G.R. No.

193217 February 26, 2014

CORAZON MACAPAGAL, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Regional Trial Court1(RTC)
Decision dated November 25, 2008 convicting petitioner Corazon Macapagal of the crime of Estafa;2 the Order denying her
Motion for Reconsideration and/or New Trial;3 and the Order4 dated June 29, 2010 denying her Notice of Appeal,5 in
Criminal Case No. 98-166722.

For a proper perspective, a brief statement of the factual and procedural antecedents of the case follows:

On November 25, 2008, the RTC rendered a decision finding petitioner guilty of the crime of Estafa for misappropriating,
for her own benefit, the total amount of ₱800,000.00, which is the value of the unreturned and unsold pieces of
jewelry.6 Petitioner received the decision on

January 13, 2009 then she timely moved for reconsideration, but was likewise denied in an Order dated May 20, 2009
which the petitioner allegedly received on July 31, 2009. She supposedly filed a Notice of Appeal 7 on August 3, 2009, but
the same was denied on June 29, 2010 for having been filed out of time.8

Aggrieved, petitioner comes directly before the Court in this petition for review on certiorari with the following assignment of
errors:

I.

THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA, BRANCH 9, GRAVELY ERRED IN DENYING THE NOTICE OF APPEAL
FILED BY THE HEREIN PETITIONER-APPELLANT.

II.

THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA, BRANCH 9, GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE HEREIN
PETITIONER-APPELLANT OF THE CRIME OF ESTAFA.

III.

THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA, BRANCH 9, GRAVELY ERRED IN DENYING THE MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION AND/OR NEW TRIAL FILED BY THE HEREIN PETITIONER-APPELLANT.9

We deny the petition.

At the outset, the Court notes that the instant case suffers from various procedural infirmities which this Court cannot
ignore and are fatal to petitioner’s cause. It appears that petitioner assails not only the denial by the RTC of her notice of
appeal but likewise seeks the reversal of her conviction for estafa. For reasons that will be discussed below, the petition is
bound to fail, because of petitioner’s complete disregard of the procedural rules and the orders of the Court.
First, petitioner availed of the wrong mode of assailing the trial court’s denial of her notice of appeal. Sections 2 and 3, Rule
122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure lay down the rules on where, how and when appeal is taken, to wit:

SEC. 2. Where to appeal. – The appeal may be taken as follows:

xxxx

(b) To the Court of Appeals or to the Supreme Court in the proper cases provided by law, in cases decided by the Regional
Trial Court; and

xxxx

SEC. 3. How appeal taken. – (a) The appeal to the Regional Trial Court or to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the
Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal filed with the court
which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from and by serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party.

SEC. 6. When appeal to be taken. – An appeal must be taken within fifteen days from promulgation of the judgment or
from notice of the final order appealed from x x x.

Consequently, the disallowance of the notice of appeal signifies the disallowance of the appeal itself.10 A petition for review
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is a mode of appeal of a lower court’s decision or final order direct to the Supreme
Court. However, the questioned Order denying her notice of appeal is not a decision or final order from which an appeal
may be taken.11 The Rules of Court specifically provides that no appeal shall be taken from an order disallowing or
dismissing an appeal. Rather, the aggrieved party can elevate the matter through a special civil action under Rule 65.
Thus, in availing of the wrong mode of appeal in this petition under Rule 45 instead of the appropriate remedy of Rule 65,
the petition merits an outright dismissal.12

The Court has often admonished litigants for unnecessarily burdening it with the task of determining under which rule a
petition should fall. It has likewise warned lawyers to follow the requisites for appeal prescribed by law, ever aware that any
error or imprecision in compliance may well be fatal to the client’s cause.13

Second, even if we treat this petition as one for certiorari under Rule 65, it is still dismissible for violation of the hierarchy of
courts.14 Although the Supreme Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the RTC and the CA to issue writs of certiorari, this
should not be taken as granting parties the absolute and unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which an
application will be directed.15 Direct resort to this Court is allowed only if there are special, important and compelling
reasons clearly and specifically spelled out in the petition, which are not present in this case.16

Third, even if we ignore the above non-compliance and consider the petition as an appeal of the trial court’s decision
convicting her of estafa, again, we cannot do so for yet another fatal procedural shortcoming committed by petitioner. As
stated earlier, petitioner elevated to this Court not only the Order denying her notice of appeal but also the Decision
convicting her of estafa and the Order denying her motion for reconsideration. In utter disregard of the rules of procedure,
petitioner attached to the petition only the June 29, 2010 RTC Order denying her notice of appeal but she failed to attach a
clearly legible duplicate original or a certified true copy of the assailed decision convicting her of estafa and the order
denying her motion for reconsideration.17 A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court must contain
a certified true copy or duplicate original of the assailed decision, final order or judgment.18 Failure to comply with such
requirement shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition.19

The main reason for the prescribed attachments is to facilitate the review and evaluation of the petition by making readily
available to the Court all the orders, resolutions, decisions, pleadings, transcripts, documents, and pieces of evidence that
are material and relevant to the issues presented in the petition without relying on the case records of the lower court.20
Lastly, this petition is bound to fail because of petitioner’s repeated disregard of the Rules and the Court’s lawful orders. In
1avvphi1

a Resolution21 dated September 15, 2010, the Court required petitioner to fully comply with the Rules of Court, the pertinent
portion of which reads:

xxxx

2. petitioner to FULLY COMPLY with the Rules by submitting: (a) an affidavit of service on the RTC and on the Office of
the Solicitor General; (b) a proper verification in accordance with Section 1, Rule 45 in relation to Section 4, Rule 7 of the
Rules, and a valid certification of non-forum shopping in accordance with Section 5, Rule 7, with properly accomplished
jurat showing that the affiant exhibited before the notary public at least one current identification document issued by an
official agency bearing the photograph and signature of the affiant as required under Sections 6 and 12, Rule II of the 2004
Rules on Notarial Practice, as amended by Court En Banc Resolution dated 19 February 2008 in A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC;
and (c) her counsel’s contact details pursuant to the En Banc Resolution dated 10 July 2007 in A.M. No. 07-6-5-SC, all
within five (5) days from notice. x x x22

Despite the directive, no such compliance was made prompting the Court to require her counsel to show cause why he
should not be disciplinary dealt with for non-compliance. Records likewise show that petitioner also failed to file a Reply to
respondent’s Comment to the petition.

On August 2, 2011, petitioner’s counsel submitted his explanation for non-compliance and asked for more time within
which to comply with the Court’s resolution, because of heavy workload and his failure to contact petitioner who apparently
transferred residence. In a Resolution23 dated

August 31, 2011, the Court, while granting the motion for extension requested, admonished petitioner’s counsel for the
unsatisfactory explanation. Yet again, petitioner failed to file the required Reply prompting the Court again to ask for the
counsel’s explanation why he should not be disciplinary dealt with. Petitioner’s counsel claimed that he could not prepare
the required reply because the documents needed had been destroyed by typhoon "Pedring." He, likewise, pointed out that
he exerted earnest efforts to locate petitioner but he could not do so at that point.24 After the Court required him again to
show cause why he should not be disciplinary dealt with for not complying with the Court’s resolutions, and since his efforts
to communicate with his client proved futile, he asked the Court that he be relieved of all his duties and responsibilities as
counsel on record.25 In a Resolution26 dated December 10, 2012, we required petitioner herself to comment thereon, but no
such compliance was made to date. 1âwphi 1

Indeed, cases should be determined on the merits after full opportunity to all parties for ventilation of their causes and
defenses, rather than on technicality or some procedural imperfections in order to serve better the ends of justice.27 It is the
duty of the counsel to make sure of the nature of the errors he proposes to assign, to determine which court has appellate
jurisdiction, and to follow the requisites for appeal.28 Any error in compliance may be fatal to the client's cause.29 It should be
stressed that the right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due process. It is merely a procedural remedy of
statutory origin and may be exercised only in the manner prescribed by the provisions of law authorizing its exercise.30 The
requirements of the rules on appeal cannot be considered as merely harmless and trivial technicalities that can be
discarded at whim. In these times when court dockets are clogged with numerous litigations, parties have to abide by these
rules with greater fidelity in order to facilitate the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases.31

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 172873 March 19, 2010

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.
ROLDAN MORALES y MIDARASA, Appellant.
 DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

The requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt has this vital role in our criminal procedure for cogent reasons. The
accused during a criminal prosecution has at stake interest of immense importance, both because of the possibility that he
may lose his liberty upon conviction and because of the certainty that he would be stigmatized by the conviction.
Accordingly, a society that values the good name and freedom of every individual should not condemn a man for
commission of a crime when there is reasonable doubt about his guilt.1 Due process commands that no man shall lose his
liberty unless the Government has borne the burden of convincing the factfinder of his guilt. To this end, the reasonable-
doubt standard is indispensable, for it ‘impresses on the trier of fact the necessity of reaching certitude of the facts in
issue.2

Moreover, use of the reasonable-doubt standard is indispensable to command the respect and confidence of the
community in applications of criminal law. It is critical that the moral force of criminal law not be diluted by a standard of
proof that leaves people in doubt whether innocent men are being condemned. It is also important in our free society that
every individual going about his ordinary affairs has confidence that his government cannot adjudge him guilty of a criminal
offense without convincing a proper factfinder of his guilt with utmost certainty.3

Lest there remain any doubt about the constitutional stature of the reasonable-doubt standard, we explicitly hold that the
Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact
necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.4

On appeal is the Decision5 of the Court of Appeals (CA) promulgated on April 24, 2006 affirming in toto the Decision6 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 103 finding appellant Roldan Morales y Midarasa guilty of the crimes of
possession and sale of dangerous drugs.

Factual Antecedents

Appellant was charged in two separate Informations before the RTC with possession and sale of methylamphetamine
hydrochloride (shabu), to wit:

Criminal Case No. Q-03-114256

That on or about the 2nd day of January, 2003 in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused not being authorized by law to
possess or use any dangerous drug, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in her/his/their possession
and control, zero point zero three (0.03) grams of methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.

CONTRARY TO LAW.7

Criminal Case No. Q-03-114257

That on or about the 2nd day of January, 2003, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, not being authorized by law
to sell, dispense, deliver, transport or distribute any dangerous drug, did, then and there, willfully and unlawfully sell,
dispense, deliver, transport, distribute or act as broker in the said transaction, zero point zero three (0.03) gram of
methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.

CONTRARY TO LAW.8
Upon arraignment, appellant, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty to both charges read in Filipino, a language known
and understood by him.9 On motion of the City Prosecutor, the cases were consolidated for joint trial.10 Trial on the merits
ensued thereafter.

The testimonies of PO1 Eduardo Roy (PO1 Roy) and PO3 Armando Rivera (PO3 Rivera) were presented by the
prosecution:

PO1 Roy testified that on January 2, 2003, at about 2:00 p.m., he was on duty at Police Station 9 where he made a pre-
operation report on the buy-bust operation to be conducted on the herein appellant that same afternoon.11 He then
proceeded to Brgy. San Vicente, Quezon City with PO3 Rivera for the operation.12 At a point near Jollibee, they met the
informant who, upon seeing the subject appellant, went with him to meet PO1 Roy.13 After being introduced to the appellant
as a buyer of "piso" worth of "shabu", appellant immediately produced a sachet containing the alleged drug. When
appellant received the marked money amounting to ₱100.00,14 PO1 Roy raised his left hand, at which point his back-up
officer, PO3 Rivera appeared and immediately arrested the appellant.15 The appellant was immediately brought to the
Police Station for investigation, while the two sachets of "shabu" and aluminum foil discovered on the said appellant were
brought to the Crime Laboratory for examination.16

PO3 Rivera testified that he was the back-up officer of PO1 Roy, the poseur-buyer in the buy-bust operation conducted
against the appellant in the afternoon of January 2, 2003.17 In preparation for the said operation, he conducted a short
briefing and recorded the particulars of the operation they were about to carry out: the place of the operation which is at the
parking lot of Jollibee Philcoa; the identification of the suspect as the appellant; and the preparation of the buy-bust money
to be used.18 With respect to the buy-bust money, he prepared one ₱50.00 bill, two ₱20.00 bills and one ₱10.00 bill, by
making the appropriate marking on the top portion of each bill and recording their respective serial numbers.19 Later that
afternoon, police officers proceeded to the meeting place. PO3 Rivera positioned himself in a parked vehicle20 about 20
meters from the situs of the transaction.21 He thus had a clear view of the appellant with the informant and PO1
Roy.22 Shortly thereafter, he saw PO1 Roy make the pre-arranged signal at which point he approached the appellant to
arrest him.23 He recovered the marked money from the appellant and proceeded to frisk the latter.24 Upon conducting the
body search, he found another sachet which he suspected to be "shabu" and two aluminum foils. Appellant was brought to
the Police Station for detention, while the items seized from him were brought to the Crime Laboratory for
examination.25 The two sachets tested positive for Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu) while the aluminum foil
sheets tested negative of the aforementioned substance.26

Both PO1 Roy and PO3 Rivera identified a Joint Affidavit dated January 3, 2003 during their respective testimonies, which
they acknowledged to have executed subsequent to the buy-bust operation.27

The defense presented the testimonies of Joaquin Artemio Marfori, Arsenia Morales and the appellant:

Appellant denied the charges against him.28 He testified that he is a resident of Dolores, Quezon where he worked in a
fertilizer store.29 He was in Manila at that time to bring money for his parents who live at Cruz na Ligas.30 As his mother did
not give him enough money for his fare back to Quezon, he sidelined as a parking attendant at Philcoa in order to earn the
balance of his bus fare.31 However, sometime that afternoon, two male persons in civilian clothes suddenly approached
him and his co-attendant, identified themselves as policemen and poked their guns at them.32 The said policemen
handcuffed them and proceeded to frisk them.33 He averred that nothing was found on him and yet the policemen still
brought him to the police station.34 He denied the allegation made against him that he sold, much less possessed, the
"shabu" subject of this action.35 He further testified that in the tricycle on the way to the police station, PO1 Roy took out a
plastic of "shabu" from his (PO1 Roy’s) pocket and once at the station, the said policeman showed it to the desk officer and
claimed that the plastic sachet was found on the appellant.36

He likewise denied having received the buy-bust money and claimed that the ₱50.00 bill and the two ₱20.00 bills, totaling
₱90.00, were given to him by his mother for his bus fare to Quezon.37 He disclaimed any knowledge of the ₱10.00 bill.38 He
further testified that he personally knew PO3 Rivera prior to the arrest, since his first cousin and PO3 Rivera had a quarrel
which he had no involvement whatsoever.39 He noted the fact that it was PO3 Rivera who arrested him.40
Witness Joaquin Artemio Marfori testified that he is the employer of the appellant in his agricultural and poultry supply store
in Babayan, Calamba, Laguna.41 He further stated that he allowed the appellant to go on vacation on December 12, 2003
to celebrate the New Year with his family in Manila.42 However, the appellant failed to report back for work at the start of
the New Year.43

Finally, witness Arsenia Morales (Arsenia) corroborated the testimony of her son that she gave him ₱90.00, consisting of
one ₱50.00 bill and two ₱20.00 bills as bus fare back to Laguna where he worked.44 Thinking that her son was already on
his way home, she was surprised to receive a call from her daughter informing her that her son, the appellant, was arrested
for possession and sale of "shabu".45

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

On April 29, 2004, the trial court rendered a Decision finding the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal
possession and illegal sale of dangerous drugs. The dispositive portion of the said Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing disquisition, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused ROLDAN MORALES
y Midarasa, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt in Criminal Case No. Q-03-114257 for violation of Section 5, Article II, R.A.
[No.] 9165 for drug pushing [of] zero point zero three (0.03) gram of white crystalline substance containing
Methylamphetamine hydrochloride and is hereby sentenced to suffer Life Imprisonment and to pay a fine of Five Hundred
Thousand (₱500,000.00) pesos.

The Court likewise finds the accused ROLDAN MORALES y Midarasa GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt in Criminal Case
No. Q-03-114256 for violation of Section 11, Article II, R.A. [No.] 9165 for drug possession x x x of zero point zero three
(0.03) gram of white crystalline substance containing Methylamphetamine hydrochloride and is hereby sentenced to suffer
an imprisonment term of Twelve (12) Years and One (1) Month to Thirteen (13) Years and to pay a fine of Three Hundred
Fifty Thousand (₱350,000.00) Pesos.

The sachets of shabu subject of these cases are ordered transmitted to the PDEA thru Dangerous Drugs Board for proper
disposition after this decision becomes final.

SO ORDERED.46

The trial court held that the prosecution witnesses positively identified the appellant as the person who possessed and sold
to the poseur-buyer the "shabu" subject of this case, during the buy-bust operation conducted in the afternoon of January
2, 2003.47 The trial court found that from the evidence presented, the prosecution was able to sufficiently establish the
following: (1) the fact of the buy-bust operation conducted in the afternoon of January 2, 2003 at the parking lot of Jollibee
Philcoa which led to the arrest of the appellant; and (2) the corpus delicti, through the presentation in court of the two
sachets of white substance which was confirmed by the Chemistry Report to be methylamphetamine hydrochloride
("shabu"), found in the possession of and sold by the appellant.48

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The CA affirmed the Decision of the trial court in toto. It found that contrary to the allegations of the appellant, there was no
instigation that took place.49 Rather, a buy-bust operation was employed by the police officers to apprehend the appellant
while in the act of unlawfully selling drugs.50 The appellate court further held that what is material in a prosecution for illegal
sale of prohibited drugs is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of
the corpus delicti.51 Stripped of non-essentials, the CA summarized the antecedent facts of the case as follows:

PO1 Eduardo Roy prepared a pre-arranged report on the buy-bust operation to be conducted against appellant at
Barangay San Vicente, Quezon City upon an informant’s tip that appellant was selling "shabu" in the said area. On the
other hand, PO3 Armando Ragundiaz Rivera recorded the briefing, summary, identification of appellant and the buy-bust
money to be used in the operation consisting of one (1) fifty peso bill, two (2) twenty peso bill[s] and one (1) ten peso bill.
PO1 Roy who acted as the poseur-buyer and PO3 Rivera as his back-up proceeded to University Avenue corner
Commonwealth Avenue, Barangay San Vicente, Quezon City together with the informant.

PO1 Roy and the informant met appellant at the parking lot of Jollibee restaurant while PO3 Rivera positioned himself at
the side of a parked car where he can easily have a clear view of the three. After PO1 Roy was introduced by the informant
to the appellant as a buyer of "shabu", the latter immediately produced a sachet containing the said prohibited drugs and
handed the same to him. PO1 Roy raised his left hand as the pre-arranged signal that the transaction was consummated.
Thereafter, PO3 Rivera went to the area, introduced himself as a police officer and frisked appellant from whom he
recovered the marked money and a matchbox, where the suspected "shabu" was placed, and two (2) aluminum foils. They
informed appellant of his constitutional rights and brought him to the police station while the two (2) small transparent heat
sealed sachets containing the suspected prohibited drugs and paraphernalia were turned over to the crime laboratory for
examination, and which [was] later, found to be positive for methylamphetamine hydrochloride (commonly known as
"shabu").52

Thence, the CA rendered judgment to wit:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 103 dated
April 29, 2004 is hereby AFFIRMED IN TOTO.

SO ORDERED.53

Appellant elevated the case to this Court via Notice of Appeal.54 In our Resolution dated July 12, 2006, we resolved to
accept the case and required the parties to submit their respective supplemental briefs simultaneously, if they so desire,
within 30 days from notice.55 Both parties adopted their respective appellant’s and appellee’s briefs, instead of filing
supplemental briefs.56

Our Ruling

Appellant claims that he should not be convicted of the offenses charged since his guilt has not been proven by the
prosecution beyond reasonable doubt.57 In support of his contention, appellant alleges that the arresting officers did not
even place the proper markings on the alleged shabu and paraphernalia at the time and place of the alleged buy-bust
operation.58 Appellant hence posits that this created serious doubt as to the items and actual quantity of shabu recovered,
if at all.59

The Office of the Solicitor General, on the other hand, insists that the direct testimony of the two arresting officers
sufficiently established the elements of illegal sale and possession of shabu.60

At the outset, we draw attention to the unique nature of an appeal in a criminal case: the appeal throws the whole case
open for review and it is the duty of the appellate court to correct, cite and appreciate errors in the appealed judgment
whether they are assigned or unassigned.61 On the basis of such review, we find the present appeal meritorious.

Prevailing jurisprudence uniformly hold that the trial court’s findings of fact, especially when affirmed by the CA, are, as a
general rule, entitled to great weight and will not be disturbed on appeal.62 However, this rule admits of exceptions and
does not apply where facts of weight and substance with direct and material bearing on the final outcome of the case have
been overlooked, misapprehended or misapplied.63 After due consideration of the records of this case, evidence presented
and relevant law and jurisprudence, we hold that this case falls under the exception.

In actions involving the illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the following elements must first be established: (1) proof that the
transaction or sale took place and (2) the presentation in court of the corpus delicti or the illicit drug as evidence.64
On the other hand, in prosecutions for illegal possession of a dangerous drug, it must be shown that (1) the accused was in
possession of an item or an object identified to be a prohibited or regulated drug, (2) such possession is not authorized by
law, and (3) the accused was freely and consciously aware of being in possession of the drug.65Similarly, in this case, the
evidence of the corpus delicti must be established beyond reasonable doubt.66

With respect to corpus delicti, Section 21 of Republic Act (RA) No. 9165 provides:

Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of
Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory
Equipment. – The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources or dangerous drugs,
controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so
confiscated, seized and or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:

(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation,
physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the persons/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of
Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy
thereof; x x x (Emphasis supplied)

In People v. Partoza,67 we held that the identity of the corpus delicti was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. In the said
case, the apprehending policeman did not mark the seized drugs after he arrested the appellant in the latter’s presence.
Neither did he make an inventory and take a photograph of the confiscated items in the presence of the appellant. There
was no representative from the media and the Department of Justice, or any elected public official who participated in the
operation and who were supposed to sign an inventory of seized items and be given copies thereof. Hence, we held in the
afore-cited case that there was no compliance with the statutory safeguards. In addition, while the apprehending policeman
admitted to have in his possession the shabu from the time the appellant was apprehended at the crime scene to the police
station, records are bereft of proof on how the seized items were handled from the time they left the hands of the said
police officer.

We declared in People v. Orteza,68 that the failure to comply with Paragraph 1, Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 implied a
concomitant failure on the part of the prosecution to establish the identity of the corpus delicti:

In People v. Laxa, where the buy-bust team failed to mark the confiscated marijuana immediately after the apprehension of
the accused, the Court held that the deviation from the standard procedure in anti-narcotics operations produced doubts as
to the origins of the marijuana. Consequently, the Court concluded that the prosecution failed to establish the identity of
the corpus delicti.

