You are on page 1of 10

1 Jarque vs. Desierto (A.C. No.

4509, En Banc Resolution December 5, 1995), that the Ombudsman or his deputies
must first be removed from office via impeachment before they may be held to answer for any wrong or
misbehavior which may be proven against them in disbarment proceedings

2. FRANCISCO VS. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES


G.R. NO. 160261. November 10, 2003

ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR., petitioner,


NAGMAMALASAKIT NA MGA MANANANGGOL NG MGA MANGGAGAWANG PILIPINO, INC., ITS OFFICERS AND
MEMBERS, petitioner-in-intervention,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, THE SENATE, REPRESENTED BY
SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO C. TEODORO, JR. AND REPRESENTATIVE
FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, respondents.
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-Intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.

Facts: On 28 November 2001, the 12th Congress of the House of Representatives adopted and approved the Rules
of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings, superseding the previous House Impeachment Rules approved by the
11th Congress.

On 22 July 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, which directed the Committee on Justice “to
conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF).

On 2 June 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint (first impeachment
complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices of the Supreme Court for
“culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes.” The complaint was
endorsed by House Representatives, and was referred to the House Committee on Justice on 5 August 2003 in
accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution. The House Committee on Justice ruled on 13 October
2003 that the first impeachment complaint was “sufficient in form,” but voted to dismiss the same on 22 October
2003 for being insufficient in substance.

The following day or on 23 October 2003, the second impeachment complaint was filed with the Secretary General
of the House by House Representatives against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of
the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. The second impeachment complaint was
accompanied by a “Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment” signed by at least 1/3 of all the Members of the
House of Representatives.

Various petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus were filed with the Supreme Court against the House
of Representatives, et. al., most of which petitions contend that the filing of the second impeachment complaint is
unconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section 5 of Article XI of the Constitution that “[n]o impeachment
proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year.”

Issues:
1. Whether or not the offenses alleged in the Second impeachment complaint constitute valid impeachable
offenses under the Constitution.
2. Whether or not Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the Rules on Impeachment adopted by the 12th Congress
are unconstitutional for violating the provisions of Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution.
3. Whether the second impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution.
Rulings: This issue is a non-justiciable political question which is beyond the scope of the judicial power of the
Supreme Court under Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution.

Any discussion of this issue would require the Court to make a determination of what constitutes an impeachable
offense. Such a determination is a purely political question which the Constitution has left to the sound discretion
of the legislation. Such an intent is clear from the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission.

Courts will not touch the issue of constitutionality unless it is truly unavoidable and is the very lis mota or crux of
the controversy.

The Rule of Impeachment adopted by the House of Congress is unconstitutional.

Section 3 of Article XI provides that “The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry
out the purpose of this section.” Clearly, its power to promulgate its rules on impeachment is limited by the phrase
“to effectively carry out the purpose of this section.” Hence, these rules cannot contravene the very purpose of the
Constitution which said rules were intended to effectively carry out. Moreover, Section 3 of Article XI clearly
provides for other specific limitations on its power to make rules.

It is basic that all rules must not contravene the Constitution which is the fundamental law. If as alleged Congress
had absolute rule making power, then it would by necessary implication have the power to alter or amend the
meaning of the Constitution without need of referendum.

It falls within the one year bar provided in the Constitution.

Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment complaint and referral to
the House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI
becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not be
filed against the same official within a one year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution.
Considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by former President Estrada against Chief Justice
Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven associate justices of this Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred to the House
Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the second impeachment complaint filed by Representatives Gilberto C.
Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional
prohibition against the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable officer within a one-
year period.

Hence, Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings which were approved
by the House of Representatives on November 28, 2001 are unconstitutional. Consequently, the second
impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. which was filed by Representatives Gilberto C.
Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B. Fuentebella with the Office of the Secretary General of the House of
Representatives on October 23, 2003 is barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution.

