CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

In the ancient days of laissez- fair practice, when industrial relations were ruled and
administered by the unprincipled and harsh weighted law of hire and fire, the administration
was in supreme command and its best with the passage of time, notions of social justice
established and the expanding horizons of socio-economic justice demanded statutory
protection to the workmen. The freedom to hire men/women is rooted in the management
philosophy and thinking and the liberty is restrained to firing them arbitrarily or at its own
will.

Now it is too late to stress absolute and unconditional freedom of an employer to impose any
condition which he adores on his employee. To get rid of an unproductive, unwanted and
erring employee shall have to initiate disciplinary act against him as per the provisions of
Standing orders or Service Rules and by following principles of natural justice in holding the
domestic investigation for proving the alleged misconduct against him.

Handling of the disciplinary matters has become the most problematic task of the
management as well as for the defence. For the management, it is a tremendously volatile
matter in industrial relations and any pitfall on this score is bound to fill a cup of sorrows for
the management. He cannot axe an employee at his individual will. On the other hand for the
defence representative, it is not only matter of defending the wrong but his ability to lead the
workmen is also at check.

Natural justice needs that administrators adhere to a reasonable decision-making procedure.

Although just procedures try to result in better decisions, the concern here is not whether the
decision itself is reasonable: it is the decision-making process that must be reasonable.
Sometimes statutes require administrators to make a decision that could be regarded as
prejudicial- for example, to require someone to pay an overpaid allowance. For legal
purposes, however, a just decision is one that is properly made, in accordance with the statute
and the necessities of natural justice.

Natural Justice is an important concept in administrative law. The principles of natural justice
of fundamental rules of procedure are the preliminary basis of a good administrative set up of
any country. Natural justice represents higher procedural rules developed by judges, which
every administrative authority must follow in taking any decision adversely affecting the
rights of a private individual1. Certain fundamental rules which are so necessary to the proper
exercise of power that they are projected from the judicial to the administrative sphere2. In
fact, natural justice is price of the rule of law3.

It could just be referred to as ‘Procedural Fairness’, with a purpose of ensuring that decision-
making is fair and reasonable. This very concept has meant different things to different
peoples at different times. In its widest sense, it was formerly used as a synonym for natural
law. It has been used to mean that reasons must be given for decisions; that a body deciding
an issue must only act on evidence of probative value. Some have asserted that the maxim
Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea is a principle of natural justice4. Whatever the
meaning of natural justice may have been, and still is to other people, the common law
lawyers have used the term in a technical manner to mean that in certain circumstances
decisions affecting the rights of citizens must only be reached after a fair hearing has been
given to the individual concerned. And in this context fair hearing requires two things,
namely, AUDI ALTERAM PARTEM and NEMO DEBET ESSE JUDEX IN PROPRIA
SUA CAUSA.

There are two main rules of natural justice. The ‘hearing rule’ is that people who will be
affected by a projected decision must be given an opportunity to express their views to the
judgement maker. The ‘bias rule’ is that the judgment maker must be impartial and must have
no personal stake in the matter to be decided. This guide deals with deliberations that
commonly rise when the rules of natural justice are applied to administrative decision
making.

1
Dr. I. P. Massey. Administrative Law, p. 170 (2nd edn.)
2
H. W. R. Wade, Administrative Law, p. 154 (2nd edn.)
3
M. Sikri, J, in Board of H. S. & I. E., U. P. Vs. Chitra, AIR 1970 SC 1039, 1040
4
Paul Jackson: Natural Law (1973) pp. 1-2
 CHAPTER II

ORIGIN OF THE CONCEPT

It is said that principles of natural justice is of very early origin and was known to Greek and
Romans. The Principles were acknowledged as early as in the days of Adam and of
Kautilya’s Arthashastra. According to the Bible when Adam & Eve ate the fruit of
knowledge, which was forbidden by God, the latter did not pass sentence on Adam before he
was called upon to defend himself. Same thing was repeated in case of Eve.

Later on, the principle of natural justice was accepted by English Jurist to be so essential as to
over-ride all laws.

The principles of natural justice were related with a few ‘accepted rules’ which have been
fabricated up and prominent over a long period of time. The word ‘Natural Justice’
establishes justice according to one’s own morality. It is derived from the Roman Concept
‘jus- naturale’ and ‘Lex- naturale’ which intended principle of natural law, natural justice,
eternal law, natural equity or good conscience. Lord Evershed, Master of the Rolls in Vionet
v Barrett remarked, “Natural Justice is the natural sense of what is right and wrong5.”

