YUMANG v. RADIO PHILIPPINES NETWORK, INC. G.R No.

201016
FACTS:

On May 1, 1998, the petitioner Leoncia A. Yumang started her employment with the
respondent Radio Philippines Network, Inc. She was a member of the Radio
Philippines Network Employees Union (RPNEU) which had a collective bargaining
agreement with RPN 9 effective July 1, 2004 to June 30, 2009.

Allegedly, after the conclusion of the CBA, a new Toyota Revo driven by RPNEU
President Reynato Siozon Jr., was found to be registered in the name of the RPN 9
General Manager. The petitioner and 14 other union members filed complaints with
the DOLE-NCR against the RPNEU officers and members of the Board of Directors
for: impeachment, an audit of union funds, and the conduct of a snap election.

On August 17, 2005, Mediator-Arbiter Clarissa G. Beltran-Lerios (Med-Arbiter

Lerios) ordered the conduct of a referendum to determine whether the incumbent
RPNEU officers would be impeached. The union officers and the BOD appealed to
the Bureau of Labor Relations. BLR Director Henry Parel granted the appeal and
reversed Med-Arbiter Lerios' ruling.

In the meantime or on June 1, 2005, two complaints were filed with the RPNEU
Executive Board against several union members. The complaints involved alleged
violations of the RPNEU Constitution and Bylaws (CBL),6 principally: (1) the
commission of acts inimical to the interests of the union and the general
membership; (2) the attempt to form another union; and (3) an appeal to the
general membership urging them to commence legal action without exhausting
remedies under the RPNEU CBL.

The CA denied the petition and affirmed the NLRC ruling.

ISSUES:
 WON the CA committed grave abuse of discretion
 WON the expulsion of the petitioner was justified
HELD:

We find no reversible error in the CA's affirmation of the NLRC's acceptance of the
appeal despite its non-perfection as described by the petitioner. Article 227
(formerly Art. 221) of the Labor Code (renumbered by R. A. No. 10151, An Act
Allowing the Employment of Night Workers), provides that "In any proceeding
before the Commission or any of the Labor Arbiters, the rules of evidence prevailing
in courts of law or equity shall not be controlling and it is the spirit and intention of
this Code that the Commission and its members and the Labor Arbiter shall use
every and all means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively and
without regard to technicalities of law or procedure, all in the interest of due
process.
In the issue of the expulsion case, which is paramount in the mind of the
management, we asked ourselves whether the so-called General Assembly
resolution that they tout as having reversed the expulsion case actually
occurred. When asked whether a General Assembly meeting was actually held to
discuss the reversal of the expulsion case, no categorical answer was given by Ms.
Ruth Yap, et al. In our search for truth, we called some members who signed and
asked them if indeed a General Assembly was called and if any deliberation on the
expulsion was discussed, the answer of the member-signatories that we called was
negative. In fact they said that one of the 15 in the group of Ms.Yap approached them
and appealed to them to sign lest they be expelled from the union.

The constitution and bylaws of the union provide that charges for any violations
thereof shall be filed before the said board. But as explained by the lower court, if
the complainants had done so the board of directors would in effect be acting as
respondent investigator and judge at the same time. To follow the procedure
indicated would be a farce under the circumstances; where exhaustion of
administrative remedies within the union itself would practically amount to a denial
of justice or would be illusory or vain, it will not be insisted upon.

The records show that there was no categorical finding of the petitioner's guilt on
this question. But we find the petitioner well within her rights as a union member
when she took the officers to task for then handling of the affairs of the union,
especially with respect to matters relating to the union funds and the quality of the
union leadership. The union President's integrity was itself put in serious doubt
when he was seen using a vehicle registered in the name of the RPN9 General
Manager after the conclusion of the July 1, 2004 to June 30, 2009 CBA.

In sum, the court finds merit in the petition. The petitioner was illegally dismissed,
as her expulsion from the union had no basis.

BARRIO FIESTA RESTAURANT v. BERONIA, G.R No. 206690

FACTS:
ON Aug. 17, 2009, respondent Helen C. Beronia filed a complaint for illegal dismissal
and money claims against petitioners Barrio Fiesta Restaurant, Liberty Ilagan,
Sunshine Ongpauco-Ikeda, and Marico Cristobal. The petitioners, through Atty.
Richard Neil S. Chua of Ligon Solis Mejia Florendo law firm, denied the claims
prayed for. In a decision dated May 31, 2010, the labor arbiter (LA) declared that
Beronia had been illegally dismissed. The National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) reversed the LA’s ruling in its Dec. 7, 2010 decision. Beronia moved for
reconsideration of the NLRC decision. On Jan. 13, 2011, the petitioners filed their
opposition to Beronia’s motion for reconsideration. The opposition was signed and
personally filed by Ilagan and Ikeda. In its July 21, 2012 decision, the Court of
Appeals (CA) reinstated the LA decision. On Nov. 29, 2012, the petitioners, through
Real Bartolo & Real law offices, filed with the CA an entry of appearance with
manifestation and motion for reconsideration. In its April 5, 2013 resolution, the CA
denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration for being 138 days late, pointing out
that petitioners’ counsel has long received a copy of its June 21, 2012 decision.
Before the Supreme Court, the petitioners asked for a liberal application of the
procedural rules, reasoning that they believed all the while that they were being
represented by their former counsel, Ligon, et. al., through Atty. Chua. They argued
that the procedural lapse before the CA was clearly due to a miscommunication with
the law firm for which they should not be made to suffer, in the interest of
substantial justice.

ISSUE:
Does this argument find merit?
HELD:
No.
In the present case, the only permissible consideration we can take is to determine
whether circumstances exist to excuse the petitioners’ delay in the filing of their
motion for reconsideration. If there are none, as indeed we find because the
petitioners utterly failed to show us one, then the delay is fatal.