The Court made a similar ruling in People v. Kimura, where the Narcom operatives failed to place markings on the seized
marijuana at the time the accused was arrested and to observe the procedure and take custody of the drug.

More recently, in Zarraga v. People, the Court held that the material inconsistencies with regard to when and where the
markings on the shabu were made and the lack of inventory on the seized drugs created reasonable doubt as to the
identity of the corpus delicti. The Court thus acquitted the accused due to the prosecution's failure to indubitably show the
identity of the shabu.

Likewise, in People v. Obmiranis,69 we acquitted the appellant due to flaws in the conduct of the post-seizure custody of the
dangerous drug allegedly recovered from the appellant, together with the failure of the key persons who handled the same
to testify on the whereabouts of the exhibit before it was offered in evidence in court.

In the instant case, it is indisputable that the procedures for the custody and disposition of confiscated dangerous drugs, as
mandated in Section 21 of RA 9165, were not observed. The records utterly failed to show that the buy-bust team complied
with these procedures despite their mandatory nature as indicated by the use of "shall" in the directives of the law. The
procedural lapse is plainly evident from the testimonies of the two police officers presented by the prosecution, namely:
PO1 Roy and PO3 Rivera.

PO1 Roy, in his testimony, failed to concretely identify the items seized from the appellant. Moreover, he confirmed that
they did not make a list of the items seized. The patent lack of adherence to the procedural mandate of RA 9165 is
manifest in his testimony, to wit:

Fiscal Jurado

x x x You mentioned that you gave the pre-arranged signal, what is that?

Witness

A- Raising my left hand.

Q- And what happened next?

A- My back up PO3 Rivera came.

Q- What [did] your back up do when you raised your hand?

A- He arrested Morales.

Q- What were you doing when he arrested Morales?

A- I put the informant away from the scene.

Q- And what happened next after that?

A- We brought him to the police station.

Q- How about the shabu, what did you do with it?

A- We brought it to the crime lab.

Q- How did you send it to crime lab?

A- Shabu and paraphernalia recovered by my companion from the suspect.

Q- How many items were sent to the crime lab?

A- 2 shabu and paraphernalia.

Q- What are the paraphernalia?

A- Foil, sir.

Q- How many foil?

A- I cannot recall.
Q- What happened to the accused in the police station?

A- He was investigated.

Q- Do you know the accused?

A- Yes, sir.

Q- What is his name?

A- Roldan Morales.

xxxx

Fiscal Jurado

Q- If the said sachet and paraphernalia will be shown to you, how would you be able to identify the said items?

Witness

A- I could not recall "pare-pareho yung shabu"

Atty. Mosing

I will object because that would be leading on the part of the prosecution because he could not identify on what shabu.

Court

That question is overruled.

Fiscal Jurado

I am showing to you an item, would you be able to identify?

Court

Fiscal showing several shabu.

WITNESS

A- This one.

Fiscal Jurado

Q- There is another plastic sachet?

Witness

A- Recovered.
Q- How about these two?

A- I was not the one who confiscated that.

Q- What happened to the said item submitted to the crime lab?

A- Positive, sir.

xxxx

Fiscal Jurado

xxxx

Q- How about the specimen forwarded to the crime lab?

Witness

A- My companion brought that.

Q- What was your participation in the case?

A- Poseur buyer.

xxxx

Atty. Mosing

xxxx

Q- After the arrest you brought the suspect and the items to the station?

A- Yes, sir.

Q- Did you not make a list of items you have confiscated in this case?

A- No, we turned it over to the investigator.

Q- You have presented the buy bust money a while ago, was that buy bust money suppose to be turned over to the
investigator?

A- No, inquest. Upon request, I was the one who received it.70 (Emphasis supplied)

The testimony of the other arresting officer, PO3 Rivera further confirms the failure of the buy-bust team to observe the
procedure mandated under Section 21 of RA 9165:

Court

Q- Where did you position yourself?

Witness

A- Parked vehicle.

Fiscal Jurado

Q- What did you notice?

Witness

A- The confidential informant introduced our poseur buyer to the suspect and after a few conversation I waited and I saw
the pre-arranged signal. And when he raised his left hand that is the signal that the transaction is consummated.

Q- After he made that signal, what did you do?

A- I rushed to the area and arrest[ed] the suspect.

Q- Who was the person you took x x x custody [of]?

A- Roldan Morales

Q- And what did you do with him?

A- Because he ha[d] a marked money I got hold of it and arrest[ed] him.

Q- And what did you do with him?

A- I frisked him.

Q- And what was the result of your frisking?

A- A box of match which I was able to recover [containing] another suspected shabu.

Q- Where did you find that on his body?

A- Front [pocket of] pants.

Q- How about the match?

A- The same.

Q- What else did you find?

A- Aluminum foil.

Q- And after you recovered that evidence, what did you do with the accused?

A- We informed him of his constitutional rights and brought him to the station.
Q- How about the items you recovered?

A- Delivered it to the crime lab for examination.

Q- What else did you deliver [to] the crime lab?

A- Request, sir.71 (Emphasis supplied)

Other than PO1 Roy and PO3 Rivera, the prosecution did not present any other witnesses. Hence, the investigator,
referred to by PO1 Roy in his testimony as the one who took delivery of the seized items, was not identified nor was he
presented in court. More importantly, the testifying police officers did not state that they marked the seized drugs
immediately after they arrested the appellant and in the latter’s presence. Neither did they make an inventory and take a
photograph of the confiscated items in the presence of the appellant. There was likewise no mention of any representative
from the media and the Department of Justice, or any elected public official who participated in the operation and who were
supposed to sign an inventory of seized items and be given copies thereof. None of these statutory safeguards were
observed.

Even PO1 Roy, the poseur-buyer, was not certain as to the identity of the confiscated shabu, to wit:

Fiscal Jurado:

Q- If the said sachet and paraphernalia will be shown to you, how would you be able to identify the said items?

Witness

A- I could not recall "pare-pareho yung shabu".72

The procedural lapses in the handling and identification of the seized items

collectively raise doubts as to whether the items presented in court were the exact same items that were confiscated from
appellant when he was apprehended.

While this Court recognizes that non-compliance by the buy-bust team with Section 21 of RA 9165 is not fatal as long as
there is a justifiable ground therefor, for and as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the siezed items are
properly preserved by the apprehending team,73 these conditions were not met in the case at bar. No explanation was
offered by the testifying police officers for their failure to observe the rule. In this respect, we cannot fault the apprehending
policemen either, as PO1 Roy admitted that he was not a PDEA operative74 and the other witness, PO3 Rivera, testified
that he was not aware of the procedure involved in the conduct of anti-drug operations by the PNP.75 In fine, there is
serious doubt whether the drug presented in court was the same drug recovered from the appellant. Consequently, the
prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt the identity of the corpus delicti. 1avvphi1

Furthermore, the evidence presented by the prosecution failed to reveal the identity of the person who had custody and
safekeeping of the drugs after its examination and pending presentation in court. Thus, the prosecution likewise failed to
establish the chain of custody which is fatal to its cause.1avv phi 1

In fine, the identity of the corpus delicti in this case was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. There was likewise a break
in the chain of custody which proves fatal to the prosecution’s case. Thus, since the prosecution has failed to establish the
element of corpus delicti with the prescribed degree of proof required for successful prosecution of both possession and
sale of prohibited drugs, we resolve to ACQUIT Roldan Morales y Midarasa.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated April 24, 2006 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No.
00037 affirming the judgment of conviction of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 103 dated April 29, 2004 is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant Roldan Morales y Midarasa is ACQUITTED based on reasonable doubt,
and is ordered to be immediately RELEASED from detention, unless he is confined for any other lawful cause.

The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is DIRECTED to IMPLEMENT this Decision and to report to this Court the action
taken hereon within five days from receipt.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 170289 April 8, 2010

ROSIE QUIDET, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Conspiracy must be proved as clearly and convincingly as the commission of the offense itself for it is a facile device by
which an accused may be ensnared and kept within the penal fold. In case of reasonable doubt as to its existence, the
balance tips in favor of the milder form of criminal liability as what is at stake is the accused’s liberty. We apply these
principles in this case.

This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks to reverse and set aside the Court of Appeal’s (CA) July 22, 2005 Decision1 in
CA-G.R. CR No. 23351 which affirmed with modifications the March 11, 1999 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 20 in Criminal Case Nos. 92-079 and 92-080.

Factual Antecedents

On January 13, 1992, petitioner Rosie Quidet (petitioner), Feliciano Taban, Jr. (Taban), and Aurelio Tubo (Tubo) were
charged with homicide in Criminal Case No. 92-079 for the death of Jimmy Tagarda (Jimmy) allegedly committed as
follows:

That on or about the 19th day of October 1991 at 8:00 o’clock in the evening, more or less, at Barangay Looc, Salay,
Misamis Oriental, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused Feliciano
Taban, Jr., Rosie Quidet and Aurelio Tubo, with intent to kill, conspiring, confederating, x x x and [sic] helping one another,
taking advantage of the darkness of the night, in order to facilitate the commission of the offense with the use of sharp
pointed x x x instruments which the accused conveniently provided themselves did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault, stab one Jimmy Tagarda thus the victim sustained several wounds in different parts of his body
and as a consequence of which the victim died immediately thereafter.

CONTRARY TO and in violation of Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code.3

On even date, the aforesaid accused were charged with frustrated homicide in Criminal Case No. 92-080 for the stab
wounds sustained by Jimmy’s cousin, Andrew Tagarda (Andrew), arising from the same incident, viz:

That on or about the 19th day of October 1991 at 8:00 o’clock in the evening, more or less, at Barangay Looc, Salay,
Misamis Oriental, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to
kill, and with the use of sharp pointed x x x instrument, and x x x conspiring, confederating and helping one another, and
taking advantage of the night [in] order to facilitate the commission of the offense, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously attack, assault, and stab one Andrew Tagarda thereby hitting his left chest and nose, the accused having
performed all the acts of execution which would produce the crime of Homicide as a consequence except for reason or
cause independent of the will of the accused that is, the stab was deflected by the victim.

CONTRARY TO and in violation of Article 249 in relation to Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code.4

Upon arraignment, all the accused entered a plea of not guilty in Criminal Case No. 92-080 (frustrated homicide).
Meanwhile, in Criminal Case No. 92-079 (homicide), Taban entered a voluntary plea of guilt while petitioner and Tubo
maintained their innocence. Accordingly, on June 24, 1992, the trial court rendered a partial judgment5sentencing Taban to
imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to twelve (12) years, two (2) months and one
(1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and ordering him to pay the heirs of Jimmy ₱50,000.00 as civil
indemnity.6 Thereafter, joint trial ensued.

Version of the Prosecution

On October 19, 1991, at around 8:00 o’clock in the evening, Jimmy, Andrew, Edwin Balani7 (Balani), and Rolando Mabayo
(Mabayo) visited a friend in Sitio Punta, Looc, Salay, Misamis Oriental. Along the way, they saw Taban, together with
petitioner and Tubo, come out of the house of one Tomas Osep (Osep). Taban suddenly stabbed Andrew on the chest with
a knife. Andrew retaliated by boxing Taban. Jimmy tried to pacify Andrew and Taban but the latter stabbed him in the
abdomen. Taban then immediately fled.

Meanwhile, after Jimmy fell down, Tubo threw a drinking glass at Andrew’s face while petitioner boxed Andrew’s jaw. Tubo
stabbed Jimmy who was then lying face down on the ground twice on the back with an ice pick after which he fled.
Petitioner then boxed Jimmy’s mouth. At this juncture, Balani rushed to Jimmy’s aid and boxed petitioner who retaliated by
punching Balani. Thereafter, petitioner left the scene. Mabayo was unable to help Jimmy or

Andrew because he was shocked by the incident.

After the incident, Jimmy was brought to the clinic of Dr. Precioso Tacandang (Dr. Tacandang). Jimmy was then in critical
condition, thus, Dr. Tacandang advised the relatives of Jimmy to bring him to the Northern Mindanao Regional Training
Hospital. Upon arrival at the aforesaid hospital, Jimmy was declared dead by the attending physician, Dr. Cedric Dael (Dr.
Dael). Jimmy sustained a vital or mortal stab wound at the epigastric area four centimeters below the cyphoid process and
another stab wound on the left lumbar. Andrew, who sustained minor injuries, was treated by Dr. Dael.

Version of the Defense

On the night of the stabbing incident, Taban, Tubo and petitioner were drinking liquor in the house of Osep. Taban left the
group to urinate on a nearby coconut tree. Outside Osep’s house, he was suddenly boxed by Andrew and kicked by Jimmy
causing him to fall near a fishing boat. There Taban found a fishing knife with which he stabbed Jimmy and Andrew in
order to defend himself. After which, he fled for fear for his life. Meanwhile, petitioner went out to look for Taban. As he was
stepping out of Osep’s house, he was boxed by Balani. Petitioner fought back. Andrew tried to help Balani but petitioner
was able to evade Andrew’s attacks. Instead, petitioner was able to box Andrew. Petitioner then called out to Tubo to come
out and run. When Tubo stepped out of the house, neither Taban nor petitioner was present but he saw a person being
lifted by several people. Upon seeing this, Tubo, likewise, fled for fear for his life.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

On May 16, 1995, the RTC rendered a judgment finding petitioner and Tubo guilty of homicide8 and all three accused
(petitioner, Tubo and Taban) guilty of frustrated homicide, viz:
1) In Criminal Case No. 92-079, accused Rosie Quidet and Aurelio Tubo are hereby sentenced, there being no mitigating
or aggravating circumstances present, to the penalty of EIGHT (8) YEARS AND ONE (1) DAY OF PRISION MAYOR with
its medium period as minimum under the Indeterminate Sentence Law to FOURTEEN (14) YEARS, EIGHT (8) MONTHS
AND ONE (1) DAY OF RECLUSION TEMPORAL in its medium period [as maximum] under the same law.

2) In Criminal Case No. 92-080 for Frustrated Homicide, there being no mitigating or aggravating circumstances present,
this court hereby sentences all the accused [Feliciano Taban, Jr., Rosie Quidet and Aurelio Tubo] in this case to an
Indeterminate Sentence [Law] of FOUR (4) YEARS OF PRISION CORRECCIONAL in its medium period as the minimum
under the Indeterminate Sentence Law to TEN (10) YEARS OF PRISION MAYOR in its medium period as the maximum
under the same law. With costs.

3) To pay jointly and severally the heirs of Jimmy Tagarda in the sum of ₱50,000.00 for Criminal Case No. 92-079;

4) And likewise to pay solidarily the heirs of the victim Andrew Tagarda the sum of ₱10,000.00 for committing the crime of
Frustrated Homicide.9

The period of preventive imprisonment during which the accused were detained pending the trial of these cases shall be
credited in full in favor of all the accused.

SO ORDERED.10

The trial court found that the stabbing of Jimmy and Andrew was previously planned by the accused. The active
participation of all three accused proved conspiracy in the commission of the crimes. Furthermore, the positive
identification of the accused by the prosecution witnesses cannot be offset by the defense of plain denial.

From this judgment, only petitioner appealed to the CA.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

On July 22, 2005, the CA promulgated the assailed Decision, affirming with modifications, the judgment of the RTC, viz:

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The assailed decision is hereby AFFIRMED with
the following modifications: (a) That in Criminal Case No. 92-080 the crime is only Attempted Homicide; and (b) the civil
indemnity in the amount of ten thousand (₱10,000.00) pesos which was awarded to the heirs of Andrew Tagarda be
deleted as the same has not been fully substantiated. No costs.

SO ORDERED.11

In upholding the conviction of the accused for homicide, the CA held that conspiracy was duly established as shown by the
concerted acts of the accused in inflicting mortal wounds on Jimmy. Hence, all of the accused are guilty of homicide for the
death of Jimmy.

The CA, however, disagreed with the trial court’s finding that the accused are liable for frustrated homicide with respect to
the injuries sustained by Andrew. According to the CA, the accused failed to inflict mortal wounds on Andrew because the
latter successfully deflected the attack. Andrew suffered only minor injuries which could have healed within five to seven
days even without medical treatment. The crime committed, therefore, is merely attempted homicide.

The CA also deleted the award of civil indemnity to the heirs of Andrew because the same was not fully substantiated.

Issue
Whether the Decision of the CA finding petitioner to have acted in conspiracy with the other accused (Taban and Tubo) in
the commission of the offenses charged is in accordance with law and/or jurisprudence.12

Petitioner’s Arguments

Petitioner claims that the evidence merely established that: (1) Taban went out of Osep’s store while petitioner and Tubo
remained inside; (2) a commotion took place between Taban and Andrew; (3) after this altercation, petitioner and Tubo
stepped out of Osep’s store; and (4) petitioner’s participation in the incident is limited to boxing Andrew after the latter had
already been stabbed by Taban, and boxing Jimmy’s mouth after the latter had been stabbed by Taban and Tubo in
succession.

Petitioner insists that it cannot be said that he had the same criminal purpose and design as Taban and Tubo. His
participation was not necessary to the completion of the criminal acts because by the time he boxed Andrew and Jimmy,
the stabbing had already taken place. The evidence further established that the stabbing incident was purely accidental
and that the accused had no grudge against the victims. Also, petitioner was unarmed negating his intent to kill.

Petitioner also cites People v. Vistido13 where it was ruled that conspiracy was not established under facts similar to the
present case. In Vistido, the accused was merely convicted of slight physical injuries.

Respondent’s Arguments

Respondent contends that conspiracy was duly established. Petitioner was not merely present during the commission of
the crime but he aided Taban and Tubo by inflicting blows on Andrew and Jimmy after the latter were stabbed. The
simultaneous movement of the accused towards the victims and their successive escape from the crime scene clearly
evince conspiracy. Respondent also stresses that the factual findings of the trial court should be accorded respect for it is
in a better position to evaluate testimonial evidence.

Our Ruling

The petition is partly meritorious.

The existence of conspiracy was not proved beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, petitioner is criminally liable only for his
individual acts.

Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to
commit it.14 The essence of conspiracy is the unity of action and purpose.15 Its elements, like the physical acts constituting
the crime itself, must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. When there is conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all.

Conspiracy can be inferred from and established by the acts of the accused themselves when said acts point to a joint
purpose and design, concerted action and community of interests.16 However, in determining whether conspiracy exists, it
is not sufficient that the attack be joint and simultaneous for simultaneousness does not of itself demonstrate the
concurrence of will or unity of action and purpose which are the bases of the responsibility of the assailants.17 What is
determinative is proof establishing that the accused were animated by one and the same purpose.18

As a general rule, factual findings of the trial court, which is in a better position to evaluate the testimonial evidence, are
accorded respect by this Court. But where the trial court overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or
circumstances of weight and substance which can affect the result of the case, this Court is duty-bound to correct this
palpable error for the right to liberty, which stands second only to life in the hierarchy of constitutional rights, cannot be
lightly taken away. In the instant case, we find that the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that petitioner
conspired with Taban and Tubo in committing the crimes of homicide and attempted homicide.
Both the trial court and the CA ruled that the evidence duly established conspiracy. In particular, the CA noted:

[T]his Court HOLDS that there was conspiracy. x x x

With respect to Criminal Case No. 92-080 (for frustrated homicide), it was revealed that after Andrew’s chest was stabbed
by Taban, Tubo also threw a drinking glass at Andrew’s face while [petitioner] boxed Andrew’s jaws.

From the foregoing facts, it can be inferred that all the accused acted in solidum in trying to inflict injuries to Andrew. Had it
been otherwise, Tubo and [petitioner] would have just left the scene of the crime.

With respect to Criminal Case No. 92-079 (for homicide), it was revealed that after Andrew was stabbed by Taban using a
double-bladed knife, Taban subsequently stabbed Jimmy before fleeing from the crime scene. Moments later, while
Andrew was recovering from fist and glass blows from [petitioner] and Tubo, Tubo [straddled] Jimmy and stabbed him
twice with an icepick before [he] left. [Petitioner], on the other hand, delivered a fist blow to Jimmy’s mouth notwithstanding
the fact that Jimmy was already stabbed by Taban and Tubo.

From the foregoing facts, it can be inferred that all the accused in Criminal Case No. 92-079 confederated and mutually
helped each other to insure the killing of Jimmy Tagarda. Hence, conspiracy was present in the cases at bar.19

We disagree. To determine if petitioner conspired with Taban and Tubo, the focus of the inquiry should necessarily be the
overt acts of petitioner before, during and after the stabbing incident. From this viewpoint, we find several facts of
substance which militate against the finding that petitioner conspired with Taban and Tubo.

First, there is no evidence that petitioner, Taban or Tubo had any grudge or enmity against Jimmy or Andrew. The
prosecution eyewitnesses (Andrew and Balani) as well as the three accused were one in testifying that there was no
misunderstanding between the two groups prior to the stabbing incident. During the testimony of prosecution witness
Balani, the trial court itself grappled with the issue of motive:

COURT: (to the witness)

Q- [W]hen you saw Feliciano Taban and Tubo stabbing Jimmy Tagarda, you mean to tell this court that they were
enemies?

A- No sir.

xxxx

Q- Now, was there any information that you received that the reason why the accused Taban and Tubo stabbed Jimmy
Tagarda and Andrew Tagarda was x x x of some previous misunderstanding?

A- No, I did not know.

Q- Until now, you cannot tell this court the reason why the stabbing took place except the fact that the group of the
accused were having [a] drinking session and your group also had a [prior] drinking session somewhere?

A- Yes, sir.20

Second, the stabbing incident appears to have arisen from a purely accidental encounter between Taban’s and Andrew’s
groups with both having had a drinking session. On direct examination, prosecution witness Andrew testified that Taban,
Tubo and petitioner successively went out of Osep’s house to engage their group. This version of the events made it
appear that the three accused laid in wait to carry out the crimes. However, on cross-examination, Andrew contradicted
himself when he stated that it was only Taban who their group initially saw with a knife outside Osep’s house and who
suddenly stabbed Andrew.1avvphi1 After he was stabbed, Andrew stated that he retaliated by boxing Taban and it was
only then when he (Andrew) saw Tubo and petitioner come out of Osep’s house.21 The records of the preliminary
investigation of this case confirm this latter version of the events when Andrew stated that it was only after the commotion
between him and Taban that Tubo and petitioner stepped out of Osep’s store to help Taban defend himself in the ensuing
fight.22 Significantly, when the defense on cross-examination confronted Andrew with this inconsistency between his
statements on direct examination and the preliminary investigation, Andrew answered that at the time of the incident it was
only Taban that he saw.23 The same observation can be made on the testimony of the prosecution’s second eyewitness,
Balani. While on direct examination Balani claimed that the three accused successively came out of Osep’s house, on
cross-examination, he modified his stance by stating that it was only Taban who initially accosted their group and that
petitioner and Tubo were inside Osep’s house prior to the commotion.24 This material inconsistency in the testimonies of
the prosecution’s eyewitnesses belies the prosecution’s theory that the three accused had a pre-conceived plan to kill
Jimmy and Andrew.

