TATEL V.

MUNICIPALITY OF VIRAC (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade

Facts: Based on complaints received by the residents of barrio Sta. Elena against the
disturbance caused by the operation of the abaca bailing machine inside Tatel’s
warehouse, Resolution 291 was enacted by the Municipal Council of Virac declaring
Tatel’s warehouse a public nuisance within the purview of Article 694 of the Civil Code
and directing the petitioner to remove and transfer said warehouse to a more suitable
place within two months from receipt of the said resolution. The municipal officials
contend that petitioner's warehouse was constructed in violation of Ordinance 13,
prohibiting the construction of warehouses near a block of houses either in the poblacion
or barrios without maintaining the necessary distance of 200 meters from said block of
houses to avoid loss of lives and properties by accidental fire. Tatel contends that said
ordinance is unconstitutional, contrary to the due process and equal protection clause of
the Constitution and null and void for not having been passed in accordance with law.
Issue: 1. WON Ordinance No. 13 is unconstitutional. NO
 Ordinance 13, was passed by the Municipal Council of Virac in the exercise of its
police power. It is a settled principle of law that municipal corporations are
agencies of the State for the promotion and maintenance of local self-government
and as such are endowed with the police powers in order to effectively accomplish
and carry out the declared objects of their creation.
(5) must be general and consistent with public policy, and
(6) must not be unreasonable.
Ordinance 13 meets these criteria.
 In spite of its fractured syntax, what is regulated by the ordinance is the
construction of warehouses wherein inflammable materials are stored where
such warehouses are located at a distance of 200 meters from a block of houses
and not the construction per se of a warehouse. The purpose is to avoid the loss of
life and property in case of fire which is one of the primordial obligation of the
government.
 The objections interposed by the petitioner to the validity of the ordinance have
not been substantiated. Its purpose is well within the objectives of sound
government. No undue restraint is placed upon the petitioner or for anybody to
engage in trade but merely a prohibition from storing inflammable products in
the warehouse because of the danger of fire to the lives and properties of the
people residing in the vicinity. As far as public policy is concerned, there can be
no better policy than what has been conceived by the municipal government.

 Its authority emanates from the general welfare clause under the Administrative
Code, which reads: The municipal council shall enact such ordinances and make
such regulations, not repugnant to law, as may be necessary to carry into effect
and discharge the powers and duties conferred upon it by law and such as shall
seem necessary and proper to provide for the health and safety, promote the
prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort and convenience of
the municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of property
therein.

 For an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of
the municipality to enact but must also be passed according to the procedure
prescribed by law.

