CAYAO- LASAM 574 S 439
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court implantation. Petitioner argued that whether or not a D&C procedure was done by her or any other
filed by Dr. Fe Cayao-Lasam (petitioner) seeking to annul the Decision[1] dated July 4, 2003 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 62206.
The antecedent facts:
On July 28, 1994, respondent, three months pregnant Editha Ramolete (Editha) was
brought to the Lorma Medical Center (LMC) in San Fernando, La Union due to vaginal
bleeding. Upon advice of petitioner relayed via telephone, Editha was admitted to the LMC on the
same day. A pelvic sonogram[2] was then conducted on Editha revealing the fetus weak cardiac
pulsation.[3]The following day, Edithas repeat pelvic sonogram[4] showed that aside from the fetus
weak cardiac pulsation, no fetal movement was also appreciated. Due to persistent and profuse
vaginal bleeding, petitioner advised Editha to undergo a Dilatation and Curettage Procedure (D&C)
or raspa.
On July 30, 1994, petitioner performed the D&C procedure. Editha was discharged from
the hospital the following day.
On September 16, 1994, Editha was once again brought at the LMC, as she was suffering from
vomiting and severe abdominal pains. Editha was attended by Dr. Beatriz de la Cruz, Dr. Victor B.
Mayo and Dr. Juan V. Komiya. Dr. Mayo allegedly informed Editha that there was a dead fetus in
the latters womb. After, Editha underwent laparotomy,[5] she was found to have a massive intra-
abdominal hemorrhage and a ruptured uterus. Thus, Editha had to undergo a procedure for
hysterectomy[6] and as a result, she has no more chance to bear a child.
On November 7, 1994, Editha and her husband Claro Ramolete (respondents) filed a
Complaint[7] for Gross Negligence and Malpractice against petitioner before the Professional
Regulations Commission (PRC).
Respondents alleged that Edithas hysterectomy was caused by petitioners unmitigated
negligence and professional incompetence in conducting the D&C procedure and the petitioners
failure to remove the fetus inside Edithas womb.[8] Among the alleged acts of negligence were: first,
petitioners failure to check up, visit or administer medication on Editha during her first day of
confinement at the LMC;[9] second, petitioner recommended that a D&C procedure be performed
on Editha without conducting any internal examination prior to the procedure;[10] third, petitioner
immediately suggested a D&C procedure instead of closely monitoring the state of pregnancy
of Editha.[11]
In her Answer,[12] petitioner denied the allegations of negligence and incompetence with the following
explanations: upon Edithas confirmation that she would seek admission at the LMC, petitioner
immediately called the hospital to anticipate the arrival of Editha and ordered through the telephone
the medicines Editha needed to take, which the nurses carried out; petitioner visitedEditha on the
morning of July 28, 1994 during her rounds; on July 29, 1994, she performed an internal
examination on Editha and she discovered that the latters cervix was already open, thus, petitioner
discussed the possible D&C procedure, should the bleeding become more profuse; on July 30
1994, she conducted another internal examination on Editha, which revealed that the latters cervix
was still open; Editha persistently complained of her vaginal bleeding and her passing out of some
meaty mass in the process of urination and bowel movement; thus, petitioner advisedEditha to
undergo D&C procedure which the respondents consented to; petitioner was very vocal in the
operating room about not being able to see an abortus;[13] taking the words of Editha to mean that
she was passing out some meaty mass and clotted blood, she assumed that the abortus must have
been expelled in the process of bleeding; it was Editha who insisted that she wanted to be
discharged; petitioner agreed, but she advised Editha to return for check-up on August 5, 1994,
which the latter failed to do.
Petitioner contended that it was Edithas gross negligence and/or omission in insisting to be
discharged on July 31, 1994 against doctors advice and her unjustified failure to return for check-up
as directed by petitioner that contributed to her life-threatening condition on September 16, 1994;
that Edithas hysterectomy was brought about by her very abnormal pregnancy known
as placentaincreta, which was an extremely rare and very unusual case of abdominal placental
doctor, there would be no difference at all because at any stage of gestation before term, the uterus
would rupture just the same.
On March 4, 1999, the Board of Medicine (the Board) of the PRC rendered a
Decision,[14] exonerating petitioner from the charges filed against her. The Board held:
Based on the findings of the doctors who conducted the laparotomy on Editha,
hers is a case of Ectopic Pregnancy Interstitial. This type of ectopic pregnancy is
one that is being protected by the uterine muscles and manifestations may take
later than four (4) months and only attributes to two percent (2%)
of ectopic pregnancy cases.
When complainant Editha was admitted at Lorma Medical Center on July 28,
1994 due to vaginal bleeding, an ultra-sound was performed upon her and the
result of the Sonogram Test reveals a morbid fetus but did not specify where
the fetus was located. Obstetricians will assume that the pregnancy is within the
uterus unless so specified by the Sonologist who conducted the ultra-
sound. Respondent (Dr. Lasam) cannot be faulted if she was not able to
determine that complainant Editha is having an ectopic pregnancy
interstitial. The D&C conducted on Editha is necessary considering that her
cervix is already open and so as to stop the profuse bleeding. Simple curettage
cannot remove a fetus if the patient is having an ectopic pregnancy,
since ectopic pregnancy is pregnancy conceived outside the uterus and
curettage is done only within the uterus.Therefore, a more extensive operation
needed in this case of pregnancy in order to remove the fetus.[15]
Feeling aggrieved, respondents went to the PRC on appeal. On November 22, 2000, the
PRC rendered a Decision[16] reversing the findings of the Board and revoking petitioners authority or
license to practice her profession as a physician.[17]
Petitioner brought the matter to the CA in a Petition for Review under Rule 43 of the Rules
of Court. Petitioner also dubbed her petition as one for certiorari[18] under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court.
In the Decision dated July 4, 2003, the CA held that the Petition for Review under Rule 43
of the Rules of Court was an improper remedy, as the enumeration of the quasi-judicial agencies in
Rule 43 is exclusive.[19] PRC is not among the quasi-judicial bodies whose judgment or final orders
are subject of a petition for review to the CA, thus, the petition for review of the PRC Decision, filed at
the CA, was improper. The CA further held that should the petition be treated as a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65, the same would still be dismissed for being improper and
premature. Citing Section 26[20] of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 2382 or the Medical Act of 1959, the CA
held that the plain, speedy and adequate remedy under the ordinary course of law which petitioner
should have availed herself of was to appeal to the Office of the President.[21]
Hence, herein petition, assailing the decision of the CA on the following
grounds:
1. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A
QUESTION OF LAW IN HOLDING THAT THE PROFESSIONAL
REGULATION[S] COMMISSION (PRC) WAS EXCLUDED
AMONG THE QUASI-JUDICIAL AGENCIES CONTEMPLATED
UNDER RULE 43 OF THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE;
2. EVEN ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, THAT PRC WAS
EXCLUDED FROM THE PURVIEW OF RULE 43 OF THE RULES
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, THE PETITIONER WAS NOT
PRECLUDED FROM FILING A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI
WHERE THE DECISION WAS ALSO ISSUED IN EXCESS OF OR
 WITHOUT JURISDICTION, OR WHERE THE DECISION WAS A
PATENT NULLITY;
3. HEREIN RESPONDENTS-SPOUSES ARE NOT
ALLOWED BY LAW TO APPEAL FROM THE DECISION OF THE
BOARD OF MEDICINE TO THE PROFESSIONAL
REGULATION[S] COMMISSION;
4. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN DENYING FOR IMPROPER FORUM
THE PETITION FOR REVIEW/PETITION FOR CERTIORARI
WITHOUT GOING OVER THE MERITS OF THE GROUNDS
RELIED UPON BY THE PETITIONER;
5. PRCS GRAVE OMISSION TO AFFORD HEREIN
PETITONER A CHANCE TO BE HEARD ON APPEAL IS A
CLEAR VIOLATION OF HER CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE
PROCESS AND HAS THE EFFECT OF RENDERING THE
JUDGMENT NULL AND VOID;
6. COROLLARY TO THE FOURTH ASSIGNED
ERROR, PRC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION,
AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION, IN ACCEPTING AND
CONSIDERING THE MEMORANDUM ON APPEAL WITHOUT
PROOF OF SERVICE TO HEREIN PETITIONER, AND IN
VIOLATION OF ART. IV, SEC. 35 OF THE RULES AND
REGULATIONS GOVERNING THE REGULATION AND
PRACTICE OF PROFESSIONALS;
7. PRC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION IN REVOKING PETITIONERS LICENSE TO
PRACTICE MEDICINE WITHOUT AN EXPERT TESTIMONY TO
SUPPORT ITS CONCLUSION AS TO THE CAUSE OF
RESPONDENT EDITHAT [SIC] RAMOLETES INJURY;
8. PRC COMMITTED AN EVEN GRAVER ABUSE OF
DISCRETION IN TOTALLY DISREGARDING THE FINDING OF
THE BOARD OF MEDICINE, WHICH HAD THE NECESSARY
COMPETENCE AND EXPERTISE TO ESTABLISH THE CAUSE
OF RESPONDENT EDITHAS INJURY, AS WELL AS THE
TESTIMONY OF THE EXPERT WITNESS AUGUSTO MANALO,
M.D. ;[AND]
9. PRC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN
MAKING CONCLUSIONS OF FACTS THAT WERE NOT ONLY
UNSUPPORTED BY EVIDENCE BUT WERE ACTUALLY
CONTRARY TO EVIDENCE ON RECORD.[22]
The Court will first deal with the procedural issues.
Petitioner claims that the law does not allow complainants to appeal to the PRC from the decision of
the Board. She invokes Article IV, Section 35 of the Rules and Regulations Governing the
Regulation and Practice of Professionals, which provides:
Sec. 35. The respondent may appeal the decision of the Board within
thirty days from receipt thereof to the Commission whose decision shall be
final. Complainant, when allowed by law, may interpose an appeal from the
Decision of the Board within the same period. (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner asserts that a careful reading of the above law indicates that while the
respondent, as a matter of right, may appeal the Decision of the Board to the Commission, the
complainant may interpose an appeal from the decision of the Board only when so allowed by
law.[23] Petitioner cited Section 26 of Republic Act No. 2382 or The Medical Act of 1959, to wit:
Section 26. Appeal from judgment. The decision of the Board of Medical
Examiners (now Medical Board) shall automatically become final thirty days
after the date of its promulgation unless the respondent, during the same
period, has appealed to the Commissioner of Civil Service (now Professional
Regulations Commission) and later to the Office of the President of
the Philippines. If the final decision is not satisfactory, the respondent may ask
for a review of the case, or may file in court a petition for certiorari.
Petitioner posits that the reason why the Medical Act of 1959 allows only the respondent in
an administrative case to file an appeal with the Commission while the complainant is not allowed to
do so is double jeopardy. Petitioner is of the belief that the revocation of license to practice a
profession is penal in nature.[24]
The Court does not agree.
For one, the principle of double jeopardy finds no application in administrative cases. Double
jeopardy attaches only: (1) upon a valid indictment; (2) before a competent court; (3) after
arraignment; (4) when a valid plea has been entered; and (5) when the defendant was acquitted or
convicted, or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the
accused.[25] These elements were not present in the proceedings before the Board of Medicine, as
the proceedings involved in the instant case were administrative and not criminal in nature. The
Court has already held that double jeopardy does not lie in administrative cases.[26]
Moreover, Section 35 of the Rules and Regulations Governing the Regulation and Practice of
Professionals cited by petitioner was subsequently amended to read:
Sec. 35. The complainant/respondent may appeal the order, the resolution or
the decision of the Board within thirty (30) days from receipt thereof to the
Commission whose decision shall be final and executory.Interlocutory order
shall not be appealable to the Commission. (Amended by Res. 174, Series of
1990).[27] (Emphasis supplied)
Whatever doubt was created by the previous provision was settled with said
amendment. It is axiomatic that the right to appeal is not a natural right or a part of due
process, but a mere statutory privilege that may be exercised only in the manner
prescribed by law.[28] In this case, the clear intent of the amendment is to render the
right to appeal from a decision of the Board available to both complainants and
respondents.
Such conclusion is bolstered by the fact that in 2006, the PRC issued Resolution
No. 06-342(A), or the New Rules of Procedure in Administrative Investigations in the Professional
Regulations Commission and the Professional Regulatory Boards, which provides for the method of
appeal, to wit:
Sec. 1. Appeal; Period Non-Extendible.- The decision, order or resolution of the
Board shall be final and executory after the lapse of fifteen (15) days from
receipt of the decision, order or resolution without an appeal being perfected or
taken by either the respondent or the complainant. A party aggrieved by the
decision, order or resolution may file a notice of appeal from the decision, order
or resolution of the Board to the Commission within fifteen (15) days from
receipt thereof, and serving upon the adverse party a notice of appeal together
with the appellants brief or memorandum on appeal, and paying the appeal and
legal research fees. x x x[29]
The above-stated provision does not qualify whether only the complainant or respondent
may file an appeal; rather, the new rules provide that a party aggrieved may file a notice of
appeal.Thus, either the complainant or the respondent who has been aggrieved by the decision,
order or resolution of the Board may appeal to the Commission. It is an elementary rule that when
the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no need, in the absence of legislative
intent to the contrary, for any interpretation.[30] Words and phrases used in the statute should be
given their plain, ordinary, and common usage or meaning.[31]
Petitioner also submits that appeals from the decisions of the PRC should be with the CA,
as Rule 43[32] of the Rules of Court was precisely formulated and adopted to provide for a uniform
rule of appellate procedure for quasi-judicial agencies.[33] Petitioner further contends that a quasi-
judicial body is not excluded from the purview of Rule 43 just because it is not mentioned therein.[34]
On this point, the Court agrees with the petitioner.
Sec. 1, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 1. Scope. - This Rule shall apply to appeals from judgments
or final orders of the Court of Tax Appeals, and from awards, judgments, final
orders or resolutions of or authorized by any quasi-judicial agency in the
exercise of its quasi-judicial functions. Among these agencies are the Civil
Service Commission, Central Board of Assessment Appeals, Securities and
Exchange Commission, Office of the President, Land Registration Authority,
Social Security Commission, Civil Aeronautics Board, Bureau of Patents,
Trademarks and Technology Transfer, National Electrification Administration,
Energy Regulatory Board, National Telecommunications Commission,
Department of Agrarian Reform under Republic Act No. 6657, Government
Service Insurance System, Employees Compensation Commission,
Agricultural Inventions Board, Insurance Commission, Philippine Atomic Energy
Commission, Board of Investments, Construction Industry Arbitration
Commission, and voluntary arbitrators authorized by law. (Emphasis supplied)
Indeed, the PRC is not expressly mentioned as one of the agencies which are expressly
enumerated under Section 1, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. However, its absence from the
enumeration does not, by this fact alone, imply its exclusion from the coverage of said Rule.[35] The
Rule expressly provides that it should be applied to appeals from awards, judgments final orders or
resolutions of any quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions. The phrase
among these agencies confirms that the enumeration made in the Rule is not exclusive to the
agencies therein listed.[36]
Specifically, the Court, in Yang v. Court of Appeals,[37] ruled
[38]
that Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 129 conferred upon the CA exclusive appellate jurisdiction over
appeals from decisions of the PRC. The Court held:
The law has since been changed, however, at least in the matter of
the particular court to which appeals from the Commission should be
taken. On August 14, 1981, Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 became effective and
in its Section 29, conferred on the Court of Appeals exclusive appellate
jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders or awards of
Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or
commissions except those falling under the appellate jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court. x x x. In virtue of BP 129, appeals from the Professional
Regulations Commission are now exclusively cognizable by the Court of
Appeals.[39] (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, the enactment of B.P. Blg. 129, the precursor of the present Rules of Civil
Procedure,[40] lodged with the CA such jurisdiction over the appeals of decisions made by the PRC.
Anent the substantive merits of the case, petitioner questions the PRC decision for being without an
expert testimony to support its conclusion and to establish the cause of Edithas injury. Petitioner
avers that in cases of medical malpractice, expert testimony is necessary to support the conclusion
as to the cause of the injury.[41]
Medical malpractice is a particular form of negligence which consists in the failure of a physician or
surgeon to apply to his practice of medicine that degree of care and skill which is ordinarily employed
by the profession generally, under similar conditions, and in like surrounding circumstances.[42] In
order to successfully pursue such a claim, a patient must prove that the physician or surgeon either
failed to do something which a reasonably prudent physician or surgeon would not have done, and
that the failure or action caused injury to the patient.[43]
There are four elements involved in medical negligence cases: duty, breach, injury and proximate
causation.[44]
A physician-patient relationship was created when Editha employed the services of the
petitioner. As Edithas physician, petitioner was duty-bound to use at least the same level of care that
any reasonably competent doctor would use to treat a condition under the same
circumstances.[45] The breach of these professional duties of skill and care, or their improper
performance by a physician surgeon, whereby the patient is injured in body or in health, constitutes
actionable malpractice.[46] As to this aspect of medical malpractice, the determination of the
reasonable level of care and the breach thereof, expert testimony is essential.[47] Further, inasmuch
as the causes of the injuries involved in malpractice actions are determinable only in the light of
scientific knowledge, it has been recognized that expert testimony is usually necessary to support
the conclusion as to causation.[48]
In the present case, respondents did not present any expert testimony to support their claim that
petitioner failed to do something which a reasonably prudent physician or surgeon would have done.
Petitioner, on the other hand, presented the testimony of Dr. Augusto M. Manalo, who
was clearly an expert on the subject.
Generally, to qualify as an expert witness, one must have acquired special knowledge of
the subject matter about which he or she is to testify, either by the study of recognized authorities on
the subject or by practical experience.[49]
Dr. Manalo specializes in gynecology and obstetrics, authored and co-authored various
publications on the subject, and is a professor at the University of the Philippines.[50] According to
him, his diagnosis of Edithas case was Ectopic Pregnancy Interstitial (also referred to as Cornual),
Ruptured.[51] In stating that the D&C procedure was not the proximate cause of the rupture
ofEdithas uterus resulting in her hysterectomy, Dr. Manalo testified as follows:
Atty. Hidalgo:
Q: Doctor, we want to be clarified on this matter. The complainant had testified
here that the D&C was the proximate cause of the rupture of the
uterus. The condition which she found herself in on the second
admission. Will you please tell us whether that is true or not?
A: Yah, I do not think so for two reasons. One, as I have said earlier, the
instrument cannot reach the site of the pregnancy, for it to further
push the pregnancy outside the uterus. And, No. 2, I was thinking a
while ago about another reason- well, why I dont think so, because it
is the triggering factor for the rupture, it could havethe rupture could
have occurred much earlier, right after the D&C or a few days after
the D&C.
Q: In this particular case, doctor, the rupture occurred to have happened
minutes prior to the hysterectomy or right upon admission
on September 15, 1994 which is about 1 months after the patient
was discharged, after the D&C was conducted. Would you tell us
whether there is any relation at all of the D&C and the rupture in this
particular instance?
A: I dont think so for the two reasons that I have just mentioned- that it would not
be possible for the instrument to reach the site of pregnancy. And,
No. 2, if it is because of the D&C that rupture could have occurred
earlier.[52] (Emphases supplied)
Clearly, from the testimony of the expert witness and the reasons given by him, it is
evident that the D&C procedure was not the proximate cause of the rupture of Edithas uterus.
 During his cross-examination, Dr. Manalo testified on how he would have
addressed Edithas condition should he be placed in a similar circumstance as the petitioner. He
stated:
Atty. Ragonton:
Q: Doctor, as a practicing OB-Gyne, when do you consider that you have done
a good, correct and ideal dilatation and curettage procedure?
A: Well, if the patient recovers. If the patient gets well. Because even after the
procedure, even after the procedure you may feel that you have
scraped everything, the patient stops bleeding, she feels well, I think
you should still have some reservations, and wait a little more time.
Q: If you were the OB-Gyne who performed the procedure on
patient Editha Ramolete, would it be your standard practice to check
the fetal parts or fetal tissues that were allegedly removed?
A: From what I have removed, yes. But in this particular case, I think it was
assumed that it was part of the meaty mass which was expelled at
the time she was urinating and flushed in the toilet. So theres no way.
Q: There was [sic] some portions of the fetal parts that were removed?
A: No, it was described as scanty scraping if I remember it rightscanty.
Q: And you would not mind checking those scant or those little parts that were
removed?
A: Well, the fact that it was described means, I assume that it was
checked, no. It was described as scanty and the color also, I think
was described. Because it would be very unusual, even improbable
that it would not be examined, because when you scrape, the
specimens are right there before your eyes. Its in front of you. You
can touch it. In fact, some of them will stick to the instrument and
therefore to peel it off from the instrument, you have to touch them.
So, automatically they are examined closely.
Q: As a matter of fact, doctor, you also give telephone orders to your patients
through telephone?
A: Yes, yes, we do that, especially here in Manila because you know,
sometimes a doctor can also be tied-up somewhere and if you have
to wait until he arrive at a certain place before you give the order, then
it would be a lot of time wasted. Because if you know your patient, if
you have handled your patient, some of the symptoms you can
interpret that comes with practice. And, I see no reason for not
allowing telephone orders unless it is the first time that you will be
encountering the patient. That you have no idea what the problem is.
Q: But, doctor, do you discharge patients without seeing them?
A: Sometimes yes, depending on how familiar I am with the patient. We are on
the question of telephone orders. I am not saying that that is the idle
[sic] thing to do, but I think the reality of present day practice
somehow justifies telephone orders. I have patients whom I have
justified and then all of a sudden, late in the afternoon or late in the
evening, would suddenly call they have decided that they will go
home inasmuch as they anticipated that I will discharge them the
following day. So, I just call and ask our resident on duty or the nurse
to allow them to go because I have seen that patient and I think I
have full grasp of her problems. So, thats when I make this telephone
orders. And, of course before giving that order I ask about how she
feels.[53] (Emphases supplied)
From the foregoing testimony, it is clear that the D&C procedure was conducted in
accordance with the standard practice, with the same level of care that any reasonably competent
doctor would use to treat a condition under the same circumstances, and that there was nothing
irregular in the way the petitioner dealt with Editha.
Medical malpractice, in our jurisdiction, is often brought as a civil action for damages under
Article 2176[54] of the Civil Code. The defenses in an action for damages, provided for under Article
2179 of the Civil Code are:
Art. 2179. When the plaintiffs own negligence was the immediate and
proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his negligence
was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being
the defendants lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the
courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded.
Proximate cause has been defined as that which, in natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces injury, and without which the result would not
have occurred.[55] An injury or damage is proximately caused by an act or a failure to act, whenever it
appears from the evidence in the case that the act or omission played a substantial part in bringing
about or actually causing the injury or damage; and that the injury or damage was either a direct
result or a reasonably probable consequence of the act or omission.[56]
In the present case, the Court notes the findings of the Board of Medicine:
When complainant was discharged on July 31, 1994, herein respondent
advised her to return on August 4, 1994 or four (4) days after the D&C. This
advise was clear in complainants Discharge Sheet.However, complainant failed
to do so. This being the case, the chain of continuity as required in order that the
doctrine of proximate cause can be validly invoked was interrupted. Had she
returned, the respondent could have examined her
thoroughly.[57] x x x (Emphases supplied)
Also, in the testimony of Dr. Manalo, he stated further that assuming that there was in fact
a misdiagnosis, the same would have been rectified if Editha followed the petitioners order to return
for a check-up on August 4, 1994. Dr. Manalo stated:
Granting that the obstetrician-gynecologist has been misled (justifiably) up to
thus point that there would have been ample opportunity to rectify the
misdiagnosis, had the patient returned, as instructed for her follow-up
evaluation. It was one and a half months later that the patient sought
consultation with another doctor. The continued growth of
an ectopic pregnancy, until its eventual rupture, is a dynamic process. Much
change in physical findings could be expected in 1 months, including the
emergence of suggestive ones.[58]
It is undisputed that Editha did not return for a follow-up evaluation, in defiance of the
petitioners advise. Editha omitted the diligence required by the circumstances which could have
avoided the injury. The omission in not returning for a follow-up evaluation played a substantial part
in bringing about Edithas own injury. Had Editha returned, petitioner could have conducted the
proper medical tests and procedure necessary to determine Edithas health condition and applied the
corresponding treatment which could have prevented the rupture of Edithas uterus. The D&C
procedure having been conducted in accordance with the standard medical practice, it is clear
that Edithas omission was the proximate cause of her own injury and not merely a contributory
negligence on her part.
