VIRGINIAGARCIAFULEvs.CA,PRECIOSAB.GARCIAandAGUSTINAB.

GARCIA, 74SCRA189 (1976)

(SpecPro 2016)

FACTS: Virginia G. Fule (illegitimate sister) filed with the CFI of

Laguna a petition for letters of administration alleging “that on April
26, 1973, Amado G. Garcia, a property owner of Calamba, Laguna,
died intestate in the City of Manila, leaving real estate and personal
properties in Calamba, Laguna, and in other places, within the
jurisdiction of the Honorable Court.” At the same time, she moved
ex parte for her appointment as special administratix over the
estate. Judge Malvar granted the motion.
A motion for reconsideration was filed by Preciosa B. Garcia, the
surviving spouse of the deceased, contending that

1) The decedent “resided” in QC for 3 months before his death as

shown by his death certificate and therefore have an improper
venue.

2) The CFI of Calamba lacks jurisdiction over the petition.

CFI denied the motion.

CA reversed and affirmed making Preciosa the administratix.

Thus, Fule elevated the matter to the SC on appeal by certiorari.

ISSUES:

a.) Are venue and jurisdiction the same? How can it be determined
in the present case?

b.) What does the word “resides” in Revised Rules of Court Rule 73
Section 1 Mean?

c.) Who is entitled as special administratix of the estate?

Held:
1. No, jurisdiction is defined as the authority to try, hear and
decide a case base on the merits or the substance of the facts. It is
a substantive aspect of the trial proceeding. It is granted by law or
by the constitution and cannot be waived or stipulated.
On the other hand, Rule 4 of Rules of Court define venue as the
proper court which has jurisdiction over the area wherein real
property involved or a portion thereof is situated. Venue is the
location of the court with jurisdiction. It is more on convenience
purposes. It’s more on procedural aspect of the case. In some cases
it may be waived or stipulated by the parties.
Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: “If the
decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death,
whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of
administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First
Instance in the province in which he resides at the time of his death,
and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First
Instance of any province in which he had estate.
1. “Resides” should be viewed or understood in its popular sense,
meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person,
actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a
place and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means
merely residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence or
domicile. Residence simply requires bodily presence as
an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily
presence in that place and also an intention to make it one’s
domicile. No particular length of time of residence is required
though; however, the residence must be more than temporary.

1. In the present case, SC ruled that the last place of residence of

the deceased should be the venue of the court. Amado G. Garcia
was in Quezon City, and not at Calamba, Laguna base on his death
certificate. A death certificate is admissible to prove the residence of
the decedent at the time of his death.

Withal, the conclusion becomes imperative that the venue for

Virginia C. Fule’s petition for letters of administration was improperly
laid in the Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna. Therefore
Preciosa B. Garcia was granted as a special administratix.
JAO VS COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. NO. 128314. May 29, 2002.

Facts:

Petitioner (Rodolfo Jao) and Private Respondent (Perico Jao) were the sons of the
deceased Spouses Ignacioand Andrea Jao who died intestate in 1988 and 1989.Private
respondent filed a petition for the issuance of letters of administration in the RTC of
Quezon City over theestate of his parents. Pending the appointment of a regular
administrator, private respondent Perico moved that he beappointed as special
administrator, alleging that petitioner Rodolfo was dissipating the assets of
the estate. Petitioner moved for the dismissal of the petition on the ground of
improper venue. He alleged that his parents did not reside in Quezon City
during their lifetime but in Angeles City, Pampanga. He submitted documentary
evidence showing that hisdeceased parents were residents of Angeles City,
Pampanga.Private respondent Perico countered that his parents resides in
Quezon City and in fact, actually resided inpetitioner’s house as shown in the
death certificate presented before the court. Petitioner argued that his parents stay
inQuezon City was merely transitory and that the death certificates could not
be deemed conclusive evidence of the decedents’ residence.The trial court ruled in
favor of private respondent Perico. The CA affirmed in toto the trial court’s decision.
Hence,this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the settlement proceeding was properly laid in Quezon City.

Held:

Yes. The settlement proceeding was properly laid in Quezon City.