In India the principle is prevalent from the early times. We find it rose in Kautllya’s
Arthashastra. In this context, in the case of Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election
Commissioner,6 may be usefully quoted:

“Indeed, natural justice is a pervasive facet of secular law where a spiritual touch enlivens
legislation, administration and adjudication, to make fairness a creed of life. It has many
colours and shades, many forms and shapes and save where valid law excludes, it applies
when people are affected by acts of authority. It is the bone of healthy government,
recognised from earliest times and not a mystic testament of judge-made law. Indeed from the
legendary days of Adam-and of Kautlly’s Arthashastra- the rule of law has had this stamp of
natural justice, which makes it social justice. He need not go into these deeps for the present
except to indicate that the roots of natural justice and its foliage are noble and not new-
fangled”.

5
1985, 55LLJ QB, 39, (Page 45)
6
AIR 1978 SC 851, (para 43)
 CHAPTER III

PRINCIPLE AND ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF NATURAL JUSTICE

In a famous English decision in Abbott vs. Sullivan7, it is stated that “the Principles of
Natural Justice are easy to proclaim, but their precise extent is far less easy to define”. It has
been stated that there is no single definition of Natural Justice and it is only possible to
enumerate with some certainty the main principles.

During the earlier days the expression natural Justice was often used interchangeably with
the expression natural Law, but in the recent times a restricted meaning has been given to
describe certain rules of Judicial Procedure.

In the famous Maneka Gandhi vs. Union of India8, the Hon’ble Supreme Court discussed the
increasing importance of Natural Justice and observed that Natural Justice is a great
humanizing principle intended to invest law with fairness and to secure Justice and over the
years it has grown in to a widely pervasive rule.

The Supreme Court extracted a speech of Lord Morris in the House of Lords which is an very
interesting speech “That the conception of natural justice should at all stages guide those who
discharge judicial functions is not merely an acceptable but is an essential part of the
philosophy of the law.

We often speak of the rules of natural justice. But there is nothing rigid or mechanical about
them. What they comprehend has been analysed and described in many authorities. But any
analysis must bring into relief rather their spirit and their inspiration than any neither
precision of definition nor precision as to application.

Natural justice, it has been said, is only “fair play in action”. Nor do we wait for directions
from Parliament. The common law has abundant riches; there may we find what Byles called
“the justice of the common law”, thus, the soul of natural justice is fair play in action and that
is why it has received the widest recognition throughout the democratic world.”

7
(1952) 1 K.B.189 at 195
8
AIR 1978 SC 597
 CHAPTER IV

RULES OF PRINCIPLE OF NATURAL JUSTICE

 Nemo judex, in causa sua: No one should be made a judge in his own cause or
the rule against bias. It is also called as the ‘doctrine of bias’ as the judge may have a
prejudice in the case. It has been pithily put by Sir Edward Coke, namely, Vacate,
Interrogate and Judicate, i.e., call, question, and adjudicates. However, this concept
has undergone lot of changes in recent times, but fundamental still stands the same.
 Audi alteram partem: Hear the other party or the rule of fair hearing or the rule
that no one should be condemned unheard. In other words, No person accused of any
charge or likely to suffer any civil consequences, must be adjudged unless and until
he is aware of the proceedings together with a notice thereon and an opportunity to
present his case fully.
 Reasoned Decisions: Speaking orders, it is an order speaking for itself and giving
reasons. Lord Denning says, the giving of reasons is one of the fundamentals of good
administration.
 CHAPTER V

RULE AGAINST BIAS (NEMO JUDEX CAUSA SUA)

The first principle is that ‘No man shall be a judge in his own cause’ i.e. to say, the deciding
authority must be impartial and without bias. It implies that no man can act as a judge for a
cause in which he himself has some interest, may be pecuniary or otherwise. Pecuniary
interest affords the strongest proof against impartiality. The emphasis is on the objectivity in
dealing with and deciding a matter. Justice Gajendragadkar, observed in a case reported:

“It is obvious that pecuniary interest, howsoever small it may be, in a subject matter of the
proceedings would wholly disqualify a member from acting as a judge”.9

Lord Hardwick observed in one of the cases, “In a matter of so tender a nature, even the
appearance of evil is to be avoided.”