Third, unlike Taban and Tubo, petitioner was unarmed during the incident, thus, negating his intent to kill the victims. By
the prosecution witnesses’ account, petitioner’s participation was limited to boxing Andrew and Jimmy after Taban and
Tubo had stabbed the victims. His acts were neither necessary nor indispensable to the commission of the crimes as they
were done after the stabbing. Thus, petitioner’s act of boxing the victims can be interpreted as a mere show of sympathy to
or camaraderie with his two co-accused.

Taken together, the evidence of the prosecution does not meet the test of moral certainty in order to establish that
petitioner conspired with Taban and Tubo to commit the crimes of homicide and attempted homicide. We agree with
petitioner that this case is similar to People v. Vistido25 and the ruling there applies with equal force here. In Vistido, we
held thus –

There is no question that "a person may be convicted for the criminal act of another where, between them, there has been
conspiracy or unity of purpose and intention in the commission of the crime charged." It is, likewise, settled that "to
establish conspiracy, it is not necessary to prove previous agreement to commit a crime, if there is proof that the
malefactors have acted in consort and in pursuance of the same objective." Nevertheless, "the evidence to prove the same
must be positive and convincing. As a facile device by which an accused may be ensnared and kept within the penal fold,
conspiracy requires conclusive proof if we are to maintain in full strength the substance of the time-honored principle in
criminal law requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt before conviction."

In the case at bar, the evidence for the prosecution does not comply with this basic requirement. To begin with, there is no
evidence that appellant and his co-accused had any enmity or grudge against the deceased. On the contrary, the cousin of
the deceased, Reynaldo Pagtakhan, testified that prior to the stabbing incident, they did not have any quarrel with them. In
the absence of strong motives on their part to kill the deceased, it can not safely be concluded that they conspired to
commit the crime involved herein.

Neither could it be assumed that when the appellant and his co-accused were together drinking wine, at the time and place
of the incident, they were there purposely to wait for and to kill the deceased. For, they could not have surmised
beforehand that between 3:00 and 4:00 o'clock in the morning of November 1, 1969, the deceased and his cousin — after
coming home from their work at the cemetery — would go to the Marzan Restaurant, and thereafter, would take a taxi for
home, and then, alight at M. Francisco Street. The meeting between the appellant's group and the deceased appears to be
purely accidental which negates the existence of conspiracy between the appellant and his co-accused.

Besides, the appellant was unarmed; only his two companions (Pepito Montaño and one John Doe) were armed with
daggers. If he (appellant) had really conspired with his co-accused to kill the deceased, he could have provided himself
with a weapon. But he did not. Again, this fact belies the prosecution's theory that the appellant had entered into a
conspiracy with his co-accused to kill the deceased.
Moreover, although the appellant and his co-accused acted with some degree of simultaneity in attacking the deceased,
nevertheless, the same is insufficient to prove conspiracy. The rule is well-settled that "simultaneousness does not of itself
demonstrate the concurrence of will nor the unity of action and purpose which are the basis of the responsibility of two or
more individuals." To establish common responsibility it is not sufficient that the attack be joint and simultaneous; it is
necessary that the assailants be animated by one and the same purpose. In the case at bar, the appellant Raymundo
Vistido and the accused Pepito Montaño, did not act pursuant to the same objective. Thus, the purpose of the latter was to
kill as shown by the fact that he inflicted a mortal wound below the abdomen of the deceased which caused his death. On
the other hand, the act of the appellant in giving the deceased one fist blow after the latter was stabbed by the accused
Pepito Montaño — an act which is certainly unnecessary and not indispensable for the consummation of the criminal
assault — does not indicate a purpose to kill the deceased, but merely to "show off" or express his sympathy or feeling of
camaraderie with the accused Pepito Montaño. Thus, in People vs. Portugueza, this Court held that:

"Although the appellants are relatives and had acted with some degree of simultaneity in attacking their victim,
nevertheless, this fact alone does not prove conspiracy. (People vs. Caayao, 48 Off. Gaz. 637). On the contrary, from the
nature and gravity of the wounds inflicted on the deceased, it can be said that the appellant and the other defendant did not
act pursuant to the same objective. Florentino Gapole's purpose was to kill the deceased, as shown by the fact that he
inflicted a mortal wound which almost severed the left arm. The injury inflicted by the appellant, merely scratching the
subcutaneous tissues, does not indicate a purpose to kill the victim. It is not enough that appellant had participated in the
assault made by his co-defendant in order to consider him a co-principal in the crime charged. He must have also made
the criminal resolution of his co-accused his own. x x x." and, in People vs. Vicente, this Court likewise held:

"In regard to appellant Ernesto Escorpizo, there seems to be no dispute that he stabbed Soriano several times with a small
knife only after the latter had fallen to the ground seriously wounded, if not already dead. There is no showing that this
accused had knowledge of the criminal intent of Jose Vicente against the deceased. In all likelihood, Escorpizo's act in
stabbing the fallen Soriano with a small knife was not in furtherance of Vicente's aim, which is to kill, but merely to 'show
off' or express his sympathy or feeling of camaraderie with Vicente. x x x."

By and large, the evidence for the prosecution failed to show the existence of conspiracy which, according to the settled
rule, must be shown to exist as clearly and convincingly as the crime itself. In the absence of conspiracy, the liability of the
defendants is separate and individual, each is liable for his own acts, the damage caused thereby, and the consequences
thereof. While the evidence shows that the appellant boxed the deceased, it is, however, silent as to the extent of the
injuries, in which case, the appellant should be held liable only for slight physical injuries.26

We reach the same conclusion here. For failure of the prosecution to prove conspiracy beyond reasonable doubt,
petitioner’s liability is separate and individual. Considering that it was duly established that petitioner boxed Jimmy and
Andrew and absent proof of the extent of the injuries sustained by the latter from these acts, petitioner should only be
made liable for two counts of slight physical injuries. In addition, he should pay ₱5,000.00 as moral damages to the heirs of
Jimmy and another ₱5,000.00 as moral damages to Andrew.27 Actual damages arising from said acts cannot, however, be
awarded for failure to prove the same.

Anent the penalty imposed on Taban and Tubo, in Criminal Case No. 92-080, the CA correctly modified the same. The
crime committed was attempted homicide and not frustrated homicide because the stab wounds that Andrew sustained
were not life-threatening.28 Although Taban and Tubo did not appeal their conviction, this part of the appellate court’s
judgment is favorable to them, thus, they are entitled to a reduction of their prison terms.29 The rule is that an appeal taken
by one or more of several accused shall not affect those who did not appeal except insofar as the judgment of the
appellate court is favorable and applicable to the latter.30

Anent the award of damages for which Taban and Tubo should be made solidarily liable, in Criminal Case No. 92-079, the
trial court properly awarded civil indemnity in the amount of ₱50,000.00 to the heirs of Jimmy. Civil indemnity is
automatically granted to the heirs of the deceased victim without need of further evidence other than the fact of the
commission of the crime.31 In addition, the trial court should have awarded moral damages in the sum of ₱50,000.00 in
consonance with current jurisprudence.32 As to actual damages, the prosecution was able to prove burial-related expenses
with supporting receipt33 only to the extent of ₱5,000.00. In People v. Villanueva,34 we held that when actual damages
proven by receipts during the trial amount to less than ₱25,000.00, the award of temperate damages for ₱25,000.00 is
justified in lieu of actual damages for a lesser amount. We explained that it was anomalous and unfair that

the heirs of the victim who tried but succeeded in proving actual damages amounting to less than ₱25,000.00 would be in a
worse situation than those who might have presented no receipts at all but would be entitled to ₱25,000.00 temperate
damages.35 Accordingly, an award of ₱25,000.00 as temperate damages in lieu of actual damages is proper under the
premises. As to loss of earning capacity, the same cannot be awarded due to lack of proof other than the self-serving
testimony of Jimmy’s mother. In Criminal Case No. 92-080, the CA correctly ruled that Andrew is not entitled to an award of
actual damages for failure to substantiate the same. However, he is entitled to moral damages in the amount of
₱30,000.00 for the pain, trauma and suffering arising from the stabbing incident.36 It may be noted that the afore-discussed
higher indemnities are not favorable to Taban and Tubo who did not appeal, but in line with our ruling in People v.
Pacaña,37 they shall be held solidarily liable therefor since these amounts are not in the form of a penalty.38

Finally, the records indicate that the three accused were placed under preventive imprisonment prior to and during the trial
of this case. This can be surmised from the motion to grant bail filed by petitioner which was subsequently granted39 by the
trial court. It is not clear, however, for how long and under what conditions they were put in preventive imprisonment. The
trial court should, thus, determine the length and conditions of the preventive imprisonment so this may be credited, if
proper, in favor of the accused as provided in Article 2940 of the Revised Penal Code.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The July 22, 2005 Decision of the Court of Appeal’s in CA-G.R. CR
No. 23351 is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:

1) In Criminal Case No. 92-079, Rosie Quidet is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of slight physical injuries and is
meted the sentence of fifteen (15) days of arresto menor. He is ordered to pay the heirs of Jimmy Tagarda ₱5,0000.00 as
moral damages. Feliciano Taban, Jr. and Aurelio Tubo are ordered to solidarily pay the heirs of Jimmy Tagarda ₱50,0000
as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages and ₱25,000.00 as temperate damages.

2) In Criminal Case No. 92-080, Feliciano Taban, Jr. and Aurelio Tubo are found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
attempted homicide and are meted the sentence of four (4) months of arresto mayor in its medium period as minimum to
four (4) years of prision correccional in its medium period as maximum. They are ordered to solidarily pay Andrew Tagarda
₱30,000.00 as moral damages. Rosie Quidet is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of slight physical injuries and is
meted the sentence of fifteen (15) days of arresto menor. He is ordered to pay Andrew Tagrda ₱5,000.00 as moral
damages

3) The period of preventive imprisonment of Feliciano Taban, Jr., Aurelio Tubo and Rosie Quidet shall be credited in their
favor in accordance with Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code.

4) The bail bond of Rosie Quidet is cancelled.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 169519 July 17, 2009

IRENORIO B. BALABA, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES Respondent.

RESOLUTION

CARPIO, J.:
This petition for review1 assails the 15 December 2004 Decision2 and 24 August 2005 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CR No. 27178. In its 15 December 2004 Decision, the Court of Appeals dismissed petitioner Irenorio B.
Balaba’s (Balaba) appeal of the 9 December 2002 Decision4 of the Regional Trial Court of Loay, Bohol, Branch 50 (trial
court), finding him guilty of Malversation of Public Funds. In its 24 August 2005 Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied
Balaba’s motion for reconsideration.

On 18 and 19 October 1993, State Auditors Arlene Mandin and Loila Laga of the Provincial Auditor’s Office conducted an
examination of the cash and accounts of the accountable officers of the Municipality of Guindulman, Bohol. The State
Auditors discovered a cash shortage of ₱56,321.04, unaccounted cash tickets of ₱7,865.30 and an unrecorded check of
₱50,000 payable to Balaba, or a total shortage of ₱114,186.34. Three demand letters were sent to Balaba asking him to
explain the discrepancy in the accounts. Unsatisfied with Balaba’s explanation, Graft Investigation Officer I Miguel P.
Ricamora recommended that an information for Malversation of Public Funds, as defined and penalized under Article 217
of the Revised Penal Code, be filed against Balaba with the Sandiganbayan.5

In an Information6 dated 26 April 1995, the Office of the Special Prosecutor charged Balaba with the crime of Malversation
of Public Funds.7 The Information against Balaba reads as follows:

That on or about October 19, 1993, in the Municipality of Guindulman, Bohol, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused, Assistant Municipal Treasurer of Guindulman, Bohol and accountable public officer for
the funds collected and received by virtue of his position, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate, embezzle and
take away from said funds, the total amount of ₱114,186.34, which he converted to his personal use and benefit, to the
damage and prejudice of the government.

CONTRARY TO LAW.8

During his arraignment on 17 May 1996, Balaba entered a plea of not guilty. Trial soon followed.

On 9 December 2002, the trial court found Balaba guilty. The dispositive portion of the 9 December 2002 Decision reads:

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Court resolves that the prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the
accused. Accordingly, pursuant to law, the Court has no recourse but to sentence the accused, Irenorio B. Balaba, to an
indeterminate sentence of 10 YEARS AND ONE DAY as minimum, to 17 YEARS, 4 MONTHS AND ONE DAY of
Reclusion Temporal as maximum. He shall suffer the penalty of perpetual special disqualification and a fine equal to the
amount of the funds malversed which is ₱114,186.34.

SO ORDERED.9

On 14 January 2003, Balaba filed his Notice of Appeal, where he indicated that he would file his appeal before the Court of
Appeals.10 On 6 August 2003, Balaba filed his Appellant’s Brief.11

The Office of the Solicitor General, instead of filing an Appellee’s Brief, filed a Manifestation and Motion 12 praying for the
dismissal of the appeal for being improper since the Sandiganbayan has exclusive jurisdiction over the appeal.

In its 15 December 2004 Decision, the Court of Appeals dismissed Balaba’s appeal. The Court of Appeals declared that it
had no jurisdiction to act on the appeal because the Sandiganbayan has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over the case.

On 27 January 2005, Balaba filed a Motion for Reconsideration and asked that he be allowed to pursue his appeal before
the proper court, the Sandiganbayan.13 In its 24 August 2005 Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied Balaba’s motion.

On 7 October 2005, Balaba filed his present petition before this Court where he raised the sole issue of whether the Court
of Appeals erred in dismissing his appeal instead of certifying the case to the proper court. Balaba claims that it was due to
inadvertence that the notice of appeal was filed before the Court of Appeals instead of the Sandiganbayan. Balaba adds
that his appeal was dismissed on purely technical grounds. Balaba asks the Court to relax the rules to afford him an
opportunity to correct the error and fully ventilate his appeal on the merits.

The petition has no merit.

Upon Balaba’s conviction by the trial court, his remedy should have been an appeal to the Sandiganbayan. Paragraph 3,
Section 4(c) of Republic Act No. 8249 (RA 8249),14 which further defined the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, reads:

The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final judgments, resolutions or orders of the
regional trial courts whether in the exercise of their own original jurisdiction or of their appellate jurisdiction as herein
provided. (Emphasis ours)

There is nothing in said paragraph which can conceivably justify the filing of Balaba’s appeal before the Court of Appeals
instead of the Sandiganbayan. Clearly, the Court of Appeals is bereft of any jurisdiction to review the judgment Balaba
seeks to appeal.

In Melencion v. Sandiganbayan,15 we ruled:

An error in designating the appellate court is not fatal to the appeal. However, the correction in designating the proper
appellate court should be made within the 15-day period to appeal. Once made within the said period, the designation of
the correct appellate court may be allowed even if the records of the case are forwarded to the Court of Appeals.
Otherwise, the second paragraph of Section 2, Rule 50 of the Rules of court would apply. The second paragraph of
Section 2, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court reads:

"An appeal erroneously taken to the Court of Appeals shall not be transferred to the appropriate court but shall be
dismissed outright." (Emphasis ours) 1avv phi1

In this case, Balaba sought the correction of the error in filing the appeal only after the expiration of the period to appeal.
The trial court promulgated its Decision on 9 December 2002. Balaba filed his notice of appeal on 14 January 2003. The
Court of Appeals issued the Decision declaring its lack of jurisdiction on 15 December 2004. Balaba tried to correct the
error only on 27 January 2005, clearly beyond the 15-day period to appeal from the decision of the trial court. Therefore,
the Court of Appeals did not commit any error when it dismissed Balaba’s appeal because of lack of jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the 15 December 2004 Decision and 24 August 2005 Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 27178.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 177768 July 27, 2009

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.
CHARMEN OLIVO y ALONG, NELSON DANDA y SAMBUTO, and JOEY ZAFRA y REYES, Appellants.

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:

This is an appeal from the Decision1 dated November 30, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA- G.R. CR HC No. 00595
which had affirmed in toto the Decision2 dated August 24, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch
81, finding accused-appellants Charmen Olivo (Olivo), Nelson Danda (Danda), and Joey Zafra (Zafra) guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with homicide, with no aggravating nor mitigating circumstance, and sentencing
them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify, jointly and severally, the heirs of the victim, Mariano
Constantino, ₱65,000 as actual damages, ₱50,000 for the death of the victim, and ₱50,000 as moral damages.

Accused-appellants Olivo, Danda and Zafra were charged in an Information dated November 29, 2000, as follows:

The undersigned accuses CHARMEN OLIVO Y ALONG alias Lipay, NELSON DANDA Y SAMBUTO alias Teng, and
JOEY ZAFRA Y REYES, of the crime of Robbery with Homicide, committed as follows:

That on or about the 21st day of November 2000, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring and
confederating together and helping one another, with intent to gain and by means of force, violence, and intimidation
against persons, to wit: by then and there armed with guns forcibly entered the hardware store of Mariano Constantino [y]
Zoleta located at Eagle Street, Sitio Veterans B, Bgy. Bagong Silangan, this City, then announced that it was [a] HOLD-UP
and ordered Maricel Permejo, storekeeper thereat, at gunpoint to give them the money of said store, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously took, rob and carry away the total amount of P35,000.00 Philippine Currency,
representing the days earnings of said hardware store, that on the occasion of and by reason of the said robbery and in
pursuance of their conspiracy, the said accused with intent to kill, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack, assault and employ personal violence upon the person of one MARIANO CONSTANTINO Y ZOLETA, by then and
there shooting him with a gun hitting him on the trunk and extrem[i]ties, thereby inflicting upon said Mariano Constantino [y]
Zoleta serious and mortal wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of his death, to the damage and prejudice of
the heirs of said Mariano Constantino [y] Zoleta.

CONTRARY TO LAW.3

When arraigned on January 22, 2001, all of the accused-appellants pleaded not guilty.4

The evidence for the prosecution consisted of the oral testimonies of Maricel Permejo, storekeeper of the victim Mariano
Constantino, Pablito Constantino, the victim’s brother, SPO2 Joseph Dino (SPO2 Dino), medico-legal officer Dr. Winston
Tan, and Emelita Constantino, the victim’s wife. The defense, for its part, presented accused-appellants Olivo and Zafra,
Dominica Bernal, who was the landlady of Olivo and Danda, and Rodel de Belen who corroborated Zafra’s testimony.

The prosecution, through the Office of the Solicitor General, narrates its version of the facts as follows:

On November 21, 2000, around 6:30 o’clock in the evening, Maricel [Permejo] was tending the store of the victim, Mariano
Constantino in Bagong Silangan, Quezon City. Suddenly, three (3) armed men entered the store and demanded money.
When Maricel did not accede to the demand, one of the armed men later identified as appellant Nelson Danda kicked her
in the leg while his other companion, appellant Joey Zafra got money from the cash register. When the store owner,
Mariano Constantino, went inside the store and shouted, the third companion, appellant Charmen Olivo poked a gun at
him. Mariano ran towards the back of the house but appellant Olivo nevertheless chased him. Thereafter, Maricel heard
successive shots and saw appellants Danda and Zafra going out of the store while the bloodied body of Mariano was lying
at the stairway of the house. The victim was taken to the hospital where he died upon arrival.

Two days after the incident SPO2 Joseph Dino received an information from the Batasan Police Station that they have
three (3) suspects for drug violations and illegal possession of firearms. He borrowed the suspects for identification by
Maricel. When presented to her, she identified them as the men who staged a hold up and shot the deceased.5

The defense, through the Public Attorney’s Office, summarized its version of facts as follows:

EVIDENCE FOR THE PROSECUTION:

To prove the allegations in the Information, the prosecution presented Maricel [Permejo], Pablito Constantino, SPO2
Joseph Dino, Dr. Winston Tan, and Emelita Constantino.

The evidence for the prosecution tends to establish that while Maricel [Permejo] was tending the store of the late Mariano
Constantino on 21 November 2000, three (3) armed men barged in at around 6:30 o’clock in the evening and ordered her
to bring out the money. When she refused, accused Nelson Danda kicked her leg while accused Joey Zafra proceeded to
get the money amounting to P35,000.00 from the cash register.

Meanwhile, the owner Constantino entered his store and shouted. Accused Charmen Olivo pointed a gun at him.
Constantino ran to the back of the house and accused Olivo chased him. Successive gunshots were subsequently heard.

[Permejo] looked for her employer and found him wounded and bloodied along the stairway of the house. She sought help
from a neighbor and the victim was brought to the Fairview [General] Hospital where he expired.

The cadaver was brought for autopsy to Camp Crame and Dr. Winston Tan, after the procedure, found several gunshot
wounds, the fatal among which was the one sustained on the right chest.

The cadaver was thereafter brought to the Dela Paz Funeral where he stayed for a day and a night. The remains were then
brought to Marinduque for the wake which lasted four (4) days and four (4) nights. Emelita Constantinotestified on the
civil aspect of the case.

SPO2 Joseph Dino, an investigator at Camp Karingal, was designated to handle the case. He went to the place of the
incident and took the statement of Maricel [Permejo]. Two (2) days after, their office received information that the Batasan
Police Station has three (3) suspects for violation of Republic Act (RA) 6425. SPO2 Dino borrowed the suspects and when
he presented them to Permejo, the latter identified them as the same persons who held them up and shot her employer.

EVIDENCE FOR THE DEFENSE:

The defense presented the following witnesses, to wit: Charmen Olivo, Dominica Bernal, Joey Zafra and Rodel de Belen.

The evidence for the defense of accused Charmen Olivo and Nelson Danda shows that at around 6:30 o’clock in the
evening of 21 November 2000, the accused were cleaning the house that they rented from Dominica Bernal on 20
November 2000.

While accused Olivo was fetching water along Barangay Holy Spirit in Payatas, Quezon City on 24 November 2000,
policemen in civilian clothes mauled and arrested him sans a warrant. Together with two (2) others, they were brought to
Station 6 allegedly for violation of R.A. 6425. A woman came and accused Olivo was taken out. The policemen asked her,
"ito ba?" which she answered in the negative. The same question was repeated twice but the answer was not changed.

After a few days, the accused were imprisoned at Camp Karingal. They were asked their names. The same woman arrived
thereat and at a distance of 1 ½ meters, accused Olivo heard the policemen telling the woman "ituro mo na". The woman
then mentioned accused Olivo’s name.6

On August 24, 2004, the RTC rendered a decision convicting accused-appellants of the crime of robbery with homicide.
The dispositive portion of the decision states:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds accused Charmen Olivo y Along, Nelson Danda y Sambuto and Joey
Zafra y Reyes guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicide. There being no mitigating or
aggravating circumstance, each accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and is hereby
ordered to indemnify, jointly and severally, the heirs of the victim in the following amounts: ₱65,000.00 as actual damages,
₱50,000.00 for the death of the victim and ₱50,000.00 as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.7

Accused-appellants Olivo and Danda appealed to the Court of Appeals.