Contributory negligence is the act or omission amounting to want of ordinary care on the
part of the person injured, which, concurring with the defendants negligence, is the proximate cause
of the injury.[59] Difficulty seems to be apprehended in deciding which acts of the injured party shall be
considered immediate causes of the accident.[60] Where the immediate cause of an accident
resulting in an injury is the plaintiffs own act, which contributed to the principal occurrence as one of
its determining factors, he cannot recover damages for the injury.[61] Again, based on the evidence
presented in the present case under review, in which no negligence can be attributed to the
petitioner, the immediate cause of the accident resulting in Edithas injury was her own omission
when she did not return for a follow-up check up, in defiance of petitioners orders. The immediate
cause of Edithas injury was her own act; thus, she cannot recover damages from the injury.
Lastly, petitioner asserts that her right to due process was violated because she was never informed
by either respondents or by the PRC that an appeal was pending before the PRC.[62] Petitioner
claims that a verification with the records section of the PRC revealed that on April 15, 1999,
respondents filed a Memorandum on Appeal before the PRC, which did not attach the actual
registry receipt but was merely indicated therein.[63]
Respondents, on the other hand avers that if the original registry receipt was not attached to the
Memorandum on Appeal, PRC would not have entertained the appeal or accepted such pleading
for lack of notice or proof of service on the other party.[64] Also, the registry receipt could not be
appended to the copy furnished to petitioners former counsel, because the registry receipt was
already appended to the original copy of the Memorandum of Appeal filed with PRC.[65]
It is a well-settled rule that when service of notice is an issue, the rule is that the person alleging that
the notice was served must prove the fact of service. The burden of proving notice rests upon the
party asserting its existence.[66] In the present case, respondents did not present any proof that
petitioner was served a copy of the Memorandum on Appeal. Thus, respondents were not able to
satisfy the burden of proving that they had in fact informed the petitioner of the appeal proceedings
before the PRC.
In EDI-Staffbuilders International, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission,[67] in which
the National Labor Relations Commission failed to order the private respondent to furnish the
petitioner a copy of the Appeal Memorandum, the Court held that said failure deprived the petitioner
of procedural due process guaranteed by the Constitution, which could have served as basis for the
nullification of the proceedings in the appeal. The same holds true in the case at bar. The Court finds
that the failure of the respondents to furnish the petitioner a copy of the Memorandum of Appeal
submitted to the PRC constitutes a violation of due process. Thus, the proceedings before the PRC
were null and void.
All told, doctors are protected by a special rule of law. They are not guarantors of care.
They are not insurers against mishaps or unusual consequences[68] specially so if the patient herself
did not exercise the proper diligence required to avoid the injury.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated July 4, 2003 in CA-GR SP No. 62206 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision
of the Board of Medicine dated March 4, 1999 exonerating petitioner is AFFIRMED. No
pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE VS. MAGAT 332 S 517
Before this court for automatic review is the joint decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 103, in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-96-68119 and Q-96-68120, finding
accused-appellant Antonio Magat y Londonio guilty of raping his daughter, Ann Fideli L.
Magat, on two occasions and sentencing him to suffer the extreme penalty of death for
each case, and to pay the sum of P750,000.00 as compensatory, moral and exemplary
damages.
The two (2) Informations, charging accused-appellant with rape reads:
CRIMINAL CASE NO.Q-96-68119
"The undersigned, upon sworn complaint of the offended party,
nineteen year old (19) ANN FIDELI LIMPOCO MAGAT, accuses
ANTONIO MAGAT y LONDONIO, her father, of the crime of rape
defined and penalized under Article 335, Revised Penal code, as
amended by RA 7659, committed as follows:
"That on or about the 14th day of August 1994, during the 17th
birthday of Ann Fideli L. Magat in Kasunduan, Quezon City and within
the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, accused ANTONIO MAGAT Y
LONDONIO, with lewd designs, and by means of threat and violence,
did then and there, unlawfully and feloniously, lie and succeeded in
having sexual intercourse with Ann Fideli Limpoco Magat." [1]
CRIMINAL CASE NO. Q-96-68120
"The undersigned, upon sworn complaint of the offended party,
nineteen year old (19) ANN FIDELI LIMPOCO MAGAT, accuses
ANTONIO MAGAT y LON DONIO, her father, of the crime of rape
defined and penalized under Article 335, Revised Penal Code, as
amended by RA 7659, committed as follows:
That on or about the 1st day of September1996, in Barangay Holy
Spirit, Quezon City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
accused ANTONIO MAGAT Y LONDONIO, with lewd designs and by
means of threat and violence, did then and there, unlawfully and
feloniously, lie and succeeded in having sexual intercourse with Ann
Fideli Limpoco Magat."[2]
Upon arraignment on January 10, 1997, accused-appellant pleaded guilty but bargained
for a lesser penalty for each case. Complainant's mother, Ofelia Limpoco Magat, and
the public prosecutor, Rio Espiritu agreed with the plea bargain. Consequently, the trial
court issued, on that same day, an Order, the fallo of which reads: katarungan
"On arraignment, accused with the assistance of his counsel Atty.
Diosdado Savellano and upon the request of the accused, the
information was read and explained to him in tagalog, a dialect known
to him and after which accused entered a plea of "GUILTY" to the
crime charged against him, and further pleads for a lower penalty to
which the Hon. Public Prosecutor interpose no objection.
ACCORDINGLY, the court hereby finds the accused ANTONIO LON
DONIO MAGAT, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Violation of Article 335, RPC in relation to RA 7659 and he is hereby
sentenced to suffer a jail term of ten (10) years imprisonment for each
case."[3]
After three months, the cases were revived at the instance of the complainant on the
ground that the penalty imposed was "too light." [4]As a consequence, accused-appellant
was re-arraigned on both Informations on April 15, 1997 where he entered a plea of not
guilty.[5]
Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued with the prosecution presenting Dr. Ida Daniel,
medico-legal officer of the National Bureau of Investigation and complainant's mother.
On July 3, 1997 accused-appellant entered anew a plea of guilty.[6] The court read to
him the Informations in English and Tagalog and repeatedly asked whether he
understood his change of plea and propounded questions as to his understanding of the
consequences of his plea.[7]
Convinced of accused-appellant's voluntariness of his plea of guilty, the court required
the taking of complainant's testimony. The accused-appellant did not present any
evidence.
On July 15, 1997, the trial court rendered judgment, the decretal portion of which
reads: HTML
"CONSEQUENTLY, the court renders judgment finding the accused
ANTONIO MAGAT y LONDONIO, GUILTY of the crime of Rape in
violation of Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
beyond reasonable doubt and accordingly, sentences him as follows:
 1.......In Crim. Case No. Q-96-68119, the accused Antonio Magat y
Londonio is sentenced to DEATH by lethal injection; and
2.......In Crim. Case No. Q-96-68120, the accused Antonio Magat y
Londonio is sentenced to DEATH by lethal injection.
On the civil aspect, the accused Antonio Magat y Londonio is hereby
ordered to pay Ann Fideli Limpoco Magat the sum of P50,000.00 as
compensatory damages; further sum of P200,000.00 as moral
damages and another sum of P500,000.00 as exemplary and
corrective damages.
SO ORDERED."[8]
Hence, this automatic review.
Accused-appellant contends that the trial court erred in re-arraigning and proceeding
into trial despite the fact that he was already convicted per Order of the trial court dated
January 10,1997 based on his plea of guilt. He also argues that when the court
rendered judgment convicting him, the prosecution did not appeal nor move for
reconsideration or took steps to set aside the order. Consequently, the conviction
having attained finality can no longer be set aside or modified even if the prosecution
later realizes that the penalty imposed was too light. Accused-appellant likewise posit
that the re-arraignment and trial on the same information violated his right against
double jeopardy.
The January 10, 1997 order of the trial court convicting the accused-appellant on his
own plea of guilt is void ab initio on the ground that accused-appellant's plea is not the
plea bargaining contemplated and allowed by law and the rules of procedure. The only
instance where a plea bargaining is allowed under the Rules is when an accused pleads
guilty to a lesser offense. Thus, Section 2, Rule 116 of Revised Rules of Court provides:
"Sec. 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense.- The accused, with the
consent of the offended party and the fiscal, may be allowed by the
trial court to plead guilty to a lesser offense, regardless of whether or
not it is necessarily included in the crime charged, or is cognizable by
a court of lesser jurisdiction than the trial court. No amendment of the
complaint or information is necessary. CODES
"A conviction under this plea shall be equivalent to a conviction of the
offense charged for purposes of double jeopardy."
Here, the reduction of the penalty is only a consequence of the plea of guilt to a lesser
penalty.
It must be emphasized that accused-appellant did not plead to a lesser offense but
pleaded guilty to the rape charges and only bargained for a lesser penalty. In short, as
aptly observed by the Solicitor General, he did not plea bargain but made conditions on
the penalty to be imposed. This is erroneous because by pleading guilty to the offense
charged, accused-appellant should be sentenced to the penalty to which he pleaded.
It is the essence of a plea of guilty that the accused admits absolutely and
unconditionally his guilt and responsibility for the offense imputed to him. [9] Hence, an
accused may not foist a conditional plea of guilty on the court by admitting his guilt
provided that a certain penalty will be meted unto him. [10]
Accused-appellant's plea of guilty is undoubtedly a conditional plea. Hence, the trial
court should have vacated such a plea and entered a plea of not guilty for a conditional
plea of guilty, or one subject to the proviso that a certain penalty be imposed upon him,
is equivalent to a plea of not guilty and would, therefore, require a full-blown trial before
judgment may be rendered.[11]
In effect, the judgment rendered by the trial court which was based on a void plea
bargaining is also void ab initio and can not be considered to have attained finality for
the simple reason that a void judgment has no legality from its inception.[12] Thus, since
the judgment of conviction rendered against accused-appellant is void, double jeopardy
will not lie.
Nonetheless, whatever procedural infirmity in the arraignment of the accused-appellant
was rectified when he was re-arraigned and entered a new plea. Accused-appellant did
not question the procedural errors in the first arraignment and having failed to do so, he
is deemed to have abandoned his right to question the same [13] and waived the errors in
procedure.[14] yacats
Accused-appellant also maintains that assuming that there was proper basis for setting
aside the Order of January 10,1997, the trial court erred in not finding that he made an
improvident plea of guilty. He faults the trial court in not complying with the procedure
laid down in the Section 3, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Court. [15] He claims that the
record of the case fails to support the trial court's assertion that it conducted a searching
inquiry to determine that the accused-appellant voluntarily entered his plea of guilty with
full understanding of the consequences of his plea. He claims that there is no evidence
that the trial court conducted searching inquiry in accordance with the rules.
Under the present rule, if the accused pleads guilty to capital offense, trial courts are
now enjoined: (a) to conduct searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full
comprehension of the consequences of his plea; (b) to require the prosecution to
present evidence to prove the guilt of the accused and the precise degree of his
culpability; and (c) to ask the accused if he so desires to present evidence in his behalf
and allow him to do so if he desires.[16]
This Court, in a long line of decisions imposed upon trial judges to comply with the
procedure laid down in the rules of arraignment, particularly the rules governing a plea
of guilty to a capital offense in order to preclude any room for reasonable doubt in the
mind of either the trial court or of this Court, on review, as to the possibility that there
might have been some misunderstanding on the part of the accused as to the nature of
the charges to which he pleaded guilty and to ascertain the circumstances attendant to
the commission of the crime which justify or require the exercise of a greater or lesser
degree of severity in the imposition of the prescribed penalties. [17] Apart from the
circumstances that such procedure may remove any doubt that the accused fully
understood the consequences of his plea is the fact that the evidence taken thereon is
essential to the fulfillment by this Court of its duty of review of automatic appeals from
death sentences.[18]
We have carefully reviewed the record of this case and are convinced that the trial
judge has faithfully discharged his bounden duty as minister of the law to determine the
voluntariness and full understanding of accused-appellants' plea of guilty. The absence
of the transcript of stenographic notes of the proceedings during the arraignment do not
make the procedure flawed. The minutes of the proceedings [19] indubitably show that
the judge read the Informations to the accused-appellant both in English and Tagalog,
asked him questions as to his understanding of the consequences of his plea, his
educational attainment and occupation. Accused-appellant could have known of the
consequence of his plea having pleaded twice to the charges against him. In fact, in the
two (2) letters sent to the trial court judge, accused-appellant not only admitted his
"sins" but also asked for forgiveness and prayed for a chance to reform. [20] olanski
Moreover, the prosecution has already presented its evidence. Thus, even assuming
that there was an improvident plea of guilt, the evidence on record can sustain the
conviction of the accused-appellant.
The testimony of the complainant, as summarized by the Solicitor General, reveal:
"Complainant's x x x parents separated when she was only seven (7)
years old and she and her younger brother David were left with her
father, accused-appellant, while another brother, Jonathan, and
 sister, Abigail, stayed with their mother (TSN, July 15, 1997, p. 46;
May 22, 1997, pp. 38-41; 49-51).
"On her 9th birthday, her father first raped her and she was beaten
when she resisted, thus, she found it futile to resist every time her
father touched her after that (TSN, supra, pp. 24-25).
"August 14, 1994, was complainant's 17th birthday. That evening,
while sleeping together with accused-appellant and her brother in
their rented house at Kasunduan, Quezon City, she was awakened by
the kisses of her father. He then removed her clothes and after
removing his own clothes, went on top of her and inserted his penis
inside her vagina as he had done to her many times before this
incident. After he had finished, he told her to wash her vagina which
she did (TSN, supra, pp. 12-17).
"On September 1, 1996, complainant who was already 19 years old,
was at home with accused-appellant and her brother after 'selling'
when her father ordered her and her brother to go to sleep. Her
brother fell asleep but complainant could not sleep and was restless
that night. Again, accused-appellant raped her on the same bed
where her brother was also sleeping. She did not resist him anymore
because nothing would happen anyway and he would just beat her if
she did (TSN, supra, 21-25). haideem
"x x x complainant further revealed that she was not only sexually
abused but also physically abused by accused-appellant who even
beat her with a whip while being tied and struck her with a bag
containing tin cans causing head injuries necessitating her
hospitalization. She also confirmed that her father started raping her
on her 9th birthday which was repeated several times after that. She
likewise revealed that she felt some fluid ('katas') coming out of her
fathers penis every time he raped her but she did not become
pregnant because her father made her drink the water from boiled
guava leaves and a medicine she identified as 'Gextex' (should be
Gestex) if her menstruation was delayed. In fact, when her menstrual
period was delayed for three (3) months, her father even boxed her
stomach after making her drink the water boiled from guava leaves
and Gextex thereby causing her to bleed profusely. She was not able
to report or reveal what her father did to her because she was warned
by him that he would kill her, her brother, her mother and her relatives
if ever she would escape and reveal the rape. Besides, she had
nowhere else to go and was further made to believe by her father that
there was nothing wrong with what he was doing to her because it
was not forbidden by the Bible."
The medical examination confirmed complainant's testimony. Dr. Ida P. Daniel of the
NBI testified that complainant had "lax fourchette" and "distensible hymen" which may
be caused by sexual intercourse or penetration of a hard blunt object such as a penis.
She also concluded that the "shallow rugosities" inside her vagina lead to the
conclusion that there was more than one or even more than ten (10) times of sexual
intercourse or penetration of a hard blunt object that passed through her vaginal canal.
Moreover, her hymen orifice can allow complete penetration of an average-sized
Filipino adult penis in its erect stage which is from 2.5 to 3.0 cms. in
diameter.[21] hustisya
Surprisingly, accused-appellant did not present any evidence to rebut the prosecution's
evidence nor testified in his behalf to deny the in culpatory testimony of the complainant,
giving us the impression that he acknowledges the charges against him.
While we have in a catena of cases set aside convictions based on pleas of guilty in
capital offenses because of the improvidence of the plea, we did so only when such
plea is the sole basis of the judgment of the condemnatory judgment. Thus, when the
trial court in obedience to this Court's injunction, receives evidence to determine
precisely whether or not the accused has erred in admitting guilt, the manner in which
the plea of guilty is made loses legal significance, for the simple reason that the
conviction is predicated not on the plea but on the evidence proving the commission by
the accused of the offense charged.[22] In such case, it cannot be claimed that
defendant was sentenced to death without having been previously informed of the
nature of the charges against him and of the qualifying and aggravating circumstances
recited in the information, as he is fully apprised not only of the allegations in the
information but of the entire evidence of the prosecution. [23]
Additionally, accused-appellant's second plea of guilty validated his first plea of guilt. It
removed any reasonable doubt as to his guilt. [24]
Accused-appellant further impugns the trial court's imposition of the death penalty in
Criminal Case No. Q-96-68120 contending that the complainant was already nineteen
(19) years old when the alleged rape occurred.
Republic Act No. 7659 which amended Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
"The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is
committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:
1.......when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the
offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by
consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-
law spouse of the parent of the victim." (Underscoring supplied)
Complainant was born on August 14, 1977.[25] On September 1, 1996, when the rape
was committed (Criminal Case No. Q-96-68120), complainant was already nineteen
(19) years of age. Therefore, the same does not fall under the last paragraph of Article
335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA No. 7659. The proper penalty
should be reclusion perpetuapursuant to Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code. Jksm
However, the extreme penalty of death should be imposed in Criminal Case No. Q-96-
68119, complainant being only 17 years of age when accused-appellant, his father,
raped her.
Finally, accused-appellant likewise assails the award of P750,000.00 damages claiming
that the same is excessive.
With regard to the award of compensatory damages, we have ruled in People vs.
Victor,[26] which was later reaffirmed in People vs. Prades,[27] that "if the crime of rape is
committed or effectively qualified by any of the circumstances under which the death
penalty is authorized by the present amended law, the indemnity of the victim shall be in
the increased amount of not less than P75,000.00."[28] Accordingly, in Criminal Case
NO. Q-96-68119, the award of compensatory damages should be increased from
P50,000.00 to P75,000.00. In Criminal Case No. Q-96-68120 however, while appellant
was sentenced to reclusion perpetua, the compensatory damage should be the same
(P75,000.00). As rightly argued by the Solicitor General, the trauma, ignominy, pain and
shame suffered by the complainant can not be treated or regarded any lesser.
The award of civil indemnity "is not only a reaction to the apathetic societal perception of
the penal law and the financial fluctuations overtime, but also an expression of the
displeasure of the Court over the incidence of heinous crimes against chastity."[29] More
so, if the crime is committed by the father against his own flesh and blood.
With respect to the award of moral damages, we have in People vs.
Prades[30] held: Chiefx
" x x x The Court has also resolved that in crimes of rape, such as
that under consideration, moral damages may additionally be
awarded to the victim in the criminal proceeding, in such amount as
the Court deems just, without the need for pleading or proof of the
basis thereof as has heretofore been the practice. Indeed, the
conventional requirement of allegata et probata in civil procedure and
for essentially civil cases should be dispensed within criminal
prosecution for rape with the civil aspect included therein, since no
appropriate pleadings are filed wherein such allegations can be
made.
"Corollarily, the fact that complainant has suffered the trauma of
mental, physical and psychological sufferings which constitute the
bases for moral damages are too obvious to still require the recital
thereof at the trial by the victim, since the Court itself even assumes
and acknowledges such agony on her part as a gauge of her
credibility. What exists by necessary implication as being ineludibly
present in the case need not go through the superfluity of still being
proved through a testimonial charade."
Nevertheless, we find the award of P200,000.00 moral damages excessive. An award
of P50,000.00 for each count of rape is to our mind more reasonable. However, we are
deleting the award of exemplary or corrective damages, in the absence of any legal
basis therefor.
Four members of the Court maintain their position that Republic Act No. 7659, insofar
as it prescribes the death penalty, is unconstitutional; nevertheless they submit to the
ruling of the Court, by majority vote, that the law is constitutional and the death penalty
should be imposed accordingly.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1.......In Criminal Case No. Q - 96 - 68119, the decision of the
Regional Trial Court convicting accused-appellant Antonio Magat y
Londonio of rape and sentencing him to the Supreme Penalty of
DEATH is hereby AFFIRMED with the modification that the award of
compensatory damages be increased to Seventy - Five Thousand
Pesos (75,000.00), moral damages is reduced to Fifty Thousand
Pesos (P50,000.00) and exemplary damages deleted. Esm
2.......In Criminal Case No. Q- 96-68120, the decision of the Regional
Trial Court convicting accused - appellant of rape and sentencing him
to the Supreme Penalty of DEATH is hereby reduced to RECLUSION
PERPETUA. The award of compensatory damages is increased to
Seventy - Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00) , moral damages is
reduced to Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) and exemplary
damages is deleted.
In accordance with Section 25 of the RA 7659, amending Article 83 of the Revised
Penal Code, upon the finality of this Decision, let the records of this case be forthwith
forwarded to the Office of the President for the possible exercise of executive clemency
or pardoning power. SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE VS. BALISACAN 17 S 1119
This is an appeal by the prosecution from a decision of acquittal.
On February 1, 1965, Aurelio Balisacan was charged with homicide in the Court of First
Instance of Ilocos Norte. The information alleged:
That on or about December 3, 1964, in the Municipality of Nueva Era, province
of Ilocos Norte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the herein accused, with intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously attack, assault and stab one, Leonicio Bulaoat, inflicting upon
the latter wounds that immediately caused his death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
To this charge the accused, upon being arraigned, entered a plea of guilty. In doing so,
he was assisted by counsel. At his de oficio counsel's petition, however, he was allowed
to present evidence to prove mitigating circumstances. Thereupon the accused testified
to the effect that he stabbed the deceased in self-defense because the latter was
strangling him. And he further stated that after the incident he surrendered himself
voluntarily to the police authorities.
Subsequently, on March 6, 1965, on the basis of the above-mentioned testimony of the
accused, the court a quorendered a decision acquitting the accused. As stated, the
prosecution appealed therefrom.
This appeal was first taken to the Court of Appeals. Appellant filed its brief on
September 9, 1965. No appellee's brief was filed. After being submitted for decision
without appellee's brief, the appeal was certified to Us by the Court of Appeals on July
14, 1966, as involving questions purely of law (Sec. 17, Republic Act 296). And on
August 5, 1966, We ordered it docketed herein.1äwphï1.ñët
The sole assignment of error is:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ACQUITTING THE ACCUSED OF THE
OFFENSE CHARGED DESPITE THE LATTER'S PLEA OF GUILTY WHEN
ARRAIGNED.
Appellant's contention is meritorious. A plea of guilty is an unconditional admission of
guilt with respect to the offense charged. It forecloses the right to defend oneself from
said charge and leaves the court with no alternative but to impose the penalty fixed by
law under the circumstances. (People v. Ng Pek, 81 Phil. 563). In this case, the
defendant was only allowed to testify in order to establish mitigating circumstances, for
the purposes of fixing the penalty. Said testimony, therefore, could not be taken as a
trial on the merits, to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused.
In view of the assertion of self-defense in the testimony of the accused, the proper
course should have been for the court a quo to take defendant's plea anew and then
proceed with the trial of the case, in the order set forth in Section 3 of Rule 119 of the
Rules of Court:
SEC. 3. Order of trial. — The plea of not guilty having been entered, the trial must
proceed in the following order:
(a) The fiscal, on behalf of the People of the Philippines, must offer evidence in
support of the charges.
(b) The defendant or his attorney may offer evidence in support of the defense.
(c) The parties may then respectively offer rebutting evidence only, unless the
court, in furtherance of justice, permit them to offer new additional evidence
bearing upon the main issue in question.
(d) When the introduction of evidence shall have been concluded, unless the
case is submitted to the court without argument, the fiscal must open the
argument, the attorney for the defense must follow, and the fiscal may
conclude the same. The argument by either attorney may be oral or written, or
partly written, but only the written arguments, or such portions of the same as
may be in writing, shall be preserved in the record of the case.
In deciding the case upon the merits without the requisite trial, the court a quo not only
erred in procedure but deprived the prosecution of its day in court and right to be heard.
This Court now turns to Section 2, Rule 122 of the Rules of Court, which provides that:
"The People of the Philippines can not appeal if the defendant would be placed thereby
in double jeopardy." The present state of jurisprudence in this regard is that the above
provision applies even if the accused fails to file a brief and raise the question of double
jeopardy (People v. Ferrer, L-9072, October 23, 1956; People v. Bao, L-12102,
September 29, 1959; People v. De Golez, L-14160, June 30, 1960).
