Bill of Rights

DUE PROCESS

ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL AND MOTEL OPERATORS ASSOCIATION V. CITY OF MANILA

20 SCRA 849

Facts: The principal question in this appeal from a judgment of the lower court in an action for prohibition is
whether Ordinance No. Of the City of Manila is violating of due process clause. It was alleged that Sec. 1 of
the challenged ordinance is unconstitutional and void for being unreasonable and violate of due process
insofar as it would impose P6T fee per annum for first class motels and P4,500 for second class motels, that
Sec. 2, prohibiting a person less than 18 years from being accepted in such hotels, motels, lodging houses,
tavern or common inn unless accompanied by parents or a lawful guardian and making it unlawful for the
owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative of such establishments to lease any room or
portion thereof more than twice every 24 hours runs counter to due process guaranty for lack of certainty
and for its unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive character.

Issue: Whether or not the ordinance is violative of the due process clause?

Held: A Manila ordinance regulating the operation of hotels, motels and lodging houses is a police measure
specifically aimed to safeguards public morals. As such it is immune from any imputation of nullity resting
purely on conjecture and unsupported by anything of substance. To hold otherwise would be to unduly
restrict and narrow the scope of police power which has been properly characterized as the most essential,
insistent and the less limitable of powers extending as it does to all great public needs.

Mush discretion is given to municipal corporations in determining the amount of license fees to be imposed
for revenue. The mere fact that some individuals in the community may be deprived of their present
business or a particular mode of earning a living cannot prevent the exercise of police power.

There is no controlling and precise definition of due process. It furnishes though a standard to which
governmental action should conform in order that deprivation of life, liberty or property, in each appropriate
case, be valid. The standard of due process which must exist both as a procedural and as substantive
requisite to free the challenged ordinance, or any governmental action for that matter, from imputation of
legal infirmity is responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, obedience to the dictates of justice. It would be
an affront to reason to stigmatize an ordinance enacted precisely to meet what a municipal lawmaking body
considers an evil of rather serious proportions as an arbitrary and capricious exercise of authority. What
should be deemed unreasonable and what would amount to an abduction of the power to govern is inaction
in the face of an admitted deterioration of the state of public morals.

The provision in Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila, making it unlawful for the owner, manager,
keeper or duly authorized representative of any hotel, motel, lodging house, tavern or common inn or the
like, to lease or rent any room or portion thereof more than twice every 24 hours, with a proviso that in all
cases full payment shall be charged, cannot be viewed as a transgression against the command of due
process. The prohibition is neither unreasonable nor arbitrary, because there appears a correspondence
between the undeniable existence of an undesirable situation and the legislative attempt at correction.
Moreover, every regulation of conduct amounts to curtailment of liberty, which cannot be absolute.

PHIL. PHOSPHATE FERETILIZER CORP. VS TORRES

231 SCRA 335

Facts: Philphos Movement for Progress, Inc (PMPI) filed with the DOLE a petition for certification election
among the supervisory employees of PHILPHOS. The said petition was not opposed by PHILPHOS. In fact
it submitted a position paper with the Mediator-Arbiter. Later, PMPI filed an amended petition with the
Mediator-Arbiter wherein it sought to represent not only the supervisory employees of PHILPHOS but also
its professional/technical and confidential employees. The parties therein agreed to submit their respective
position papers and to consider the amended petition submitted for decision on the basis thereof and related
documents. The Mediator-Arbiter issued an order granting the petition and directing the holding of a
certification election. PHILPHOS appealed said order to the Sec. Of Labor, which appeal was denied.

PHILPHOS alleged that it was denied due process in the proceedings before the Mediator-Arbiter.

Issue: Whether or not PHILPHOS was denied due process?

Held: The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or, as applied to administrative
proceedings, an opportunity to explain one’s side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or
ruling complained of. Where, as in the instant case, PHILPHOS agreed to file its position paper with the
Mediator-Arbiter and to consider the case submitted for decision on the basis of the position papers filed by
the parties, there was sufficient compliance with the requirement of due process, as PHILPHOS was
afforded reasonable opportunity to present its side. Moreover, PHILPHOS could have, if it so desired,
insisted on a hearing to confront and examine the witnesses of the other party. But it did not, instead, it
opted to submit its position paper with the Mediator-Arbiter. Besides, PHILPHOS had all opportunity to
ventilate its arguments in its appeal to the Sec. Of Labor.

JAVIER VS COMELEC

144 SCRA 194

Facts: The petitioner and private were candidates in Antique for the Batasang Pambamnsa in the May 1984
elections. On the eve of the elections several followers of the petitioner were ambushed and killed allegedly
by the private respondent’s men. This heightened the tension in the province. It was in this atmosphere that
the voting was held.

Petitioner went to the Comelec to question the canvass of the election returns. His complaint was dismissed
and private respondent was proclaimed winner by the Second Division of the body. Said decision was
signed by among others. Commissioner Opinion who was previously asked to inhibit himself on the ground
that he was a former law partner of private respondent Pacificador. Opinion had refused. The decision of
said division is being contested by petitioner.

Issue: Was there a due process observed by the COMELEC in proclaiming private respondent?

Held: No. Given the general attitude of the COMELEC toward the party in power at the time and particular
relationship between Opinion and private respondent, one could not be at least apprehensive, if not certain,
that the decision of the body would be adverse to petitioner. Opinion’s refusal to inhibit himself cannot be
justified by any criterion of propriety.

This court has repeatedly demanded “the cold neutrality of an impartial judge” as the indispensable
imperative of due process. To bolster that requirement, we have held that the judge must not only be
impartial but must also appear to be impartial as an added assurance to the parties that his decision will be
just. They must trust the judge, otherwise they will not go to him at all.

The relationship of the judge at one of the parties may color the facts and distort the law to the prejudice of a
just decision. Where this is probable or even possible, due process demands that the judge inhibit himself, if
only out of a sense of delicadeza. For refusing to do so, he divested the second division of the necessary
vote for the questioned decision, assuming it could act and rendered proceeding null and void.
 EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE

DUMLAO VS COMELEC

96 SCRA 392

Facts: BP 52 was enacted in connection with January 30, 1980 Local Elections. The petitioners question
Sec. 4 of the said law on the ground that it violates the equal protection clause and the constitutional
presumption of innocence. The first paragraph of Sec. 4 reads “… any retired elective provincial city,
municipal official, who has received payment of the retirement benefits to which he is entitled under the law
and who shall have been 65 yrs. of age at the commencement of the term of office to which he seeks to be
elected, shall not be qualified to run for the same elective office to which he seeks to be elected, shall not be
qualified to run for the same elective office from which he retired.” On the other hand, par. 2 of Sec. 4
provides:

“Any person who has committed any act of disloyalty to the State, including acts amounting to subversion,
insureccion, rebellion or other similar crimes, shall not be qualified to be a candidate for any of the offices
covered by this Act, or to participate in any partisan political activity therein… and the filing of charges for the
commission of such crimes before a civil court of military tribunal after preliminary investigation shall be
prima facie evidence of such facts.”

Issue: Whether or not the aforecited provisions of Sec. 4 of BP 52 are violative of the constitutional
principles of equal protection and presumption of innocence.

Held: Par. 1, Sec 4 of BP 52 does not transgress the constitutional guarantee mentioned the first par. Of
Sec 4 is VALID. As adverted to in many decisions, the equal protection clauses does not prohibit
classification, provided it complies with the requisites what is prohibited is a classification which is arbitrary
and unreasonable. The distinction here is substantial. The 2nd par. of Sec 4 however, violates the
constitutional guaranty of presumption of innocence. This is so, since a candidate is disqualified from
running for a public office on the ground alone that charges have been filed against him. In this wise, it is as
if he is placed in the same category as a person who has already been convicted of a crime whose penalty
carries with it the accessory penalty of suspension of the right to hold public office.

ALMONTE VS VASQUEZ

G.R. No. 95367, May 23, 1995

Facts: This is a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus to annul the subpoena duces tecum and
orders issued by respondent Ombudsman, requiring the chief accountant and record custodian of the
Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (EIIB) to produce “all documents relating to Personal
Services Funds for the year 1988 and all evidence, such as vouchers for the whole plantilla of EIIN for 1988”
and to enjoin him from enforcing his orders. The subpoena duces tecum was issued by the Ombudsman in
connection with his investigation of an anonymous letter alleging that funds representing savings from
unfilled positions in the EIIB has been illegally disbursed, petitioners move to quash the subpoena duces
tecum on the following issues:

1. whether petitioners can be ordered to produce documents relating to personal services and salary
vouchers of EIIB employees on the plea that such documents are “classified”,
2. whether petitioner’s right to the equal protection of laws have been violated. Petitioners complain
that in all forum and tribunal the aggrieved parties can only hale respondents via their verified
complaints and sworn statements with their identities fully disclosed, while in proceedings before the
Office of the Ombudsman anonymous letters suffice to start an investigation;
3. that the subpoena duces tecum is violative of the petitioners right against self-incrimination.
Issue: Were petitioners correct in forwarding the aforementioned issues?

Held: Where the claim of confidentiality does not vest on the need to protect military, diplomatic or other
national security secrets but on a general public interest in the confidentiality of his conversation, courts
have declined to find it in the constitution an absolute privilege of the President against a subpoena
considered essential to the enforcement of criminal laws.

In the case at bar, there is no claim that the military or diplomatic secrets will be disclosed by the production
of records pertaining to the personnel of the EIIB. Indeed, EIIB’s function is the gathering and evaluation of
intelligence reports and information regarding illegal activities affecting the national economy. Consequently,
while in cases which involve state secrets, it may be sufficient to determine from the circumstances of the
case that there is reasonable danger that compulsion of the evidence will expose military matters without
compelling production, no similar excuse can be made for privilege resting on other consideration. Likewise,
no law or regulation was shown which considers personnel records of EIIB as classified information.

The Constitution expressly enjoins the Ombudsman to act on any complaint file in any form or manner
concerning official acts or omissions (Sec. 12, Art. XI). Rather than referring to the form of complaints, the
phrase “ in an appropriate case in Art XI Sec 12 means any case concerning official act or omission which is
alleged to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient”. The phrase “subject to such limitations as may be
provided by law” refers to such limitations as may be provided by Congress or in the absence thereof to
such limitations as may be imposed by the courts. There is a violation of petitioners right to equal protection
of laws since in the first place the procedure for the proceedings before the Office of the Ombudsman is
provided for in the Constitution itself. Second, it is apparent that in permitting the filing of complaints “in any
form and in any manner” the framers of the Constitution took into account the well known reticence of the
people which keep them from complaining against official wrongdoing. The Office of the Ombudsman is
different from the other investigatory and prosecutory agencies of the government because those subject to
its jurisdiction are public officials who through official pressure and influence can quash, delay or dismiss
investigations held against them.