As provided for under the Rules of Court, the estate of an inhabitant of the Philippines
shall be settled or letters of administration granted in the proper court located in the
province where the decedent resides at the time of his death.The Rules of Court
refers to residence at the time of death, not to the permanent residence or
domicile.

In thecase of Garcia-Fule vs CA, it was held that the term resides connotes ex vi
termini “actual residence” as distinguishedfrom legal residence or domicile. xxx resides
should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning the personal,actual or
physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical
presence in a place andactual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term
means merely residence, that is, personal residence, not legalresidence or
domicile. Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a
given place, while domicilerequires bodily presence and also an intention to make it
one’s domicile. No particular length of time is required; however,the residence must me
more than temporary.

In the case at bar, it was found that the decedents’ have been living in Quezon City at
the time of their death andsome time prior thereto, and as was also shown in the death
certificate presented by private respondent. Thus, the venuefor the settlement of the
decedents’ intestate was properly laid in the Quezon City.
Title: Malig vs. Bush, G.R. No. L-22761 (1969)

Facts The plaintiffs filed the complaint, alleging that they were the acknowledged
natural children and the only heirs in the direct line of the deceased John T. Bush; that
the defendant, by falsely alleging that she was the legal wife of the deceased was able
to secure her appointment as administratrix of the estate of the deceased; that she
submitted to the court for approval a project of partition, purporting to show that the
deceased left a will; that the defendant then knew that the plaintiffs were the
acknowledged natural children of the deceased; and that they discovered the fraud and
misrepresentation perpetrated by the defendant only in July, 1962. They prayed that the
project of partition be annulled. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss stating that
since the action was one to annul a project of partition duly approved by the probate
court it was that court alone which could take cognizance of the case, citing Rule 75,
Section 1, of the Rules of Court.

Issue Whether or not the case should be dismissed on jurisdictional ground based on
Rule 75, Section 1 (now Rule 73, Section 1) of the Rules of Court.

Ruling

No.

The case should be remanded for further proceedings. Section 1 of Rule 73 of the
Rules of Court fixes the jurisdiction for purposes of the special proceeding for the
settlement of the estate of a deceased person, "so far as it depends on the place of
residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate." The matter really concerns
venue, as the caption of Rule cited indicates, and in order to preclude different courts
which may properly assume jurisdiction from doing so, the Rule specifies that "the court
first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise
jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts." In the final analysis this action is not
necessarily one to annul the partition already made and approved by the probate court,
and to reopen the estate proceeding so that a new partition may be made, but for
recovery by the plaintiffs of the portion of their alleged inheritance of which, through
fraud, they have been deprived. Without prejudice to whatever defenses may be
available to the defendant, the Court believes that the plaintiffs' cause should not be
foreclosed without a hearing on the merits.

Title: Macias vs. Uy Kim, G.R. No. L-31174 (1972)

Facts Petitioner-appellant Manuel Y. Macias filed on December 2, 1969 a

petition for review by certiorari against respondents Uy Kim, Andres Co,
Nemesio Co, Nicasio Co, Manuel Sosantong, Reliable Realty Corporation,
and Branch X of the Manila Court of First Instance. It appearing from the
complaint that there is presently pending in Branch VIII of this Court
Special Proceeding No. 63866 for the settlement of the inheritance of the
deceased Rosina Marguerite Wolfson. That the plaintiff claims to be a
beneficiary by hereditary title of her estate. It being unquestionable that
the authority to distribute the inheritance of a deceased person and
determine the persons entitled thereto belongs exclusively to the court or
branch thereof taking cognizance of the proceedings for its settlement
(Branch VIII) in this case. The orders sought to be annulled and set aside
by herein petitioner-appellant in his complaint against private respondents
which was assigned to Branch X of the Manila Court of First Instance
presided over by Judge Jose L. Moya, were issued by Judge Barcelona
presiding over Branch VIII of the same court. The Petitoner filed a separate
civil case in Branch X, seeks to recover his distributive share of the estate
of the decedent Rosina.

Issue: Whether or not the Judge of Branch X of the Manila Court of First
Instance can legally interfere with, or pass upon the validity of said orders
of the Judge of Branch VIII, as the probate court.