The next issue, therefore, is whether this appeal placed the accused in double jeopardy.
It is settled that the existence of a plea is an essential requisite to double jeopardy
(People v. Ylagan, 58 Phil. 851; People v. Quimsing, L-19860, December 23, 1964). In
the present case, it is true, the accused had first entered a plea of guilty. Subsequently,
however, he testified, in the course of being allowed to prove mitigating circumstances,
that he acted in complete self-defense. Said testimony, therefore — as the court a
quo recognized in its decision — had the effect of vacating his plea of guilty and the
court a quo should have required him to plead a new on the charge, or at least direct
that a new plea of not guilty be entered for him. This was not done. It follows that in
effect there having been no standing plea at the time the court a quo rendered its
judgment of acquittal, there can be no double jeopardy with respect to the appeal
herein.1
Furthermore, as afore-stated, the court a quo decided the case upon the merits without
giving the prosecution any opportunity to present its evidence or even to rebut the
testimony of the defendant. In doing so, it clearly acted without due process of law. And
for lack of this fundamental prerequisite, its action is perforce null and void. The
acquittal, therefore, being a nullity for want of due process, is no acquittal at all, and
thus can not constitute a proper basis for a claim of former jeopardy (People v. Cabero,
61 Phil. 121; 21 Am. Jur. 2d. 235; McCleary v. Hudspeth 124 Fed. 2d. 445).
It should be noted that in rendering the judgment of acquittal, the trial judge below
already gave credence to the testimony of the accused. In fairness to the prosecution,
without in any way doubting the integrity of said trial judge, We deem it proper to
remand this case to the court a quo for further proceedings under another judge of the
same court, in one of the two other branches of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos
Norte sitting at Laoag.
Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is hereby set aside and this case is remanded
to the court a quo for further proceedings under another judge of said court, that is, for
plea by the defendant, trial with presentation of evidence for the prosecution and the
defense, and judgment thereafter, No costs. So ordered.
PEOPLE VS. ESPINOSA 409 S 256
A waiver of the constitutional right against double jeopardy must be clear,
categorical, knowing and intelligent. Corollary to this rule, the alleged conditions
attached to an arraignment must be unmistakable, express, informed and
enlightened. Otherwise, the plea should be deemed to be simple and unconditional.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Certiorari[1] under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking
to nullify the April 10, 2002 Resolution[2] of the Sandiganbayan (SBN) in Criminal Case
Nos. 26422-26428. The anti-graft court dismissed the criminal cases against
Respondent Mario K. Espinosa on the ground of double jeopardy as follows:
That being the case, the Court is constrained to concur with the accused that jeopardy
has set in and that he is now at peril of punishment twice for the same offense in
violation of the protection afforded by Sec. 21, Art. III of the Constitution.
WHEREFORE, these cases are DISMISSED as against accused Mario K. Espinosa
alone.[3]
The Antecedents
On February 4, 1998, separate cases of estafa and attempted corruption of public
officers were filed before the SBN by the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB) against (1)
Respondent Espinosa, then provincial administrator of Masbate; (2) Emma Vasquez;
and (3) Romeo Sanano. The cases were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 24438 and
24439.
Prior to his arraignment, Espinosa filed a Motion for Reinvestigation of the
cases. The SBN Fourth Division granted the Motion in an Order [4] dated March 23,
1988, and directed the Office of the Special Prosecutor to evaluate the evidence against
the accused.
While the cases were being reevaluated, Espinosa filed with the SBN a Motion for
Leave to Travel Abroad for the period May 2-13, 1999.
On the date set for the hearing of the Motion, the SBN (Fourth Division) issued an
Order resetting the hearing to April 22, 1999. It required private respondent to be
conditionally arraigned on that date[5] before it would act on his Motion to Travel.
As ordered, private respondent was arraigned, and thereafter granted his Motion
to Travel. The Order of Arraignment dated April 22, 2000, stated that upon being duly
arraigned, [he] entered a plea of Not Guilty to both Informations in Crim. Case Nos.
24438 and 24439.[6] The Court also ordered the deferment of the pretrial of the cases,
pending the reinvestigation then being conducted by the Ombudsman.
On December 28, 2000, the OMB -- through the Office of the Special Prosecutor --
moved to withdraw ex parte the two cases against private respondent. The SBN granted
the Motion in a Resolution dated January 9, 2001.
Thereafter, the OMB filed in the same court seven Informations for Malversation of
Public Funds against Espinosa and several others. These Informations were docketed
as Criminal Case Nos. 24622 to 24628 and raffled to the SBN First Division.
On January 22, 2001, Espinosa filed a Motion to Quash the Informations. He
argued that double jeopardy had already attached, because (1) he had been arraigned
in the previous estafa cases; and (2) the Motion to Withdraw the two earlier ones had
been granted without his express consent.
Petitioner countered that the arraignment for the two previous cases was
conditional, because it was made solely for the purpose of accommodating private
respondents request to travel abroad while the matters were pending reinvestigation.
Ruling of the Sandiganbayan
In its assailed Resolution, the SBN First Division ruled that jeopardy had attached
in the first instance when Criminal Case Nos. 24438-24439 were dismissed upon the
prosecutions ex parte motion to withdraw the information. It noted that the dismissal had
been sought and obtained without respondents knowledge, much less express consent.
It likewise held private respondents actual arraignment to be straightforward and
unqualified. The records did not disclose any circumstance showing that the accused
knew that his arraignment was subject to certain conditions.
Hence this recourse.[7]
Issue
Petitioner submits the following issue for the Courts consideration:
Whether or not [the SBN] acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or x x
x excess of jurisdiction in dismissing Criminal Cases Nos. 34622 to 24628 as against
RespondentEspinosa.[8]
The Courts Ruling
The Petition is unmeritorious.
Preliminary Issue:
Procedural Lapses
Before tackling the main issue raised by petitioner, the Court will point out some
procedural lapses.
 First, prior to submitting the instant Petition to this Court, petitioner should have
filed a motion for reconsideration before the SBN. The extraordinary remedy of certiorari
will lie only if there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.[9]
Here, the plain, speedy and adequate remedy expressly provided by law [10] is a
motion for reconsideration to be filed within fifteen (15) days from promulgation or notice
of the final order or judgment.[11] The purpose of the motion[12] is x x x to afford public
respondent an opportunity to correct any actual or fancied error attributed to it by way of
a re-examination of the legal and factual aspects of the case.
Explaining further, the Court said:
x x x. Petitioner's inaction or negligence under the circumstances is tantamount to a
deprivation of the right and opportunity of the respondent commission to cleanse itself of
an error unwittingly committed or to vindicate itself of an act unfairly imputed. An
improvident resort to certiorari cannot be used as a tool to circumvent the right of public
respondent to review and purge its decision of an oversight, if any. x x x. [13] (Italics
supplied)
Second, the proper remedy is appeal under Rule 45, not certiorari under Rule
65. Section 7 of Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended by Republic Act No. 8249,
provides that [d]ecisions and final orders of the Sandiganbayan shall be appealable to
the Supreme Court by [a] petition for review on certiorari raising pure questions of law in
accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
likewise provides that a judgment or final order or resolution of the Sandiganbayan may
be appealed to the Supreme Court via a verified petition for review on certiorari.
Clearly then, the remedy of appeal was available to petitioner. For unexplained
reasons, it chose not to pursue this recourse. Neither has it cited grounds to exempt the
Petition from the stringent rule forbidding a substitution of remedies. Verily, its cavalier
disregard of procedural requirements, especially its erroneous choice of remedy, is
indeed enough reason to throw out this Petition summarily.
Main Issue:
Attachment of Legal Jeopardy
Even if we are to gloss over these procedural infirmities, the Petition should
nonetheless be dismissed for its lack of substantive merit.
Petitioner argues that the dismissal of the later Informations against private
respondent on the ground of double jeopardy had no factual or legal basis,[14] because
his arraignment in the earlier cases was only conditional.
We are unconvinced.
Previous cases[15] have mentioned the SBNs practice of conditionally arraigning
the accused pending the Ombudsmans reinvestigation of the case. [16] This practice is
not mentioned or provided for in the regular rules of procedure.
Section 9 of PD 1606, as amended by RA 7975,[17] provides:
Sec. 9. Rules of Procedure. - The Rules of Court promulgated by the Supreme Court
shall apply to all cases and proceedings filed with the Sandiganbayan. The
Sandiganbayan shall have no power to promulgate its own rules of procedure, except to
adopt internal rules governing the allotment of cases among the divisions, the rotation of
justices among them, and other matters relating to the internal operations of the court
which shall be enforced until repealed or modified by the Supreme Court."
The Revised Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan,[18] promulgated by this Court,
do not mention any conditional arraignment. Neither do the regular Rules of Court.
Arraignment is an indispensable requirement of due process. It consists of the
judges or the clerk of courts reading of the criminal complaint or information to the
defendant. At this stage, the accused is granted, for the first time, the opportunity to be
officially informed of the nature and the cause of the accusation. [19] Thus, arraignment
cannot be regarded lightly or brushed aside peremptorily.
Espinosa pleaded simply and unconditionally on April 22, 1999. No unusual
ceremony punctuated his arraignment. The SBN itself found this simple process
inconsistent with its studied manner of conditionally arraigning the accused pending
reinvestigation in other cases. We quote from its assailed Resolution as follows:
Since it is the accused who wishes to travel even while his case is pending review, and
in order that the Court might not lose jurisdiction over him while he is abroad, the
accused and counsel are advised as part of the arraignment process, that the
arraignment is conditional, i.e., that arraignment is without prejudice to the results of the
reinvestigation or review; that if the prosecution should recommend the filing of new
charges, in lieu of the present charge, which would necessarily include or be included in
the present accusation, the accused would now be understood as having waived his
right against double jeopardy; and that if the prosecution sought to withdraw the
information, the arraignment would be deemed to have been of no effect. If the accused
accepts these conditions for arraignment, then he is arraigned and allowed to travel. In
other words, in this instance, the accused is clearly aware of what is going on; at the
time of his arraignment, there is an explicit waiver against the protection against double
jeopardy as a condition for his travel.[20] (Italics supplied)
Under Section 11(c) of Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, the arraignment shall be
suspended for a period not exceeding 60 days when a reinvestigation or review is being
conducted at either the Department of Justice or the Office of the President. However,
we should stress that the court does not lose control of the proceedings by reason of
such review. Once it had assumed jurisdiction, it is not handcuffed by any resolution of
the reviewing prosecuting authority.[21] Neither is it deprived of its jurisdiction by such
resolution.[22] The principles established in Crespo v. Mogul[23] still stands, as follows:
"Whether the accused had been arraigned or not and whether it was due to a
reinvestigation by the fiscal or a review by the Secretary of Justice whereby a motion to
dismiss was submitted to the Court, the Court in the exercise of its discretion may grant
the motion or deny it and require that the trial on the merits proceed for the proper
determination of the case.
xxxxxxxxx
"The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed in
Court any disposition of the case as to its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the
accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal retains the
direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is already
in Court he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. The Court is the best and sole
judge on what to do with the case before it. The determination of the case is within its
exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal
should be addressed to the Court which has the option to grant or deny the same. It
does not matter if this is done before or after the arraignment of the accused or that the
motion was filed after a reinvestigation or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice
who reviewed the records of the investigation." [24] (Italics supplied)
In any event, petitioner insists that private respondent has waived his right to
invoke double jeopardy in the light of his allegedly conditional arraignment.
Again, the Court is not persuaded.
The right against double jeopardy is enshrined in Section 21 of Article III of the
Constitution, which reads:
No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is
punished by a law and an ordinance conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute
a bar to another prosecution for the same act.
 This constitutionally mandated right is procedurally buttressed by Section 17 of
Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.[25] To substantiate a claim for
double jeopardy, the following must be demonstrated:
x x x (1) [A] first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy
must have been validly terminated; (3) the second jeopardy must be for the same
offense, or the second offense includes or is necessarily included in the offense
charged in the first information, or is an attempt to commit the same or is a frustration
thereof.
And legal jeopardy attaches only: (a) upon a valid indictment; (b) before a competent
court; (c) after arraignment; (d) [when] a valid plea [has] been entered; and (e) the case
was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused. [26]
It has been the unwavering position of this Court that substantial rights cannot be
trifled with or cast aside on the basis of mere suppositions and conjectures. The
relinquishment of a constitutional right has to be laid out convincingly. Such waiver must
be clear, categorical, knowing and intelligent. [27]
As can be gleaned from the Memorandum of petitioner, the alleged waiver falls
short of the above requirement:
Unfortunately, the records reveal that a lawyer for respondent Espinosa was present
when the April 19,1999 Order of the Fourth Division was issued in open court. Thus,
said lawyer must have heard that the hearing of the motion to travel was reset to April
22, 1999 so that the movant could be conditionally arraigned. [28]
xxxxxxxxx
x x x. As stressed in the petition, the arraignment was conditional for if it was not so,
respondent Espinosa would have been deemed to have abandoned his recourse for the
reevaluation of his cases before the Office of the Ombudsman.[29] (Italics supplied)
As correctly pointed out in the challenged Resolution, the dismissal of the estafa
and the corruption cases was made upon petitioners ex parte Motion for the withdrawal
of the Informations. Petitioner does not dispute the fact that private respondent was not
notified of this Motion. Neither was a hearing held thereon.
On the other hand, private respondent has amply shown that he learned of the
Motion only after the cases had been dismissed. It is clear that the dismissal, having
been secured by petitioner without the express consent of the accused, does not
amount to a waiver of the right against double jeopardy. But it does unequivocally show
the fourth requisite for the proper invocation of such right.
In a nutshell, the alleged conditions attached to an arraignment must be
unmistakable, express, informed and enlightened. They must be expressly stated in the
Order disposing of the arraignment. Otherwise, the plea should be deemed to be simple
and unconditional.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.
VILLAREAL VS. ALIGA GR 166995 1/13/14
Challenged in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised
Rules of Civil Procedure (Rules) are the April 27, 2004 Decision 1 and August 10, 2004
Resolution,2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. R No. 25581entitled People of he
Philippines v. Consuelo Cruz Aliga which acquitted respondent Consuelo C. Aliga
(Aliga) from the offense charged and, in effect, reversed and set aside the July 12, 2001
Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court RTC), Branch 147, Makati City.
On October 31, 1996, an Information was filed against respondent Aliga for the crime of
Qualified Theft thru Falsification of Commercial Document, committed as follows:
That on or about the 30th day of October 1996, in the City of Makati, Philippines, a
place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being
then an accountant of Dentrade Inc., herein represented by Dennis T. Villareal, and who
has access to the company’s checking accounts did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously with grave abuse of confidence, with intent [to] gain and without the
consent of the owner thereof, take, steal and carry away from complainant’s office,
United Coconut Planters Bank Check No. HOF 681039 dated October 24, 1996 in the
amount of P5,000.00, once in possession of said check, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously falsify the amount by changing it to P65,000.00 and having
the same encashed with the bank, thereafter misappropriate and convert to her own
personal use and benefit the amount of P60,000.00 to the damage and prejudice of the
herein complainant, Dentrade Inc., in the aforementioned amount of P60,000.00.4
During her arraignment on December 6, 1996, respondent Aliga pleaded not
guilty.5 After the RTC resolved to deny petitioner’s motion for issuance of a hold
departure order against respondent Aliga and the latter’s motion to suspend
proceedings,6 trial on the merits ensued. Both the prosecution and the defense were
able to present the testimonies of their witnesses and their respective documentary
exhibits.
The Court of Appeals, substantially adopting the trial court’s findings, narrated the
relevant facts as follows:
Apart from the documentary exhibits "A" to "F", the combined testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses Elsa Doroteo, Diosdado Corompido, Yolanda Martirez and NBI
agent John Leonard David tend to establish the following factual milieu:
Complainant Dennis T. Villareal is the President and General Manager of Dentrade,
Inc., a corporation with principal office address at the 7/F Citibank Center 8741 Paseo
de Roxas, Makati City. As a businessman, Villareal maintains checking accounts with
the head office of China Banking Corporation (Chinabank) in Paseo de Roxas and
United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) in Makati Avenue, both banks are located in
Makati City. He has under his employ, Elsa Doroteo, as executive secretary, Diosdado
Corompido, as messenger, Yolanda Martirez, as chief accountant, [respondent]
Consuelo Cruz Aliga and Annaliza Perez, as accounting clerks. [Respondent] has
custody of the personal checks of Villareal. She prepares the personal checks by typing
its contents and submits them to Villareal for his signature. After the signed checks are
delivered to her, she in turn, gives the checks to the messenger for encashment with the
bank.
Sometime in October 1996, Villareal’s governess asked Doroteo for the payment
covering the year 1995 for his children’s teacher in horseback riding. Doroteo replied
that the said fees had been paid. To verify the matter, Doroteo instructed Perez, one of
the accounting clerks, to produce the originals of the returned checks from [the]
personal account of Villareal. Upon examining the returned checks, Doroteo found out
that the fees for the horseback riding instructor had indeed been paid and that there
were large encashments reflected on the checks in typewritten form. Doroteo informed
Villareal of her findings. Villareal examined the returned checks and was surprised as
he never authorized the large encashments.
Upon advice of his lawyer, Atty. Victor Lazatin of the ACCRA Law Offices, Mr. Villareal
sent a letter to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) asking for assistance in the
investigation of the matter (Exh. "A"). A few days thereafter, NBI agents John Leonard
David and Rafael Ragos arrived at the Dentrade office. They examined the particular
checks which involved large amounts and interviewed Doroteo.
When asked by the two NBI agents, Villareal told them that there were three (3) checks
pending for his signature, UCPB checks, all in petty cash: one check was for P1,000.00,
another for P5,000.00, and the last one forP6,000.00. They were all in typewritten form
which [respondent] prepared. As suggested by the NBI agents, Villareal signed the
three (3) checks. Doroteo had the three checks photocopied then released their
originals to [respondent].
On instruction of Villareal, Doroteo and NBI agent David went to UCPB the next day
hoping that one of the checks will be encashed. At or about 3:00 p.m. on that day,
Doroteo asked the bank teller if Villareal’s three checks were encashed. The bank teller
informed Doroteo that UCPB check in the amount of P65,000.00 was encashed.
Doroteo was surprised because she was then holding a photocopy of the original check
for P5,000.00 while she saw the teller holding a check for P65,000.00 but the check
number and date were exactly the same as that of its photocopy. Obviously, the number
"6" was intercalated in the check by adding the said number before the digits "5,000.00."
Upon Doroteo’s request, the teller gave her a photocopy of the supposedly altered
check.
Doroteo reported back to the Dentrade office and handed to Villareal the photocopy of
the check bearing the amount of P65,000.00. When summoned, [respondent] arrived
then executed a statement voluntarily giving back the amount of P60,000.00 to Villareal
in the presence of his lawyers Lazatin and Vallente, and Doroteo. The said statement
was in the handwriting of [respondent] (Exh. "D"), which reads:
"After being confronted by Mr. Dennis T. Villareal, I am voluntarily surrendering
the P60,000.00 as part of the proceeds of UCPB check # 681039 dated October 30,
1996 as follows (in P1,000.00 bills) (serial no. of P1,000.00 bills subject of the
statement)."
Doroteo photocopied the P1,000.00 bills (Exh. "E"). After [respondent] admitted the
taking of the excess amount of P60,000.00, the NBI agents placed her under arrest and
took her to the NBI detention center.
According to witness Corompido, Villareal’s messenger, at 10:00 a.m. of October 30,
1996, he was bound for UCPB, Makati Avenue branch. [Respondent] requested him to
pay her "Extelcom" bill and asked him to meet her at the UCPB bank. After several
minutes, the two met at the bank. [Respondent] handed to Corompido her "Extelcom"
bill and one personal check of Villareal in the amount of P65,000.00. [Respondent]
returned to the Dentrade [office]. Corompido gave to the teller [respondent’s] "Extelcom"
payment and also the personal check of Villareal for P65,000.00. The teller release
the P65,000.00 to Corompido who signed on the stamped portion of the check.
[Respondent] Aliga has a different version for her defense. She claimed that on October
30, 1996 at around 2:30 p.m., the NBI agents arrested her but they did [not] inform [her]
of her constitutional rights to remain silent and to be assisted by counsel; that she was
actually an accounting assistant to Dentrade’s chief accountant, Yolanda Martirez, the
accounting clerk being Annaliza Perez; that she was not in charge of Villareal’s personal
checking account, but Martirez; that Perez was the one in custody of the [checkbooks]
pertaining to the personal checking accounts of Villareal with UCPB and [Chinabank];
that Doroteo was in possession of another [checkbook] and kept it in Villareal’s
residence.
[Respondent] admitted that the UCPB and Chinabank checks were also used for the
replenishment of the cash advances made by Villareal; that the replenishment was
prepared using a typewriter by Martirez, Perez, Doroteo and herself; that there was no
regulation or control mechanism in their office where the responsibility for preparing any
particular check on the personal account of Villareal could be identified; that the
issuance of checks against the personal checking accounts at the UCPB and
Chinabank were frequent, from 5 to 12 checks daily; and that there were no
accompanying vouchers to record the purposes for which the checks were issued; and
that it was Martirez who monitors Villareal’s personal checks at the UCPB and
Chinabank.7
Additionally, respondent Aliga claimed that Perez, Doroteo, and Martirez are also using
typewriter in the check preparation.8 Moreover, at the time she was summoned by
Villareal inside his office, the two NBI agents (David and Ragos) and Villareal’s
counsels (Attys. Lazatin and Vallente) were joined in by NBI Director Toledo.9 The
extent of the NBI’s participation is disputed. While respondent Aliga 10 maintained that
she was already arrested by the NBI at the moment she was called to the office of
Villareal, David11 testified that they were merely silent spectators therein, just witnessing
the confrontation or interview conducted by Villareal and not even talking to respondent
Aliga.
The RTC succinctly opined that the evidence of the prosecution is very clear that
respondent Aliga must have been the one who made the intercalation in the subject
check, and that even without her written admission (Exhibit "D"), the evidence
presented constitutes proof beyond reasonable doubt. The July 12, 2001 Decision
disposed:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court, finding the accused CONSUELO
CRUZ ALIGA guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged, hereby sentences
her to suffer an indeterminate sentence of 14 years, 8 months of reclusion temporal as
the minimum to 20 years of reclusion temporal as the maximum.
It appearing that the amount of P60,000.00 subject of the offense was already returned
by the accused, the Court hereby absolves the accused of civil liability in this case.
SO ORDERED.12
Respondent Aliga appealed to the CA, which, on April 27, 2004, reversed and set aside
the judgment of the RTC on the grounds that: (1) her admission or confession of guilt
before the NBI authorities, which already qualifies as a custodial investigation, is
inadmissible in evidence because she was not informed of her rights to remain silent
and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of her own choice; and (2)
the totality of the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution is insufficient to
overcome the presumption of innocence of the accused.
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied by the CA on August 10, 2004;
hence, this petition raising the issues for resolution as follows:
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN DECLARING INADMISSIBLE
RESPONDENT’S VOLUNTARY ADMISSION OF GUILT, ON ITS CLEARLY
SPECULATIVE AND CONJECTURAL PREMISE THAT RESPONDENT’S FREEDOM
OF ACTION WAS IMPAIRED WHEN SHE MADE THE ADMISSION, CONSIDERING
THAT:
A. AS LAID DOWN BY THIS HONORABLE COURT, AN ADMISSION OF
GUILT SHIFTS THE BURDEN TO THE DEFENSE TO SHOW THAT IT WAS
EXTRACTED BY FORCE OR DURESS.
B. CONTRARY TO THE JURISPRUDENTIAL GUIDELINES LAID DOWN BY
THIS HONORABLE COURT, THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRONEOUSLY
CONCLUDED THAT RESPONDENT WAS "EFFECTIVELY PLACED UNDER
CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION" BY THE SHEER PHYSICAL PRESENCE OF
THE NBI AGENTS WHEN THE ADMISSION WAS MADE. C.
RESPONDENT’S VOLUNTARY ADMISSION WAS MADE TO A PRIVATE
INDIVIDUAL, I.E., PETITIONER HEREIN.
