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ARTICLE IV -CITIZENSHIP
Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
[1] Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution;
[2] Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
[3] Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship
upon reaching the age of majority; and
[4] Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
Section 2. Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth
without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship. Those who
elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be deemed
natural-born citizens.
Section 3. Philippine citizenship may be lost or reacquired in the manner provided by law.
Section 4. Citizens of the Philippines who marry aliens shall retain their citizenship, unless by
their act or omission, they are deemed, under the law, to have renounced it.
Section 5. Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with
by law.
G.R. No. 137000, Aug. 9, 2000
o Principle of jus sanguinis
o How Philippine citizenship is acquired
o Effect of filing certificate of candidacy: express renunciation of other citizenship
FACTS:
Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16, 1934 in Australia to a Filipino father and an
Australian mother. In 1949, at the age of fifteen, she left Australia and came to settle in the
Philippines, where she later married a Filipino and has since then participated in the electoral
process not only as a voter but as a candidate, as well. In the May 1998 elections, she ran for
governor but Valles filed a petition for her disqualification as candidate on the ground that she
is an Australian.
ISSUE:
o Whether or not Rosalind is an Australian or a Filipino
HELD:
The Philippine law on citizenship adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis. Thereunder, a child
follows the nationality or citizenship of the parents regardless of the place of his/her birth, as
opposed to the doctrine of jus soli which determines nationality or citizenship on the basis of
place of birth.
Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born a year before the 1935 Constitution took into effect and at
that time, what served as the Constitution of the Philippines were the principal organic acts by
which the United States governed the country. These were the Philippine Bill of July 1, 1902
and the Philippine Autonomy Act of Aug. 29, 1916, also known as the Jones Law.
Under both organic acts, all inhabitants of the Philippines who were Spanish subjects on April
11, 1899 and resided therein including their children are deemed to be Philippine citizens.
Private respondents father, Telesforo Ybasco, was born on Jan. 5, 1879 in Daet, Camarines
Norte.... Thus, under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Jones Law, Telesforo Ybasco was
deemed to be a Philippine citizen. By virtue of the same laws, which were the laws in force at
the time of her birth, Telesforo’s daughter, herein private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is
likewise a citizen of the Philippines.
The signing into law of the 1935 Philippine Constitution has established the principle of jus
sanguinis as basis for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship, xxx
So also, the principle of jus sanguinis, which confers citizenship by virtue of blood relationship,
was subsequently retained under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. Thus, the herein private
respondent, Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is a Filipino citizen, having been born to a Filipino father.
The fact of her being born in Australia is not tantamount to her losing her Philippine
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citizenship. If Australia follows the principle of jus soli, then at most, private respondent can
also claim Australian citizenship resulting to her possession of dual citizenship.
Board of Commissioners vs Joselito Dela Rosa
On July 6, 1960, Santiago Gatchalian, grandfather of William Gatchalian, was recognized by the
BOI as a native born Filipino citizen. Santiago Gatchalian testified that he has 5 children.
On June 27, 1961, William Gatchalian then a twelve year old minor arrived in Manila and
sought admission as Filipino citizen which was eventually granted by the board of special
inquiry. However, the Secretary of Justice issued a memorandum setting aside all decisions and
directed the Board of Commissions to review all cases where entry was allowed among which
was that of William Gatchalian.
ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage of Gatchalian in China is valid in accordance with
Philippine law.
HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court held that in the absence of the evidence to the contrary foreign
laws on a particular subject are presumed to be the same as those of the Philippines. This is
known as Processual Presumption. In this case, there being no proof of Chinese law relating to
marriage, there arises a presumption that it is the same of that of Philippine law the said
marriage then is declared valid. Therefore, William Gatchalian following the citizenship of his
father is a Filipino citizen.
Co vs. Electoral Tribunal
G.R. Nos. 92191-92, July 30, 1991
Facts:
On May 11, 1987, the congressional election of Northern Samar was held.Among the candidate
is herein respondent Jose Ong, Jr. Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly elected
representative of the second district of Northern Samar. Petitioners questioned the citizenship
of respondent Ong since Ong’s father was only a naturalized Filipino citizen and questioned
Ong’s residence qualificationsince Ong does not own any property in Samar.
ISSUE/s:
1.) Whether the decision of HRET is appealable;
2.) Whether respondent is a citizen of the Philippines; and
3.) WhetherOng is a resident of Samar.
RULING:
1.) Yes. The Constitution explicitly provides that the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal (HRET) and the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) shall be the sole judges of all contests
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective members. In the case at
bar, the Court finds no improvident use of power, no denial of due process on the part of the
HRET which will necessitate the exercise of the power of judicial review by the Supreme Court.
2.) Yes. On April 28, 1955, Jose OngChuan, respondent’s father, an immigrant from China was
declared a Filipino citizen by the CFI of Samar. At the time Jose OngChuan took his oath, the
private respondent then is a minor of nine years, was finishing his elementary education in the
province of Samar. Hence, there is no ground to deny the Filipino citizenship of respondent
Ong. Respondent Ong was also born of a natural-born Filipino mother, thus the issue of
citizenship is immaterial.
3.) Yes. The framers of the Constitution adhered to the earlier definition given to the word
residence which regarded it as having the same meaning as domicile. The domicile of origin of
the private respondent, which was the domicile of his parents, is fixed at Laoang,
Samar. Contrary to the petitioners' imputation, Jose Ong, Jr. never abandoned said domicile; it
remained fixed therein even up to the present. Hence, the residency of respondent Ong has
sufficiently proved.
The records show that in the year 1895, the private respondent's grandfather, Ong Te, arrived
in the Philippines from China. Ong Te established his residence in the municipality of Laoang,
Samar on land which he bought from the fruits of hard work.
As a resident of Laoang, Ong Te was able to obtain a certificate of residence from the then
Spanish colonial administration.
The father of the private respondent, Jose Ong Chuan was born in China in 1905. He was
brought by Ong Te to Samar in the year 1915.
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Jose Ong Chuan spent his childhood in the province of Samar. In Laoang, he was able to
establish an enduring relationship with his neighbors, resulting in his easy assimilation into the
community.
