Petitioner - Jurisdiction

Petitioner through certiorari under Rule 65 raises the constitutionality of the Victims’ Dignity Act of 2013 to reverse
and set-aside the finding of probable cause by the trial court.

Petition for certiorari under Rule 65 warrants that when any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-
judicial functions has acted without or in excess its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with
certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or
officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require. 1

It is quite clear from the foregoing facts that petitioner was an aggrieved party by virtue of the order of arrest issued
by the trial court. Verily, assailing the constitutionality of the Victim’s Dignity Act of 2013 through certiorari is a
proper remedy that may be used by the petitioner to avail of a speedy resolution of his case.

Though it may be argued that the petition violates the principle of hierarchy of court on the contention that the
petition should have been filed before the lower courts, the instant petition is an exception to the principle of
hierarchy of courts

In The Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on Elections:

“The Supreme Court's role to interpret the Constitution and act in order to protect constitutional rights
when these become exigent should not be emasculated by the doctrine in respect of the hierarchy of courts.
That has never been the purpose of such doctrine.

Thus, the doctrine of hierarchy of courts is not an iron-clad rule. This court has "full discretionary power to
take cognizance and assume jurisdiction [over] special civil actions for certiorari ... filed directly with it for
exceptionally compelling reasons or if warranted by the nature of the issues clearly and specifically raised
in the petition." As correctly pointed out by petitioners, we have provided exceptions to this doctrine:

First, a direct resort to this court is allowed when there are genuine issues of constitutionality that must be
addressed at the most immediate time. A direct resort to this court includes availing of the remedies
of certiorari and prohibition to assail the constitutionality of actions of both legislative and executive
branches of the government.

1 Section 1 Rule 65 Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus Rules of Court – Civil Procedure
....

A second exception is when the issues involved are of transcendental importance. In these cases, the
imminence and clarity of the threat to fundamental constitutional rights outweigh the necessity for
prudence. The doctrine relating to constitutional issues of transcendental importance prevents courts from
the paralysis of procedural niceties when clearly faced with the need for substantial protection.
....

Third, cases of first impression warrant a direct resort to this court. In cases of first impression, no
jurisprudence yet exists that will guide the lower courts on this matter. In Government of the United States
v. Purganan, this court took cognizance of the case as a matter of first impression that may guide the lower
courts:

In the interest of justice and to settle once and for all the important issue of bail in extradition
proceedings, we deem it best to take cognizance of the present case. Such proceedings constitute a
matter of first impression over which there is, as yet, no local jurisprudence to guide lower courts.
....

Fourth, the constitutional issues raised are better decided by this court. In Drilon v. Lim, this court held
that:
... it will be prudent for such courts, if only out of a becoming modesty, to defer to the higher
judgment of this Court in the consideration of its validity, which is better determined after a
thorough deliberation by a collegiate body and with the concurrence of the majority of those who
participated in its discussion.
....

Fifth, ... Exigency in certain situations would qualify as an exception for direct resort to this court.

Sixth, the filed petition reviews the act of a constitutional organ...

....

Seventh, [there is] no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law[.]
... The lack of other sufficient remedies in the course of law alone is sufficient ground to allow direct resort
to this court.

Eighth, the petition includes questions that are "dictated by public welfare and the advancement of public
policy, or demanded by the broader interest of justice, or the orders complained of were found to be patent
 nullities, or the appeal was considered as clearly an inappropriate remedy." In the past, questions similar to
these which this court ruled on immediately despite the doctrine of hierarchy of courts included citizens'
right to bear arms, government contracts involving modernization of voters' registration lists, and the status
and existence of a public office.
....