The issuance of the subpoena duces tecum would not violate petitioners right against self-incrimination. It is
enough to state that the documents required to be produced in this case are public records and those to
whom the subpoena duces tecum is directed are government officials in whose possession or custody the
documents are.

ART.III, SEC. 2

SEARCHES AND SEIZURES

TAMBASEN VS PEOPLE

Facts: On August 31, 1988 P Sgt. Natal applied for the issuance of a search warrant from the MTCC,
alleging that he received information that petitioner had in his possession at his course “M-16 armalite rifle,
hand grenades, .45 pistol, dynamite sticks and subversive documents”, which articles were used or intended
to be used for illegal purposes. On the same day, the application was granted by the MTCC which allowed
the seizure of the items specified in the application.

At around 6:30pm of September 9, 1988, a police team searched the house of petitioner and seized the
following articles: a) 2 envelopes containing cash in the total amount of P14,000; b) 1 hand set c) handset
with antenna …Petitioners prays that the search warrant and the seizure of his personal effects be declared
illegal.

Issue: Whether or not the search warrant was legal.

Held: The search warrant violates Section 3, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court, which prohibits the
issuance of a search warrant for more than one specific offense. Moreover, by their seizure of articles not
described in the search warrant, the police acted beyond the parameters of their authority under the search
warrant. Section 2, Art. III requires that a search warrant should particularly describe the thing to be seized.
The evident purpose and intent of the requirement is to limit the things to be seized to those and only those,
particularly described in the search warrant to leave the officers of the law no discretion regarding what
articles they should seize to the end that unreasonable searches and seizures may not be made and abuses
may not be committed. Clearly then, the money which was not indicated in the search warrant, has been
illegally seized from petitioners. The fact that the members of the police team were doing their task of
pursuing subversives is not a valid excuse for the illegal seizure. The same constitutional provision is also
aimed at preventing violations of security in person and property and unlawful invasions of the sanctity of the
home, and giving remedy against such usurpation when attempted.

VEROY VS LAYAGUE

210 SCRA 97

Facts: Spouses Leopoldo and Ma. Luisa Veroy owned 2 houses, one in Quezon City, where they are
presently residing and another in Davao City. The house in Davao City was entrusted to caretakers.
However, the keys to the Master’s and children’s bedroom were retained by the Veroy so the caretaker
could not enter those rooms.

On April 12, 1990 Capt. Obrero called the telephone from Davao City, Mrs. Veroy to ask permission from the
latter if he could enter and search the house in Davao City as there was information that the said house was
being used as a safehouse of rebel soldiers. Mrs. Veroy gave her permission on the condition that Major
Macasaet, a long time friend of the Veroys, be present during the search. Thereafter, Capt. Obrero and
Major Macasaet conducted the search. When they were already inside the house, they opened the padlock
of the door leading to the children’s room. Inside the children’s room, they recovered a .45 caliber handgun
with a magazine fully loaded, printed materials of RAM-SFP and a book entitled “Islamic Revolution Future
Path of the Nation”. As a consequence of which, the Veeroy spouses were charged under PD 1866.

Issue: Is the search valid? Whether or not the materials taken are admissible in evidence.

Held: No. The search is not valid. The permission given by Mrs. Veroy to break open the door of their
residence was merely for the purpose of ascertaining thereat the presence of the alleged rebel soldiers. The
permission did not include any authority to conduct a room to room search once inside the house. The items
taken, were, therefore products of an illegal search, violative of their constitutional rights. As such, they are
inadmissible in evidence.

PEOPLE VS DEL ROSARIO

234 SCRA 246

Facts: Private respondent was charged and convicted of the Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunitions
and illegal sale of regulated Drugs in 2 separate criminal cases filed against him with the RTC of Cavite.

There appears to be certain irregularities in the procedure of the buy-bust operations and in the
implementation of the search warrant. As to the buy-bust operations, the alleged poseur-buyer had to return
to the police station and inform the raiding team that he had already bought the shabu from the accused to
implement the search warrant. Thereupon, the raiding team proceeded to the house of the accused to
implement the search warrant. The usual procedure in a buy-bust operation is for the police officers to arrest
the pusher of drugs at the very moment he hands over the dangerous drug to the poseur-buyer. As to the
implementation of the search warrant, the search warrant specifically authorized only the search and seizure
of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride commonly known as shabu and its paraphernalia but the raiding team
also seized certain firearms.
Issue: Whether or not the firearm seized though not specifically included in the search warrant is
admissible as evidence against the accused.

Held: No. A search warrant is not a sweeping authority empowering a raiding party to undertake a fishing
expedition to seize and confiscate any and all kinds of evidence articles relating to the crime. The
Constitution itself (sec. 2, art.III) and the Rules of Court (Sec. 3, Rule 126) specifically mandate that the
search warrant must particularly describe the things to be seized. Thus, the search warrant was no authority
for the police officers to seize the firearm which was not mentioned, much less described with particularity, in
the search warrant. Neither, may it be maintained that the gun was seized in the course of the arrest, for as
earlier observed, accused’s arrest was far from regular and legal. Said firearm, having been illegally seized
is not admissible in evidence.

PEOPLE VS TANGLIBEN

184 SCRA 220

Facts: Patrolmen Quenedo and Punzalan were conducting surveillance mission at the Victory Liner
Terminal aimed not only against persons who may commit misdemeanor at said place but also on persons
who may be engaging in the traffic of dangerous drugs based on informations supplied by informers. At 9:30
pm, they noticed a person carrying a red travelling bag who was acting suspiciously and they confronted
him. The person was requested to open the bag but he refused only to accede later on when the petitioner
identified themselves. Found inside the bag were marijuana leaves. The accused was then taken the police
headquarters for further investigation.

Issue: Was the marijuana inadmissible in evidence on the ground that it was the product of an
unlawful search without a warrant.

Held: No. One of the exceptions to the general rule requiring a search warrant is a search incident to a
lawful arrest. (Sec. 12 Rule 126). Accused was caught in flagrante, since he was carrying a marijuana at the
time of his arrest. This case therefore falls squarely within the exception. The warantless search was
incident to a lawful arrest and is consequently valid.

This case also presented urgency. The transcript of stenographic notes reveals that there was an informer
who pointed to the accused aas carrying marijuana. Faced with such on-the-spot information, the police
officer had to act quickly. There was no enough time to secure a search warrant.

PEOPLE VS GALVEZ

GR. NO. 136790 MARCH 26, 2001

Facts: The incident happened one evening at a local fair which was illuminated by fluorescent lights. Playing
games at that time in one of the stalls throwing 25 centavo coins were Larry, Romy and Al while their
companion Danny was about three meters away playing bingo. After a while five men arrived. Two of them
approached Romy while the two others served as the lookout. Then the fifth man went directly to Romy and
stabbed him at the back with a knife. Afterwards the assailant threw the knife away and then fled with his
companions. Larry saw Romy fall to the ground seriously wounded. Al was around three arms length away
and saw the entire incident. Larry and Danny brought Romy to the hospital where he was declared dead on
arrival. Then they informed Romy’s relatives of his death.

Initial police investigation showed that there were six suspects but they could not be found in their respective
residences. Inside the bus terminal bystanders informed SPO1 Lazaro, the police investigator, that Manny
stabbed the victim. So the policeman fetched Manny and told him to go to the house of the victim. But when
they arrived people just looked at manny and did not point to him as the assailant. In fact the victims brother
Rey told the police that Manny was not the one who stabbed his brother and should be released. So the
police released Manny.
But as soon as they had left, the people inside the house particularly Danny, Larry and Al told Rey that it
was Manny who stabbed his brother as they were him and saw the entire incident. So at the instance of
Rey, the Barangay Tanod apprehended Manny and took the latter to the police headquarters. The tanod had
no warrant of arrest when he took Manny into custody.

At the police station, the statements of the witnesses were prepared pointing to Manny as the assailant.
Manny was charged with murder and was denied bail. At the trial, after pleading not guilty, the eyewitnesses
pointed to Manny as the culprit. So Manny was found guilty as charged and sentence to reclusion perpetua
despite his alibi and despite the fact that the knife was not found.

On appeal, among the points raised by Manny was the legality of his arrest. He alleged that he was arrested
not because of the positive identification of the eyewitnesses but on the basis of the hearsay testimony of
Rey. Besides, he was arrested without warrant.

Issue: Was Manny’s arrest legal?

Held: NO. Manny’s arrest was illegal. The Barangay Tanod arrested Manny on the basis solely of what Rey
told him and not because he saw Manny commit the crime charged against him. Indeed there was no
warrant issued against Manny when the latter was taken into custody by the tanod. Considering that Manny
was not committing a crime at the time he was arrested nor did the arresting officer have any personal
knowledge of facts indicating that Manny committed a crime, his arrest without a warrant cannot be justified.

By entering a plea of not guilty and participating at the trial however, Manny waived his right to raise the
issue of the illegality of arrest. Objection to a warrant of arrest or the procedure by which the court acquires
jurisdiction over the person of an accused must be made before he enters a plea, otherwise the objection is
deemed waived. The fact that the arrest was illegal does not render the subsequent proceedings void and
derive the State of its right to convict the guilty when all the facts point to culpability of the accused.

And in the case all the facts point to the culpability of Manny. He was positively identified as the assailant by
the eyewitnesses who were found by the court to be credible. The failure to present as evidence of the
murder weapon is not fatal because the positive identification of the eyewitnesses is sufficient to prove the
culpability of Manny.

ART. III, SEC. 3

PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATION AND CORRESPONDENCE

GAANAN VS IAC

145 SCRA 112

Facts: Petitioner Edgardo Gaanan was requested by his client Atty. Leonardo Laconico to secretly listen to
the telephone conversation with Atty. Tito Pintor through a telephone extension so as to hear personally the
proposed condition without complainant’s consent, complainant charged Gaanan and Laconico with violation
of the Anti-Wiretapping Act (RA No. 4200).