In a Decision dated November 30, 2006, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the RTC’s decision, as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is hereby DISMISSED. The assailed decision is AFFIRMED in
toto.

SO ORDERED.8

Before this Court now, the issues raised by the accused-appellants are the following:

I.

the court a quo gravely erred in convicting the accused-appellants charmen olivo and nelson danda of the crime charged
despite the failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

II.

the court a quo gravely erred in finding that there was conspiracy in the case at bar.

iii.

assuming arguendo that accused-appellants charmen olivo and nelson danda’s culpability was established, the court a
quo gravely erred in convicting them of the complex crime of robbeRy with homicide.9

The accused-appellants argue that in criminal prosecutions, the State has the burden of proving the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt. It has to prove the identity of the accused as the malefactor, as well as the fact of the
commission of the crime for which he is allegedly responsible.10 They argue that it can be gleaned from the records of the
case that the prosecution relied mainly on the testimony of the alleged eyewitness Maricel Permejo, but her testimony
leaves much to be desired.11 They argue that Maricel Permejo did not point to them as the malefactors and she only did so
upon the instruction given in Camp Karingal. They point out that they were invited allegedly for violation of the anti-drugs
law and were appalled to learn that they were charged with a different crime and the alleged witness was coached to
identify them. Evidently, they stress, their guilt has not been proved with the required quantum of evidence. Where the
people’s evidence fails to meet the quantum required to overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence, the
accused is entitled to acquittal regardless of the weakness of his defense of denial and uncorroborated alibi, for it is better
to acquit a guilty man than to unjustly keep in prison one whose guilt has not been proven beyond the required quantum of
evidence.12

The appellants further argue that while the alleged eyewitness claimed she saw the accused-appellant Joey Zafra take the
money from the cash register, she did not see how and who killed Mariano Constantino. She merely claimed that she saw
the accused-appellants armed and chased the deceased outside the store. They conclude that whether or not the
accused-appellants indeed committed homicide on the occasion of the robbery is a matter that has not been proven with
the required moral certainty of guilt.13

On the other hand, the prosecution, through the Office of the Solicitor General, argues that findings of fact of the trial court
are generally upheld on appeal and the accused-appellants are assailing the correctness of the findings of fact of the trial
court by impugning the credibility of the prosecution witness Maricel Permejo.14 The prosecution claims that contrary to the
accused-appellants’ claim that the police officers taught the witness Maricel Permejo to point to them as the perpetrators,
her testimony is straightforward and direct.15
After review, we find that the accused-appellants should be acquitted.

It is settled that when the issue is the evaluation of the testimony of a witness or his credibility, this Court accords the
highest respect and even finality to the findings of the trial court, absent any showing that it committed palpable mistake,
misappreciation of facts or grave abuse of discretion. It is the trial court which has the unique advantage of observing first-
hand the facial expressions, gestures and the tone of voice of a witness while testifying.16

The well-entrenched rule is that findings of the trial court affirmed by the appellate court are accorded high respect, if not
conclusive effect, by this Court, absent clear and convincing evidence that the tribunals ignored, misconstrued or
misapplied facts and circumstances of substances such that, if considered, the same will warrant the modification or
reversal of the outcome of the case.17

Factual findings of trial courts, when substantiated by the evidence on record, command great weight and respect on
appeal, save only when certain material facts and circumstances were overlooked and which, if duly considered, may vary
the outcome of the case.18

In this case, the material fact and circumstance that the lone alleged eyewitness, Maricel Permejo, was not able to identify
the accused-appellants as the perpetrators of the crime, varies the outcome of this case. This circumstance was
established during the direct examination of Olivo and was not rebutted by the prosecution during cross-examination or in
its pleadings. Olivo’s testimony reads as follows:

xxxx

Q: Mr. Witness, when they brought you to Station 6[,] what happened there in Station 6?

A [(Charmen Olivo)]: A woman [(Maricel Permejo)] came in and the police took me out.

Q: After bringing you out[,] what happened when the certain woman arrived?

A: They questioned the woman sir.

Q: What did they ask the woman?

A: They asked the woman, ["ito ba"]? [T]he woman answered, ["he is not the one sir".]

Q: How many times did they ask the woman that question, if they asked more than [once]?

A: Three (3) times sir.

Q: And what was the answer of that woman for the second and third time that they asked her again?

A: Hindi po yan sir.19 (Emphasis supplied.)

xxxx

It was only a few days after, when the accused-appellants were brought to Camp Karingal, that Maricel Permejo was again
asked to identify the accused-appellants. This time, she identified them as the perpetrators of the crime. Olivo’s testimony
reads as follows:

xxxx
Q: After that what happened?

A: The woman gave a negative answer.

After a few days, we were brought to Camp Karingal sir.

Q: When you were brought to Camp Karingal what happened there?

A: Our names were asked sir.

Q: Who took your names?

A: I do not know sir.

Q: What happened after somebody took your names while you were there at Camp Karingal?

A: We were put in prison sir.

Q: What happened after you were brought to the cell?

A: A woman arrived sir.

Q: Are you saying that that woman who arrived was the same woman that you saw there at Station 6?

A: Yes sir.

Q: When she arrived what did you notice that the poli[c]emen were doing while the woman arrived?

A: I saw the poli[c]emen teaching the woman sir.

Q: How do you know that the poli[c]em[e]n [were] te[a]ching the woman?

A: I heard them sir.

Q: How far were you from the police and this woman when you said you overheard them?

A: About one and one half me[t]ers sir.

Q: And what did the policem[e]n [do] when you said the policemen were teaching the woman[?] What did the policem[e]n
tell the woman?

A: The police said ["ituro mo na"].

Q: What did the woman do after the policem[e]n said ["ituro mo na"] did the[y] point at you and your companion?

A: She mentioned my name sir.

Q: What did the woman [do] aside from mentioning your name?
Aside from the woman [giving] your name, [what else] did she do, if she did any?

A: No more sir.20

xxxx

The fact that Permejo was not able to identify accused-appellants as the perpetrators of the crime impinges heavily on the
credibility of prosecution’s evidence. For if, indeed, the accused-appellants were the malefactors of the crime who did not
hide their faces during the robbery, the eyewitness, who had such close, traumatic encounter with them, should
automatically have recalled their faces upon seeing them. It behooves this Court to declare that she was not able to do so
positively.

Having ignored the abovementioned important circumstance, the trial court misconstrued and misapplied facts and
circumstances of the case, warranting the modification or reversal of the outcome of the case. The trial court grievously
erred when it ruled that the lone prosecution eyewitness categorically and positively identified accused-appellants as the
perpetrators of the crime.

Other circumstances tend to prove that the accused-appellants were not the perpetrators of the crime.

One, they were not arrested for the crime of robbery with homicide but were arrested during a buy-bust operation. The
records are bereft as to whether or not the case against them for violation of Republic Act No. 642521prospered.

Two, they were brought to Camp Karingal for dubious reasons. When SPO2 Dino was asked during direct examination
why he was called to investigate the robbery with homicide which occurred in the Batasan area when he was in Camp
Karingal, SPO2 Dino replied that it was standard operating procedure (SOP) that when the case is murder and robbery and
the amount is more than ₱1 million, the case will be handled by the Criminal Investigation Unit (CIU). Apparently realizing
his mistake that the amount taken was only ₱35,000.00 when asked the same question during cross-examination, SPO2
Dino replied that it was SOP that if the case is murder or homicide and if there is no available police investigator for that
police station, then Camp Karingal will be the one to conduct the investigation. SPO2 Dino’s testimony during direct
examination goes:

xxxx

Q: How did you learn of the death of the same person?

A: The case was called at the Batasan Police Station, in our station, and our desk officer told me to handle the case.

Q: By the way, can you tell this court why the case/incident happened in Batasan and you were called to investigate when
in fact you were in Camp Karingal?

A: It was SOP in the [Central Police District (CPD)] that when the case is Murder and Robbery [and the amount] is more
than 1 million, the case is to be handled by the [Criminal Investigation Unit (CIU)].22(Emphasis supplied.)

xxxx

On cross-examination, he replied:

xxxx

Q: Now, Mr. [P]oliceman, would you tell us why you were assigned to conduct the investigation in this case when they have
other police investigator[s] at Batasan Hills, Quezon City?
A: Because that was the standard [operating] procedure that if the case is [murder] or [h]omicide that if there is [no]
available police investigator for that police station, then Camp Karingal will be the one to conduct the investigation.

Q: In your direct examination, I did not remember you tell before this Court that you conduct[ed] the investigation of this
case. Since it involved robbery with [h]omicide, do you know how much was involved in the robbery?

A: If I remember, it was P[h]p 30,000.00 sir.

Q: It was not one (1) million?

A: Yes sir.

Q: By the way, who is the one making the assignment in case of destination of [a] case like this[?]

A: The criminal investigator, sir.

Q: You are referring to Camp [K]aringal or Batasan Hills?

A: Camp Karingal, sir.

Q: You are saying that even if the offense is committed at another place, Camp Karingal will be the one to investigate?

A: Yes sir.

Q: This case was reported to the Batasan Hills Police Station?

A: Yes sir.

Q: And it was not directly reported to Camp Karingal?

A: The Batasan Police Station Desk Officer reported the case to Camp Karingal.

Q: How do you know that?

A: The Desk Officer called the Camp Karingal Office, sir.23 (Emphasis supplied.)

xxxx

The abovementioned testimony of SPO2 Dino makes his credibility doubtful.

Apparently, the accused-appellants were arrested without a warrant during a buy-bust operation on November 24,
2000,24 transferred to Camp Karingal under dubious circumstances, and made to stand in a police line-up and identified by
an eyewitness who failed to identify them three times. These circumstances were ignored by the trial court who gave too
much credence on the positive identification of the accused-appellants by the same eyewitness during direct examination.

Trial courts are mandated not only to look at the direct examination of witnesses but to the totality of evidence before them.
In every case, the court should review, assess and weigh the totality of the evidence presented by the parties. It should not
confine itself to oral testimony during the trial.25
We cannot convict appellants for the special complex crime of robbery with homicide when the evidence relied upon by the
trial court is plainly erroneous and inadequate to prove appellants’ guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Conviction must rest on
nothing less than moral certainty, whether it proceeds from direct or circumstantial evidence.26

In view of the foregoing, acquittal of the accused-appellants is in order.

One final note. The other accused, Joey Zafra, who is identically circumstanced as the other appellants and who was
likewise convicted on the same evidence, does not appear to have perfected an appeal from the trial court’s judgment. The
record does not show the reason therefor.

Be that as it may, the present rule is that an appeal taken by one or more several accused shall not affect those who did
not appeal, except insofar as the judgment of the appellate court is favorable and applicable to the latter.27 Our
pronouncements here with respect to the insufficiency of the prosecution evidence to convict appellants beyond
reasonable doubt are definitely favorable and applicable to accused Joey Zafra. He should not therefore be treated as the
odd man out and should benefit from the acquittal of his co-accused. In fact, under similar conditions and on the same
ratiocination, Section 11(a), Rule 122 of the Rules of Court has justified the extension of our judgment of acquittal to the
co-accused who failed to appeal from the judgment of the trial court which we subsequently reversed.28

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated November 30, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 00595 and the
Decision dated August 24, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 81 are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.
Accused-appellants Charmen Olivo and Nelson Danda are hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged on the ground of
reasonable doubt. Pursuant to Rule 122 of the Rules of Court, their co-accused Joey Zafra is declared entitled also to
ACQUITTAL. Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Director of the New Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa, Rizal, who is
ordered to IMMEDIATELY RELEASE them from confinement unless held for some other legal cause, and to report to this
Court any action taken by him within ten days from notice.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 176015 June 16, 2009

MERCEDITA T. GUASCH, Petitioner,

vs.
ARNALDO DELA CRUZ, Respondent.

DECISION

PUNO, CJ.:

Before us is a Petition for Review1 on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to set aside the Decision2 dated
August 31, 2006 of the Court of Appeals which reversed the Order3 dated September 20, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 50, Manila in Criminal Case No. 02-199357.

On November 10, 2000, respondent Arnaldo dela Cruz (respondent) filed a Complaint-Affidavit4 against petitioner
Mercedita T. Guasch (petitioner) with the City Prosecutor of Manila. Respondent alleged that petitioner was his neighbor
and kumadre. On several occasions, petitioner transacted business with him by exchanging cash for checks of small
amount without interest. On July 26, 1999, petitioner went to his residence requesting him to exchange her check with cash
of ₱3,300,000.00. Initially, he refused. However, petitioner returned the next day and was able to convince him to give her
₱3,300,000.00 in cash in exchange for her Insular Savings Bank Check No. 0032082 dated January 31, 2000 upon her
assurance that she will have the funds and bank deposit to cover the said check by January 2000. On the date of maturity
and upon presentment, however, the check was dishonored for the reason that the account against which it was drawn
was already closed.

On March 2, 2001, the City Prosecutor of Manila issued a Resolution5 recommending that an information for estafa be filed
against petitioner. On February 7, 2002, the City Prosecutor of Manila filed an Information6 for estafa against petitioner.
The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 02-199357 and raffled to Honorable William Simon P. Peralta, Presiding
Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 50, Manila.

After petitioner entered her plea of not guilty and after the prosecution rested its case, petitioner filed a Motion With Leave
To Admit Demurrer to Evidence7 with attached Demurrer to Evidence8 on April 1, 2005.

The trial court issued an Order9 dated June 16, 2005 granting the demurrer to evidence and dismissing the case. The trial
court found that respondent’s assertion of misrepresentation by petitioner that her check will be fully funded on the maturity
date was not supported by the evidence on record. Accordingly, her guilt not having been proven beyond reasonable
doubt, petitioner was acquitted.

On June 28, 2005, respondent received a copy of the said order. On July 14, 2005, respondent filed a Manifestation10 with
attached Motion to Amend Order dated June 16, 200511 (Motion to Amend) to include a finding of civil liability of petitioner.
In the Manifestation, respondent’s counsel justified his failure to file the motion within the reglementary period of 15 days
because all postal offices in Metro Manila were allegedly ordered closed in the afternoon due to the rally staged on Ayala
Avenue.

Meantime, on August 30, 2005, respondent filed a Petition for Certiorari12 with the Court of Appeals praying that the trial
court’s Order dated June 16, 2005 granting the demurrer to evidence be set aside.

The trial court denied respondent’s Motion to Amend in its Order13 dated September 20, 2005 finding that counsel for
respondent was inexcusably negligent; hence, the Order dated June 16, 2005 has become final and executory.
Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration14 but the same was denied by the trial court in its Order15 dated November
7, 2005.

On December 7, 2005, respondent filed a Notice of Appeal16 informing the trial court that he was appealing the Order dated
September 20, 2005 and the Order dated November 7, 2005. The trial court likewise denied the notice of appeal in an
Order17 dated December 13, 2005.

Consequently, on February 13, 2006, respondent filed a Supplemental Petition for Certiorari18 with the Court of Appeals to
set aside the Order dated September 20, 2005, the Order dated November 7, 2005, and the Order dated December 13,
2005.

On August 31, 2006, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed Decision.19 On the issue of whether the issuance of the
Order dated June 16, 2005 granting the demurrer to evidence was made with grave abuse of discretion, the Court of
Appeals ruled in the negative as it found that the trial court did not anchor the acquittal of petitioner on evidence other than
that presented by the prosecution as contended by petitioner. On the issue of whether the denial of respondent’s Motion to
Amend was tainted with grave abuse of discretion, the Court of Appeals ruled in the affirmative. The Court of Appeals
ratiocinated that matters of paramount importance outweigh rules of procedure in this instance. Accordingly, the Court of
Appeals ruled as follows:

WHEREFORE, the assailed order dated September 20, 2005 denying petitioner’s Motion to Amend Order dated 16 [June]
2005 is hereby SET ASIDE. Public respondent is hereby directed to determine and fix the amount due the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration20 arguing that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the trial court
committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied respondent’s Motion to Amend. However, the same was denied by the
Court of Appeals in its Resolution21 dated December 20, 2006.

Hence, this petition.

The lone issue in this case is whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the trial court committed grave abuse of
discretion when it denied respondent’s Motion to Amend.

We affirm the ruling of the Court of Appeals.

Respondent contends that the delay of one day in filing his motion was due to circumstances beyond his control. He
submitted a Certification22 from the Makati Central Post Office stating that it was closed in the afternoon of July 13, 2005
due to the rally along Ayala Avenue per declaration by the City Mayor.

Petitioner, on the one hand, alleges that the denial of respondent’s Motion to Amend was due to the inexcusable
negligence of respondent’s counsel; hence, the trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion. Furthermore, the Order
dated June 16, 2005 granting the demurrer to evidence has become final and executory and the remedy of certiorari
cannot be used as a substitute for a lost appeal.

Respondent’s counsel received a copy of the Order dated June 16, 2005 granting the demurrer to evidence on June 28,
2005. However, he only filed his Motion to Amend on July 14, 2005 which was one day beyond the 15-day reglementary
period to file a motion for reconsideration of final orders of the trial court pursuant to Section 1, Rule 37 of the Rules of
Court.1avv phil

As a general rule, the statutory requirement that when no motion for reconsideration is filed within the reglementary period,
the decision attains finality and becomes executory in due course must be strictly enforced as they are considered
indispensable interdictions against needless delays and for orderly discharge of judicial business. The purposes for such
statutory requirement are twofold: first, to avoid delay in the administration of justice and thus, procedurally, to make
orderly the discharge of judicial business, and, second, to put an end to judicial controversies, at the risk of occasional
errors, which are precisely why courts exist. Controversies cannot drag on indefinitely. The rights and obligations of every
litigant must not hang in suspense for an indefinite period of time.23

However, in exceptional cases, substantial justice and equity considerations warrant the giving of due course to an appeal
by suspending the enforcement of statutory and mandatory rules of procedure.24 Certain elements are considered for the
appeal to be given due course, such as: (1) the existence of special or compelling circumstances, (2) the merits of the
case, (3) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules, (4)
lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, and (5) the other party will not be unduly
prejudiced thereby.25

Several of these elements obtain in the case at bar.

First, there is ostensible merit to respondent’s cause. The records show that petitioner admits her civil obligation to
respondent. In her Kontra-Salaysay,26 petitioner alleged that she owed respondent a total of ₱3,300,000.00 as a result of
their joint lending business whereby petitioner borrows money from respondent with interest and petitioner, in turn, lends
the money to her clients. Respondent did not waive, reserve, nor institute a civil action for the recovery of civil liability. As
correctly observed by the Court of Appeals, respondent’s actual and active participation in the criminal proceedings
through a private prosecutor leaves no doubt with respect to his intentions to press a claim for the unpaid obligation of
petitioner in the same action. Hence, since the civil action is deemed instituted with the criminal action, the trial court was
duty-bound to determine the civil liability of petitioner pursuant to paragraph 2, Section 2, Rule 120 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure which provides:
SECTION 2. Contents of the judgment. —

xxx

In case the judgment is of acquittal, it shall state whether the evidence of the prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt
of the accused or merely failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In either case, the judgment shall determine if
the act or omission from which the civil liability might arise did not exist. (2a)

Second, it cannot be said that petitioner will be unduly prejudiced if respondent’s Motion to Amend for the sole purpose of
including the civil liability of petitioner in the order of acquittal shall be allowed. Foremost, petitioner admits her civil
obligation to respondent. Respondent concededly has an available remedy even if his Motion to Amend was denied, which
is to institute a separate civil action to recover petitioner’s civil liability. However, to require him to pursue this remedy at
this stage will only prolong the litigation between the parties which negates the avowed purpose of the strict enforcement of
reglementary periods to appeal, that is, to put an end to judicial controversies. Not only will that course of action be a waste
of time, but also a waste of the resources of both parties and the court as well. We agree with the following observation
made by the Court of Appeals:

To sustain the denial of the Motion to Amend the Order of June 16, 2005 on the ground that the private respondent was
acquitted and the order of acquittal had already attained its final and executory stage simply because the motion was filed
beyond the time fixed by the rules will necessarily constrained (sic) petitioner to institute a separate civil action which in the
end results in needless clogging of court dockets and unnecessary duplication of litigation with all its attendant loss of time,
effort and money on the part of all concerned. Finally, the amendment of the order of acquittal for the sole purpose of
including therein the civil liability of private complainant will not unduly prejudice her. It bears stressing that private
complainant was the first to agree that the transaction is a loan and she never denied but even admitted her debt or
obligation to herein petitioner.27 (Emphasis supplied)

A review of the records below shows that the evidence to make a determination of petitioner’s civil liability is already at the
disposal of the trial court. For example, the checks covering the amounts owed by petitioner to respondent in the total
amount of ₱3,300,000.00 were already submitted by petitioner to the trial court as Annexes to the Motion to Quash28 that
she filed. Neither can it be said that petitioner’s right to due process shall be violated if her civil liability be determined in the
same case. In Padilla v. Court of Appeals,29 we held:

There appear to be no sound reasons to require a separate civil action to still be filed considering that the facts to be
proved in the civil case have already been established in the criminal proceedings where the accused was acquitted. Due
process has been accorded the accused. He was, in fact, exonerated of the criminal charged. The constitutional
presumption of innocence called for more vigilant efforts on the part of prosecuting attorneys and defense counsel, a
keener awareness by all witnesses of the serious implications of perjury, and a more studied consideration by the judge of
the entire records and of applicable statutes and precedents. To require a separate civil action simply because the accused
was acquitted would mean needless clogging of court dockets and unnecessary duplication of litigation with all its
attendant loss of time, effort, and money on the part of all concerned. (emphasis supplied)

As we ruled in Gayos v. Gayos,30 "it is a cherished rule of procedure that a court should always strive to settle the entire
controversy in a single proceeding leaving no root or branch to bear the seeds of future litigation." Given the circumstances
in this case, we find that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied respondent’s Motion to Amend.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. No pronouncement as to
costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 185202 February 18, 2009

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
FRANCISCO TARUC @ TARUC, Accused-Appellant.

Present:
vs
QUISUMBING, J.,*

CARPIO,**

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,

Acting Chairperson,

CHICO-NAZARIO,

PERALTA, JJ.

Promulgated:

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

RESOLUTION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as amended, assailing the Decision1 of
the Court of Appeals dated 27 February 2008 in CA-G.R. CR H.C. No. 01638 entitled, People of the Philippines v.
Francisco Taruc @ Taruc, which affirmed with modification the Decision dated 29 June 2005 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Bataan, Branch 3, in Criminal Case No. 8010 for murder.

Accused-appellant Francisco Taruc was charged in Criminal Case No. 8010 before the RTC of Bataan, Branch 3, with the
crime of murder in connection with the death of Emelito Sualog.