As Jose Ong Chuan grew older in the rural and seaside community of Laoang, he absorbed
Filipino cultural values and practices. He was baptized into Christianity. As the years passed,
Jose Ong Chuan met a natural born-Filipino, Agripina Lao. The two fell in love and, thereafter,
got married in 1932 according to Catholic faith and practice.
The couple bore eight children, one of whom is the private respondent who was born in 1948.
The private respondent's father never emigrated from this country. He decided to put up a
hardware store and shared and survived the vicissitudes of life in Samar.
The business prospered. Expansion became inevitable. As a result, a branch was set-up in
Binondo, Manila. In the meantime, the father of the private respondent, unsure of his legal
status and in an unequivocal affirmation of where he cast his life and family, filed with the
Court of First Instance of Samar an application for naturalization on February 15, 1954.
On April 28, 1955, the CFI of Samar, after trial, declared Jose Ong Chuan a Filipino citizen.
On May 15, 1957, the Court of First Instance of Samar issued an order declaring the decision of
April 28, 1955 as final and executory and that Jose Ong Chuan may already take his Oath of
Allegiance.
Pursuant to said order, Jose Ong Chuan took his Oath of Allegiance; correspondingly, a
certificate of naturalization was issued to him.
At the time Jose Ong Chuan took his oath, the private respondent then a minor of nine years
was finishing his elementary education in the province of Samar. There is nothing in the
records to differentiate him from other Filipinos insofar as the customs and practices of the
local populace were concerned.
Fortunes changed. The house of the family of the private respondent in Laoang, Samar was
burned to the ground.
Undaunted by the catastrophe, the private respondent's family constructed another one in
place of their ruined house. Again, there is no showing other than that Laoang was their abode
and home.
After completing his elementary education, the private respondent, in search for better
education, went to Manila in order to acquire his secondary and college education.
In the meantime, another misfortune was suffered by the family in 1975 when a fire gutted
their second house in Laoang, Samar. The respondent's family constructed still another house,
this time a 16-door apartment building, two doors of which were reserved for the family.
The private respondent graduated from college, and thereafter took and passed the CPA Board
Examinations.
Since employment opportunities were better in Manila, the respondent looked for work here.
He found a job in the Central Bank of the Philippines as an examiner. Later, however, he
worked in the hardware business of his family in Manila. In 1971, his elder brother, Emil, was
elected as a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention. His status as a natural born citizen
was challenged. Parenthetically, the Convention which in drafting the Constitution removed
the unequal treatment given to derived citizenship on the basis of the mother's citizenship
formally and solemnly declared Emil Ong, respondent's full brother, as a natural born Filipino.
The Constitutional Convention had to be aware of the meaning of natural born citizenship
since it was precisely amending the article on this subject.
The private respondent frequently went home to Laoang, Samar, where he grew up and spent
his childhood days.
In 1984, the private respondent married a Filipina named Desiree Lim.
For the elections of 1984 and 1986, Jose Ong, Jr. registered himself as a voter of Laoang,
Samar, and correspondingly, voted there during those elections.
The private respondent after being engaged for several years in the management of their
family business decided to be of greater service to his province and ran for public office. Hence,
when the opportunity came in 1987, he ran in the elections for representative in the second
district of Northern Samar.
Mr. Ong was overwhelmingly voted by the people of Northern Samar as their representative in
Congress. Even if the total votes of the two petitioners are combined, Ong would still lead the
two by more than 7,000 votes.
The pertinent portions of the Constitution found in Article IV read:
SECTION 1, the following are citizens of the Philippines:
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1. Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of the Constitution;
2. Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
3. Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship
upon reaching the age of majority; and
4. Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
SECTION 2, Natural-born Citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth
without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their citizenship. Those who elect
Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph 3 hereof shall be deemed natural-born
citizens.
The Court interprets Section 1, Paragraph 3 above as applying not only to those who elect
Philippine citizenship after February 2, 1987 but also to those who, having been born of Filipino
mothers, elected citizenship before that date.
The provision in Paragraph 3 was intended to correct an unfair position which discriminates
against Filipino women. There is no ambiguity in the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission, viz:
Mr. Azcuna: With respect to the provision of section 4, would this refer only to those who elect
Philippine citizenship after the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution or would it also cover those
who elected it under the 1973 Constitution?
Fr. Bernas: It would apply to anybody who elected Philippine citizenship by virtue of the
provision of the 1935 Constitution whether the election was done before or after January 17,
1973. (Records of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 1, p. 228; Emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
Mr. Trenas: The Committee on Citizenship, Bill of Rights, Political Rights and Obligations and
Human Rights has more or less decided to extend the interpretation of who is a natural-born
citizen as provided in section 4 of the 1973 Constitution by adding that persons who have
elected Philippine Citizenship under the 1935 Constitution shall be natural-born? Am I right Mr.
Presiding Officer?
Fr. Bernas: yes.
xxx xxx xxx
Mr. Nolledo: And I remember very well that in the Reverend Father Bernas' well written book,
he said that the decision was designed merely to accommodate former delegate Ernesto Ang
and that the definition on natural-born has no retroactive effect. Now it seems that the
Reverend Father Bernas is going against this intention by supporting the amendment?
Fr. Bernas: As the Commissioner can see, there has been an evolution in my thinking. (Records
of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 1, p. 189)
xxx xxx xxx
Mr. Rodrigo: But this provision becomes very important because his election of Philippine
citizenship makes him not only a Filipino citizen but a natural-born Filipino citizen entitling him
to run for Congress. . .
Fr. Bernas: Correct. We are quite aware of that and for that reason we will leave it to the body
to approve that provision of section 4.
Mr. Rodrigo: I think there is a good basis for the provision because it strikes me as unfair that
the Filipino citizen who was born a day before January 17, 1973 cannot be a Filipino citizen or a
natural-born citizen. (Records of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 1, p. 231)
xxx xxx xxx
Mr. Rodrigo: The purpose of that provision is to remedy an inequitable
situation.1avvphi1 Between 1935 and 1973 when we were under the 1935 Constitution, those
born of Filipino fathers but alien mothers were natural-born Filipinos. However, those born of
Filipino mothers but alien fathers would have to elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the
age of majority; and if they do elect, they become Filipino citizens but not natural-born Filipino
citizens. (Records of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 1, p. 356)
The foregoing significantly reveals the intent of the framers. To make the provision prospective
from February 3, 1987 is to give a narrow interpretation resulting in an inequitable situation. It
must also be retroactive.