After trial on the merits, the lower court found both Gaanan and Laconico guilty of Violating Sec. 1 of RA No.
4200, which provides:

“Sec. 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parrties to any private
communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable or by using any other device or arraignment to
secretly overhear, intercept or record such communication or spoken word by using a device commonly
known as a Dictaphone or dictagraph or detecphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or otherwise
decribed”.

The petitioner appealed to the appellate court. The Intermediate Appellate Court now the Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision of the trial court holding that the communication between the complainant and the
accused Laconico was private in nature and therefore covered by RA No. 4200; that the petitioner overheard
such communication and that the extension telephone which was used by the petitioner to overhear the
telephone conversation is covered in the term “device” as provided in the RA No. 4200.

Issue: Whether or not an extension telephone is among the prohibited devices in Sec. 1 of the Act
such that its use to overhear a private conversation would constitute lawful interception of
communications between the 2 parties using the telephone line.

Held: The unlawful refers to a “tap” of a wire or cable or the use of a “device or arrangement” for the
purpose of secretly overhearing, intercepting or recording the communication. There must be either a
physical interruption through a wiretap or the deliberate installation of a device or arrangement in order to
overhear, intercept or recorded the spoken words. An extension telephone cannot be place in the same
category as a Dictaphone, dictagraph or other devices enumerated in Sec. 1 of RA No. 4200 as the use
thereof cannot be considered as “tapping” the wire or cable of a telephone line. The telephone extension in
this case was not installed for that purpose. It just happened to be there for ordinary office use. It is a rule in
statutory construction that in order to determine the true intent of the legislative, the statute should not be
taken as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part thereof must be considered in
fixing the meaning of any of its parts.

Hence, the phrase “device or arrangement” in Sec 1 of RA No. 4200, although not exclusive to that
enumerated therein, should not b e construed to comprehend instruments of the same or similar nature, that
is, instrument the use of which would be tantamount to tapping the main line of telephone. It refers to
instrument whose installation or presence cannot be presumed by the party or parties being overheard
because by their very nature, they are not of common usage and their purpose is precisely for tapping
intercepting or recording a telephone conversation.

PEOPLE VS ALBOFERA

152 SCRA 123

Facts: Albofera and Lawi-an were convicted in the RTC of Davao del Sur for the murder of a forester and
were sentenced to capital punishment. There was no direct evidence linking both accused to the crime
charged, their alleged participation therein having been found by the trial court to have proved by
circumstantial evidence adduced by the prosecution. On appeal, the accused assails the trial court’s
decision on the ground of among others, a letter written in the Visayan dialect by accused Albofera, while
under detention, to witness Rodrigo Esma, a friend of Albofera, asking Esma to testify in favor of Albofera.
Albofera contends that the admissibility thereof was specifically excluded under Sec. 4, Art. IV of the 1973
Constitution on the Privacy of Communication and Correspondence.

Issue: Whether or not the admission of such letter as evidence was valid.

Held: Yes, Albofera’s contention is untenable. The production of the letter by the prosecution was not the
result of an unlawful search and seizure nor was it through unwarranted intrusion or invasion into Albofera’s
privacy. Albofera admitted having sent the letter to Esma, and Esma produced such letter in the course of
his testimony before the trial court. Besides, there was nothing really self-incriminatory in the letter. Albofera
mainly pleaded that Esma change his declaration in his affidavit and testify in Albofera’s favor. Nothing
Albofera stated in this letter was taken against him in assiving at a determination of his culpability.

(NOTE: The Supreme Court affirmed the judgement of conviction of the trial court based on circumstantial
evidence of which Esma’s testimony was much noted for its worthiness, even if Albofera’s extra-judicial
confession was disregarded as invalid.)

ART. III, SEC. 4

FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
 NATIONAL PRESS CLUB VS COMELEC

207 SCRA 1

Facts: Petitioner in these cases are questioning the validity of Sec. 11 (6) of RA 6646 which prohibits the
selling or donating space and time for political advertisements except to the COMELEC as provided under
Sec. 90 and 92 of the Omnibus Election Code. Petitioners argue that the provision violates and invades the
constitutional guarantees comprising Freedom of Expression; that it amounts to censorship, that the
prohibition is in derogation of media’s role and function to provide adequate channels of public information
and public opinion relevant to election issues.

Held: No infringement of the Freedom of Expression.

1. The constitution itself, has expressly authorized the COMELEC to supervise or regulate the
enjoyment or utilization of franchises or permits for the operation of media of communication and
information. (Art IX-C, 4). The fundamental purpose of that is to ensure equal opportunity, time and
space and the right to reply, as well as uniform and reasonable rates of charges for the used of such
media facilities, in connection with “public information campaigns and forums among candidates”.
2. The technical effect of Art IX-C,4 of the Constitution may be seen to be that no presumption of
invalidity arise in respect of exercises of supervisory or regulatory authority on the part of the
COMELEC for the purpose of securing equal opportunity among candidates for political office, although
such supervision or regulation may result in some limitation of the rights of free speech and free press.
For supervision or regulation of the operations of media enterprises is scarcely inconceivable without
accompanying limitation. Thus, the applicable rule is the general time honored one- that a statute is
presumed to be constitutional and that the party asserting its unconstitutionality must discharge the
burden of clearly and convincingly proving that assertion.
3. The assailed provision is limited in the duration of its applicability and enforceability in time to
election period.
4. It is limited in scope of application. It applied only to sale and purchase, and donation of print space
or airtime for campaign and other report or commentary or other coverage that, in responsible media, is
not paid for by candidates advertisements of particular candidates.
5. It does not limit the right of free speech and of access to mass media of the candidates themselves.
The limitation however, bears a clear and reasonable connection with the constitutional objective. For it
is precisely in the unlimited purchase of print space and radio and television time that the resources of
the financially affluent candidates are likely to make a crucial difference.

AYER PRODUCTIONS PTY. LTD. VS CAPULONG

160 SCRA 861

Facts: Petitioner Ayer Production Pty. Ltd. For Philippines and International release, the historic struggle of
the Filipinos at EDSA entitled “The Four Day Revolution”. During the filming of said motion picture, private
respondent Juan Ponce Enrile, who played a major role in the events proposed to be filmed, filed a
complaint with application for Temporary Restraining Order and a writ of Preliminary Injunction with RTC of
Makati seeking to stop movie production alleging that petitioners production of said movie is without his
consent and over his objections constitutes a violation of his right of privacy. Petitioner, on the other hand
maintained that the film would not involve the private life of the Enrile nor that of his family and that a
Preliminary Injunction would amount to a prior restraint on their right of free expression. The lower court then
issued a writ of preliminary injunction against petitioner company. The latter then filed a petition for certiorari
with an urgent prayer or preliminary injunction. The Court then granted a limited temporary restraint order
partially enjoining the implementation of respondent’s judge order and the writ of preliminary injunction
issued therein, and allowing the petitioners to resume producing and filming those portions of the movie
which do not make any reference to private respondent Enrile or of his family or to any fictitious character
based on bearing substantial resemblance or similarity to or identifiable with Enrile.

Issue: Whether the “balancing of interest test” or the “clear and present danger test” be applied.
Held: The court believes that a different conclusion must be reached. The production and filming by
petitioner of the projected motion picture does not in the circumstances of this case constitute as unlawful
intrusion upon private respondents “right of privacy”. The subject matter of the movie is one of public interest
and concern and does not relate to the individual life. Unlike in the Lagunzad case which concerned the
lifestory of Moises Padilla necessarily including at least his immediate family. What we have here is not a
film biography, more or less fictionalized, of private respondent Enrile. The film is not principally about nor is
it focused upon, the man Enrile, but is compelled, if it is to be historical, to refer to the role played by Enrile
in the precipitating and constituent events of the change of government in February 1986. The respondent
judge should have his hand, instead of issuing an ex parte TRO, for the projected motion picture was as yet
uncompleted and hence not exhibited to any audience. Neither Enrile nor the respondent judge knew what
the completed film would precisely look like. There was in other words, no “clear and present danger” or any
violation of any right to privacy that private respondent could lawfully assert.

EASTERN BROADCASTING CORP. (DYRE) VS HON. DANS, JR

137 SCRA 628

Facts: The petition was filed to compel the respondents to re-open the radio station DYRE which had been
summarily closed on the ground of national security. The petitioner contends that it was denied due process
when the radio station was closed based on the mere allegation that it was used to incite people to sedition.
No hearing and action were taken on the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. The petition also raises the
issue of freedom of speech. Before the court could promulgate a decision, the petitioner withdraw his
petition since the radio station had already been sold.

Held: Considering that the case has become moot and academic, the petitioners motion to withdraw or
dismiss the petition is GRANTED. The following guidelines were issued by the Supreme Court for the
guidance of inferior courts and administrative tribunals exercising quasi-judicial functions, to wit:

1. The cardinal primary requirements in administrative proceedings laid down in Ang Tibay V C.A.
should have followed before a broadcast station may be closed or its operations curtailed.
2. All forms of media, whether print or broadcast, are entitled to the broad protection of the freedom of
speech and expression clause. The test for limitations on freedom of expression continues to be the
clear and present danger rule- that words are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as
to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that the lawmaker
has a right to prevent.
3. The clear and present danger test however, does not lend itself to a simplistic and all embracing
interpretation applicable to all utterances in all forums.
4. All forms of communication are entitled to the broad protection of the freedom of expression clause.
Necessarily, however, the freedom of television and radio broadcasting is somewhat lesser in scope
than the freedom accorded to newspaper and print media.
5. The transistor radio is found everywhere, the television set is also becoming universal. Their
message may be simultaneously received by a national or regional audience of listeners including the
indifferent or unwilling who happen to be within reach of a blaring radio or television set.
6. The impact of the vibrant speech is forceful and immediate. Unlike readers of the printed work, the
radio audience has lesser opportunity to cogitate, analyze and reject the utterance.
7. The clear and present danger test must take the particular circumstances of broadcast media into
account. Broadcast stations deserve the special protection given to all forms of media by the due
process and freedom of expression clauses of the Constitution.

There is a simple, extremely narrow class of cases in which the First Amendment’s ban on prior restraint
may be. When the nation is at war, But the government has failed to even allege an emergency that could
be tantamount to an undeniable and extreme danger so as to justify the restraint. Mere conclusions are
insufficient.

In the area of national defense and foreign affairs, the executive is endowed with enormous power
unchecked by the other branches of government. The only restraint to this power would be an enlightened
citizenry. For this reason, the press must be kept alert, aware and so as to inform and enlighten the people.
Secrecy is the best maintained through credibility. An effective internal security is premised on disclosure.

