Professional Documents
Culture Documents
A. composition
-sema vs comelec
Thus, the creation of any of the four local government units – province, city,
municipality or barangay – must comply with three conditions. First, the
creation of a local government unit must follow the criteria fixed in the Local
Government Code. Second, such creation must not conflict with any
provision of the Constitution. Third, there must be a plebiscite in the political
units affected.
Under the present Constitution, as well as in past Constitutions, the power to increase the
allowable membership in the House of Representatives, and to reapportion legislative districts, is
vested exclusively in Congress. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides:
xxxx
(4) Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress
shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standards
provided in this section. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 5 (1), Article VI of the Constitution vests in Congress the power to increase,
through a law, the allowable membership in the House of Representatives. Section 5 (4)
empowers Congress to reapportion legislative districts. The power to reapportion legislative
districts necessarily includes the power to create legislative districts out of existing ones.
Congress exercises these powers through a law that Congress itself enacts, and not through a law
that regional or local legislative bodies enact. The allowable membership of the House of
Representatives can be increased, and new legislative districts of Congress can be created, only
through a national law passed by Congress. In Montejo v. COMELEC, we held that the “power
of redistricting x x x is traditionally regarded as part of the power (of Congress) to make laws,”
and thus is vested exclusively in Congress.
a.1. Senate
Section 4. The term of office of the Senators shall be six years and shall
commence, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of
June next following their election. No Senator shall serve for more than two
consecutive terms[SENATOR COULD RUN AGAIN THREE YERS AFTER THE
EXPIRATION OF THE SECOND TERM]. Voluntary renunciation of the office for
any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity
of his service for the full term of which he was elected.
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the
total number of representatives including those under the party list. For three
consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the
seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law,
by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous
cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be
provided by law, except the religious sector.
(4) Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress
shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standards
provided in this section.
Tobias vs abalos
As to the contention that the assailed law violates the present limit on the number of
representatives as set forth in the Constitution, a reading of the applicable provision, Article VI, Section
5(1), as aforequoted, shows that the present limit of 250 members is not absolute. The Constitution
clearly provides that the House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than 250 members,
"unless otherwise provided by law." The inescapable import of the latter clause is that the present
composition of Congress may be increased, if Congress itself so mandates through a legislative
enactment. Therefore, the increase in congressional representation mandated by R.A. No. 7675 is not
unconstitutional.
As to the contention that Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 in effect preempts the right of Congress
to reapportion legislative districts, the said argument borders on the absurd since petitioners overlook
the glaring fact that it was Congress itself which drafted, deliberated upon and enacted the assailed
law, including Section 49 thereof. Congress cannot possibly preempt itself on a right which pertains to
itself.
In the same vein, the COMELEC cannot, in the guise of enforcing and
administering election laws or promulgating rules and regulations to implement Sec.
36(g), validly impose qualifications on candidates for senator in addition to what the
Constitution prescribes. If Congress cannot require a candidate for senator to
meet such additional qualification, the COMELEC, to be sure, is also
without such power. The right of a citizen in the democratic process of
election should not be defeated by unwarranted impositions of
requirement not otherwise specified in the Constitution.13
b. Residence Requirement
Macalintal vs Comelec
The majority, thru our esteemed colleague, Madam Justice Martinez, rules
that section 2, Article V of the 1987 Constitution mandating Congress to devise a
system for overseas absentee voting operates as an exception to the residence
requirements as the members of the Constitutional Commission manifested a clear
intent “to enfranchise as much as possible all Filipino citizens abroad who have not
abandoned their domicile of origin,” viz:[6]
The majority further holds that if actual physical residence in the Philippines is
required, “there is no sense for the framers of the Constitution to mandate
Congress to establish a system for absentee voting.”[8]
Contrary to the claim of petitioner, the execution of the affidavit itself is not
the enabling or enfranchising act. The affidavit required in Section 5(d) is not only
proof of the intention of the immigrant or permanent resident to go back and
resume residence in the Philippines, but more significantly, it serves as an
explicit expression that he had not in fact abandoned his domicile of
origin. Thus, it is not correct to say that the execution of the affidavit under Section
5(d) violates the Constitution that proscribes “provisional registration or a promise
by a voter to perform a condition to be qualified to vote in a political exercise.”