 These principles require that a municipal ordinance

(1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute

(2) must not be unfair or oppressive

(3) must not be partial or discriminatory

Humberto Basco vs Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation
In 1977, the Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) was
created by Presidential Decree 1067-A. PD 1067-B meanwhile granted PAGCOR the power “to
establish, operate and maintain gambling casinos on land or water within the territorial
jurisdiction of the Philippines.” PAGCOR’s operation was a success hence in 1978, PD 1399
was passed which expanded PAGCOR’s power. In 1983, PAGCOR’s charter was updated
through PD 1869. PAGCOR’s charter provides that PAGCOR shall regulate and centralize all
games of chance authorized by existing franchise or permitted by law. Section 1 of PD 1869
provides:
Section 1. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared to be the policy of the State to
centralize and integrate all games of chance not heretofore authorized by existing franchises
or permitted by law.
Atty. Humberto Basco and several other lawyers assailed the validity of the law creating
PAGCOR. They claim that PD 1869 is unconstitutional because a) it violates the equal
protection clause and b) it violates the local autonomy clause of the constitution.
Basco et al argued that PD 1869 violates the equal protection clause because it legalizes
PAGCOR-conducted gambling, while most other forms of gambling are outlawed, together
with prostitution, drug trafficking and other vices.
Anent the issue of local autonomy, Basco et al contend that P.D. 1869 forced cities like Manila
to waive its right to impose taxes and legal fees as far as PAGCOR is concerned; that Section
13 par. (2) of P.D. 1869 which exempts PAGCOR, as the franchise holder from paying any “tax
of any kind or form, income or otherwise, as well as fees, charges or levies of whatever nature,
whether National or Local” is violative of the local autonomy principle.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not PD 1869 violates the equal protection clause.
2. Whether or not PD 1869 violates the local autonomy clause.
HELD:
1. No. Just how PD 1869 in legalizing gambling conducted by PAGCOR is violative of the
equal protection is not clearly explained in Basco’s petition. The mere fact that some
gambling activities like cockfighting (PD 449) horse racing (RA 306 as amended by RA 983),
sweepstakes, lotteries and races (RA 1169 as amended by BP 42) are legalized under certain
conditions, while others are prohibited, does not render the applicable laws, PD. 1869 for one,
unconstitutional.
Basco’s posture ignores the well-accepted meaning of the clause “equal protection of the
laws.” The clause does not preclude classification of individuals who may be accorded
different treatment under the law as long as the classification is not unreasonable or
arbitrary. A law does not have to operate in equal force on all persons or things to be
conformable to Article III, Sec 1 of the Constitution. The “equal protection clause” does not
prohibit the Legislature from establishing classes of individuals or objects upon which
different rules shall operate. The Constitution does not require situations which are different
in fact or opinion to be treated in law as though they were the same.
2. No. Section 5, Article 10 of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own source of revenue and to
levy taxes, fees, and other charges subject to such guidelines and limitation as the congress
may provide, consistent with the basic policy on local autonomy. Such taxes, fees and
charges shall accrue exclusively to the local government.
A close reading of the above provision does not violate local autonomy (particularly on taxing
powers) as it was clearly stated that the taxing power of LGUs are subject to such guidelines
and limitation as Congress may provide.
Further, the City of Manila, being a mere Municipal corporation has no inherent right to
impose taxes. The Charter of the City of Manila is subject to control by Congress. It should be
stressed that “municipal corporations are mere creatures of Congress” which has the power to
“create and abolish municipal corporations” due to its “general legislative powers”. Congress,
therefore, has the power of control over Local governments. And if Congress can grant the
City of Manila the power to tax certain matters, it can also provide for exemptions or even
take back the power.
Further still, local governments have no power to tax instrumentalities of the National
Government. PAGCOR is a government owned or controlled corporation with an original
charter, PD 1869. All of its shares of stocks are owned by the National Government.
Otherwise, its operation might be burdened, impeded or subjected to control by a mere Local
government.
This doctrine emanates from the “supremacy” of the National Government over local
governments.
DRILON VS LIM (1994)
Facts: The principal issue in this case is the constitutionality of Section 187 of the Local
Government Code3. The Secretary of Justice (on appeal to him of four oil companies and a
taxpayer) declared Ordinance No. 7794 (Manila Revenue Code) null and void for non-
compliance with the procedure in the enactment of tax ordinances and for containing certain
provisions contrary to law and public policy. The RTC revoked the Secretary’s resolution and
sustained the ordinance. It declared Sec 187 of the LGC as unconstitutional because it vests
on the Secretary the power of control over LGUs in violation of the policy of local autonomy
mandated in the Constitution. The Secretary argues that the annulled Section 187 is
constitutional and that the procedural requirements for the enactment of tax ordinances as
specified in the Local Government Code had indeed not been observed. (Petition originally
dismissed by the Court due to failure to submit certified true copy of the decision, but
reinstated it anyway.)
Issue: WON the lower court has jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of Sec 187 of
the LGC
Held: Yes. Ratio:BP 129 vests in the regional trial courts jurisdiction over all civil cases in
which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation. Moreover, Article X,
Section 5(2), of the Constitution vests in the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over final
judgments and orders of lower courts in all cases in which the constitutionality or validity of
any treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation,
order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question. In the exercise of this jurisdiction,
lower courts are advised to act with the utmost circumspection, bearing in mind the
consequences of a declaration of unconstitutionality upon the stability of laws, no less than on
the doctrine of separation of powers. It is also emphasized that every court, including this
Court, is charged with the duty of a purposeful hesitation before declaring a law
unconstitutional, on the theory that the measure was first carefully studied by the executive
and the legislative departments and determined By them to be in accordance with the
fundamental law before it was finally approved. To doubt is to sustain. The presumption of
constitutionality can be overcome only by the clearest showing that there was indeed an
infraction of the Constitution.
Issue:WON Section 187 of the LGC is unconstitutional.
Held: Yes. Ratio: Section 187 authorizes the Secretary of Justice to review only the
constitutionality or legality of the tax ordinance and, if warranted, to revoke it on either or
both of these grounds. When he alters or modifies or sets aside a tax ordinance, he is not also
permitted to substitute his own judgment for the judgment of the local government
thatenacted the measure. Secretary Drilon did set aside the Manila Revenue Code, but he did
not replace it with his own version of what the Code should be.. What he found only was that
it was illegal. All he did in reviewing the said measure was determine if the petitioners were
performing their functions in accordance with law, that is, with the prescribed procedure for
the enactment of tax ordinances and the grant of powers to the city government under the
Local Government Code. As we see it, that was an act not of control but of mere supervision.
An officer in control lays down the rules in the doing of an act. If they are not followed, he
may, in his discretion, order the act undone or re-done by his subordinate or he may even
decide to do it himself. Supervision does not cover such authority. The supervisor or
superintendent merely sees to it that the rules are followed, but he himself does not lay
downsuch rules, nor does he have the discretion to modify or replace them. Significantly, a
rule similar to Section 187 appeared in the Local Autonomy Act. That section allowed the
Secretary of Finance to suspend the effectivity of a tax ordinance if, in his opinion, the tax or
fee levied was unjust, excessive, oppressive or confiscatory. Determination of these
flaws would involve the exercise of judgment or discretion and not merely an examination of
whether or not the requirements or limitations of the law had been observed; hence, it
would smack of control rather than mere supervision. That power was never questioned
before this Court but, at any rate, the Secretary of Justice is not given the same latitude
under Section 187. All he is permitted to do is ascertain the constitutionality or legality of the
tax measure, without theright to declare that, in his opinion, it is unjust, excessive, oppressive
or confiscatory. He has no discretion on this matter. In fact, Secretary Drilon set aside the
Manila Revenue Code only on two grounds, to with, the inclusion therein of certain ultra vires
provisions and non-compliance with the prescribed procedure in its enactment.
These grounds affected the legality, not the wisdom or reasonableness, of the tax
measure. The issue of non-compliance with the prescribed procedure in the enactment of the
Manila Revenue Code is anothermatter. (allegations: No written notices of public hearing,
no publication of the ordinance, no minutes of public hearing, no posting, no translation into
Tagalog) Judge Palattao however found that all the procedural requirements had been
observed in the enactment of the Manila Revenue Code and that the City of Manila had
not been able to prove such compliance before the Secretary only because he had given it only
five days within which to gather and present to him all the evidence (consisting of 25 exhibits)
later submitted to the trial court. We agree with the trial court that the procedural
requirements have indeed been observed. Notices of the public hearings were sent
to interested parties as evidenced. The minutes of the hearings are found in Exhibits M, M-1,
M-2, and M-3. Exhibits B and C show that the proposed ordinances were published in the
Balita and the Manila Standard on April 21 and 25, 1993, respectively, and the approved
ordinance was published in the July 3, 4, 5, 1993 issues of the Manila Standard and in the
July 6, 1993 issue of Balita. The only exceptions are the posting of the ordinance as approved
but this omission does not affect its validity, considering that its publication in
three successive issues of a newspaper of general circulation will satisfy due process. It has
also not been shown that the text of the ordinance has been translated and disseminated,
but this requirement applies to the approval of local development plans and public
investment programs of the local government unit and not to tax ordinances.