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED, IF NOT ACTED IN EXCESS OF ITS
JURISDICTION, WHEN IT CONCLUDED THAT THE PROSECUTION’S EVIDENCE
WAS INSUFFICIENT TO OVERCOME RESPONDENT’S PRESUMPTION OF
INNOCENCE, CONSIDERING THAT:
A. CONTRARY TO THIS HONORABLE COURT’S JURISPRUDENTIAL
RULING, THE COURT OF APPEALS ENTIRELY OVERLOOKED THE
EVIDENCE ON RECORD AND EXACTED DIRECT EVIDENCE FROM THE
PROSECUTION.
 B. THE COURT OF APPEALS’ ERRONEOUS CONCLUSION THAT
RESPONDENT IS INNOCENT IS BASED ON ITS FINDING OF A
SUPPOSED INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE WHICH IS CONTRADICTED
BY THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD.
C. THE COURT OF APPEALS DEPARTED FROM SETTLED
JURISPRUDENCE, REQUIRING FROM THE PROSECUTION A QUANTUM
OF EVIDENCE GREATER THAN PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT,
WHEN IT:
1. ERRONEOUSLY RULED THAT THE PROSECUTION FAILED TO
DISCOUNT THE POSSIBILITY THAT SOMEONE ELSE COULD
HAVE CAUSED THE ALTERATION ON THE CHECK; AND
2. FAULTING THE PROSECUTION FOR NOT PRESENTING
PETITIONER AS A WITNESS.
D. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN, BASED ON NOTHING
MORE THAN RESPONDENT’S DENIALS, IT DEPARTED FROM THE WELL-
SETTLED RULE LAID DOWN BY THIS HONORABLE COURT THAT THE TRIAL
COURT’S FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS BASED THEREON, AS WELL
AS ITS ASSESSMENT OF THE CREDIBILITY OF THE WITNESSES, ARE
CONCLUSIVE UPON APPELLATE COURTS.13
On the other hand, respondent Aliga countered that:
I.
THE PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI SHOULD BE DISMISSED FOR
RAISING ONLY QUESTIONS OF FACTS.
II.
THE PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI SHOULD BE DISMISSED ON THE
GROUND OF DOUBLE JEOPARDY.
III.
PETITIONER HAS NO STANDING TO FILE THE INSTANT PETITION FOR REVIEW
ON CERTIORARI.
IV.
WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE FOREGOING ARGUMENTS, THE PETITION FOR
REVIEW ON CERTIORARI SHOULD BE DISMISSED FOR FAILURE TO SHOW THAT
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRIEVOUS ERROR IN ISSUING THE 27
APRIL 2004 AND 10 AUGUST 2004 DECISIONS; ON THE CONTRARY, THE
DECISIONS APPEAR TO BE IN ACCORD WITH THE FACTS AND THE APPLICABLE
LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE.14
The petition is unmeritorious.
The petition should have been filed
by the State through the OSG
Petitioner took a procedural misstep when he filed the present petition without the
representation of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). In Bautista v. Cuneta-
Pangilinan,15 We underscored:
x x x The authority to represent the State in appeals of criminal cases before the
Supreme Court and the CA is solely vested in the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG).
Section 35 (1), Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code explicitly
provides that the OSG shall represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies
and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding,
investigation or matter requiring the services of lawyers. It shall have specific powers
and functions to represent the Government and its officers in the Supreme Court and
the CA, and all other courts or tribunals in all civil actions and special proceedings in
which the Government or any officer thereof in his official capacity is a party. The OSG
is the law office of the Government.
To be sure, in criminal cases, the acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case
against him can only be appealed by the Solicitor General, acting on behalf of the State.
The private complainant or the offended party may question such acquittal or dismissal
only insofar as the civil liability of the accused is concerned. In a catena of cases, this
view has been time and again espoused and maintained by the Court. In Rodriguez v.
Gadiane, it was categorically stated that if the criminal case is dismissed by the trial
court or if there is an acquittal, the appeal on the criminal aspect of the case must be
instituted by the Solicitor General in behalf of the State. The capability of the private
complainant to question such dismissal or acquittal is limited only to the civil aspect of
the case. The same determination was also arrived at by the Court in Metropolitan Bank
and Trust Company v. Veridiano II. In the recent case of Bangayan, Jr. v. Bangayan,
the Court again upheld this guiding principle.
Worthy of note is the case of People v. Santiago, wherein the Court had the occasion to
bring this issue to rest. The Court elucidated:
It is well settled that in criminal cases where the offended party is the State, the interest
of the private complainant or the private offended party is limited to the civil liability.
Thus, in the prosecution of the offense, the complainant's role is limited to that of a
witness for the prosecution. If a criminal case is dismissed by the trial court or if there is
an acquittal, an appeal therefrom on the criminal aspect may be undertaken only by the
State through the Solicitor General. Only the Solicitor General may represent the
People of the Philippines on appeal. The private offended party or complainant may not
take such appeal. However, the said offended party or complainant may appeal the civil
aspect despite the acquittal of the accused.
In a special civil action for certiorari filed under Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
wherein it is alleged that the trial court committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack of jurisdiction or on other jurisdictional grounds, the rules state that the petition
may be filed by the person aggrieved. In such case, the aggrieved parties are the State
and the private offended party or complainant. The complainant has an interest in the
civil aspect of the case so he may file such special civil action questioning the decision
or action of the respondent court on jurisdictional grounds. In so doing, complainant
should not bring the action in the name of the People of the Philippines. The action may
be prosecuted in [the] name of said complainant.
Thus, the Court has definitively ruled that in a criminal case in which the offended party
is the State, the interest of the private complainant or the private offended party is
limited to the civil liability arising therefrom. If a criminal case is dismissed by the trial
court or if there is an acquittal, an appeal of the criminal aspect may be undertaken,
whenever legally feasible, only by the State through the Solicitor General. As a rule,
only the Solicitor General may represent the People of the Philippines on appeal. The
private offended party or complainant may not undertake such appeal.16
In the case at bar, the petition filed essentially assails the criminal, not the civil, aspect
of the CA Decision. It must even be stressed that petitioner never challenged before the
CA, and in this Court, the RTC judgment which absolved respondent Aliga from civil
liability in view of the return of the P60,000.00 subject matter of the offense on October
30, 1996. Therefore, the petition should have been filed only by the State through the
OSG. Petitioner lacks the personality or legal standing to question the CA Decision
because it is only the OSG which can bring actions on behalf of the State in criminal
proceedings before the Supreme Court and the CA. Unlike in Montañez v.
Cipriano17 where we adopted a liberal view, the OSG, in its Comment on this
case,18 neither prayed that the petition be granted nor expressly ratified and adopted as
its own the petition for the People of the Philippines. Instead, it merely begged to
excuse itself from filing a Comment due to conflict of interest and for not having been
impleaded in the case.
A judgment of acquittal may be
assailed only in a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
Petitioner also committed another procedural blunder. A petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules should have been filed instead of herein petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45. The People may assail a judgment of acquittal only via petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules. If the petition, regardless of its nomenclature,
merely calls for an ordinary review of the findings of the court a quo, the constitutional
right of the accused against double jeopardy would be violated. 19 The Court made this
clear in People v. Sandiganbayan (First Div.),20 thus:
x x x A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court and a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court are two and separate remedies. A
petition under Rule 45 brings up for review errors of judgment, while a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 covers errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction. Grave abuse of discretion is not an allowable
ground under Rule 45. A petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is a
mode of appeal. Under Section 1 of the said Rule, a party aggrieved by the decision or
final order of the Sandiganbayan may file a petition for review on certiorari with this
Court:
Section 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. - A party desiring to appeal by certiorari
from a judgment or final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan,
the Regional Trial Court, or other courts whenever authorized by law, may file with the
Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition shall raise only
questions of law which must be distinctly set forth.
However, the provision must be read in relation to Section 1, Rule 122 of the Revised
Rules of Court, which provides that any party may appeal from a judgment or final order
"unless the accused will thereby be placed in double jeopardy." The judgment that may
be appealed by the aggrieved party envisaged in the Rule is a judgment convicting the
accused, and not a judgment of acquittal. The State is barred from appealing such
judgment of acquittal by a petition for review.
Section 21, Article III of the Constitution provides that "no person shall be twice put in
jeopardy of punishment for the same offense." The rule is that a judgment acquitting the
accused is final and immediately executory upon its promulgation, and that accordingly,
the State may not seek its review without placing the accused in double jeopardy. Such
acquittal is final and unappealable on the ground of double jeopardy whether it happens
at the trial court or on appeal at the CA. Thus, the State is proscribed from appealing
the judgment of acquittal of the accused to this Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court.
xxxx
A judgment of acquittal may be assailed by the People in a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court without placing the accused in double jeopardy. However,
in such case, the People is burdened to establish that the court a quo, in this case, the
Sandiganbayan, acted without jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to
excess or lack of jurisdiction. Grave abuse of discretion generally refers to capricious or
whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of
discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or
virtual refusal to perform a duty imposed by law, or to act in contemplation of law or
where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion
and hostility. No grave abuse of discretion may be attributed to a court simply because
of its alleged misapplication of facts and evidence, and erroneous conclusions based on
said evidence. Certiorari will issue only to correct errors of jurisdiction, and not errors or
mistakes in the findings and conclusions of the trial court. 21
The nature of certiorari action was expounded in People v. Court of Appeals (Fifteenth
Div.):22
x x x Certiorari alleging grave abuse of discretion is an extraordinary remedy. Its use is
confined to extraordinary cases wherein the action of the inferior court is wholly void. Its
aim is to keep the inferior court within the parameters of its jurisdiction or to prevent it
from committing such a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. No grave abuse of discretion may be attributed to the court simply because
of its alleged misappreciation of facts and evidence. While certiorari may be used to
correct an abusive acquittal, the petitioner in such extraordinary proceeding must clearly
demonstrate that the lower court blatantly abused its authority to a point so grave as to
deprive it of its very power to dispense justice.23
and further in First Corporation v. Former Sixth Division of the Court of Appeals: 24
It is a fundamental aphorism in law that a review of facts and evidence is not the
province of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, which is extra ordinem – beyond the
ambit of appeal. In certiorari proceedings, judicial review does not go as far as to
examine and assess the evidence of the parties and to weigh the probative value
thereof. It does not include an inquiry as to the correctness of the evaluation of
evidence. x x x It is not for this Court to re-examine conflicting evidence, re-evaluate the
credibility of the witnesses or substitute the findings of fact of the court a quo.25
The case does not fall within the
exception to rule on double jeopardy
Indeed, a judgment of acquittal, whether ordered by the trial or the appellate court, is
final, unappealable, and immediately executory upon its promulgation. 26 The rationale
for the rule is elucidated in the oft-cited case of People v. Hon. Velasco:27
The fundamental philosophy highlighting the finality of an acquittal by the trial court cuts
deep into "the humanity of the laws and in a jealous watchfulness over the rights of the
citizen, when brought in unequal contest with the State. x x x." Thus, Green expressed
the concern that "(t)he underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in at least the
Anglo-American system of jurisprudence, is that the State with all its resources and
power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an
alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and
compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as
enhancing the possibility that even though innocent, he may be found guilty."
It is axiomatic that on the basis of humanity, fairness and justice, an acquitted defendant
is entitled to the right of repose as a direct consequence of the finality of his acquittal.
The philosophy underlying this rule establishing the absolute nature of acquittals is "part
of the paramount importance criminal justice system attaches to the protection of the
innocent against wrongful conviction." The interest in the finality-of-acquittal rule,
confined exclusively to verdicts of not guilty, is easy to understand: it is a need for
"repose," a desire to know the exact extent of one's liability. With this right of repose, the
criminal justice system has built in a protection to insure that the innocent, even those
whose innocence rests upon a jury’s leniency, will not be found guilty in a subsequent
proceeding.
Related to his right of repose is the defendant’s interest in his right to have his trial
completed by a particular tribunal. This interest encompasses his right to have his guilt
or innocence determined in a single proceeding by the initial jury empanelled to try him,
for society’s awareness of the heavy personal strain which the criminal trial represents
for the individual defendant is manifested in the willingness to limit Government to a
single criminal proceeding to vindicate its very vital interest in enforcement of criminal
laws. The ultimate goal is prevention of government oppression; the goal finds its voice
in the finality of the initial proceeding. As observed in Lockhart v. Nelson, "(t)he
fundamental tenet animating the Double Jeopardy Clause is that the State should not
be able to oppress individuals through the abuse of the criminal process." Because the
innocence of the accused has been confirmed by a final judgment, the Constitution
conclusively presumes that a second trial would be unfair. 28
People v. Court of Appeals (Fifteenth Div.)29 also stated:
x x x The finality-of-acquittal doctrine has several avowed purposes. Primarily, it
prevents the State from using its criminal processes as an instrument of harassment to
wear out the accused by a multitude of cases with accumulated trials. It also serves the
additional purpose of precluding the State, following an acquittal, from successively
retrying the defendant in the hope of securing a conviction. And finally, it prevents the
State, following conviction, from retrying the defendant again in the hope of securing a
greater penalty. In People v. Velasco, we stressed that an acquitted defendant is
entitled to the right of repose as a direct consequence of the finality of his acquittal x x
x.30
However, the rule against double jeopardy is not without exceptions, which are: (1)
Where there has been deprivation of due process and where there is a finding of a
mistrial, or (2) Where there has been a grave abuse of discretion under exceptional
circumstances.31 Unfortunately for petitioner, We find that these exceptions do not exist
in this case.
First, there is no deprivation of due process or a mistrial.1âwphi1 In fact, petitioner did
not make any allegation to that effect. What the records show is that during the trial,
both parties had more than sufficient occasions to be heard and to present their
evidence. The same is true during the appeal before the CA. The State, represented by
the OSG, was not deprived of a fair opportunity to prove its case.
And second, no grave abuse of discretion could be attributed to the CA. It could not be
said that its judgment was issued without jurisdiction, and, for this reason, void. Again,
petitioner did not even allege that the CA gravely abused its discretion. Instead, what he
asserted was that the CA "gravely erred" in the evaluation and assessment of the
evidence presented by the parties. Certainly, what he questioned was the purported
errors of judgment or those involving misappreciation of evidence or errors of law,
which, as aforesaid, cannot be raised and be reviewed in a Rule 65 petition. To repeat,
a writ of certiorari can only correct errors of jurisdiction or those involving the
commission of grave abuse of discretion, not those which call for the evaluation of
evidence and factual findings.
x x x Any error committed in the evaluation of evidence is merely an error of judgment
that cannot be remedied by certiorari. An error of judgment is one in which the court
may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction. An error of jurisdiction is one where the
act complained of was issued by the court without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion which is tantamount to lack or in excess of jurisdiction and
which error is correctible only by the extraordinary writ of certiorari. Certiorari will not be
issued to cure errors by the trial court in its appreciation of the evidence of the parties,
and its conclusions anchored on the said findings and its conclusions of law. Since no
error of jurisdiction can be attributed to public respondent in her assessment of the
evidence, certiorari will not lie.32
Upon perusal of the records, it is Our considered view that the conclusions arrived at by
the CA cannot, by any measure, be characterized as capricious, whimsical or arbitrary.
While it may be argued that there have been instances where the appreciation of facts
might have resulted from possible lapses in the evaluation of the evidence, nothing
herein detracts from the fact that relevant and material evidence was scrutinized,
considered and evaluated as proven by the CA’s lengthy discussion of its opinion. We
note that the petition basically raises issues pertaining to alleged errors of judgment not
errors of jurisdiction which is tantamount to an appeal contrary to the express injunction
of the Constitution the Rules of Court and prevailing jurisprudence. Conformably then
we need not embark upon review of the factual and evidentiary issues raised by
petitioner as these are obviously not within the realm of Our jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The acquittal of
herein respondent Consuelo C. Aliga by the Court of Appeals in its April 27, 2004
Decision and August 10, 2004 Resolution in CA-G.R. CR No. 25581 entitled People of
the Philippines v. Consuelo Cruz Aliga is AFFIRMED.
No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE VS DE GRANO 588 S 550
This is a petition for review on certiorari, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
seeking to annul and set aside the Resolutions [1] dated January 25, 2005 and April 5,
2005, issued by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 88160.
The antecedents are as follows:
On November 28, 1991, an Information for murder committed against
Emmanuel Mendoza was filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 6, Tanauan,
Batangas, against Joven de Grano (Joven), Armando de Grano (Armando), and
Estanislao Lacaba (Estanislao), together with their co-accused Leonides Landicho
(Leonides), Domingo Landicho (Domingo), and Leonardo Genil (Leonardo), who were
at-large.[2] It was docketed as Criminal Case No. 2730, the pertinent portion of which
reads:
That on April 21, 1991, between 9:00 oclock and 10:00 oclock in
the evening, in Barangay Balakilong, [M]unicipality of Laurel,
[P]rovince of Batangas, and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable
Court, all the above named accused, conspiring, confederating, and
helping one another, motivated by common design and intent to kill,
did then and there, willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, and by means
of treachery and with evident premeditation, shoot EMMANUEL
MENDOZA with firearms, inflicting upon him eight gunshot wounds
and causing his death thereby, thus committing the crime of
MURDER to the damage and prejudice of his heirs in the amount as
the Honorable Court shall determine.[3]
Duly arraigned, Joven, Armando, and Estanislao pleaded not guilty to the
crime as charged; while their co-accused Leonides, Leonardo, and Domingo remained
at-large.Thereafter, respondents filed a motion for bail contending that the prosecutions
evidence was not strong.[4]
Meanwhile, considering that one of the accused was the incumbent Mayor of
Laurel, Batangas at the time when the crime was committed, Senior State Prosecutor
Hernani T. Barrios moved that the venue be transferred from the RTC, Branch 6,
Tanauan, Batangas to any RTC in Manila. Consequently, the case was transferred to
the RTC Manila for re-raffling amongst its Branches. The case was re-docketed as
Criminal Case No. 93-129988 and was initially re-raffled to Branches 6, 9, and 11
before being finally raffled to Branch 27, RTC, Manila.[5]
Before transferring the case to the RTC, Branch 27, Manila, the trial court
deferred the resolution of respondents motion for bail and allowed the prosecution to
present evidence. Thereafter, the hearing of the application for bail ensued, wherein the
prosecution presented Teresita and Dr. Leonardo Salvador. After finding that the
prosecutions evidence to prove treachery and evident premeditation was not strong, the
RTC, Branch 11, Manila, granted respondents motion for bail. A motion for
reconsideration was filed, but it was denied.[6]
The prosecution then filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, docketed as CA-
G.R. SP No. 41110, which was denied. Aggrieved, they sought recourse before this
Court in G.R. No. 129604. In a Resolution dated July 12, 1999, this Court granted the
petition and set aside the decision of the CA together with the Order of the RTC
granting bail to the respondents. The RTC was also ordered to immediately issue a
warrant of arrest against the accused. The resolution was also qualified to be
immediately executory.[7] As a result, Estanislao was re-arrested, but Joven and
Armando were not.[8]
However, upon respondents motion for reconsideration, this Court, in a
Resolution dated September 4, 2001, resolved to remand the case to the RTC. We
noted that, in view of the transmittal of the records of the case to this Court in
connection with the petition, the trial court deferred the rendition of its
decision. Consequently, the case was remanded to the RTC for further proceedings,
including the rendition of its decision on the merits.
After the presentation of the parties respective sets of evidence, the RTC
rendered a Decision[9] dated April 25, 2002, finding several accused guilty of the offense
as charged, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, CONSIDERING ALL THE FOREGOING, this
Court finds the accused JOVEN DE GRANO, ARMANDO DE
GRANO, DOMINGO LANDICHO and ESTANISLAO LACABA, guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER, qualified by
treachery, and there being no modifying circumstance attendant,
hereby sentences them to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua,
and to indemnify the heirs of Emmanuel Mendoza the sum of
P50,000.00 and to pay the costs.
The case as against accused Leonides Landicho and Leonardo
Genil is hereby sent to the files or archived cases to be revived as
soon as said accused are apprehended.
Let alias warrants of arrest be issued against accused Leonardo
Genil and Leonides Landicho.
Only Estanislao was present at the promulgation despite due notice to the
other respondents.
Respondents, thru counsel, then filed a Joint Motion for Reconsideration dated
May 8, 2002, praying that the Decision dated April 25, 2002 be reconsidered and set
aside and a new one be entered acquitting them based on the following grounds, to wit:
1. The Honorable Court erred in basing the decision of conviction of
all accused solely on the biased, uncorroborated and baseless
testimony of Teresita Duran, the common-law wife of the victim;
2. The Honorable Court erred in not giving exculpatory weight to the
evidence adduced by the defense, which was amply corroborated on
material points;
3. The Honorable Court erred in not finding that the failure of the
prosecution to present rebuttal evidence renders the position of the
defense unrebutted;
4. The Honorable Court erred in adopting conditional or preliminary
finding of treachery of the Supreme Court in its Resolution dated July
12, 1999; and
5. The Honorable Court erred in rendering a verdict [sic] of
conviction despite the fact that the guilt of all the accused were not
proven beyond reasonable doubt.[10]
In its Opposition, the prosecution pointed out that while the accused jointly
moved for the reconsideration of the decision, all of them, except Estanislao, were at-
large.Having opted to become fugitives and be beyond the judicial ambit, they lost their
right to file such motion for reconsideration and to ask for whatever relief from the
court.[11]
Acting on respondents motion for reconsideration, the RTC issued an
Order[12] dated April 15, 2004 modifying its earlier decision by acquitting Joven and
Armando, and downgrading the conviction of Domingo and Estanislao from murder to
homicide. The decretal portion of the Order reads:
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court
modifies its decision and finds accused DOMINGO LANDICHO and
ESTANISLAO LACABA, GUILTYbeyond reasonable doubt, as
principal of the crime of Homicide, and in default of any modifying
circumstance, sentences them to an indeterminate prison term of SIX
(6) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of Prision Mayor, as minimum, to
TWELVE YEARS [and] ONE DAY of Reclusion Temporal, as
maximum. Said accused shall be credited with the full period of their
preventive imprisonment pursuant to B.P. Blg. 85.
Accused ARMANDO DE GRANO and JOVEN DE GRANO are
hereby ACQUITTED on the basis of reasonable doubt. They are
likewise declared free of any civil liability.
To the extent herein altered or modified, the Decision dated April
25, 2002 stands.
SO ORDERED.[13]
Estanislao filed a Notice of Appeal, while the prosecution sought
reconsideration of the Order arguing that:
1. There was absolutely no basis for this Court to have taken
cognizance of the Joint Motion for Reconsideration dated May 8,
2002, citing Sec. 6, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court.
2. The testimony of Teresita Duran deserves credence. The delay
in the taking of Ms. Durans written statement of the events she
witnessed is understandable considering that Joven de Grano
was the mayor of the municipality where the crime was
committed and that another accused, Estanislao Lacaba, was a
policeman in the same municipality.
3. The crime committed is murder.
4. Accused Armando de Grano and Joven de Grano participated
in the conspiracy.
On September 28, 2004, the RTC issued an Order[14] denying the motion and
giving due course to Estanislaos notice of appeal.
Petitioner, thru Assistant City Prosecutor Cesar Glorioso of the Office of the
Manila City Prosecutor, with the assistance of private prosecutor Atty. Michael E. David,
filed a Petition[15] for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the CA
arguing that:
(a) the private respondents, having deliberately evaded arrest
after being denied bail and deliberately failing to attend the
promulgation of the Decision despite due notice, lost the right
to move for reconsideration of their conviction; and
(b) the grounds relied upon by respondent RTC in modifying its
Decision are utterly erroneous.[16]
Petitioner alleged that it had no other plain, adequate, and speedy remedy,
considering that the State could not appeal a judgment of acquittal. However, by way of
exception, a judgment of acquittal in a criminal case may be assailed in a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court upon a showing by the petitioner that
the lower court, in acquitting the accused, committed not only reversible errors of
judgment, but also grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,
or a denial of due process, thus rendering the assailed judgment void. Consequently,
the accused cannot be considered at risk of double jeopardy.[17]
Respondent De Grano filed a Motion to Dismiss,[18] arguing that the verification
and certification portion of the petition was flawed, since it was signed only by counsel
and not by the aggrieved party. Also, the petition did not contain the conformity of the
Solicitor General.[19]
On January 31, 2005, petitioner, through the private prosecutor, filed an
Opposition to Motion to Dismiss.[20] Petitioner explained that, for lack of material time, it
failed to secure the conformity of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) when it filed
the petition, but it would nevertheless obtain it. A day after filing the petition, the private
prosecutor sought the OSGs conformity in a letter[21] dated January 12, 2005. The OSG,
in turn, informed the private prosecutor that rather than affixing its belated conformity, it
would rather await the initial resolution of the CA.[22] Also, so as not to preempt the
action of the Department of Justice (DOJ) on the case, the OSG instructed the private
prosecutor to secure the necessary endorsement from the DOJ for it to pursue the
case. Anent the verification and certification of the petition having been signed by the
private prosecutor, petitioner explained that private complainant Teresita was in fear for
her life as a result of the acquittal of former Mayor Joven de Grano, but she was willing
to certify the petition should she be given ample time to travel to Manila. [23]
However, in a Resolution[24] dated January 25, 2005, which was received by
the petitioner on the same day it filed its Opposition or on January 31, 2005, the petition
was dismissed outright by the CA on the grounds that it was not filed by the OSG and
that the assailed Orders were only photocopies and not certified true copies. The
dispositive portion of the Resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this petition is
hereby OUTRIGHTLY DISMISSED.