We note that on Jan. 13, 2011, the petitioners filed an Opposition, dated January 5,
2011, to the motion filed by Beronia seeking reconsideration of the NLRC’s Dec. 7,
2010 decision. Significantly, this Jan. 5, 2011 opposition was signed personally by
petitioners Ilagan and Ikeda, on behalf of themselves and of petitioner Barrio Fiesta,
instead of by Atty. Chua for Ligon, et al. as the petitioners’ counsel. As a rule, when a
party to a proceeding is represented by counsel, it is the counsel who signs any
pleading filed in the course of the proceeding. The party represented does not have
to sign the pleadings, save only in the specific instances required by the rules; they
appear before the court and participate in the proceedings only when specifically
required by the court or tribunal. In the petitioners’ case, they were themselves
aware that Beronia sought reconsideration of the NLRC decision as they had, in fact,
personally opposed this motion instead of through their counsel on record, Ligon, et
al. Had they still been represented by their counsel, through Atty. Chua as they
claim, the latter would have signed and filed the opposition in their behalf. Viewed
in this light, the petitioners must have known that Ligon, et al. no longer
represented them in this case; this was true even at the NLRC level and before the
case reached the CA. (Brion, J.; SC 2nd Division, Barrio Fiesta Restaurant, et. al. vs.
Helen C. Beronia, G.R. No. 206690, July 11, 2016).

GUAGUA NATIONAL COLLEGES v. GUAGUA NATIONAL COLLEGES FACULTY

LABOR UNION, G.R No. 204693
FACTS:
GNC is an educational institution located in Sta. Filomena, Guagua, Pampanga. On
the other hand, respondents Guagua National Colleges Faculty Labor Union
(GNCFLU) and Guagua National Colleges Non-Teaching and Maintenance Labor
Union (GNCNTMLU) were the bargaining agents for GNC's faculty members and
non-teaching and maintenance personnel, respectively.

Beginning 1994 until their present dispute, the parties concluded their Collective
Bargaining Agreements (CBA) without issue as follows: (1) CBA effective June 1,
1994 to May 31, 1999 (1994-1999 CBA), the economic provisions of which were
renegotiated on November 3, 1997 for years 1997-1999; (2) CBA effective June
1,1999 to May 31, 2004, the economic provisions of which were renegotiated on
July 4, 2002 for years 2002-2004; and, (3) CBA effective June 1, 2004 to May 31,
2009. The aforementioned CBAs applied to both GNCFLU and GNCNTMLU without
distinction. Significantly, the 1994-1999 CBA has a "no-strike, no lock-out" clause
under Section 17 thereof which likewise provides for mechanism for grievance
resolution and voluntary arbitration. This provision was considered carried over in
the subsequent CBAs.

Respondents alleged that after several mediation meetings, the parties finally
agreed on the details regarding the grant of signing bonus. Hence, they undertook to
compose the final draft of the 2009-2014 CBA which it submitted to the NCMB on
May 14, 2010 and copy furnished GNC on May 21, 2010. Respondents likewise
averred that the parties already agreed to schedule the signing of the said CBA on
May 28, 2010.

GNC, on the other hand, contended that during mediation meetings with the NCMB,
respondents submitted several CBA drafts for its consideration. Upon its receipt on
May 21, 2010 of another draft CBA23 from respondents under cover letter dated
May 20, 2010, it decided to secure the services of Atty. Padilla to assist it in its
negotiations with respondents. Hence, on May 28, 2010, Atty. Padilla appeared
before the NCMB and asked for 10 days to submit GNC's comment/counter-proposal
to the purported draft CBA of respondents. However, on June 1, 2010, respondents
filed a notice of strike.

GNC called attention to the fact that when it requested the Secretary of Labor and
Employment to assume jurisdiction over the dispute, it also prayed that the same be
ordered submitted to the grievance machinery and voluntary arbitration provided
for under the parties' CBA. It stressed that its participation in the compulsory
arbitration proceeding should therefore not be construed as a waiver of its position
that jurisdiction over the dispute rests with the voluntary arbitrator in view of the
parties' agreement in the CBA, the pertinent provisions of the Labor Code.

The NLRC rendered a decision that GNC committed unfair labor practice by violating
the statutory duty to bargain collectively in good faith.

GNC’s motion for reconsideration was denied for lack of merit. It sought recourse
from the CA through a petition for certiorari.

The CA also denied the petition for lack of merit, the motion for reconsideration was
likewise denied.
ISSUE:
WHETHER THE CA COMMITTED GRIEVOUS AND IRREVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT
DISMISSED GNC's PETITION FOR CERTIORARI AND MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION
HELD:
GNC asserts that it is the voluntary arbitrator which has jurisdiction over the
grounds cited by respondents in their notice of strike in view of Section 17 of the
parties' 1994-1999 CBA. The said provision contains the agreement of the parties on
a "no strike, no lock-out" policy and on grievance resolution and voluntary
arbitration which was carried over to their subsequent CBAs up to the existing one.
According to GNC, respondents should not have filed a notice of strike in view of
such "no-strike, no lock-out" clause and also since respondents' grounds for strike
are within the scope of "grievance" to be resolved in accordance with the said
Section 17. It argues that respondents, by the simple expedient of filing a notice of
strike, were able to circumvent the "no strike, no lock-out" clause and the grievance
machinery and voluntary arbitration provision of their CBA.

Indeed, the parties through their CBA, agreed to a "no-strike, no lock-out" policy and
to resolve their disputes through grievance machinery and voluntary arbitration.
Despite these, respondents were justified in filing a notice of strike in light of the
facts of this case. It is settled that a "no strike, no lock-out" provision in the CBA
"may [only] be invoked by [an] employer when the strike is economic in nature or
one which is conducted to force wage or other agreements from the employer that
are not mandated to be granted by law. It [is not applicable when the strike] is
grounded on unfair labor practice."48 Here, while respondents enumerated four
grounds in their notice of strike, the facts of the case reveal that what primarily
impelled them to file said notice was their perception of bad faith bargaining and
violation of the duty to bargain collectively by GNC - charges which constitute unfair
labor practice under Article 248(g) of the Labor Code.

The CA, on certiorari petition, found merit in the University's argument that the
Secretary of Labor abused his/her discretion in resolving the economic issues on the
ground that the same were proper subject of the grievance machinery as embodied
in the parties' CBA. Accordingly, the said court directed the parties to submit the
economic issues to voluntary arbitration.