Footnote 3 Procedure For Approval And Effectivity Of Tax Ordinances And Revenue
Measures; Mandatory Public Hearings. The procedure for approval of local tax ordinances
and revenue measures shall be in accordance with the provisions of this Code: Provided, That
public hearings shall be conducted for the purpose prior to the enactment thereof; Provided,
further, That any question on the constitutionality or legality of tax ordinances or revenue
measures may be raised on appeal within thirty (30) days from the effectivity thereof to the
Secretary of Justice who shall render a decision within sixty (60) days from the date of receipt
of the appeal: Provided, however, That such appeal shall not have the effect of suspending the
effectivity of the ordinance and the accrual and payment of the tax, fee, or charge levied
therein: Provided, finally, That within thirty (30) days after receipt of the decision or the lapse
of the sixty-day period without the Secretary of Justice acting upon the appeal, the aggrieved
party may file appropriate proceedings with a court of competent jurisdiction.
PILAPIL v. CA

FACTS:

Spouses Pilapil own a parcel of land in Bahak, Poblacion, Liloan, Cebu. Spouses
Colomida, on the other hand, bought a parcel of land located also in Bahak. Now this land
owned by the Colomidas has for its ingress and egress to the National Road a camino vecinal
(barrio road). However, this camino vecinal transverses the property of the Pilapil, which was
the root of all their problems.