b. 2 Term vs Tenure
Dimaporo vs Mitra
Under the questioned provision, when an elective official covered thereby files a
certificate of candidacy for another office, he is deemed to have voluntarily cut
short his tenure, not his term. The term remains and his successor, if any, is allowed
to serve its unexpired portion.
in the case of State ex rel. Berge vs. Lansing, the expression in the
constitution of the circumstances which shall bring about a vacancy does not
necessarily exclude all others. Neither does it preclude the legislature from
prescribing other grounds. Events so enumerated in the constitution or statutes are
merely conditions the occurrence of any one of which the office shall become
vacant not as a penalty but simply as the legal effect of any one of the events.
That the act, contemplated in Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881, of filing a
certificate of candidacy for another office constitutes an overt, concrete act of
voluntary renunciation of the elective office presently being held is evident from
this exchange between then Members of Parliament Arturo Tolentino and Jose Rono
And in the other, because he is running for the same position, it is otherwise.
In Monroy vs. Court of Appeals, a case involving Section 27 of R.A. No. 180
above-quoted, this Court categorically pronounced that "forfeiture (is) automatic
and permanently effective upon the filing of the certificate of candidacy for another
office. Only the moment and act of filing are considered. Once the certificate is filed,
the seat is forever forfeited and nothing save a new election or appointment can
restore the ousted official.
As the mere act of filing the certificate of candidacy for another office
produces automatically the permanent forfeiture of the elective position being
presently held, it is not necessary, as petitioner opines, that the other position be
actually held. The ground for forfeiture in Section 13, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution is different from the forfeiture decreed in Section 67, Article IX of B.P.
Blg. 881, which is actually a mode of voluntary renunciation of office under Section
7, par. 2 of Article VI of the Constitution.
Gaminde vs Mitra
In the law of public officers, there is a settled distinction between term and
tenure. [T]he term of an office must be distinguished from the tenure of the
incumbent. The term means the time during which the officer may claim to hold
office as of right, and fixes the interval after which the several incumbents shall
succeed one another. The tenure represents the term during which the incumbent
actually holds the office. The term of office is not affected by the hold-over. The
tenure may be shorter than the term for reasons within or beyond the power of the
incumbent.
In concluding that February 02, 1987 is the proper starting point of the terms
of office of the first appointees to the Constitutional Commissions of a staggered 7-
5-3 year terms, we considered the plain language of Article IX (B), Section 1 (2),
Article IX (C), Section 1 (2) and Article IX (D), Section 1 (2) of the 1987 Constitution
that uniformly prescribed a seven-year term of office for Members of the
Constitutional Commissions, without re-appointment, and for the first appointees
terms of seven, five and three years, without re-appointment. In no case shall any
Member be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity. There is no
need to expressly state the beginning of the term of office as this is understood to
coincide with the effectivity of the Constitution upon its ratification (on February 02,
1987).
D. Election of Officers
Sec. 16 (2) – The Senate shall elect its president and the house of
representative its speaker, by a majority vote of all its respective members.
Each house shall choose such other officers as it may deem necessary.
Avelino vs Cuenco
The Court has no jurisdiction of the case because the subject matter is political in
nature and in doing so, the court will be against the doctrine of separation of
powers.
To the first question, the answer is in the negative, in view of the separation
of powers, the political nature of the controversy (Alejandrino vs. Quezon, 46
Phil., 83; Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil., 192; Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil., 1)
and the constitutional grant to the Senate of the power to elect its own
president, which power should not be interfered with, nor taken over, by the
judiciary. We refused to take cognizance of the Vera case even if the rights of
the electors of the suspended senators were alleged affected without any
immediate remedy. A fortiori we should abstain in this case because the
selection of the presiding officer affect only the Senators themselves who are
at liberty at any time to choose their officers, change or reinstate them.
Anyway, if, as the petition must imply to be acceptable, the majority of the
Senators want petitioner to preside, his remedy lies in the Senate Session
Hall — not in the Supreme Court.
Avelino vs Cuenco
It was held that there is a quorum that 12 being the majority of 23.