This Court affirmed the CA's ruling based on the following ratiocinations:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
We xxx find logic in the CA's directive for the herein parties to proceed with
voluntary arbitration as provided in their CBA. As we see it, the issue as to the
economic benefits, which included the issue on the formula in computing the TIP
share of the employees, is one that arises from the interpretation or implementation
of the CBA. To be sure, the parties' CBA provides for a grievance machinery to
resolve any 'complaint or dissatisfaction arising from the interpretation or
implementation of the CBA and those arising from the interpretation of enforcement
of company personnel policies.' Moreover, the same CBA provides that should the
grievance machinery fail to resolve the grievance or dispute, the same shall be
'referred to a Voluntary Arbitrator for arbitration and final resolution.' However,
through no fault of the University these processes were not exhausted. It must be
recalled that while undergoing preventive mediation proceedings before the NCMB,
the Union declared a bargaining deadlock, filed a notice of strike and thereafter,
went on strike. The University filed a Motion to Strike Out Notice of Strike and to
Refer the Dispute to Voluntary Arbitration but the motion was not acted upon by the
NCMB. As borne by the records, the University has been consistent in its position
that the Union must exhaust the grievance machinery provisions of the CBA which
ends in voluntary arbitration.

HSY Marketing Ltd. Co. v. VILLASTIQUE, G.R No. 2119569

FACTS:
On January 3, 2003, petitioner hired respondent as a field driver for Fabulous Jeans
& Shirt & General Merchandise, tasked to deliver ready-to-wear items and/or
general merchandise for a daily compensation of P370.00. On January 10, 2011,
respondent figured in an accident when the service vehicle he was driving in Iligan
City bumped a pedestrian, Ryan Dorataryo. Fabulous jeans shouldered the
hospitalization and medical expenses of Dorataryo which respondent was asked to
reimburse, but to no avail.

On February 24, 2011, respondent was allegedly required to sign a resignation

letter, which he refused to do. A couple of years later. He tried to collect his salary
for that week but was told that it was withheld because of his refusal to resign.
Convinced that he was already terminated on February 26, 2011, he lost no time in
filing a complaint for illegal dismissal with money claims against petitioner,
Fabulous Jeans and its owner before the NLRC.

In their defense, petitioner, et al. contended that respondent had committed several
violations in the course of his employment, and had been found by his superior and
fellow employees to be a negligent and reckless driver, which resulted in the
vehicular mishap involving Dorataryo. After they paid for Dorataryo's
hospitalization and medical expenses, respondent went on absence without leave,
presumably to evade liability for his recklessness. Since respondent was the one
who refused to report for work, he should be considered as having voluntarily
severed his own employment. Thus, his money claims cannot prosper, as he was not
terminated.

LA dismissed the charge of illegal dismissal. Petitioner appealed to NLRC.

NLRC affirmed the finding of LA that there was no illegal dismissal. Petitioner
moved for reconsideration, but was denied.
CA affirmed NLRC decision.
ISSUE:
WON respondent was illegally dismissed.
HELD:

Respondent had not been dismissed at all. Other that the latter’s unsubstantiated
allegation of having been verbally terminated from his work, no substantial
evidence was presented to show that he was indeed dismissed or was prevented
from returning to his work. In the absence of any showing of an overt or positive act
proving that petitioner had dismissed respondent, the latter’s claim of illegal
dismissal cannot be sustained as such supposition would be self-serving, conjectural
and of no probative value.

Similarly, petitioner’s claims of respondent’s voluntary resignation and/or

abandonment deserve scant consideration, considering petitioner’s failure to
discharge the burden of proving the deliberate and unjustified refusal of respondent
to resume his employment without any intention of returning. It was incumbent
upon petitioner to ascertain respondent’s interest or non-interest in the
continuance of his employment, but to no avail.

Hence, since there is no dismissal or abandonment to speak of, the appropriate

course of action is to reinstate the employee.

PENINSULA EMPLOYEE UNION v. ESQUIVEL, G.R No. 218454

FACTS:

On December 13, 2007, Peninsula Employees Union’ (PEU) Board of Directors

passed Local Board Resolution No. 12, series of 20078 authorizing, among others,
the affiliation of PEU with NUWHRAIN, and the direct membership of its individual
members thereto. On the same day, the said act was submitted to the general
membership, and was duly ratified by 223 PEU members. Beginning January 1,
2009, PEU-NUWHRAIN sought to increase the union dues/agency fees from one
percent (1%) to two percent (2%) of the rank and file employees’ monthly salaries,
brought about by PEU’s affiliation with NUWHRAIN, which supposedly requires its
affiliates to remit to it two percent (2%) of their monthly salaries.

The non-PEU members objected to the assessment of increased agency fees arguing
that: (a) the new CBA is unenforceable since no written CBA has been formally
signed and executed by PEU-NUWHRAIN and the Hotel; (b) the 2% agency fee is
exorbitant and unreasonable; and (c) PEU-NUWHRAIN failed to comply with the
mandatory requirements for such increase.

OSEC’s June 2, 2010 decision upheld PEU-NUWHRAIN's right to collect agency fees
from the non-PEU members in accordance with Article 4, Section 2 of the expired
CBA, which was declared to be in full force and effect pursuant to the October 10,
2008 Decision, but only at the rate of one percent (1%), and denied its bid to
increase the agency fees to two percent (2%) for failure to show that its general
membership approved the same

PEU moved for reconsideration. On March 6, 2012, the OSEC issued an

Order partially granting PEU-NUWHRAIN's motion for reconsideration, and
declaring it entitled to collect two percent (2%) agency fees from the non-PEU
members beginning July 2010 since the GMR showing approval for the increase of
the union dues from one percent (1%) to two percent (2%) was only procured at
that time

CA reinstated the June 2, 2010 OSEC’s decision.

PEU-NUWHRAIN moved for reconsideration, which was denied.

ISSUE:
 WON PEU-NUWHRAIN has right to collect the increased agency fees
 WON PEU-NUWHRAIN failed to comply with the mandatory requirements
for such increase
HELD:

1. Yes.

The recognized collective bargaining union which successfully negotiated the CBA
with the employer is given the right to collect a reasonable fee called “agency fee”
from non-union members who are employees of the appropriate bargaining unit,
in an amount equivalent to the dues and other fees paid by union members, in case
they accept the benefits under the CBA. While the collection of agency fees is
recognized by Article 259 (formerly Article 248) of the Labor Code, as amended,
the legal basis of the union’s right to agency fees is neither contractual nor
statutory, but quasi-contractual, deriving from the established principle that non-
union employees may not unjustly enrich themselves by benefiting from
employment conditions negotiated by the bargaining union. In the present case,
PEU-NUWHRAIN’s right to collect agency fees is not disputed.