It should be noted that in construing the law, the Courts are not always to be hedged in by the
literal meaning of its language. The spirit and intendment thereof, must prevail over the letter,
especially where adherence to the latter would result in absurdity and injustice. (Casela v.
Court of Appeals, 35 SCRA 279 [1970])
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A Constitutional provision should be construed so as to give it effective operation and suppress
the mischief at which it is aimed, hence, it is the spirit of the provision which should prevail
over the letter thereof. (Jarrolt v. Mabberly, 103 U.S. 580)
In the words of the Court in the case of J.M. Tuason v. LTA (31 SCRA 413 [1970]:
To that primordial intent, all else is subordinated. Our Constitution, any constitution is not to
be construed narrowly or pedantically for the prescriptions therein contained, to paraphrase
Justice Holmes, are not mathematical formulas having their essence in their form but are
organic living institutions, the significance of which is vital not formal. . . . (p. 427)
The provision in question was enacted to correct the anomalous situation where one born of a
Filipino father and an alien mother was automatically granted the status of a natural-born
citizen while one born of a Filipino mother and an alien father would still have to elect
Philippine citizenship. If one so elected, he was not, under earlier laws, conferred the status of
a natural-born.
Under the 1973 Constitution, those born of Filipino fathers and those born of Filipino mothers
with an alien father were placed on equal footing. They were both considered as natural-born
citizens.
Hence, the bestowment of the status of "natural-born" cannot be made to depend on the
fleeting accident of time or result in two kinds of citizens made up of essentially the same
similarly situated members.
It is for this reason that the amendments were enacted, that is, in order to remedy this
accidental anomaly, and, therefore, treat equally all those born before the 1973 Constitution
and who elected Philippine citizenship either before or after the effectivity of that Constitution.
The Constitutional provision in question is, therefore curative in nature. The enactment was
meant to correct the inequitable and absurd situation which then prevailed, and thus, render
those acts valid which would have been nil at the time had it not been for the curative
provisions. (See Development Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 96 SCRA 342 [1980])
There is no dispute that the respondent's mother was a natural born Filipina at the time of her
marriage. Crucial to this case is the issue of whether or not the respondent elected or chose to
be a Filipino citizen.
Election becomes material because Section 2 of Article IV of the Constitution accords natural
born status to children born of Filipino mothers before January 17, 1973, if
they elect citizenship upon reaching the age of majority.
To expect the respondent to have formally or in writing elected citizenship when he came of
age is to ask for the unnatural and unnecessary. The reason is obvious. He was already a
citizen. Not only was his mother a natural born citizen but his father had been naturalized
when the respondent was only nine (9) years old. He could not have divined when he came of
age that in 1973 and 1987 the Constitution would be amended to require him to have filed a
sworn statement in 1969 electing citizenship inspite of his already having been a citizen since
1957. In 1969, election through a sworn statement would have been an unusual and
unnecessary procedure for one who had been a citizen since he was nine years old.
We have jurisprudence that defines "election" as both a formal and an informal process.
In the case of In Re: Florencio Mallare (59 SCRA 45 [1974]), the Court held that the exercise of
the right of suffrage and the participation in election exercises constitute a positive act of
election of Philippine citizenship. In the exact pronouncement of the Court, we held:
Esteban's exercise of the right of suffrage when he came of age, constitutes a positive act of
election of Philippine citizenship (p. 52; emphasis supplied)
The private respondent did more than merely exercise his right of suffrage. He has established
his life here in the Philippines.
For those in the peculiar situation of the respondent who cannot be expected to have elected
citizenship as they were already citizens, we apply the In Re Mallare rule.
The respondent was born in an outlying rural town of Samar where there are no alien enclaves
and no racial distinctions. The respondent has lived the life of a Filipino since birth. His father
applied for naturalization when the child was still a small boy. He is a Roman Catholic. He has
worked for a sensitive government agency. His profession requires citizenship for taking the
examinations and getting a license. He has participated in political exercises as a Filipino and
has always considered himself a Filipino citizen. There is nothing in the records to show that he
does not embrace Philippine customs and values, nothing to indicate any tinge of alien-ness no
acts to show that this country is not his natural homeland. The mass of voters of Northern
Samar are frilly aware of Mr. Ong's parentage. They should know him better than any member
of this Court will ever know him. They voted by overwhelming numbers to have him represent
them in Congress. Because of his acts since childhood, they have considered him as a Filipino.
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The filing of sworn statement or formal declaration is a requirement for those who still have to
elect citizenship. For those already Filipinos when the time to elect came up, there are acts of
deliberate choice which cannot be less binding. Entering a profession open only to Filipinos,
serving in public office where citizenship is a qualification, voting during election time, running
for public office, and other categorical acts of similar nature are themselves formal
manifestations of choice for these persons.
An election of Philippine citizenship presupposes that the person electing is an alien. Or his
status is doubtful because he is a national of two countries. There is no doubt in this case
about Mr. Ong's being a Filipino when he turned twenty-one (21).
We repeat that any election of Philippine citizenship on the part of the private respondent
would not only have been superfluous but it would also have resulted in an absurdity. How can
a Filipino citizen elect Philippine citizenship?
The respondent HRET has an interesting view as to how Mr. Ong elected citizenship. It
observed that "when protestee was only nine years of age, his father, Jose Ong Chuan became
a naturalized Filipino. Section 15 of the Revised Naturalization Act squarely applies its benefit
to him for he was then a minor residing in this country. Concededly, it was the law itself that
had already elected Philippine citizenship for protestee by declaring him as such." (Emphasis
supplied)
The petitioners argue that the respondent's father was not, validly, a naturalized citizen
because of his premature taking of the oath of citizenship.
