPLE OF
THE PHIL. v. MARIANITO INTINO
G.R. No. 73488 September 26, 1988 - PEOPLE OF
THE PHIL. v. TEODORO BALARES
G.R. No. 73859 September 26, 1988 - JUAN DE
CASTRO, ET AL. v. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT,
ET AL.
G.R. No. 73876 September 26, 1988 - PEOPLE OF
THE PHIL. v. LAURO G. CARIÑO, ET AL.
G.R. Nos. 74123-24 September 26, 1988 - PEOPLE
OF THE PHIL. v. RONILO L. PINLAC
G.R. No. 75816 September 26, 1988 - PEOPLE OF
THE PHIL. v. GAVINO AGUINALDO
G.R. No. 75877 September 26, 1988 - SANTOS
BERNARDO, ET AL. v. BALTAZAR R. DIZON
G.R. No. 76132 September 26, 1988 - PEOPLE OF
THE PHIL. v. FERNANDO CLAVO, JR.
G.R. No. 76711 September 26, 1988 - PEOPLE OF
THE PHIL. v. MARVIN H. TORRES, ET AL.
G.R. No. 77201 September 26, 1988 - AVENTINO C.
SASAN, ET AL. v. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
G.R. No. 77290 September 26, 1988 - DIVINA
JABALLAS v. CONSTRUCTION & DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 77951 September 26, 1988 -
COOPERATIVE RURAL BANK OF DAVAO CITY, INC. v.
PURA FERRER-CALLEJA, ET AL.
G.R. No. 78606 September 26, 1988 - GELACIO V.
SAMULDE v. RAMON M. SALVANI, JR.
G.R. No. 79891 September 26, 1988 - AURELIO M.
DE VERA v. C. F. SHARP & CO., INC., ET AL.
G.R. No. L-80383 September 26, 1988 - EMMANUEL
LABAJO v. PUREZA V. ALEJANDRO, ET AL.
G.R. No. 81163 September 26, 1988 - EDUARDO S.
BARANDA, ET AL. v. TITO GUSTILO, ET AL.
G.R. No. 81969 September 26, 1988 - JOCELYN
RULONA-AL AWADHI v. ABDULMAJID J. ASTIH
G.R. No. 82833 September 26, 1988 - 3M
PHILIPPINES, INC. v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
REVENUE
G.R. No. L-52034 September 27, 1988 - SALVADOR
LACORTE v. AMADO G. INCIONG, ET AL.
G.R. No. L-60935 September 27, 1988 - ANTONIO
GARCIA, JR. v. SANTIAGO RANADA, JR., ET AL.
http://www.chanrobles.com/cralaw/1988septemberdecisions.php?id=779
sale of the property or the (judicial) confirmation of the (Sheriff s) sale," citing Top Rate International
Services, Inc. v. I.A.C., 142 SCRA 473 [1976], or "the right to redeem mortgaged property by paying the
amount ordered by the court within a period of ninety days, or, even thereafter but before the
confirmation of the sale, invoking Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada v. Diez, 52 Phil. 275 [1928]. 14 On
this premise, he postulates that "from October 17, 1982, the date Sarmiento’s predecessors-in-interest
defaulted in their obligations over the mortgaged properties, up to June 17, 1987, when the lower court
confirmed the auction sale of those properties, Sarmiento could have exercised his ‘equity of
redemption." ‘ Not having done so within that time, his equity of redemption had been extinguished;
indeed, by opting to file "new suits against Ponce . . . seeking to annul Ponce’s titles over those
properties" instead of redeeming the same, he had "waived his equity of redemption (assuming such
right existed at the time the suits were commenced)." cralaw virtua1aw library
It is Sarmiento’s position, on the other hand, 15 that the "17 June 1987 confirmation of the sale of the
two lots could not have cut off . . . (his) equity of redemption;" in fact, "Ponce himself, in his ‘Urgent
Motion’ dated 1 June 1987, precisely prayed for the issuance of a writ of possession ‘subject to the equity
of redemption of Rogelio M. Sarmiento’ thereby recognizing Sarmiento’s equity of redemption beyond
confirmation date," 16 He also argues that he had not been informed of the time when his right of
redemption would be cut-off, 17 because he "never received a copy of any Motion for Confirmation, much
less notice of hearing thereon in violation of his right to due process;" that to hold otherwise would
"render nugatory the decision of the Court of Appeals and this . . . Court on the issue;" and that he is
entitled to a reasonable time, e.g., a year, for the exercise of his equity of redemption. 18