Yet it has been laid down as principle of law that pecuniary interest would disqualify a judge
to decide the natter even though it is not proved that the decision was in any way affected.
This is thus a matter of faith, which a common man must have, in the deciding authority.

The word ‘bias’ in popular English parlance stands included with in the attributes and broader
purview of the word ‘malice’ which is common acceptation means and implies ‘spite’ or ‘ill-
will’ and it is now well settled that mere general statements will not be sufficient for the
purpose of indication of ill-will.

There must be cognet evidence available on record to come to a conclusion as to whether in

fact there was existing a bias which resulted in the miscarriage of justice. It is a fundamental
and well established principle, not only in public administration but also in the procedure of
courts that the decision-maker should be free from bias so that fair and genuine consideration
is given to arguments advanced by the parties

A person is barred from deciding any case in which he or she may be, or may fairly be
suspected to be, biased. This principle embodies the basic concept of impartiality, and applies
to courts of law, tribunals, arbitrators and all those having the duty to act judicially. A public
authority has a duty to act judicially whenever it makes decisions that affect people's rights or
interests, and not only when it applies some judicial-type procedure in arriving at decisions.

9
M/s Builders Supply Corporation v. The Union of India and others, AIR 1965 SC 1061
The basis on which impartiality operates is the need to maintain public confidence in the
legal system.

The rule against bias flows from following two principles: -

 No one should be a judge in his own cause

 Justice should not only be done but manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done.

Thus a judge should not only be impartial but should be in a position to apply his mind
objectively to the dispute before him.

The rule against bias thus has two main aspects: -

 The administrator exercising adjudicatory powers must not have any personal or
proprietary interest in the outcome of the proceedings.
 There must be real likelihood of bias. Real likelihood of bias is a subjective term,
which means either actual bias or a reasonable suspicion of bias. It is difficult to prove
the state of mind of a person. Therefore, what the courts see is whether there is
reasonable ground for believing that the deciding factor was likely to have been
biased.

Possible sources of bias, for and against, are infinitely varied but they can be grouped into
four main categories. The most obvious source of bias is for the decision-maker to have a
financial interest in the matter to be decided. Bias may also arise from the decision maker’s
personal attitudes, relationships or beliefs in the case. Thirdly, loyalty to an institution can
result in the decision-maker being so committed to the objectives or interests of that
institution, that they might be incapable of holding the balance fairly between these
objectives and other interests. Finally, prior involvement in a case or pre-judgement of the
issues can also lead to bias. Whether other relationships between the decision-maker and the
parties will amount to objectionable bias so as to disqualify the decision-maker is often a
matter of fine judgement.

Bias can take many forms: -

 Personal bias: Personal bias arises from a certain relationship equation between the
deciding authority and the parties which incline him unfavourably or otherwise on the
side of one of the parties before him. When the adjudicator is a relation of one of the
 parties, or when a person sits on the selection board to select persons for a post for
which he himself is a candidate, even though he may not participate in its
deliberations when his name is considered.
 Pecuniary bias: A direct pecuniary interest, howsoever small or insignificant, will
disqualify a person from acting as a Judge.
 Departmental bias: The problem of departmental bias is something which is
inherent in the administrative process, and if it is not effectively checked, it may
negate the very concept of fairness in the administrative proceeding.
 Bias on judicial obstinacy: The word Obstinacy implies unreasonable and
unwavering persistence and the deciding officer would not take ‘no’ for an answer.
This new category of bias was discovered in a situation where a judge of the Calcutta
High Court upheld his own judgment while sitting in appeal against his own
judgment. Of course a direct violation of the rule that no judge can sit in appeal
against his own judgment is not possible, therefore, this rule can only be violated
indirectly. In this case in a fresh writ petition the judge validated his own order in an
earlier writ petition which had been overruled by the Division Bench. What applies to
judicial process can be applied to administrative process as well.
 Real Likelihood of Bias/Reasonable Suspicion of Bias: However, in order
to challenge administrative action successfully on the ground of personal bias, it is
essential to prove that there is a “reasonable suspicion of bias” or a “real likelihood of
bias”. The “reasonable suspicion” test looks mainly to outward appearance, and the
“real likelihood” test focuses on the court’s own revaluation of possibilities. What the
courts see is whether there is a reasonable ground of believing that the deciding
officer was likely to have been biased. In deciding the Question of bias judges have to
take into consideration the human possibilities and the ordinary course of human
conduct.
 Subject matter bias: Those cases fall within this category where the deciding
officer is directly, or otherwise, involved in the subject-matter of the case. Here again
mere involvement would not vitiate the administrative action unless there is a real
likelihood of bias.
A.K.KRIPAK V. UOI10