2. Yes.

Case law interpreting Article 250 (n) and (o) of the Labor Code mandates the
submission of three (3) documentary requisites in order to justify a valid levy of
increased union dues. These are: (a) an authorization by a written resolution of the
majority of all the members at the general membership meeting duly called for the
purpose; (b) the secretary’s record of the minutes of the meeting, which shall
include the list of all members present, the votes cast, the purpose of the special
assessment or fees and the recipient of such assessment or fees; and (c) individual
 written authorizations for check-off duly signed by the employees conceded. In the
present case, however, PEU-NUWHRAIN failed to show compliance with the
foregoing requirements. It attempted to remedy the “inadvertent omission” of the
matter of the approval of the deduction of two percent (2%) union dues from the
monthly basic salary of each union member.

PEOPLE’S SECURITY INC. v. FLORES, G.R No. 211312

FACTS:

Julius S. Flores and Esteban S. Tapiru (respondents) were security guards

previously employed by People's Security, Inc. (PSI). The respondents were
assigned at the various facilities of Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company
(PLDT) pursuant to a security services agreement between PSI and PLDT

On October 1, 2001, however, PSI's security services agreement with PLDT was
terminated and, accordingly, PSI recalled its security guards assigned to PLDT
including the respondents.

On October 8, 2001, the respondents, together with several other security guards
employed by PSI, filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) against PLDT and PSI, claiming that they are PLDT
employees.

Thereafter, PSI assigned the respondents to the facilities of its other clients such as
the warehouse of a certain Marivic Yulo in Sta. Ana, Manila and Trinity College's
Elementary Department in Quezon City.

On January 13, 2003, the respondents were relieved from their respective
assignments pursuant to Special Order No. 200310108 dated January 10, 2003
issued by Col. Leonardo L. Aquino, the Operations Manager of PSI.9 Accordingly,
Flores and Tapiru, on September 6 and 27, 2005, respectively, filed with the
Regional Arbitration Branch of the NLRC in Quezon City a complaint for illegal
dismissal and non-payment of service incentive leave pay and cash bond, with
prayer for separation pay, against PSI and its President Nestor Racho (Racho)
(collectively, the petitioners).

Respondents claimed that, after they were relieved from their assignment in the
warehouse in Sta. Ana, Manila on January 13, 2003, they repeatedly reported to
PSI's office for possible assignment, but the latter refused to give them any
assignment.

Petitioners, in their position paper, claimed that the respondents were merely
relieved from their assignment in the warehouse in Sta. Ana, Manila and that the
same was on account of their performance evaluation, which indicated that they
were ill-suited for the said assignment.

On January 30, 2009, the LA rendered a Decision finding that the respondents
were illegally dismissed from their employment and, thus, directing the
petitioners jointly and severally liable to pay the former separation pay and back
wages.

On appeal, the NLRC, in its Decision dated April 14, 2010, reversed the LA Decision
dated January 30, 2009. On April 25, 2013, the CA rendered the herein assailed
Decision, reversing the NLRC's Decision dated April 14, 2010 and Resolution dated
June 15, 2010. In finding that the respondents were illegally dismissed, the CA
found that the petitioners failed to prove that the respondents had abandoned
their work and that their defense of abandonment was negated by the filing of
a case for illegal dismissal.

In this petition for review on certiorari, the petitioners claim that the CA
committed reversible error in ruling that the respondents were illegally dismissed
from their employment. They maintain that PSI never terminated the
respondents' employment. On the contrary, they claim that the respondents freely
and voluntarily resigned from their employment.

Petitioners also claim that the CA erred when it ruled that they should be held
jointly and solitarily liable to pay the respondents separation pay and back wages
considering that there was absolutely no allegation or proof of participation, bad
faith, or malice on the part of Racho in dealing with the respondents.

ISSUES:

 Whether respondents were illegally dismissed?

 Whether Racho is jointly and solidarily liable with PSI for the payment of the
monetary awards to the respondents?

HELD:

 Yes

As rule, employment cannot be terminated by an employer without any just or

authorized cause. No less than the 1987 Constitution in Section 3, Article 13
guarantees security of tenure for workers and because of this, an employee may
only be terminated for just or authorized causes that must comply with the due
process requirements mandated by law. Hence, employers are barred from
arbitrarily removing their workers whenever and however they want.
Further, as aptly ruled by the CA, the petitioners miserably failed to prove that the
respondents abandoned their work. Abandonment is a matter of intention and
cannot lightly be inferred or legally presumed from certain equivocal acts. For
abandonment to exist, two requisites must concur: first, the employee must have
failed to report for work or must have been absent without valid or justifiable
reason; and second, there must have been a clear intention on the part of the
employee to sever the employer-employee relationship as manifested by some overt
acts. The Court is not convinced that the respondents failed to report for work or
have been absent without valid or justifiable cause. After the petitioners relieved
them from their previous assignment in Sta. Ana, Manila, the respondents were no
longer given any assignment.

What is more, PSI did not afford the respondents due process. The validity of the
dismissal of an employee hinges not only on the fact that the dismissal was for a just
or authorized cause, but also on the very manner of the dismissal itself. It is
elementary that the termination of an employee must be effected in accordance with
law. It is required that the employer furnish the employee with two written notices:
(1) a written notice served on the employee specifying the ground or grounds for
termination, and giving to said employee reasonable opportunity within which to
explain his side; and (2) a written notice of termination served on the employee
indicating that upon due consideration of all the circumstances, grounds have been
established to justify his termination.

 No

Anent, the propriety of holding Racho, PSI's President, jointly and solidarily liable
with PSI for the payment of the money awards in favor of the respondents, the Court
finds for the petitioners.

The doctrine of piercing the corporate veil applies only when the corporate fiction is
used to defeat public convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud, or defend crime. In
the absence of malice, bad faith, or a specific provision of law making a corporate
officer liable, such corporate officer cannot be made personally liable for corporate
liabilities.