It is not, however, necessary that all of these exceptions must occur at the same time to justify a direct
resort to this court. (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

In First United Constructors Corp. v. Poro Point Management Corp. (PPMC), et al2. the Supreme Court reiterated
that it "will not entertain a direct invocation of its jurisdiction unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the
appropriate lower courts, and exceptional and compelling circumstances justify the resort to the extraordinary
remedy of a writ of certiorari."3

In Liza L. Maza v. Hon. Evelyn A. Turla4, the mere possibility of the petitioners’ arrest and incarceration
necessitated this Court's exercise of jurisdiction.

In this case, the presence of compelling circumstances clearly warrants the exercise of the Supreme Court's
jurisdiction. At the time the petition was filed, petitioners was already arrested and deprived of his liberty.

At the outset, judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.5

Anent thereto, the 1987 Constitution clothes the Supreme Court with the power to review, revise, reverse, modify, or
affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower
courts in all cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement,
law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.6 (Emphasis
supplied)

Such broad power to review constitutionality of issues is tempered by strict requirements before the Supreme Court
can take cognizance of the case. In constitutional litigations, the power of judicial review is limited by four exacting

2 596 Phil. 334 (2009) [Per J. Nachura, Third Division].

3 Id. at 342.
4 G.R. No. 187094 dated February 15, 2017.
5 Section 1, Article VIII, 1987 Constitution.
6 Section 5 (2) (a), Article VIII, 1987 Constitution.
requisites, viz: (a) there must be an actual case or controversy; (b) petitioners must possess locus standi; (c) the
question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be
the lismota of the case.7

Generally, the proceeding will only be given due course when these conditions sine qua non are present, especially
when the constitutionality of an act by a co-equal branch of government is put in issue.

The petition in the instant case is imbued with the presence of the four requisites mentioned in the preceding
paragraph.

Actual Case or Controversy

As early as Angara v. Electoral Commission (63 Phil. 139, 158 (1936) the Court ruled that the power of judicial
review is limited to actual cases or controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties.
Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions
unrelated to actualities. An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or
ripe for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, lest the decision of the court would amount to an advisory
opinion.8

In Belgica v. Ochoa9, the Supreme Court enumerated jurisprudence which provides that an actual case or
controversy is one which "involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible of
judicial resolution as distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute. In other words, "there must
be a contrariety of legal rights that can be interpreted and enforced on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence.
Related to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of "ripeness," meaning that the
questions raised for constitutional scrutiny are already ripe for adjudication. "A question is ripe for adjudication
when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. It is a prerequisite
that something had then been accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may come into the
picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or threatened injury to itself as a result of
the challenged action." "Withal, courts will decline to pass upon constitutional issues through advisory opinions,
bereft as they are of authority to resolve hypothetical or moot questions.” (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

In the instant case, the twin requirement of “actual controversy” and “ripeness” is unequivocally met. Assailing the
constitutionality of the Victims’ Dignity Act which the State intends to uphold will create a contrariety of
interpretation between the opposing parties. The requisite of ripeness for adjudication is hurdled since there exists

7 Francisco v. House of Representatives, G.R. No. 160261, November 10, 2003, 415 SCRA 44, 133 (2003).
8 Republic Telecommunications Holding, Inc. v. Santiago, G.R. No. 140338, August 7, 2007, 529 SCRA 232, 243.
9 G.R. No. 208566 dated November 19, 2013
an immediate or threatened injury to petitioner as a result of the continuing enactment of said statue – the
deprivation of his liberty.

Notwithstanding petitioner’s failure either to assert any specific and concrete legal claim or to demonstrate any
direct adverse effect of the law, the Supreme Court may still take cognizance of the issue of the statute’s
constitutionality.

In ABAKADA Guro Partylist v. Purisima10, petitioners were unable to show a personal stake in the outcome of the
case or an injury to themselves by virtue of the passage of RA No. 9335 (Attrition Act of 2005). This
notwithstanding, the Supreme Court held that public interest requires the resolution of the constitutional issues
raised by petitioners. The grave nature of their allegations tends to cast a cloud on the presumption of
constitutionality in favor of the law. And where an action of the legislative branch is alleged to have infringed the
Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute.

