PEOPLE VS CORECHE

FACTS: Appellant Marian Coreche y Caber was charged for violation of Sections
5 and 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 (RA 9165), the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, for selling and possessing the prohibited drug
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.

After and entrapment operation, the police officers brought appellant and
Emily to the San Mateo police station for detention. The plastic sachets taken
from appellant and Emily were marked. The station chief, Police Senior
Inspector Jesus Fetalino, requested the PNP laboratory for chemical analysis of
the sachets contents.

Denying the charges, appellant claimed never to have transacted with

Arellano in a drug deal. According to appellant, Arellano, Tougan, and Pineda
went to her house in the early morning of 10 September 2003 and tried to mulct
P50,000 to free Emily whom the police officers had arrested. When appellant
could not produce the amount, the police officers detained her and Emily at the
San Mateo police station and filed the charges in question. The specimens
tested positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride.

HELD: The SC held that the failure of the prosecution to provide details
pertaining to the post-examination custody of the seized item created a gap in
the chain of custody which again raises reasonable doubt on the authenticity of
the corpus delicti.This also applies in this case, where the prosecution failed to
offer any details in the links pertaining to the seized items after they were
allegedly turned over by SPO4 Larot to the laboratory which failure casts doubt
on the integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti.

Crucial in proving chain of custody is the marking of the seized drugs or other related items
immediately after they are seized from the accused. Marking after seizure is the starting point in the
custodial link, thus it is vital that the seized contraband are immediately marked because succeeding
handlers of the specimens will use the markings as reference. The marking of the evidence serves to
separate the marked evidence from the corpus of all other similar or related evidence from the time they
are seized from the accused until they are disposed of at the end of criminal proceedings, obviating
switching, “planting,” or contamination of evidence.

In sustaining the prosecution’s case, the lower courts inevitably relied on the evidentiary
presumption that official duties have been regularly performed. This presumption, it must be emphasized, is
not conclusive. Not only is it rebutted by contrary proof, as here, but it is also inferior (People v. Cañete, 433
Phil. 781 (2002)) to the constitutional presumption of innocence.

All told, the Supreme Court finds merit in appellant’s claim that the prosecution failed to discharge
its burden of proving her guilt beyond reasonable doubt due to substantial gaps in the chain of custody,
raising reasonable doubt on the authenticity of the corpus delicti. ACQUITTED
BONDAD VS PEOPLE

FACTS: Elpidio Bondad, Jr. was charged before the Regional Trial Court, Marikina City, for violation of
Sections 5 and 11, Article II, Republic Act 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs
Act of 2002. During the trial, the prosecution witnesses averred that Bondad was arrested pursuant to a
legitimate buy-bust operation conducted where he was allegedly found to have been in possession likewise
of two other sachets of white crystalline substance, later on found to be the prohibited drug, shabu.

The prosecution witnesses admitted and confirmed that there was no physical inventory taken of the
seized drugs, neither were there photographs taken thereof, immediately after its seizure and confiscation,
contrary to the mandate of Section 21(1), R.A. 9165.

Bondad denied that a buy-bust operation was conducted and claimed that he was really arrested
while he was playing billiards. he further contested that, assuming a buy-bust operation had really been
conducted, still the evidence presented by the prosecution could not really be admissible in evidence, as its
integrity has clearly become highly questionable in the light of the unjustified failure of the prosecution
witnesses, while acting as apprehending officers, to comply with the mandate of Section 21(1) of R.A. 9165.

The RTC found Bondad guilty of the offense charge. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirned the lower
Court‘s decision. Hence, this petition.

HELD: In the present case, by the claim of one of the prosecution witnesses, he immediately marked the
seized items which were brought to the Crime Laboratory for examination. By his admission, however, he
did not conduct an inventory of the items seized. Worse, no photograph of the items was taken. There was
thus failure to faithfully follow the requirements of the law.

Parenthetically, unlike in Pringas, Bondad in the present case questioned early on, during the cross
examination of one of the prosecution witnesses, the failure of the apprehending officers to comply with
the inventory and photographing requirements of Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165, despite their awareness of
such requirements.

In fine, as the failure to comply with the aforesaid requirements of the law compromised the
identity of the items seized, which is the corpus delicti of each of the crimes charged against Bondad, his
acquittal is in order.
PEOPLE VS OBMIRANIS

FACTS: Samuel Obmiranis y Oreta (appellant) who was charged with violation of Section 5 in relation to
Section 26 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165. He was allegedly caught in a buy-bust operation by elements of
the Manila Western Police District (MWPD) while offering to sell methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a
dangerous drug locally known as shabu.

According to PO Velasco, he was the one who effected the arrest but it was Cinco who seized the
plastic sachet from appellant. He further stated that immediately after the arrest, he and his team brought
the seized item to the police headquarters and there, in his presence, Cinco marked the same with the
initials SOO. At the trial, he identified the plastic sachet as that seized from appellant as well as the marking
made by Cinco on it. Furthermore, he admitted on cross-examination that there was no evidence custodian
designated and that he could not remember if the seized item had been inventoried and photographed in
the presence of the accused; that Cinco put the item in his pocket after the same was recovered and did not
mark it on the spot and that the markings made on the buy-bust money had not been entered in the
blotter.