The respondents failed to adduce any evidence to prove that Racho, as President
and General Manager of PSI, is hiding behind the veil of corporate fiction to defeat
public convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud, or defend crime. Thus, it is only PSI
who is responsible for the respondents' illegal dismissal

MARINA’S CREATION ENTERPRISES v. ANCHETA, G.R No. 218333

FACTS:
Petitioner Marina Creation Enterprises (Marina) is engaged in the business of
making shoes and bags. In 2010, Marina hired respondent Romeo V. Ancheta
(Ancheta) as a sole attacher in Marina. In 2011, Ancheta suffered a stroke and was
placed under home care. Thereafter, Ancheta suffered another stroke and was
confined at St. Victoria Hospital in Marikina City for 4 days.
Ancheta filed for a Sickness Notification with the Social Security System (SSS) and
was paid sickness benefits. The physician who examined Ancheta told that he would
be fit to resume work after ninety (90) days.
When Ancheta reported for work. He was required by Marina to submit a new
medical certificate before he could resume his work in Marina. However, Ancheta
did not comply and therefore was not able to resume work. He filed a complaint
with the LA against Marina for illegal dismissal and non-payment of separation pay.
Ancheta alleged that he recovered from his illness and went to work but Marina
advised him to just wait for the companies call. He was also told that he should take
more rest and that Marina employed 2 new workers as his replacement. He alleged
that there was no notice for his termination.
On the other hand, Marina claimed that Ancheta was employed on a piece rate bases
and was not terminated but instead was not allowed to work because of his failure
to submit a medical clearance showing he was fit to resume to work. Furthermore, it
is the companies precautionary measure to avoid any incident that would endanger
the life of Ancheta.
The Labor Arbiter and the National Labor Relations Commission ruled in favor of
Marina but reversed by The Court of Appeals stating that the medical certificate
given by Ancheta’s examining physician attached to his SSS Sickness Notification
was enough proof that he is fit to work.

ISSUE:
The issue in this case is whether Ancheta was illegally dismissed by Marina.

HELD:
Yes, In its petition, Marina argues that the company's action of requiring Ancheta to
undergo a medica1 examination and to submit a medical certificate was a valid
exercise of management prerogative. Marina's contention is not correct. Article 279
of the Labor Code provides: "In cases of regular employment, the employer shall not
terminate the services of an employee except for a just cause or when authorized by
this title. x x x." Since Ancheta was a regular employee of Marina, Ancheta's
employment can only be terminated by Marina based on just or authorized causes
provided in the Labor Code. In its position paper, Marina admitted that the company
had refused to give Ancheta work assignments until Ancheta submitted a new
medical certificate. It is Marina's position that Ancheta's employment would not
continue if Ancheta would not submit a new medical certificate. Marina's action in
refusing to accept Ancheta notwithstanding the medical certificate attached to
Ancheta's SSS Sickness Notification stating that Ancheta was physically fit to resume
his work in Marina on 12 August 2011 amounts to an illegal dismissal of Ancheta.
Book VI, Rule I, Section 8 of the Implementing Rules of the Labor Code provides:

Section 8. Disease as a ground for dismissal. - Where the employee suffers from a
disease and his continued employment is prohibited by law or prejudicial to his
health or to the health of his co-employees, the employer shall not terminate his
employment unless there is a certification by a competent public health
authority that the disease is of such nature or at such a stage that it cannot be
cured within a period of six (6) months even with proper medical treatment. If
the disease or ailment can be cured within the period, the employer shall not
terminate the employee but shall ask the employee to take a leave. The employer
shall reinstate the employee to his former position immediately upon the
restoration of his normal health. (Emphasis supplied)

The Implementing Rules of the Labor Code impose upon the employer the duty not
to terminate an employee until there is a certification by a competent public health
authority that the employee's disease is of such nature or at such a stage that it
cannot be cured within a period of six months even with proper medical treatment.
In this case, Marina terminated Ancheta from employment without seeking a prior
certification from a competent public health authority that Ancheta's disease is of
such nature or at such a stage that it cannot be cured within a period of six months
even with proper medical treatment. Hence, Ancheta was illegally dismissed by
Marina.

WESLEYAN UNIVERSITY-PHILIPPINES v. MAGLAYA Sr. G.R No. 212774

FACTS:

Wesleyan University-Philippines (WUP) is a non-stock, non-profit, non-sectarian

educational corporation duly organized and existing under the Philippine laws.

Respondent Atty. Guillermo T. Maglaya, Sr. (Maglaya) was appointed as a corporate

member and was elected as a member of the Board of Trustees (Board), both for a
period of five years. Then he was elected as President of the University for a five-
year term and was re-elected as a trustee.

In a Memorandum created by the incumbent Bishops of the United Methodist

Church (Bishops) apprised all the corporate members of the expiration of their
terms, unless renewed by the former. The said members, including Maglaya, sought
the renewal of their membership in the WUP's Board, and signified their willingness
to serve the corporation.

Maglaya learned that the Bishops created an Ad Hoc Committee to plan the efficient
and orderly turnover of the administration of the WUP in view of the alleged
"gentleman's agreement” and that the Bishops have appointed the incoming
corporate members and trustees. He clarified that there was no agreement and any
discussion of the turnover because the corporate members still have valid and
existing corporate terms.

Complaint was filed as the termination of their membership in the corporation

necessarily resulted in the conclusion of their positions as members of the Board
pursuant to the WUP by-laws.

Thereafter, Maglaya filed the present illegal dismissal case against the WUP,
claiming that he was unceremoniously dismissed in a wanton, reckless, oppressive
and malevolent manner. He also alleged that he faithfully discharged his necessary
and desirable functions as President.

WUP, on the other hand, asseverated that the dismissal or removal of Maglaya, being
a corporate officer and not a regular employee, is a corporate act or intra-corporate
controversy under the jurisdiction of the RTC. WUP also maintained that since
Maglaya's appointment was not renewed, he ceased to be a member of the
corporation and of the Board; thus, his term for presidency has also been
terminated.

The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of WUP and held that the action between
employers and employees where the employer-employee relationship is merely
incidental is within the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the regular courts. This
instant case involves intra-corporate dispute, which was definitely beyond the
jurisdiction of the labor tribunal.
Ruling in favor of Maglaya, the NLRC explicated that although the position of the
President of the University is a corporate office, the manner of Maglaya's
appointment, and his duties, salaries, and allowances point to his being an employee
and subordinate.
In a Resolution, the CA dismissed the petition for certiorari filed by WUP.
Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Maglaya is a corporate officer or a mere employee.

HELD:

This Court expounded that an "office" is created by the charter of the corporation
and the officer is elected by the directors or stockholders, while an "employee"
usually occupies no office and generally is employed not by action of the directors or
stockholders but by the managing officer of the corporation who also determines
the compensation to be paid to such employee.
It is under the By-laws of WUP that the president was one of the officers of the
corporation, and was an honorary member of the Board. He was appointed by the
Board and not by a managing officer of the corporation. The Court held that one who
is included in the by-laws of a corporation in its roster of corporate officers is an
officer of said corporation and not a mere employee.
A corporate officer's dismissal is always a corporate act, or an intra-corporate
controversy which arises between a stockholder and a corporation, and the nature
is not altered by the reason or wisdom with which the Board of Directors may have
in taking such action. The issue of the alleged termination involving a corporate
officer, not a mere employee, is not a simple labor problem but a matter that comes
within the area of corporate affairs and management and is a corporate controversy
in contemplation of the Corporation Code.