The Information reads:

That on or about November 8, 1998 at Brgy. Puting Buhangin, Orion, Bataan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack , assault and use personal violence upon Emelito Sualog @ Elmer, by then
and there shooting him with a Celiber (sic) 45 on the different parts of his body, thereby inflicting upon him mortal wounds
which were the direct and immediate cause of his death, thereafter, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the said
victim.2

Upon arraignment on 25 April 2005, accused, duly assisted by a lawyer from the Public Attorney’s Office (PAO),3pleaded
not guilty to the crime charged.

After trial on the merits, the RTC on 29 June 2005 rendered a Decision4 convicting the accused, the decretal portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, accused FRANCISCO TARUC is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as principal by direct
participation pf the crime of MURDER, defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, and with the
attending aggravating circumstance of treachery, is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of DEATH.

Accused Francisco Taruc is likewise ordered to pay the heirs of the victim Emelito Saulog the amounts of ₱49,225.00 in
actual damages, ₱50,000.00 in civil indemnity and ₱30,000.00 in moral damages.

Issue warrant of arrest against accused Francisco Taruc that he may serve the sentence imposed against him.5

The case was brought to the Court of Appeals for automatic review pursuant to A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC6 where it was
docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 01638.

On 13 January 2006, accused-appellant, through the PAO, filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File Appellant’s Brief.7

Considering that the Notice to File Brief addressed to accused-appellant was returned to the appellate court with postal
notation "moved out," the Court of Appeals directed accused-appellant’s counsel to furnish it with the present and complete
address of his client within five days from notice.

In compliance, the PAO lawyer concerned informed8 the Court of Appeals that accused-appellant escaped from prison on
23 August 2002. Said PAO lawyer claimed that he had no means of knowing the current whereabouts of the accused-
appellant. Thereupon, the PAO lawyer asked the Court of Appeals to direct the Warden of the Provincial Jail in Balanga,
Bataan, to file a certification as to the accused-appellant’s escape.

On 20 February 2006, the Court of Appeals required9 the Warden of the Bataan Provincial Jail to comment on the afore-
stated information relayed by the PAO lawyer.

On 6 March 2006, Ropadolfo Fabros Torcuato, Sr., Officer-in-Charge (OIC), Warden of the Bataan Provincial Jail,
conveyed10 to the appellate court that accused-appellant was indeed committed to said jail on 10 November 2000 but
escaped at about 11:00 p.m. on 23 August 2002.

On 23 March 2006, notwithstanding the escape of accused-appellant from prison, the Court of Appeals granted PAO’s
Motion for Extension of Time to File Appellant’s Brief, in view of the ruling of the Supreme Court in People v.
Flores,11 making the review of death penalty cases mandatory. The period of extension granted had lapsed without the
accused-appellant filing his brief; thus, the Court of Appeals required the PAO to show cause why the latter should not be
held in contempt for failing to file the same.12

The Court of Appeals found the explanation valid, and accepted the briefs of both the appellant and the appellee, and
considered the case submitted for decision.

On 27 February 2008, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision affirming with modification the Decision of the RTC, the
dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 3, City of Balanga, Bataan in Criminal Case No. 8010 is
AFIRMED WITH MODIFICATIONS. The accused-appellant Francisco Taruc, is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
murder qualified by treachery, defined in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659. In
view of R.A. No. 9346, the modification of the penalty imposed by the trial court from death to reclusion perpetua is
ordered.

The accused-appellant Francisco Taruc is likewise ordered to pay the heirs of the victim, Emelito Sualog, Fifty Thousand
Pesos (₱50,000.00) as civil indemnity ex delicto; Forty-Nine Thousand Two Hundred Fifty Five (₱49,255.00) as actual
damages; Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00) as moral damages and Twenty-Five Thousand Pesos (₱25,000.00) as
exemplary damages. Costs against the accused-appellant.

On 13 March 2008, accused-appellant, still represented by the PAO, filed a Notice of Appeal13 stating that he was
appealing the Decision of the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court on questions of law and fact. And on 29 April 2008,
the Court of Appeals gave due course to accused-appellant’s appeal and directed its Records Division to forward the rollo
and records of the case to the Supreme Court.14

Hence, this Petition.

As may be gleaned from the records, before the prosecution witness Randy Espina could be cross-examined,15accused-
appellant escaped from the Bataan Provincial Jail on 23 August 2002. Thus, the RTC considered the act of the accused as
a waiver to cross-examine said witness. Thereafter, the trial court promulgated a judgment of conviction while accused-
appellant was at large. He remains at large even while his counsel continues to file various pleadings on his behalf before
the RTC, the Court of Appeals, and this Court.

Given that the accused-appellant escaped from jail and eluded arrest until the present, the issue of whether he has lost his
right to appeal his conviction inexorably ensues.

An accused is required to be present before the trial court at the promulgation of the judgment in a criminal case. If the
accused fails to appear before the trial court, promulgation of judgment shall be made in accordance with Rule 120,
Section 6, paragraphs 4 and 5 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, to wit:

In case the accused fails to appear at the scheduled date of promulgation of judgment despite notice, the promulgation
shall be made by recording the judgment in the criminal docket and serving him a copy thereof at his last known address or
thru his counsel.

If the judgment is for conviction and the failure of the accused to appear was without justifiable cause, he shall lose the
remedies available in these Rules against the judgment and the court shall order his arrest. Within fifteen (15) days from
promulgation of judgment, however, the accused may surrender and file a motion for leave of court to avail of these
remedies. He shall state the reasons for his absence at the scheduled promulgation and if he proves that his absence was
for a justifiable cause, he shall be allowed to avail of said remedies within fifteen (15) days from notice. (Emphasis
supplied.)

Consistently, Rule 124, Section 8, paragraph 2 of the same Rules allows the Court of Appeals, upon motion of the appellee
or motu proprio, to dismiss the appeal of the accused-appellant who eludes the jurisdiction of the courts over his person,
viz:

SEC. 8. Dismissal of appeal for abandonment or failure to prosecute. – The Court of Appeals may, upon motion of the
appellee or motu proprio and with notice to the appellant in either case, dismiss the appeal if the appellant fails to file his
brief within the time prescribed by this Rule, except where the appellant is represented by a counsel de oficio.

The Court of Appeals may also, upon motion of the appellee or motu proprio, dismiss the appeal if the appellant
escapes from prison or confinement, jumps bail or flees to a foreign country during the pendency of the appeal.
(Emphasis supplied.)

In allowing the dismissal of the appeal of the accused-appellant under the circumstances identified by the foregoing rule,
the Court, in People v. Mapalao,16 explained that:
[O]nce an accused escapes from prison or confinement or jumps bail or flees to a foreign country, he loses his standing in
court and unless he surrenders or submits to the jurisdiction of the court he is deemed to have waived any right to seek
relief from the court.

Although Rule 124, Section 8 particularly applies to the Court of Appeals, it has been extended to the Supreme Court by
Rule 125, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which reads:

SECTION 1. Uniform procedure. - Unless otherwise provided by the Constitution or by law, the procedure in the Supreme
Court in original and in appealed cases shall be the same as in the Court of Appeals.

It is indisputable that accused-appellant herein, by escaping from jail, was not present at the promulgation by the RTC of its
Decision dated 29 June 2005 in Criminal Case No. 8010, finding him guilty of the crime of murder. Accused-appellant failed
to surrender and file the required motion within 15 days from the promulgation of the RTC Decision. This alone already
deprived him of any remedy against said judgment of conviction available under the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,
including the right to appeal the same.

The foregoing notwithstanding, the escape of the accused-appellant did not preclude the Court of Appeals from exercising
its review jurisdiction, considering that what was involved was capital punishment. Automatic review being mandatory, it is
not only a power of the court but a duty to review all death penalty cases.17

In this case, considering that the penalty imposed by the trial court was death, the Court of Appeals rightly took cognizance
of the case. Upon review by the appellate court, however, it modified the penalty from death to reclusion perpetua.

We now come to the resolution of the case.

By escaping prison, accused-appellant impliedly waived his right to appeal. In People v. Ang Gioc,18 the Court enunciated
that:

There are certain fundamental rights which cannot be waived even by the accused himself, but the right of appeal is not
one of them. This right is granted solely for the benefit of the accused. He may avail of it or not, as he pleases. He may
waive it either expressly or by implication. When the accused flees after the case has been submitted to the court for
decision, he will be deemed to have waived his right to appeal from the judgment rendered against him x x x.

The accused cannot be accorded the right to appeal unless he voluntarily submits to the jurisdiction of the court or is
otherwise arrested within 15 days from notice of the judgment against him.19 While at large, he cannot seek relief from the
court, as he is deemed to have waived the appeal.20 Thus, having escaped from prison or confinement, he loses his
standing in court; and unless he surrenders or submits to its jurisdiction, he is deemed to have waived any right to seek
relief from the court.

By putting himself beyond the reach and application of the legal processes of the land, accused-appellant revealed his
contempt of the law and placed himself in a position to speculate, at his pleasure on his chances for a reversal. In the
process, he kept himself out of the reach of justice, but hoped to render the judgment nugatory at his option.21Such conduct
is intolerable and does not invite leniency on the part of the appellate court.22

Accused-appellant, in the case at bar, has remained at large for most of the proceedings before the RTC, as well as for the
entirety of the pendency of his appeal before the Court of Appeals, and even until now when his appeal is pending before
this Court. He cannot so audaciously hope that his appeal before this Court would succeed. He only hopes in vain.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is dismissed. Let the records of this case be remanded to the trial court for the issuance of the
mittimus.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 162370 April 21, 2009

DAVID TIU, Petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and EDGARDO POSTANES, Respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Before the Court is a petition for review1 assailing the 29 October 2003 Decision2 and 24 February 2004 Resolution3 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 64783. The Court of Appeals annulled the 6 November 2000 Decision4 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 115, Pasay City on the ground of violation of the right of the accused against double
jeopardy. The RTC declared void the acquittal by the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 44, Pasay City, of
respondent Edgardo Postanes for the crime of grave threats.

The Facts

The instant controversy stemmed from a criminal charge for slight physical injuries filed by respondent Edgardo Postanes
(Postanes) against Remigio Pasion (Pasion). On the other hand, petitioner David Tiu (Tiu) filed a criminal charge for grave
threats against Postanes.

Consequently, an Information for Slight Physical Injuries, docketed as Criminal Case No. 96-412, and an Information for
Grave Threats, docketed as Criminal Case No. 96-413, were filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Pasay City.
The Informations read as follows:

Criminal Case No. 96-412 (Slight Physical Injuries)

That on or about the 2nd day of November 1995, in Pasay City Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Remegio Pasion, there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and
use personal violence upon the person of one Edgardo Postanes y Talara thereby inflicting physical injuries to the latter,
which injuries required and will require medical attendance for a period of less than nine (9) days and incapacitated and will
incapacitate him from performing his habitual work and/or activities during the same period of time.

Contrary to law.5

Criminal Case No. 96-413 (Grave Threats)

That on or about the 2nd day of November 1995, in Pasay City Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Edgardo Postanes y Talara, without justifiable cause, by creating in the
minds of the complainants Genes Carmen y Motita and David S. Tiu that the threats will be carried out, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously threatened to inflict bodily harm on the latter’s person by poking a gun and uttering the
following threatening words, to wit:

"PUTANG INA NINYO MGA HINDOT KAYO PAGBABABARILIN KO KAYO."

Contrary to law.6
Upon motion of Pasion, Criminal Case Nos. 96-412 and 96-413 were consolidated and jointly heard before the MeTC of
Pasay City, Branch 44.

During the trial, Postanes testified as a witness, together with his eyewitnesses Jose Aynaga (Aynaga) and Aristotle
Samson (Samson). Postanes’ testimony was also offered to prove his innocence as the accused in Criminal Case No. 96-
413, thus:

ATTY. VALDEZ: The purposes in presenting the testimony of this witness your Honor, is [sic] to affirm and confirm his
Affidavit or Sworn Statement earlier submitted to this Honorable Court as his direct testimony pursuant to the Rules of
Summary Procedure; second, to affirm and confirm his Affidavit or his Sworn Statement as part of his controverting
evidence on the counter charge on Criminal Case No. 96-413 also pursuant to the Rules on Summary Procedure; third,
to identify the accused; and [fourth] to prove that the accused is guilty of the crime charged; and [fifth] to prove that the
witness Edgardo Postanes is innocent in the charges in Criminal Case No. 96-413.7 (Emphasis supplied)

On 3 April 1997, Postanes formally offered his evidence, as the private complainant in Criminal Case No. 96-412.
Postanes offered, among others, his affidavit and the affidavits of his witnesses, Aynaga and Samson, which were
correspondingly marked as Exhibits "A," "C," and "D."

On 17 April 1997, the MeTC admitted all of Postanes’ documentary evidences.

In Criminal Case No. 96-413, where he stood as the accused, Postanes adopted his testimony and his witnesses’
testimonies which were formally offered and admitted in Criminal Case No. 96-412. Accordingly, the MeTC issued an
Order dated 13 October 1998, which pertinently states:

Atty. Paul Edwin D.S. Bautista, counsel for the accused manifested that the witness to be presented today in the person of
Norlie B Ubay cannot be located by Mr. Postanes. Atty. Bautista further manifested that he is adopting the
testimonies of their witnesses, Aristotle Samson and Jose Aynaga in Criminal Case No. 96-412 for Slight Physical
Injuries wherein Edgardo Postanes is the private complainant against Remigio Pasion, Jr., their testimonies and
other evidences introduced as evidence for the accused.8 (Emphasis supplied)

Postanes requested more time to submit a formal offer of evidence in Criminal Case No. 96-413. However, Postanes’
counsel filed a formal offer of evidence belatedly. In its Order dated 22 December 1998, the MeTC denied Postanes’
motion to admit formal offer of evidence and ordered it expunged from the records.9

In its Decision dated 26 January 1999,10 the MeTC dismissed both Criminal Case Nos. 96-412 and 96-413. The dispositive
portion of the MeTC Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the charge for Slight Physical Injuries
against Remegio Pasion, Jr. and the counter-charge of Grave Threats against Edgardo Postanes DISMISSED for
insufficiency of evidence.

SO ORDERED.11

Tiu filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the MeTC in its Order dated 11 March 1999.

On 29 March 1999, Tiu, through his counsel, filed a petition for certiorari with the RTC of Pasay City.

On 6 November 2000, the RTC, Branch 115, Pasay City rendered a Decision declaring void the judgment of the MeTC.
The dispositive portion of the RTC Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, granting certiorari, the Decision of Acquittal dated January 26, 1999 of the respondent judge in Criminal
Case No. 96-413, with respect to accused Edgardo Postanes, is declared NULL AND VOID.

This case is remanded to the Court of origin for reconsideration of its Decision.12

Postanes moved for reconsideration, which was denied by the RTC in its Order dated 3 April 2001.13

On 22 May 2001, Postanes filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari (with prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order), challenging the decision of the RTC which annulled the
judgment of the MeTC dismissing Criminal Case Nos. 96-412 and 96-413.

In a Resolution promulgated on 5 January 2001, the Court of Appeals directed respondents (Tiu and Judge Francisco G.
Mendiola of RTC Pasay, Branch 115) to file their Comment on the petition. The Court of Appeals found no reason to justify
the issuance of a temporary restraining order.14

Meanwhile, Tiu, through his counsel, filed with the MeTC a Motion for Compliance asking the MeTC to enforce the RTC
decision. He also filed a motion to inhibit MeTC Presiding Judge Estrellita M. Paas. Postanes, on the other hand, filed a
motion to suspend the proceedings and an Opposition to the motion for compliance.

On 3 September 2001, the MeTC issued an Order15 granting Postanes’ motion to suspend the proceedings. Presiding
Judge Estrellita M. Paas also inhibited herself from further hearing the case.

On 3 January 2002, Tiu filed with the Court of Appeals a Motion to Dismiss Petition16 on the ground of forum shopping.

In a Resolution promulgated on 16 September 2003, the Court of Appeals stated that "action on the Motion to Dismiss
Petition filed by the private respondents, together with the petitioner’s Opposition thereto, and private respondents’ Reply
to Opposition shall be included in the preparation of the decision in the present petition."17

On 29 October 2003, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed Decision, reversing the RTC Decision and affirming the
dismissal of Criminal Case No. 96-413. The dispositive portion of the appellate court’s decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Decision dated November 6, 2000 and the Order dated April 3, 2001 of
the public respondent judge are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.18

On 24 February 2004, the Court of Appeals denied Tiu’s motion for reconsideration.19

Hence, this petition.

The Court of Appeals’ Ruling

In annulling the RTC decision, the Court of Appeals held that the RTC "has granted upon the State, through the
extraordinary remedy of certiorari, the right to appeal the decision of acquittal which right the government does not have."

The Court of Appeals stated that the prosecution had not been denied by the MeTC of its right to due process. Hence, it
was wrong for the RTC to declare the findings of the MeTC as having been arrived at with grave abuse of discretion,
thereby denying Postanes of his Constitutional right against double jeopardy.
The Court of Appeals opined that the MeTC evaluated and passed upon the evidence presented both by the prosecution
and the defense. The MeTC, however, believed that the evidence of the prosecution was not sufficient to overcome the
constitutional presumption of innocence of Postanes, thus acquitted him based on reasonable doubt.

The Issues

The main issues in this case are:

1. Whether there was double jeopardy when Tiu filed a petition for certiorari questioning the acquittal of Postanes by the
MeTC; and

2. Whether there was forum shopping when Postanes filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings in the MeTC when the Court
of Appeals already denied Postanes’ prayer for a temporary restraining order to enjoin the enforcement of the decision of
the RTC.

The Ruling of this Court

The petition lacks merit.

At the outset, the Court finds that the petition is defective since it was not filed by the Solicitor General. Instead, it was filed
by Tiu, the private complainant in Criminal Case No. 96-413, through his counsel. Settled is the rule that only the Solicitor
General may bring or defend actions on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, or represent the People or State in
criminal proceedings before this Court and the Court of Appeals.20 Tiu, the offended party in Criminal Case No. 96-413 is
without legal personality to appeal the decision of the Court of Appeals before this Court. Nothing shows that the Office of
the Solicitor General represents the People in this appeal before this Court. On this ground alone, the petition must fail.

However, the Court opts to resolve the question of double jeopardy to finally put an end to this controversy.

The elements of double jeopardy are (1) the complaint or information was sufficient in form and substance to sustain a
conviction; (2) the court had jurisdiction; (3) the accused had been arraigned and had pleaded; and (4) the accused was
convicted or acquitted or the case was dismissed without his express consent.21

These elements are present here: (1) the Information filed in Criminal Case No. 96-413 against Postanes was sufficient in
form and substance to sustain a conviction; (2) the MeTC had jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. 96-413; (3) Postanes
was arraigned and entered a non-guilty plea;22 and (4) the MeTC dismissed Criminal Case No. 96-413 on the ground of
insufficiency of evidence amounting to an acquittal from which no appeal can be had.23Clearly, for this Court to grant the
petition and order the MeTC to reconsider its decision, just what the RTC ordered the MeTC to do, is to transgress the
Constitutional proscription not to put any person "twice x x x in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense."24 Further, as
found by the Court of Appeals, there is no showing that the prosecution or the State was denied of due process resulting in
loss or lack of jurisdiction on the part of the MeTC, which would have allowed an appeal by the prosecution from the order
of dismissal of the criminal case.25

Tiu also contends that since the defense in Criminal Case No. 96-413 failed to submit a formal of evidence, the defense in
effect had no evidence to dispute the charge against Postanes. Tiu insists that though Criminal Case Nos. 96-412 and 96-
413 were consolidated, the MeTC should not have considered the evidence offered in Criminal Case No. 96-412 to dismiss
Criminal Case No. 96-413. In doing so, the MeTC allegedly committed grave abuse of discretion rendering its dismissal of
Criminal Case No. 96-413 (grave threats case) void.

Tiu’s arguments fail to convince us. There is nothing in the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure prohibiting the MeTC
from appreciating the evidence presented and formally offered in Criminal Case No. 96-412 in resolving Criminal Case No.
96-413, inasmuch as these two criminal cases were properly consolidated and jointly tried. In fact, the MeTC’s act of
assessing the evidence in Criminal Case No. 96-412 in deciding Criminal Case No. 96-413 is consistent with the avowed
objective of the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure "to achieve an expeditious and inexpensive determination of
the cases" covered by these Rules. Besides, the testimonies of Postanes, Aynaga,26 and Samson27 were properly offered
at the time when these witnesses were called to testify.28 Hence, while the affidavits as documentary evidence were not
formally offered, there were testimonial evidences supporting Postanes’ defense in Criminal Case No. 96-413.

Contrary to the RTC’s finding, there is nothing capricious or whimsical in the act of the MeTC of considering the evidence
formally offered in Criminal Case No. 96-412 in resolving the consolidated Criminal Case No. 96-413. Therefore, the MeTC
committed no grave abuse of discretion in dismissing Criminal Case No. 96-413 for insufficient evidence.

In view of the foregoing, the Court finds no need to discuss the forum shopping issue.

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition. The Court AFFIRMS the 29 October 2003 Decision and 24 February 2004
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 64783. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 182748 December 13, 2011

ARNEL COLINARES, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

ABAD, J.:

This case is about a) the need, when invoking self-defense, to prove all that it takes; b) what distinguishes frustrated
homicide from attempted homicide; and c) when an accused who appeals may still apply for probation on remand of the
case to the trial court.

The Facts and the Case

The public prosecutor of Camarines Sur charged the accused Arnel Colinares (Arnel) with frustrated homicide before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Jose, Camarines Sur, in Criminal Case T-2213.1

Complainant Rufino P. Buena (Rufino) testified that at around 7:00 in the evening on June 25, 2000, he and Jesus Paulite
(Jesus) went out to buy cigarettes at a nearby store. On their way, Jesus took a leak by the roadside with Rufino waiting
nearby. From nowhere, Arnel sneaked behind and struck Rufino twice on the head with a huge stone, about 15 ½ inches in
diameter. Rufino fell unconscious as Jesus fled.

Ananias Jallores (Ananias) testified that he was walking home when he saw Rufino lying by the roadside. Ananias tried to
help but someone struck him with something hard on the right temple, knocking him out. He later learned that Arnel had hit
him.

Paciano Alano (Paciano) testified that he saw the whole incident since he happened to be smoking outside his house. He
sought the help of a barangay tanod and they brought Rufino to the hospital.