The equity of redemption is, to be sure, different from and should not be confused with the right of
redemption. 19
The right of redemption in relation to a mortgage — understood in the sense of a prerogative to re-
acquire mortgaged property after registration of the foreclosure sale — exists only in the case of the
where the mortgagee is the Philippine National Bank or a bank or banking institution.
Where a mortgage is foreclosed extrajudicially, Act 3135 grants to the mortgagor the right of redemption
within one (1) year from the registration of the sheriffs certificate of foreclosure sale. 20
Where the foreclosure is judicially effected, however, no equivalent right of redemption exists. The law 21
declares that a judicial foreclosure sale, "when confirmed by an order of the court, . . . shall operate to
divest the rights of all the parties to the action and to vest their rights in the purchaser, subject to such
rights of redemption as may be allowed by law." 22 Such rights exceptionally "allowed by law" (i.e., even
after confirmation by an order of the court) are those granted by the charter of the Philippine National
Bank (Acts No. 2747 and 2938), and the General Banking Act (R.A. 337). 23 These laws confer on the
mortgagor, his successors in interest or any judgment creditor of the mortgagor, the right to redeem the
property sold on foreclosure — after confirmation by the court of the foreclosure sale — which right may
be exercised within a period of one (1) year, counted from the date of registration of the certificate of
sale in the Registry of Property.
chanrobles law library
But, to repeat, no such right of redemption exists in case of judicial foreclosure of a mortgage if the
mortgagee is not the PNB or a bank or banking institution. In such a case, the foreclosure sale, "when
confirmed by an order of the court . . . shall operate to divest the rights of all the parties to the action
and to vest their rights in the purchaser." There then exists only what is known as the equity of
redemption. This is simply the right of the defendant mortgagor to extinguish the mortgage and retain
ownership of the property by paying the secured debt within the 90-day period after the judgment
becomes final, in accordance with Rule 68, or even after the foreclosure sale but prior to its confirmation.
Section 2, Rule 68 provides that —
". . . If upon the trial . . . the court shall find the facts set forth in the complaint to be true, it shall
ascertain the amount due to the plaintiff upon the mortgage debt or obligation, including interest and
costs, and shall render judgment for the sum so found due and order the same to be paid into court
within a period of not less than ninety (90) days from the date of the service of such order, and that in
default of such payment the property be sold to realize the mortgage debt and costs." 24
This is the mortgagor’s equity (not right) of redemption which, as above stated, may be exercised by him
even beyond the 90-day period "from the date of service of the order," and even after the foreclosure
sale itself, provided it be before the order of confirmation of the sale. 25 After such order of confirmation,
no redemption can be effected any longer.
It is this same equity of redemption that is conferred by law on the mortgagor’s successors-in-interest, or
third persons acquiring rights over the mortgaged property subsequent, and therefore subordinate, to the
mortgagee’s lien. 26 If these subsequent or junior lien-holders be not joined in the foreclosure action, the
judgment in the mortgagor’s favor is ineffective as to them, of course. In that case, they retain what is
known as the "unforeclosed equity of redemption," and a separate foreclosure proceeding should be
brought to require them to redeem from the first mortgagee, or the party acquiring title to the
mortgaged property at the foreclosure sale, within 90 days, 27 under penalty of losing that prerogative to