In fine, all the four justice agree that the Court being confronted with the practical
situation that of the twenty three senators who may participate in the Senate
deliberations in the days immediately after this decision, twelve senators will
support Senator Cuenco and, at most, eleven will side with Senator Avelino, it would
be most injudicious to declare the latter as the rightful President of the Senate, that
office being essentially one that depends exclusively upon the will of the majority of
the senators, the rule of the Senate about tenure of the President of that body being
amenable at any time by that majority. And at any session hereafter held with
thirteen or more senators, in order to avoid all controversy arising from the
divergence of opinion here about quorum and for the benefit of all concerned, the
said twelve senators who approved the resolutions herein involved could ratify all
their acts and thereby place them beyond the shadow of a doubt.
d. 3 Rules of proceedings
Section 16, [3]- Each house may determine the rules of proceedings, punish its
members for disorderly behavior, and with the concurrence of two thirds of all its
members, suspend or expel a member. A penalty for suspension, when imposed,
shall not exceed thirty days.
Arroyo vs de Venecia
Rules of each House of Congress are hardly permanent in character. They are
subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting
them as they are primarily procedural. Courts ordinarily have no concern with their
observance. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body.
Consequently, mere failure to conform to them does not have the effect of nullifying
the act taken if the requisite number of members has agreed to a particular
measure. But this is subject to qualification. Where the construction to be given to a
rule affects person other than members of the legislative body, the question
presented is necessarily judicial in character. Even its validity is open to question in
a case where private rights are involved.
In the case, no rights of private individuals are involved but only those of a member
who, instead of seeking redress in the House, chose to transfer the dispute to the
Court.
The matter complained of concerns a matter of internal procedure of the House with
which the Court should not be concerned. The claim is not that there was no
quorum but only that Rep. Arroyo was effectively prevented from questioning the
presence of a quorum. Rep. Arroyo’s earlier motion to adjourn for lack of quorum
had already been defeated, as the roll call established the existence of a quorum.
The question of quorum cannot be raised repeatedly especially when the quorum is
obviously present for the purpose of delaying the business of the House.
d. 4 Discipline of Members
Section 16, [3] - Each house may determine the rules of proceedings, punish its
members for disorderly behavior, and with the concurrence of two thirds of all its
members, suspend or expel a member. A penalty for suspension, when imposed,
shall not exceed thirty days.
Alejandro vs Quezon
There are certain basic principles which lie at the foundation of the
Government of the Philippine Islands, which are familiar to students of
public law. It is here only necessary to recall that under our system of government,
each of the three departments is
distinct and not directly subject to the control of another
department. The power to control is the power to abrogate
and the power to abrogate is the power to usurp. Each
department may, nevertheless, indirectly restrain the others.
It is peculiarly the duty of the judiciary to say what the law is,
to enforce the Constitution, and to decide whether the proper
constitutional sphere of a department has been transcended.
The courts must determine the validity of legislative
enactments as well as the legality of all private and official
acts. To this extent, do the courts restrain the other
departments.
Conceding therefore that the power of the Senate to punish its
members for disorderly behavior does not authorize it to suspend on
appointive member from the exercise of his office for one year,
conceding what has been so well stated by the learned counsel for the
petitioner, conceding all this and more, yet the writ prayed for cannot
issue, for the all-conclusive reason that the Supreme Court does not
possess the power of coercion to make the Philippine Senate take any
particular action. If it be said that this conclusion leaves the petitioner
without a remedy, the answer is that the judiciary is not the repository
of all wisdom and all power. It would hardly be becoming for the
judiciary to assume the role of either a credulous inquisitor, a
querulous censor, or a jaunty knight, who passes down the halls of
legislation and of administration giving heed to those who have grievances against
the Legislature and the Chief Executive.
Osmena vs Pandatun
Sec. 15 (now Sec. 11), Art. VI of the Constitution provides that for any speech
or debate in Congress, the Senators or Members of the House of Representatives
shall not be questioned in any other place.
Santiago vs Sandiganbayan
The authority of the Sandiganbayan to order the preventive suspension of an
incumbent public official charged with violation of the provisions of Republic Act No.