Petitioner timely filed a Motion for Reconsideration. [25] In addition to the
justifications it raised in its earlier Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss, petitioner argued
that the petition was not only signed by the private prosecutor, it was also signed by the
prosecutor who represented the petitioner in the criminal proceedings before the trial
court.Petitioner also maintains that the certified true copies of the assailed Orders were
accidentally attached to its file copy instead of the one it submitted. To rectify the
mistake, it attached the certified true copies of the assailed Orders. [26] This was
opposed by the respondents in their Comment/Opposition to Petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration.[27]
Meanwhile, in its 1st Indorsement[28] dated March 15, 2005, DOJ Secretary
Raul M. Gonzalez, endorsed the petition filed by the Assistant City Prosecutor, with the
assistance of the private prosecutor, to the Solicitor General for his conformity.
On April 5, 2005, the CA issued a Resolution[29] denying the motion, thus:
WHEREFORE, petitioners motion for reconsideration is
hereby DENIED.
In denying the motion, the CA opined that the rule on double jeopardy prohibits
the state from appealing or filing a petition for review of a judgment of acquittal that was
based on the merits of the case. If there is an acquittal, an appeal therefrom, if it will not
put the accused in double jeopardy, on the criminal aspect, may be undertaken only by
the State through the Solicitor General. It added that a special civil action
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court may be filed by the person
aggrieved. In such case, the aggrieved parties are the State and the private offended
party or complainant. Moreover, the records reveal that the petition was not filed in the
name of the offended party; and worse, the verification and certification of non-forum
shopping attached to the petition was signed not by the private offended party, but by
her counsel. Notwithstanding the efforts exerted by the petitioner to secure the
confirmation of the OSG and the endorsement of the DOJ, there is no showing of any
subsequent participation of the OSG in the case.
Hence, the petition raising the following issues:
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED
REVERSIBLE ERROR AND GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT
DISMISSED THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI ON THE GROUND
OF DOUBLE JEOPARDY.
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED
REVERSIBLE ERROR AND GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT
DISMISSED THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI FOR NOT HAVING
BEEN FILED BY THE OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL NOR
IN THE NAME OF THE OFFENDED PARTY.
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED
REVERSIBLE ERROR AND GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
WHEN IT DISMISSED THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI ON THE
GROUND THAT THE VERIFICATION AND CERTIFICATION
ATTACHED TO THE PETITION WAS SIGNED BY THE PRIVATE
COUNSEL AND NOT BY THE OFFENDED PARTY.[30]
Petitioner, through the Solicitor General, argues that, except for Estanislao,
none of the respondents appeared at the promulgation of the Decision. Neither did they
surrender after promulgation of the judgment of conviction, nor filed a motion for leave
to avail themselves of the judicial remedies against the decision, stating the reasons for
their absence. The trial court thus had no authority to take cognizance of the joint
motion for reconsideration filed by the respondents as stated in Section 6, Rule 120 of
the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. As such, the RTC committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Having been issued
without jurisdiction, the Order dated April 15, 2004 is void. Consequently, no double
jeopardy attached to such void Order. The CA, therefore, committed reversible error
when it dismissed the petition for certiorari on the ground of double jeopardy.[31]
Petitioner also contends that, with the endorsement of the DOJ and the letter
of the OSG manifesting its intention to pursue the petition, the OSG had in fact
conformed to the filing of the petition and agreed to pursue the same. Had the CA given
the OSG ample time to file the necessary pleading, the petition would not have been
dismissed for the reason that it was filed by the said office. [32]
With respect to the verification and certification of non-forum shopping,
petitioner invokes a liberal application of the Rules for private complainants failure to
personally sign it. Petitioner maintains that out of extreme fear arising from the
unexpected acquittal of Joven, private complainant was reluctant to travel
to Manila. After she was taken out of the witness protection program, she took refuge in
the Visayas and she was there at the time her signature was required. Since the period
for filing the petition for certiorariwas about to lapse, and it could not be filed without the
verification and certification of non-forum shopping, the private prosecutor was left with
no option but so sign it, instead of allowing the deadline to pass without filing the
petition.[33]
Moreover, petitioner maintains that the OSG has the authority to sign the
verification and certification of the present petition, because the real party-in-interest is
the OSG itself as the representative of the State.[34]
On their part, respondents contend that the petition for certiorari questioning
the order of acquittal is not allowed and is contrary to the principle of double
jeopardy.Respondents argue that, contrary to the OSGs contention, respondents Joven
and Domingos absence during the promulgation of the Decision dated April 25,
2002 did not deprive the trial court of its authority to resolve their Joint Motion for
Reconsideration, considering that one of the accused, Estanislao, was present during
the promulgation.[35]
Joven, Armando, and Domingo maintain that while they were not present
during the promulgation of the RTC Decision, Estanislao, who was under police
custody, attended the promulgation of the said Decision. Thus, when they filed their
Joint Motion for Reconsideration, which included that of Estanislao, the RTC was not
deprived of its authority to resolve the joint motion. [36]
Respondents insist that the CA properly dismissed the petition for certiorari, as
it was not instituted by the OSG on behalf of the People of the Philippines, and that the
verification and certification portion thereof was not signed by private complainant
Teresita.[37]
Respondents also argue that the petition for certiorari before this Court should
be dismissed, since the verification and certification thereof were signed by a solicitor of
the OSG, not private complainant.
The petition is meritorious.
Before considering the merits of the petition, we will first address the technical
objections raised by respondents.
As regards the issue of the signatory of the verification and certification of non-
forum shopping, a liberal application of the Rules should be applied to the present case.
The purpose of requiring a verification is to secure an assurance that the
allegations in the petition have been made in good faith; or are true and correct, not
merely speculative. This requirement is simply a condition affecting the form of
pleadings, and noncompliance therewith does not necessarily render it fatally
defective.[38] Truly, verification is only a formal, not a jurisdictional, requirement. Hence,
it was sufficient that the private prosecutor signed the verification.
With respect to the certification of non-forum shopping, it has been held that the
certification requirement is rooted in the principle that a party-litigant shall not be
allowed to pursue simultaneous remedies in different fora, as this practice is detrimental
to an orderly judicial procedure.[39] However, this Court has relaxed, under justifiable
circumstances, the rule requiring the submission of such certification considering that
although it is obligatory, it is not jurisdictional.[40] Not being jurisdictional, it can be
relaxed under the rule of substantial compliance.
In Donato v. Court of Appeals[41] and Wee v. Galvez,[42] the Court noted that
the petitioners were already in the United States; thus, the signing of the certification by
their authorized representatives was deemed sufficient compliance with the Rules. In Sy
Chin v. Court of Appeals,[43] the Court upheld substantial justice and ruled that the
failure of the parties to sign the certification may be overlooked, as the parties case was
meritorious. In Torres v. Specialized Packaging and Development Corporation,[44] the
Court also found, among other reasons, that the extreme difficulty to secure all the
required signatures and the apparent merits of the substantive aspects of the case
constitute compelling reasons for allowing the petition.
In Ortiz v. Court of Appeals[45] and similar rulings, the following has always
been pointed out:
The attestation contained in the certification on non-forum
shopping requires personal knowledge by the party who executed the
same. To merit the Courts consideration, petitioners here must show
reasonable cause for failure to personally sign the certification. The
petitioners must convince the court that the outright dismissal of the
petition would defeat the administration of justice.
Thus, petitioners need only show that there was reasonable cause for the
failure to sign the certification against forum shopping, and that the outright dismissal of
the petition would defeat the administration of justice. [46]
We find that the particular circumstances of this case advance valid reasons
for private complainants failure to sign the certification. As pointed out in the petition, it
was out of extreme fear that private complainant failed to personally sign the
certification. It is to be noted that when Armando and Joven were acquitted, Teresita
was already out of the witness protection program and was in hiding in the Visayas. As
such, she could not travel to Manila to personally sign the petition. Moreover, as
maintained by the petitioner, since the period for filing the petition for certiorari was
about to lapse, the private prosecutor was left with no option but to sign the verification
and certification, instead of allowing the period to file the petition to pass without it being
filed. A relaxation of the procedural rules, considering the particular circumstances, is
justified. The requirement was thus substantially complied with.
As summarized in Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Court of Appeals,[47] when
a strict and literal application of the rules on non-forum shopping and verification would
result in a patent denial of substantial justice, they may be liberally construed. An
unforgiving application of the pertinent provisions of the Rules will not be given premium
if it would impede rather than serve the best interests of justice in the light of the
prevailing circumstances in the case under consideration.
We reiterate our holding in City Warden of the Manila City Jail v.
Estrella,[48] that the signature of the Solicitor General on the verification and certification
of non-forum shopping in a petition before the CA or with this Court is substantial
compliance with the requirement under the Rules, considering that the OSG is the legal
representative of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and its agencies
and instrumentalities; more so, in a criminal case where the People or the State is the
real party-in-interest and is the aggrieved party.[49]
Also, respondents contention that there is no showing of any subsequent
participation of the OSG in the petition before the CA does not hold water. In the letter
datedJanuary 18, 2004, the OSG instructed the private prosecutor to secure the
necessary endorsement from the DOJ for it to pursue the case. In its 1st Indorsement
dated March 15, 2005, DOJ Secretary Raul M. Gonzalez, endorsed the petition to the
Solicitor General for his conformity. When the CA denied petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration for its outright dismissal of the petition, the OSG filed motions [50] for
extension of time to file the present petition. Moreover, the OSG filed a Comment[51] on
respondents Motion for Reconsideration.[52] Thus, any doubt regarding the
endorsement, conformity, and participation of the OSG in the petitions is dispelled.
Now on the substantive aspect.
A peculiar situation exists in the instant case. Petitioner has sought recourse
before the CA, via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, from an Order of the trial court
drastically modifying its earlier findings convicting the respondents of the crime of
murder, by acquitting Joven and Armando, and downgrading the convictions of their co-
accused from murder to homicide; this, notwithstanding that all the accused, except
Estanislao Lacaba, failed to personally appear at the promulgation of the Decision
despite due notice thereof.
Petitioner contends that its petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court with the CA was the proper remedy, since the RTC committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it entertained the Joint
Motion for Reconsideration with respect to Armando and Joven despite the fact that
they had not regained their standing in court.
Petitioners recourse to the CA was correct.
A writ of certiorari is warranted when (1) any tribunal, board or officer has
acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (2) there is no appeal, nor any plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. [53] An act of a court or
tribunal may be considered as grave abuse of discretion when the same was performed
in a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The
abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a
positive duty, or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, as where the
power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner because of passion or
hostility.[54]
By way of exception, a judgment of acquittal in a criminal case may be
assailed in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, but only upon a
clear showing by the petitioner that the lower court, in acquitting the accused,
committed not merely reversible errors of judgment but also grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, or to a denial of due process, thus rendering
the assailed judgment void.[55] In which event, the accused cannot be considered at risk
of double jeopardy the revered constitutional safeguard against exposing the accused to
the risk of answering twice for the same offense.
Double jeopardy has the following essential elements: (1) the accused is
charged under a complaint or an information sufficient in form and substance to sustain
a conviction; (2) the court has jurisdiction; (3) the accused has been arraigned and he
has pleaded; and (4) he is convicted or acquitted, or the case is dismissed without his
express consent.[56]
Although this Court does not absolutely preclude the availment of the remedy
of certiorari to correct an erroneous acquittal, the petitioner must clearly and
convincingly demonstrate that the lower court blatantly abused its authority to a point so
grave and so severe as to deprive it of its very power to dispense justice. [57]
Under English common law, exceptions to the pleas of prior conviction or
acquittal existed where the trial court lacked jurisdiction, the theory being that a
defendant before such a court was not actually placed in jeopardy.[58] Hence, any
acquittal or conviction before a court having no jurisdiction would not violate the
principle of double jeopardy since it failed to attach in the first place.
Section 14(2),[59] Article III of the Constitution, authorizing trials in absentia,
allows the accused to be absent at the trial but not at certain stages of the proceedings,
to wit: (a) at arraignment and plea, whether of innocence or of guilt; (b) during trial,
whenever necessary for identification purposes; and (c) at the promulgation of
sentence, unless it is for a light offense, in which case, the accused may appear by
counsel or representative. At such stages of the proceedings, his presence is required
and cannot be waived.[60]
Section 6, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Rules
applicable at the time the Decision was promulgated, provides:
Section 6. Promulgation of judgment. The judgment
is promulgated by reading it in the presence of the accused and any
judge of the court in which it was rendered. However, if the conviction
is for a light offense the judgment may be pronounced in the presence
of his counsel or representative. When the judge is absent or outside
the province or city, the judgment may be promulgated by the clerk of
court.
If the accused is confined or detained in another province or
city, the judgment may be promulgated by the executive judge of the
Regional Trial Court having jurisdiction over the place of confinement
or detention upon request of the court which rendered the
judgment. The court promulgating the judgment shall have authority
to accept the notice of appeal and to approve the bail bond pending
appeal; provided, that if the decision of the trial court convicting the
accused changed the nature of the offense from non-bailable to
bailable, the application for bail can only be filed and resolved by the
appellate court.
The proper clerk of court shall give notice to the accused,
personally or through his bondsman or warden and counsel, requiring
him to be present at the promulgation of the decision. If the accused
was tried in absentia because he jumped bail or escaped from prison,
the notice to him shall be served at his last known address.
In case the accused fails to appear at the scheduled date of
promulgation of judgment despite notice, the promulgation shall be
made by recording the judgment in the criminal docket and serving
him a copy thereof at his last known address or thru his counsel.
If the judgment is for conviction and the failure of the
accused to appear was without justifiable cause, he shall lose the
remedies available in these Rules against the judgment and the court
shall order his arrest. Within fifteen (15) days from promulgation of
judgment however, the accused may surrender and file a motion for
leave of court to avail of these remedies. He shall state the reasons
for his absence at the scheduled promulgation and if he proves that
his absence was for a justifiable cause, he shall be allowed to avail of
said remedies within fifteen (15) days from notice.[61]
Thus, the accused who failed to appear without justifiable cause shall lose the
remedies available in the Rules against the judgment. However, within 15 days from
promulgation of judgment, the accused may surrender and file a motion for leave of
court to avail of these remedies. He shall state in his motion the reasons for his absence
at the scheduled promulgation, and if he proves that his absence was for a justifiable
cause, he shall be allowed to avail of said remedies within 15 days from notice. [62]
When the Decision dated April 25, 2002 was promulgated, only Estanislao
Lacaba was present. Subsequently thereafter, without surrendering and explaining the
reasons for their absence, Joven, Armando, and Domingo joined Estanislao in their
Joint Motion for Reconsideration. In blatant disregard of the Rules, the RTC not only
failed to cause the arrest of the respondents who were at large, it also took cognizance
of the joint motion.
The RTC clearly exceeded its jurisdiction when it entertained the joint Motion
for Reconsideration with respect to the respondents who were at large. It should have
considered the joint motion as a motion for reconsideration that was solely filed by
Estanislao. Being at large, Joven and Domingo have not regained their standing in
court. Once an accused jumps bail or flees to a foreign country, or escapes from prison
or confinement, he loses his standing in court; and unless he surrenders or submits to
the jurisdiction of the court, he is deemed to have waived any right to seek relief from
the court.[63]
Thus, Joven, Armando, and Domingo, were not placed in double jeopardy
because, from the very beginning, the lower tribunal had acted without jurisdiction.
Verily, any ruling issued without jurisdiction is, in legal contemplation, necessarily null
and void and does not exist. In criminal cases, it cannot be the source of an acquittal.[64]
 However, with respect to Estanislao, the RTC committed no reversible error when
it entertained the Motion for Reconsideration. He was in custody and was present at the
promulgation of the judgment. Hence, the RTC never lost jurisdiction over his person.
Consequently, the RTCs ruling downgrading his conviction from murder to homicide
stands. For Estanislao, and for him alone, the proscription against double jeopardy
applies.
Factual matters cannot be inquired into by this Court in
a certiorari proceeding. We can no longer be tasked to go over the proofs presented by
the parties and analyze, assess and weigh them again to ascertain if the trial court was
correct in according superior credit to this or that piece of evidence of one party or the
other.[65] The sole office of a writ of certiorari is the correction of errors of jurisdiction,
including the commission of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction,
and does not include a review of the RTCs evaluation of the evidence and the factual
findings based thereon.[66]
True, were it not for the procedural lapses of the RTC and its blatant disregard
of the Rules, the finality of respondents acquittal and their co-accuseds conviction of
homicide instead of murder would have been barred by the rule on double jeopardy.
We may tolerate an erroneous acquittal borne from an attempt to protect the
innocent or from an attempt to uphold the accuseds treasured right to a fair trial, but
when these concerns are not evident, an erroneous acquittal is a source of substantial
dismay and warrants this Courts corrective action via a special writ of error.
Moreover, although the CA dismissed the appeal filed before it, the RTC
Judge cannot hide behind such fact considering that the dismissal of the appeal was not
based on the validity of the assailed Order of the RTC, but was based on technical rules
and the rule against double jeopardy.
It is to be stressed that judges are dutybound to have more than a cursory
acquaintance with laws and jurisprudence. Failure to follow basic legal commands
constitutes gross ignorance of the law from which no one may be excused, not even a
judge.[67] The Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that a judge shall be faithful to the law
and maintain professional competence.[68] It bears stressing that competence is one of
the marks of a good judge. When a judge displays an utter lack of familiarity with the
Rules, he erodes the publics confidence in the competence of our courts. Such is gross
ignorance of the law. Having accepted the exalted position of a judge, he/she owes the
public and the court the duty to be proficient in the law.[69]
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions dated January 25,
2005 and April 5, 2005, issued by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 88160,
areREVERSED and SET ASIDE. The pertinent portions of the Order dated April 15,
2004 issued by the Regional Trial Court, convicting Domingo Landicho of the crime of
Homicide and acquitting Armando de Grano and Joven de Grano, are ANNULLED and
DELETED. In all other aspects, the Order stands.
To the extent herein altered or modified, the pertinent portions of the Decision
dated April 25, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court are REINSTATED.
The Office of the Court Administrator is DIRECTED to INVESTIGATE Judge
Teresa P. Soriaso for possible violation/s of the law and/or the Code of Judicial Conduct
in issuing the Order dated April 15, 2004 in Criminal Case No. 93-129988. SO
ORDERED.
IVLER VS MODESTO-SAN PEDRO 635 S 191
The Case
The petition seeks the review[1] of the Orders[2] of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City
affirming sub-silencio a lower courts ruling finding inapplicable the Double Jeopardy
Clause to bar a second prosecution for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and
Damage to Property. This, despite the accuseds previous conviction for Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries arising from the same incident
grounding the second prosecution.
The Facts
Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner Jason Ivler (petitioner) was
charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 71 (MeTC), with two
separate offenses: (1) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries
(Criminal Case No. 82367) for injuries sustained by respondent Evangeline L. Ponce
(respondent Ponce); and (2) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage
to Property (Criminal Case No. 82366) for the death of respondent Ponces husband
Nestor C. Ponce and damage to the spouses Ponces vehicle. Petitioner posted bail for
his temporary release in both cases.
On 7 September 2004, petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge in Criminal Case
No. 82367 and was meted out the penalty of public censure. Invoking this conviction,
petitioner moved to quash the Information in Criminal Case No. 82366 for placing him in
jeopardy of second punishment for the same offense of reckless imprudence.
The MeTC refused quashal, finding no identity of offenses in the two cases. [3]
After unsuccessfully seeking reconsideration, petitioner elevated the matter to
the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 157 (RTC), in a petition for certiorari
(S.C.A. No. 2803). Meanwhile, petitioner sought from the MeTC the suspension of
proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366, including the arraignment on 17 May 2005,
invoking S.C.A. No. 2803 as a prejudicial question. Without acting on petitioners motion,
the MeTC proceeded with the arraignment and, because of petitioners absence,
cancelled his bail and ordered his arrest.[4] Seven days later, the MeTC issued a
resolution denying petitioners motion to suspend proceedings and postponing his
arraignment until after his arrest.[5]Petitioner sought reconsideration but as of the filing of
this petition, the motion remained unresolved.
Relying on the arrest order against petitioner, respondent Ponce sought in the
RTC the dismissal of S.C.A. No. 2803 for petitioners loss of standing to maintain the
suit. Petitioner contested the motion.
The Ruling of the Trial Court
In an Order dated 2 February 2006, the RTC dismissed S.C.A. No. 2803,
narrowly grounding its ruling on petitioners forfeiture of standing to maintain S.C.A. No.
2803 arising from the MeTCs order to arrest petitioner for his non-appearance at the
arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366. Thus, without reaching the merits of S.C.A.
No. 2803, the RTC effectively affirmed the MeTC. Petitioner sought reconsideration but
this proved unavailing.[6]
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner denies absconding. He explains that his petition in S.C.A. No. 2803
constrained him to forego participation in the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366.
Petitioner distinguishes his case from the line of jurisprudence sanctioning dismissal of
appeals for absconding appellants because his appeal before the RTC was a special
civil action seeking a pre-trial relief, not a post-trial appeal of a judgment of conviction.[7]
Petitioner laments the RTCs failure to reach the merits of his petition in S.C.A. 2803.
Invoking jurisprudence, petitioner argues that his constitutional right not to be placed
twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense bars his prosecution in Criminal
Case No. 82366, having been previously convicted in Criminal Case No. 82367 for the
same offense of reckless imprudence charged in Criminal Case No. 82366. Petitioner
submits that the multiple consequences of such crime are material only to determine his
penalty.
 Respondent Ponce finds no reason for the Court to disturb the RTCs decision forfeiting
petitioners standing to maintain his petition in S.C.A. 2803. On the merits, respondent
Ponce calls the Courts attention to jurisprudence holding that light offenses (e.g. slight
physical injuries) cannot be complexed under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code with
grave or less grave felonies (e.g. homicide). Hence, the prosecution was obliged to
separate the charge in Criminal Case No. 82366 for the slight physical injuries from
Criminal Case No. 82367 for the homicide and damage to property.
In the Resolution of 6 June 2007, we granted the Office of the Solicitor Generals motion
not to file a comment to the petition as the public respondent judge is merely a nominal
party and private respondent is represented by counsel.
The Issues
Two questions are presented for resolution: (1) whether petitioner forfeited his standing
to seek relief in S.C.A. 2803 when the MeTC ordered his arrest following his non-
appearance at the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366; and (2) if in the negative,
whether petitioners constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause bars further
proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366.
The Ruling of the Court
We hold that (1) petitioners non-appearance at the arraignment in Criminal Case No.
82366 did not divest him of personality to maintain the petition in S.C.A. 2803; and (2)
the protection afforded by the Constitution shielding petitioner from prosecutions placing
him in jeopardy of second punishment for the same offense bars further proceedings in
Criminal Case No. 82366.
Petitioners Non-appearance at the Arraignment in
Criminal Case No. 82366 did not Divest him of Standing
to Maintain the Petition in S.C.A. 2803
Dismissals of appeals grounded on the appellants escape from custody or violation of
the terms of his bail bond are governed by the second paragraph of Section 8, Rule
124,[8]in relation to Section 1, Rule 125, of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure
authorizing this Court or the Court of Appeals to also, upon motion of the appellee
or motu proprio, dismiss the appeal if the appellant escapes from prison or confinement,
jumps bail or flees to a foreign country during the pendency of the appeal. The appeal
contemplated in Section 8 of Rule 124 is a suit to review judgments of convictions.