The Court cannot go into the collateral procedure of stripping Mr. Ong's father of his
citizenship after his death and at this very late date just so we can go after the son.
The petitioners question the citizenship of the father through a collateral approach. This can
not be done. In our jurisdiction, an attack on a person's citizenship may only be done through a
direct action for its nullity. (See Queto v. Catolico, 31 SCRA 52 [1970])
To ask the Court to declare the grant of Philippine citizenship to Jose Ong Chuan as null and
void would run against the principle of due process. Jose Ong Chuan has already been laid to
rest. How can he be given a fair opportunity to defend himself. A dead man cannot speak. To
quote the words of the HRET "Ong Chuan's lips have long been muted to perpetuity by his
demise and obviously he could not use beyond where his mortal remains now lie to defend
himself were this matter to be made a central issue in this case."
The issue before us is not the nullification of the grant of citizenship to Jose Ong Chuan. Our
function is to determine whether or not the HRET committed abuse of authority in the exercise
of its powers. Moreover, the respondent traces his natural born citizenship through his mother,
not through the citizenship of his father. The citizenship of the father is relevant only to
determine whether or not the respondent "chose" to be a Filipino when he came of age. At
that time and up to the present, both mother and father were Filipinos. Respondent Ong could
not have elected any other citizenship unless he first formally renounced Philippine citizenship
in favor of a foreign nationality. Unlike other persons faced with a problem of election, there
was no foreign nationality of his father which he could possibly have chosen.
There is another reason why we cannot declare the HRET as having committed manifest grave
abuse of discretion. The same issue of natural-born citizenship has already been decided by the
Constitutional Convention of 1971 and by the Batasang Pambansa convened by authority of
the Constitution drafted by that Convention. Emil Ong, full blood brother of the respondent,
was declared and accepted as a natural born citizen by both bodies.
Assuming that our opinion is different from that of the Constitutional Convention, the Batasang
Pambansa, and the respondent HRET, such a difference could only be characterized as error.
There would be no basis to call the HRET decision so arbitrary and whimsical as to amount
to grave abuse of discretion.
What was the basis for the Constitutional Convention's declaring Emil Ong a natural born
citizen?
Under the Philippine Bill of 1902, inhabitants of the Philippines who were Spanish subjects on
the 11th day of April 1899 and then residing in said islands and their children born subsequent
thereto were conferred the status of a Filipino citizen.
Was the grandfather of the private respondent a Spanish subject?
Article 17 of the Civil Code of Spain enumerates those who were considered Spanish
Subjects, viz:
ARTICLE 17. The following are Spaniards:
1. Persons born in Spanish territory.
2. Children born of a Spanish father or mother, even though they were born out of Spain.
3. Foreigners who may have obtained naturalization papers.
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4. Those without such papers, who may have acquired domicile in any town in the Monarchy.
(Emphasis supplied)
The domicile of a natural person is the place of his habitual residence. This domicile, once
established is considered to continue and will not be deemed lost until a new one is
established. (Article 50, NCC; Article 40, Civil Code of Spain; Zuellig v. Republic, 83 Phil. 768
[1949])
As earlier stated, Ong Te became a permanent resident of Laoang, Samar around 1895.
Correspondingly, a certificate of residence was then issued to him by virtue of his being a
resident of Laoang, Samar. (Report of the Committee on Election Protests and Credentials of
the 1971 Constitutional Convention, September 7, 1972, p. 3)
The domicile that Ong Te established in 1895 continued until April 11, 1899; it even went
beyond the turn of the 19th century. It is also in this place were Ong Te set-up his business and
acquired his real property.
As concluded by the Constitutional Convention, Ong Te falls within the meaning of sub-
paragraph 4 of Article 17 of the Civil Code of Spain.
Although Ong Te made brief visits to China, he, nevertheless, always returned to the
Philippines. The fact that he died in China, during one of his visits in said country, was of no
moment. This will not change the fact that he already had his domicile fixed in the Philippines
and pursuant to the Civil Code of Spain, he had become a Spanish subject.
If Ong Te became a Spanish subject by virtue of having established his domicile in a town under
the Monarchy of Spain, necessarily, Ong Te was also an inhabitant of the Philippines for an
inhabitant has been defined as one who has actual fixed residence in a place; one who has a
domicile in a place. (Bouvier's Law Dictionary, Vol. II) A priori, there can be no other logical
conclusion but to educe that Ong Te qualified as a Filipino citizen under the provisions of
section 4 of the Philippine Bill of 1902.
The HRET itself found this fact of absolute verity in concluding that the private respondent was
a natural-born Filipino.
The petitioners' sole ground in disputing this fact is that document presented to prove it were
not in compliance with the best the evidence rule. The petitioners allege that the private
respondent failed to present the original of the documentary evidence, testimonial evidence
and of the transcript of the proceedings of the body which the aforesaid resolution of the 1971
Constitutional Convention was predicated.
On the contrary, the documents presented by the private respondent fall under the exceptions
to the best evidence rule.
It was established in the proceedings before the HRET that the originals of the Committee
Report No. 12, the minutes of the plenary session of 1971 Constitutional Convention held on
November 28, 1972 cannot be found.
This was affirmed by Atty. Ricafrente, Assistant Secretary of the 1971 Constitutional
Convention; by Atty. Nolledo, Delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention; and by Atty.
Antonio Santos, Chief Librarian of the U.P Law Center, in their respective testimonies given
before the HRET to the effect that there is no governmental agency which is the official
custodian of the records of the 1971 Constitutional Convention. (TSN, December 12, 1988, pp.
30-31; TSN, January 17, 1989, pp. 34-35; TSN, February 1, 1989, p. 44; TSN, February 6, 1989,
pp. 28-29)
The execution of the originals was established by Atty. Ricafrente, who as the Assistant
Secretary of the 1971 Constitutional Convention was the proper party to testify to such
execution. (TSN, December 12, 1989, pp. 11-24)
The inability to produce the originals before the HRET was also testified to as aforestated by
Atty. Ricafrente, Atty. Nolledo, and Atty. Santos. In proving the inability to produce, the law
does not require the degree of proof to be of sufficient certainty; it is enough that it be shown
that after a bona fide diligent search, the same cannot be found. (see Government of P.I. v.