Since the Victims’ Dignity Act is imbued with public interest being a penal statue which generally bears an in
terrorem effect in deterring socially harmful conduct, the argument in the preceding paragraph would all the more
hold. A penal statue is more far reaching to impact the public than a statute enacted to creating a Rewards and
Incentives Fund and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board for the BIR and BOC.

Locus Standi

Locus standi or legal standing requires a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of
difficult constitutional questions.11

Anak Mindanao Party-List Group v. The Executive Secretary12 summarized the rule on locus standi, thus:

Locus standi or legal standing has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in a case such that the
party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged.
The gist of the question on standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the
court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.

[A] party who assails the constitutionality of a statute must have a direct and personal interest. It must
show not only that the law or any governmental act is invalid, but also that it sustained or is in immediate

10 G.R. No. 166715 dated August 14, 2008

11 Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, 392 Phil. 618, 633 (2000), citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
12 G.R. No. 166052, August 29, 2007, 531 SCRA 583, 591-592.
 danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that it suffers
thereby in some indefinite way. It must show that it has been or is about to be denied some right or
privilege to which it is lawfully entitled or that it is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by
reason of the statute or act complained of.

For a concerned party to be allowed to raise a constitutional question, it must show that (1) it has
personally suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the
government, (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action, and (3) the injury is likely to be
redressed by a favorable action. (Emphasis and Underscoring supplied)

Moreover, The case of David v. Arroyo 13 explained the deep-seated rules on locus standi. Thus:

“Locus standi is defined as a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question. In private suits,
standing is governed by the real-parties-in interest rule as contained in Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, as amended. It provides that every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name
of the real party in interest. Accordingly, the real-party-in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or
injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Succinctly put, the plaintiffs
standing is based on his own right to the relief sought.

xxx xxx xxx

However, to prevent just about any person from seeking judicial interference in any official policy or act
with which he disagreed with, and thus hinders the activities of governmental agencies engaged in public
service, the United State Supreme Court laid down the more stringent direct injury test in Ex Parte Levitt,
later reaffirmed in Tileston v. Ullman. The same Court ruled that for a private individual to invoke the
judicial power to determine the validity of an executive or legislative action, he must show that he has
sustained a direct injury as a result of that action, and it is not sufficient that he has a general interest
common to all members of the public.

This Court adopted the direct injury test in our jurisdiction. In People v. Vera, it held that the person who
impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has
sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result.” (Citations omitted)

In the Southern Hemisphere14 cases, the Court held that in assailing the constitutionality of RA No. 9372 (Human
Security Act), petitioners have not presented any personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as none of them

13 G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006, 489 SCRA 160, 216-218.

faces any charge under RA 9372. It bears to stress that generalized interests, albeit accompanied by the assertion of a
public right, do not establish locus standi. Evidence of a direct and personal interest is key.

Petitioner’s impending arrest by virtue of the trial court’s order is an obvious proof that he has sustained, or will
sustain direct injury. As the aggrieved party, petitioner has an unbridled legal standing required in constitutional
litigations.

Earliest Opportunity

A law enacted by Congress enjoys the strong presumption of constitutionality. To justify its nullification, there must
be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and equivocal one. 15

As it is, the Victims’ Dignity Act has been in force since 2013 but it is only now (in February 2018) that the
constitutionality of said statute is being assailed. Suffice to say, earliest opportunity does not mean that a statute’s
constitutionality is assailed as soon as it is passed by legislature. As previously mentioned, an actual case or
controversy must be ripe before the Supreme Court may be called upon to adjudicate. To invalidate a statute based
on a supposition is an affront to the wisdom not only of the legislature that passed it but also of the executive which
approved it.

Earliest opportunity, in this sense, means that the issue of constitutionality must be included in the initial pleading
filed, so that it may properly be raised. Corollary thereto, raising the issue of constitutionality through an appeal or a
motion for reconsideration will not merit.