3. Gutierrez v. House Committee on Justice, et al.


G.R. No. 193459 : February 15, 2011

MA. MERCEDITAS N. GUTIERREZ Petitioner, v. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE, RISA
HONTIVEROS-BARAQUEL, DANILO D. LIM, FELIPE PESTA, EVELYN PESTA, RENATO M. REYES, JR., SECRETARY
GENERAL OF BAGONG ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN (BAYAN); MOTHER MARY JOHN MANANZAN, CO-CHAIRPERSON
OF PAGBABAGO; DANILO RAMOS, SECRETARY-GENERAL OF KILUSANG MAGBUBUKID NG PILIPINAS (KMP); ATTY.
EDRE OLALIA, ACTING SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL UNION OF PEOPLE'S LAWYERS (NUPL); FERDINAND
R. GAITE, CHAIRPERSON, CONFEDERATION FOR UNITY, RECOGNITION AND ADVANCEMENT OF GOVERNMENT
EMPLOYEES (COURAGE); and JAMES TERRY RIDON OF THE LEAGUE OF FILIPINO STUDENTS (LFS), Respondents.
FELICIANO BELMONTE, JR.,Respondent-Intervenor.

CARPIO MORALES,J.:

FACTS: For resolution is petitioners "Motion for Reconsideration.

To argue, as petitioner does, that there never was a simultaneous referral of two impeachment complaints as they
were actually referred to the committee "separately, one after the other" is to dismantle her own interpretation of
Francisco that the one-year bar is to be reckoned from the filing of the impeachment complaint. Petitioners
Motion concedes that the Francisco doctrine on the initiation of an impeachment proceeding includes the Houses
initial action on the complaint. By recognizing the legal import of a referral, petitioner abandons her earlier claim
that per Francisco an impeachment proceeding is initiated by the mere filing of an impeachment complaint.

Having uprooted her reliance on the Francisco case in propping her position that the initiation of an impeachment
proceeding must be reckoned from the filing of the complaint, petitioner insists on actual initiation and not
"constructive initiation by legal fiction" as averred by Justice Adolfo Azcuna in his separate opinion in Francisco.

In Justice Azcunas opinion which concurred with the majority, what he similarly found untenable was the
stretching of the reckoning point of initiation to the time that the Committee on Justice (the Committee) report
reaches the floor of the House. Notably, the provisions of the Impeachment Rules of the 12th Congress that were
successfully challenged in Francisco provided that an impeachment proceeding was to be "deemed initiated" upon
the Committees finding of sufficiency of substance or upon the Houses affirmance or overturning of the
Committees finding, which was clearly referred to as the instances "presumably for internal purposes of the
House, as to the timing of some of its internal action on certain relevant matters."Definitely, "constructive
initiation by legal fiction" did not refer to the aspects of filing and referral in the regular course of impeachment,
for this was precisely the gist of Francisco in pronouncing what initiation means.

The Court adhered to the Francisco-ordained balance in the tug-of-war between those who want to stretch and
those who want to shrink the term "initiate," either of which could disrupt the provisions congruency to the
rationale of the constitutional provision. Petitioners imputation that the Courts Decision presents a sharp deviation
from Francisco as it defers the operability of the one-year bar rule rings hollow.

Petitioner urges that the word "initiate" must be read in its plain, ordinary and technical meaning, for it is contrary
to reason, logic and common sense to reckon the beginning or start of the initiation process from its end or
conclusion.

Petitioner would have been correct had the subject constitutional provision been worded as "no initiation process
of the impeachment proceedings hall be commenced against the same official more than once within a period of
one year," in which case the reckoning would literally point to the "start of the beginning." To immediately reckon
the initiation to what petitioner herself concedes as the start of the initiation process is to countenance a raw or
half-baked initiation.

In re-affirming what the phrase "no impeachment proceedings shall be initiated" means, the Court closely applied
Francisco on what comprises or completes the initiation phase. Nothing can be more unequivocal or well-defined
than the elucidation of filing-and-referral in Francisco. Petitioner must come to terms with her denial of the exact
terms of Francisco.

Petitioner posits that referral is not an integral or indispensable part of the initiation of impeachment proceedings,
in case of a direct filing of a verified complaint or resolution of impeachment by at least one-third of all the
Members of the House.