Martinez, 44 Phil. 817 [1918])
Since the execution of the document and the inability to produce were adequately established,
the contents of the questioned documents can be proven by a copy thereof or by the
recollection of witnesses.
Moreover, to erase all doubts as to the authenticity of the documentary evidence cited in the
Committee Report, the former member of the 1971 Constitutional Convention, Atty. Nolledo,
when he was presented as a witness in the hearing of the protest against the private
respondent, categorically stated that he saw the disputed documents presented during the
hearing of the election protest against the brother of the private respondent. (TSN, February 1,
1989, pp. 8-9)
In his concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Sarmiento, a vice-president of the Constitutional
Convention, states that he was presiding officer of the plenary session which deliberated on
the report on the election protest against Delegate Emil Ong. He cites a long list of names of
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delegates present. Among them are Mr. Chief Justice Fernan, and Mr. Justice Davide, Jr. The
petitioners could have presented any one of the long list of delegates to refute Mr. Ong's
having been declared a natural-born citizen. They did not do so. Nor did they demur to the
contents of the documents presented by the private respondent. They merely relied on the
procedural objections respecting the admissibility of the evidence presented.
The Constitutional Convention was the sole judge of the qualifications of Emil Ong to be a
member of that body. The HRET by explicit mandate of the Constitution, is the sole judge of the
qualifications of Jose Ong, Jr. to be a member of Congress. Both bodies deliberated at length
on the controversies over which they were sole judges. Decisions were arrived at only after a
full presentation of all relevant factors which the parties wished to present. Even assuming that
we disagree with their conclusions, we cannot declare their acts as committed with grave
abuse of discretion. We have to keep clear the line between error and grave abuse.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 87193 June 23, 1989
JUAN GALLANOSA FRIVALDO, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND THE LEAGUE OF MUNICIPALITIES, SORSOGON CHAPTER, HEREIN REPRESENTED BY ITS
PRESIDENT, SALVADOR NEE ESTUYE, respondents.
DECISION
CRUZ, J.:
Petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor-elect of the province of Sorsogon on January 22, 1988, and assumed
office in due time. On October 27, 1988, the League of Municipalities, Sorsogon Chapter (hereafter, League), represented
by its President, Salvador Estuye, who was also suing in his personal capacity, filed with the Commission on Elections a
petition for the annulment of Frivaldo’s election and proclamation on the ground that he was not a Filipino citizen, having
been naturalized in the United States on January 20, 1983. In his answer dated May 22, 1988, Frivaldo admitted that he
was naturalized in the United States as alleged but pleaded the special and affirmative defenses that he had sought
American citizenship only to protect himself against President Marcos. His naturalization, he said, was “merely forced
upon himself as a means of survival against the unrelenting persecution by the Martial Law Dictator’s agents abroad.” He
added that he had returned to the Philippines after the EDSA revolution to help in the restoration of democracy. He also
argued that the challenge to his title should be dismissed, being in reality a quo warranto petition that should have been
filed within ten days from his proclamation, in accordance with Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code. The League,
moreover, was not a proper party because it was not a voter and so could not sue under the said section.
Frivaldo moved for a preliminary hearing on his affirmative defenses but the respondent Commission on Elections decided
instead by its Order of January 20, 1988, to set the case for hearing on the merits. His motion for reconsideration was
denied in another Order dated February 21, 1988. He then came to this Court in a petition for certiorari and prohibition to
ask that the said orders be set aside on the ground that they had been rendered with grave abuse of discretion. Pending
resolution of the petition, we issued a temporary order against the hearing on the merits scheduled by the COMELEC and
at the same time required comments from the respondents.
In their Comment, the private respondents reiterated their assertion that Frivaldo was a naturalized American citizen and
had not reacquired Philippine citizenship on the day of the election on January 18, 1988. He was therefore not qualified to
run for and be elected governor. They also argued that their petition in the Commission on Elections was not really for quo
warranto under Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code. The ultimate purpose was to prevent Frivaldo from continuing
as governor, his candidacy and election being null and void ab initio because of his alienage. Even if their petition were to
be considered as one for quo warranto, it could not have been filed within ten days from Frivaldo’s proclamation because
it was only in September 1988 that they received proof of his naturalization. And assuming that the League itself was not a
proper party, Estuye himself, who was suing not only for the League but also in his personal capacity, could nevertheless
institute the suit by himself alone.
Speaking for the public respondent, the Solicitor General supported the contention that Frivaldo was not a citizen of the
Philippines and had not repatriated himself after his naturalization as an American citizen. As an alien, he was disqualified
from public office in the Philippines. His election did not cure this defect because the electorate of Sorsogon could not
amend the Constitution, the Local Government Code, and the Omnibus Election Code. He also joined in the private
respondent’s argument that Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code was not applicable because what the League and
Estuye were seeking was not only the annulment of the proclamation and election of Frivaldo. He agreed that they were
also asking for the termination of Frivaldo’s incumbency as governor of Sorsogon on the ground that he was not a Filipino.
In his Reply, Frivaldo insisted that he was a citizen of the Philippines because his naturalization as an American citizen was
not “impressed with voluntariness.” In support he cited the Nottebohm Case, [(1955 I.C.J. 4; 49 A.J.I.L. 396 (1955)] where a
German national’s naturalization in Liechtenstein was not recognized because it had been obtained for reasons of
convenience only. He said he could not have repatriated himself before the 1988 elections because the Special Committee
on Naturalization created for the purpose by LOI No. 27C had not yet been organized then. His oath in his certificate of
candidacy that he was a natural-born citizen should be a sufficient act of repatriation. Additionally, his active participation
in the 1987 congressional elections had divested him of American citizenship under the laws of the United States, thus
restoring his Philippine citizenship. He ended by reiterating his prayer for the rejection of the move to disqualify him for
being time-barred under Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code.
Considering the importance and urgency of the question herein raised, the Court has decided to resolve it directly instead
of allowing the normal circuitous route that will after all eventually end with this Court, albeit only after a, long delay. We
cannot permit this delay. Such delay will be inimical to the public interest and the vital principles of public office to be here
applied.