In sum, this Court finds that the NLRC erred in assuming jurisdiction over, and
thereafter in failing to dismiss, Maglaya's complaint for illegal dismissal against
WUP, since the subject matter of the instant case is an intra-corporate controversy
which the NLRC has no jurisdiction.

TURKS SHAWARMA COMPANY v. FELICIANO PAJARON, G.R. No. 207156

FACTS:

Gem Zeñarosa, owner of Turks Shawarma Company, hired Feliciano Z. Pajaron in

May 2007 as service crew and Larry A. Carbonilla in April 2007 as head crew. On
April 15, 2010, Pajaron and Carbonilla filed their respective Complaints for
constructive and actual illegal dismissal, non-payment of overtime pay, holiday pay,
holiday premium, rest day premium, service incentive leave pay and 13th month
pay against petitioners.

Pajaron alleged that on April 9, 2010, Zeñarosa asked him to sign a piece of paper
stating that he was receiving the correct amount of wages and that he had no claims
whatsoever from petitioners. Disagreeing to the truthfulness of the statements,
Pajaron refused to sign the paper prompting Zeñarosa to fire him from work.
Carbonilla, on the other hand, alleged that sometime in June 2008, he had an
altercation with his supervisor Conchita Marcillana while at work. When the
incident was brought to the attention of Zeñarosa, he was immediately dismissed
from service. He was also asked by Zeñarosa to sign a piece of paper acknowledging
his debt amounting to ₱7,000.00.

Both Pajaron and Carbonilla claimed that there was no just or authorized cause for
their dismissal and that petitioners also failed to comply with the requirements of
due process. Petitioners denied having dismissed Pajaron and Carbonilla; they
averred that they actually abandoned their work.

The Labor Arbiter found credible Pajaron and Carbonilla's version and held them
constructively and illegally dismissed by petitioners. The National Labor Relations
Commission and Court of Appeals both denied the Motion for Reconsideration of the
petitioners.

ISSUE:
Whether the Labor Arbiter's Decision declaring Pajaron and Carbonilla illegally
terminated from employment was not based on substantial evidence.

HELD:
The Court ruled that the Labor Arbiter's Decision declaring Pajaron and Carbonilla
illegally dismissed was supported by substantial evidence. While petitioners
vehemently argue that Pajaron and Carbonilla abandoned their work, the records
are devoid of evidence to show that there was intent on their part to forego their
employment. In fact, petitioners adamantly admitted that they refused to rehire
Pajaron and Carbonilla despite persistent requests to admit them to work. Hence,
petitioners essentially admitted the fact of dismissal. However, except for their
empty and general allegations that the dismissal was for just causes, petitioners did
not proffer any evidence to support their claim of misconduct or misbehavior on the
part of Pajaron and Carbonilla. "In termination cases, the burden of proof rests on
the employer to show that the dismissal is for a just cause."37 For lack of any clear,
valid, and just cause in terminating Pajaron and Carbonilla's employment,
petitioners are indubitably guilty of illegal dismissal.

PNCC Skyway Corporation v. SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, G.R

No. 196110
FACTS:

The Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC) was awarded by the Toll
Regulatory Board (TRB) with the franchise of constructing, operating and
maintaining the north and south expressways, including the South Metro Manila
Skyway (referred as Skyway herein). It created the petitioner PNCC Skyway
Corporation (PSC) on December 15, 1998, for the purpose of taking charge of its
traffic safety, maintaining its facilities and collecting toll.
Eight years have passed, the Citra Metro Manila Tollway Corporation (Citra), a
private investor under a build-and-transfer scheme, entered into an agreement with
the TRB and the PNCC to transfer the operation of the Skyway from petitioner PSC
to the Skyway O & M Corporation (SOMCO). The said transfer provided for a five-
month transition period from July 2007 until the full turn-over of the Skyway at
10:00 p.m. of December 31, 2007 upon which petitioner PSC will close its operation.
However, on December 28, 2007 or three (3) days before the full transfer of the
operation of the Skyway to SOMCO, petitioner PSC served termination letters to its
employees, many of whom were members of private respondent PNCC Skyway
Traffic Management and Security Division Worker's Organization (Union).
According to the letter, PSC has no choice but to close its operations resulting in the
termination of its employees effective January 31, 2008. However, the employees
are entitled to receive separation pay amounting to 250% of the basic monthly pay
for every year of service, among others things. Petitioner PSC, likewise, served a
notice of termination to the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE).
On that same day of December 28, 2007, private respondent Union, immediately
upon receipt of the termination letters, filed a Notice of Strike before the DOLE
alleging that the closure of the operation of PSC is tantamount to union-busting
because it is a means of terminating employees who are members thereof. In
addition, the notices of termination were served on its employees three (3) days
before petitioner PSC ceases its operations, hence violating the employees' right to
due process.
As a matter of fact, the employees were no longer allowed to work as of January 1,
2008. Private respondent Union, thus, prayed that petitioner PSC be held guilty of
unfair labor practice and illegal dismissal. It, likewise, prayed for the reinstatement
of all dismissed employees, along with the award of backwages, moral and
exemplary damages, and attorney's fees.
PSC denied that the closure of its operation was intended to remove employees who
are members of private respondent Union. Instead, it claimed that it was done in
good faith and in the exercise of management prerogative, considering that it was
anchored on an agreement between the TRB, the PNCC and the private investor
Citra.
PSC likewise denied that it had violated the right to due process of its employees,
considering that the notices of termination were served on December 28, 2007
while the termination was effective only on January 31, 2008. PSC alleged that the
Union was guilty of an illegal strike when it started a strike on the same day it filed a
notice of strike on December 28, 2007.
Public Respondent Secretary of Labor found that there was authorized cause for the
closure of the operation however it failed to comply with the procedural
requirements set forth under Article 283 of the Labor Code.
On appeal, PSC filed a petition for certiorari alleging grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the Secretary of Labor
when it additionally directed payment of an additional ₱30,000.00 to PSC's former
employees pursuant to Article 283 of the Labor Code.