There is no proof that the publication of the study would lead to immediate and irreparable damage to our
nation and people.

Should the government fail to proceed with its grievance, it may do so in other ways but not through restraint
by constitutional entitlement.

ART. III, SEC. 4

ASSEMBLY AND PETITION

Primicias VS Fugoso

80 Phil 71

Facts: The resondent Mayor sought to defend his refusal to allow the nacionalista party to hold meeting at
the PLAZA MIRANDA by what he called “a reasonable ground to believe basing upon previous and upon the
fact that passions, especially on the part of the losing groups, remain bitter and high, that similar speeches
will be delivered tending to undermine the faith and confidence of the people in their government, and in the
duly peace constituted authorities which might threaten breaches of the peace and a disruption of public
order.”

Issue: Whether or not the mayor has the discretion to allow holding of a meeting in a public place.

Held: The Philippine Legislature has delegated the exercise of police power to the Municipal Board of the
City of Manila, which according to Sec. 2444 of the Administrative Code has the following powers, among
others, is to regulate the use of streets, avenues, parks, cemeteries and other public places and to enact
ordinances it may deem necessary.

The Supreme Court rejected the Mayor’s argument noting that the condition of Manila at that time did not
justify the mayor’s fears. The power of local officials is only one of regulation and not prohibition. The said
provision odes not confer the Mayor the power to refuse to grant the permit, but only the discretion in issuing
the permit to determine or specify the streets or public places where the parade or procession may pass or
the meeting may be held. They cannot bar the use of public places for lawful assemblies.

NON VS DAMES II

185 SCRA 523

Facts: Petitioner urge the Court en Banc to review and reverse the doctrine laid down in Alcuaz V PSBA
161 SCRA 7, to the effect that a college student, once admitted by the school, is considered enrolled only for
one semester and hence, may be refused readmission after the semester is over, as the contract between
the student and the school is deemed terminated.

Petitioners, students in private respondent Mabini Colleges, Inc. in Daet, Camarines Norte, were not allowed
to re-enrol by the school for the academic year 1988-1989 for leading or participating in student mass
actions against the school in the preceding semester. The subject of the protest is not, however, made clear
in the pleadings.

Upholding the primacy of freedom of expression because the students do not shed their constitutionally
protected right at the schoolgate.
Held: The Court in Alcuaz, anchored its decision on the “termination of contract” theory. But it must be
repeatedly emphasized that the contract between the school and the student is not ordinary contract. It is
imbued with public interest, considering the high priority given by the Constitution to educate and the grant
to the State of supervisory and regulatory powers over all educational institutions (See Art. XIV, Sec. 1-2,
4(1)

Respondent school cannot justify its actions by relying on Par. 137 of the manual of regulations for private
schools, which provides that “when a student registers in a school, it is understood that he is enrolling… for
the entire semester for collegiate courses,” which the Court in Alcuaz construed as authority for schools to
refuse enrollment to a student on the ground that his contract, which has a term of one semester, has
already expired.

The “termination of contract” theory does not even find support in the Manual par. 137 merely clarifies that a
college student enrolls for the entire semester. It serves to protect schools wherein tuition fees are collected
and paid on a installment basis. Thus, even if a student does not complete the semester for which he was
enrolled, but has stayed on for more than two weeks, he may required to pay his tuition fees for the whole
semester before he is given his credentials for transfer.

On the other hand, it does not appear that the petitioners were afforded due process, in the manner
expressed in Guzman, before they were refused re –enrollment. In fact, it would appear from the pleadings
that the decision to refuse them re –enrollment because of failing grades was a mere after thought. It is not
denied that what incurred the fire of the school authorities was the student mass actions conducted in
February 1988 and which were led and/or participated in by petitioners. Certainly, excluding students
because of failing grades when the cause for the action taken against them undeniably related to possible
breaches of discipline not only is a denial of due process but also constitutes a violation of the basic tenets
of fair play.

NOTE: The Supreme Court pointed out that this is not a simple case of a school refusing readmission or re
–enrollment or returning students. Undisputed is the fact that the refusal to readmit or re-enroll petitioners
was decided upon and implemented by school authorities as a reaction to student mass actions directed
against the school. Petitioners are students of respondent school who, after leading and participating in
student protests were denied readmission and re-enrollment for the next semester. This is a case that
focuses on the right to speech and assembly as exercised by students vis-à-vis the right of school officials to
discipline pronouncements in the cases of Malabanan V Ramento and Villar V TIP.

ART.III, SEC. 5

FREEDOM OF RELIGION

GARCES VS ESTENZO

104 SCRA 510

Facts: On March 23, 1976, the Barangay Council of Valencia, Ormoc City adopted several resolutions
regarding the acquisition of the wooden image of San Vicente Ferrer to be used in the celebrations of his
annual feats day and the construction of waiting shed. Funds for the two projects would be obtained through
the “selling of tickets and cash donations”. With those funds, the waiting shed was constructed and the
wooden image was acquired.

The image was temporarily places in the altar of the Catholic Church of Barangay Valencia. A controversy
arose after the mass when the parish priest refused to return the image to the barangay council.

A replivin case was filed against the priest. In his answer to the complaint, he assailed the constitutionality of
the said resolutions.
Issue: Whether or not the resolutions violated the constitutional provision prohibiting the use of
public funds for religious purpose.

Held: No. The questioned resolutions do not directly or indirectly establish any religion, nor abridge religious
liberty nor appropriate public money or property for the benefit of any religious sect, priest or clergyman. The
image was purchased with private funds, not with tax money. The construction of awaiting shed is entirely a
secular matter.

The wooden image was purchased in connection with the celebration of the barrio first honoring the patron
saint, San Vicente Ferrer, and not for the purpose of favoring any religion nor interfering with religious
matters or the religious beliefs of the barrio residents. One of the highlights of the fiesta was the mass,
consequently, the image of the patron saint had to be placed in the church when the mass celebrated.

The barangay council, as owner of the image has the right to determine who should have custody thereof.

EBRALINAG VS DIVISION SUPERINTENDENT OF SCHOOLS OF CEBU

219 SCRA 526

Facts: About 68 students (grade school and highschool) were expelled by the public school authorities in
Cebu for refusing to salute the flag, sing the National Anthem and recite the Patriotic Pledge as required by
RA 1265 and by the Department Order No. 8 of the DECS making the flag ceremony in all educational
institutions. These students were members of the “Jehovah’s Witnesses” which teaches their children not to
salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge for they believe that those are acts of
worship or religious devotion.

Issue: Whether or not the children may be expelled from school (public and private) for refusing, on
account of their religious beliefs to take part in the flag ceremony.

Held: Jehovah’s Witnesses are accorded exemption to the observance of flag ceremony in deference to
their religious beliefs but said right not to participate does not give them the right to disrupt such patriotic
exercises.

Their expulsion will violate their right as Phil. Citizens under the 1987 Constitution, to receive education, for
it is the duty to protect and promote the right of all citizens to quality education and to make such education
accessible to all. (Sec. 1, Art. XIV)

Compulsion to observe the flag salute law on pain of dismissal from one’s job or expulsion from school is
alien to the conscience of present generation of Filipinos, being violative of their constitutional right to free
speech and free exercise of religious profession and worship.

PAMIL VS TELERON

86 SCRA 413

Facts: Private Respondent Father Margarito R. Gonzaga was elected as municipal mayor of Alburquerque,
Bohol in 1971. He was duly proclaimed. Petitioner filed a suit for quo warranto for responsdent’s
disqualification based on sec. 2175 of Administrative Code of 1917 which reads: “In no case shall there be
elected or appointed to a municipal office ecclesiatics…” The court a quo sustained the right of the private
respondent to the office holding that the above quoted provision was already impiledly repeated by the
Election Code of 1971.

Held: There is no clear cut answer. To render the challenged provision ineffective, 8 votes are required to
be attained. In this case however, only 7 Justices are of the view that the lower court’s judgment should be
affirmed because the challenged provision is no longer operative either because it was superseded by the
1935 Constitution or it was repealed. Five members however believe that no repeal was made, the
provisions of the prohibition being unequivocal in terms. Procedurally, the required number of votes not
having been attained, the validity of Sec. 2175 is upheld and Father Gonzaga is ordered to vacate his
position.

NOTE: As to the constitutional dimension of the case, Justice Fernando, with six other Justices are of the
view that the Constitution (both 1973 and 1935) prohibits religious test as a requirement for the exercise of
Civil or Political rights. Justice Teehankee notes that the provision declaring ecclesiastics ineligible for
election or appointment to a municipal office is inconsistent with and violative of the religious freedom
guaranteed by the Constitution because to do so bar them is to impose a religious test in violation of the
Constitution.

On the other hand, Justice Barredo opines that there is no repugnancy as between the challenged provision
and the freedom of religion protected by the Constitution. The “no religious test” means that no public office
may denuded to any person any reason of his religious belief. But when he becomes an ecclesiastic, he
becomes the official minister of his church with distinct duties and responsibilities which may not always be
compatible with the posture of absolute indifference and impartiality to all religious beliefs which the
government must maintain at all times Justice Makasiar notes that to allow an ecclesiastic to head the
executive department of a municipality is to permit the erosion of the principle of church and state because
there can be no assurance that the decision of such ecclesiastic in the exercise of his powers vested in him
by reason of his local position will be clothed with impartiality.

ART.III, SEC. 6

LIBERTY OF ABODE AND TRAVEL

MARCOS VS MANGLAPUS

177 SCRA 568

Facts: Deposed Pres. Marcos exiled in Hawaii wishes to return to the Philippine, however, Pres. Aquino
rendered a decision to bar their return to the Philippines considering the dire consequences to the nation of
his return at the time when the stability of the government is threatened. Mr. Marcos filed a petition for
mandamus and prohibition to compel the Sec. Foreign Affairs to issue travel documents to him and his
family, alleging that his right to return to the Philippine is guaranteed under the Bill of Rights, and questions
Pres. Aquino’s power to impair their right to travel in the absence of legislation to that effect.

Issue: May the Pres. prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines?

Held: YES. The right to return to one’s country is not among the rights specifically guaranteed in the Bill of
Rights, which treats only of the Liberty of Abode and the right to travel, but it is well considered view that the
right to return may be considered as a generally accepted principle of international law and, under the
Constitution, is part of the law of the land. However, it is distinct and separate from the right to travel.