In this case, Naquishband, who was the acting Chief Conservator of Forests, was a member
of the Selection Board and was also a candidate for selection to All India cadre of the Forest
Service. Though he did not take part in the deliberations of the Board when his name was
considered and approved, the SC held that `there was a real likelihood of a bias for the mere
presence of the candidate on the Selection Board may adversely influence the judgement of
the other members'.

SC also made the following observations: -

1. The dividing line between an administrative power and quasi-judicial power is quite thin
and is being gradually obliterated. Whether a power is administrative or quasi-judicial, one
has to look into –

a) the nature of power conferred

b) the person on whom it is conferred
c) the framework of the law conferring that power
d) the manner in which that power is expected to be exercised.

2. The principles of natural justice also apply to administrative proceedings,

3. The concept of natural justice is to prevent miscarriage of justice and it entails -

a) No one shall be a judge of his own cause.

b) No decision shall be given against a party without affording him a reasonable hearing.
c) The quasi-judicial enquiries should be held in good faith and not arbitrarily or
unreasonably.

J.MOHOPATRA & CO. V. STATE OF ORISSA11

SC quashed the decision of the Textbooks' selection committee because some of its members
were also the authors of the books, which were considered for selection. The Court concluded
that withdrawal of person at the time of consideration of his books is not sufficient as the
element of quid pro quo with other members cannot be eliminated.

10
AIR 1970SC 150
11
1984 AIR 1572, 1985 SCR (1) 322
ASHOK KUMAR YADAV V. STATE OF HARYANA12

Issue

Whether the selection of candidate would vitiate for bias if close relative of members of the
Public Service Commission is appearing for selection?

Held

The SC laid down the following propositions: -

a) Such member must withdraw altogether from the entire selection process otherwise
all selection would be vitiated on account of reasonable likelihood of bias affecting
the process of selection
b) This is not applicable in case of Constitutional Authority like PSC whether central or
State. This is so because if a member was to withdraw altogether from the selection
process, no other person save a member can be substituted in his place and it may
sometimes happen that no other member is available to take the place of such a
member and the functioning of PSC may be affected.
c) In such a case, it is desirable that the member must withdraw from participation in
interview of such a candidate and he should also not take part in the discussions.

The Supreme Court conceptualised the doctrine of necessity in this case.

12
1987 AIR 454, 1985 SCR Supl. (1) 657
 CHAPTER VI

AUDI ALTERAM PARTEM OR RULE OF FAIR HEARING

Audi Alteram Partem is the second long arm of natural justice which protects the ‘little man’
from arbitrary administrative action whenever his right to person or property is jeopardized.
Thus one of the objectives of giving a hearing in application of the principles of natural
justice is to see that an illegal action or decision does not take place. The principle of audi
alteram partem is the basic concept of the principle of natural justice. The audi alteram
partem rule ensures that no one should be condemned unheard.

It is the first principle of civilized jurisprudence that a person against whom any action is
sought to be taken, or whose right or interest is being affected, should be given a reasonable
opportunity to defend himself. In the field of administrative action, this principle has been
applied to ensure fair play and justice to affected persons. Its application depends upon the
factual matrix to improve administrative efficiency, expediency and to mere out justice

This rule covers various stages through which administrative adjudication passes starting
from notice to final determination. Right to fair hearing thus includes:-

1. Right to notice
2. Right to present case and evidence
3. Right to rebut adverse evidence
 Right to cross examination
 Right to legal representation
4. Disclosure of evidence to party
5. Report of enquiry to be shown to the other party
6. Reasoned decisions or speaking orders

RIGHT TO NOTICE

In legal sense it embraces knowledge of circumstances that ought to induce suspicion or

belief, as well as direct information of the fact.

Notice embodies rule of fairness and must precede an adverse order. It should be clear and
precise so as to give the party adequate information of the case he has to meet. Time given
should be adequate for a person so that he could prepare an effective defence. Denial of
notice and opportunity to respond make the administrative decision completely vitiated.