ISSUE: Whether the period of one year to file impeachment complaint is mandatory.
HELD: The decision is sustained

POLITICAL LAW impeachment

The House cannot indeed refuse to refer an impeachment complaint that is filed without a subsisting bar. To refer
an impeachment complaint within an existing one-year bar, however, is to commit the apparently unconstitutional
act of initiating a second impeachment proceeding, which may be struck down under Rule 65 for grave abuse of
discretion. It bears recalling that the one-year bar rule itself is a constitutional limitation on the Houses power or
function to refer a complaint.

Tackling on the House floor in its order of business a clearly constitutionally-prohibited second impeachment
complaint on the matter of whether to make the appropriate referral goes precisely into the propriety of the
referral and not on the merits of the complaint. The House needs only to ascertain the existence or expiry of the
constitutional ban of one year, without any regard to the claims set forth in the complaint.

To petitioner, the intervening days from the filing of the complaint to whatever completes the initiation of an
impeachment proceeding is immaterial in mitigating the influx of successive complaints since allowing multiple
impeachment charges would result to the same harassment and oppression. She particularly cites Constitutional
Commissioner Ricardo Romulos concerns on the amount of time spent if "multiple impeachment charges "are
allowed. She fails, however, to establish whether Commissioner Romulo limited or quantified his reference to not
more than one complaint or charge.

In sum, the Court did not deviate from, as it did apply the twin rule of filing and referral in the present case, with
Francisco as the guiding light. Petitioner refuses to see the other half of that light, however.

The Constitution clearly gives the House a wide discretion on how to effectively promulgate its Impeachment
Rules. It is not for this Court to tell a co-equal branch of government on how to do so when such prerogative is
lodged exclusively with it.

Still, petitioner argues that the Court erred when it ruled that "to require publication of the House Impeachment
Rules would only delay the impeachment proceedings and cause the House of Representatives to violate
constitutionally mandated periods" She insists that the Committee, after publishing the Impeachment Rules, would
still have a remainder of 45 days out of the 60-day period within which to finish its business.

Indubitably, an impeachment is not a judicial proceeding, but rather a political exercise. Petitioner thus cannot
demand that the Court apply the stringent standards it asks of justices and judges when it comes to inhibition from
hearing cases. Incidentally, the Impeachment Rules do not provide for any provision regarding the inhibition of the
Committee chairperson or any member from participating in an impeachment proceeding. The Committee may
thus direct any question of partiality towards the concerned member only. And any decision on the matter of
inhibition must be respected, and it is not for this Court to interfere with that decision.

Except for the constitutionally mandated periods, the pacing or alleged precipitate haste with which the
impeachment proceeding against petitioner is conducted is beyond the Courts control. Again, impeachment is a
highly politicized intramural that gives the House ample leg room to operate, subject only to the constitutionally
imposed limits. And beyond these, the Court is duty-bound to respect the discretion of a co-equal branch of
government on matters which would effectively carry out its constitutional mandate.

DENIED FOR BEING BEREFT OF MERIT.


4. JEJOMAR C. BINAY, petitioner, vs. HON. SANDIGANBAYAN (Third Division) and the DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR
AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT,respondents.
G.R. Nos. 120681-83. October 1, 1999

MARIO C. MAGSAYSAY, FRANCISCO B. CASTILLO, CRISTINA D. MABIOG, REGINO E. MALAPIT, ERLINDA I.


MASANGCAY and VICENTE DE LA ROSA, petitioners, vs. HON. SANDIGANBAYAN, HON. OMBUDSMAN and its
PROSECUTOR WENDELL BARERRAS-SULIT and STATE PROSECUTORS ERIC HENRY JOSEPH F. MALLONGA and
GIDEON C. MENDOZA, respondents.

KAPUNAN.

FACTS: The Office of the Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan three separate informations against
petitioner, Mayor Jejomar Binay, one for violation of Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code (Illegal Use of Public
Funds), and two for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 (giving undue favor to private parties). The
informations alleged that the acts constituting these crimes were committed in 1987 during petitioner’s
incumbency as Mayor of Makati, then a municipality of Metro Manila. Petitioner argued that the Sandiganbayan
has no jurisdiction over the cases filed against him.