The constitutional guarantees they invoked are neither absolute nor inflexible. For the exercise of such
freedoms admits of limits and must be adjusted to the requirements of equally important public interest.

The request or demand of the Marcoses to be allowed to return to the Philippines cannot be considered in
the light solely of the constitutional provisions guaranteeing liberty of abode and the right to travel, subject to
certain exemptions, or of case law which clearly never contemplated situations similar to the present one. It
must be treated as a matter that is appropriately addressed to those residual unstated powers of the
president which are implicit in and correlative to the paramount duty residing in that office to safeguard and
protect general welfare.

The president did not act arbitrarily and capriciously and whimsically in determining that the return of the
Marcoses poses a serious threat to the national interest and welfare and in prohibiting their return.
 SILVERIO VS C.A

195 SCRA 760

Facts: Petitioner Silverio was charged with the violation of the Revised Securities Act in a criminal case filed
with the RTC. He posted a bail for his provisional liberty. Two years after the filing of the information,
respondent People of the Philippines filed a Motion to Cancel the passport of and to issue a hold departure
order against accused-petitioner on the ground that he had gone abroad several times without the
necessary Court approval resulting in the postponements of the arraignment and schedules hearings. The
RTC granted the Motion. Petitioner questioned the RTC’s Order contending that the right to travel can be
impaired upon lawful order of the Court only on grounds in the “interest of national security, public safety or
public health” as was previously stated in the 1973 Constitution.

Issue: May the right to travel be impaired?

Held: YES. Art. III, Sec 6 of the 1987 Constitution should be interpreted to mean that while the liberty of
travel may be impaired even without Court order the appropriate executive officers or administrative
authorities are not armed with arbitrary discretion to impose limitations. They can impose limits only on the
basis of “national security, public safety or public health” and “as may be provided by law”, a limited phrase
which did not appear in the 1973 text.

Article III, sec. 6 of the 1987 Constitution should by no means be construed as delimiting the inherent power
of the courts to use all means necessary to carry their orders into effect in criminal cases pending before
them.

The conditions of bail imposed upon an accused to make himself available at all times whenever the court
requires his presence operates as a valid restriction of his right to travel. An accused on bail may be re-
arrested without the necessity of the warrants if he attempts to depart from the Philippine without prior
permission of the Court where the case is pending.

Holding an accused in a criminal case within the reach of the Courts by preventing his departure from the
Philippine must be considered as a valid restriction on his right to travel so that he may dealt with in
accordance with law.

SANTIAGO VS VASQUEZ

217 SCRA 633

Facts: An information docketed as criminal case No. 16698 was filed against petitioner with the
Sandiganbayan for alleged violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices. An order of arrest was issued in
said case against herein petitioner with bail for the release of the accused fixed at P15000. Petitioner filed
an “Urgent ex-parte Motion for Acceptance of Cash Bail Bond for and in behalf of Dr. Miriam Defensor
Santiago”. Meanwhile, in a resolution of Sandiganbayan issued a hold departure order against petitioner by
reason of the announcement made by petitioner, which was publicized in both print and broadcast media,
that she would be leaving for the United States to accept a fellowship supposedly offered by the John F.
Kennedy school of government at Harvard University, hence, this “Motion to Restrain the Sandiganbayan
from enforcing its Hold Departure Order with prayer for the issuance of a TRO and/of Preliminary Injunction”.

Issues:

1. WON the hold departure order violates her right to due process, right to travel and freedom of
speech.
2. WON under the 1987 Constitution, courts can impair the right to travel only on grounds of “national
security, public safety or public health”.
HELD:

1. No. It is averred that the hold departure order was issued without notice and hearing because of
the fact that there was no showing that a motion to issue a hold departure order was filed by the
Sandiganbayan. Petitioner is in error.

Courts possess certain inherent powers which may be said to be implied from a general grant of jurisdiction,
in addition to those expressly conferred on them. A court has the inherent power to make interlocutory
orders necessary to protect its jurisdiction. Such being the case, with more reason may a party litigant be
subjected to proper coercive measure where he disobeys a proper order. Petitioner does not deny and even
made a public statement that she in taking judicial notice of such fact of petitioner’s polan to go abroad and
in issuing sua sponte the hold departure order is but an exercise of respondent court’s inherent power to
preserve and maintain the effectiveness of its jurisdiction over the case and the person of the accused.

1. No. In the more recent case of Silverio V C.A, it was held that Art. III, Sec. 6 of the 1987
Constitution should be interpreted to mean that while the liberty of travel may be impaired or
administrative authorities are not armed with arbitrary discretion to impose limitations. They can impose
limits only on the basis of “national security. Public safety and public health” and “as may be provided
by law”. Art III, Sec.6 should by no means be construed as delimiting the inherent power of the courts to
use all means necessary to carry their power of the effect in criminal cases pending before them. When
by law jurisdiction is conferred on a Court or Judicial Officer, all auxiliary writs, processes and other
means necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by such court or officer.

ART. III, SEC 7

RIGHT TO INFORMATION

VALMONTE VS BELMONTE

170 SCRA 256

Facts: Petitioner in this case of special action for mandamus with preliminary injunction invoked their right to
information and pray that respondent be directed:

1. to furnish petitioners the list of the names of the Batasan Pambansa members belonging to the
UNIDO and PDP-LABAN who were able to secure clean loans immediately before the February 7
election thru the intercession on/marginal note of the then First Lady Imelda Marcos, and
2. to furnish petitioners with certified true copy of the documents evidencing their respective loans,
and/or
3. to allow petitioners access to the public records for the subject’s information

Held: The right to information is an essential premise meaningful to the right to speech and expression. But
this is not to say that the right to information is merely an adjunct of and therefore restricted in application by
the exercise of the freedom of speech and of the press. Far from it, the right to information goes hand-in-
hand with the constitutional policies of full public disclosures and honesty in the public service. It is meant to
enhance the widening role of the citizenry in governmental decision making as well in checking abuse in
government. Yet like all constitutional guarantee, the right to information is not absolute. As stated in the
case of Legaspi, the people’s right to information is limited to matters of public concern, and is further
subject to such limitations as may be provided by law. Hence, before mandamus may issue, it may clear that
the information sought is of public interest or public concern, and is not exempted by law from the operation
of the constitutional guarantee. The public nature of the loanable funds of the GSIS and the public office
held by the alleged borrower make the information sought clearly a matter of public interest and concern.
On the alleged relationship of confidential nature between the GSIS and its borrowers, respondent failed to
cite any law granting the GSIS the privilege of confidentiality as regards the documents subject of this
petition. His position is apparently based merely on consideration of policy. The judiciary does not settle
policy issue. The court can only declare what the law is, and not what the law should be. Under our system
of government policy issues are within the domain of the political branches of the government and of the
people themselves as the repository of all State power. On the issue of privacy there can be no doubt that
the right to privacy belongs to the individual in his private capacity, and not to public and governmental
agencies like the GSIS. A corporation has no right of privacy in its name since the entire basis of the right to
privacy is an inquiry to the feelings and sensibilities of the party and the corporation would not have such
ground on relief.

Neither can the GSIS, through its General Manager, the respondent invoke the right to privacy of its
borrowers. The right is purely personal in nature, and hence may be invoked only by the person whose
privacy is claimed to be violated, which cannot, however be invoked in the instant case considering the
public offices they were holding at the time the loans were alleged to have been granted. In fine, petitioners
are entitled to access to the documents evidencing loans granted by the GSIS subjects to reasonable
regulations that the latter may promulgate relating to the manner and hours of examination, to the end that
damage to or loss of the records may be avoided, that undue interference with the duties of the custodians
of the records may be prevented and that the right of other persons entitled to inspect the record may be
insured.

ART. III, SEC 8

RIGHT TO FORM ASSOCIATION

CENECO VS SECRETARRY OF DOLE

201 SCRA 584

Facts: Petitioner Central Negros Electric Cooperative seeks to annul the order issued by then Acting
Secretary Laques declaring the project certification election unnecessary and declaring petitioner to continue
recognizing private respondent CENECO UNION of RATIONAL EMPLOYEES (CURE) as the sole and
exclusive bargaining representative of all the rank and file employees of petitioner’s electric cooperative for
purposes of collective bargaining. CENECO entered into a CBA with CURE providing for a term of three
years up to March 31, 1990. CURE wrote CENECO proposing that negotiation be conducted for a new CBA
but CENECO denied on the ground that employees who at the same time are members of an electric
cooperative are not entitled to form or join a union. Prior to the proposed CBS negotiation, CURE members
in a general assembly approved Resolution No. 35 whereby it was agreed that all union members shall
withdraw, retract or recall the union members’ membership from CENECO to avail of the full benefit under
the existing CBA entered into by and between CENECO and CURE. However, the withdrawal from
membership was denied by CENECO by reason of CENECO’s refusal to negotiate a new CBA, CURE filed
a petition for direct recognition or for certification election. CENECO filed a motion to dismiss on the ground
that employees who at the same time are members of an electric cooperative are not entitled to form or join
union for purposes of CBA for certainly an owner cannot bargain with himself or his co-owners. Med-arbiter
issued an order granting petition for certification election. CENECO appealed to the DOLE which issued the
questioned order. Hence, this petition.

Issue: WON employees of CENECO who withdrew their membership from the cooperative are
entitled to form or join CURE for purposes of CBA.

Held: The articles of Incorporation of CENECO do not provide any ground for withdrawal from membership
which gives rise to the presumption that the same may be done anytime and for whatever reason. Moreover,
membership is on a voluntary basis. The right to join an organization necessarily the equivalent right not to
join the same.

VICTORIANO VS ELIZALDE ROPE WORKERS’ UNION

59 SCRA 54
Facts: Benjamin Victoriano, a member of the Iglesia ni Cristo had been in the employ of the Elizalde Rope
Factory, Inc. since 1958. As such employee, he was a member of the respondent union, which had with the
company, a closed-shop provision, pursuant to RA 875 (Industrial Peace Act). Later, RA 3350 was enacted
amending RA 875, among others, it provided that the agreement on closed shop “shall not cover members
of any religious sect which prohibit affiliation of their members in any such labor organization”. Victoriano
resigned from the union. Thereupon, the Union recommended to the company his termination.

Issue: The constitutionality of RA 3350 which allows members of religious sect to disassociate from
the labor union despite the presence of closed shop agreement between employer and bargaining
union.