RIGHT TO PRESENT CASE AND EVIDENCE

The adjudicatory authority should afford reasonable opportunity to the party to present his
case. It is requirement of natural justice that quasi-judicial bodies cannot make a decision
adverse to the individual without giving him an effective opportunity of meeting any relevant
allegations against him, but it does not have to be a personal hearing. The person affected
should have an opportunity of adequately meeting the case against him and of presenting his
case. If this minimum does not take place, the principles of natural justice will be violated. A
hearing to be fair must fulfil several conditions as explained below.

RIGHT TO KNOW THE EVIDENCE AGAINST HIM

Every person before an administrative authority exercising adjudicatory powers has the right
to know the evidence to be used against him.

RIGHT TO REBUT ADVERSE EVIDENCE

The right to rebut adverse evidence presupposes that the person has been informed about the
evidence against him. It is not enough that the party should know the adverse material on the
file but it is further necessary that he must have an opportunity to rebut the evidence.

NO EVIDENCE SHOULD BE TAKEN AT THE BACK OF OTHER

PARTY

That ex-parte evidence taken in the absence of the other party violates the principle of fair
hearing.

RIGHT TO COUNSEL

The judicial approach to start with was halting in the matter of representation through a
counsel. The view taken was that representation through a lawyer was not claimable as a
matter of right. This was the general rule and right to counsel an exception. But this view has
now taken an almost about turn. In some situations the court has made this requirement as
mandatory, leaving no discretion with the adjudicator. It has also liberalized the procedural
restrictions in the matter of representation through a counsel by the party.
REPORT OF ENQUIRY TO BE SHOWN TO THE OTHER PARTY

In Managing Director ECIL V. B. Karunakar, the Court held that the delinquent employee
has a right to a copy of the enquiry report before the disciplinary authority takes a decision on
the question of his guilt. The Court further emphasized that this rule extends to all
establishments-government, non-government, public or private. Failure of the employee to
ask for the report would not amount to waiver. Rules/Standing orders denying this first-stage
right will be invalid

POST DECISIONAL HEARING

Post decisional hearing means hearing after the decision is reached. The idea of post
decisional hearing has been developed by the SC in Maneka Gandhi V. UOI to maintain the
balance between administrative efficiency and fairness to the individual.

MANEKA GANDHI V. UOI13

Facts

In this case the passport dated 01.06.1976 of the petitioner, a journalist, was impounded `in
the public interest' by an order dated 02.07.1977. The Govt. declined to furnish her the
reasons for its decision. She filed a petition before the SC under article 32 challenging the
validity of the impoundment order. She was also not given any pre-decisional notice and
hearing.

Argument by the Govt.

The Govt. argued that the rule of “audi alteram partem” must be held to be excluded because
otherwise it would have frustrated the very purpose of impounding the passport.

The SC held that though the impoundment of the passport was an administrative action yet
the rule of fair hearing is attracted by the necessary implication and it would not be fair to
exclude the application of this cardinal rule on the ground of administrative convenience. The
court did not outright quash the order and allowed the return of the passport because of the
special socio-political factors attending the case.

13
1978 AIR 597, 1978 SCR (2) 621
The technique of post decisional hearing was developed in order to balance these factors
against the requirements of law, justice and fairness. The court stressed that a fair opportunity
of being heard following immediately the order impounding the passport would satisfy the
mandate of natural justice.

The same technique of validating void administrative decision by post decisional hearing was
adopted in Swadeshi Cotton Mills V. UOI14., u/s 15 of IDRA, an undertaking can be taken
over after making an investigation into its affairs. The court validated the order of the govt.
which had been passed in violation of the rule of audi alteram partem because the govt. had
agreed to give post-decisional hearing. The ratio of the majority decision was as follows: -

1. Pre-decisional hearing may be dispensed with in an emergent situation where

immediate action is required to prevent some imminent danger or injury or hazard to
paramount public interest.
2. Mere urgency is, however, no reason for exclusion of audi alteram partem rule. The
decision to exclude pre-decisional hearing would be justiciable.
3. Where pre-decisional hearing is dispensed with, there must be a provision for post-
decisional remedial hearing.