It is true that the Commission on Elections has the primary jurisdiction over this question as the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the Congress and elective provincial and city officials.
However, the decision on Frivaldo’s citizenship has already been made by the COMELEC through its counsel, the Solicitor
General, who categorically claims that Frivaldo is a foreigner. We assume this stance was taken by him after consultation
with the public respondent and with its approval. It therefore represents the decision of the COMELEC itself that we may
now review. Exercising our discretion to interpret the Rules of Court and the Constitution, we shall consider the present
petition as having been filed in accordance with Article IX-A Section 7, of the Constitution, to challenge the
aforementioned Orders of the COMELEC.
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The basic question we must resolve is whether or not Juan G. Frivaldo was a citizen of the Philippines at the time of his
election on January 18, 1988, as provincial governor of Sorsogon. All the other issues raised in this petition are merely
secondary to this basic question.
The reason for this inquiry is the provision in Article XI, Section 9, of the Constitution that all public officials and employees
owe the State and the Constitution “allegiance at all times” and the specific requirement in Section 42 of the Local
Government Code that a candidate for local elective office must be inter alia a citizen of the Philippines and a qualified
voter of the constituency where he is running. Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that a qualified voter
must be, among other qualifications, a citizen of the Philippines, this being an indispensable requirement for suffrage
under Article V, Section 1, of the Constitution.
In the certificate of candidacy he filed on November 19, 1987, Frivaldo described himself as a “natural-born” citizen of the
Philippines, omitting mention of any subsequent loss of such status. The evidence shows, however, that he was
naturalized as a citizen of the United States in 1983 per the following certification from the United States District Court,
Northern District of California, as duly authenticated by Vice Consul Amado P. Cortez of the Philippine Consulate General
in San Francisco, California, U.S.A.
The Court sees no reason not to believe that the petitioner was one of the enemies of the Marcos dictatorship. Even so, it
cannot agree that as a consequence thereof he was coerced into embracing American citizenship. His feeble suggestion
that his naturalization was not the result of his own free and voluntary choice is totally unacceptable and must be rejected
outright.
There were many other Filipinos in the United States similarly situated as Frivaldo, and some of them subject to greater
risk than he, who did not find it necessary — nor do they claim to have been coerced — to abandon their cherished status
as Filipinos. They did not take the oath of allegiance to the United States, unlike the petitioner who solemnly declared “on
oath, that I absolutely and entirely renounce and abjure all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state or
sovereignty of whom or which I have heretofore been a subject or citizen,” meaning in his case the Republic of the
Philippines. The martyred Ninoy Aquino heads the impressive list of those Filipinos in exile who, unlike the petitioner, held
fast to their Philippine citizenship despite the perils of their resistance to the Marcos regime.
The Nottebohm case cited by the petitioner invoked the international law principle of effective nationality which is clearly
not applicable to the case at bar. This principle is expressed in Article 5 of the Hague Convention of 1930 on the Conflict of
Nationality Laws as follows:

OFFICE OF THE CLERK Art. 5. Within a third State a person having more than one nationality shall be treated as if he had only one. Without
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT prejudice to the application of its law in matters of personal status and of any convention in force, a third State shall, of
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA the nationalities which any such person possesses, recognize exclusively in its territory either the nationality of the
country in which he is habitually and principally resident or the nationality of the country with which in the circumstances
September 23, 1988 he appears to be in fact most closely connected.

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN: Nottebohm was a German by birth but a resident of Guatemala for 34 years when he applied for and acquired
naturalization in Liechtenstein one month before the outbreak of World War II. Many members of his family and his
Our records show that JUAN GALLANOSA FRIVALDO, born on October 20, 1915, was naturalized in this Court on January business interests were in Germany. In 1943, Guatemala, which had declared war on Germany, arrested Nottebohm and
20, 1983, and issued Certificate of Naturalization No. 11690178. confiscated all his properties on the ground that he was a German national. Liechtenstein thereupon filed suit on his
behalf, as its citizen, against Guatemala. The International Court of Justice held Nottebohm to be still a national of
Petition No. 280225. Germany, with which he was more closely connected than with Liechtenstein.

Alien Registration No. A23 079 270. That case is not relevant to the petition before us because it dealt with a conflict between the nationality laws of two
states as decided by a third state. No third state is involved in the case at bar; in fact, even the United States is not actively
Very truly yours, claiming Frivaldo as its national. The sole question presented to us is whether or not Frivaldo is a citizen of the
Philippines under our own laws, regardless of other nationality laws. We can decide this question alone as sovereign of our
WILLIAM L. WHITTAKER own territory, conformably to Section 1 of the said Convention providing that “it is for each State to determine under its
law who are its nationals.”
Clerk
It is also worth noting that Nottebohm was invoking his naturalization in Liechtenstein whereas in the present case
by: Frivaldo is rejecting his naturalization in the United States.

(Sgd.) If he really wanted to disavow his American citizenship and reacquire Philippine citizenship, the petitioner should have
done so in accordance with the laws of our country. Under CA No. 63 as amended by CA No. 473 and PD No. 725,
ARACELI V. BAREN Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation.

Deputy Clerk
This evidence is not denied by the petitioner. In fact, he expressly admitted it in his answer. Nevertheless, as earlier noted,
he claims it was “forced” on him as a measure of protection from the persecution of the Marcos government through his
agents in the United States.
While Frivaldo does not invoke either of the first two methods, he nevertheless claims he has reacquired Philippine
citizenship by virtue of a valid repatriation. He claims that by actively participating in the elections in this country, he
automatically forfeited American citizenship under the laws of the United States. Such laws do not concern us here. The
alleged forfeiture is between him and the United States as his adopted country. It should be obvious that even if he did
lose his naturalized American citizenship, such forfeiture did not and could not have the effect of automatically restoring
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his citizenship in the Philippines that he had earlier renounced. At best, what might have happened as a result of the loss
of his naturalized citizenship was that he became a stateless individual.