The Pilapil denied the existence of the camino vecinal. Socrates Pilapil, the husband,
presented himself as witness (which was lousy) as well as Engineer Epifanio Jordan,
Municipal Planning and Development Coordinator of Liloan. The engineer said that while
that zoning map of Poblacion, Liloan made reference to a camino vecinal, said reference was
but a mere proposal of its existence to the Sangguniang Bayan of Liloan.

The Colomidas, on the other hand, relied on old-timers as witnesses – witnesses such
as Florentino Pepito, who attested to the existence of the Camino vecinal and its availability to
the general public since practically time immemorial.

The trial court ruled in favor of the Colomidas because the zoning map used as
evidence by the Pilapil did not specifically indicate that the amino vecinal was indeed merely
“proposed” since other roads and streets were classified as such. The CA upheld that trial
court, basically because it said that findings of facts by the trial court, as a general rule, should
be undisturbed.

ISSUE: WON the zoning plan must give way to the claims of the adversaries?

HELD: NO In its infinite wisdom, the SC said that it didn’t matter what opinion the
Colomidas or the engineer gave regarding the existence of the camino vecinal. What really
mattered is the zoning plan (the Urban Land Use Plan) as finally approved by the
Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Liloan. The zoning plan showed that the camino
vecinal was declared closed. And it’s beyond dispute that the abandonment, closure or
establishment of the camino vecinal is the sole prerogative of the Municipality of Liloan under
the LGU of 1983. The SC rebuked the parties for not having resorted to a pre-trial conference
which would have prevented the dragging of a trivial case for six years.
 Municipality of Pililla, Rizal v. Court of Appeals
Nature: Petition for review on certiorari of a judgment of the CA
Facts:
The RTC of Tanay, Rizal rendered judgment ordering the Philippine Petroleum
Corporation (PPC) to pay the Municipality of Pililla (municipality) business taxes and other
fees. The judgment was affirmed by the SC and became final and executor. The case was
remanded to the RTC for execution.
Hence, only the provincial fiscal or municipal attorney can represent a
province or municipality in their lawsuits. The provision is mandatory. The
municipality’s authority to employ a private lawyer is limited only to
situations where the provincial fiscal is disqualified to represent it. For
this exception to apply, the fact that the provincial fiscal was disqualified
must appear on record.
2. The fiscal’s refusal to represent the municipality is not a legal justification for
employing the services of private counsel.

In connection with the execution of judgment, Atty. Felix Mendiola filed a motion in
behalf of the municipality for the examination of PPC’s gross sales for the purpose of
computing its business taxes. PPC filed a manifestation before the RTC to the effect that
Mayor Patenia of Pililla received from it P11.5M as full satisfaction of the judgment as
evidenced by the release and quit claim documents executed by the said mayor. The RTC
issued an order denying Atty. Mendiola’s motionfor examination and execution of judgment.
Atty. Mendiola filed a motion for reconsideration claiming that the total liability
amounted to P24.2M while the amount received by the mayor was only P12.7M. He asserted
that the mayor cannot waive the balance of the judgment over which his law firm had
registered two liens for alleged consultancy services and attorney’s fees amounting to more
than P12M. The RTC, however, denied his MR.
Unlike a practicing lawyer who has a right to refuse employment, fiscal cannot
refuse to perform his functions on grounds not provided for by law
without violating his oath of office.
Instead of engaging the services of a special attorney, the municipal council
should request the Secretary of Justice to appoint an acting provincial
fiscal in place of the provincial fiscal who has declined to handle and prosecute its
case in court.
3. The legality of a private counsel’s representation can be questioned at any stage of
the proceedings.

A petition for certiorari was filed by Atty. Mendiola which was referred to the CA for
appropriate action. PPC filed a motion questioning the authority of Atty. Mendiola to
represent the municipality. The CA dismissed the petition for having been filed by a private
counsel in violation of the law and jurisprudence but without prejudice to the filing of a
similar petition by the municipality thru the proper provincial or municipal legal officer.

Atty. Mendiola filed a petition before the SC to assail the decision of the CA.