K.I.SHEPHARD V. UOI15

Certain employees of the amalgamated banks were excluded from employment. The Court
allowing the writs held that post decisional hearing in this case would not do justice. The
court pointed out that there is no justification to throw a person out of employment and then
give him an opportunity of representation when the requirement is that he should be given an
opportunity as a condition precedent to action.

H.L.TREHAN V. UOI16

A circular was issued by the Govt. on taking over the company prejudicially altering the
terms and conditions of its employees w/o affording an opportunity of hearing to them. The
SC observed that "In our opinion, the post decisional opportunity of hearing does not observe
the rules of natural justice. The authority that embarks upon a post-decisional hearing will

14
1981 AIR 818, 1981 SCR (2) 533
15
1988 AIR 686, 1988 (1) SCR 188, 1987 (4) SCC 431
16
1989 AIR 568, 1988 SCR Supl. (3) 925
normally proceed with a closed mind and there is hardly any chance of getting proper
consideration of the representation at such a post decisional hearing."

Thus in every case where pre-decisional hearing is warranted, post-decisional hearing will
not validate the action except in very exceptional circumstances.

It can be concluded that pre-decisional hearing is the standard norm of rule of audi alteram
partem. But post-decisional hearing at least affords an opportunity to the aggrieved person
and is better than no hearing at all. However, post-decisional hearing should be an exception
rather than rule.

It is acceptable in the following situations:-

 where the original decision does not cause any prejudice or detriment to the person
affected;
 where there is urgent need for prompt action;
 where it is impracticable to afford pre-decisional hearing.

The decision of excluding pre-decisional hearing is justiciable.

 CHAPTER VII

REASONED DECISION

Three grounds on which it stands:

 The party aggrieved has the opportunity to demonstrate before the appellate or
revision court that the reasons which persuaded the authority to reject his case were
erroneous;
 The obligation to record reasons operates as a deterrent against possible arbitrary
action by the executive authority invested with judicial power; and
 It gives satisfaction to the party against whom the order is made.

The power to refuse to disclose reasons in support of the order is of an exceptional nature
and it ought to be exercised fairly, sparingly and only when fully satisfied by the
exigencies of uncommon situations.

SIEMENS ENGINEERING V. UNION OF INDIA17

The Supreme Court gave a bit of advice to the administrative agencies exercising quasi-
judicial powers. The Courts observed that if courts of law are to be replaced by administrative
authorities and tribunals, as indeed in some kinds of cases, with the proliferation of
administrative laws, they may have to be replaced, it is essential that administrative
authorities and tribunals should accord fair and proper hearing to the persons sought to be
affected by their order and give sufficiently clear and explicit reasons in support of the orders
made by them.

MANEKA GANDHI V. UNION OF INDIA 18

Bhagwati, J. held that the Central Government was wholly unjustified in withholding the
reasons for impounding the passport of the petitioner, and in this way not only a breach of
statutory duty was committed but it also amounted to denial of opportunity of hearing to the
petitioner.

17
AIR1976 SC 1785
18
AIR1978 SC 597
The principles of natural justice have for some time past, come into common use in our
country. But it is difficult to ascertain from the law reports or other source as to how these
principles came to be applied in the field of industrial law. There is no legal provision found
anywhere which prescribes them.

The Patna, High Court in Raj Kishore Prasad Jaiswal V. Subak Narain19, has aptly observed:

“It is well established rule of law that rule of natural justice is applied only where the law
itself is silent and is not inconsistent with what it provides, but where any provision as to the
rule of natural justice is expressly or by necessary implication negative by law that cannot be
a ground for holding that the enactment giving that law is ultra vires or unconstitutional.”

The Principles of natural justice are enforceable on all courts of law, general or special, all
tribunals statutory or otherwise, and all persons or bodies exercising a judicial or quasi-
judicial function by statute or by agreement between the parties. This applies equally to any
domestic enquiry.

In the Province of Bombay V. Madhukar20, Vyas J concluded:

“It is clear that all that is meant by compliance with the rules of natural justice by a domestic
tribunal is that the tribunal must act honestly and in good faith, and must give the delinquent
a chance of explanation and defence. If its rules postulate an enquiry, the delinquent must
have a reasonable opportunity of being heard and of correcting and contradicting relevant
statement prejudicial to his view.”

Model Standing orders in its sub-clause (4) of clause 14 provides that no order or dismissal
shall be made unless the workman concerned is charge-sheeted and given adequate
opportunity to explain his alleged misconduct. Standing orders, applicable to an industrial
establishment generally prescribe a procedure for initiating disciplinary action against
workmen. While taking so, it is always necessary to follow a set of approved and well
accepted procedures.