Ruling No, Branch VIII as the probate court has exclusive jurisdiction over
the estate of the decedent, including the validity of the will, the
declaration of heirs, the disposition of the estate for the payment of its
liabilities, and the distribution among the heirs of the residue thereof.
Under Section 1 of Rule 73, Rules of Court, "the court first taking
cognizance of the settlement of the estates of the deceased, shall
 exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts." Pursuant to this
provision, therefore all questions concerning the settlement of the estate
of the deceased Rosina Marguerite Wolfson should be filed before Branch
VIII of the Manila Court of First Instance, then presided over by former
Judge, now Justice of the Court of Appeals, Manuel Barcelona, where
Special Proceedings No. 63866 for the settlement of the testate estate of
the deceased Rosina Marguerite Wolfson was filed and is still pending. The
reason for this provision of the law is obvious. The settlement of the estate
of a deceased person in court constitutes but one proceeding. For the
successful administration of that estate it is necessary that there should
be but one responsible entity, one court, which should have exclusive
control of every part of such administration. To intrust it to two or more
courts, each independent of the other, would result in confusion and delay.
The Court cannot ignore the proclivity or tendency of appellant herein to
file several actions covering the same subject matter or seeking
substantially identical relief, which is unduly burdening the courts. 31 |
Case Digests in Special Proceeding

Title: Bernardo vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-18148

Facts
Capili died in 1958, testate in which he disposed his properties in favor of his
wife, cousins all surnamed Capili and Arturo, Deogracias (petitioner) and
Eduardo, all surnamed Bernardo. Reyes died the following year. Upon petition of
Deogracias Bernando, executor of the estate of Capili, she was substituted by
her collateral relatives and intestate heirs. The executor filed a project of
partition in the estate proceeding in accordance with the terms of the will,
adjudicating the estate of Capili among the testamentary heirs with the
exception of Reyes, whose share was allotted to her collateral relatives. These
relatives filed an opposition to the executor’s project of partition and submitted a
counter-projection of their own, claiming ½ of the properties mentioned in the
will of the deceased Capili on the theory that they belong not to the latter alone
but to the conjugal partnership of the spouses. The probate court issued an order
declaring the donation void for the reason that it falls under Article 133 of the
Civil Code which prohibits donation between spouses during the marriage. In the
same order, the court disapproved both projects of partition and directed the
executor to file another, dividing the property mentioned in the last will and
testament of Capili and the properties mentioned in the deed of donation,
between the instituted heirs of Capili and Reyes, upon the basis that the said
properties were conjugal properties of the deceased spouses.

Issue: Whether or not a probate court in special proceeding had jurisdiction to

determine the validity of the deed of donation in question and to pass upon the
question of title or ownership of the properties mentioned in the will.

Ruling
The Supreme Court answered in the affirmative. The Court held that the
determination of title to property is within the jurisdiction of the Court of First
Instance. The probate court has the jurisdiction since there is a necessity to
liquidate the conjugal partnership in order to determine the estate of the
decedent which is to be distributed among his heirs who are all parties, who are
all parties to the proceedings, including the widow, now represented because of
her death, by her heirs who have been substituted upon petition of the executor
himself and who have appeared voluntarily. The petitioners, by presenting their
project of partition including therein the disputed lands (upon the claim that they
were donated by the wife to her husband) put in question the issue of ownership
of the properties is within the competence of probate court. 32 |Case Digests in
Special Proceeding

G.R. No. L-23419

Facts of the Case:

Gelacio Sebial died in 1943, he had 3 children with this 1st wife Reoncia (Roberta's mother) and 6
other children with his 2nd wife Dolores, (Benjamina's mother). In 1960, BEjamina filed for the
settlement of her father's estate and her appointment as administrator. Thisd petition was oppsed by
Roberta on the ground that said estate had already been apportioned and that she should be the
one appointed as administrator and not Benjamina. The Court appointed Benjamina and found that
alleged partition was invalid and ineffective. So the letters of administration were issued and a notice
to the creditors was issue don the same date. The oppositors motion for reconsideration was denied.
For the possibility of an amicale settlement, the court ordered both sides to give a complete list of
the porperties of te decedent with segregation for each marriage.