ISSUE:
Whether or not PSC failed to comply with the procedural requirements of Article
283 of the Labor Code

HELD:

YES. The SC agreed with the appellate court's stance that public respondent
Secretary of Labor committed no grave abuse of discretion in its resolution that
while there was an authorized cause for the closure of PSC's operations and the
subsequent termination of its employees, it however failed to comply with the
procedural requirements set forth under Article 283 of the Labor Code, that is, by
serving notices of termination upon the employees and the DOLE at least one (1)
month before the intended date thereof.

Article 283 of the Labor Code provides the three requirements are necessary for a
valid cessation of business operations which are as follows: (a) service of a written
notice to the employees and to the DOLE at least one month before the intended
date thereof; (b) the cessation of business must be bona fide in character; and (c)
payment to the employees of termination pay amounting to one month pay or at
least one-half month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher.

The required written notice under Article 283 of the Labor Code is to inform the
employees of the specific date of termination or closure of business operations and
must be served upon them at least one (1) month before the date of effectivity to
give them sufficient time to make the necessary arrangements. The purpose of this
requirement is to give employees time to prepare for the eventual loss of their jobs,
as well as to give DOLE the opportunity to ascertain the veracity of the alleged cause
of termination.

Thus, considering that the notices of termination were given merely three (3) days
before the cessation of the PSC's operation, it defeats the very purpose of the
required notice and the mandate of Article 283 of the Labor Code. Neither the
payment of employees' salaries for the said one-month period nor the employees'
alleged actual knowledge of the ASTOA is sufficient to replace the formal and
written notice required by the law.

Moreover, as early as July 2007, PSC already had knowledge of the eventual take-
over by SOMCO of the Skyway by December 31, 2007. Thus, considering that PSC
had ample time of more than five (5) months to serve the notice of termination to its
employees, its failure to comply with the notice requirement under Article 283 of
the Labor Code is inexcusable.

PJ LHUILLIER, INC v. CAMACHO, G.R No. 223073

FACTS:
On 2011, petitioner P.J. Lhuillier, Inc. (PJLI), the owner and operator of the "Cebuana
Lhuillier" chain of pawnshops, hired petitioner Feliciano Vizcarra as PLJI's Regional
Manager for Northern and Central Luzon pawnshop operations and respondent
Camacho as Area Operations Manager (AOM) for Area 213, covering the province of
Pangasinan. Camacho was assigned to administer and oversee the operations of
PJLI's pawnshop branches in the area.

On May 15, 2012, Vizcarra received several text messages from some personnel
assigned in Area 213, reporting that Camacho brought along an unauthorized
person, a non-employee, during the QTP operation (pull-out of "rematado" pawned
items) from the different branches of Cebuana Lhuillier Pawnshop in Pangasinan.
During the formal investigation on June 1, 2012, Camacho admitted that he brought
along a non-employee, Marasigan, during the QTP operations on May 15, 2012. He
explained that on May 12, 2012, he went home to Manila to celebrate Mother's Day
with his family on May 13, 2012. He drove himself using the service vehicle assigned
to him and arrived in Manila at around 11:00 o'clock in the evening.

Camacho admitted that he knew that it was prohibited to bring unauthorized

personnel, especially a non-employee, during the QTP operations because this was
discussed in the seminars facilitated by the company's Security Service Division. He
only realized his mistake at the end of their 13-branch stop when he noticed that his
companions were unusually quiet throughout the trip. It was also discovered that
Camacho committed another violation of company policy when he allowed an
unauthorized person to drive a company vehicle.

On June 14, 2012, the Formal Investigation Committee issued the Report of Formal
Investigation. The committee concluded that Camacho was guilty as charged. This
prompted Camacho to file a complaint before the Labor Arbiter (LA) against the
petitioners for illegal dismissal, money claims, damages, and attorney's fees.

The NLRC reversed and set aside the May 14, 2013 Decision of the LA. It declared
the dismissal of Camacho as illegal. It opined that there was no indication that
Camacho, in allowing his mother's driver to be present during the conduct of the
QTP operation, was motivated by malicious intent so as to construe the infraction as
serious misconduct punishable by dismissal.

The CA reversed the NLRC resolutions. It held that contrary to the findings of the LA
and the NLRC, the misconduct of Camacho was not of a serious nature as to warrant
a dismissal from work. At most, said the CA, he was negligent and remiss in the
exercise of his duty as an AOM.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent Camacho was illegally dismissed

HELD:
The Court finds merit in the petition.

Article 282(c) of the Labor Code authorizes the employer to dismiss an employee for
committing fraud or for willful breach of trust reposed by the employer on the
employee. Loss of confidence, however, is never intended to provide the employer
with a blank check for terminating its employee a. "Loss of trust and confidence"
should not be loosely applied in justifying the termination of an employee." For loss
of trust and confidence to be valid ground for termination, the employer must
establish that: (1) the employee holds a position of trust and confidence; and (2) the
act complained against justifies the loss of trust and confidence.
The first requisite mandates that the erring employee must be holding a position of
trust and confidence. Loss of trust and confidence is not a one-size- fits-all cause
that can be applied to all employees without distinction on their standing in the
work organization. Distinction yet should be made as to what kind of position of
trust is the employee occupying.

The law contemplates two (2) classes of positions of trust. The first class consists
of managerial employees. They are as those who are vested with the power or
prerogative to lay down management policies and to hire, transfer, suspend, layoff,
recall, discharge, assign or discipline employees or effectively recommend such
managerial actions. The second class consists of cashiers, auditors, property
custodians, etc. who, in the normal and routine exercise of their functions, regularly
handle significant amounts of money or property.

Clearly from the foregoing, it can be deduced that Camacho held a managerial
position and, therefore, enjoyed the full trust and confidence of his superiors. As a
managerial employee, he was "bound by more exacting work ethics" and should live
up to this high standard of responsibility."

The second requisite for loss of confidence as a valid ground for termination is that
it must be based on a willful breach of trust and founded on clearly established facts.

As can be culled from the records of the case, Camacho admitted that he had
committed a breach of trust when he brought along his mother's driver, an
unauthorized person, during the QTP operation, a very sensitive and confidential
operation. As explained by PJLI in its petition for review:

Camacho, as AOM, was a managerial employee. As such, he could be terminated on

the ground of loss of confidence by mere existence of a basis for believing that he
had breached the trust of his employer. Proof beyond reasonable doubt is not
required. It would already be sufficient that there is some basis for such loss of
confidence, such as when the employer has reasonable ground to believe that the
concerned employee is responsible for the purported misconduct and the nature of
his participation therein. This distinguishes a managerial employee from a fiduciary
rank-and-file where loss of trust and confidence, as ground for valid dismissal,
requires proof of involvement in the alleged events in question, and that mere
uncorroborated assertion and accusation by the employer will not be sufficient.