JUAN GALLANOSA FRIVALDO, petitioner,
Frivaldo’s contention that he could not have repatriated himself under LOI 270 because the Special Committee provided
for therein had not yet been constituted seems to suggest that the lack of that body rendered his repatriation
vs.
unnecessary. That is far-fetched if not specious Such a conclusion would open the floodgates, as it were. It would allow all
Filipinos who have renounced this country to claim back their abandoned citizenship without formally rejecting their
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND THE LEAGUE OF MUNICIPALITIES, SORSOGON CHAPTER, HEREIN
adopted state and reaffirming their allegiance to the Philippines.
REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT, SALVADOR NEE ESTUYE, respondents.
It does not appear that Frivaldo has taken these categorical acts. He contends that by simply filing his certificate of
candidacy he had, without more, already effectively recovered Philippine citizenship. But that is hardly the formal FACTS : Petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor-elect of the province of Sorsogon on January
declaration the law envisions — surely, Philippine citizenship previously disowned is not that cheaply recovered. If the 22, 1988, and assumed office in due time. On October 27, 1988. the League of Municipalities, Sorsogon
Special Committee had not yet been convened, what that meant simply was that the petitioner had to wait until this was Chapter (hereafter, League), represented by its President, Salvador Estuye, who was also suing in his
done, or seek naturalization by legislative or judicial proceedings. personal capacity, filed with the Commission on Elections a petition for the annulment of Frivaldo

The argument that the petition filed with the Commission on Elections should be dismissed for tardiness is not well-taken.
The herein private respondents are seeking to prevent Frivaldo from continuing to discharge his office of governor
because he is disqualified from doing so as a foreigner. Qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and
must be possessed not only at the time of appointment or election or assumption of office but during the officer’s entire
tenure. Once any of the required qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably challenged. If, say, a female legislator
were to marry a foreigner during her term and by her act or omission acquires his nationality, would she have a right to
remain in office simply because the challenge to her title may no longer be made within ten days from her proclamation?
It has been established, and not even denied, that the evidence of Frivaldo’s naturalization was discovered only eight
months after his proclamation and his title was challenged shortly thereafter.
This Court will not permit the anomaly of a person sitting as provincial governor in this country while owing exclusive
allegiance to another country. The fact that he was elected by the people of Sorsogon does not excuse this patent
violation of the salutary rule limiting public office and employment only to the citizens of this country. The qualifications
prescribed for elective office cannot be erased by the electorate alone. The will of the people as expressed through the
ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly believed, as in this case, that the candidate was
qualified. Obviously, this rule requires strict application when the deficiency is lack of citizenship. If a person seeks to serve
in the Republic of the Philippines, he must owe his total loyalty to this country only, abjuring and renouncing all fealty and
fidelity to any other state.
It is true as the petitioner points out that the status of the natural-born citizen is favored by the Constitution and our laws,
which is all the more reason why it should be treasured like a pearl of great price. But once it is surrendered and
renounced, the gift is gone and cannot be lightly restored. This country of ours, for all its difficulties and limitations, is like
a jealous and possessive mother. Once rejected, it is not quick to welcome back with eager arms its prodigal if repentant
children. The returning renegade must show, by an express and unequivocal act, the renewal of his loyalty and love.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and petitioner JUAN G. FRIVALDO is hereby declared not a citizen of the
Philippines and therefore DISQUALIFIED from serving as Governor of the Province of Sorsogon. Accordingly, he is ordered
to vacate his office and surrender the same to the duly elected Vice-Governor of the said province once this decision
becomes final and executory. The temporary restraining order dated March 9, 1989, is LIFTED.
SO ORDERED.
FRIVALDO VS COMELEC
In his answer dated May 22, 1988, Frivaldo admitted that he was naturalized in the United States as
alleged but pleaded the special and affirmative defenses that he had sought American citizenship only to
protect himself against President Marcos
Frivaldo moved for a preliminary hearing on his affirmative defenses but the respondent Commission on
Elections decided instead by its Order of January 20, 1988, to set the case for hearing on the merits. His
motion for reconsideration was denied in another Order dated February 21, 1988. He then came to this
Court in a petition for certiorari and prohibition to ask that the said orders be set aside on the ground that
they had been rendered with grave abuse of discretion. Pending resolution of the petition, we issued a
temporary order against the hearing on the merits scheduled by the COMELEC and at the same time
required comments from the respondents.
ISSUE : WON Juan G. Frivaldo was a citizen of the Philippines at the time of his election on January 18,
1988, as provincial governor of Sorsogon. All the other issues raised in this petition are merely secondary
to this basic question.
HELD : The reason for this inquiry is the provision in Article XI, Section 9, of the Constitution that all public
officials and employees owe the State and the Constitution "allegiance at all times" and the specific
requirement in Section 42 of the Local Government Code that a candidate for local elective office must be
inter alia a citizen of the Philippines and a qualified voter of the constituency where he is running. Section
117 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that a qualified voter must be, among other qualifications, a
citizen of the Philippines, this being an indispensable requirement for suffrage under Article V, Section 1, of
the Constitution.
In the certificate of candidacy he filed on November 19, 1987, Frivaldo described himself as a "natural-
born" citizen of the Philippines, omitting mention of any subsequent loss of such status. The evidence
shows, however, that he was naturalized as a citizen of the United States in 1983 per the following
certification from the United States District Court, Northern District of California, as duly authenticated by
Vice Consul Amado P. Cortez of the Philippine Consulate General in San Francisco, California, U.S.A.

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 Consti 2
The reason for this inquiry is the provision in Article XI, Section 9, of the Constitution that all public officials
and employees owe the State and the Constitution "allegiance at all times" and the specific requirement in
Section 42 of the Local Government Code that a candidate for local elective office must be inter alia a
citizen of the Philippines and a qualified voter of the constituency where he is running. Section 117 of the
Omnibus Election Code provides that a qualified voter must be, among other qualifications, a citizen of the
Philippines, this being an indispensable requirement for suffrage under Article V, Section 1, of the
Constitution.