On Nov. 1961, the lower court approved the administrator's inventory (second one) or six months
from the appointment. Roberta them moved for the motion reocnsideration alleging as ground that
the court has no jusridiction to approve the inventory as it was files beyiind the 3-month period. The
Court of Appeals certified the case to the Supreme Court.

Issue: Did the court lose jurisdiction to approve the inventory which was made 6 months
after the appointment?

Ruling. NO. Under section 1 of Rule 83 of the Rules of Court, the prescribed three-month period is
not mandatory. Once a petition for the issuance of letters of administration is filed with the proper
court and the publication of the notice of hearing is complied with, said court acquires jurisdiction
over the estate and retains such until the probate proceedings is closed. Hence, even if the inventory
was filed only after the three-month period, this delay will not deprive the probate court of its
jurisdiction to approve it. However, under section 2 of Rule 82 of the Rules of Court, such
unexplained delay can be a ground for an administrator's removal.

G.R. No. L-56504 May 7, 1987

POMPILLO VALERA and EUMELIA VALERA CABADO, petitioners,

vs.
HON. JUDGE SANCHO Y. INSERTO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Iloilo, Branch 1, and
MANUEL R. FABIANA, respondents.

Nos. L-59867-68 May 7, 1987

EUMELIA V. CABADO, POMPILLO VALERA and HON. MIDPANTAO L. ADIL, petitioners-appellants,
vs.
MANUEL FABIANA, JOSE GARIN and HON. COURT OF APPEALS (Tenth Division), respondents-appellants.

FACTS:

 Rafael Valera was granted leasehold rights over an 18 hectare fishpond in Iloilo by the Government to last
during his lifetime
 He transferred it by “fictitious sale” to his daughter Teresa to support her children with the agreement that when
the children finishes schooling, the fishpond will be returned to him
 Valera and his spouse Consolacion Sarosa and their child Teresa died
 The heirs of Teresa—her husband Jose Garin and their children bought the fishpond from the government acquiring title
thereto
 The administrators of the Spouses Rafael Valera and Consolacion Sarosa filed before the Probate Court and
claim the fishpond to the spouses’ estates.
 The Probate Court presided by Judge Adil held that there has been an implied trust created, therefore the
fishpond should be restored to the estate of the spouses pursuant to Articles 1453 and 1455 of the Civil Code 1
 Pursuant thereto, he directed the sheriff to enforce reconveyance of the fishpond to the estate
 The fishpond was leased by the Garin Heirs to Fabiana, who although willingly surrendered it to the sheriff, later
filed a complaint-in-intervention. This was dismissed so he instituted a separate action for injunction and
damages
 CA: reversed (fishpond be returned to Garin Heirs and their lessee Fabiana) saying that:
 Probate Court had no jurisdiction
 That the Title of the Garin Heirs is a stronger claim that rebuts the presumption that the estate owns the
fishpond; and
 That assuming the Probate Court had competence to resolve ownership, a separate action has to be filed

ISSUE: WON the probate court had authority to order reconveyance of the fishpond

HELD: NO

 The RTC, acting as Probate Court, exercises but limited jurisdiction, and thus has no power to take cognizance
of and determine the issue of the title to property claimed by a third person adversely to the decedent,
unless the claimant and all the other parties having legal interest in the property consent, expressly or impliedly, to the
submission of the question of the Probate Court for adjudgment, or the interests of the third person are not thereby
prejudiced
 This is issue not a jurisdictional, but procedural, involving a mode of practice which may be waived
 The facts obtaining in this case, however, do not call for the application of the exception to the rule.
 It was at all times clear to the Court as well as to the parties that if cognizance was being taken of the
question of title over the fishpond, it was not for the purpose of settling the issue definitely and
permanently, and writing “finis” thereto, the question being explicitly left for determination “in an ordinary
civil action,” but merely to determine whether it should or should not be included in the inventory
 This function of resolving WON property should be included in the estate inventory is, to be sure, one clearly within the
Probate Court’s competence, although the Court’s determination is only provisional in character, not conclusive, and is
subject to the final decision in a separate action that may be instituted by the parties
 Since the determination by the Probate Court of the question of title to the fishpond was merely
provisional, the fishpond cannot be the subject of execution, as against its possessor who has set up title
in himself (or in another) adversely to the decedent, and whose right to possess has not been ventilated
and adjudicated in an appropriate action.
 These considerations assume greater cogency, where, as here, the Torrens title to the property is not in the decedent’s
names but in others

1 Article 1453. When property is conveyed to a person in reliance upon his declared intentions to hold it for, or transfer it to another or the grantor,
there is an implied trust in favor of the person for whose benefit it is contemplated.