The RTCs dismissal of petitioners special civil action for certiorari to review a pre-
arraignment ancillary question on the applicability of the Due Process Clause to bar
proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366 finds no basis under procedural rules and
jurisprudence. The RTCs reliance on People v. Esparas[9] undercuts the cogency of its
ruling because Esparas stands for a proposition contrary to the RTCs ruling. There, the
Court granted review to an appeal by an accused who was sentenced to death for
importing prohibited drugs even though she jumped bail pending trial and was thus tried
and convicted in absentia. The Court in Esparas treated the mandatory review of death
sentences under Republic Act No. 7659 as an exception to Section 8 of Rule 124. [10]
The mischief in the RTCs treatment of petitioners non-appearance at his arraignment in
Criminal Case No. 82366 as proof of his loss of standing becomes more evident when
one considers the Rules of Courts treatment of a defendant who absents himself from
post-arraignment hearings. Under Section 21, Rule 114[11] of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, the defendants absence merely renders his bondsman potentially
liable on its bond (subject to cancellation should the bondsman fail to produce the
accused within 30 days); the defendant retains his standing and, should he fail to
surrender, will be tried in absentia and could be convicted or acquitted. Indeed, the 30-
day period granted to the bondsman to produce the accused underscores the fact that
mere non-appearance does not ipso facto convert the accuseds status to that of a
fugitive without standing.
Further, the RTCs observation that petitioner provided no explanation why he
failed to attend the scheduled proceeding[12] at the MeTC is belied by the records. Days
before the arraignment, petitioner sought the suspension of the MeTCs proceedings in
Criminal Case No. 82366 in light of his petition with the RTC in S.C.A. No. 2803.
Following the MeTCs refusal to defer arraignment (the order for which was released
days after the MeTC ordered petitioners arrest), petitioner sought reconsideration. His
motion remained unresolved as of the filing of this petition.
Petitioners Conviction in Criminal Case No. 82367
Bars his Prosecution in Criminal Case No. 82366
The accuseds negative constitutional right not to be twice put in jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense[13] protects him from, among others, post-conviction
prosecution for the same offense, with the prior verdict rendered by a court of
competent jurisdiction upon a valid information.[14] It is not disputed that petitioners
conviction in Criminal Case No. 82367 was rendered by a court of competent
jurisdiction upon a valid charge. Thus, the case turns on the question whether Criminal
Case No. 82366 and Criminal Case No. 82367 involve the same offense. Petitioner
adopts the affirmative view, submitting that the two cases concern the same offense of
reckless imprudence. The MeTC ruled otherwise, finding that Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries is an entirely separate offense from Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property as the [latter] requires proof
of an additional fact which the other does not.[15]
We find for petitioner.
Reckless Imprudence is a Single Crime,
its Consequences on Persons and
Property are Material Only to Determine
the Penalty
The two charges against petitioner, arising from the same facts, were prosecuted under
the same provision of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, namely, Article 365
defining and penalizing quasi-offenses. The text of the provision reads:
Imprudence and negligence. Any person who, by reckless imprudence, shall
commit any act which, had it been intentional, would constitute a grave felony, shall
suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its
medium period; if it would have constituted a less grave felony, the penalty of arresto
mayor in its minimum and medium periods shall be imposed; if it would have constituted
a light felony, the penalty of arresto menor in its maximum period shall be imposed.
Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit
an act which would otherwise constitute a grave felony, shall suffer
the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods; if it
would have constituted a less serious felony, the penalty of arresto
mayor in its minimum period shall be imposed.
When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only
resulted in damage to the property of another, the offender shall be
punished by a fine ranging from an amount equal to the value of said
damages to three times such value, but which shall in no case be less
than twenty-five pesos.
A fine not exceeding two hundred pesos and censure shall be
imposed upon any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence,
shall cause some wrong which, if done maliciously, would have
constituted a light felony.
In the imposition of these penalties, the court shall exercise their
sound discretion, without regard to the rules prescribed in Article
sixty-four.
 The provisions contained in this article shall not be applicable:
1. When the penalty provided for the offense is equal to or lower than
those provided in the first two paragraphs of this article, in which case
the court shall impose the penalty next lower in degree than that
which should be imposed in the period which they may deem proper
to apply.
2. When, by imprudence or negligence and with violation of
the Automobile Law, to death of a person shall be caused, in which
case the defendant shall be punished by prision correccional in its
medium and maximum periods.
Reckless imprudence consists in voluntary, but without malice, doing
or failing to do an act from which material damage results by reason
of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing
or failing to perform such act, taking into consideration his
employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition
and other circumstances regarding persons, time and place.
Simple imprudence consists in the lack of precaution displayed in
those cases in which the damage impending to be caused is not
immediate nor the danger clearly manifest.
The penalty next higher in degree to those provided for in this article
shall be imposed upon the offender who fails to lend on the spot to
the injured parties such help as may be in this hand to give.
Structurally, these nine paragraphs are collapsible into four sub-groupings
relating to (1) the penalties attached to the quasi-offenses of imprudence and
negligence (paragraphs 1-2); (2) a modified penalty scheme for either or both quasi-
offenses (paragraphs 3-4, 6 and 9); (3) a generic rule for trial courts in imposing
penalties (paragraph 5); and (4) the definition of reckless imprudence and simple
imprudence (paragraphs 7-8). Conceptually, quasi-offenses penalize the mental attitude
or condition behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight,
the imprudencia punible,[16] unlike willful offenses which punish the intentional
criminal act. These structural and conceptual features of quasi-offenses set them apart
from the mass of intentional crimes under the first 13 Titles of Book II of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended.
Indeed, the notion that quasi-offenses, whether reckless or simple, are distinct
species of crime, separately defined and penalized under the framework of our penal
laws, is nothing new. As early as the middle of the last century, we already sought to
bring clarity to this field by rejecting in Quizon v. Justice of the Peace of Pampanga the
proposition that reckless imprudence is not a crime in itself but simply a way of
committing it x x x[17] on three points of analysis: (1) the object of punishment in quasi-
crimes (as opposed to intentional crimes); (2) the legislative intent to treat quasi-
crimes as distinct offenses (as opposed to subsuming them under the mitigating
circumstance of minimal intent) and; (3) the different penalty structures for quasi-crimes
and intentional crimes:
The proposition (inferred from Art. 3 of the Revised Penal Code) that reckless
imprudence is not a crime in itself but simply a way of committing it and merely
determines a lower degree of criminal liability is too broad to deserve unqualified
assent. There are crimes that by their structure cannot be committed through
imprudence: murder, treason, robbery, malicious mischief, etc. In truth, criminal
negligence in our Revised Penal Code is treated as a mere quasi offense, and dealt
with separately from willful offenses. It is not a mere question of classification or
terminology. In intentional crimes, the act itself is punished; in negligence or
imprudence, what is principally penalized is the mental attitude or condition behind the
act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight, the imprudencia punible. x x
xx
Were criminal negligence but a modality in the commission
of felonies, operating only to reduce the penalty therefor, then it would
be absorbed in the mitigating circumstances of Art. 13, specially the
lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong as the one actually
committed. Furthermore, the theory would require that the
corresponding penalty should be fixed in proportion to the penalty
prescribed for each crime when committed willfully. For each penalty
for the willful offense, there would then be a corresponding penalty for
the negligent variety. But instead, our Revised Penal Code (Art. 365)
fixes the penalty for reckless imprudence at arresto mayor maximum,
to prision correccional [medium], if the willful act would constitute a
grave felony, notwithstanding that the penalty for the latter could
range all the way from prision mayor to death, according to the
case. It can be seen that the actual penalty for criminal negligence
bears no relation to the individual willful crime, but is set in relation to
a whole class, or series, of crimes.[18] (Emphasis supplied)
This explains why the technically correct way to allege quasi-crimes is to state
that their commission results in damage, either to person or property.[19]
Accordingly, we found the Justice of the Peace in Quizon without jurisdiction to
hear a case for Damage to Property through Reckless Imprudence, its jurisdiction being
limited to trying charges for Malicious Mischief, an intentional crime conceptually
incompatible with the element of imprudence obtaining in quasi-crimes.
Quizon, rooted in Spanish law[20] (the normative ancestry of our present day
penal code) and since repeatedly reiterated, [21] stands on solid conceptual foundation.
The contrary doctrinal pronouncement in People v. Faller[22] that [r]eckless impudence is
not a crime in itself x x x [but] simply a way of committing it x x x,[23] has long been
abandoned when the Court en banc promulgated Quizon in 1955 nearly two
decades after the Court decided Faller in 1939. Quizon rejected Fallers
conceptualization of quasi-crimes by holding that quasi-crimes under Article 365 are
distinct species of crimes and not merely methods of committing crimes. Faller found
expression in post-Quizonjurisprudence[24] only by dint of lingering doctrinal confusion
arising from an indiscriminate fusion of criminal law rules defining Article 365 crimes and
the complexing of intentional crimes under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code which,
as will be shown shortly, rests on erroneous conception of quasi-crimes. Indeed,
the Quizonian conception of quasi-crimes undergirded a related branch of jurisprudence
applying the Double Jeopardy Clause to quasi-offenses, barring second prosecutions
for a quasi-offense alleging one resulting act after a prior conviction or acquittal of a
quasi-offense alleging another resulting act but arising from the same reckless act or
omission upon which the second prosecution was based.
Prior Conviction or Acquittal of
Reckless Imprudence Bars
Subsequent Prosecution for the Same
Quasi-Offense
The doctrine that reckless imprudence under Article 365 is a single quasi-
offense by itself and not merely a means to commit other crimes such that
conviction or acquittal of such quasi-offense bars subsequent prosecution for
the same quasi-offense, regardless of its various resulting acts, undergirded
this Courts unbroken chain of jurisprudence on double jeopardy as applied to
Article 365 starting with People v. Diaz,[25] decided in 1954. There, a full Court,
speaking through Mr. Justice Montemayor, ordered the dismissal of a case for
damage to property thru reckless imprudence because a prior case against the
same accused for reckless driving, arising from the same act upon which the
first prosecution was based, had been dismissed earlier. Since then, whenever
the same legal question was brought before the Court, that is, whether prior
conviction or acquittal of reckless imprudence bars subsequent prosecution for
the same quasi-offense, regardless of the consequences alleged for both
charges, the Court unfailingly and consistently answered in the affirmative
in People v. Belga[26] (promulgated in 1957 by the Court en banc, per
Reyes, J.), Yap v. Lutero[27] (promulgated in 1959, unreported, per
Concepcion, J.), People v. Narvas[28] (promulgated in 1960 by the Court en
banc, per Bengzon J.), People v. Silva[29] (promulgated in 1962 by the Court en
banc, per Paredes,J.), People v. Macabuhay[30] (promulgated in 1966 by the
Court en banc, per Makalintal, J.), People v. Buan[31] (promulgated in 1968 by
the Court en banc, per Reyes, J.B.L., acting C. J.), Buerano v. Court of
Appeals[32] (promulgated in 1982 by the Court en banc, per Relova, J.),
and People v. City Court of Manila[33] (promulgated in 1983 by the First
Division, per Relova, J.). These cases uniformly barred the second
prosecutions as constitutionally impermissible under the Double Jeopardy
Clause.
The reason for this consistent stance of extending the constitutional protection
under the Double Jeopardy Clause to quasi-offenses was best articulated by Mr. Justice
J.B.L. Reyes in Buan, where, in barring a subsequent prosecution for serious physical
injuries and damage to property thru reckless imprudence because of the accuseds
prior acquittal of slight physical injuries thru reckless imprudence, with both charges
grounded on the same act, the Court explained:[34]
Reason and precedent both coincide in that once convicted
or acquitted of a specific act of reckless imprudence, the accused
may not be prosecuted again for that same act. For the essence of
the quasi offense of criminal negligence under article 365 of the
Revised Penal Code lies in the execution of an imprudent or negligent
act that, if intentionally done, would be punishable as a felony. The
law penalizes thus the negligent or careless act, not the result thereof.
The gravity of the consequence is only taken into account to
determine the penalty, it does not qualify the substance of the
offense. And, as the careless act is single, whether the injurious result
should affect one person or several persons, the offense (criminal
negligence) remains one and the same, and can not be split into
different crimes and prosecutions.[35] x x x (Emphasis supplied)
Evidently, the Diaz line of jurisprudence on double jeopardy merely extended to its
logical conclusion the reasoning of Quizon.
There is in our jurisprudence only one ruling going against this unbroken line
of authority. Preceding Diaz by more than a decade, El Pueblo de Filipinas v.
Estipona,[36] decided by the pre-war colonial Court in November 1940, allowed the
subsequent prosecution of an accused for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to
property despite his previous conviction for multiple physical injuries arising from the
same reckless operation of a motor vehicle upon which the second prosecution was
based. Estiponas inconsistency with the post-war Diaz chain of jurisprudence suffices to
impliedly overrule it. At any rate, all doubts on this matter were laid to rest in 1982
in Buerano.[37] There, we reviewed the Court of Appeals conviction of an accused for
damage to property for reckless imprudence despite his prior conviction for slight and
less serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence, arising from the same act upon
which the second charge was based. The Court of Appeals had relied on Estipona. We
reversed on the strength of Buan:[38]
Th[e] view of the Court of Appeals was inspired by the ruling
of this Court in the pre-war case of People vs. Estipona decided on
November 14, 1940. However, in the case of People vs. Buan, 22
SCRA 1383 (March 29, 1968), this Court, speaking thru Justice J. B.
L. Reyes, held that
Reason and precedent both coincide in that once convicted
or acquitted of a specific act of reckless imprudence, the accused
may not be prosecuted again for that same act. For the essence of
the quasi offense of criminal negligence under Article 365 of the
Revised Penal Code lies in the execution of an imprudent or negligent
act that, if intentionally done, would be punishable as a felony. The
law penalizes thus the negligent or careless act, not the result thereof.
The gravity of the consequence is only taken into account to
determine the penalty, it does not qualify the substance of the
offense. And, as the careless act is single, whether the injurious result
should affect one person or several persons, the offense (criminal
negligence) remains one and the same, and can not be split into
different crimes and prosecutions.
xxxx
. . . the exoneration of this appellant, Jose
Buan, by the Justice of the Peace (now Municipal)
Court of Guiguinto, Bulacan, of the charge of slight
physical injuries through reckless
imprudence, prevents his being prosecuted for
serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence in the Court of First Instance of the
province, where both charges are derived from the
consequences of one and the same vehicular
accident, because the second accusation places
the appellant in second jeopardy for the same
offense.[39] (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, for all intents and purposes, Buerano had effectively overruled Estipona.
It is noteworthy that the Solicitor General in Buerano, in a reversal of his earlier
stance in Silva, joined causes with the accused, a fact which did not escape the Courts
attention:
Then Solicitor General, now Justice Felix V. Makasiar, in his
MANIFESTATION dated December 12, 1969 (page 82 of the
Rollo) admits that the Court of Appeals erred in not sustaining
petitioners plea of double jeopardy and submits that its affirmatory
decision dated January 28, 1969, in Criminal Case No. 05123-CR
finding petitioner guilty of damage to property through reckless
imprudence should be set aside, without costs. He stressed that if
double jeopardy exists where the reckless act resulted into homicide
and physical injuries. then the same consequence must perforce
follow where the same reckless act caused merely damage to
property-not death-and physical injuries. Verily, the value of a human
life lost as a result of a vehicular collision cannot be equated with any
amount of damages caused to a motors vehicle arising from the same
mishap.[40] (Emphasis supplied)
 Hence, we find merit in petitioners submission that the lower courts erred in refusing to
extend in his favor the mantle of protection afforded by the Double Jeopardy Clause. A
more fitting jurisprudence could not be tailored to petitioners case than People v.
Silva, [41] a Diaz progeny. There, the accused, who was also involved in a vehicular
collision, was charged in two separate Informations with Slight Physical Injuries thru
Reckless Imprudence and Homicide with Serious Physical Injuries thru Reckless
Imprudence. Following his acquittal of the former, the accused sought the quashal of
the latter, invoking the Double Jeopardy Clause. The trial court initially denied relief, but,
on reconsideration, found merit in the accuseds claim and dismissed the second
case. In affirming the trial court, we quoted with approval its analysis of the issue
following Diaz and its progeny People v. Belga:[42]
On June 26, 1959, the lower court reconsidered its Order of
May 2, 1959 and dismissed the case, holding:
[T]he Court believes that the case falls squarely within the doctrine of
double jeopardy enunciated in People v. Belga, x x x In the case
cited, Ciriaco Belga and Jose Belga were charged in the Justice of
the Peace Court of Malilipot, Albay, with the crime of physical injuries
through reckless imprudence arising from a collision between the two
automobiles driven by them (Crim. Case No. 88). Without the
aforesaid complaint having been dismissed or otherwise disposed of,
two other criminal complaints were filed in the same justice of the
peace court, in connection with the same collision one for damage to
property through reckless imprudence (Crim. Case No. 95) signed by
the owner of one of the vehicles involved in the collision, and another
for multiple physical injuries through reckless imprudence (Crim. Case
No. 96) signed by the passengers injured in the accident. Both of
these two complaints were filed against Jose Belga only. After trial,
both defendants were acquitted of the charge against them in Crim.
Case No. 88. Following his acquittal, Jose Belga moved to quash the
complaint for multiple physical injuries through reckless imprudence
filed against him by the injured passengers, contending that the case
was just a duplication of the one filed by the Chief of Police wherein
he had just been acquitted. The motion to quash was denied and after
trial Jose Belga was convicted, whereupon he appealed to the Court
of First Instance of Albay. In the meantime, the case for damage to
property through reckless imprudence filed by one of the owners of
the vehicles involved in the collision had been remanded to the Court
of First Instance of Albay after Jose Belga had waived the second
stage of the preliminary investigation. After such remand, the
Provincial Fiscal filed in the Court of First Instance two informations
against Jose Belga, one for physical injuries through reckless
imprudence, and another for damage to property through reckless
imprudence. Both cases were dismissed by the Court of First
Instance, upon motion of the defendant Jose Belga who alleged
double jeopardy in a motion to quash. On appeal by the Prov. Fiscal,
the order of dismissal was affirmed by the Supreme Court in the
following language: .
The question for determination is whether the acquittal of
Jose Belga in the case filed by the chief of police constitutes a bar to
his subsequent prosecution for multiple physical injuries and damage
to property through reckless imprudence.
In the case of Peo[ple] v. F. Diaz, G. R. No. L-6518, prom.
March 30, 1954, the accused was charged in the municipal court of
Pasay City with reckless driving under sec. 52 of the Revised Motor
Vehicle Law, for having driven an automobile in a ῾fast and reckless
manner ... thereby causing an accident. After the accused had
pleaded not guilty the case was dismissed in that court ῾for failure of
the Government to prosecute. But some time thereafter the city
attorney filed an information in the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
charging the same accused with damage to property thru reckless
imprudence. The amount of the damage was alleged to be P249.50.
Pleading double jeopardy, the accused filed a motion, and on appeal
by the Government we affirmed the ruling. Among other things we
there said through Mr. Justice Montemayor
The next question to determine is the relation between the
first offense of violation of the Motor Vehicle Law prosecuted before
the Pasay City Municipal Court and the offense of damage to property
thru reckless imprudence charged in the Rizal Court of First Instance.
One of the tests of double jeopardy is whether or not the second
offense charged necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the
offense charged in the former complaint or information (Rule 113,
Sec. 9). Another test is whether the evidence which proves one would
prove the other that is to say whether the facts alleged in the first
charge if proven, would have been sufficient to support the second
charge and vice versa; or whether one crime is an ingredient of the
other. x x x
xxxx
The foregoing language of the Supreme Court also disposes
of the contention of the prosecuting attorney that the charge for slight
physical injuries through reckless imprudence could not have been
joined with the charge for homicide with serious physical injuries
through reckless imprudence in this case, in view of the provisions of
Art. 48 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. The prosecutions
contention might be true. But neither was the prosecution obliged to
first prosecute the accused for slight physical injuries through reckless
imprudence before pressing the more serious charge of homicide with
serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence. Having first
prosecuted the defendant for the lesser offense in the Justice of the
Peace Court of Meycauayan, Bulacan, which acquitted the defendant,
the prosecuting attorney is not now in a position to press in this case
the more serious charge of homicide with serious physical injuries
through reckless imprudence which arose out of the same alleged
reckless imprudence of which the defendant have been previously
cleared by the inferior court.[43]
Significantly, the Solicitor General had urged us in Silva to
reexamine Belga (and hence, Diaz) for the purpose of delimiting or clarifying its
application.[44] We declined the invitation, thus:
The State in its appeal claims that the lower court erred in
dismissing the case, on the ground of double jeopardy, upon the
basis of the acquittal of the accused in the JP court for Slight Physical
Injuries, thru Reckless Imprudence. In the same breath said State,
thru the Solicitor General, admits that the facts of the case at bar, fall
squarely on the ruling of the Belga case x x x, upon which the order of
 dismissal of the lower court was anchored. The Solicitor General,
however, urges a re-examination of said ruling, upon certain
considerations for the purpose of delimiting or clarifying its
application. We find, nevertheless, that further elucidation or
disquisition on the ruling in the Belga case, the facts of which are
analogous or similar to those in the present case, will yield no
practical advantage to the government. On one hand, there is nothing
which would warrant a delimitation or clarification of the applicability
of the Belga case. It was clear. On the other, this Court has reiterated
the views expressed in the Belga case, in the identical case of Yap v.
Hon. Lutero, etc., L-12669, April 30, 1959.[45] (Emphasis supplied)
Article 48 Does not Apply to Acts Penalized
Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code
The confusion bedeviling the question posed in this petition, to which the MeTC
succumbed, stems from persistent but awkward attempts to harmonize conceptually
incompatible substantive and procedural rules in criminal law, namely, Article 365
defining and penalizing quasi-offenses and Article 48 on complexing of crimes, both
under the Revised Penal Code. Article 48 is a procedural device allowing single
prosecution of multiple felonies falling under either of two categories: (1) when a single
act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies (thus excluding from its
operation light felonies[46]); and (2) when an offense is a necessary means for
committing the other. The legislature crafted this procedural tool to benefit the accused
who, in lieu of serving multiple penalties, will only serve the maximum of the penalty for
the most serious crime.
In contrast, Article 365 is a substantive rule penalizing not an act defined as a
felony but the mental attitude x x x behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of
care or foresight x x x,[47] a single mental attitude regardless of the resulting
consequences. Thus, Article 365 was crafted as one quasi-crime resulting in one or
more consequences.
Ordinarily, these two provisions will operate smoothly. Article 48 works to
combine in a single prosecution multiple intentional crimes falling under Titles 1-13,
Book II of the Revised Penal Code, when proper; Article 365 governs the prosecution of
imprudent acts and their consequences. However, the complexities of human
interaction can produce a hybrid quasi-offense not falling under either models that of
a single criminal negligence resulting in multiple non-crime damages to persons and
property with varying penalties corresponding to light, less grave or grave offenses. The
ensuing prosecutorial dilemma is obvious: how should such a quasi-crime be
prosecuted? Should Article 48s framework apply to complex the single quasi-
offense with its multiple (non-criminal) consequences (excluding those amounting to
light offenses which will be tried separately)? Or should the prosecution proceed under
a single charge, collectively alleging all the consequences of the single quasi-crime, to
be penalized separately following the scheme of penalties under Article 365?
Jurisprudence adopts both approaches. Thus, one line of rulings (none of
which involved the issue of double jeopardy) applied Article 48 by complexing one
quasi-crime with its multiple consequences [48] unless one consequence amounts to a
light felony, in which case charges were split by grouping, on the one hand, resulting
acts amounting to grave or less grave felonies and filing the charge with the second
level courts and, on the other hand, resulting acts amounting to light felonies and filing
the charge with the first level courts.[49] Expectedly, this is the approach the MeTC
impliedly sanctioned (and respondent Ponce invokes), even though under Republic Act
No. 7691,[50] the MeTC has now exclusive original jurisdiction to impose the most
serious penalty under Article 365 which is prision correccional in its medium period.
Under this approach, the issue of double jeopardy will not arise if the
complexing of acts penalized under Article 365 involves only resulting acts penalized as
grave or less grave felonies because there will be a single prosecution of all the
resulting acts. The issue of double jeopardy arises if one of the resulting acts is
penalized as a light offense and the other acts are penalized as grave or less grave
offenses, in which case Article 48 is not deemed to apply and the act penalized as a
light offense is tried separately from the resulting acts penalized as grave or less grave
offenses.