Petitioner Mario Magsaysay is the Mayor of the Municipality of San Pascual, Batangas. Save for petitioner Vicente
dela Rosa, all of Mayor Magsaysay’s co-petitioners are officials of the same municipality. Two complaints were
raised against petitioners for violation of Section 3(e) and (g) of R.A. No. 3019 for overpaying Vicente de la Rosa of
TDR Construction for the landscaping project of the San Pascual Central School which informations were filed
before the RTC of Batangas City. While another complaint on the same matter was eventually filed before the
Sandiganbayan. Petitioner moved to quash the Criminal Case filed before the Sandiganbayan on the grounds that
the same complaints has already been filed with the RTC. The proceedings of both cases were suspended by the
Sandiganbayan and the RTC pending resolution of the Binay case as to the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

ISSUE/S:
I. Whether the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the subject cases.
II. In GR No. 128136, whether the filing of information with the RTC effectively ousted the Sandiganbayan of
its jurisdiction over the case and estopped the respondents from filing an information before the latter; and
whether the filing of the information before the Sandiganbayan constitutes double jeopardy.

RULING:
I.
The court ruled that it is the Sandiganbayan which has jurisdiction over the subject cases. R.A. No. 7975 (took
effect on May 16, 1995) as amended by RA. 8249 (took effect on February 8, 1997) specified that the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over cases involving violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title
VII of the Revised Penal Code when the principal accused includes officials of the executive branch occupying the
positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as grade “27” and higher, of the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758) with enumeration as to officials specifically included.
Even if the municipal mayor is not specifically included in the list and despite the fact that the actual salary
received is not equivalent to grade 27, the court ruled that the classification of salary grades should not be based
on the actual amount of salary received but on the nature of the functions performed by the official concerned -
the level of difficulty, responsibilities, and qualification requirements thereof -- relative to that of another position.
It is the official’s Grade that determines his or her salary, not the other way around.

In the Index of Occupational Services, Position Titles and Salary Grades prepared by the DBM lists the municipal
Mayor under Salary Grade 27. Petitioners, therefore, fall within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Section
444(d) of the Local Government Code also settles the matter as it provides that municipal mayor shall receive a
minimum monthly compensation corresponding to Salary Grade twenty-seven (27) as prescribed under R.A. No.
6758.

II.
The court ruled that the Sandiganbayan was not ousted of its jurisdiction even if the information was first filed in
the RTC since the latter did not have jurisdiction in the first place as provided in R.A. 7975. Estoppel could not also
be invoked because jurisdiction is determined by law and not by the consent or agreement of the parties. The
court has previously ruled that a filing of a complaint with one court does not prevent the plaintiff from filing the
same with the competent court. This does not amount to forum shopping since the only authority of the first court
was to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction. By estoppel, it means that the party estopped consistently invoked
the jurisdiction of the court and actively participated in the proceedings, impugning such jurisdiction only when
faced with an adverse decision. Also, the filing of another complaint with the Sandiganbayan does not also amount
to double jeopardy because there can be no double jeopardy where the accused entered a plea in a court that had
no jurisdiction. The remedy should have been for the petitioner to move the quashal of information for lack of
jurisdiction.

The consolidated petitions were DISMISSED.

5. Bolastig vs. Sandiganbayan235 SCRA 103 August 4, 1994; Justice Mendoza

Facts:
Antonio M. Bolastig is the governor of the province of Samar. Information was filed against him and two others –
Pedro Ason the provincial treasurer and Prudencio Macabenta the property officer of the province- for alleged
overpricing of 100 reams of onion skin paper in violation of Anti-graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The
Sandiganbayan acting upon the motion of the Special Prosecutor suspended the Petitioner for 90 days with the
strength of the provision of sec. 13 of the Anti graft and corrupt practices act which provides for the preventive
suspension of public officers if they are under criminal prosecution under valid information under the same act or
under title 7, Book II of the RPC, or for any offense involving fraud upon government or public funds or property as
basis. However, herein petitioner contends that his suspension was a mindless and meaningless exercise and it was
imposed without regard to the spirit and intent of the law in which it is based. He further contends that his
suspension may deprive his constituents of the services of an elected official elected by them. Sandiganbayan
rejected the motion of the accused hence this petition.