Dr. Albert Belleza issued a Medico-Legal Certificate2 showing that Rufino suffered two lacerated wounds on the forehead,
along the hairline area. The doctor testified that these injuries were serious and potentially fatal but Rufino chose to go
home after initial treatment.
The defense presented Arnel and Diomedes Paulite (Diomedes). Arnel claimed self-defense. He testified that he was on
his way home that evening when he met Rufino, Jesus, and Ananias who were all quite drunk. Arnel asked Rufino where
he supposed the Mayor of Tigaon was but, rather than reply, Rufino pushed him, causing his fall. Jesus and Ananias then
boxed Arnel several times on the back. Rufino tried to stab Arnel but missed. The latter picked up a stone and, defending
himself, struck Rufino on the head with it. When Ananias saw this, he charged towards Arnel and tried to stab him with a
gaff. Arnel was able to avoid the attack and hit Ananias with the same stone. Arnel then fled and hid in his sister’s house.
On September 4, 2000, he voluntarily surrendered at the Tigaon Municipal Police Station.

Diomedes testified that he, Rufino, Jesus, and Ananias attended a pre-wedding party on the night of the incident. His three
companions were all drunk. On his way home, Diomedes saw the three engaged in heated argument with Arnel.

On July 1, 2005 the RTC rendered judgment, finding Arnel guilty beyond reasonable doubt of frustrated homicide and
sentenced him to suffer imprisonment from two years and four months of prision correccional, as minimum, to six years
and one day of prision mayor, as maximum. Since the maximum probationable imprisonment under the law was only up to
six years, Arnel did not qualify for probation.

Arnel appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), invoking self-defense and, alternatively, seeking conviction for the lesser
crime of attempted homicide with the consequent reduction of the penalty imposed on him. The CA entirely affirmed the
RTC decision but deleted the award for lost income in the absence of evidence to support it.3 Not satisfied, Arnel comes to
this Court on petition for review.

In the course of its deliberation on the case, the Court required Arnel and the Solicitor General to submit their respective
positions on whether or not, assuming Arnel committed only the lesser crime of attempted homicide with its imposable
penalty of imprisonment of four months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two years and four months of prision
correccional, as maximum, he could still apply for probation upon remand of the case to the trial court.

Both complied with Arnel taking the position that he should be entitled to apply for probation in case the Court metes out a
new penalty on him that makes his offense probationable. The language and spirit of the probation law warrants such a
stand. The Solicitor General, on the other hand, argues that under the Probation Law no application for probation can be
entertained once the accused has perfected his appeal from the judgment of conviction.

The Issues Presented

The case essentially presents three issues:

1. Whether or not Arnel acted in self-defense when he struck Rufino on the head with a stone;

2. Assuming he did not act in self-defense, whether or not Arnel is guilty of frustrated homicide; and

3. Given a finding that Arnel is entitled to conviction for a lower offense and a reduced probationable penalty, whether or
not he may still apply for probation on remand of the case to the trial court.

The Court’s Rulings

One. Arnel claims that Rufino, Jesus, and Ananias attacked him first and that he merely acted in self-defense when he hit
Rufino back with a stone.

When the accused invokes self-defense, he bears the burden of showing that he was legally justified in killing the victim or
inflicting injury to him. The accused must establish the elements of self-defense by clear and convincing evidence. When
successful, the otherwise felonious deed would be excused, mainly predicated on the lack of criminal intent of the
accused.4
In homicide, whether consummated, frustrated, or attempted, self-defense requires (1) that the person whom the offender
killed or injured committed unlawful aggression; (2) that the offender employed means that is reasonably necessary to
prevent or repel the unlawful aggression; and (3) that the person defending himself did not act with sufficient provocation.5

If the victim did not commit unlawful aggression against the accused, the latter has nothing to prevent or repel and the
other two requisites of self-defense would have no basis for being appreciated. Unlawful aggression contemplates an
actual, sudden, and unexpected attack or an imminent danger of such attack. A mere threatening or intimidating attitude is
not enough. The victim must attack the accused with actual physical force or with a weapon.6

Here, the lower courts found that Arnel failed to prove the element of unlawful aggression. He alone testified that Jesus
and Ananias rained fist blows on him and that Rufino and Ananias tried to stab him. No one corroborated Arnel’s testimony
that it was Rufino who started it. Arnel’s only other witness, Diomedes, merely testified that he saw those involved having a
heated argument in the middle of the street. Arnel did not submit any medical certificate to prove his point that he suffered
injuries in the hands of Rufino and his companions.7

In contrast, the three witnesses—Jesus, Paciano, and Ananias—testified that Arnel was the aggressor. Although their
versions were mottled with inconsistencies, these do not detract from their core story. The witnesses were one in what
Arnel did and when and how he did it. Compared to Arnel’s testimony, the prosecution’s version is more believable and
consistent with reality, hence deserving credence.8

Two. But given that Arnel, the accused, was indeed the aggressor, would he be liable for frustrated homicide when the
wounds he inflicted on Rufino, his victim, were not fatal and could not have resulted in death as in fact it did not?

The main element of attempted or frustrated homicide is the accused’s intent to take his victim’s life. The prosecution has
to prove this clearly and convincingly to exclude every possible doubt regarding homicidal intent.9And the intent to kill is
often inferred from, among other things, the means the offender used and the nature, location, and number of wounds he
inflicted on his victim.10

Here, Arnel struck Rufino on the head with a huge stone. The blow was so forceful that it knocked Rufino out. Considering
the great size of his weapon, the impact it produced, and the location of the wounds that Arnel inflicted on his victim, the
Court is convinced that he intended to kill him.

The Court is inclined, however, to hold Arnel guilty only of attempted, not frustrated, homicide. In Palaganas v.
People,11 we ruled that when the accused intended to kill his victim, as shown by his use of a deadly weapon and the
wounds he inflicted, but the victim did not die because of timely medical assistance, the crime is frustrated murder or
frustrated homicide. If the victim’s wounds are not fatal, the crime is only attempted murder or attempted homicide.

Thus, the prosecution must establish with certainty the nature, extent, depth, and severity of the victim’s wounds. While Dr.
Belleza testified that "head injuries are always very serious,"12 he could not categorically say that Rufino’s wounds in this
case were "fatal." Thus:

Q: Doctor, all the injuries in the head are fatal?

A: No, all traumatic injuries are potentially treated.

Q: But in the case of the victim when you treated him the wounds actually are not fatal on that very day?

A: I could not say, with the treatment we did, prevent from becoming fatal. But on that case the patient preferred
to go home at that time.
Q: The findings also indicated in the medical certificate only refers to the length of the wound not the depth of the
wound?

A: When you say lacerated wound, the entire length of the layer of scalp.

Q: So you could not find out any abrasion?

A: It is different laceration and abrasion so once the skin is broken up the label of the frontal lo[b]e, we always call
it lacerated wound, but in that kind of wound, we did not measure the depth.13

Indeed, Rufino had two lacerations on his forehead but there was no indication that his skull incurred fracture or that he
bled internally as a result of the pounding of his head. The wounds were not so deep, they merely required suturing, and
were estimated to heal in seven or eight days. Dr. Belleza further testified:

Q: So, in the medical certificate the wounds will not require surgery?

A: Yes, Madam.

Q: The injuries are slight?

A: 7 to 8 days long, what we are looking is not much, we give antibiotics and antit[e]tanus – the problem the
contusion that occurred in the brain.

xxxx

Q: What medical intervention that you undertake?

A: We give antibiotics, Your Honor, antit[e]tanus and suturing the wounds.

Q: For how many days did he stay in the hospital?

A: Head injury at least be observed within 24 hours, but some of them would rather go home and then come back.

Q: So the patient did not stay 24 hours in the hospital?

A: No, Your Honor.

Q: Did he come back to you after 24 hours?

A: I am not sure when he came back for follow-up.14

Taken in its entirety, there is a dearth of medical evidence on record to support the prosecution’s claim that Rufino would
have died without timely medical intervention. Thus, the Court finds Arnel liable only for attempted homicide and entitled to
the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.

Three. Ordinarily, Arnel would no longer be entitled to apply for probation, he having appealed from the judgment of the
RTC convicting him for frustrated homicide.

But, the Court finds Arnel guilty only of the lesser crime of attempted homicide and holds that the maximum of the penalty
imposed on him should be lowered to imprisonment of four months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two years and four
months of prision correccional, as maximum. With this new penalty, it would be but fair to allow him the right to apply for
probation upon remand of the case to the RTC.

Some in the Court disagrees. They contend that probation is a mere privilege granted by the state only to qualified
convicted offenders. Section 4 of the probation law (PD 968) provides: "That no application for probation shall be
entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction."15 Since Arnel appealed
his conviction for frustrated homicide, he should be deemed permanently disqualified from applying for probation.

But, firstly, while it is true that probation is a mere privilege, the point is not that Arnel has the right to such privilege; he
certainly does not have. What he has is the right to apply for that privilege. The Court finds that his maximum jail term
should only be 2 years and 4 months. If the Court allows him to apply for probation because of the lowered penalty, it is still
up to the trial judge to decide whether or not to grant him the privilege of probation, taking into account the full
circumstances of his case.

Secondly, it is true that under the probation law the accused who appeals "from the judgment of conviction" is disqualified
from availing himself of the benefits of probation. But, as it happens, two judgments of conviction have been meted out to
Arnel: one, a conviction for frustrated homicide by the regional trial court, now set aside; and, two, a conviction for
attempted homicide by the Supreme Court.

If the Court chooses to go by the dissenting opinion’s hard position, it will apply the probation law on Arnel based on the
trial court’s annulled judgment against him. He will not be entitled to probation because of the severe penalty that such
judgment imposed on him. More, the Supreme Court’s judgment of conviction for a lesser offense and a lighter penalty will
also have to bend over to the trial court’s judgment—even if this has been found in error. And, worse, Arnel will now also
be made to pay for the trial court’s erroneous judgment with the forfeiture of his right to apply for probation. Ang kabayo
ang nagkasala, ang hagupit ay sa kalabaw (the horse errs, the carabao gets the whip). Where is justice there?

The dissenting opinion also expresses apprehension that allowing Arnel to apply for probation would dilute the ruling of this
Court in Francisco v. Court of Appeals16 that the probation law requires that an accused must not have appealed his
conviction before he can avail himself of probation. But there is a huge difference between Francisco and this case.

In Francisco, the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Makati found the accused guilty of grave oral defamation and
sentenced him to a prison term of one year and one day to one year and eight months of prision correccional, a clearly
probationable penalty. Probation was his to ask! Still, he chose to appeal, seeking an acquittal, hence clearly waiving his
right to apply for probation. When the acquittal did not come, he wanted probation. The Court would not of course let him. It
served him right that he wanted to save his cake and eat it too. He certainly could not have both appeal and probation.

The Probation Law, said the Court in Francisco, requires that an accused must not have appealed his conviction before he
can avail himself of probation. This requirement "outlaws the element of speculation on the part of the accused—to wager
on the result of his appeal—that when his conviction is finally affirmed on appeal, the moment of truth well-nigh at hand,
and the service of his sentence inevitable, he now applies for probation as an ‘escape hatch’ thus rendering nugatory the
appellate court’s affirmance of his conviction."17

Here, however, Arnel did not appeal from a judgment that would have allowed him to apply for probation. He did not have a
choice between appeal and probation. He was not in a position to say, "By taking this appeal, I choose not to apply for
probation." The stiff penalty that the trial court imposed on him denied him that choice. Thus, a ruling that would allow Arnel
to now seek probation under this Court’s greatly diminished penalty will not dilute the sound ruling in Francisco. It remains
that those who will appeal from judgments of conviction, when they have the option to try for probation, forfeit their right to
apply for that privilege.

Besides, in appealing his case, Arnel raised the issue of correctness of the penalty imposed on him. He claimed that the
evidence at best warranted his conviction only for attempted, not frustrated, homicide, which crime called for a
probationable penalty. In a way, therefore, Arnel sought from the beginning to bring down the penalty to the level where the
law would allow him to apply for probation.

In a real sense, the Court’s finding that Arnel was guilty, not of frustrated homicide, but only of attempted homicide, is an
original conviction that for the first time imposes on him a probationable penalty. Had the RTC done him right from the
start, it would have found him guilty of the correct offense and imposed on him the right penalty of two years and four
months maximum. This would have afforded Arnel the right to apply for probation.
lavvphil

The Probation Law never intended to deny an accused his right to probation through no fault of his. The underlying
philosophy of probation is one of liberality towards the accused. Such philosophy is not served by a harsh and stringent
interpretation of the statutory provisions.18 As Justice Vicente V. Mendoza said in his dissent in Francisco, the Probation
Law must not be regarded as a mere privilege to be given to the accused only where it clearly appears he comes within its
letter; to do so would be to disregard the teaching in many cases that the Probation Law should be applied in favor of the
accused not because it is a criminal law but to achieve its beneficent purpose.19

One of those who dissent from this decision points out that allowing Arnel to apply for probation after he appealed from the
trial court’s judgment of conviction would not be consistent with the provision of Section 2 that the probation law should be
interpreted to "provide an opportunity for the reformation of a penitent offender." An accused like Arnel who appeals from a
judgment convicting him, it is claimed, shows no penitence.

This may be true if the trial court meted out to Arnel a correct judgment of conviction. Here, however, it convicted Arnel of
the wrong crime, frustrated homicide, that carried a penalty in excess of 6 years. How can the Court expect him to feel
penitent over a crime, which as the Court now finds, he did not commit? He only committed attempted homicide with its
maximum penalty of 2 years and 4 months.

Ironically, if the Court denies Arnel the right to apply for probation under the reduced penalty, it would be sending him
straight behind bars. It would be robbing him of the chance to instead undergo reformation as a penitent offender,
defeating the very purpose of the probation law.

At any rate, what is clear is that, had the RTC done what was right and imposed on Arnel the correct penalty of two years
and four months maximum, he would have had the right to apply for probation. No one could say with certainty that he
would have availed himself of the right had the RTC done right by him. The idea may not even have crossed his mind
precisely since the penalty he got was not probationable.

The question in this case is ultimately one of fairness. Is it fair to deny Arnel the right to apply for probation when the new
penalty that the Court imposes on him is, unlike the one erroneously imposed by the trial court, subject to probation?

WHEREFORE, the Court PARTIALLY GRANTS the petition, MODIFIES the Decision dated July 31, 2007 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR 29639, FINDS petitioner Arnel Colinares GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of attempted homicide,
and SENTENCES him to suffer an indeterminate penalty from four months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two years and
four months of prision correccional, as maximum, and to pay Rufino P. Buena the amount of ₱20,000.00 as moral
damages, without prejudice to petitioner applying for probation within 15 days from notice that the record of the case has
been remanded for execution to the Regional Trial Court of San Jose, Camarines Sur, in Criminal Case T-2213.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 151258 December 1, 2014

ARTEMIO VILLAREAL, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 154954

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ANTONIO MARIANO ALMEDA, DALMACIO LIM, JR., JUNEL ANTHONY
AMA, ERNESTO JOSE MONTECILLO, VINCENT TECSON, ANTONIO GENERAL, SANTIAGO RANADA III, NELSON
VICTORINO, JAIME MARIA FLORES II, ZOSIMO MENDOZA, MICHAEL MUSNGI, VICENTE VERDADERO, ETIENNE
GUERRERO, JUDE FERNANDEZ, AMANTE PURISIMA II, EULOGIO SABBAN, PERCIVAL D. BRIGOLA, PAUL
ANGELO SANTOS, JONAS KARL B. PEREZ, RENATO BANTUG, JR., ADEL ABAS, JOSEPH LLEDO, and RONAN
DE GUZMAN, Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 155101

FIDELITO DIZON, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

x-----------------------x

G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080

GERARDA H. VILLA, Petitioner,

vs.
MANUEL LORENZO ESCALONA II, MARCUS JOEL CAPELLAN RAMOS, CRISANTO CRUZ SARUCA, JR., and
ANSELMO ADRIANO, Respondents.

RESOLUTION

SERENO, CJ:

We are asked to revisit our Decision in the case involving the death of Leonardo "Lenny" Villa due to fraternity hazing.
While there is nothing new in the arguments raised by the parties in their respective Motions for Clarification or
Reconsideration, we find a few remaining matters needing to be clarified and resobed. Sorne oJ' these matters include the
effect of our Decision on the finality of the Court of Appeals judgments insofar as respondents Antonio Mariano A!meda
(Almeda), June] Anthony D. Arna (Arna), Renato Bantug, Jr. (Bantug), and Vincent Tecson (Tecson) are concerned; the
question of who are eligible to seek probation; and the issue of the validity of the probation proceedings and the
concomitant orders of a court that allegedly had no jurisdiction over the case.

Before the Court are the respective Motions for Reconsideration or Clarification filed by petitioners People of the
Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), and Gerarda H. Villa (Villa); and by respondents Almeda,
Ama, Bantug, and Tecson (collectively, Tecson et al.) concerning the Decision of this Court dated 1 February 2012.1 The
Court modified the assailed judgments2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 15520 and found respondents
Fidelito Dizon (Dizon), Almeda, Ama, Bantug, and Tecson guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide. The modification had the effect of lowering the criminal liability of Dizon from the crime of
homicide, while aggravating the verdict against Tecson et al. from slight physical injuries. The CA Decision itself had
modified the Decision of the Caloocan City Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 121 finding all of the accused therein guilty
of the crime of homicide.3
Also, we upheld another CA Decision4 in a separate but related case docketed as CA-G.R. S.P. Nos. 89060 & 90153 and
ruled that the CA did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed the criminal case against Manuel Escalona II
(Escalona), Marcus Joel Ramos (Ramos), Crisanto Saruca, Jr. (Saruca), and Anselmo Adriano (Adriano) on the ground
that their right to speedy trial was violated. Reproduced below is the dispositive portion of our Decision:5

WHEREFORE, the appealed Judgmentin G.R. No. 155101 finding petitioner Fidelito Dizon guilty of homicide is hereby
MODIFIED and SET ASIDE IN PART. The appealed Judgment in G.R. No. 154954 – finding Antonio Mariano Almeda,
Junel Anthony Ama, Renato Bantug, Jr., and Vincent Tecson guilty of the crime of slight physical injuries – is also
MODIFIED and SET ASIDE IN PART. Instead, Fidelito Dizon, Antonio Mariano Almeda, Junel Anthony Ama, Renato
Bantug, Jr., and Vincent Tecson are found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide
defined and penalized under Article 365 in relation to Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. They are hereby sentenced to
suffer an indeterminate prison term of four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and
two (2) months of prision correccional, as maximum. In addition, accused are ORDERED jointly and severally to pay the
heirs of Lenny Villa civil indemnity ex delicto in the amount of 50,000, and moral damages in the amount of 1,000,000, plus
legal interest on all damages awarded at the rate of 12% from the date of the finality of this Decision until satisfaction.
Costs de oficio.

The appealed Judgment in G.R. No. 154954, acquitting Victorino et al., is hereby AFFIRMED. The appealed Judgments in
G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080, dismissing the criminal case filed against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano, are
likewise AFFIRMED. Finally, pursuant to Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code, the Petition in G.R. No. 151258 is
hereby dismissed, and the criminal case against Artemio Villareal deemed CLOSED and TERMINATED.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Senate President and the Speaker of the House of Representatives for
possible consideration of the amendment of the Anti-Hazing Law to include the fact of intoxication and the presence of
non-resident or alumni fraternity members during hazing as aggravating circumstances that would increase the applicable
penalties.

SO ORDERED.

To refresh our memories, we quote the factual antecedents surrounding the present case:6

In February 1991, seven freshmen law students of the Ateneo de Manila University School of Law signified their intention
to join the Aquila Legis Juris Fraternity (Aquila Fraternity). They were Caesar "Bogs" Asuncion, Samuel "Sam" Belleza,
Bienvenido "Bien" Marquez III, Roberto Francis "Bert" Navera, Geronimo "Randy" Recinto, Felix Sy, Jr., and Leonardo
"Lenny" Villa (neophytes).

On the night of 8 February 1991, the neophytes were met by some members of the Aquila Fraternity (Aquilans) at the
lobby of the Ateneo Law School. They all proceeded to Rufo’s Restaurant to have dinner. Afterwards, they went to the
house of Michael Musngi, also an Aquilan, who briefed the neophytes on what to expect during the initiation rites. The
latter were informed that there would be physical beatings, and that they could quit at any time. Their initiation rites were
scheduled to last for three days. After their "briefing," they were brought to the Almeda Compound in Caloocan City for the
commencement of their initiation.

Even before the neophytes got off the van, they had already received threats and insults from the Aquilans. As soon as the
neophytes alighted from the van and walked towards the pelota court of the Almeda compound, some of the Aquilans
delivered physical blows to them. The neophytes were then subjected to traditional forms of Aquilan "initiation rites." These
rites included the "Indian Run," which required the neophytes to run a gauntlet of two parallel rows of Aquilans, each row
delivering blows to the neophytes; the "Bicol Express," which obliged the neophytes to sit on the floor with their backs
against the wall and their legs outstretched while the Aquilans walked, jumped, or ran over their legs; the "Rounds," in
which the neophytes were held at the back of their pants by the "auxiliaries" (the Aquilans charged with the duty of lending
assistance to neophytes during initiation rites), while the latter were being hit with fist blows on their arms or withknee
blows on their thighs by two Aquilans; and the "Auxies’ Privilege Round," in which the auxiliaries were given the opportunity
to inflict physical pain on the neophytes. During this time, the neophytes were also indoctrinated with the fraternity
principles. They survived their first day of initiation.

On the morning of their second day – 9 February 1991 – the neophytes were made to present comic plays and to play
rough basketball. They were also required to memorize and recite the Aquila Fraternity’s principles. Whenever they would
give a wrong answer, they would be hit on their arms or legs. Late in the afternoon, the Aquilans revived the initiation rites
proper and proceeded to torment them physically and psychologically. The neophytes were subjected to the same manner
of hazing that they endured on the first day of initiation. After a few hours, the initiation for the day officially ended.

After a while, accused non-resident or alumni fraternity members Fidelito Dizon (Dizon) and Artemio Villareal (Villareal)
demanded that the rites be reopened. The head of initiation rites, Nelson Victorino (Victorino), initially refused. Upon the
insistence of Dizon and Villareal, however, he reopened the initiation rites. The fraternity members, including Dizon and
Villareal, then subjected the neophytes to "paddling" and to additional rounds of physical pain. Lenny received several
paddle blows, one of which was so strong it sent him sprawling to the ground. The neophytes heard him complaining of
intense pain and difficulty in breathing. After their last session of physical beatings, Lenny could no longer walk. He had to
be carried by the auxiliaries to the carport. Again, the initiation for the day was officially ended, and the neophytes started
eating dinner. They then slept at the carport.

After an hour of sleep, the neophytes were suddenly roused by Lenny’s shivering and incoherent mumblings. Initially,
1avv phi 1

Villareal and Dizon dismissed these rumblings, as they thought he was just overacting. When they realized, though, that
Lenny was really feeling cold, some of the Aquilans started helping him. They removed his clothes and helped him through
a sleeping bag to keep him warm. When his condition worsened, the Aquilans rushed him to the hospital. Lenny was
pronounced dead on arrival.