3019 has both legal and jurisprudential support. xxx
The order of suspension prescribed by Republic Act No. 3019 is distinct from the
power of Congress to discipline its own ranks under the Constitution which
provides that each-
“x x x house may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its Members for
disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds of all its Members,
suspend or expel a Member. A penalty of suspension, when imposed, shall not
exceed sixty days.”
xxx
Republic Act No. 3019 does not exclude from its coverage the members of Congress
and that, therefore, the Sandiganbayan did not err in thus decreeing the assailed
preventive suspension order.
sec. 16 [4] –
Petition is dismissed without cost. The Court held that to go behind the
enrolled bills which were already authenticated and to investigate the journals
amounts to disregard of the respect due to the coequal and independent
department of the state, and it would be an inquisition into the conduct of the
members of the legislature, a very delicate power, the frequent exercise of which
must lead to confusion in the administration of the law.
Duly certified copies shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of Acts and the due
enactment thereof.
Casco vs Gimenez
Furthermore, it is well settled that the enrolled bill — which uses the term
"urea formaldehyde" instead of "urea and formaldehyde" — is conclusive upon the
courts as regards the tenor of the measure passed by Congress and approved by
the President (Primicias vs. Paredes, 61 Phil. 118, 120; Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78
Phil. 1; Macias vs. Comm. on Elections, L-18684, September 14, 1961). If there has
been any mistake in the printing ofthe bill before it was certified by the officers of
Congress and approved by the Executive — on which we cannot speculate, without
jeopardizing the principle of separation of powers and undermining one of the
cornerstones of our democratic system — the remedy is by amendment or curative
legislation, not by judicial decree.
Us vs Pons
See Bernas pp 744
astorga vs villegas
The enrolled bill theory is based mainly on the respect due to coequal and
independent departments, which requires the judicial department to accept, as
having passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the right manner.
The journal discloses that substantial and lengthy amendments were introduced on
the floor and approved by the Senate but were not incorporated in the printed text
sent to the President and signed by him. The Court declares that the bill was not
duly enacted and therefore did not become a law.
Morales vs Subido
It was not until 1947 that the question was presented Mabanao v. Lopez-
Vito, 8 and we there held that an enrolled bill "imports absolute verity and is binding
on the courts". This Court held itself bound by an authenticated resolution despite
the fact that the vote of three-fourths of the members of the Congress (as required
by the Constitution to approve proposals for constitutional amendments) was not
actually obtained on account of the suspension of some members of the House of
Representative and the Senate.lawphi1.nêt
Thus in Mabanag the enrolled bill theory was adopted. Whatever doubt there
might have been as to the status and force of the theory in the Philippines, in view
of the dissent of three Justices in Mabanag, 9 was finally laid to rest by the
unanimous decision in Casco Philippine Chemical Co. v. Gimenez. 10 Speaking for the
Court, the then Justice (now Chief Justice) Concepcion said:
Furthermore it is well settled that the enrolled bill — which uses the
term "urea formaldehyde" instead of "urea and formaldehyde" — is
conclusive upon the courts as regards the tenor of the measure passed by
Congress and approved by the President (Primicias vs. Paredes, 61 Phil. 118,
120; Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1; Macias vs. Comm. on Elections, L-
18684, September 14, 1961). If there has been any mistake in the printing of
the bill before it was certified by the officers of Congress and approved by the
Executive — on which we cannot speculate, without jeopardizing the principle
of separation of powers and undermining one of the cornerstones of our
democratic system — the remedy is by amendment or curative legislation,
not by judicial decree.
Arroyo vs de Vencia
e. Congressional Recorde
f. sessions
f. 1. Regular sessions
section 15 - Section 15. The Congress shall convene once every year on the fourth
Monday of July for its regular session, unless a different date is fixed by law, and
shall continue to be in session for such number of days as it may determine until
thirty days before the opening of its next regular session, exclusive of Saturdays,
Sundays, and legal holidays. The President may call a special session at any time.
Section 16 [5] - (5) Neither House during the sessions of the Congress shall, without
the consent of the other, adjourn for more than three days, nor to any other place
than that in which the two Houses shall be sitting.