The second jurisprudential path nixes Article 48 and sanctions a single
prosecution of all the effects of the quasi-crime collectively alleged in one charge,
regardless of their number or severity,[51] penalizing each consequence separately.
Thus, in Angeles v. Jose,[52] we interpreted paragraph three of Article 365, in relation to
a charge alleging reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property and less serious
physical injuries, as follows:
[T]he third paragraph of said article, x x x reads as follows:
When the execution of the act covered by
this article shall have only resulted in damage to the
property of another, the offender shall be punished
by a fine ranging from an amount equal to the value
of said damage to three times such value, but
which shall in no case be less than 25 pesos.
The above-quoted provision simply means that if there is
only damage to property the amount fixed therein shall be
imposed, but if there are also physical injuries there should be
anadditional penalty for the latter. The information cannot be split into
two; one for the physical injuries, and another for the damage to
property, x x x.[53] (Emphasis supplied)
By additional penalty, the Court meant, logically, the penalty scheme under Article 365.
Evidently, these approaches, while parallel, are irreconcilable. Coherence in
this field demands choosing one framework over the other. Either (1) we allow the
complexing of a single quasi-crime by breaking its resulting acts into separate offenses
(except for light felonies), thus re-conceptualize a quasi-crime, abandon its present
framing under Article 365, discard its conception under the Quizon and Diaz lines of
cases, and treat the multiple consequences of a quasi-crime as separate intentional
felonies defined under Titles 1-13, Book II under the penal code; or (2) we forbid the
application of Article 48 in the prosecution and sentencing of quasi-crimes, require
single prosecution of all the resulting acts regardless of their number and severity,
separately penalize each as provided in Article 365, and thus maintain the distinct
concept of quasi-crimes as crafted under Article 365, articulated in Quizon and applied
to double jeopardy adjudication in the Diaz line of cases.
A becoming regard of this Courts place in our scheme of government denying
it the power to make laws constrains us to keep inviolate the conceptual distinction
between quasi-crimes and intentional felonies under our penal code. Article 48 is
incongruent to the notion of quasi-crimes under Article 365. It is conceptually impossible
for a quasi-offense to stand for (1) a single act constituting two or more grave or less
grave felonies; or (2) an offense which is a necessary means for
committing another. This is why, way back in 1968 in Buan, we rejected the Solicitor
Generals argument that double jeopardy does not bar a second prosecution for slight
physical injuries through reckless imprudence allegedly because the charge for that
offense could not be joined with the other charge for serious physical injuries through
reckless imprudence following Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code:
 The Solicitor General stresses in his brief that the charge for
slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence could not be
joined with the accusation for serious physical injuries through
reckless imprudence, because Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code
allows only the complexing of grave or less grave felonies. This same
argument was considered and rejected by this Court in the case
of People vs. [Silva] x x x:
[T]he prosecutions contention might be true. But neither was
the prosecution obliged to first prosecute the accused for slight
physical injuries through reckless imprudence before pressing the
more serious charge of homicide with serious physical injuries
through reckless imprudence. Having first prosecuted the defendant
for the lesser offense in the Justice of the Peace Court of
Meycauayan, Bulacan, which acquitted the defendant, the
prosecuting attorney is not now in a position to press in this case the
more serious charge of homicide with serious physical injuries
through reckless imprudence which arose out of the same alleged
reckless imprudence of which the defendant has been previously
cleared by the inferior court.
[W]e must perforce rule that the exoneration of this appellant x x x by
the Justice of the Peace x x x of the charge of slight physical injuries
through reckless imprudence, prevents his being prosecuted for
serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence in the Court of
First Instance of the province, where both charges are derived from
the consequences of one and the same vehicular accident, because
the second accusation places the appellant in second jeopardy for the
same offense.[54] (Emphasis supplied)
Indeed, this is a constitutionally compelled choice. By prohibiting the splitting
of charges under Article 365, irrespective of the number and severity of the resulting
acts, rampant occasions of constitutionally impermissible second prosecutions are
avoided, not to mention that scarce state resources are conserved and diverted to
proper use.
Hence, we hold that prosecutions under Article 365 should proceed from a
single charge regardless of the number or severity of the consequences. In imposing
penalties, the judge will do no more than apply the penalties under Article 365 for each
consequence alleged and proven. In short, there shall be no splitting of charges under
Article 365, and only one information shall be filed in the same first level court. [55]
Our ruling today secures for the accused facing an Article 365 charge a
stronger and simpler protection of their constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy
Clause. True, they are thereby denied the beneficent effect of the favorable sentencing
formula under Article 48, but any disadvantage thus caused is more than compensated
by the certainty of non-prosecution for quasi-crime effects qualifying as light offenses
(or, as here, for the more serious consequence prosecuted belatedly). If it is so minded,
Congress can re-craft Article 365 by extending to quasi-crimes the sentencing formula
of Article 48 so that only the most severe penalty shall be imposed under a single
prosecution of all resulting acts, whether penalized as grave, less grave or light
offenses. This will still keep intact the distinct concept of quasi-offenses. Meanwhile, the
lenient schedule of penalties under Article 365, befitting crimes occupying a lower rung
of culpability, should cushion the effect of this ruling.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We REVERSE the Orders dated 2 February
2006 and 2 May 2006 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 157.
WeDISMISS the Information in Criminal Case No. 82366 against petitioner Jason Ivler y
Aguilar pending with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 71 on the ground
of double jeopardy. Let a copy of this ruling be served on the President of the Senate
and the Speaker of the House of Representatives. SO ORDERED.
BRAZA VS SANDIGANBAYAN 691 S 471
This is a petition for certiorari filed by petitioner Isabelo Braza (Braza)seeking to reverse
and set aside the October 12, 2009 Resolution
of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. SB-08-CRM-0275, entitledPeople v.
Robert G. Lala, et al., as well as its October 22, 2010 Resolution,
denying his motion for reconsideration.
The Philippines was assigned the hosting rights for the 12th Association of Southeast
Asian Nations (ASEAN) Leaders Summit scheduled in December 2006. In preparation
for this international diplomatic event with the province of Cebu as the designated
venue, the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) identified projects
relative to the improvement and rehabilitation of roads and installation of traffic safety
devices and lighting facilities. The then Acting Secretary of the DPWH, Hermogenes E.
Ebdane, approved the resort to alternative modes of procurement for the
implementation of these projects due to the proximity of the ASEAN Summit.
One of the ASEAN Summit-related projects to be undertaken was the installation of
street lighting systems along the perimeters of the Cebu International Convention
Center in Mandaue City and the ceremonial routes of the Summit to upgrade the
appearance of the convention areas and to improve night-time visibility for security
purposes. Four (4) out of eleven (11) street lighting projects were awarded to FABMIK
Construction and Equipment Supply Company, Inc. (FABMIK) and these were covered
by Contract I.D. Nos. 06H0021, 06H00049, 06H00050, and 06H00052. Contract I.D.
No. 06H00050, the subject transaction of this case, involved the supply and installation
of street lighting facilities along the stretch of Mandaue-Mactan Bridge 1 to Punta
Engaño Section in Lapu-Lapu City, with an estimated project cost of ₱83,950,000.00.
With the exception of the street lighting project covered by Contract I.D. No. 06H0021,
the three other projects were bidded out only on November 28, 2006 or less than two
(2) weeks before the scheduled start of the Summit. Thereafter, the DPWH and
FABMIK executed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) whereby FABMIK obliged itself
to implement the projects at its own expense and the DPWH to guarantee the payment
of the work accomplished. FABMIK was able to complete the projects within the
deadline of ten (10) days utilizing its own resources and credit facilities. The schedule of
the international event, however, was moved by the national organizers to January 9-
15, 2007 due to typhoon Seniang which struck Cebu for several days.
After the summit, a letter-complaint was filed before the Public Assistance and
Corruption Prevention Office (PACPO), Ombudsman -Visayas, alleging that the ASEAN
Summit street lighting projects were overpriced. A panel composing of three
investigators conducted a fact-finding investigation to determine the veracity of the
accusation. Braza, being the president of FABMIK, was impleaded as one of the
respondents. On March 16, 2007, the Ombudsman directed the Department of Budget
and Management (DBM) and the DPWH to cease and desist from releasing or
disbursing funds for the projects in question.
On March 23, 2007, the fact-finding body issued its Evaluation Report
recommending the filing of charges for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practice Act,
against the DPWH officials and employees in Region VII and the cities of Mandaue and
Lapu-lapu, and private contractors FABMIK and GAMPIK Construction and
Development, Inc. (GAMPIK). This report was filed before the Office of the
Ombudsman-Visayas (OMBVisayas) for the conduct of a preliminary investigation and
was docketed therein as OMB-V-C-07-124-C, entitled PACPO-OMB-Visayas v. Lala, et.
al.
After the preliminary investigation, the OMB-Visayas issued its Resolution,
dated January 24, 2008, finding probable cause to indict the concerned respondents for
violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019. It was found that the lampposts and other
lighting facilities installed were indeed highly overpriced after a comparison of the costs
of the materials indicated in the Program of Works and Estimates (POWE) with those in
the Bureau of Customs (BOC) documents; and that the contracts entered into between
the government officials and the private contractors were manifestly and grossly
disadvantageous to the government.
Subsequently, the OMB-Visayas filed several informations before the Sandiganbayan
for violation of Sec. 3(g) of R.A. 3019 against the officials of DPWH Region VII, the
officials of the cities of Mandaue and Lapu-lapu and private contractors, FABMIK
President Braza and GAMPIK Board Chairman Gerardo S. Surla (Surla). The
Information docketed as SB-08- CRM-0275
(first information) which involved the street lighting project covered by Contract I.D. No.
06H00050 with FABMIK, was raffled to the First Division of the Sandiganbayan. It was
alleged therein that Braza acted in conspiracy with the public officials and employees in
the commission of the crime charged.
On June 6, 2008, Braza was arraigned as a precondition to his authorization to travel
abroad. He entered a plea of "not guilty."
On August 14, 2008, the motions for reinvestigation filed by Arturo
Radaza (Radaza), the Mayor of Lapu-lapu City, and the DPWH officials were denied by
the Sandiganbayan for lack of merit. Consequently, they moved for the reconsideration
of said resolution.
On August 27, 2008, Braza filed a motion for reinvestigation
anchored on the following grounds: (1) the import documents relied upon by the OMB-
Visayas were spurious and falsified; (2) constituted new evidence, if considered, would
overturn the finding of probable cause; and (3) the finding of overpricing was bereft of
factual and legal basis as the same was not substantiated by any independent canvass
of prevailing market prices of the subject lampposts. He prayed for the suspension of
the proceedings of the case pending such reinvestigation. The Sandiganbayan treated
Braza's motion as his motion for reconsideration of its August 14, 2008 Resolution.
On November 13, 2008, Braza filed a manifestation
to make of record that he was maintaining his previous plea of "not guilty" without any
condition.
During the proceedings held on November 3, 2008, the Sandiganbayan reconsidered its
August 14, 2008 resolution and directed a reinvestigation of the case.
According to the anti-graft court, the allegations to the effect that no independent
canvass was conducted and that the charge of overpricing was based on falsified
documents were serious reasons enough to merit a reinvestigation of the case. The
Sandiganbayan said that it could be reasonably inferred from the July 30, 2008 Order of
the Ombudsman in OMB-V-C-07-0124-C that the latter would not object to the conduct
of a reinvestigation of all the cases against the accused.
Braza filed his Manifestation,
dated February 2, 2009, informing the Sandiganbayan of his intention to abandon his
previous motion for reinvestigation. He opined that the prosecution would merely use
the reinvestigation proceedings as a means to engage in a second unbridled fishing
expedition to cure the lack of probable cause.
On March 23, 2009, Braza filed a motion
in support of the abandonment of reinvestigation with a plea to vacate Information,
insisting that the further reinvestigation of the case would only afford the prosecution a
second round of preliminary investigation which would be vexatious, oppressive and
violative of his constitutional right to a speedy disposition of his case, warranting its
dismissal with prejudice.
After concluding its reinvestigation of the case, the OMB-Visayas issued its Resolution,
dated May 4, 2009, (Supplemental Resolution) which upheld the finding of probable
cause but modified the charge from violation of Sec. 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019
to violation of Sec. 3(e)
of the same law. Accordingly, the prosecution filed its Manifestation and Motion to
Admit Amended Information
on May 8, 2009.
On July 1, 2009, Braza filed his Comment (to the motion to admit amended information)
with Plea for Discharge and/or Dismissal of the Case.
He claimed that the first information had been rendered ineffective or had been
deemed vacated by the issuance of the Supplemental Resolution and, hence, his
discharge from the first information was in order. By way of an alternative prayer, Braza
sought the dismissal of the case with prejudice claiming that his right to a speedy
disposition of the case had been violated and that the Supplemental Resolution failed to
cure the fatal infirmities of the January 24, 2008 Resolution since proof to support the
allegation of overpricing remained wanting. Braza averred that he could not be
arraigned under the second information without violating the constitutional proscription
against double jeopardy.
On October 12, 2009, the Sandiganbayan issued the first assailed resolution admitting
the Amended Information,
dated May 4, 2009,(second Information) and denying Braza's plea for dismissal of the
criminal case. The Sandiganbayan ruled that Braza would not be placed in double
jeopardy should he be arraigned anew under the second information because his
previous arraignment was conditional. It continued that even if he was regularly
arraigned, double jeopardy would still not set in because the second information
charged an offense different from, and which did not include or was necessarily
included in, the original offense charged. Lastly, it found that the delay in the
reinvestigation proceedings could not be characterized as vexatious, capricious or
oppressive and that it could not be attributed to the prosecution. The dispositive portion
of the said resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion to Admit Attached Amended
Information filed by the prosecution is hereby GRANTED. The Amended Information
charging all the accused therein with violation of Sec. 3 (e) of R.A. 3019, being the
proper offense, is hereby ADMITTED.
Consequently, accused Braza's Alternative Relief for Dismissal of the Case is
hereby DENIED.
Let the arraignment of all the accused in the Amended Information be set on November
18, 2009, at 8:30 in the morning.
SO ORDERED.
On November 6, 2009, Braza moved for reconsideration with alternative motion to
quash the information
reiterating his arguments that his right against double jeopardy and his right to a
speedy disposition of the case were violated warranting the dismissal of the criminal
case with prejudice. In the alternative, Braza moved for the quashal of the second
information vigorously asserting that the same was fatally defective for failure to allege
any actual, specified and quantifiable injury sustained by the government as required by
law for indictment under Sec. 3(e) of R.A. 3019, and that the charge of overpricing was
unfounded.
On October 22, 2010, the Sandiganbayan issued the second assailed resolution stating,
among others, the denial of Braza's Motion to Quash the information. The anti-graft
court ruled that the Amended Information was sufficient in substance as to inform the
accused of the nature and causes of accusations against them. Further, it held that the
specifics sought to be alleged in the Amended Information were evidentiary in nature
which could be properly presented during the trial on the merits. The Sandiganbayan
also stated that it was possible to establish the fact of overpricing if it would be proven
that the contract price was excessive compared to the price for which FABMIK
purchased the street lighting facilities from its supplier. Braza was effectively discharged
from the first Information upon the filing of the second Information but said discharge
was without prejudice to, and would not preclude, his prosecution for violation of Sec.
3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. It added that his right to speedy disposition of the case was not
violated inasmuch as the length of time spent for the proceedings was in compliance
with the procedural requirements of due process. The Sandiganbayan, however,
deemed it proper that a new preliminary investigation be conducted under the new
charge. Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan disposed:
WHEREFORE, in the light of all the foregoing, the separate omnibus motions of
accused-movant Radaza and accused-movants Bernido, Manggis and Ojeda, insofar as
the sought preliminary investigation is concerned is GRANTED.
Accordingly, this case is hereby remanded to the Office of the Ombudsman/Special
Prosecutor for preliminary investigation of violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019. The said
office/s are hereby ordered to complete the said preliminary investigation and to submit
to the Court the result of the said investigation within sixty (60) days from notice.
However, the Motion for Bill of Particulars of accusedmovants Lala, Dindin Alvizo,
Fernandez, Bagolor, Galang and Diano, the Motion for Quashal of Information of
accused-movants Bernido, Manggis and Ojeda, and accused-movant Braza's Motion to
Quash, are hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
ISSUES
Undaunted, Braza filed this petition for certiorari ascribing grave abuse of discretion on
the Sandiganbayan for issuing the Resolutions, dated October 12, 2009 and October
22, 2010, respectively. Braza raised the following issues:
**A) The Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in sustaining the
withdrawal of the Information in violation of the constitutional guarantee against double
jeopardy, the petitioner having entered a valid plea and vigorously objected to any
further conduct of reinvestigation and amendment of Information.
B) The Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion in allowing the withdrawal
and amendment of the Information without prejudice, the proceedings being fraught with
flip-flopping, prolonged and vexatious determination of probable cause, thereby violating
petitioner's constitutional right to speedy disposition of his case, warranting his
discharge with prejudice regardless of the nature of his previous arraignment.
C) The Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion to
quash Amended Information, there being no allegation of actual, specified, or
quantifiable injury sustained by the government as required by law (in cases involving
Sec. 3 (e) of RA 3019) with the Reinvestigation Report itself admitting on record that the
government has not paid a single centavo for the fully-implemented project.
D) The Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion in sustaining the new
indictment under Sec. 3(e) of R.A. 3019 without threshing out the fatal infirmities that
hounded the previous finding of overpricing - the erroneous reliance on spurious import
documents and lack of price canvass to establish prevailing market price - thereby
rendering the new Resolution fatally defective.**
Essentially, Braza posits that double jeopardy has already set in on the basis of his "not
guilty" plea in the first Information and, thus, he can no longer be prosecuted under the
second Information. He claims that his arraignment was unconditional because the
conditions in the plea were ineffective for not being unmistakable and categorical. He
theorizes that the waiver of his constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy was
not absolute as the same was qualified by the phrase "as a result of the pending
incidents." He argues that even granting that his arraignment was indeed conditional,
the same had become simple and regular when he validated and confirmed his plea of
"not guilty" by means of a written manifestation which removed any further condition
attached to his previous plea.
Braza submits that the prolonged, vexatious and flip-flopping determination of probable
cause violated his right to a speedy disposition of the case which would justify the
dismissal of the case with prejudice. Further, he assails the sufficiency of the allegation
of facts in the second Information for failure to assert any actual and quantifiable injury
suffered by the government in relation to the subject transaction. He points out that the
admission in the Reinvestigation Report to the effect that the government had not paid a
single centavo to FABMIK for the fully implemented project, had rendered as invalid,
baseless and frivolous any indictment or prosecution for violation of Sec. 3(e) of R.A.
3019. Braza insists that the Supplemental Resolution of the OMB-Visayas was fatally
defective considering that the Ombudsman did not conduct an independent price
canvass of the prevailing market price of the subject lampposts and merely relied on the
spurious and false BOC documents to support its conclusion of overpricing.
By way of comment,
the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP)retorts that the withdrawal of the first
information and the subsequent filing of the second information did not place Braza in
double jeopardy or violate his right to speedy disposition of the case. The OSP reasons
that Braza waived his right to invoke double jeopardy when he agreed to be
conditionally arraigned. It further argues that even granting that the arraignment was
unconditional, still double jeopardy would not lie because the charge of violation of
Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 in the second information is a different offense with different
elements from that of the charge of violation of Sec. 3(g) in the first Information. The
OSP posits that his right to a speedy disposition of the case was not violated as the
delay in the proceedings cannot be considered as oppressive, vexatious or capricious.
According to the OSP, such delay was precipitated by the many pleadings filed by the
accused, including Braza, and was in fact incurred to give all the accused the
opportunities to dispute the accusation against them in the interest of fairness and due
process.
The OSP also submits that proof of the actual injury suffered by the government and
that of overpricing, are superfluous and immaterial for the determination of probable
cause because the alleged mode for committing the offense charged in the second
Information was by giving any private party unwarranted benefit, advantage or
preference. The second Information sufficiently alleges all the elements of the offense
for which the accused were indicted.
The Court’s Ruling
Simply put, the pivotal issue in this case is whether the Sandiganbayan acted with grave
abuse of discretion in denying Braza's plea for the dismissal of Case No. SB-08-CRM-
0275 and his subsequent motion to quash the second Information, particularly on the
grounds of double jeopardy, violation of his right to a speedy disposition of the case,
and failure of the Information to state every single fact to constitute all the elements of
the offense charged.
The petition is devoid of merit.
It is Braza’s stance that his constitutional right under the double jeopardy clause bars
further proceedings in Case No. SB-08-CRM-0275. He asserts that his arraignment
under the first information was simple and unconditional and, thus, an arraignment
under the second information would put him in double jeopardy.
The Court is not persuaded. His argument cannot stand scrutiny.
The June 6, 2008 Order
of the Sandiganbayan reads:
This morning, accused Isabelo A. Braza was summoned to arraignmentas a
precondition in authorizing his travel. The arraignment of the accused was conditional in
the sense that if the present Information will be amended as a result of the pending
incidents herein, he cannot invoke his right against double jeopardy and he shall submit
himself to arraignment anew under such Amended Information. On the other hand, his
conditional arraignment shall not prejudice his right to question such Amended
Information, if one shall be filed. These conditions were thoroughly explained to the
accused and his counsel. After consultation with his counsel, the accused willingly
submitted himself to such conditional arraignment.
Thereafter, the accused, with the assistance of counsel, was arraigned by reading the
Information to him in English, a language understood by him. Thereafter, he pleaded
Not Guilty to the charge against him. [Emphases supplied]
While it is true that the practice of the Sandiganbayan of conducting "provisional" or
"conditional" arraignment of the accused is not specifically sanctioned by the Revised
Internal Rules of the Procedure of the Sandiganbayan or by the regular Rules of
Procedure, this Court had tangentially recognized such practice in People v. Espinosa,
provided that the alleged conditions attached to the arraignment should be
"unmistakable, express, informed and enlightened." The Court further required that the
conditions must be expressly stated in the order disposing of arraignment, otherwise, it
should be deemed simple and unconditional.
A careful perusal of the record in the case at bench would reveal that the arraignment of
Braza under the first information was conditional in nature as it was a mere
accommodation in his favor to enable him to travel abroad without the Sandiganbayan
losing its ability to conducttrial in absentia in case he would abscond. The
Sandiganbayan's June 6, 2008 Order clearly and unequivocally states that the
conditions for Braza's arraignment as well as his travel abroad, that is, that if the
Information would be amended, he shall waive his constitutional right to be protected
against double jeopardy and shall allow himself to be arraigned on the amended
information without losing his right to question the same. It appeared that these
conditions were duly explained to Braza and his lawyer by the anti-graft court. He was
afforded time to confer and consult his lawyer. Thereafter, he voluntarily submitted
himself to such conditional arraignment and entered a plea of "not guilty" to the offense
of violation of Sec. 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019.
Verily, the relinquishment of his right to invoke double jeopardy had been convincingly
laid out. Such waiver was clear, categorical and intelligent. It may not be amiss to state
that on the day of said arraignment, one of the incidents pending for the consideration of
the Sandiganbayan was an omnibus motion for determination of probable cause and for
quashal of information or for reinvestigation filed by accused Radaza. Accordingly, there
was a real possibility that the first information would be amended if said motion was
granted. Although the omnibus motion was initially denied, it was subsequently granted
upon motion for reconsideration, and a reinvestigation was ordered to be conducted in
the criminal case.
Having given his conformity and accepted the conditional arraignment and its legal
consequences, Braza is now estopped from assailing its conditional nature just to
conveniently avoid being arraigned and prosecuted of the new charge under the second
information. Besides, in consonance with the ruling in Cabo v. Sandiganbayan,
this Court cannot now allow Braza to renege and turn his back on the above conditions
on the mere pretext that he affirmed his conditional arraignment through a pleading
denominated as Manifestation filed before the Sandiganbayan on November 13, 2008.
After all, there is no showing that the anti-graft court had acted on, much less noted, his
written manifestation.
Assuming, in gratia argumenti, that there was a valid and unconditional plea, Braza
cannot plausibly rely on the principle of double jeopardy to avoid arraignment under the
second information because the offense charged therein is different and not included in
the offense charged under the first information. The right against double jeopardy is
enshrined in Section 21 of Article III of the Constitution, which reads:
No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is
punished by a law and an ordinance conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute
a bar to another prosecution for the same act.