In People and Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation vs. Vera and Cu Unjieng16 , the Supreme Court stated
that, "... as a general rule, the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity, so that if not
raised by the pleadings, ordinarily it may not be raised at the trial, and if not raised in the trial court, it will not be
considered on appeal.

This rule, which is subject to exceptions, is applicable to criminal cases. In so grave a matter, the constitutional issue
should be raised and lodged in the case at the earliest opportunity that orderly procedure will admit under the
circumstances.

14 Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network Inc. v. Anti-Terrorism Council, G.R. No. 178552, 178554, 178581, 178890,
179157, 179461 dated October 5, 2010
15 Central Bank Employees Association, Inc. v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, G.R. No. 148208, 15 December 2004, 446 SCRA 299.
16 37 Off. Gaz., 164
In Hilscher v. People of the Philippines17, the appellants did not raise the constitutional question in the Court of First
Instance of Manila before which they were tried; upon conviction and on appeal neither was such question raised in
their briefs; it was only during the oral argument and in the memoranda thereafter submitted by them that they
challenged the constitutionality of the law. Under these circumstances, the Supreme Court held that the Court of
Appeals committed no reversible error in passing judgment upon the merits of the case.

By including a petition assailing the constitutionality of the Victims’ Dignity Act alongside his motion questioning
the finding of probable cause by the trial court, petitioner was able to raise was able to raise the issue at the earliest
opportunity.

Lis Mota

Lis mota literally means "the cause of the suit or action"; it is rooted in the principle of separation of powers and is
thus merely an offshoot of the presumption of validity accorded the executive and legislative acts of our coequal
branches of the government.18

This means that the petitioner who claims the unconstitutionality of a law has the burden of showing first that the
case cannot be resolved unless the disposition of the constitutional question that he raised is unavoidable. If there is
some other ground upon which the court may rest its judgment, that course will be adopted and the question of
constitutionality should be avoided.19 Thus, to justify the nullification of a law, there must be a clear and
unequivocal breach of the Constitution, and not one that is doubtful, speculative or argumentative. 20

In, Planters Products, Inc. vs. Ferthiphil Corp.21, the Court held that when Fertiphil filed the complaint to compel
PPI to refund the levies paid under the statute on the ground that LOI No. 1465, the law imposing the levy, is
unconstitutional, the constitutionality of the law became the very lis mota of the complaint for collection. The thesis
is that an unconstitutional law is void. It has no legal effect. Being void, Fertiphil had no legal obligation to pay the
levy. Necessarily, all levies duly paid pursuant to an unconstitutional law should be refunded as a mere consequence
of the law being declared unconstitutional.

In, the instant case, when Petitioner assailed the constitutionality of the very statute by which the trial court
allegedly found probable cause, the issue of constitutionality became the very list mota of the motion impugning the

17 G.R. No. L-45866 dated June 12, 1939.

18 KALIPUNAN NG DAMAY ANG MAHIBIRAP, INC. v. Hon. Sec. Jesse Robredo, G.R. No. 200903 dated July 22, 2014
19 Liban v. Gordon, G. R. No. 175352, January 18, 2011, 639 SCRA 709; and General v. Urro, G.R. No. 191560, March 29, 2011,

646 SCRA 567.

20 Betoy v. Board of Directors, G.R. Nos. 156556-57, October 4, 2011, 658 SCRA 420, 451-452, citing Gerochi v. Department of

Energy, G.R. No. 159796, July 17, 2007, 527 SCRA 696.
21
G.R. No. 166006 dated March 14, 2008
order of arrest. The question of constitutionality in this case cannot be avoided as the validity of the trial court’s
order hinges on the validity of the law which it used as basis.

As gleaned from the foregoing discussion, it is indubitable that the Supreme Court has acquired jurisdiction to hear
and try the petition at hand since the four requisites mentioned above has been sufficiently met.