Issue: Whether the Sandiganbayan is correct in suspending herein petitioner as Governor with the strength of Sec.
13 of the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

Held: Yes, it is now settled that sec 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 makes it mandatory for
theSandiganbayan to suspend any public officer against whom a valid information chargingviolation of the law, Bo
ok II, Title 7 of the RPC, or any offense involving fraud upongovernment or public funds or property is filed. The
fact that an elected official’s preventive suspension may deprive his constituents of the official elected by them is
not a sufficient basis for reducing what is otherwise a mandatory suspension provided by law.

6. ORAP VS. SANDIGANBAYAN


G.R. Nos. L-50508-11, October 11, 1985

Facts: Tanodbayan Special Prosecutor Rodolfo B. Aquino filed four informations before the Sandiganbayan
charging petitioner Vicente S. Orap Presiding Judge of the Municipal Court of Mangatarem, Pangasinan, with
violation of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The
gravamen of all these charges was to the effect that the accused on different occasions unlawfully and feloniously
received and took various sums of money from several persons in connection with a criminal case pending before
his sala.
Before his arraignment, petitioner filed a motion to quash the informations on the ground that the officer who
signed the same had no authority to do so and that, corollarily, the Sandiganbayan did not acquire jurisdiction over
the offenses charged. The respondent court denied the motion to quash. Petitioner verbally moved for the
reconsideration of the order but the relief sought was denied.

Hence, petitoner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the SC. It is the petitioner's position that the
Tanodbayan has no power to conduct preliminary investigations, file informations and prosecute criminal
cases against judges and their appurtenant judicial staff. He contended that under the Section 9(a) of the
Tanodbayan Decree, the courts, judges and other appurtenant judicial staff, among others, are beyond the reach
of the Tanodbayan, and that only administrative acts of agencies of the government, whether or not criminal in
character, are within the powers of said official.

Issue: Has the Tanodbayan the authority to conduct a preliminary investigation of a complaint charging a municipal
judge and his clerk of court with violation of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019 and, upon a finding of prima facie
case, proceedto file the corresponding information before the Sandiganbayan and prosecute the same?

Held:
Yes. Petitioner’s argument overlooks the fact that under the decree, the Tanodbayan functions not only as an
ombudsman, but as prosecutor as well.

As ombudsman, his investigatory powers are limited to complaints initiated against officers and personnel of
administrative agencies, as defined in Section 9(a) of the law. To that extent, we agree with the petitioner's
interpretation of the law that insofar as administrative complaints are concerned, the courts, judges and their
appurtenant judicial staff are outside the Tanodbayan's investigatory power. The reason for such exclusion is quite
evident: under Section 6, Article 10 of the Constitution, it is the Supreme Court that exercises administrative
supervision over all courts and their personnel and, therefore, is the proper forum to which administrative
complaints involving judges and the court's personnel should be lodged.

As prosecutor, however, the authority of the Tanodbayan is primary and withoutexceptions. His powers are
defined in Sections 17 and 19 of P.D. 1607, as follows:

SEC. 17. Office of the Chief Special Prosecutor.—There is hereby created in the Office of the Tanodbayan an
Office of the Chief Special Prosecutor composed of a Chief Special Prosecutor, an Assistant Chief Special
Prosecutor, and nine (9) Special Prosecutors, who shall have the same qualifications as provincial and city fiscals
and who shall be appointed by the President; ...

The Chief Special Prosecutor, the Assistant Chief Special Prosecutor and the Special Prosecutors shall have the
exclusive authority to conduct preliminary investigation of all cases cognizable, by the Sandiganbayan:
to file informations therefor and to direct and control the prosecution of said cases therein Provided, however that
the Tanodbayan may upon recommendation of the Chief Special Prosecutor, designate any fiscal, state prosecutor
or lawyer in the government service to act as Special Prosecutor to assist in the investigation and prosecution of all
cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan who shall not receive any additional compensation except suchallowances,
per diems and travelling expenses as the Tanodbayan may determinein accordance with existing laws, rules and
regulations.