This constitutionally mandated right is procedurally buttressed by Section 17 of Rule
117
of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. To substantiate a claim for double
jeopardy, the accused has the burden of demonstrating the following requisites: (1) a
first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have
been validly terminated; and (3) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense as in
the first.
As to the first requisite, the first jeopardy attaches only (a) after a valid indictment; (b)
before a competent court; (c) after arraignment, (d) when a valid plea has been entered;
and (e) when the accused was acquitted or convicted, or the case was dismissed or
otherwise terminated without his express consent.
The test for the third element is whether one offense is identical with the other or is an
attempt to commit it or a frustration thereof; or whether the second offense includes or is
necessarily included in the offense charged in the first information.
Braza, however, contends that double jeopardy would still attach even if the first
information charged an offense different from that charged in the second information
since both charges arose from the same transaction or set of facts. Relying on the
antiquated ruling of People v. Del Carmen,
Braza claims that an accused should be shielded against being prosecuted for several
offenses made out from a single act.
It appears that Braza has obviously lost sight, if he is not altogether aware, of the ruling
in Suero v. People
where it was held that the same criminal act may give rise to two or more separate and
distinct offenses; and that no double jeopardy attaches as long as there is variance
between the elements of the two offenses charged. The doctrine of double jeopardy is a
revered constitutional safeguard against exposing the accused from the risk of being
prosecuted twice for the same offense, and not a different one.
There is simply no double jeopardy when the subsequent information charges another
and different offense, although arising from the same act or set of acts.
Prosecution for the same act is not prohibited. What is forbidden is the prosecution for
the same offense.
In the case at bench, there is no dispute that the two charges stemmed from the same
transaction. A comparison of the elements of violation of Sec. 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019 and
those of violation of Sec. 3(e) of the same law, however, will disclose that there is
neither identity nor exclusive inclusion between the two offenses. For conviction of
violation of Sec. 3(g), the prosecution must establish the following elements:
1. The offender is a public officer;
2. He entered into a contract or transaction in behalf of the government; and
3. The contract or transaction is manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the
government.
On the other hand, an accused may be held criminally liable of violation of Section 3(e)
of R.A. No. 3019, provided that the following elements are present:
1. The accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or official
functions;
2. The accused must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence; and
3. His action caused undue injury to any party, including the government or gave any
private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his
functions.
Although violation of Sec. 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019 and violation of Sec. 3(e) of the same
law share a common element, the accused being a public officer, the latter is not
inclusive of the former. The essential elements of each are not included among or do
not form part of those enumerated in the other. For double jeopardy to exist, the
elements of one offense should ideally encompass or include those of the other. What
the rule on double jeopardy prohibits refers to identity of elements in the two offenses.
Next, Braza contends that the long delay that characterized the proceedings for the
determination of probable cause has resulted in the transgression of his constitutional
right to a speedy disposition of the case. According to him, the proceedings have
unquestionably been marred with vexatious, capricious and oppressive delay meriting
the dismissal of Case No. SB-08-CRM-0275. Braza claims that it took the OMB more
than two (2) years to charge him and his co-accused with violation of Section 3(e) in the
second information.
The petitioner's contention is untenable.
Section 16, Article III of the Constitution declares in no uncertain terms that "[A]ll
persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial,
quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies." The right to a speedy disposition of a case is
deemed violated only when the proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious, and
oppressive delays, or when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and
secured, or when without cause or justifiable motive, a long period of time is allowed to
elapse without the party having his case tried.
The constitutional guarantee to a speedy disposition of cases is a relative or flexible
concept.
It is consistent with delays and depends upon the circumstances. What the Constitution
prohibits are unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive delays which render rights
nugatory.
In Dela Peña v. Sandiganbayan,
the Court laid down certain guidelines to determine whether the right to a speedy
disposition has been violated, as follows:
The concept of speedy disposition is relative or flexible. A mere mathematical reckoning
of the time involved is not sufficient. Particular regard must be taken of the facts and
circumstances peculiar to each case. Hence, the doctrinal rule is that in the
determination of whether that right has been violated, the factors that may be
considered and balanced are as follows: (1) the length of the delay; (2) the reasons for
the delay; (3) the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused; and (4) the
prejudice caused by the delay.
Using the foregoing yardstick, the Court finds that Braza’s right to speedy disposition of
the case has not been infringed.
Record shows that the complaint against Braza and twenty-three (23) other
respondents was filed in January 2007 before the PACPO-Visayas. After the extensive
inquiries and data-gathering, the PACPO-Visayas came out with an evaluation report on
March 23, 2007 concluding that the installed lampposts and lighting facilities were highly
overpriced.
PACPO-Visayas recommended that the respondents be charged with violation of
Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. Thereafter, the investigatory process was set in motion
before the OMB-Visayas where the respondents filed their respective counter-affidavits
and submitted voluminous documentary evidence to refute the allegations against them.
Owing to the fact that the controversy involved several transactions and varying modes
of participation by the 24 respondents and that their respective responsibilities had to be
established, the OMB-Visayas resolved the complaint only on January 24, 2008 with the
recommendation that the respondents be indicted for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A.
3019. The Court notes that Braza never decried the time spent for the preliminary
investigation. There was no showing either that there were unreasonable delays in the
proceedings or that the case was kept in idle slumber.
After the filing of the information, the succeeding events appeared to be part of a valid
and regular course of the judicial proceedings not attended by capricious, oppressive
and vexatious delays. On November 3, 2008, Sandiganbayan ordered the
reinvestigation of the case upon motion of accused Radaza, petitioner Braza and other
accused DPWH officials. In the course of the reinvestigation, the OMB-Visayas
furnished the respondents with the additional documents/papers it secured, especially
the Commission on Audit Report, for their verification, comment and submission of
countervailing evidence.
Thereafter, the OMB-Visayas issued its Supplemental Resolution, dated May 4, 2009,
finding probable cause against the accused for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019.
Indeed, the delay can hardly be considered as "vexatious, capricious and oppressive."
The complexity of the factual and legal issues, the number of persons charged, the
various pleadings filed, and the volume of documents submitted, prevent this Court from
yielding to the petitioner’s claim of violation of his right to a speedy disposition of his
case. Rather, it appears that Braza and the other accused were merely afforded
sufficient opportunities to ventilate their respective defenses in the interest of justice,
due process and fair investigation. The re-investigation may have inadvertently
contributed to the further delay of the proceedings but this process cannot be dispensed
with because it was done for the protection of the rights of the accused. Albeit the
conduct of investigation may hold back the progress of the case, the same was
essential so that the rights of the accused will not be compromised or sacrificed at the
altar of expediency.
The bare allegation that it took the OMB more than two (2) years to terminate the
investigation and file the necessary information would not suffice.
As earlier stated, mere mathematical reckoning of the time spent for the investigation is
not a sufficient basis to conclude that there was arbitrary and inordinate delay.
The delay in the determination of probable cause in this case should not be cause for
an unfettered abdication by the anti-graft court of its duty to try and determine the
controversy in Case No. SB-08-CRM-0275. The protection under the right to a speedy
disposition of cases should not operate to deprive the government of its inherent
prerogative in prosecuting criminal cases.
Finally, Braza challenges the sufficiency of the allegations in the second information
because there is no indication of any actual and quantifiable injury suffered by the
government. He then argues that the facts under the second information are inadequate
to support a valid indictment for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019.
The petitioner's simple syllogism must fail.
Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019 states:
Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers - In addition to acts or omission of public
officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices
of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any
private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his
official administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or
gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of
offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or
other concessions.
In a catena of cases, this Court has held that there are two (2) ways by which a public
official violates Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 in the performance of his functions,
namely: (1) by causing undue injury to any party, including the Government; or (2) by
giving any private party any unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference.
The accused may be charged under either mode or under both. The disjunctive term
"or" connotes that either act qualifies as a violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019.
In other words, the presence of one would suffice for conviction.
It must be emphasized that Braza was indicted for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No.
3019 under the second mode. "To be found guilty under the second mode, it suffices
that the accused has given unjustified favor or benefit to another, in the exercise of his
official, administrative and judicial functions."
The element of damage is not required for violation of Section 3(e) under the second
mode.
In the case at bench, the second information alleged, in substance, that accused public
officers and employees, discharging official or administrative function, together with
Braza, confederated and conspired to give F ABMIK unwarranted benefit or preference
by awarding to it Contract I.D. No. 06H00050 through manifest partiality or evident bad
faith, without the conduct of a public bidding and compliance with the requirement for
qualification contrary to the provisions of R.A. No. 9184 or the Government
Procurement Reform Act. Settled is the rule that private persons, when acting in
conspiracy with public officers, may be indicted and, if found guilty, held liable for the
pertinent offenses under Section 3 of R.A. No. 3 019.
Considering that all the elements of the offense of violation of Sec. 3(e) were alleged in
the second information, the Court finds the same to be sufficient in form and substance
to sustain a conviction.
At any rate, the presence or absence of the elements of the crime is evidentiary in
nature and is a matter of defense that may be passed upon after a full-blown trial on the
merits.
It is not proper, therefore, to resolve the issue right at the outset without the benefit of a
full-blown trial. This issue requires a fuller ventilation and examination.
All told, this Court finds that the Sandiganbayan did not commit grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, much less did it gravely err, in
denying Braza's motion to quash the information/dismiss Case No. SB-08-CRM-0275.
This ruling, however, is without prejudice to the actual merits of this criminal case as
may be shown during the trial before the court a quo.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DENIED. The Sandiganbayan is
hereby DIRECTED to dispose of Case No. SB-08-CRM- 0275 with reasonable dispatch.
SO ORDERED.
DIGEST
CAYAO-LASAM VS RAMOLETE (GR NO. 159132 DECEMBER 18, 2002)
Facts: On July 28, 1994, respondent 3 months pregnant Editha Ramolete was brought
to Lorma Medical Center (LMC) in San Fernando, La Union due to vaginal bleeding
upon advise of petitioner related via telephone, Editha was admitted to the LMC on the
same day. A pelvic sonogram was then conducted on Editha revealing the fetus weak
cardiac pulsation. The following day, Editha repeat pelvic sonogram showed that aside
from the fetus weak cardiac pulsation, no fetal movement was also appreciated. Due to
persistent and profuse vaginal bleeding, petitioner advised her to undergo a D&C
procedure. She was discharged the following day. On September 16, 1994, Editha was
once gain brought at the LMC, as she was suffering from vomiting ans severe
abdominal pains. Editha was attended by Drs. Dela Cruz, Mayo and Komiya. Dr. Mayo
allegedly informed Editha that there was a dead fetus in the latter’s womb, after Editha
went laparectomy, she was found to have massive intra abdominal hemorrhage and
ruptured uterus. Thus, she had to go hysterectomy and as a result no more chance to
bear a child.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner is liable for medical malpractice.
Held: No. Medical malpractice is a particular form of negligence which consists in the
failure of a physician or surgeon to apply to his practice of medicine that degree of care
and skill which is ordinarily employed by the profession generally under similar
conditions, and in like surrounding circumstances. In order to successfully pursue such
a claim, a patient must prove that the physician or surgeon either failed to do
something which a reasonably prudent physician or surgeon would not have done, and
that the failure or action caused injury to the patient.
There are four elements involved in medical negligence cases: duty, breach, injury, and
proximate cause..
A physician-patient relationship was created when Editha employed the services of the
petitioner. As Editha’s physician, petitioner was duty-bound to use at least the same
level of care that any reasonably competent doctor would use to treat a condition under
the same circumstances. The breach of these professional duties of skill and care, or
their improper performance by a physician surgeon, whereby the patient’s injured in
body or in health, constitutes actionable malpractice, as to this aspect of medical
malpractice, the determination of the reasonable level of care and the breach thereof,
expert testimony is essential. Further, in as much as the causes of the injuries involved
in malpractice actions are determinable only in the light of scientific knowledge, it has
been recognized that expert testimony is usually necessary to suspect the conclusion
as to causation.
It is undisputed that Editha did not return for follow-up evaluation, in defiance of the
petitioners advice. This is as found out is the proximate cause of the injury she
sustained.
PEOPLE VS. MAGAT
This is a case of incestuous rapeTwo informations were filed
against appellant.Uponarraignment, he pleaded guilty but bargained for a lesser penalty
for each case.The mother of the complainant and the public prosecutor agreed and an
order was issued the same day imposing tenyears imprisonment for
each case.After three months, the cases were revived at the instance of the
complainant on the ground that the penalty was too light.Appellant was re-arraigned and
he entered a plea of not guilty.Two months later, he entered anew a plea
ofguilty.The court then imposed the enalty of death.He now appeals on the ground that
there was double jeopardy upon the re-arraignment and trial on the same information.
Held:
The first order issued by the trial is void ab initio on the ground that the accused’s plea
is not the plea bargaining contemplated by law and the rules of procedure.The only
instance where a plea bargaining is allowed under the Rules is when the accused
pleads guilty to a lesseroffense.Sec 2 Rule 116 (note that there is a new set of Rules of
Criminal Procedure).Here the reduction of the penalty is only a consequence of the plea
of guilt to a lesser penalty.Theappellant did not plead to a lesser offense but pleaded
guilty to the rape charges and only baargained for a lesser penalty.He did not plea
bargain but made conditions on the penalty to be imposed.This is erroneous because
by pleading guilty to the offense charged, accused should be sentenced to the penalty
to which he pleaded.It is the essence of a plea of guilty that that the accused admits
absolutely and unconditionally hid guilt and responsibilty for the offense imputed
to him.Hence, an accused may not foist a conditional plea of guilty on the court by
admitting his guilt provided that a certain penalty will be meted unto him. Since the
judgment of conviction is void, double jeopardy will not lie. Whatever procedural infirmity
in the arraignment of the accused was rectified when he was re-arraigned and entered a
newplea.he did not question the procedural errors in the first arrraignment and having
failed to do so, waived the errors in procedure.
PEOPLE VS. BALISACAN
FACTS: Defendant-appellee Aurelio Balisacan was charged with homicide in the CFI
of Ilocos Norte. The information alleged that on December 3, 1964, in Nueva Era, Ilocos
Norte, the accused assaulted and stabbed to death Leonicio Bulaoat.
The accused, assisted by counsel, entered a plea of guilty. At his counsel's petition,
however, he was allowed to present evidence to prove mitigating circumstances. The
accused testified that he stabbed Bulaoat in self-defense because the latter was
strangling him. He further stated that he surrendered himself voluntarily to the police
after the incident.
The court a quo rendered a decision acquitting the accused on the basis of his
testimony. Hence, the instant appeal.
ISSUE: WON the instant appeal placed the accused in double jeopardy
RULING: It is settled that the existence of a plea is an essential requisite to double
jeopardy. In the present case, it is true, the accused had first entered a plea of guilty.
Subsequently, however, he testified, in the course of being allowed to prove mitigating
circumstances, that he acted in complete self-defense. Said testimony, therefore — as
the court a quo recognized in its decision — had the effect of vacating his plea of guilty
and the court a quo should have required him to plead a new on the charge, or at least
direct that a new plea of not guilty be entered for him. This was not done. It follows that
in effect there having been no standing plea at the time the court a quo rendered
its judgment of acquittal, there can be no double jeopardy with respect to the
appeal herein.
Furthermore, as aforestated, the court a quo decided the case upon the merits without
giving the prosecution any opportunity to present its evidence or even to rebut the
testimony of the defendant. In doing so, it clearly acted without due process of law. And
for lack of this fundamental prerequisite, its action is perforce null and void. The
acquittal, therefore, being a nullity for want of due process, is no acquittal at all, and
thus cannot constitute a proper basis for a claim of former jeopardy.
It should be noted that in rendering the judgment of acquittal, the trial judge below
already gave credence to the testimony of the accused. In fairness to the prosecution,
without in any way doubting the integrity of said trial judge, We deem it proper
to remand this case to the court a quo for further proceedings under another judge of
the same court, in one of the two other branches of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos
Norte sitting at Laoag.
Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is hereby set aside and this case is remanded
to the court for further proceedings under another judge of said court, that is, for plea by
the defendant, trial with presentation of evidence for the prosecution and the defense,
and judgment thereafter.
VILLAREAL VS. ALIGA
PEOPLE VS DE GRANO
Although the Supreme Court does not absolutely preclude the availment of the remedy
of certiorari to correct an erroneous acquittal, the petitioner must clearly and
convincingly demonstrate that the lower court blatantly abused its authority to a point so
grave and so severe as to deprive it of its very power to dispense justice.
A judgment of acquittal in a criminal case may be assailed in a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, but only upon a clear showing by the petitioner that
the lower court, in acquitting the accused, committed not merely reversible errors of
judgment but also grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,
or to a denial of due process, thus rendering the assailed judgment void. In which event,
the accused cannot be considered at risk of double jeopardy — the revered
constitutional safeguard against exposing the accused to the risk of answering twice for
the same offense.
JASON IVLER VS HON SAN PEDRO & EVANGELINE PONCE
The petition seeks the review of the Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City
affirming sub-silencio a lower court’s ruling finding inapplicable the Double Jeopardy
Clause to bar a second prosecution for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and
Damage to Property. This, despite the accused’s previous conviction for Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries arising from the same incident
grounding the second prosecution.
Facts:
Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner Jason Ivler (petitioner) was
charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City (MeTC), with two separate
offenses: (1) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries for injuries
sustained by respondent Evangeline L. Ponce (respondent Ponce); and (2) Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property for the death of respondent
Ponce’s husband Nestor C. Ponce and damage to the spouses Ponce’s vehicle.
Petitioner posted bail for his temporary release in both cases.
On 2004, petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge on the first delict and was meted out
the penalty of public censure. Invoking this conviction, petitioner moved to quash the
Information for the second delict for placing him in jeopardy of second punishment for
the same offense of reckless imprudence.
The MeTC refused quashal, finding no identity of offenses in the two cases.
The petitioner elevated the matter to the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City (RTC), in a
petition for certiorari while Ivler sought from the MeTC the suspension of proceedings in
criminal case, including the arraignment his arraignment as a prejudicial question.
Without acting on petitioner’s motion, the MeTC proceeded with the arraignment and,
because of petitioner’s absence, cancelled his bail and ordered his arrest.
Seven days later, the MeTC issued a resolution denying petitioner’s motion to suspend
proceedings and postponing his arraignment until after his arrest.Petitioner sought
reconsideration but as of the filing of this petition, the motion remained unresolved.
Issues:
(1) Whether petitioner forfeited his standing to seek relief from his petition for certiorari
when the MeTC ordered his arrest following his non-appearance at the arraignment in
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries for injuries sustained by
respondent; and
(2) Whether petitioner’s constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause bars
further proceedings in Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to
Property for the death of respondent Ponce’s husband.
Ruling:
On Petition for Certiorari
The RTC dismissed Ivler’s petition for certiorari, narrowly grounding its ruling on
petitioner’s forfeiture of standing to maintain said petition arising from the MeTC’s order
to arrest petitioner for his non-appearance at the arraignment in the second offense.
Thus, without reaching the merits of the said petition, the RTC effectively affirmed the
MeTC. Petitioner sought reconsideration but this proved unavailing.
Respondent Ponce finds no reason for the Court to disturb the RTC’s decision forfeiting
petitioner’s standing to maintain his petition in S.C.A. 2803. On the merits, respondent
Ponce calls the Court’s attention to jurisprudence holding that light offenses (e.g. slight
physical injuries) cannot be complexed under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code with
grave or less grave felonies (e.g. homicide). Hence, the prosecution was obliged to
separate the charge in Criminal Case No. 82366 for the slight physical injuries from
Criminal Case No. 82367 for the homicide and damage to property.
In the Resolution of 6 June 2007, the Court granted the Office of the Solicitor General’s
motion not to file a comment to the petition as the public respondent judge is merely a
nominal party and private respondent is represented by counsel.
Dismissals of appeals grounded on the appellant’s escape from custody or violation of
the terms of his bail bond are governed by the second paragraph of Section 8, Rule
124, in relation to Section 1, Rule 125, of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure
authorizing this Court or the Court of Appeals to "also, upon motion of the appellee or
motu proprio, dismiss the appeal if the appellant escapes from prison or confinement,
jumps bail or flees to a foreign country during the pendency of the appeal." The "appeal"
contemplated in Section 8 of Rule 124 is a suit to review judgments of convictions.
On Double Jeopardy
The accused’s negative constitutional right not to be "twice put in jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense" protects him from, among others, post-conviction
prosecution for the same offense, with the prior verdict rendered by a court of
competent jurisdiction upon a valid information.
Petitioner adopts the affirmative view, submitting that the two cases concern the same
offense of reckless imprudence. The MeTC ruled otherwise, finding that Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries is an entirely separate offense from
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property "as the [latter]
requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not."
The two charges against petitioner, arising from the same facts, were prosecuted under
the same provision of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, namely, Article 365
defining and penalizing quasi-offenses.
The provisions contained in this article shall not be applicable. Indeed, the notion that
quasi-offenses, whether reckless or simple, are distinct species of crime, separately
defined and penalized under the framework of our penal laws, is nothing new.
The doctrine that reckless imprudence under Article 365 is a single quasi-offense by
itself and not merely a means to commit other crimes such that conviction or acquittal of
such quasi-offense bars subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-offense, regardless
of its various resulting acts, undergirded this Court’s unbroken chain of jurisprudence on
double jeopardy as applied to Article 365.
These cases uniformly barred the second prosecutions as constitutionally impermissible
under the Double Jeopardy Clause.
Our ruling today secures for the accused facing an Article 365 charge a stronger and
simpler protection of their constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause. True,
they are thereby denied the beneficent effect of the favorable sentencing formula under
Article 48, but any disadvantage thus caused is more than compensated by the
certainty of non-prosecution for quasi-crime effects qualifying as "light offenses" (or, as
here, for the more serious consequence prosecuted belatedly). If it is so minded,
Congress can re-craft Article 365 by extending to quasi-crimes the sentencing formula
of Article 48 so that only the most severe penalty shall be imposed under a single
prosecution of all resulting acts, whether penalized as grave, less grave or light
offenses. This will still keep intact the distinct concept of quasi-offenses. Meanwhile, the
lenient schedule of penalties under Article 365, befitting crimes occupying a lower rung
of culpability, should cushion the effect of this ruling.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We REVERSE the Orders dated 2 February
2006 and 2 May 2006 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 157. We
DISMISS the Information in Criminal Case No. 82366 against petitioner Jason Ivler y
Aguilar pending with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 71 on the ground
of double jeopardy.
BRAZA VS SANDIGANBAYAN 691 S 471
Braza challenges the sufficiency of the allegations in the second information because
there is no indication of any actual and quantifiable injury suffered by the government.
He then argues that the facts under the second information are inadequate to support a
valid indictment for violation of section 3(e) of R.A. 3019. In a catena of cases, the
Supreme Court (SC) has held that there are two (2) ways by which a public official
violates section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 in the performance of his functions, namely: (1) by
causing undue injury to any party, including the Government; or (2) by giving any private
party any unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference.The accused may be charged
under either mode or under both. The disjunctive term “or” connotes that either act
qualifies as a violation of section 3(e) of R.A. 3019.In other words, the presence of one
would suffice for conviction. It must be emphasized that Braza was indicted for violation
of section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 under the second mode. “To be found guilty under the
second mode,it suffices that the accused has given unjustified favor or benefit to
another, in the exercise of his official,administrative and judicial functions.” The element
of damage is not required for violation of section 3(e) under the second mode.In the
case at bench, the second information alleged, in substance, that accused public
officers and employees, discharging official or administrative function, together with
Braza, confederated and conspired to give FABMIK Construction and Equipment
Supply Company, Inc. unwarranted benefit or preference by awarding to it Contract J.D.
No. 06H00050 through manifest partiality or evident bad faith, without the conduct of a
public bidding and compliance with the requirement for qualification contrary to the
provisions of R.A. 9184 or the Government Procurement Reform Act. Settled is the rule
that private persons, when acting in conspiracy with public officers, may be indicted
and, if found guilty, held liable for the pertinent offenses under section 3 of R.A. 3019.
Considering that all the elements of the offense of violation of section 3(e) were alleged
in the second information, the SC found the same to be sufficient in form and substance
to sustain a conviction.