Against Relativism: A Short Argument from the Possibility of Progress 

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1 Introduction 
In Christian Smith’s ​Lost in Transition​, a team of sociologists interview 230 ‘emerging adults’ (i.e. 
18-23-year-olds) about their views on moral living. Their findings: many (if not most) emerging adults 
believe in something akin to moral relativism, the idea that there no objective moral standards, only 
relative moral truths. Opponents of moral relativism find this news alarming. Likewise, several 
arguments have been constructed to illustrate the danger that moral relativism poses. Such arguments 
typically follow this strategy: deduce a non-obvious implication from moral relativism that is so 
outrageous that we cannot reasonably stand by it. I intend to employ a similar approach. I will argue 
that if moral relativism is true, then moral progress is impossible. (This implication is not obvious 
prima facie​, but ​is​, as I will show, an implication nonetheless.) But, clearly, there are empirical (and 
ethical) reasons for thinking that moral progress i​ s​ possible. So, moral relativism must be false. 
2 My Argument 
It will be useful here to present my argument formally: 
(1) If moral relativism is true, then moral progress is impossible. 
(2) But moral progress i​ s​ possible. 
(c) So, moral relativism is false. 
Clearly, the logic is deductively valid. If (1-2) are true, then (c) must be true. But are (1-2) true? 
First, let’s get clearer on moral relativism. (Doing so will help us see what its implications are.) 
As we have seen, moral relativism says that there are no objective moral standards or facts. That is not 
to say that there are no moral standards whatever. There are such standards, says the moral relativist, 
but they are relative to communities, or individuals. What is right for one community, or individual, 
may be wrong for another. 
In my judgment, this view implies that moral progress, something revered by Western 
civilization, is impossible. An example will illuminate this fact. Consider United States history. Today, 
most Americans approve of black-white marriages. 50 years ago, most disapproved. Likely, most of us 
feel inclined to say that, in this respect, the U.S. has seen moral progress. That is, an immoral cultural 
attitude toward black-white marriages has been replaced by a righteous one.  
 However, reason does not permit the moral relativist to share this opinion. If moral relativism 
is true, then, 50 years ago, the widespread attitude of disapproval toward black-white marriages was 
truly morally ​righteous​, relative to standards of the time. Americans today merely promote different 
moral standards. So, no moral progress has taken place in the U.S., only arbitrary moral change. What 
is more, something similar can be said about any case of alleged moral change that we can think of – if 
moral relativism is true, then those cases do not represent cases of moral progress, just arbitrary moral 
change. 
The moral relativist may object by arguing that widely-held moral standards in the U.S. have 
not changed. They may say that, today, Americans assent to the same moral standards as they did 50 
years ago. It simply took us 50 years to overcome temptation and obey our consciences. 
This objection goes wrong in two ways. First, it is false that widely-held moral standards in the 
U.S. have not changed. There is ample evidence confirming that Americans 50 years ago sincerely 
believed that the righteous attitude toward black-white marriages was one of disapproval. Second, even 
if it were true that widely-held moral standards have remained mostly the same, reason would still not 
permit the moral relativist to claim that moral progress has taken place. I am conceiving of moral 
progress as taking place when a community uncovers moral facts that it was previously unaware of, 
and revises its moral beliefs accordingly. But, if moral relativism obtains, then Americans today do not 
possess any moral information that was previously unknown to them. Instead, today, the moral beliefs 
that Americans count as facts are simply different than the ones that they counted as facts 50 years ago. 
By now, it should be clear that moral relativism runs contrary to (at least one of) our 
commonsense moral beliefs. It tells us that the idea of moral progress, discovering moral truths and 
revising our moral beliefs accordingly, is incoherent. But our moral intuition tells us that moral 
progress ​is​ possible, and that, if any moral progress need be made, we have a moral obligation to make 
it. Our moral intuition also tells us that there are many cases where moral progress ​has​ taken place – 
events such as the social gospel movement of the early 20​th​ century, or the civil rights movement of the 
1960s, come to mind. However, as we have seen, moral relativism would have us believe that these 
were merely instances of arbitrary moral change. But surely this is incorrect. Clearly, premise (2) from 
above (i.e., “Moral progress ​is p
​ ossible.”) is more plausible than its denial (i.e., “Moral progress is 
im​possible.”). 
 3 Conclusion 
In sum, I have argued that, if moral relativism is true (that is, if there are no objective moral standards, 
only relative moral truths), then moral progress is, by definition, an impossible activity. We have seen 
that the moral relativist is bound by reason to feel indifferent toward events that possess every 
appearance of being great moral victories. But ordinary folks do not regard such events with apathy. 
We have a strong, trustworthy moral intuition that moral progress is not only​ p
​ ossible, but​ has ​taken 
place. Thus, for goodness’ sake, moral relativism must be false.