Sri S. Chakravarthi, in his book ‘Natural Justice’, has very aptly summarised the constituents
of the rules of natural justice. They are:

19
AIR1959 Pat 89
20
AIR1952 Bom. 37
  Substantial requirement of justice shall not be violated.
 The tribunal must give both the parties an opportunity of being heard and stating their
case and view.
 Notice to be given to the parties about when the judge will proceed with the matter.
 The tribunal should act honestly and impartially.
 Must not be at the dictation of others to whom no authority has been given by law.
 There must not be malversation of any kind.
 A person cannot be a judge in his own cause.
 The least bias or prejudice on the part of the person deciding the cause will vitiate the
order.

The principles of natural justice can therefore be summarised as follows:

 That every person whose rights are affected must have a reasonable notice of the
matter he has to meet.
 That he must have reasonable opportunity of being heard in his defence.
 That the hearing must be by an impartial person, i.e. a person who is neither directly
nor indirectly a party to the case. One who has an interest in litigation is already
biased against the party concerned.
 That the authority hearing the case must act in good faith and not arbitrarily but
reasonably.
 CHAPTER VIII

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: STATUTORY PROCESS AND RELATION

WITH NATURAL JUSTICE

The requirements of natural justice come from general administrative law, not the particular
statute being administered. Many statutes do, however, spell out procedures that must be
followed when making decisions; for example; the statute might stipulate who is entitled to
notice, when notice should be given and in what form, what kind of hearing is to be given,
and how much time is allowed for a person to respond.

Natural justice imposes similar requirements, independently of the statute. If the statutory
procedures are equivalent or superior to what natural justice would require, compliance with
the statutory procedures will also satisfy the requirements of natural justice. On the other
hand, if the statutory procedures fall short of what natural justice would require, the question
of whether the statute establishes a complete procedural code arises.

A statute that deals exhaustively with decision-making procedures might be read as implicitly
excluding natural justice, but the law leans against that interpretation. If natural justice is not
excluded its requirements operate alongside the statutory procedures and supplement them.
This means it might not be sufficient to comply only with the statutory procedures if natural
justice requires more. For example; if the legislation allows a person to make a submission at
a particular time and further relevant material is later received that is adverse to the person
who made the submission, natural justice allows them to read and comment on the new
material before a decision is made. Natural justice requires this additional procedure, even if
the statutory procedures do not mention it.
 CHAPTER IX

CONCLUSION

Therefore in summary, the principles of natural justice have been developed and followed by
the judiciary to protect the right of the public against the arbitrariness of the administrative
authorities. One can note that the rules of natural justice relate to fairness: they exist to
protect the fair dealing with individuals who find themselves before a court, tribunal or any
hearing to whose judgment an individual is subject. The concept that natural justice should at
all stages guide those who discharge judicial functions is not merely an acceptable, but
essential part of the philosophy of the law to secure justice or to prevent miscarriage of
justice.

It is important to note that any decision which violates natural justice would be found null
and void, hence one must always bear in mind that the doctrine of natural justice is important
for any administrative decision to be valid. It must further also be recollected that the rights
to fair hearing and a judge not adjudicating over a matter in which he has an interest is
germane. The extent and application of the rules of natural justice cannot be imprisoned
within the strait jacket of a rigid formula. The application of the doctrine depends upon the
nature of the jurisdiction conferred on the administrative authority and upon the character of
the rights of the person affected.

Natural justice has a close relation with common law and moral principles but it is not the
natural law. Natural justice aims at providing fairness equity and equality to the people and it
aims at decisions and judgement free from any kind of biasness to give proper justice to
people in absence of this, judgements would go influenced with biasness and would change
their nature so we cannot hope to get justice from court as they would be partial which would
thus make a court a useless place to get justice from.

Rule against biasness makes a judge to be impartial and to put his mind objectly to the
dispute or problem before him. The basis on which impartiality operates is the need to
maintain public confidence in the legal system. The erosion of public confidence undermines
the nobility of the legal system, and leads to ensuing chaos Justice must be rooted in
confidence and confidence is destroyed when right-minded people go away thinking: 'The
judge was biased. And thus the complete law and order fails without natural justice and rule
against biasness.