In the certificate of candidacy he filed on November 19, 1987, Frivaldo described himself as a "natural-
born" citizen of the Philippines, omitting mention of any subsequent loss of such status. The evidence
shows, however, that he was naturalized as a citizen of the United States in 1983 per the following
certification from the United States District Court, Northern District of California, as duly authenticated by
Vice Consul Amado P. Cortez of the Philippine Consulate General in San Francisco, California, U.S.A.
If he really wanted to disavow his American citizenship and reacquire Philippine citizenship, the petitioner
should have done so in accordance with the laws of our country. Under CA No. 63 as amended by CA No.
473 and PD No. 725, Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization,
or by repatriation.
It does not appear that Frivaldo has taken these categorical acts. He contends that by simply filing his
certificate of candidacy he had, without more, already effectively recovered Philippine citizenship. But that
is hardly the formal declaration the law envisions — surely, Philippine citizenship previously disowned is
not that cheaply recovered. If the Special Committee had not yet been convened, what that meant simply
was that the petitioner had to wait until this was done, or seek naturalization by legislative or judicial
proceedings.
The argument that the petition filed with the Commission on Elections should be dismissed for tardiness is
not well-taken. The herein private respondents are seeking to prevent Frivaldo from continuing to
discharge his office of governor because he is disqualified from doing so as a foreigner. Qualifications for
public office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not only at the time of appointment or
election or assumption of office but during the officer's entire tenure. Once any of the required
qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably challenged. If, say, a female legislator were to marry a
foreigner during her term and by her act or omission acquires his nationality, would she have a right to
remain in office simply because the challenge to her title may no longer be made within ten days from her
proclamation? It has been established, and not even denied, that the evidence of Frivaldo's naturalization
was discovered only eight months after his proclamation and his title was challenged shortly thereafter.
This Court will not permit the anomaly of a person sitting as provincial governor in this country while owing
exclusive allegiance to another country. The fact that he was elected by the people of Sorsogon does not
excuse this patent violation of the salutary rule limiting public office and employment only to the citizens
of this country. The qualifications prescribed for elective office cannot be erased by the electorate alone.
The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility, especially if they
mistakenly believed, as in this case, that the candidate was qualified. Obviously, this rule requires strict
application when the deficiency is lack of citizenship. If a person seeks to serve in the Republic of the
Philippines, he must owe his total loyalty to this country only, abjuring and renouncing all fealty and fidelity
to any other state.
It is true as the petitioner points out that the status of the natural-born citizen is favored by the
Constitution and our laws, which is all the more reason why it should be treasured like a pearl of great
price. But once it is surrendered and renounced, the gift is gone and cannot be lightly restored. This
country of ours, for all its difficulties and limitations, is like a jealous and possessive mother. Once rejected,
it is not quick to welcome back with eager arms its prodigal if repentant children. The returning renegade
must show, by an express and unequivocal act, the renewal of his loyalty and love.__
Frivaldo v. Comelec
G.R. No. 120295 June 28, 1996
Facts:
Frivaldo obtained the highest number of votes in three successive elections but was disqualified by the
Court twice due to his alien citizenship. He claims to have re-assumed his lost Philippine citizenship thru
repatriation. Respondent Lee was the second placer in the canvass and claimed that the votes cast in favor
of petitioner should be considered void; that the electorate should be deemed to have intentionally
thrown away their ballots; and that legally, he secured the most number of valid votes; or the incumbent
Vice-Governor should take over the said post due to permanent vacancy due to Frivaldo’s ineligibility.
Issues:
1) Was the repatriation valid and legal and reasonably cure his lack of citizenship as to qualify him to be
proclaimed and to hold the Office?
2) Is disqualification for lack of citizenship a continuing bar to his eligibility to run for or be elected to or
hold public office?
3) Did Comelec have jurisdiction over the initiatory petition considering that said petition is not a pre-
proclamation case, an election protest or a quo warranto case?
4) Was the proclamation of Lee, a runner-up in the election, valid and legal in light of existing
jurisprudence?
Ruling:
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1) Yes. According to law, citizenship may be reacquired by 1) direct act of Congress, 2) by naturalization or
3) by repatriation under P.D 725. The law does not specifically state a particular date or time when the
candidate must possess citizenship, unlike that for residence (at least 1 year residency immediately
preceding the day of election) and age (at least 35 years old on election day).Philippine citizenship is an
indispensable requirement for holding an elective public office to ensure that no alien, or person owing
allegiance to another nation, shall govern our people and our country or a unit of territory thereof. An
official begins to govern or to discharge his functions only upon his proclamation and on the day the law
mandates his term of office to begin. Since Frivaldo re-assumed his citizenship on the very day the term of
his

office began, he was therefore already qualified to be proclaimed, to hold office and to discharge the
functions and responsibilities thereof as of said date. The law intended CITIZENSHIP to be a qualification
distinct from being a VOTER, even if being a voter presumes being a citizen first. The Local Government
Code requires an elective official to be a registered voter. It does not require him to vote actually. In other
words, the law's purpose in this second requirement is to ensure that the prospective official is actually
registered in the area he seeks to govern — and not anywhere else. In fact, petitioner voted in all the
previous elections. The prime issue of citizenship should be reckoned from the date of proclamation, not
necessarily the date of election or date of filing of the certificate of candidacy. The repatriation of the
petitioner retroacted upon the date of filing of his application.

2) No. Decisions declaring the acquisition or denial of citizenship cannot govern a person's future status
with finality. This is because a person may subsequently reacquire, or for that matter, lose his citizenship
under any of the modes recognized by law for the purpose.

3) No. The Constitution has given the Comelec ample power to "exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over
all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of all elective provincial officials. Such
power to annul a proclamation must be done within ten (10) days following the proclamation. Frivaldo's
petition was filed only six (6) days after Lee's proclamation, there is no question that the Comelec correctly
acquired jurisdiction over the same.

4) No. The fact remains that Lee was not the choice of the sovereign will. Lee is just a second placer. The
rule is: the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes does not entitle the eligible candidate
receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared elected. A minority or defeated candidate
cannot be deemed elected to the office.

The petition was DISMISSED for being moot and academic and has no merit.

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