Article 1453. When property is conveyed to a person in reliance upon his declared intentions to hold it for, or transfer it to another or the grantor, there
is an implied trust in favor of the person for whose benefit it is contemplated.
  A separate action must be instituted by the administrator to recover the property.
 CA decision was affirmed

INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE VITO BORROMEO, PATROCINIO BORROMEO-HERRERA, petitioner,

vs.
FORTUNATO BORROMEO and HON. FRANCISCO P. BURGOS, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Cebu,
Branch II, respondents.

G.R. No. L-41171 July 23, 1987

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

Vito Borromeo, a widower and permanent resident of Cebu City, died on March 13, 1952, in Paranaque,
Rizal at the age of 88 years, without forced heirs but leaving extensive properties in the province of
Cebu.

On April 19, 1952, Jose Junquera filed with the Court of First Instance of Cebu a petition for the probate
of a one page document as the last will and testament left by the said deceased, devising all his
properties to Tomas, Fortunato and Amelia, all surnamed Borromeo, in equal and undivided shares, and
designating Junquera as executor thereof.

After due trial, the probate court held that the document presented as the will of the deceased was a
forgery.

The testate proceedings was converted into an intestate proceedings.

After determining the intestate heirs of the decedent, the court ordered that the assets of the intestate
estate of Vito Borromeo shall be divided into 4/9 and 5/9 groups and distributed in equal and equitable
shares among the 9 declared intestate heirs.

On August 25, 1972, respondent Fortunato Borromeo, who had earlier claimed as heir under the forged
will, filed a motion before the trial court praying that he be declared as one of the heirs of the deceased
Vito Borromeo, alleging that he is an illegitimate son of the deceased and that in the declaration of heirs
made by the trial court, he was omitted, in disregard of the law making him a forced heir entitled to
receive a legitime like all other forced heirs. As an acknowledged illegitimate child, he stated that he was
entitled to a legitime equal in every case to four-fifths of the legitime of an acknowledged natural child.

Finding that the motion of Fortunato Borromeo was already barred by the order of the court dated April
12, 1969 declaring the persons named therein as the legal heirs of the deceased Vito Borromeo, the
court dismissed the motion on June 25, 1973.

Fortunato Borromeo filed a motion for reconsideration. In the memorandum he submitted to support his
motion for reconsideration, Fortunato changed the basis for his claim to a portion of the estate. He
asserted and incorporated a Waiver of Hereditary Rights dated July 31, 1967, supposedly signed by Pilar
N. Borromeo, Maria B. Putong, Jose Borromeo, Canuto V. Borromeo, Jr., Salud Borromeo, Patrocinio
Borromeo-Herrera, Marcial Borromeo, Asuncion Borromeo, Federico V. Borromeo, Consuelo B. Morales,
Remedios Alfonso and Amelinda B. Talam In the waiver, five of the nine heirs relinquished to Fortunato
their shares in the disputed estate. The motion was opposed on the ground that the trial court, acting as
a probate court, had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the claim; that respondent Fortunato
Borromeo is estopped from asserting the waiver agreement; that the waiver agreement is void as it was
executed before the declaration of heirs; that the same is void having been executed before the
distribution of the estate and before the acceptance of the inheritance; and that it is void ab initio and
inexistent for lack of subject matter.

On December 24, 1974, after due hearing, the trial court concluding that the five declared heirs who
signed the waiver agreement assigning their hereditary rights to Fortunato Borromeo had lost the same
rights, declared the latter as entitled to 5/9 of the estate of Vito Borromeo.