Consequently, a criminal case for homicide was filed against the following 35 Aquilans:

In Criminal Case No. C-38340(91)

1. Fidelito Dizon (Dizon)

2. Artemio Villareal (Villareal)

3. Efren de Leon (De Leon)

4. Vincent Tecson (Tecson)

5. Junel Anthony Ama (Ama)

6. Antonio Mariano Almeda (Almeda)

7. Renato Bantug, Jr. (Bantug)

8. Nelson Victorino (Victorino)

9. Eulogio Sabban (Sabban)

10. Joseph Lledo (Lledo)

11. Etienne Guerrero (Guerrero)

12. Michael Musngi (Musngi)

13. Jonas Karl Perez (Perez)

14. Paul Angelo Santos (Santos)

15. Ronan de Guzman (De Guzman)

16. Antonio General (General)

17. Jaime Maria Flores II (Flores)

18. Dalmacio Lim, Jr. (Lim)

19. Ernesto Jose Montecillo (Montecillo)

20. Santiago Ranada III (Ranada)

21. Zosimo Mendoza (Mendoza)

22. Vicente Verdadero (Verdadero)

23. Amante Purisima II (Purisima)

24. Jude Fernandez (J. Fernandez)

25. Adel Abas (Abas)

26. Percival Brigola (Brigola)

In Criminal Case No. C-38340

1. Manuel Escalona II (Escalona)

2. Crisanto Saruca, Jr. (Saruca)

3. Anselmo Adriano (Adriano)

4. Marcus Joel Ramos (Ramos)

5. Reynaldo Concepcion (Concepcion)

6. Florentino Ampil (Ampil)

7. Enrico de Vera III (De Vera)

8. Stanley Fernandez (S. Fernandez)

9. Noel Cabangon (Cabangon)

Twenty-six of the accused Aquilans in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91) were jointly tried. On the other hand, the trial
against the remaining nine accused in Criminal Case No. C-38340 was held in abeyance due to certain matters that had to
be resolved first.

On 8 November 1993, the trial court rendered judgment in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91), holding the 26 accused guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide, penalized with reclusion temporal under Article 249 of the Revised
Penal Code. A few weeks after the trial court rendered its judgment, or on 29 November 1993, Criminal Case No. C-38340
against the remaining nine accused commenced anew.

On 10 January 2002, the CAin (CA-G.R. No. 15520) set aside the finding of conspiracy by the trial court in Criminal Case
No. C-38340(91) and modified the criminal liability of each of the accused according to individual participation. Accused De
Leon had by then passed away, so the following Decision applied only to the remaining 25 accused, viz:

1. Nineteen of the accused-appellants– Victorino, Sabban, Lledo, Guerrero, Musngi, Perez, De Guzman, Santos, General,
Flores, Lim, Montecillo, Ranada, Mendoza, Verdadero, Purisima, Fernandez, Abas, and Brigola (Victorino et al.) – were
acquitted,as their individual guilt was not established by proof beyond reasonable doubt.

2. Four of the accused-appellants– Vincent Tecson, Junel Anthony Ama, Antonio Mariano Almeda, and Renato Bantug, Jr.
(Tecson et al.) – were found guilty of the crime of slight physical injuriesand sentenced to 20 days of arresto menor. They
were also ordered to jointly pay the heirs of the victim the sum of ₱30,000 as indemnity.

3. Two of the accused-appellants– Fidelito Dizonand Artemio Villareal– were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. Having found no mitigating or aggravating circumstance,
the CA sentenced them to an indeterminate sentence of 10 years of prision mayor to 17 years of reclusion temporal. They
were also ordered to indemnify, jointly and severally, the heirs of Lenny Villa in the sum of ₱50,000 and to pay the
additional amount of ₱1,000,000 by way of moral damages.

On 5 August 2002, the trial court in Criminal Case No. 38340 dismissed the charge against accused Concepcion on the
ground of violation of his right to speedy trial. Meanwhile, on different dates between the years 2003 and 2005, the trial
court denied the respective Motions to Dismiss of accused Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano. On 25 October 2006,
the CA in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 89060 & 90153 reversed the trial court’s Orders and dismissed the criminal case against
Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano on the basis of violation of their right to speedy trial.

From the aforementioned Decisions, the five (5) consolidated Petitions were individually brought before this Court.
(Citations omitted)

Motion for Partial Reconsideration

filed by Petitioner Gerarda H. Villa

Petitioner Villa filed the present Motion for Partial Reconsideration7 in connection with G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080 (Villa v.
Escalona) asserting that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed the criminal case against
Escalona, Ramos,Saruca, and Adriano (collectively, Escalona et al.) in its assailed Decision and Resolution.8 Villa
reiterates her previous arguments that the right to speedy trial of the accused was not violated, since they had failed to
assert that right within a reasonable period of time. She stresses that, unlike their co-accused Reynaldo Concepcion,
respondents Escalona et al.did not timely invoke their right to speedy trial during the time that the original records and
pieces of evidence were unavailable. She again emphasizes that the prosecution cannot be faulted entirely for the lapse of
12 years from the arraignment until the initial trial, as there were a number of incidents attributable to the accused
themselves that caused the delay of the proceedings. She then insists that we apply the balancing test in determining
whether the right to speedy trial of the accused was violated.

Motion for Reconsideration filed by the OSG

The OSG, in its Motion for Reconsideration9 of G.R. Nos. 155101 (Dizon v. People) and 154954 (People v. Court of
Appeals), agrees with the findings of this Court that accused Dizon and Tecson et al. had neither the felonious intent to kill
(animus interficendi) nor the felonious intent to injure (animus iniuriandi) Lenny Villa. In fact, it concedes that the mode in
which the accused committed the crime was through fault (culpa). However, it contends that the penalty imposed should
have been equivalent to that for deceit (dolo) pursuant to Article 249 (Homicide) of the Revised Penal Code. It argues that
the nature and gravity of the imprudence or negligence attributable to the accused was so gross that it shattered the fine
distinction between dolo and culpaby considering the act as one committed with malicious intent. It maintains that the
accused conducted the initiation rites in such a malevolent and merciless manner that it clearly endangered the lives of the
initiates and was thus equivalent to malice aforethought.

With respect to the 19 other accused, or Victorino et al., the OSG asserts that their acquittal may also be reversed despite
the rule on double jeopardy, as the CA also committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing its assailed Decision (CA-G.R.
No. 15520). The OSG insists that Victorino et al. should have been similarly convicted like their other co-accused Dizon,
Almeda, Ama, Bantug, and Tecson, since the former also participated in the hazing of Lenny Villa, and their actions
contributed to his death.

Motions for Clarification or Reconsideration of Tecson et al.

Respondents Tecson et al.,10 filed their respective motions pertaining to G.R. No. 154954 (People v. Court of Appeals).
They essentially seek a clarification as to the effect of our Decision insofar as their criminal liability and service of sentence
are concerned. According to respondents, they immediately applied for probation after the CA rendered its Decision
(CAG.R. No. 15520) lowering their criminal liability from the crime of homicide, which carries a non-probationable
sentence, to slight physical injuries, which carries a probationable sentence. Tecson et al.contend that, as a result, they
have already been discharged from their criminal liability and the cases against them closed and terminated. This outcome
was supposedly by virtue of their Applications for Probation on various dates in January 200211 pursuant to Presidential
Decree No. 968, as amended, otherwise known as the Probation Law. They argue that Branch 130 of Caloocan City
Regional Trial Court (RTC) had already granted their respective Applications for Probation on 11 October 200212 and, upon
their completion of the terms and conditions thereof, discharged them from probation and declared the criminal case
against them terminated on various dates in April 2003.13

To support their claims, respondents attached14 certified true copies of their respective Applications for Probation and the
RTC Orders granting these applications, discharging them from probation, and declaring the criminal case against them
terminated. Thus, they maintain that the Decision in CA-G.R. No. 15520 had already lapsed into finality, insofar as they
were concerned, whenthey waived their right to appeal and applied for probation.

ISSUES

I. Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it dismissed the
case against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano for violation of their right to speedy trial

II. Whether the penalty imposed on Tecson et al. should have corresponded to that for intentional felonies

III. Whether the completion by Tecson et al. of the terms and conditions of their probation discharged them from their
criminal liability, and closed and terminated the cases against them DISCUSSION

Findings on the Motion for Partial Reconsideration of

Petitioner Gerarda H. Villa

As regards the first issue, we take note that the factual circumstances and legal assertions raised by petitioner Villa in her
Motion for Partial Reconsideration concerning G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080 have already been thoroughly considered and
passed uponin our deliberations, which led to our Decision dated 1 February 2012. We emphasize that in light of the
finding of violation of the right of Escalona et al. to speedy trial, the CA’s dismissal of the criminal case against them
amounted to an acquittal,15 and that any appeal or reconsideration thereof would result in a violation of their right against
double jeopardy.16 Though we have recognized that the acquittal of the accused may be challenged where there has been
a grave abuse of discretion,17 certiorari would lie if it is convincingly established that the CA’s Decision dismissing the case
was attended by a whimsical or capricious exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. It must be shown that the
assailed judgment constitutes "a patent and gross abuse of discretion amounting to an evasion of a positive duty or to a
virtual refusal to perform a duty imposed by law or toact in contemplation of law; an exercise of power in an arbitrary and
despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility; or a blatant abuse of authority to a point so grave and so severe as to
deprive the court of its very power to dispense justice."18 Thus, grave abuse of discretion cannot be attributed to a court
simply because it allegedly misappreciated the facts and the evidence.19

We have taken a second look at the court records, the CA Decision, and petitioner’s arguments and found no basis to rule
that the CA gravely abused its discretion in concluding that the right to speedy trial of the accused was violated. Its findings
were sufficiently supported by the records of the case and grounded in law. Thus, we deny the motion of petitioner Villa
with finality.

Ruling on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the OSG

We likewise deny with finality the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the OSG with respect to G.R. Nos. 155101 (Dizon v.
People) and 154954 (People v. Court of Appeals). Many of the arguments raised therein are essentially a mere rehash of
the earlier grounds alleged in its original Petition for Certiorari.

Furthermore, we cannot subscribe to the OSG’s theory that even if the act complained of was born of imprudence or
negligence, malicious intent can still be appreciated on account of the gravity of the actions of the accused. We emphasize
that the finding of a felony committed by means of culpa is legally inconsistent with that committed by means of dolo.
Culpable felonies involve those wrongs done as a result of an act performed without malice or criminal design. The
Revised Penal Code expresses thusly:

ARTICLE 365. Imprudence and Negligence. — Any person who, by reckless imprudence, shall commit any act which, had
it been intentional, would constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayorin its maximum period toprisión
correccional in its medium period; if it would have constituted a less grave felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its
minimum and medium periods shall be imposed.

Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an act which would otherwise constitute a grave
felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayorin its medium and maximum periods; if it would have constituted a less
serious felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum period shall be imposed.

xxxx

Reckless imprudence consists in voluntary, but without malice, doing or falling to do an act from which material damage
results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing or failing to perform suchact,
taking into consideration his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition and other circumstances
regarding persons, time and place.

Simple imprudence consists in the lack of precaution displayed in those cases in which the damage impending to be
caused is not immediate nor the danger clearly manifest. (Emphases supplied)

On the other hand, intentional felonies concern those wrongs in which a deliberate malicious intent to do an unlawful act is
present. Below is our exhaustive discussion on the matter:20 Our Revised Penal Code belongs tothe classical school of
thought. x x x The identity of mens rea– defined as a guilty mind, a guilty or wrongful purpose or criminal intent – is the
predominant consideration. Thus, it is not enough to do what the law prohibits. In order for an intentional felony to exist, it is
necessary that the act be committed by means of doloor "malice."
The term "dolo" or "malice" is a complex idea involving the elements of freedom, intelligence, and intent. x x x x The
element of intent – on which this Court shall focus – is described as the state of mind accompanying an act, especially a
forbidden act. It refers to the purpose of the mind and the resolve with which a person proceeds.It does not refer to mere
will, for the latter pertains to the act, while intentconcerns the result of the act. While motive is the "moving power" that
impels one to action for a definite result, intent is the "purpose" of using a particular means to produce the result. On the
other hand, the term "felonious"means, inter alia, malicious, villainous, and/or proceeding from an evil heart or
purpose.With these elements taken together, the requirement of intent in intentional felony must refer to malicious intent,
which is a vicious and malevolent state of mind accompanying a forbidden act. Stated otherwise, intentional felony requires
the existence of dolus malus– that the act or omission be done "willfully," "maliciously," "with deliberate evil intent," and
"with malice aforethought." The maxim is actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea– a crime is not committed if the mind of
the person performing the act complained of is innocent. As is required of the other elements of a felony, the existence of
malicious intent must be proven beyond reasonable doubt.

xxxx

The presence of an initial malicious intent to commit a felony is thus a vital ingredient in establishing the commission of the
intentional felony of homicide. Being mala in se, the felony of homicide requires the existence of malice or dolo immediately
before or simultaneously with the infliction of injuries. Intent to kill – or animus interficendi– cannot and should not be
inferred, unless there is proof beyond reasonable doubt of such intent. Furthermore, the victim’s death must not have been
the product of accident, natural cause, or suicide. If death resulted from an act executed without malice or criminal intent –
but with lack of foresight, carelessness, or negligence – the act must be qualified as reckless or simple negligence or
imprudence resulting in homicide.

xxxx

In order to be found guilty ofany of the felonious acts under Articles 262 to 266 of the Revised Penal Code, the
employment of physical injuries must be coupled with dolus malus. As an act that is mala in se, the existence of malicious
intent is fundamental, since injury arises from the mental state of the wrongdoer – iniuria ex affectu facientis consistat. If
there is no criminal intent, the accused cannot be found guilty of an intentional felony. Thus, incase of physical injuries
under the Revised Penal Code, there must be a specific animus iniuriandi or malicious intention to do wrong against the
physical integrity or wellbeing of a person, so as to incapacitate and deprive the victim of certain bodily functions. Without
proof beyond reasonable doubt of the required animus iniuriandi, the overt act of inflicting physical injuries per semerely
satisfies the elements of freedom and intelligence in an intentional felony. The commission of the act does not, in itself,
make a man guilty unless his intentions are.

Thus, we have ruled in a number of instances that the mere infliction of physical injuries, absentmalicious intent, does not
make a person automatically liable for an intentional felony.x x x.

xxxx

The absence of malicious intent does not automatically mean, however, that the accused fraternity members are ultimately
devoid of criminal liability. The Revised Penal Code also punishes felonies that are committed by means of fault (culpa).
According to Article 3 thereof, there is fault when the wrongful act results from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight, or
lack of skill.

Reckless imprudence or negligence consists of a voluntary act done without malice, from which an immediate personal
harm, injury or material damage results by reason of an inexcusable lack of precaution or advertence on the part of the
person committing it. In this case, the danger is visible and consciously appreciated by the actor. In contrast, simple
imprudence or negligence comprises an act done without grave fault, from which an injury or material damage ensues by
reason of a mere lack of foresight or skill. Here, the threatened harm is not immediate, and the danger is not openly visible.
The test for determining whether or not a person is negligent in doing an act is as follows: Would a prudent man in the
position of the person to whom negligence is attributed foresee harm to the person injured as a reasonable consequence
of the course about to be pursued? If so, the law imposes on the doer the duty to take precaution against the mischievous
resultsof the act. Failure to do so constitutes negligence.

As we held in Gaid v. People, for a person to avoid being charged with recklessness, the degree of precaution and
diligence required varies with the degree of the danger involved. If, on account of a certain line of conduct, the danger of
causing harm to another person is great, the individual who chooses to follow that particular course of conduct is bound to
be very careful, inorder to prevent or avoid damage or injury. In contrast, if the danger is minor, not much care is required.
It is thus possible that there are countless degrees of precaution or diligence that may be required of an individual, "from a
transitory glance of care to the most vigilant effort." The duty of the person to employ more or less degree of care will
depend upon the circumstances of each particular case. (Emphases supplied, citations omitted)

We thus reiterate that the law requires proof beyond reasonable doubt of the existence of malicious intent or dolus malus
before an accused can be adjudged liable for committing an intentional felony.

Since the accused were found to have committed a felony by means of culpa, we cannot agree with the argument of the
OSG. It contends that the imposable penalty for intentional felony can also be applied to the present case on the ground
that the nature of the imprudence or negligence of the accused was so gross that the felony already amounted to malice.
The Revised Penal Code has carefully delineated the imposable penalties as regards felonies committed by means of
culpaon the one hand and felonies committed by means of doloon the other in the context of the distinctions it has drawn
between them. The penalties provided in Article 365 (Imprudence and Negligence) are mandatorily applied if the death of a
person occurs as a result of the imprudence or negligence of another. Alternatively, the penalties outlined in Articles 246 to
261 (Destruction of Life) are automatically invoked if the death was a result of the commission of a forbidden act
accompanied by a malicious intent. These imposable penalties are statutory, mandatory, and not subjectto the discretion of
the court. We have already resolved – and the OSG agrees – that the accused Dizon and Tecson et al. had neither animus
interficendi nor animus iniuriandi in inflicting physical pain on Lenny Villa. Hence, we rule that the imposable penalty is
what is applicable to the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide as defined and penalized under Article 365 of
the Revised Penal Code.

Ruling on the Motions for Clarification or Reconsideration

filed by Tecson et al.

We clarify, however, the effect of our Decision in light of the motions of respondents Tecson et al. vis-à-vis G.R. No.
154954 (People v. Court of Appeals).

The finality of a CA decision will not

bar the state from seeking the
annulment of the judgment via a
Rule 65 petition.

In their separate motions,21 respondents insist that the previous verdict of the CA finding them guilty of slight physical
injuries has already lapsed into finality as a result of their respective availments of the probation program and their ultimate
discharge therefrom. Hence, they argue that they can no longer be convicted of the heavier offense of reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide.22 Respondents allude to our Decision in Tan v. People23 to support their contention that the CA
judgment can no longer be reversed or annulled even by this Court.

The OSG counters24 that the CA judgment could not have attained finality, as the former had timely filed with this Court a
petition for certiorari. It argues that a Rule 65 petition is analogous to an appeal, or a motion for new trial or
reconsideration, in that a petition for certiorarialso prevents the case from becoming final and executory until after the
matter is ultimately resolved.
Indeed, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court speaks of the finality of a criminal judgment once the accused applies for probation,
viz:

SECTION 7. Modification of judgment. — A judgment of convictionmay, upon motion of the accused, be modified or set
aside before it becomes final or before appeal is perfected. Except where the death penalty is imposed, a judgment
becomes finalafter the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal, or whenthe sentence has been partially or totally
satisfied or served, or when the accusedhas waived in writing his right to appeal, or has applied for probation. (7a)
(Emphases supplied)

Coupled with Section 7 of Rule 11725 and Section 1 of Rule 122,26 it can be culled from the foregoing provisions that only
the accused may appeal the criminal aspect of a criminal case, especially if the relief being sought is the correction or
review of the judgment therein. This rule was instituted in order to give life to the constitutional edict27against putting a
person twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. It is beyond contention that the accused would be exposed to
double jeopardy if the state appeals the criminal judgment in order to reverse an acquittal or even to increase criminal
liability. Thus, the accused’s waiver of the right to appeal – as when applying for probation – makes the criminal judgment
immediately final and executory. Our explanation in People v. Nazareno is worth reiterating:28

Further prosecution via an appeal from a judgment of acquittal is likewise barred because the government has already
been afforded a complete opportunity to prove the criminal defendant’s culpability; after failing to persuade the court to
enter a final judgment of conviction, the underlying reasons supporting the constitutional ban on multiple trials applies and
becomes compelling. The reason is not only the defendant’s already established innocence at the first trial where he had
been placed in peril of conviction, but also the same untoward and prejudicial consequences of a second trial initiated by a
government who has at its disposal all the powers and resources of the State.

Unfairness and prejudice would necessarily result, as the government would then be allowed another opportunity to
persuade a second trier of the defendant’s guilt while strengthening any weaknesses that had attended the first trial, all in a
process where the government’s power and resources are once again employed against the defendant’s individual means.
That the second opportunity comesvia an appeal does not make the effects any less prejudicial by the standards of reason,
justice and conscience. (Emphases supplied, citations omitted)

It must be clarified, however, that the finality of judgment evinced in Section 7 of Rule 120 does not confer blanket
invincibility on criminal judgments. We have already explained in our Decision that the rule on double jeopardy is not
absolute, and that this rule is inapplicable to cases in which the state assails the very jurisdiction of the court that issued
the criminal judgment.29 The reasoning behind the exception is articulated in Nazareno, from which we quote:30

In such instance, however, no review of facts and law on the merits, in the manner done in an appeal, actually takes place;
the focus of the review is on whether the judgment is per sevoid on jurisdictional grounds, i.e., whether the verdict was
rendered by a court that had no jurisdiction; or where the court has appropriate jurisdiction, whether it acted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. In other words, the review is on the question of whether
there has been a validly rendered decision, not on the question of the decision’s error or correctness. Under the
exceptional nature of a Rule 65 petition, the burden — a very heavy one — is on the shoulders of the party asking for the
review to show the presence of a whimsical or capricious exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction; or of a
patent and gross abuse of discretion amounting to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty
imposed by law or to act in contemplation of law; or to an exercise of power in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason
of passion and hostility. (Emphases supplied, citations omitted) While this Court’s Decision in Tan may have created an
impression of the unassailability of a criminal judgment as soon as the accused applies for probation, we point out that
what the state filed therein was a mere motion for the modification of the penalty, and not a Rule 65 petition. A petition for
certiorari is a special civil action that is distinct and separate from the main case. While in the main case, the core issue is
whether the accused is innocent or guilty of the crime charged, the crux of a Rule 65 petition is whether the court acted (a)
without or in excess of its jurisdiction; or (b) with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Hence, strictly speaking, there is nomodification of judgment in a petition for certiorari, whose resolution does not call for a
re-evaluation of the merits of the case in order to determine the ultimate criminal responsibility of the accused. In a Rule 65
petition, any resulting annulment of a criminal judgment is but a consequence of the finding of lack of jurisdiction.

In view thereof, we find that the proper interpretation of Section 7 of Rule 120 must be that it is inapplicable and irrelevant
where the court’s jurisdiction is being assailed through a Rule 65 petition. Section 7 of Rule 120 bars the modification of a
criminal judgment only if the appeal brought before the court is in the nature of a regular appeal under Rule 41, or an
appeal by certiorari under Rule 45, and if that appeal would put the accused in double jeopardy. As it is, we find no
irregularity in the partial annulment of the CA Decision in CA-G.R. No. 15520 in spite of its finality, as the judgment therein
was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

The orders of Caloocan City RTC

Branch 130 have no legal effect, as
they were issued without jurisdiction.