Section 15. The Congress shall convene once every year on the fourth Monday of
July for its regular session, unless a different date is fixed by law, and shall continue
to be in session for such number of days as it may determine until thirty days
before the opening of its next regular session, exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays, and
legal holidays. The President may call a special session at any time.
Art. 7 secs 10 – 11
Section 10. The Congress shall, at ten o'clock in the morning of the third day after
the vacancy in the offices of the President and Vice-President occurs, convene in
accordance with its rules without need of a call and within seven days, enact a law
calling for a special election to elect a President and a Vice-President to be held not
earlier than forty-five days nor later than sixty days from the time of such call. The
bill calling such special election shall be deemed certified under paragraph 2,
Section 26, Article V1 of this Constitution and shall become law upon its approval on
third reading by the Congress. Appropriations for the special election shall be
charged against any current appropriations and shall be exempt from the
requirements of paragraph 4, Section 25, Article V1 of this Constitution. The
convening of the Congress cannot be suspended nor the special election postponed.
No special election shall be called if the vacancy occurs within eighteen months
before the date of the next presidential election.
Section 11. Whenever the President transmits to the President of the Senate and
the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration that he is
unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, and until he transmits to
them a written declaration to the contrary, such powers and duties shall be
discharged by the Vice-President as Acting President.
Whenever a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet transmit to the President of
the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written
declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his
office, the Vice-President shall immediately assume the powers and duties of the
office as Acting President.
Thereafter, when the President transmits to the President of the Senate and to the
Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration that no inability
exists, he shall reassume the powers and duties of his office. Meanwhile, should a
majority of all the Members of the Cabinet transmit within five days to the President
of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives, their written
declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his
office, the Congress shall decide the issue. For that purpose, the Congress shall
convene, if it is not in session, within forty-eight hours, in accordance with its rules
and without need of call.
If the Congress, within ten days after receipt of the last written declaration, or, if not
in session, within twelve days after it is required to assemble, determines by a two-
thirds vote of both Houses, voting separately, that the President is unable to
discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice-President shall act as
President; otherwise, the President shall continue exercising the powers and duties
of his office.
The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen,
the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or the extension thereof,
and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.
f. 3. Joint sessions
f.3. a. voting separately
article vii, sec 4. Section 4. The President and the Vice-President shall be elected by
direct vote of the people for a term of six years which shall begin at noon on the
thirtieth day of June next following the day of the election and shall end at noon of
the same date, six years thereafter. The President shall not be eligible for any re-
election. No person who has succeeded as President and has served as such for
more than four years shall be qualified for election to the same office at any time.
No Vice-President shall serve for more than two successive terms. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of the service for the full term for which he was
elected.
Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election for President and Vice-
President shall be held on the second Monday of May.
The returns of every election for President and Vice-President, duly certified by the
board of canvassers of each province or city, shall be transmitted to the Congress,
directed to the President of the Senate. Upon receipt of the certificates of canvass,
the President of the Senate shall, not later than thirty days after the day of the
election, open all the certificates in the presence of the Senate and the House of
Representatives in joint public session, and the Congress, upon determination of the
authenticity and due execution thereof in the manner provided by law, canvass the
votes.
The person having the highest number of votes shall be proclaimed elected, but in
case two or more shall have an equal and highest number of votes, one of them
shall forthwith be chosen by the vote of a majority of all the Members of both
Houses of the Congress, voting separately.
The Congress shall promulgate its rules for the canvassing of the certificates.
The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating
to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and
may promulgate its rules for the purpose.
11, [4] = If the Congress, within ten days after receipt of the last written
declaration, or, if not in session, within twelve days after it is required to assemble,
determines by a two-thirds vote of both Houses, voting separately, that the
President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice-
President shall act as President; otherwise, the President shall continue exercising
the powers and duties of his office.
Section 23. The President shall address the Congress at the opening of its regular
session. He may also appear before it at any other time.
The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours following such
proclamation or suspension, convene in accordance with its rules without need of a
call.
The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen,
the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or the extension thereof,
and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.
A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor
supplant the functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize
the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where
civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus.
The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall apply only to
persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in, or directly connected
with, invasion.
During the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, any person thus
arrested or detained shall be judicially charged within three days, otherwise he shall
be released.