Held: The SC upheld the validity of RA 3350, allowing workers to disassociate from or not to join a labor
union despite a closed shop agreement, if they were members of any religious sect which prohibits affiliation
of their members in any such labor organization.

The constitutional guarantees the “right” to form or join associations. A right comprehends at least two broad
nations, namely: first, liberty or freedom (whereby an employee may act for himself without being prevented
by law), and second, power (whereby an employee may as he pleases join or refrain from joining an
association). It is, therefore, the employee who should decide for himself whether he should join or not to
join, he himself make up his mind as to which association he would join, and even after he has joined, he
still retains the liberty and the power to leave and cancel his membership with said organizations at any
time. It is clear, therefore, that the right to join a union includes the right to abstain from joining any union.

However, the legal protection granted to such right to refrain from joining is withdrawn by operation of law,
where a labor union and an employer have agreed on a closed shop, by virtue of which the employer may
employ only the members of the union for the duration of the contract in order to keep their jobs. Exception:
To the all embracing coverage of the closed shop agreement, RA 3350 introduced an exception… “but such
agreement shall not covers members of any religious sect which prohibit affiliation of their members in any
such labor organization”. RA 3350 merely excludes ipso jure from the application and coverage of the closed
shop agreement the employees belonging to any labor organization. What the exception provides, therefore,
is that members of said religious sects cannot be compelled or coerced to join labor unions even when said
unions have closed shop agreements with the employers; that inspite of any closed shop agreement
members of said religious sects cannot be refused employment or dismissed from their jobs on the sole
ground that they are not members of the collective bargaining union.

ART. III, SEC 10 NON –IMPAIRMENT CLAUSE

ORTIGAS & CO., LTD. VS FEATI BANK AND TRUST CO. 91 SCRA 533

Facts: Ortigas & Co., plaintiff, sold two parcels of land on installments to Padilla who later on transferred
their rights and interest to Chavez. The agreements of sale contained stipulation, among others that the
parcel of land “shall be used by the buyer exclusively for residential purposes…” Such stipulation was
annotated in the TCTs. The parcels of land were eventually sold to FEATI Bank, who began constructing of
the commercial building. The latter refused to comply with the demand, contending that the building was
being constructed in accordance with the Municipal Resolution No. 27, zoning regulations which declared
the area a commercial and industrial zone. Plaintiff filed complaint seeking for the issuance of writ of
preliminary injunction praying, among others, that the defendant observe and comply with the building
restrictions annotated in the TCT. Trial court dismissed the complaint.

Issue: WON the resolution of the Municipal Council of Mandaluyong declaring the parcels of land, among
others, as part of the commercial and industrial zone of the municipality prevailed over the building
restrictions imposed by the plaintiff on the lots in question?

Held: With regard to the contention that the said resolution cannot nullify the contractual obligation assumed
by the defendant- referring to the restriction incorporated in the deed of sale and later in the corresponding
TCT issued to defendant it should be stressed that, while non-impairment of contracts is constitutionally
guaranteed, the rule is not absolute, since it has to be reconciled with the legitimate exercise of police
power. Such power is superior to contractual stipulations between parties on the use of lands sold by
subdivisions even if said conditions are annotated in the Torrens Title.
 ART. III, SEC 12 CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION

PEOPLE V JUDGE AYSON 175 SCRA 216

Facts: Felipe Ramos, a freight ticket clerk of PAL, was invited for investigation on February 9, 1986 by the
Management, in accordance with PAL’s Code of Conduct and Discipline on allegations of irregularities in the
sales of plane tickets. On Feb. 8, 1986, Ramos gave to his superiors a handwritten note or admission. At the
investigation before the Branch Manager and in the presence of the station agent, ticket freight clerk and
PALEA’s shop steward was informed of the charge before him. Thereafter, his answers to the questions by
the Branch Manager were taken down in writing.

After two months, Ramos was charged for estafa. Trial on the merits ensued. At the close of the people’s
case, the private prosecutors made an offer of evidence to 1) the handwritten note or admission and 2) to
the written question and answer before the Branch Manager. The defense objected to the offered evidence
on the ground that the admission or confession was taken without the accused represented by counsel.
Judge Ayson ruled in favor of the defense declared that the written admission or confession and record of
the investigation was inadmissible because the accused was not informed of his right to remain silent and to
have counsel. Hence this petition.

Issue: Is the constitutional right of a person suspected of having committed a crime and
subsequently charge with its commission violated in this case?

Held: No. One of the rights specified exist only in custodial investigation. And as this court has already
stated, a custodial investigation is “questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been
taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way, which is not in the
case at bar. It seems quite evident that a defendant on trial or under preliminary investigation is not under
custodial investigation. But unquestionably, the accused in court possesses rights against self-incrimination.
Under the Rules of Court, in all criminal prosecutions the defendant is entitled 1) to be exempt from being a
witness against himself and 2) to testify as witness in his own behalf, but 3) if he offers himself as a witness
he may be cross-examined as any other witness; however 4) his neglect or refusal to be a witness shall not
in any manner prejudiced or be used against him. In fine a person suspected of having committed a crime
and subsequently charged with its commission in court, has the following Rights in the matter of his
testifying or producing evidence, to wit: 1) BEFORE THE CASE IS FILED IN COURT (or with the public
prosecutor, for preliminary investigation), but after having taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his
liberty in some significant way, and on being interrogated by the police: the continuing right to remain silent
and to have counsel, and to be informed thereof, not to be suspected to force, violence, threat, intimidation
or any other means which vitiates free will, and to have evidence obtained in violation of these rights
rejected; and 2) AFTER THE CASE IS FILED IN COURT a) to refuse to be a witness; b) to testify in his own
behalf, subject to cross-examination by the prosecution; c) not to have any prejudice whatsoever result to
him by such refusal; d) WHILE TESTIFYING, to refuse to answer a specific question which tends to
incriminate him for some crime other than that for which he is then prosecuted.

PEOPLE VS MAQUEDA GR. NO. 112983: MARCH 22,1995

Facts: Hector Maqueda was convicted by the RTC of Benguet with the crime of robbery with homicide and
various physical injuries. The trial court based its conviction on the confession and the proof of corpus
delicti. The extra-judicial confession referred to is the “Sinumpaang Salaysay” of Maqueda taken by the
police immediately after he was arrested. The trial court admitted the Sinumpaang Salaysay of the acccused
although it was taken filed in court against him and he was arrested pursuant to a warrant of arrest issued by
the court, the SS was not therefore taken during custodial investigation and hence Sec. 12 (1) Art.III of the
Constitution is not applicable, i.e.., the police investigation was no longer within the ambit of a custodial
investigation. The trial court even stated at the time of the confession that the accused was already facing
charges in court, thus he no longer had the right to remain silent and to counsel but he had the right to
refuse to be a witness and not to be prejudiced whatsoever resulting from such refusal.

Issue: Does an accused lose his right to remain silent and to counsel after a criminal complaint or
information has been filed against him?
Held: No. The exercise of the rights to remain silent and to counsel and to be informed thereof under Sec.
12(1) Art III of the Constitution are not confined to that period prior to the filing of a criminal complaint or
information, but are available at that stage when a person is under the investigation for the commission of an
offense. It was wrong for the trial court to say that Sec. 12(1) Art.III of the Constitution is strictly limited to
custodial investigation and that it does not apply to a person against whom a criminal complaint or
information has already been filed because after its filing he loses the right to remain counsel and to
counsel. If we follow the theory of the trial court, then the police authorities and other law enforcement
agencies would have a heyday in extracting confessions or admissions from the accused persons after they
had been arrested but before they are arraigned because at such stage the accused persons are
supposedly not entitled to the enjoyment of the rights to remain silent and to counsel. The accused in this
case was not even told of any of his constitutional rights. The statement was also taken in the absence of
counsel. Such uncounselled SS is wholly inadmissible pursuant to Sec. 12 (3) Art III of the Constitution.

PEOPLE VS AGUSTIN GR. NO. 110290 JANUARY 25, 1996

Facts: On September 6, 1986, a shooting incident occurred in Baguio City, which cause the death of two
people and the wounding of three others. On Feb. 10, 1987, appellant was picked up in Pangasinan by
military personnel and brought to Baguio City. In the afternoon of the same day he was brought to the City
Fiscal’s Office where he was investigated in connection with the crime. Appellant alleged that although he
was given a lawyer and that the lawyer who assisted him interviewed him only for two minutes in Englsh and
Tagalog nut not in Ilocano, the dialect he understands. Appellant also contends that the lawyer who assisted
him was not of his own choice but was foisted upon him by the City Fiscal and the former is a law partner of
the private prosecutor. Moreover, he alleged that while he was giving his statements at the Fiscal’s office the
armed men stayed with him and their presence deferred him from telling the investigating fiscal that he was
being threatened.

Issues:

1. Was his extra-judicial admissions taken in violation of his rights under Art III, sec. 12 of the
Constitution?

2. Was the arrest of the appellant valid?

Held:

1. Yes. Sec. 12 Art III of the Constitution applies both to confessions and admissions. Moreover, it
was observed by the court that the appellant was not explicitly told of his right to have a competent and
independent counsel of his own choice. He was not categorically informed that he could waive his right
to remain silent and to counsel and that hi waiver must be in writing and in the presence of his counsel.
He had, in fact waived his right to remain silent by agreeing to be investigated, yet no written waiver of
such rights appears in the transcript and no other independent evidence was offered to prove its
existence. It is doubtful for a suspect to have understood his constitutional rights if he was informed of
the same in English and Tagalog when he could only understand Ilocano. Also, where the fiscal
immediately suggested the availability of a particular counsel without first asking the suspect if he had a
counsel of own choice and if he had one, whether he could hires such counsel or whether he would
agree to have one provided for him then such counsel provided was foisted upon the suspect ant not
one who was voluntarily and intelligently “accepted” by the suspect. A counsel appointed to assist a
suspect must be an independent counsel, and he could not be one who is an associate of the private
prosecutor in the same case. Furthermore, the presence during the custodial investigation before the
fiscal of the military officer who had earlier threatened the suspect with death vitiated the latter’s free
will.

2. No. No arrest without a warrant could have been legally and validly effected 5 months after the
commission of the crime. A warrantless arrest should comply with the conditions prescribed in Sec. 5,
Rule 113 of the Rules of Court.

PEOPLE VS ALICANDO DECEMBER 12, 1995

Facts: In the morning of June 13, 1994, the lifeless body of Khaye Mae 4 years old, was discovered. The
autopsy report revealed that she was raped and that the proximate cause of her death was asphyxia by
strangulation.