First, Tecson et al. filed their Applications for Probation with the wrong court. Part and parcel of our criminal justice system
is the authority or jurisdiction of the court to adjudicate and decide the case before it. Jurisdiction refers to the power and
capacity of the tribunal to hear, try, and decide a particular case or matter before it.31 That power and capacity includes the
competence to pronounce a judgment, impose a punishment,32 and enforce or suspend33 the execution of a sentencein
accordance with law.

The OSG questions34 the entire proceedings involving the probation applications of Tecson et al. before Caloocan City RTC
Branch 130. Allegedly, the trial court did not have competence to take cognizance of the applications, considering that it
was not the court of origin of the criminal case. The OSG points out that the trial court that originally rendered the Decision
in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91) was Branch 121 of the Caloocan City RTC.

The pertinent provision of the Probation Law is hereby quoted for reference:

SEC. 4. Grant of Probation. — Subject to the provisions of this Decree, the trial court may, after it shall have convicted and
sentenced a defendant, and upon application by said defendant within the period for perfecting an appeal, suspend the
execution of the sentence and place the defendant on probation for such period and upon such terms and conditions as it
may deem best; Provided, That no application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected
the appeal from the judgment of conviction. x x x x (Emphases supplied)

It is obvious from the foregoing provision that the law requires that an application for probation be filed withthe trial court
that convicted and sentenced the defendant, meaning the court of origin. Here, the trial court that originally convicted and
sentenced Tecson et al.of the crime of homicide was Branch 121 – not Branch 130 – of the Caloocan City RTC.35 Neither
the judge of Branch 130 in his Orders nor Tecson et al.in their pleadings have presented any explanation or shown any
special authority that would clarify why the Applications for Probation had not been filed with or taken cognizance of by
Caloocan City RTC Branch 121. While we take note that in a previous case, the CA issued a Decision ordering the
inhibition of Branch 121 Judge Adoracion G. Angeles from hearing and deciding Criminal Case No. C-38340(91), the ruling
was made specifically applicable to the trial of petitioners therein, i.e. accused Concepcion, Ampil, Adriano, and S.
Fernandez.36

Tecson et al. thus committed a fatal error when they filed their probation applications with Caloocan City RTC Branch 130,
and not with Branch 121. We stress that applicants are not at liberty to choose the forum in which they may seek probation,
as the requirement under Section 4 of the Probation law is substantive and not merely procedural. Considering, therefore,
that the probation proceedings were premised on an unwarranted exercise of authority, we find that Caloocan City RTC
Branch 130 never acquired jurisdiction over the case.

Second, the records of the casewere still with the CA when Caloocan City RTC Branch 130 granted the probation
applications. Jurisdiction over a case is lodged with the court in which the criminal action has been properly instituted.37 If a
party appeals the trial court’s judgment or final order,38 jurisdiction is transferred to the appellate court. The execution of the
decision is thus stayed insofar as the appealing party is concerned.39 The court of origin then loses jurisdiction over the
entire case the moment the other party’s time to appeal has expired.40 Any residual jurisdiction of the court of origin shall
cease – including the authority to order execution pending appeal – the moment the complete records of the case are
transmitted to the appellate court.41 Consequently, it is the appellate court that shall have the authority to wield the power to
hear, try, and decide the case before it, as well as to enforce its decisions and resolutions appurtenant thereto. That power
and authority shall remain with the appellate court until it finally disposes of the case. Jurisdiction cannot be ousted by any
subsequent event, even if the nature of the incident would have prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the first place.

According to Article 78 of the Revised Penal Code, "[n]o penalty shall be executed except by virtue of a final judgment." A
judgment of a court convicting or acquitting the accused of the offense charged becomes final under any of the following
conditions among others:42 after the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal; when the accused waives the right to
appeal; upon the grant of a withdrawal ofan appeal; when the sentence has already been partially or totally satisfied or
served; or when the accused applies for probation. When the decision attains finality, the judgment or final order is entered
in the book of entries of judgments.43 If the case was previously appealed to the CA, a certified true copy of the judgment or
final order must be attached to the original record, which shall then be remanded to the clerk of the court from which the
appeal was taken.44 The court of origin then reacquires jurisdiction over the case for appropriate action. It is during this time
that the court of origin may settle the matter of the execution of penalty or the suspension of the execution
thereof,45 including the convicts’ applications for probation.46

A perusal of the case records reveals that the CA had not yet relinquished its jurisdiction over the case when Caloocan City
RTC Branch 130 took cognizance of the Applications for Probation of Tecson et al. It shows that the accused filed their
respective applications47 while a motion for reconsideration was still pending before the CA48 and the records were still with
that court.49 The CA settled the motion only upon issuing the Resolution dated 30 August 2002 denying it, or about seven
months after Tecson et al. had filed their applications with the trial court.50 In September 2002, or almost a month before the
promulgation of the RTC Order dated 11 October 2002 granting the probation applications,51 the OSG had filed
Manifestations of Intent to File Petition for Certiorari with the CA52 and this Court.53 Ultimately, the OSG assailed the CA
judgments by filing before this Court a Petition for Certiorari on 25 November 2002.54 We noted the petition and then
required respondents to file a comment thereon.55 After their submission of further pleadings and motions, we eventually
required all parties to file their consolidated memoranda.56 The records of the case remained with the CA until they were
elevated to this Court in 2008.57

For the foregoing reasons, we find that RTC Branch 130 had no jurisdiction to act on the probation applications of Tecson
et al. It had neither the power nor the authority to suspend their sentence, place them on probation, order their final
discharge, and eventually declare the case against them terminated. This glaring jurisdictional faux pasis a clear evidence
of either gross ignorance of the law oran underhanded one-upmanship on the part of RTC Branch 130 or Tecson et al., or
both – to which this Court cannot give a judicial imprimatur.

In any event, Tecson et al. were ineligible to seek probation at the time they applied for it. Probation58 is a special privilege
granted by the state to penitent qualified offenders who immediately admit their liability and thus renounce their right to
appeal. In view of their acceptance of their fate and willingness to be reformed, the state affords them a chance to avoid
the stigma of an incarceration recordby making them undergo rehabilitation outside of prison. Some of the major purposes
of the law are to help offenders to eventually develop themselves into law-abiding and self respecting individuals, as well
as to assist them in their reintegration with the community.

It must be reiterated that probation is not a right enjoyed by the accused. Rather, it is an act of grace orclemency conferred
by the state. In Francisco v. Court of Appeals,59 this Court explained thus:

It is a special prerogative granted by law to a person or group of persons not enjoyed by others or by all. Accordingly, the
grant of probation rests solely upon the discretion of the court which is to be exercised primarily for the benefit of organized
society, and only incidentally for the benefit of the accused. The Probation Law should not therefore be permitted to divest
the state or its government of any of the latter’s prerogatives, rights or remedies, unless the intention of the legislature to
this end is clearly expressed, and no person should benefit from the terms of the law who is not clearly within them.
(Emphases supplied)

The OSG questions the validity of the grant of the probation applications of Tecson et al.60 It points out that when they
appealed to the CA their homicide conviction by the RTC, they thereby made themselves ineligible to seek probation
pursuant to Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 968 (the Probation Law).

We refer again to the full text ofSection 4 of the Probation Law as follows:

SEC. 4. Grant of Probation. — Subject to the provisions of this Decree, the trial court may, after it shall have convicted and
sentenced a defendant, and upon application by said defendant within the period for perfecting an appeal, suspend the
execution of the sentence and place the defendant on probation for such period and upon such terms and conditions as it
may deem best; Provided, That no application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected
the appeal from the judgment of conviction.

Probation may be granted whether the sentence imposes a term of imprisonment or a fine only. An application for
probation shall be filed with the trial court. The filing of the application shall be deemed a waiver of the right to appeal.

An order granting or denying probation shall not be appealable. (Emphases supplied)

Indeed, one of the legal prerequisites of probation is that the offender must not have appealed the conviction.61 In the 2003
case Lagrosa v. Court of Appeals,62 this Court was faced with the issue of whether a convict may still apply for probation
even after the trial court has imposed a non probationable verdict, provided that the CA later on lowers the original penalty
to a sentence within the probationable limit. In that case, the trial court sentenced the accused to a maximum term of eight
years of prisión mayor, which was beyond the coverage of the Probation Law. They only became eligible for probation after
the CA reduced the maximum term of the penalty imposed to 1 year, 8 months and 21 days of prisión correccional.

In deciding the case, this Court invoked the reasoning in Francisco and ruled that the accused was ineligiblefor probation,
since they had filed an appeal with the CA. In Francisco, we emphasized that Section 4 of the Probation Law offers no
ambiguity and does not provide for any distinction, qualification, or exception. What is clearis that all offenders who
previously appealed their cases, regardless of their reason for appealing, are disqualified by the law from seeking
probation. Accordingly, this Court enunciated in Lagrosathat the accused are disallowed from availing themselves of the
benefits of probation if they obtain a genuine opportunity to apply for probation only on appeal as a result of the
downgrading of their sentence from non-probationable to probationable.

While Lagrosa was promulgated three months after Caloocan City RTC Branch 130 issued its various Orders discharging
Tecson et al. from probation, the ruling in Lagrosa, however, was a mere reiteration of the reasoning of this Court since the
1989 case Llamado v. Court of Appeals63 and Francisco. The Applications for Probation of Tecson et al., therefore, should
not have been granted by RTC Branch 130, as they had appealed their conviction to the CA. We recall that respondents
were originally found guilty of homicide and sentenced to suffer 14 years, 8 months, and 1 day of reclusion temporal as
maximum. Accordingly, even if the CA later downgraded their conviction to slight physical injuries and sentenced them to
20 days of arresto menor, which made the sentence fall within probationable limits for the first time, the RTC should have
nonetheless found them ineligible for probation at the time.

The actions of the trial court must thus be adjudged as an arbitrary and despotic use of authority, so gross that it divested
the court of its very power to dispense justice. As a consequence, the RTC Orders granting the Applications for Probation
of Tecson et al. and thereafter discharging them from their criminal liability must be deemed to have been issued with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

Whether for lack of jurisdiction orfor grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, we declare all
orders, resolutions, and judgments of Caloocan City RTC Branch 130 in relation to the probation applications of Tecson et
al. null and void for having been issued without jurisdiction. We find our pronouncement in Galman v.
Sandiganbayan64 applicable, viz:

A void judgment is, in legal effect, no judgment at all. By it no rights are divested. Through it, no rights can be attained.
Being worthless, all proceedings founded upon it are equally worthless. It neither binds nor bars anyone. All acts performed
under it and all claims flowing out of it are void. (Emphasis supplied)

The ultimate discharge of Tecson et

al. from probation did not totally
extinguish their criminal liability.

Accused Bantug asserts65 that, in any event, their criminal liability has already been extinguished as a result of their
discharge from probation and the eventual termination of the criminal case against them by Caloocan City RTC Branch
130. To support his argument, he cites the following provision of the Revised Penal Code:

ARTICLE 89. How Criminal Liability is Totally Extinguished. — Criminal liability is totally extinguished:

1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is extinguished
only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment.

2. By service of the sentence.

3. By amnesty, which completely extinguishes the penalty and all its effects.

4. By absolute pardon.

5. By prescription of the crime.

6. By prescription of the penalty.

7. By the marriage of the offended woman, as provided in article 344 of this Code. (Emphasis supplied)

As previously discussed, a void judgment cannot be the source of legal rights; legally speaking, it is as if no judgment had
been rendered at all. Considering our annulment of the Orders of Caloocan City RTC Branch 130 in relation to the
probation proceedings, respondents cannot claim benefits that technically do not exist.

In any event, Tecson et al.cannot invoke Article89 of the Revised Penal Code, as we find it inapplicable to this case. One
of the hallmarks of the Probation Law is precisely to "suspend the execution of the sentence,"66 and not to replace the
original sentence with another, as we pointed out in our discussion in Baclayon v. Mutia:67

An order placing defendant on "probation" is not a "sentence" but is rather in effect a suspension of the imposition of
sentence. It is not a final judgment but is rather an "interlocutory judgment"in the nature of a conditional order placing the
convicted defendant under the supervision of the court for his reformation, to be followed by a final judgment of discharge,
if the conditions of the probation are complied with, or by a final judgment of sentence if the conditions are violated.
(Emphases supplied)

Correspondingly, the criminal liability of Tecson et al.remains.

In light of our recent Decision in
Colinares v. People, Tecson et al.
may now reapply for probation.
Very recently, in Colinares v. People,68 we revisited our ruling in Franciscoand modified our pronouncements insofar as the
eligibility for probation of those who appeal their conviction is concerned. Through a majority vote of 9-6, the Court En
Bancin effect abandoned Lagrosaand settled the following once and for all:69

Secondly, it is true that under the probation law the accused who appeals "from the judgment of conviction" is disqualified
from availing himself of the benefits of probation. But, as it happens, two judgments of conviction have been meted out to
Arnel: one, a conviction for frustrated homicide by the regional trial court,now set aside; and, two, a conviction for
attempted homicide by the Supreme Court.

If the Court chooses to go by the dissenting opinion’s hard position, it will apply the probation law on Arnel based on the
trial court’s annulled judgment against him. He will not be entitled to probation because of the severe penalty that such
judgment imposed on him. More, the Supreme Court’s judgment of conviction for a lesser offense and a lighter penalty will
also have to bend over to the trial court’s judgment — even if this has been found in error. And, worse, Arnel will now also
be made to pay for the trial court’s erroneous judgment with the forfeiture of his right to apply for probation. Ang kabayo
ang nagkasala, ang hagupit ay sa kalabaw(the horse errs, the carabao gets the whip). Where is justice there?

The dissenting opinion also expresses apprehension that allowing Arnel to apply for probation would dilute the ruling of this
Court in Francisco v. Court of Appealsthat the probation law requires that an accused must not have appealed his
conviction before he can avail himself of probation. But there is a huge difference between Franciscoand this case.

xxxx

Here, however, Arnel did not appeal from a judgment that would have allowed him to apply for probation. He did not have a
choice between appeal and probation. Hewas not in a position to say, "By taking this appeal, I choose not to apply for
probation." The stiff penalty that the trial court imposed on him denied him that choice. Thus, a ruling that would allow Arnel
to now seek probation under this Court’s greatly diminished penalty will not dilute the sound ruling in Francisco. It remains
that those who will appeal from judgments of conviction, when they have the option to try for probation, forfeit their right to
apply for that privilege.

xxxx

In a real sense, the Court’s finding that Arnel was guilty, not of frustrated homicide, but only of attempted homicide, is an
original conviction that for the first time imposes on him a probationable penalty. Had the RTC done him right from the
start, it would have found him guilty of the correct offense and imposed on him the right penalty of two years and four
months maximum. This would have afforded Arnel the right to apply for probation.

The Probation Law never intended to deny an accused his right to probation through no fault of his. The underlying
philosophy of probation is one of liberality towards the accused. Such philosophy is not served by a harsh and stringent
interpretation of the statutory provisions. As Justice Vicente V. Mendoza said in his dissent in Francisco, the Probation Law
must not be regarded as a mere privilege to be given to the accused only where it clearly appears he comes within its
letter; to do so would be to disregard the teaching in many cases that the Probation Law should be applied in favor of the
accused not because it is a criminal law but to achieve its beneficent purpose.

xxxx

At any rate, what is clear is that, had the RTC done what was right and imposed on Arnel the correct penalty of two years
and four months maximum, he would havehad the right to apply for probation. No one could say with certainty that he
would have availed himself of the right had the RTC doneright by him. The idea may not even have crossed his mind
precisely since the penalty he got was not probationable.
The question in this case is ultimately one of fairness. Is it fair to deny Arnel the right to apply for probation when the new
1âwphi1

penalty that the Court imposes on him is, unlike the one erroneously imposed by the trial court, subject to probation?
(Emphases supplied)

In our Decision, we set aside the RTC and the CA judgments and found Tecson et al.ultimately liable for the crime of
reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. Pursuant to Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, the offense is punishable by
arresto mayor in its maximum period (from 4 months and 1 day to 6 months) to prisión correccional in its medium period
(from 2 years, 4 months, and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months). Considering that the new ruling in Colinares is more
favorable to Tecson et al., we rule that they are now eligible to apply for probation. Since Fidelito Dizon (Dizon) was
convicted of the same crime, we hereby clarify that Dizon is also eligible for probation.

While we cannot recognize the validityof the Orders of RTC Branch 130, which granted the Applications for Probation, we
cannot disregard the fact that Tecson et al. have fulfilled the terms and conditions of their previous probation program and
have eventually been discharged therefrom. Thus, should they reapply for probation, the trial court may, at its discretion,
consider their antecedent probation service in resolving whether to place them under probation at this time and in
determining the terms, conditions, and period thereof.

Final clarificatory matters

We now take this opportunity to correct an unintentional typographical error in the minimum term of the penalty imposed on
the accused Dizon and Tecson et al. While this issue was not raised by any of the parties before us, this Court deems it
proper to discuss the matter ex proprio motuin the interest of justice. In the first paragraph of the dispositive portion of our
Decision dated 1 February 2012, the fourth sentence reads as follows:

They are hereby sentenced to suffer anindeterminate prison term of four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as
minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prisión correccional, as maximum.

As we had intended to impose on the accused the maximum term of the "penalty next lower" than that prescribed by the
Revised Penal Code for the offense of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide, in accordance with the Indeterminate
Sentence Law (ISL),70 the phrase "and one (1) day," which had been inadvertently added, must be removed. Consequently,
in the first paragraph of the dispositive portion, the fourth sentence should now read as follows:

They are hereby sentenced to suffer anindeterminate prison term of four (4) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four
(4) years and two (2) months of prisión correccional, as maximum. In this instance, we further find it important to clarify the
accessory penalties inherent to the principal penalty imposed on Dizon and Tecson et al.

By operation of Articles 40 to 45 and 73 of the Revised Penal Code, a corresponding accessory penalty automatically
attaches every time a court lays down a principal penalty outlined in Articles 25 and 27 thereof.71 The applicable accessory
penalty is determined by using as reference the principal penaltyimposed by the court before the prison sentence is
computed in accordance with the ISL.72 This determination is made in spite of the two classes ofpenalties mentioned in an
indeterminate sentence. It must be emphasized that the provisions on the inclusion of accessory penalties specifically
allude to the actual "penalty"73 imposed, not to the "prison sentence"74 set by a court. We believe that the ISL did not intend
to have the effect of imposing on the convict two distinct sets of accessory penalties for the same offense.75 The two
penalties are only relevant insofar as setting the minimum imprisonment period is concerned, after which the convict may
apply for parole and eventually seek the shortening of the prison term.76

Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, the prescribed penalty for the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide is arresto mayor in its maximum period to prisión correccionalin its medium period. As this provision grants courts
the discretion tolay down a penalty without regard to the presence of mitigating and aggravating circumstances, the
imposable penaltymust also be within the aforementioned range.77 Hence, before applying the ISL, we ultimately imposed
on Dizon and Tecson et al. the actual (straight) penalty78 of four years and two months of prisión correccional.79 Pursuant to
Article 43 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty of prisión correccional automatically carries with it80 the following
accessory penalties: ARTICLE 43. Prisión Correccional— Its accessory penalties. — The penalty of prisión correccional
shall carry with it that of suspension from public office, from the right tofollow a profession or calling, and that of perpetual
special disqualification from the right of suffrage, if the duration of said imprisonment shall exceed eighteen months. The
offender shall suffer the disqualification provided in this article although pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the
same shall have been expressly remitted in the pardon.

The duration of their suspension shall be the same as that of their principal penalty sans the ISL; that is, for four years and
two months81 or until they have served their sentence in accordance with law. Their suspension takes effect immediately,
once the judgment of conviction becomes final.82

We further point out that if the length of their imprisonment exceeds 18 months, they shall furthermore suffer a perpetual
special disqualification from the right of suffrage. Under Article 32 of the RevisedPenal Code, if this accessory penalty
attaches, it shall forever deprive them of the exercise of their right (a) to vote in any popular election for any public office;
(b) to be elected to that office; and (c) to hold any public office.83 Any public office that they may be holding becomes vacant
upon finality of the judgment.84 The aforementioned accessory penalties can only be wiped out if expressly remitted in a
pardon.85

Of course, the aforementioned accessory penalties are without prejudice to a grant of probation, shouldthe trial court find
them eligible therefor. As we explained in Baclayon,86 the grant of probation suspends the execution of the principal penalty
of imprisonment, as well as that of the accessory penalties. We have reiterated this point in Moreno v. Commission on
Elections:87

In Baclayon v. Mutia, the Court declared that an order placing defendant on probation is not a sentence but is rather, in
effect, a suspension of the imposition of sentence. We held that the grant of probation to petitioner suspended the
imposition of the principal penalty of imprisonment, as well as the accessory penalties of suspension from public office and
from the right to follow a profession or calling, and that of perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage. We
thus deleted from the order granting probation the paragraph which required that petitioner refrain from continuing with her
teaching profession.

Applying this doctrine to the instant case, the accessory penalties of suspension from public office, from the right to follow a
profession or calling, and that of perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage, attendant to the penalty of
arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period imposed upon Moreno were similarly
suspended upon the grant of probation.

It appears then that during the period of probation, the probationer is not even disqualified from running for a public office
because the accessory penalty of suspension from public office is put on hold for the duration of the probation. x x x x.
During the period of probation, the probationer does not serve the penalty imposed upon him by the court but is merely
required to comply with all the conditions prescribed in the probation order.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for Partial Reconsideration of petitioner Gerarda H. Villa in connection
with G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080 is hereby DENIED. The Motion for Reconsideration filed by the Office of the Solicitor
General concerning G.R. Nos. 155101 and 154954 is also DENIED.

The respective Motions for Clarification or Reconsideration of Antonio Mariano Almeda, Junel Anthony D. Arna, Renato
Bantug, Jr., and Vincent Tecson are likewise DENIED. In light of the finding that Caloocan City Regional Trial Court Branch
130 acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the aforementioned Applications for Probation, we
hereby ANNUL the entire probation proceedings and SET ASIDE all orders, resolutions, or judgments issued in connection
thereto. We, however, CLARIFY that Antonio Mariano Almeda, Junel Anthony D. Arna, Renato Bantug, Jr., Vincent
Tecson, and Fidelito Dizon are eligible to apply or reapply for probation in view of our recent ruling in Colinares v. People of
the Philippines,88 without prejudice to their remaining civil liability, if any.
Furthermore, we issue a CORRECTION of the dispositive portion of our Decision dated 1 February 2012 and hereby
delete the phrase "and one (1) day" located in the fourth sentence of the first paragraph thereof. The sentence shall now
read as follows: "They are hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term of four (4) months of arresto mayor, as
minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prisi6n correccional, as maximum."

SO ORDERED.