Prohibited Punishment
possessing or carrying firearm is not cruel or unusual, having due regard to
Section 19. (1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or
inhuman punishment inflicted. Neither shall the death penalty be imposed,
unless, for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress
hereafter provides for it. Any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced
to reclusion perpetua.
(2) The employment of physical, psychological, or degrading punishment
against any prisoner or detainee or the use of substandard or inadequate
penal facilities under subhuman conditions shall be dealt with by law.
People v. Estoista
G.R. No. L-5793 | August 27, 1953 |Art.19 – Cruel, Degrading or Inhuman
Punishment
Facts: Estoista was for acquitted for homicide through reckless imprudence
and convicted for illegal possession of firearm under one information by the
CFI of Lanao. The firearm with which the appellant was charged with having in
his possession was a rifle and belonged to his father, Bruno Estoista, who held
a legal permit for it. Father and son live & in the same house, a little distance
from a 27-hectare estate belonging to the family which was partly covered
with cogon grass, tall weeds and second growth trees. From a spot in the
plantation 100 to 120 meters from the house, the defendant took a shot at a
wild rooster and hit Diragon Dima, a la- borer of the family who was setting a
trap for wild chickens and whose presence was not perceived by the accused.
Estoista is assailing his conviction saying that the 5-10 years penalty for the
illegal possession of firearms is cruel and excessive.
Issue: WoN the 5-10 years penalty for the illegal possession of firearms is
excessive.
Held: It is of the court’s opinion that confinement from 5 to 10 years for
the prevalent conditions which the law proposes to suppress or curb. The
rampant lawlessness against property, person, and even the very security of
the Government, directly traceable in large measure to promiscuous carrying
and use of powerful weapons, justify imprisonment which in normal
circumstances might appear excessive. If imprisonment from 5 to 10 years is
out of proportion to the present case in view of certain circumstances, the
law is not to be declared unconstitutional for this reason. The
constitutionality of an act of the legislature is not to be judged in the light of
exceptional cases. Small transgressors for which the heavy net was not
spread are, like small fishes, bound to be caught, and it is to meet such a
situation as this that courts are advised to make a recommendation to the
Chief Executive for clemency or reduction of the penalty.
People v. Esparas (1996)
J. Puno
Facts: Esparas was charged with violation of DDA for importing 20kg of shabu.
After arraignment and pleading not guilty, she escaped from jail and was tried
in absentia. She was found guilty and was sentenced to death. She remains at
large at present. This is the issue.
Issue: Whether the Court may proceed to automatically review Esparas’s
death sentence despite her absence.
Held: Yes. In US v. Laguna (1910), the Court held that its power to review a
decision imposing the death penalty cannot be waived either by the accused
or by the courts. There, the Court said, mainly, that the judgment of
conviction (capital punishment of death) entered on trial is not final, cannot
be executed, and is wholly without force or effect until the cause has been
passed upon by the Supreme Court. TC acts as a commissioner who takes the
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testimony and reports the same to the Court with its recommendation. A
decision of TC does not become final unless and until it has been reviewed by
the Court. An accused who was sentenced with the highest penalty is entitled
under the law to have the sentence and all the facts and circumstances upon
which it is founded placed before the Court, as the highest tribunal of the
land, to the end that its justice and legality may be clearly and conclusively
determined. Such procedure is merciful. It gives a second chance for
life. Neither the courts nor the accused can waive it. It is a positive provision
of the law that brooks no interference and tolerates no evasions. (The Court
here applied Sec. 50, Gen. Orders No. 58.)
A little history on the matter: The 1935 Constitution did not prohibit the
imposition of the death penalty. Section 2(4) of Art. VIII provided for review
by the Court of death penalty cases. Both the Rules of Court of 1940 and
1964 require the transmission to the Court of the records of all cases in which
the death penalty was imposed by TC, whether the defendant has appealed
or not, for review and judgment. These rules were taken from the General
Orders itself. The 1973 Constitution did not also prohibit death penalty. Sec.
9, Rule 122 provided the procedure for review of death penalty cases by the
Court. Sec. 10, Rule 122 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure even
reenacted said procedure of review and even expressly used the term
"automatic review and judgment" by the Court.
So in People v. Villanueva (1953), the Court held that the withdrawal of
appeal by a death convict does not deprive the Court of jurisdiction to review
his conviction. In People v. Cornelio (1971), which involved the escape of a
death convict, the Court held that said escape does not relieve the Court of its
duty of reviewing his conviction. In People v. Daban (1972), the Court said,
speaking about convictions by TC of death penalty on the defendant, that
until after the Court has spoken en consulta, no finality could be attached to
said decision. This automatic review cannot be waived by the accused nor by
the courts. The mere fact of escape of the accused cannot be a bar at all. In
People v. Saliling (1976), the Court said that it is not precluded from reviewing
the death sentence of an accused who is at large. In People v. Buynay (1984),
the Court reiterated the rule that escape of a death convict will not
automatically result in the dismissal of his appeal.
But finally, the 1987 Constitution was enacted. It prohibits the imposition of
the death penalty unless for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes as
determined by Congress. On December 13, 1993, Congress reimposed the
death penalty in cases involving the commission of heinous crimes. This
revived the procedure by which the Court reviews death penalty cases per
the Rules. It remains automatic, does not depend on the whims of the death
convict, continues to be mandatory, and leaves the Court without any option.
Sec. 8, Rule 124, authorizing the dismissal of an appeal when the appellant
jumps bail, does not apply to cases where the death penalty is imposed. In
death penalty cases, automatic review is mandatory. This is the text and tone
of Sec. 10, Rule 122, which is the more applicable rule. There is more wisdom
in mandating the review by the Court of all death penalty cases, regardless of
the wish of the convict and regardless of the will of the Court. Nothing less
than life is at stake and any court decision authorizing the State to take life
must be as error-free as possible. An appellant may withdraw his appeal not
because he is guilty but because of his wrong perception of the law, or
because he may want to avail of the more speedy remedy of pardon, or
because of his frustration and misapprehension that he will not get justice
from the authorities. Nor should the Court be influenced by the seeming
repudiation of its jurisdiction when a convict escapes. The Court has the duty
to review all death penalty cases. No litigant can repudiate this power which
is bestowed by the Constitution. The power is more of a sacred duty which
the Court has to discharge to assure the People that the innocence of a
citizen is the main concern especially in crimes that that shock the
conscience. This concern cannot be diluted.
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An accused does not cease to have rights just because of his conviction. This
principle is implicit in the Constitution which recognizes that an accused, to
be right, while the majority, even if overwhelming, has no right to be wrong.

COUNSEL FOR THE ACCUSED IS GIVEN A NEW PERIOD OF 30 DAYS FROM

NOTICE HEREOF TO FILE THE BRIEF OF ESPARAS.