A neighbor pointed appellant as the offender. Forthwith, he was arrested and interrogated by the police. He
verbally confessed his guilt without the assistance of counsel. On the basis of this follow up interrogation,
the police recovered from his house the victim’s slippers, a pair of gold earrings, a buri mat, a stained pillow
and a stained T-shirt, all of which were later presented as evidence for the prosecution. The appellant was
arraigned with the assistance of counsel. He pleaded guilty. The trial court found him guilty of the crime of
rape with homicide.

Issue: Is the confession of the accused admissible against him?

Held: No. it is now familiar learning that the Constitution has stigmatized as inadmissible evidence any
uncounselled confession or admission.

In the case at bar, PO3 Tan did not even have the simple sense to reduce the all important confession of the
appellant in writing. Neither did he present any writing shown that appellant waived his right to silent and to
have competent and independent counsel. Despite the blatant violation of appellant’s constitutional right, the
trial court allowed his uncounselled confession to flow into the records and illicitly used it in sentencing him
to death.

It is not only the uncounselled confession that is condemned as inadmissible, but also evidence derived
therefrom. The pillow and the T-shirt with the alleged bloodstains were evidence derived from the
uncounselled confession illegally extracted by the police from the appellant.

The burden to prove that an accused waived his right to remain silent and the right to counsel before making
a confession under custodial investigation rests with the prosecution. The burden has to be discharged by
clear and convincing evidence. Indeed, par. 1 of Sec. 12 Art III of the Constitution provides that the waiver
must be in writing and in the presence of counsel. In the case at bar, the records show that the prosecution
utterly failed to discharge this burden. It matters not that in the course of the hearing, the appellant failed to
make a timely objection to the introduction of these constitutionally prescribed evidence. The lack of
objection did not satisfy the heavy burden of proof that rested on the prosecution.

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7438

AN ACT DEFINING CERTAIN RIGHTS OF PERSON ARRESTED, DETAINED OR UNDER CUSTODIAL

INVESTIGATION AS WELL AS THE DUTIES OF THE ARRESTING, DETAINING AND INVESTIGATING
OFFICERS AND PROVIDING OPENALTIES FOR VIOLATIONS THEREOF

Be it enacted by the Senate and house of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled.

Section 1. Statement of Policy – It is the policy of the state to value the dignity of every human being and
guarantee full respect for human rights.

Section 2. Rights of persons arrested, detained or under custodial investigation; Duties of public Officers

1. Any person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation shall be at all times be assisted by
counsel.

2. Any public officer or employee, or anyone acting under his order or his place, who arrests, detains
investigates any person for the commission of an offense shall inform the latter, in a language known to
and understood by him, of his rights to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel,
preferably of his own choice, who shall at all times be allowed to confer private with the person
 arrested, detained or under custodial investigation. If such person cannot afford the services of his own
counsel, he must be provided with a competent and independent counsel by the investigating officer.

3. The custodial investigation report shall be reduced to writing by the investigating officer, provided
that before such report is signed, or thumbmarked if the person arrested or detained does not know to
read and write, it shall be read and adequately explained to him by his counsel or by the assisting
counsel provided by the investigating officer in the language or dialect know to such arrested or
detained person or otherwise, such investigation report shall be null and void and of no effect
whatsoever.

4. Any extra-judicial confession made by a person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation
shall be in writing and signed by such person in the presence of his counsel or in the latter’s absence,
upon a valid waiver, and in the presence of any of the parents, elder brothers and sisters, his spouse,
the municipal mayor, the municipal judge, district school supervisor, or priest or minister of the gospel
as chosen by him, otherwise, such extra-judicial confession shall be inadmissible as evidence in any
proceeding.

5. Any waiver by a person arrested or detained under the provisions of Art. 125 of the Revised Penal
Code or under custodial investigation shall be in writing and signed by such person in the presence of
his counsel, otherwise such waiver shall be null and void and of no effect.

6. Any person arrested or detained under custodial investigation shall be allowed visits by or
conferences with any member of his immediate family, or any medical doctor or priest or religious
minister chosen by him or by any member of his immediate family or by his counsel, or by any national
non-governmental organization duly accredited by the Commission on Human Rights or by any
international non-governmental organization duly accredited by the Office of the President. The
person’s “immediate family” shall include his or her spouse, parent or child, brother or sister,
grandparent or grandchild, uncle or aunt, nephew or niece and guardian or ward.

As used in this ACT, “custodial investigation” shall include the practice of issuing an “invitation” to a person
who is investigated in connection with an offense he is suspected to have committed, without prejudice to
the liability of the “inviting” officer for any violation of law.

Section 3. Assisting Counsel –Assisting counsel is any lawyer, except those directly affected by the case,
those charged with conducting preliminary investigation or those charged with the prosecution of crimes.

The assisting counsel other than the government lawyers shall be entitled to the following fees:

1. The amount of One Hundred fifty pesos (P150.00) if the suspected person is chargeable with light
felonies;

2. The amount of Two Hundred fifty pesos (P250.00) if the suspected person is chargeable with less
grave or grave felonies;

3. The amount of Three Hundred fifty pesos (P350.00) if the suspect is chargeable with a capital
offense.

The fee for the assisting counsel shall be paid by the city or municipality where the custodial investigation is
conducted, provided if the municipality or city cannot pay such fee, the province comprising such
municipality or city shall pay the fee: Provided, that the Municipal or City Treasure must certify that no funds
are available to pay the fees of assisting counsel before the province pay said fees.

In the absence of any lawyer, no custodial investigation shall be conducted and the suspected person can
only be detained by the investigating officer in accordance with the provision of Article 125 of the Revised
Penal Code.
Section 4. Penalty Clause –a) Any arresting public officer or employee, or any investigating officer, who fails
to inform any person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation of his right to remain silent and to
have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice, shall suffer a fine of Six Thousand
pesos (P6,000.00) or a penalty or imprisonment of not less than eight (8) years but not more than ten (10)
years, or both. The penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification shall also be imposed upon the
investigating officer who has been previously convicted of a similar offense.

The same penalties shall be imposed upon a public officer or employee, or anyone acting upon orders of
such investigating officer or in his place, who fails to provide a competent and independent counsel to a
person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation for the commission of an offense if the latter
cannot afford the services of his own counsel.

b) Any person who obstructs, prevents or prohibits any lawyer, any member of the immediate family of a
person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation, or any medical doctor or priest or religious
minister or by his counsel, from visiting and conferring privately chosen by him or by any member of his
immediate family with him, or from examining and treating him, or from ministering to his spiritual needs, at
any hour of the day or, in urgent cases, of the right shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment of not less than
four (4) years nor more than six (6) years and a fine of Four Thousand pesos (P4,000.00)

The provisions of the above section notwithstanding, any security officer with custodial responsibility over
any detainee or prisoner may undertake such reasonable measures as may be necessary to secure his
safety and prevent his escape.

Section 5. Repealing Clause –Republic Act No. 857, as amended, is hereby repealed. Other laws,
presidential decrees, executive orders or rules and regulations, or parts thereof inconsistent with the
provision of this Act are repealed or modified accordingly.

Section 6. Effectivity –This Act shall take effect (15) fifteen days following its publication in the Official
Gazette or in any daily newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines.

Approved. April 27,1992.

ART. III, SEC 13 RIGHT TO BAIL

PEOPLE VS JUDGE DONATO 198 SCRA 130

Facts: Rodolfo Salas (Commander Bilog) and his co-accused were charged for the crime of rebellion. Sales
filed a petition for bail which was opposed by herein petitioner on the ground that since rebellion became a
capital offense under PD 1996, 943 and 1834 which amended Article 135 of the RPC, by imposing the
penalty of reclusion perpetua to death on those who promote, maintain or head a rebellion, the accused is
no longer entitled to bail as evidence of guilt is strong. Subsequently however, the President issue EO 187
restoring to fulll force and effect Article 135 RPC. Accordingly Salas was granted bail.

Petitioner contends that it would be dangerous to grant bail to Salas considering the nature in the CPP-NPA
hierarchy, whose ultimate overriding goals is to wipe out all vestiges of democracy and to replace it with their
ideology, and that his release would allow his return to this organization to direct its armed struggle to topple
the government before whose courts he invokes the constitutional right to bail. Petitioner argues that while
he is entitled to bail as a matter of right, yet when the interest of the State conflicts with that of an individual,
that of the former shall prevail for the “the right of the State to self-preservation is paramount to any of the
rights of an individual enshrined in the Bill of Rights.

Issue: Whether or not rebellion is a bailable offense.

Held: YES. Bail is a matter of right when the offense charged is punishable by any penalty lower than
reclusion perpetua.
Accordingly, the prosecution does have the right to present evidence for the denial of bail in the instances
where bail is a matter of right. However, in the cases where the grant of bail is discretionary, due process
requires that the prosecution must be given an opportunity to present within reasonable time all the evidence
that it may desire to introduce before the court should resolve the motion for bail.

CALLANTA VS VILLANUEVA 77 SCRA 377

Facts: The validity of the issuance of the warrants of arrest by respondent City Judge Felipe Villanueva
based on the two complaints for grave oral defamation against petitioner is being contested on the ground
that it should have been the City Fiscal who should have conducted the preliminary examination. There was
then, in the opinion of petitioner’s counsel a jurisdictional infirmity. From the very petition itself, however, it
was shown that after such issuance of the warrants of arrest with the bail fixed in the amount of P600.00,
petitioner posted such required bail bonds, thus obtaining her provisional liberty.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner can still questioned the defect, if any, in the issuance of the
warrants of arrest.

Held: No. With the express admission by petitioner that she had posted the required bail to obtain her
provisional liberty, it becomes futile to assail the validity of the issuance of the warrants of arrest. In the case
of Zacarias Vs Cruz, it was held that “posting of a bail of a person, stops him from discussing the validity of
his arrest”. In the case of Luna Vs Plaza, it was held that “where petitioner has filed an application for bail
and waived the preliminary investigation proper, he waived his objection to whatever defect, if any, in the
preliminary investigation conducted prior to thr issuance of the warrant of arrest”.

At any rate, it cannot be denied that the City fiscal of Dagupan City had been quite active in the investigation
and thereafter in the prosecution of petitioner. The matter was referred to his office. It was he who appeared
at the hearing and manifested his readiness to proceed with the trial. It would be then to pay an undue
premium to technicalities to assert that under such circumstances the procedural requisite, assuming that
the contention of petitioner is correct, of such official conducting the preliminary examination was not in fact
complied with.