Issue: WON Atty. Mendiola, a private counsel, has authority can file an action in court for
and in behalf of the municipality of Pililla

Held: No. Atty. Mendiola has no authority to file an action in court in behalf and in the name
of the Municipality of Pililla.

1. Private attorneys cannot represent a province or municipality in lawsuits.

Sec. 1683 of the Revised Administrative Code provides that the provincial fiscal shall
represent the province or any municipality or municipal district thereof in any court
except (a) in cases whereof original jurisdiction is vested in the SC or (b) in cases
where the municipality or municipal district is a party adverse to the provincial
government or to some municipality or municipal district in the same province.
When the provincial fiscal is disqualified, a special attorney may be employed by the
municipal council.
MACASIANO v. DIOKNO
FACTS: Respondent municipality Parañaque passed Ordinance No. 86, series of 1990
which authorized the closure of J. Gabriel, G.G. Cruz, Bayanihan, Lt. Garcia Extension and
Opena streets located at Baclaran, Parañaque, Metro Manila and the establishment of a flea
market thereon. The said ordinance was approved by the municipal council pursuant to MMC
Ordinance No. 2, Series of 19779, authorizing and regulating the use of certain city and /or
municipal streets, roads, and open spaces within Metropolitan Manila as sites for flea
markets and/or vending areas under certain terms and conditions.
On June 20, 19990, the municipal council of Parañaque issued a resolution
authorizing Parañaque Mayor Walfrido N. Ferrer to enter into contract with any service
cooperative for the establishment, operation, maintenance and management of flea markets
and/or vending areas. On July 20, 1990, the Metropolitan Manila Authority approved
Ordinance No. 86 of the municipal council of respondent municipality subject to conditions.
Article 424 of the Civil Code provides that property of public dominion devoted to
public use and made available to the public in general are outside the commerce of man and
cannot be disposed of or used by the local government unit to private persons.
The closure of a road, street or park should be for the sole purpose of withdrawing the
road or other public property from public use when circumstances show that such property is
no longer municipality can “use or convey them for any purpose for which other real property
belonging to the local unit concerned might be lawfully used or conveyed” in accordance with
the last sentence of Section 10, Chapter II of B.P. Blg. 337, known as the Local Government
Code.
Those roads and streets which are available to the pubic in general and ordinarily
used for vehicular traffic are still considered public property devoted to public use. In such
case, the local government has no power tom use it for another purpose or to dispose of or
lease it to private persons.

On August 8, 1990, respondent municipality and respondent Palanyag, a service
cooperative, entered into an agreement whereby the latter shall operate, maintain and
manage the flea market in the aforementioned streets. Consequently, market stalls were put
up by respondent Palanyag on the said streets.
On September 13, 1990, petitioner Brig. Gen. Macasiano, PNP Superintendent of the
Metropolitan Traffic Command, ordered the destruction and confiscation of stalls along G.G.
Cruz and J. Gabriel St. in Baclaran.
On December 17, 1990, the trial court issued an order upholding the validity of
Ordinance No. 86 of the Municipality of Parañaque and enjoining petitioner Macasiano from
enforcing his letter0order against respondent Palanyag.
Even assuming, in gratia argument, that respondent municipality has the authority to pass
the disputed ordinance, the same cannot be validly implemented because it cannot be
considered approved by the MMA due to non-compliance by respondent municipality of the
conditions imposed by the former for the approval of the ordinance. Respondent municipality
has not shown any iota of proof that it has complied with the foregoing conditions precedent
to the approval of the ordinance.intended or necessary for public use or public service. When
it is already withdrawn from public use, the property then becomes patrimonial property of
the local government unit concerned. It is only then that the respondent

ISSUE: Whether or not an ordinance or resolution issued by the municipal council of

Parañaque authorizing the lease and use of public streets or thoroughfares as sites for flea
markets is valid

HELD: NO. Properties of the local government which are devoted to public service
are deemed public and are under the absolute control of Congress. Hence, local governments
have no authority whatsoever to control or regulate the use of public property unless specific
authority is vested upon them by Congress (e.g. Section 10, Chapter II, Local Government
Code – Closure of Roads)