xxx xxx xxx

SEC. 19. Prosecution of Public Personnel or Other Person.—If the Tanodbayan has reason to believe that any
public official employee, or other person has acted in a manner warranting criminal or disciplinary action or
proceedings, he shall cause him to be investigated by the Office of the Chief Special Prosecutor who
shall file and prosecute the corresponding criminal or administrative case before the Sandiganbayan or the
proper court or before the proper administrative agency. In case of failure of justice, the Tanodbayan shall make
the appropriate recommendations to the administrative agency concerned.
Section 17 of the Decree, in unequivocal term, confers upon the Tanodbayan, through the Chief Special Prosecutor
and the Special Prosecutors, the exclusive authority to "conduct preliminary investigation of all cases cognizable by
the Sandiganbayan, to file informations therefor, and to direct and control the prosecution of said cases therein."
If, as petitioner contends, judges, and other court personnel lie outside the investigatory power of the
Tanodbayan, then no judge or court employee could ever be brought to justice for crimes and offenses cognizable
by the Sandiganbayan, for lack of proper officer or entity authorized to conduct the preliminary investigation on
complaints of such nature against them. This absurd situation the law could never have intended, considering that
the Office of the Tanodbayan was purposely created to "give effect to the constitutional right of the people to
petition the government for redress of grievances and to promote higher standards of integrity and efficiency in
the government service."

Petition dismissed.

7. DIAZ vs Sandiganbayan
8. BUENASEDA vs FLAVIER
Legal Ethics – Legal Profession – Motion for Disbarment Improperly Filed
Administrative Law – Power of the Ombudsman – Preventive Suspension

In 1992, the NCMH Nurses Association (NCMH) filed a case of graft and corruption against Dr. Brigida Buenaseda
and several other government officials of the Department of Health (DOH). The Ombudsman (then Conrado
Vasquez), ordered the suspension of Buenaseda et al. The suspension was carried on by then DOH Secretary Juan
Flavier, being the officer in charge over Buenaseda et al. Buenaseda et al then filed with the Supreme Court a
petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus, questioning the suspension order. NCMH submitted its
Comment on the Petition where they attached a Motion for Disbarment against the lawyers of Buenaseda et al.
Allegedly, the lawyers of Buenaseda et al advised them not to obey the suspension order, which is a lawful order
from a duly constituted authority. NCMH maintains that such advice from the lawyers constitute a violation against
the Code of Professional Responsibility.

The Solicitor General, commenting on the case, agreed with Buenaseda’s lawyers as he maintained that all the
Ombudsman can do is to recommend suspensions not impose them. The Sol-Gen based his argument on Section
13 (3) of the 1987 Constitution which provides that the Office of the Ombudsman shall have inter alia the power,
function, and duty to:

Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public official or employee at fault,
and recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure or prosecution, and ensure compliance
therewith.

ISSUES: Whether or not the Ombudsman has the power to suspend government officials. Whether or not a Motion
for Disbarment may be filed in a special civil action.

HELD: Yes, the Ombudsman may impose suspension orders. The Supreme Court clarifies that what the
Ombudsman issued is an order of preventive suspension pending the resolution of the case or investigation
thereof. It is not imposing suspension as a penalty (not punitive suspension). What the Constitution contemplates
that the Ombudsman may recommend are punitive suspensions.
Anent the issue of the Motion for Disbarment filed with the Ombudsman, the same is not proper. It cannot be filed
in this special civil action which is confined to questions of jurisdiction or abuse of discretion for the purpose of
relieving persons from the arbitrary acts of judges and quasi-judicial officers. There is a set of procedure for the
discipline of members of the bar separate and apart from the present special civil action. However, the lawyers of
Buenaseda were reminded not be carried away in espousing their client’s cause. The language of a lawyer, both
oral or written, must be respectful and restrained in keeping with the dignity of the legal profession and with his
behavioral attitude toward his brethren in the profession.
9. LEDESMA vs CA
[G.R. No. 161629. July 29, 2005.]
ATTY. RONALDO P. LEDESMA, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO, in his
capacity as Ombudsman, HON. ABELARDO L. APORTADERA, in his capacity as Assistant Ombudsman, and
Ombudsman's Fact Finding and Intelligence Bureau, represented by Director AGAPITO ROSALES, respondents.
||| (Ledesma v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 161629, [July 29, 2005], 503 PHIL 396-411)

10. PDIC vs Casimiro

You might also like