ART. III, SEC 14 CRIMINAL DUE PROCESS

GALMAN VS SANDIGANBAYAN 144 SCRA 43

Facts: Petitioners filed an action alleging that the Tanodbayan did not represent the interest of the people
when he failed to exert genuine and earnest efforts to present vital and important testimonial and
documentary evidence for the prosecution and that the Sandiganbayan Justices were biased, prejudiced
and partial in favor of the accused. The court resolved to dismiss the petition and lift the TRO issued earlier
enjoining the Sandiganbayan from rendering its decision. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration. The
court required the respondents to comment on the the MR but issued no restraining order. On Dec. 2, 1985,
Sandiganbayan acquitted all the accused of the crime charged and absolved them of civil liability. The
petitioners filed their second motion for reconsideration on the ground that the President ordered the
respondents Sandiganbayan and Tanodbayan and the prosecution panel to whitewash the criminal cases
against the 26 respondents. The SC thus created a fact finding commission to determine the allegations of
the petitioners.

Issue: WON the interference and pressure of the President violative of due process and prevented a
fair and impartial trial.

Held: The fact of the secrete Malacanang conference of Jan. 10, 1985 at which the authoritarian President
discussed with the Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan and the entire prosecution panel the matter of
the imminent filing of the criminal charges against all 26 accuses (as admitted by respondent Justice
Fernandez to have been confirmed by him to the then President’s “Coordinator” Manuel Lazaro on the
proceeding day) is not denied. This illegality vitiated from the very beginning all proceedings in the
Sandiganbayan court healed by the very Presiding Justice who attended. As the commission noted: “The
very acts of being summoned to Malacanang and their ready acquiescence thereto under the circumstances
then obtaining, are in themselves pressure dramatized and exemplified.” Verily, it can be said that any
avowal of independent action or resistance to presidential pressure became illusory from the very moment
they stepped inside Malacanang Palace on Jan. 10, 1985.

No court whose presiding justice has received “orders or suggestions” from the President who by an
amendatory decree made it possible to refer the cases to the Sandiganbayan can be an impartial court,
which is the very essence of due process of law. Jurisdiction over cases should be determined by law, and
not by preselection of the executive, which could be much too easily transformed into a means of
predetermining the outcome of individual cases. This criminal collusion as to the handling and treatment of
the cases by public respoindents at the secret Malacanang conference (and revealed only after 15 months
by Justice Herrera) completely disqualified respondent Sandiganbayan and voided ab initio its verdict.
 PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE

PEOPLE VS DRAMAYO 42 SCRA 59

Facts: The accused-appellants, Dramayo and Carbin were charged and convicted by the crime of murder.
In their appeal, accused appellants claim that there is an absence of evidence sufficient to convict and that
there is a reasonable doubt to be implied from the fact that while conspiracy was alleged, only two of the
seven accused were held culpable.

Issue: WON proof beyond reasonable doubt is needed to overcome presumption of innocence.

Held: Accusation is not, according to the fundamental law, synonymous with guilt. It is incumbent on the
prosecution to demonstrate the culpability lies. Appellants were not even called upon then to offer evidence
on their behalf. Their freedom is forfeit only if the requisite quantum of proof necessary for conviction be in
existence. Their guilt must be shown beyond reasonable doubt. To such a standard this court has always
been committed. There is need, therefore, for the most careful scrutiny of the testimony of the state, both
oral and documentary independently of whatever defense is offered by the accused. Only if the judge below
and the appellate tribunal could arrive at a conclusion that the crime had been committed precisely by the
person on trial under such an exacting test should be sentence be one of conviction. The conscience must
be satisfied that on the defendant could be laid the responsibility for the offense charged, that not only did he
perpetrate the act but that it mounted to a crime. What is required then is moral certainly. In the case at bar,
the presumption of innocence could not come to their rescue as it was more than sufficiently overcome by
the proof that was by the prosecution.

RIGHT TO BE HEARD BY HIMSELF AND COUNSEL

PEOPLE VS ELOY MAGSI 124 SCRA 64

Facts: Magsi, del Rosario and other co-accused were charged with the murder of Jesus Gallardo with
several aggravating circumstances attendant to the crime. They were convicted but Del Rosario appealed
the said decision on the ground, among others, that the trial court erred in appointing as attorney de officio,
a lawyer who is the compadre of the person killed by the accused, and who, because of special relationship
with the deceased, reluctantly discharged his duties as attorney de officio, after the court had denied his
repeated petition to be relieved of his appointment as such.

Issue: Whether or not the conviction was valid.

Held: No. It is established the de officio counsel Atty. Rivera and del Rosario were hardly afforded by the
trial court any opportunity to discuss the case together, and the qualified plea of guilty resulted from the
court’s prodding rather than from the accused’s spontaneous violation. Where defendants are charged with
capital offenses, mere pro forma appointment of de officio counsel, who fails to genuinely protect the interest
of the accused, resulting of hearing by the court for alleged reception of evidence when such fact was not
conducted, perfunctory queries to the accused, whether he understands the charges and the gravity of the
penalty, are not sufficient with the Supreme Court’s injunction.

RIGHT TO BE INFORMED OF THE NATURE AND CAUSE OF ACCUSATION

SORIANO VS SANDIGANBAYAN 131 SCRA 187

Facts: In the course of an investigation for qualified theft alleged to have been committed by Thomas Tan,
herein petitioner demanded from the latter an amount of P4,000.00 as consideration for dismissing the case.
The same was reported to the NBI thus an entrapment was made. A complaint for violation of the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act was filed against petitioner with the public respondent. Petitioner contends that an
“investigation cannot be regarded as a contract of transaction” within the purview of the said Act hence
cannot be convicted of violation thereof. Public respondent then convicted him for Direct Bribery. Petitioner
now raises the defense of violation of his right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against
him considering that he was charged of violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

Issue: Was there a violation of petitioner’s above mentioned right?

Held: It is obvious that the investigation conducted by the petitioner was not a contract. Neither was if a
transaction because this term is analogous to the former term. A transaction, like a contract, is one which
involves some consideration, like a credit transaction, and this element is absent in the investigation
conducted by the petitioner, thus he cannot be liable for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
He however could be liable for Direct Bribery. A reading of the information filed against him clearly shows
that the same is a case of Direct Bribery, thus he cannot claim that he was deprived of his right to be
informed. It is not the title of the information that counts but the contents thereof.

RIGHT TO SPEEDY, IMPARTIAL AND PUBLIC TRIAL

MANUEL MATEO JR. VS HON. VILLALUZ 50 SCRA 18

Facts: Petitioners were charged with robbery in band with homicide. They filed motions to dismiss the
criminal cases which were not immediately resolved by the respondent Judge. In the meantime, another
suspect, one Rolando Reyes was arrested. He executed an extra-judicial statement and signed and swore
to its truth before the respondent Judge wherein he implicated the petitioners. On this basis, the respondent
Judge deferred action on the petitioner’s motion to dismiss until after the prosecution had presented and
rested its case against Reyes. Reyes was tried separately and in the absence of petitioners. During the
petitioner’s trial, Reyes was called as an additional witness where he repudiated his extra-judicial statement
contending that the same was procured through threats by a government agent. As a consequence, he
petitioners filed a motion to disqualify the respondent Judge on the ground that Reyes had repudiated the
extra-judicial statement which the latter sworn to before the former and that the latter would have to pass
upon the repudiation. The motion to disqualify was denied by the respondent Judge.

Issue: Whether the respondent Judge should disqualify was denied by the respondent Judge.

Held: Petition is granted. The restraining order issued is made permanent.

It is beyond that due process cannot be satisfied in the absence of that degree of objectivity on the part of a
judge sufficient to reassure litigants of his being fair and being just. Thereby there is the legitimate
expectation that the decision arrived at would be the application of the law to the facts as found by a hearing
before an impartial and disinterested tribunal, and that every litigant is entitled to nothing less than the cold
neutrality of an impartial judge. Petitioners can assert then that this court has the power to set aside the
order denying the motion for disqualification. While the discretion in the first instance belongs to the
respondent Judge, its exercise is subject to this court’s corrective authority. There can be no question as to
its being considered abused if it can be shown that to refuse disqualification is to cast valid doubts as to
court’s impartiality. In this case, the respondent Judge could not be totally immune to what apparently was
asserted before him in such extra-judicial statement. It is unlikely that he was not in the slightest bit offended
by the affiant’s turn about which his later declaration that there was intimidation by considering that the
respondent Judge would have to pass judgement on a question that by implication had already been
answered by him (having already given his opinion on the matter).

TRIAL IN ABSENTIA

PEOPLE VS SALAS 143 SCRA 163

Facts: Marie Abong was originally charged with homicide in the Court of First Instance of Cebu but before
he could be arraigned the case was reinvestigated on motion of the prosecution. As a result of the
reinvestigation, an amended information was filed, with no bail recommended, to which he pleaded not
guilty. Trial commenced but while it was in progress, the prisoner, taking advantage of the first information
for homicide, succeeded in deceiving the city court of Cebu into granting him bail and ordering his release
and so he escaped. The respondent Judge, learning later of the trickery, cancelled the illegal bail bond and
ordered Abong’s re-arrest. But he was gone, nonetheless, the prosecution moved that the hearing continue
in accordance with the constitutional provision authorizing trial in absentia under certain circumstances. The
respondent Judge denied the motion, however, and suspended all proceedings until the return of the
accused.

Issue: Was the order of the Judge proper?

Held: No. The old case of People V Avancena has been modified by Sec. 19 of Art. IV of the 1973
Constitution which now allows trial in absentia. Now, the prisoner cannot by simply escaping thwart his
continued prosecution and possibly eventual provided only that: a) he has been arraigned b) he has been
duly modified of the trial, and c) his failure to appear is unjustified. The purpose of this rule is to speed up the
disposition of criminal cases, trial of which in the past be indefinitely deferred, and many times completely
abandoned, because of defendant’s escape. The old case of People V Avancena has been modified. The
right to present at one’s trial may now be waived except only at that stage where the prosecution intends to
present witnesses who will identify the accused. The defendant’s escape will be considered as a waiver of
his right about the inability of the court to notify him of the subsequent hearings will not prevent it from
continuing with his trial he will be deemed to have received due notice. The same fact of his escape will
make his failure to appear unjustified.