However, the afore-stated legal provision should be read and interpreted in

accordance with basic principles already established by law.
CITY OF MANILA v. IAC
FACTS:
Vivencio Sto. Domingo, Sr. died and was buried in North Cemetery which lot was
leased by the city to Irene Sto. Domingo for the period from June 6, 1971 to June 6, 2021. The
wife paid the full amount of the lease. Apart, however from the receipt, no other document
embodied such lease over the lot. Believing that the lease was only for five years, the city
certified the lot as ready for exhumation. On the basis of the certification, Joseph Helmuth
authorized the exhumation and removal of the remains of Vicencio. His bones were placed in
a bag and kept in the bodega of the cemetery. The lot was also leased to another lessee.
During the next all souls day, the private respondents were shocked to find out that Vicencio’s
remains were removed. The cemetery told Irene to look for the bones of the husband in the
bodega. Aggrieved, the widow and the children brought an action for damages against the
City of Manila; Evangeline Suva of the City Health Office; Sergio Mallari, officer-in-charge of
the North Cemetery; and Joseph Helmuth, the latter's predecessor as officer-in-charge of the
said burial grounds owned and operated by the City Government of Manila. The court
ordered defendants to give plaintiffs the right to make use of another lot. The CA affirmed
and included the award of damages in favor of the private respondents.
ISSUE: Whether or not the operations and functions of a public cemetery
are a governmental, or a corporate or proprietary function of the City of Manila
HELD: It is under the proprietary functions of the City of Manila
corporation, it may acquire property in its public or governmental capacity, and private or
proprietary capacity. The New Civil Code divides such properties into property for public use
and patrimonial properties (Article 423), and further enumerates the properties for public use
as provincial roads, city streets, municipal streets, the squares, fountains, public waters,
promenades, and public works for public service paid for by said provisions, cities or
municipalities, all other property is patrimonial without prejudice to the provisions of special
laws. Thus in Torio v. Fontanilla, the Court declared that with respect to proprietary functions
the settled rule is that a municipal corporation can be held liable to third persons ex
contractu.
Under the foregoing considerations and in the absence of a special law, the North
Cemetery is a patrimonial property of the City of Manila. The administration and government
of the cemetery are under the City Health Officer, the order and police of the cemetery, the
opening of graves, niches, or tombs, the exhuming of remains, and the purification of the
same are under the charge and responsibility of the superintendent of the cemetery. With the
acts of dominion, there is no doubt that the North Cemetery is within the class of property
which the City of Manila owns in its proprietary or private character. Furthermore, there is no
dispute that the burial lot was leased in favor of the private respondents. Hence, obligations
arising from contracts have the force of law between the contracting parties. Thus a lease
contract executed by the lessor and lessee remains as the law between them. Therefore, a
breach of contractual provision entitles the other party to damages even if no penalty for such
breach is prescribed in the contract

Petitioners alleged in their petition that the North Cemetery is exclusively devoted for
public use or purpose as stated in Sec. 316 of the Compilation of the Ordinances of the City of
Manila. They conclude that since the City is a political subdivision in the performance of its
governmental function, it is immune from tort liability which may be caused by its public
officers and subordinate employees. Private respondents maintain that the City of Manila
entered into a contract of lease which involves the exercise of proprietary functions with Irene
Sto. Domingo. The city and its officers therefore can be sued for any-violation of the contract
of lease.