redeem. In the case at bar, however, there is no occasion to speak of any "unforeclosed equity of
redemption" in Sarmiento’s favor since he was properly impleaded in the judicial proceeding where his
and Ponce’s rights over the mortgaged property were ventilated and specifically adjudicated. chanrobles.com : virtual law library
Under the circumstances obtaining in this case, the plain intendment of the Intermediate Appellate Court
was to give to Sarmiento, not the unforeclosed equity of redemption pertaining to a stranger to the
foreclosure suit, but the same equity of redemption possessed by the mortgagor himself. The judgment
cannot be construed as contemplating or requiring the institution of a separate suit by Ponce to compel
Sarmiento to exercise his unforeclosed equity of redemption, or as granting Sarmiento the option to
redeem at any time that he pleases, subject only to prescription. This would give rise to that multiplicity
of proceedings which the law eschews. The judgment plainly intended that Sarmiento exercise his option
to redeem, as successor of the mortgagor.
Upon the facts on record, Sarmiento cannot be heard to complain of denial of due process for alleged
lack of notice of any motion or hearing for confirmation of sale. The Decision of the Intermediate
Appellate Court which he and his predecessor, Limpin, had appealed to this Court specifically ordered the
Trial Court to confirm 28 the judicial foreclosure sale in favor of Ponce over the two lots, in these terms:
29
"WHEREFORE, the orders dated October 16, 1983 and December 19, 1983 of the respondent court, so far
as they deny the confirmation of the sale of the lots formerly covered by TCT Nos. 92836 and 92837, are
SET ASIDE, and the respondent court is hereby ORDERED to confirm the sale and issue a writ of
possession to the petitioner with respect to the aforesaid lots, subject to the equity of redemption of the
respondent Rogelio V. Sarmiento. Without costs." cralaw virtua1aw library
Given the fact that said appealed orders of the Trial Court had been issued upon motion for confirmation
earlier made by Ponce — which was duly served and heard — the aforecited Decision of the Intermediate
Appellate Court can be construed in nowise than as a peremptory command to the Trial Court to confirm
the sale as directed, motu proprio, and without the need of any further motion or other action on the part
of Ponce. The rejection by this Court of Sarmiento’s and Limpin’s appeal in its own Decision of January
30, 1987, which imported nothing less than a total affirmance of the Decision of the Appellate Court,
3/5
10/27/2017 G.R. No. L-70987 September 29, 1988 - GREGORIO Y. LIMPIN, ET AL. v. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, ET AL. : SEPTEMBER 198…
G.R. No. L-75880 September 27, 1988 - BERNARDO
M. CORDIAL v. PEOPLE OF THE PHIL., ET AL.
G.R. No. L-45447 September 28, 1988 - CARLITO V.
SEMBRANO v. PEDRO A. RAMIREZ, ET AL.
G.R. No. L-54287 September 2, 1988 - REPUBLIC
PLANTERS BANK v. CONRADO M. MOLINA, ET AL.
G.R. No. L-75569 September 28, 1988 - BOARD OF
LIQUIDATORS v. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
G.R. No. L-80380 September 28, 1988 - CARLOS
BELL RAYMOND, ET AL. v. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
G.R. No. L-82173 September 28, 1988 - EDGAR S.
ASUNCION v. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
G.R. No. L-37079 September 29, 1988 - HEIRS OF
ZOILO LLIDO v. PAULINO S. MARQUEZ, ET AL.
G.R. No. L-41322 September 29, 1988 - provide against its lapsing. Moreover, assuming for the sake of argument that a resolutory period fixed by
MUNICIPALITY OF KAPALONG, ET AL. v. FELIX L.
MOYA, ET AL.
G.R. No. L-44347 September 29, 1988 - VICENTE
TAN v. CITY OF DAVAO
G.R. No. L-49731 September 29, 1988 - ALFREDO
SERING v. RESTITUTO PLAZO, ET AL.
G.R. No. L-70987 September 29, 1988 - GREGORIO
Y. LIMPIN, ET AL. v. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE
COURT, ET AL.
G.R. No. L-75736 September 29, 1988 - Cruz, Gancayco, Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
ASSOCIATED LABOR UNIONS (ALU-TUCP), ET AL. v.
ANTONIO V. BORROMEO, ET AL.
G.R. No. L-80457 September 29, 1988 - PEOPLE OF
THE PHIL. v. CASIANO ROSE, SR., ET AL.
G.R. No. L-80737 September 29, 1988 -
PHILIPPINE GRAPHIC ARTS, INC., ET AL. v.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, ET AL.
G.R. No. L-81760 September 29, 1988 - EDGARDO
L. STO. DOMINGO v. SEDFREY A. ORDOÑEZ, ET AL.
G.R. No. L-82542 September 29, 1988 - BARRY
JOHN PRICE, ET AL. v. UNITED LABORATORIES
G.R. No. L-40218 September 30, 1988 - REPUBLIC
OF THE PHIL. v. ALEJANDRO E. SEBASTIAN, ET AL.
G.R. No. L-50168 September 30, 1988 - HEIRS OF
GAVINO SABANAL v. BENJAMIN K. GOROSPE, ET AL.
G.R. No. L-65935 September 30, 1988 - FILINVEST
CREDIT CORPORATION v. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE
COURT, ET AL.
G.R. No. L-69136 September 30, 1988 -
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE v. MEGA
GENERAL MERCHANDISING CORPORATION, ET AL.
G.R. Nos. L-74610-11 September 30, 1988 - ALGA
MOHER INTERNATIONAL PLACEMENT SERVICES v.
DIEGO P. ATIENZA, ET AL.
G.R. No. L-74811 September 30, 1988 - CHUA YEK
HONG v. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, ET AL.
G.R. No. L-77032 September 30, 1988 - EXCEL
AGRO-INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION v. JUAN T.
GOCHANGCO, ET AL.
G.R. No. L-79488 September 30, 1988 - REPUBLIC
PLANTERS BANK v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION, ET AL.
G.R. No. L-80040 September 30, 1988 - ISMAEL
AMORGANDA, ET AL. v. COURT APPEALS, ET AL.
G.R. No. L-81381 September 30, 1988 - EFIGENIO
S. DAMASCO v. HILARIO L. LAQUI, ET AL.
http://www.chanrobles.com/cralaw/1988septemberdecisions.php?id=779
should therefore have sufficiently alerted Sarmiento that confirmation could come at any time after this
Court’s Decision became final, with or without any action from Ponce. He cannot, in the circumstances,
claim unfair surprise. He should, upon being notified of this Court’s Decision, have taken steps to redeem
the properties in question or, at the very least, served the Trial Court and Ponce with notice of his
intention to exercise his equity of redemption. There was certainly time enough to do this — the order
confirming the foreclosure sale issuing only on June 17, 1987 — had he not occupied himself with the
fruitless maneuverings to re-litigate the issues already recounted. Indeed, had he made an attempt to
redeem, even belatedly but within a reasonable period of time after learning of the order of confirmation
(the record shows he did learn of it within three [3] days after its issuance), 30 he might perhaps have
given the Court some reason to consider his bid on equitable grounds. He did not. He let nine (9) months
pass, to repeat, in carrying out improper (and contumacious) stratagems to negate the judgments
against him, before making any such move. chanrobles law library : red
Neither can Sarmiento acceptably claim that Ponce, by moving for a writ of possession subject to his
(Sarmiento’s) equity of redemption, recognized the existence and enforceability of that prerogative
beyond the prescribed cut-off date of confirmation of the sale. Such an interpretation of the motion is
totally unwarranted, given the fact that said motion was made at a time (June 1, 1987) when there was
as yet no order confirming the sale and, since Sarmiento’s equity of redemption then still unquestionably
existed, there was hardly occasion or for that matter, any reason as far as Ponce was concerned, to
law may be extended by act of the party in whose favor its expiration would operate, that act must
bespeak a clear and unequivocal intent to grant such an extension. No such clear grant can be inferred
from the terms of Ponce’s motion, which can, and in fact should be, read as a mere affirmation that there