In this case, there was such basis. It was established that Camacho had breached
PJLI's trust when he took an unauthorized person with him to the QTP operation
which was already a violation of company existing policy and security protocol. His
explanation that his alleged misdeed was brought about by his poor physical and
health condition on that day could not prevail over two significant details that PJLI
pointed out in its petition.

Although it may be true that PJLI did not sustain damage or loss on account of
Camacho's action, this is not reason enough to absolve him from the consequence of
his misdeed. The fact that an employer did not suffer pecuniary damage will not
obliterate the respondent's betrayal of trust and confidence reposed on him by his
employer.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolution of the National Labor

Relations Commission is REINSTATED.

STA. ANA v. MANILA JOCKEY CLUB, INC. G.R No. 208459

FACTS:

Julieta Sta. Ana was hired by MJCI as outlet teller of its off-track betting (OTB)
station in Tayuman, Manila. As teller, Sta. Ana performed the following duties and
functions:

1. Waits on [OTB] tellers' booth for customers/clients; sells betting tickets.

2. Answers bettor's inquiries, provides information on racing events, assists patrons

with information, and takes bet orders.

3. Processes cash payments through terminal registers; balances registers and

makes daily ticket sales reports after the races.

4. Handles cash and transactions with due diligence and honesty to the bettors and
to the company as well.

5. Coordinates with the Betting Operations Department (BOD) on matters beyond

the standard operating procedure of the BOD.

6. Strictly observes and implements' company policies and procedures to protect

the interests of the company against unscrupulous bettors and operators

7. Reports incidents to the company on matters pertaining to the operations.

8, Submits or remits the cash sales for the day to the official collection team and/or
to the assigned banks with night depository box.1âwphi1

9. May be assigned to different OTBs as necessary to the company's operations.

10. Performs miscellaneous job-related duties as assigned.8

It was found out by MJCI that its treasury department has been illegally
appropriating funds and lending it out to the employees of the latter corporation.
The Special Disciplinary Committee of MJCI found Sta. Ana conducting her lending
business during office hours and using the funds and personnel of MJCI; thus, she
was found guilty of dishonesty and other fraudulent acts by the said committee.

On her defense, she alleged that she started her lending business 15 years ago prior
to the takeover of the new management of MJCI and she sold her fishing vessels 2
years ago to finance her lending business.

She was eventually terminated by MJCI. Consequently, she filed a complaint for
illegal dismissal.

Note that Sta. Ana was dismissed for willful breach of trust and confidence.

The LA dismissed the Complaint for lack of merit.

The NLRC affirmed the LA Decision. It ruled that MJCI validly dismissed Sta. Ana for
loss of trust and confidence.

The CA also affirmed the NLRC Resolutions.

ISSUE:
Whether Sta. Ana was validly dismissed on the ground of loss of trust and
confidence.
HELD:

The Supreme Court enumerated the elements to legally dismiss an employee on the
ground of loss and trust, to wit:

“The employer must establish that:

a) the employee occupied a position of trust and confidence, or has been routinely
charged with the care and custody of the employer’s money or property;

b) the employee committed a willful breach of trust based on clearly established

facts; and

c) such loss of trust relates to the employee’s performance of duties.”

In the case at bar, only the first element was proven by MCJI. The SC ruled that
nowhere in the evidence presented by MJCI that Sta. Ana utilized the funds of the
corporation for her lending business. Also, Sta. Ana was able to present documents
to show her capability to engage in loan operations.
Quoting the words of the SC:

“Particularly, it [MJCI] failed to establish that Sta. Ana used its employee for her
personal business during office hours, and used its money, without authority, to
lend money to another”

MJCI failed to prove that Sta. Ana committed willful breach of its trust. Particularly,
it failed to establish that Sta. Ana used its employee for her personal business during
office hours, and used its money; without authority, to lend money to another.
Hence, to dismiss her on the ground of loss of trust and confidence is unwarranted.

Under these circumstances. Sta. Ana is also entitled to receive backwages and
separation pay.

DE OCAMPO MEMORIAL SCHOOLS, INC. v. BIGKIS MANGGAGAWA SA DE

OCAMPO, INC, G.R No. 192648
FACTS:

De Ocampo Memorial Schools, Inc. a domestic corporation has two main divisions;
De Ocampo Memorial Medical Center (DOMMC), its hospital entity, and the De
Ocampo Memorial Colleges (DOMC), its school entity.

A Union Registration was issued in favor of Bigkis Manggagawa sa De Ocampo

Memorial Medical Center - LAKAS (BMDOMMC) while Bigkis Manggagawa sa De
Ocampo Memorial School, Inc. (BMDOMSI) was later declared a legitimate labor
organization. Due to this, De Ocampo Memorial Schools, Inc. filed a Petition for
Cancellation of Ce1iificate of Registration to cancel the Certificate of Registration of
BMDOMSI on the following grounds: 1) misrepresentation, false statement and
fraud in connection with its creation and registration as a labor union as it shared
the same set of officers and members with BMDOMMC; 2) mixed membership of
rank-and-file and managerial/supervisory employees; and 3) inappropriate
bargaining unit.

DOLE-NCR ruled that BMDOMSI committed misrepresentation by making it

appear that the bargaining unit is composed of faculty and technical employees. In
fact, all the union officers and most of the members are from the General Services
Division. Furthermore, the members of the union do not share commonality of
interest, as it is composed of academic and non-academic personnel. However,
reversed the Regional Director's finding. The CA affirmed the decision of the
Regional Director but also ruled that there was no commonality of interest present.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the union committed fraud and misrepresentation by having same
set of officers with BMDOMMC

HELD:
No.
For fraud and misrepresentation to constitute grounds for cancellation of union
registration under the Labor Code Art. 247, the nature of the fraud and
misrepresentation must be grave and compelling enough to vitiate the consent of a
majority of union members. Moreover, there is nothing in the form "Report of
Creation of Local Chapter" that requires the applicant to disclose the existence of
another union, much less the names of the officers of such other union. Although
commonality of interest is absent, it is not a ground for cancellation of union
registration.