It is argued by the petitioner that the document entitled " waiver of Hereditary Rights" executed on July
31, 1967, aside from having been cancelled and revoked on June 29, 1968, by Tomas L. Borromeo,
Fortunato Borromeo and Amelia Borromeo, is without force and effect because there can be no effective
waiver of hereditary rights before there has been a valid acceptance of the inheritance the heirs intend
to transfer. Pursuant to Article 1043 of the Civil Code, to make acceptance or repudiation of inheritance
valid, the person must be certain of the death of the one from whom he is to inherit and of his right to
the inheritance. Since the petitioner and her co-heirs were not certain of their right to the inheritance
until they were declared heirs, their rights were, therefore, uncertain. This view, according to the
petitioner, is also supported by Article 1057 of the same Code which directs heirs, devicees, and legatees
to signify their acceptance or repudiation within thirty days after the court has issued an order for the
distribution of the estate.

Respondent Fortunato Borromeo on the other hand, contends that under Article 1043 of the Civil Code
there is no need for a person to be first declared as heir before he can accept or repudiate an
inheritance. What is required is that he must first be certain of the death of the person from whom he is
to inherit and that he must be certain of his right to the inheritance. He points out that at the time of the
signing of the waiver document on July 31, 1967, the signatories to the waiver document were certain
that Vito Borromeo was already dead as well as of their rights to the inheritance as shown in the waiver
document itself.

ISSUE:

Whether or not an acceptance or renunciation of inheritance, in order to be valid, must be preceded by

a court declaration that the person making the acceptance or renunciation is indeed an heir.

RULING:

No.
The prevailing jurisprudence on waiver of hereditary rights is that "the properties included in an existing
inheritance cannot be considered as belonging to third persons with respect to the heirs, who by fiction
of law continue the personality of the former. Nor do such properties have the character of future
property, because the heirs acquire a right to succession from the moment of the death of the deceased,
by principle established in article 657 and applied by article 661 of the Civil Code, according to which the
heirs succeed the deceased by the mere fact of death. More or less, time may elapse from the moment
of the death of the deceased until the heirs enter into possession of the hereditary property, but the
acceptance in any event retroacts to the moment of the death, in accordance with article 989 of the Civil
Code. The right is vested, although conditioned upon the adjudication of the corresponding hereditary
portion." The heirs, therefore, could waive their hereditary rights in 1967 even if the order to partition
the estate was issued only in 1969.

In this case, however, the purported "Waiver of Hereditary Rights" cannot be considered to be effective.
For a waiver to exist, three elements are essential: (1) the existence of a right; (2) the knowledge of the
existence thereof; and (3) an intention to relinquish such right. The intention to waive a right or
advantage must be shown clearly and convincingly, and when the only proof of intention rests in what a
party does, his act should be so manifestly consistent with, and indicative of an intent to, voluntarily
relinquish the particular right or advantage that no other reasonable explanation of his conduct is
possible.

The circumstances of this case show that the signatories to the waiver document did not have the clear
and convincing intention to relinquish their rights, Thus: (1) On October 27, 1967. Fortunato, Tomas, and
Amelia Borromeo filed a pleading entitled "Compliance" wherein they submitted a proposal for the
amicable settlement of the case. In that Compliance, they proposed to concede to all the eight (8)
intestate heirs of Vito Borromeo all properties, personal and real, including all cash and sums of money
in the hands of the Special Administrator, as of October 31, 1967, not contested or claimed by them in
any action then pending in the Court of First Instance of Cebu. In turn, the heirs would waive and
concede to them all the 14 contested lots. In this document, the respondent recognizes and concedes
that the petitioner, like the other signatories to the waiver document, is an heir of the deceased Vito
Borromeo, entitled to share in the estate. This shows that the "Waiver of Hereditary Rights" was never
meant to be what the respondent now purports it to be. Had the intent been otherwise, there would not
be any reason for Fortunato, Tomas, and Amelia Borromeo to mention the heirs in the offer to settle the
case amicably, and offer to concede to them parts of the estate of the deceased; (2) On April 21 and 30,
1969, the majority of the declared heirs executed an Agreement on how the estate they inherited shall
be distributed. This Agreement of Partition was approved by the trial court on August 15, 1969; (3) On
June 29, 1968, the petitioner, among others, signed a document entitled Deed of Assignment"
purporting to transfer and assign in favor of the respondent and Tomas and Amelia Borromeo all her
(Patrocinio B. Herrera's) rights, interests, and participation as an intestate heir in the estate of the
deceased Vito Borromeo. The stated consideration for said assignment was P100,000.00; (4) On the
same date, June 29, 1968, the respondent Tomas, and Amelia Borromeo (assignees in the
aforementioned deed of assignment) in turn executed a "Deed of Reconveyance" in favor of the heirs-
assignors named in the same deed of assignment. The stated consideration was P50,000.00; (5) A
Cancellation of Deed of Assignment and Deed of Reconveyance was signed by Tomas Borromeo and
Amelia Borromeo on October 15, 1968, while Fortunato Borromeo signed this document on March 24,
1969.