existed at the time an equity of redemption in Sarmiento’s favor. cralawnad
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby rules that the equity of redemption claimed and invoked by Rogelio M.
Sarmiento over the properties originally covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 92836 and 92837
(now by TCTs Numbered 307100 and 307124), Registry of Deeds of Quezon City, subject of this case,
lapsed and ceased to exist without having been properly exercised, on June 17, 1987, with the issuance
by the Trial Court of the Order confirming the sheriff’s sale (on judicial foreclosure) of said, properties in
favor of Guillermo Ponce.
Endnotes:
1. At p. 1; Emphasis supplied.
2. 92 Phil. 495.
3. At pp. 7-8; and p. 4, Resolution, May 5, 1988.
4. The petitioners’ motion for reconsideration of the judgment was denied with finality by
the Court’s Resolution dated April 27, 1987 (Rollo, p. 363), and entry of judgment was
made on June 1, 1987 (Rollo, p. 364).
5. The writ of possession was issued, more precisely, on June 17, 1987 (Rollo, p. 386).
6. "Motion (Ex Abundanti Cautela)," Annex 1 of Sarmiento’s Comment dated 17 June 1988.
7. Order, March 17, 1988, Annex 2 of same Comment.
8. Annex 3 of Sarmiento Comment.
9. Annex 4, id.
10. Annex 6, id.
11. Annex 7, id.
12. In his Order of April 8, 1988, he declared that Ponce’s theory "would render nugatory
and empty the decision of the Appellate Court on this issue" (Annex 8, Comment of June
17, 1988, supra); and in his Order dated July 8, 1988, His Honor denied Ponce’s motion for
reconsideration dated May 4, 1988.
13. Reply to Comment, Aug. 3, 1988.
14. Drawing attention, too, to Quimson v. PNB, 36 SCRA 265; Villar v. Javier de Paderanga,
97 Phil. 604; Anderson v. Reyes, 54 Phil. 944.
15. Comment, June 17, 1988.
16. Emphasis supplied.
17. Citing Tiglao v. Botones, 90 Phil. 275.
18. Invoking Pascua v. Perez, 10 SCRA 198; Doronila v. Basquez, 72 Phil. 572; de Castro v.
Olondriz, 50 Phil. 725; La Urbana v. Belando, 54 Phil. 930.
19. Top Rate International Services v. IAC, Et Al., 142 SCRA 467, supra.
20. Salazar v. Meneses, 8 SCRA 495; General v. Barrameda, 69 SCRA 182; Gorospe v.
Santos, 69 SCRA 191; PNB v. CA, 94 SCRA 357.
21. Sec. 3, Rule 68, Rules of Court.
22. Emphasis supplied.
23. SEE Moran, Comments on the Rules, 1970 ed., Vol. 3, p. 273, citing Gonzales v. PNB,
48 Phil. 824, 828; and Martin, Rules of Court, etc., 3rd ed., Vol. 3, p. 289, citing Villar v.
Javier de Paderanga, 97 Phil. 64; Piano v. Cayanong, 7 SCRA 397.
24. Emphasis supplied.
25. Anderson v. Reyes, 54 Phil. 944; Grimalt v. Velasquez, 36 Phil. 936; La Urbana v.
Belando, 54 Phil. 930; Villar v. Paderanga, 51 O.G. 5162, cited in Moran, op cit., at p. 273.
26. E.g., by second mortgage or subsequent attachment or judgment.
27. The period fixed in Section 2, Rule 68 for the mortgagor himself to redeem.
4/5
10/27/2017 G.R. No. L-70987 September 29, 1988 - GREGORIO Y. LIMPIN, ET AL. v. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, ET AL. : SEPTEMBER 198…

28. Something which it had earlier refused to do.

29. Rollo, p. 26.

30. Rollo, p. 382.

Back to Home | Back to Main

QUICK SEARCH

1901 1902 1903 1904 1905 1906 1907 1908

1909 1910 1911 1912 1913 1914 1915 1916
1917 1918 1919 1920 1921 1922 1923 1924
1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932
1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939 1940
1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 1946 1947 1948
1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956
1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964
1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
2013 2014 2015 2016

Main Indices of the Library ---> Go!

Copyright © 1998 - 2017 ChanRobles Publishing Company | Disclaimer | E-mail Restrictions ChanRobles™ Virtual Law Library™ | chanrobles.com™ RED

http://www.chanrobles.com/cralaw/1988septemberdecisions.php?id=779 5/5