The City of Manila is a political body corporate and as such endowed with the
faculties of municipal corporations to be exercised by and through its city government in
conformity with law, and in its proper corporate name. It may sue and be sued, and contract
and be contracted with. Its powers are twofold in character-public, governmental or political
on the one hand, and corporate, private and proprietary on the other. Governmental powers
are those exercised in administering the powers of the state and promoting the public welfare
and they include the legislative, judicial, public and political. Municipal powers on the one
hand are exercised for the special benefit and advantage of the community and include those
which are ministerial, private and corporate. In connection with the powers of a municipal
CITY OF MANILA v. TEOTICO
FACTS:
Genaro N. Teotico was at the corner of a "loading and unloading" zone, waiting for a
jeepney to take him down town. After waiting for about five minutes, he managed to hail a
jeepney that came along to a stop. As he stepped down from the curb to board the jeepney,
and took a few steps, he fell inside an uncovered and unlighted catch basin or manhole on P.
Burgos Avenue. Due to the fall, his head hit the rim of the manhole breaking his eyeglasses
and causing broken pieces thereof to pierce his left eyelid. As blood flowed therefrom,
impairing his vision, several persons came to his assistance and pulled him out of the
manhole. One of them brought Teotico to the PGH. In addition to the lacerated wound in his
left upper eyelid, Teotico suffered contusions on the left thigh, the left upper arm, the right leg
and the upper lip apart from an abrasion on the right infra-patella region.
Teotico filed a complaint for damages against the City of Manila, its mayor, city
engineer, city health officer, city treasurer and chief of police. The trial court dismissed the
complaint. The CA affirmed, except insofar as the City of Manila is concerned, which was
sentenced to pay damages in the aggregate sum of P6,750.00.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 409 should prevail over Art 2189 of the Civil Code
HELD: NO RA 409: The city shall not be liable or held for damages or injuries to persons or
property arising from the failure of the Mayor, the Municipal Board, or any other city officer,
to enforce the provisions of this chapter, or any other law or ordinance, or from negligence of
said Mayor, Municipal Board, or other officers while enforcing or attempting to enforce said
provisions.
Art 2189 CC: Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the
death of, or injuries suffered by, any person by reason of defective conditions of road, streets,
bridges, public buildings, and other public works under their control or supervision.
It is true that, insofar as its territorial application is concerned, Republic Act No. 409
is a special law and the Civil Code a general legislation; but, as regards the subject-matter of
the provisions above quoted, Section 4 of Republic Act 409 establishes a general rule
regulating the liability of the City of Manila for: "damages or injury to persons or property
arising from the failure of" city officers "to enforce the provisions of" said Act "or any other
law or ordinance, or from negligence" of the city "Mayor, Municipal Board, or other officers
while enforcing or attempting to enforce said provisions." Upon the other hand, Article 2189
of the Civil Code constitutes a particular prescription making "provinces, cities and
municipalities . . . liable for damages for the death of, or injury suffered by any person by
reason "specifically" of the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and
other-public works under their control or supervision." In other words, said section 4 refers to
liability arising from negligence, in general, regardless of the object thereof, whereas Article
2189 governs liability due to "defective streets," in particular. Since the present action is
based upon the alleged defective condition of a road, said Article 2189 is decisive thereon.
It is urged that the City of Manila cannot be held liable to Teotico for damages: 1)
because the accident involving him took place in a national highway; and 2) because the City
of Manila has not been negligent in connection therewith.
As regards the first issue, we note that it is based upon an allegation of fact not made
in the answer of the City. Moreover, Teotico alleged in his complaint, as well as in his
amended complaint, that his injuries were due to the defective condition of a street which is
"under the supervision and control" of the City. In its answer to the amended complaint, the
City, in turn, alleged that "the streets aforementioned were and have been constantly kept in
good condition and regularly inspected and the storm drains and manholes thereof covered
by the defendant City and the officers concerned" who "have been ever vigilant and zealous in
the performance of their respective functions and duties as imposed upon them by law."
Thus, the City had, in effect, admitted that P. Burgos Avenue was and is under its control and
supervision.
Moreover, the assertion to the effect that said Avenue is a national highway was
made, for the first time, in its motion for reconsideration of the decision of the Court of
Appeals. Such assertion raised, therefore, a question of fact, which had not been put in issue
in the trial court, and cannot be set up, for the first time, on appeal, much less after the
rendition of the decision of the appellate court, in a motion for the reconsideration thereof.
At any rate, under Article 2189 of the Civil Code, it is not necessary for the liability
therein established to attach that the defective roads or streets belong to the province, city or
municipality from which responsibility is exacted. What said article requires is that the
province, city or municipality have either "control or supervision" over said street or road.
Even if P. Burgos Avenue were, therefore, a national highway, this circumstance would not
necessarily detract from its "control or supervision" by the City of Manila, under Republic Act
409.
This authority has been neither withdrawn nor restricted by Republic Act No. 917 and
Executive Order No. 113, dated May 2, 1955, upon which the City relies. Said Act governs the
disposition or appropriation of the highway funds and the giving of aid to provinces,
chartered cities and municipalities in the construction of roads and streets within their
respective boundaries, and Executive Order No. 113 merely implements the provisions of said
Republic Act No. 917, concerning the disposition and appropriation of the highway funds.
Moreover, it provides that "the construction, maintenance and improvement of national
primary, national secondary and national aid provincial and city roads shall be accomplished
by the Highway District Engineers and Highway City Engineers under the supervision of the
Commissioner of Public Highways and shall be financed from such appropriations as may be
authorized by the Republic of the Philippines in annual or special appropriation Acts."