The chemistry report issued at the instance of Pedrozo and signed by Forensic Chemical Officer
Maritess Mariano of the PNP Crime Laboratory revealed that the specimen supposedly seized from
appellant yielded positive of methylamphetamine hydrochloride content.

Taking the stand, appellant boldly asserted that he was merely framed up by the buy-bust team,
and strongly denied having transacted the alleged sale of shabu with Velasco and the confidential
informant.

HELD: All told, in view of the deviation by the buy-bust team from the mandated conduct of taking post-
seizure custody of the dangerous drug in this case, there is no way to presume that the members thereof
had performed their duties regularly. Even granting that we must blindly rely on the credibility of Velascos
testimony, still, the prosecution evidence would fall short of satisfying the quantum of evidence required to
arrive at a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt inasmuch as the evidence chain failed to solidly connect
appellant with the seized drug in a way that would establish that the specimen is one and the same as that
seized in the first place and offered in court as evidence. The Court cannot indulge in the presumption of
regularity of official duty if only to obliterate the obvious infirmity of the evidence advanced to support
appellants conviction.

In Mallillin v. People, we categorically declared that the failure of the prosecution to offer in court
the testimony of key witnesses for the basic purpose of establishing a sufficiently complete chain of custody
of a specimen of shabu and the irregularity which characterized the handling of the evidence before the
same was finally offered in court, materially conflict with every proposition as to the culpability of the
accused. For the same plain but consequential reason, we will not hesitate to reverse the judgment of
conviction in the present appeal.

In no uncertain terms must it be stressed that basic and elementary is the presupposition that the
burden of proving the guilt of an accused rests on the prosecution which must draw strength from its own
evidence and not from the weakness of the defense. The rule, in a constitutional system like ours, is
invariable regardless of the reputation of the accused because the law presumes his innocence until the
contrary is shown. In dubio pro reo. When moral certainty as to culpability hangs in the balance, acquittal
on reasonable doubt inevitably becomes a matter of right.
PEOPLE VS MALLILLIN

FACTS: Police officers raided the residence of Junie Malillin y Lopez

(petitioner). The search allegedly yielded two (2) plastic sachets of shabu and
five (5) empty plastic sachets containing residual morsels of the said
substance. Petitioner was charged with violation of Sec. 11, Art. II of RA No.
9165 (The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002).
Petitioner entered a negative plea. At the ensuing trial, the prosecution
presented P/Insp Bolanos, Arroyo (forensic chemist) and PO3 Esternon as
witnesses.
The evidence for the defense focused on the irregularity of the search and
seizure conducted by the police operatives. Petitioner testified that PO3
Esternon began the search of the bedroom with Licup and petitioner himself
inside. Petitioner was then asked by a police officer to buy cigarettes at a
nearby store.
Petitioner asserted that on his return from the errand, he was summoned by
Esternon to the bedroom and once inside, the officer closed the door and asked
him to lift the mattress on the bed. And as he was doing as told, Esternon
stopped him and ordered him to lift the portion of the headboard. In that
instant, Esternon showed him "sachet of shabu" which according to him came
from a pillow on the bed. Petitioner's account in its entirety was corroborated in
its material respects by Norma (petitioner's mother), barangay kagawad Licup
and Sheila (petitioner’s wife) in their testimonies. Norma and Sheila positively
declared that petitioner was not in the house for the entire duration of the
search because at one point he was sent by Esternon to the store to buy
cigarettes while Sheila was being searched by the lady officer. Licup for his
part testified on the circumstances surrounding the discovery of the plastic
sachets. He recounted that after the five empty sachets were found, he went
out of the bedroom and into the living room and after about three minutes,
Esternon, who was left inside the bedroom, exclaimed that he had just found
two filled sachets.

HELD: The petitioner may defeat the positive assertions through proving the
failure to follow the chain of custody rule.The dangerous drug itself constitutes
the very corpus delicti of the offense and the fact of its existence is vital to a
judgment of conviction.
The prosecution's evidence is incomplete to provide an affirmative
answer. The prosecution was thus unsuccessful in discharging its burden of
establishing the identity of the seized items because it failed to offer not only
the testimony of Gallinera and Garcia but also any sufficient explanation for
such failure. Also the records disclose a series of irregularities committed by
the police officers from the commencement of the search of petitioner's house
until the submission of the seized items to the laboratory for analysis.
Given the foregoing deviations of police officer Esternon from the
standard and normal procedure in the implementation of the warrant and in
taking post-seizure custody of the evidence, the blind reliance by the trial court
and the Court of Appeals on the presumption of regularity in the conduct of
police duty is manifestly misplaced. The presumption of regularity is merely
just that—a mere presumption disputable by contrary proof and which when
challenged by the evidence cannot be regarded as binding truth. Suffice it to
say that this presumption cannot preponderate over the presumption of
innocence that prevails if not overthrown by proof beyond reasonable doubt. In
the present case the lack of conclusive identification of the illegal drugs
allegedly seized from petitioner, coupled with the irregularity in the manner by
which the same were placed under police custody before offered in court,
strongly militates a finding of guilt. ACQUITTED.