Rule 74

Gallanosa v. Arcangel
83 SCRA 676

FACTS:

Florentino Hitosis was a childless widower and was survived by his brother Lito. In his
will, Florentino bequeathed his ½ share in the conjugal estate to his second wife, Tecla,
and, should Tecla predecease him, as was the case, his ½ share would be assigned to
spouses Gallanosa. Pedro Gallanosa was Tecla’s son by her first marriage who grew up
under the care of Florentino. His other properties were bequeathed to his protégé
Adolfo Fortajada.

Upon his death, a petition for the probate of his will was wile. Opposition was registered
by Florentino’s brother, nephews and nieces.

After a hearing, where the oppositors did not present any evidence, the Judge admitted
the will to probate.

The testator’s legal heirs did not appeal from the decree of probate and from the order of
partition and distribution.

Later, the legal heirs filed a case for recovery of 61 parcels of land against Pedro alleging
that they had been in continuous possession of those lands and praying that they be
declared owners thereof.

Pedro moved for a dismissal which was later granted by the Judge on the ground of res
judicata.

The legal heirs did not appeal from the order of dismissal.

15 years after the dismissal of the first civil case and 28 years after the probate of the
will, the legal heirs filed a case for “annulment of the will” alleging fraud and deceit.

The court dismissed said action. However, the court set aside the dismissal after the
heirs filed a motion for reconsideration. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:
Whether the legal heirs have a cause of action for the “annulment” of the will of
Florentino and for the recovery of the 61 parcels of land adjudicated under that will to
the petitioners.

HELD:

NO. The SC held that the lower court committed a grave abuse of discretion in setting
aside its order of dismissal and ignoring the testamentary case and the first civil case
which is the same as the instant case. It is evident that second civil case is barred by res
judicata and by prescription.

The decree of probate is conclusive as to the due execution or formal validity of the will.
That means that the testator was of sound and disposing mind at the time he executed
the will and was not acting under duress, menace, fraud, or undue influence; that the
will was signed by him in the presence of the required number of witnesses, and that the
will is genuine.

Accordingly, these facts cannot again be questioned in a subsequent proceeding, not

even in a criminal action for the forgery of the will.

After the finality of the allowance of a will, the issue as to the voluntariness of its
execution cannot be raised anymore.

The SC also held that the decree of adjudication, having rendered in a proceeding in
rem, is binding upon the whole world. Moreover, the dismissal of the first civil case,
which is a judgment in personam, was an adjudication on the merits. Thus. It
constitutes a bar by former judgment under the Rules of Court.

The SC also held that the lower court erred in saying that the action for the recovery of
the lands had not prescribed. The SC ruled that the Art. 1410 of NCC (the action or
defense for the declaration of the inexistence of a contract does not prescribe) cannot
apply to last wills and testaments.

The Rules of Court does not sanction an action for “annulment” of a will.

A final decree of probate is conclusive as to the due execution of the will.

A decree of adjudication in a testate proceeding is binding on the whole world.After the

period for seeking relief from a final order or judgment under Rule 38 of the Rules of
court has expired, a final judgment or order can be set aside only on the grounds of: (a)
lack of jurisdiction or lack of due process of law or (b) that the judgment was obtained
by means of extrinsic or collateral fraud. In the latter case, the period for annulling the
judgment is four (4) years from the discovery of fraud.
The Civil Law rule that an action for declaration of inexistence of a contract does not
prescribe cannot be applied to last wills and testaments.
Gallanosa vs Arcangel, 83 SCRA 676After the finality of the allowance of a will, the
issue as to the voluntariness ofits execution cannot be raised anymore. It is not only the
1939 probateproceeding that can be interposed as res judicata with respect to private
respondents complaint.