Digest: Calalang vs Williams
constitutional precept regarding the promotion of social justice to insure the
MAXIMO CALALANG vs A. D. WILLIAMS, ET AL.,
G.R. No. 47800 December 2, 1940
Doctrine: Social Justice
LAUREL, J.:
Facts:
The National Traffic Commission, in its resolution of July 17, 1940, resolved to
recommend to the Director of the Public Works and to the Secretary
of Public Works and Communications that animal-
drawn vehicles be prohibited from passing along the following for a period of
one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic:
1) Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to Dasmariñas
Street from 7:30Am to 12:30 pm and from 1:30 pm to 530 pm; and
2) along Rizal Avenue extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street
toEchague Street from 7 am to 11pm
The Chairman of the National Traffic Commission on July 18, 1940
recommended to the Director of Public Works with the approval of the
Secretary of Public Works the adoption of the measure proposed in the
resolution aforementioned in pursuance of the provisions of the
Commonwealth Act No. 548 which authorizes said Director with the approval
from the Secretary of the Public Works and Communication to promulgate
rules and regulations to regulate and control the use of and traffic on national
roads.
On August 2, 1940, the Director recommended to the Secretary the approval
of the recommendations made by the Chairman of the National Traffic
Commission with modifications. The Secretary of Public Works approved the
recommendations on August 10, 1940. The Mayor of Manila and the Acting
Chief of Police of Manila have enforced and caused to be enforced the rules
and regulation. As a consequence, all animal-drawn vehicles are not allowed
to pass and pick up passengers in the places above mentioned to the
detriment not only of their owners but of the riding public as well.
Issues:
1) Whether the rules and regulations promulgated by the respondents
pursuant to the provisions of Commonwealth Act NO. 548 constitute an
unlawful inference with legitimate business or trade and abridged the right to
personal liberty and freedom of locomotion?
2) Whether the rules and regulations complained of infringe upon the
well-being and economic security of all the people?
Held:
1) No. The promulgation of the Act aims to promote safe transit upon and avoid
obstructions on national roads in the interest and convenience of the public. In
enacting said law, the National Assembly was prompted by considerations of
public convenience and welfare. It was inspired by the desire to relieve
congestion of traffic, which is a menace to the public safety. Public welfare lies
at the bottom of the promulgation of the said law and the state in order to
promote the general welfare may interfere with personal liberty, with property,
and with business and occupations. Persons and property may be subject to
all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the general comfort,
health, and prosperity of the State. To this fundamental aims of the
government, the rights of the individual are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing
which should not be made to prevail over authority because society will fall into
anarchy. Neither should authority be made to prevail over liberty because then
the individual will fall into slavery. The paradox lies in the fact that the apparent
curtailment of liberty is precisely the very means of insuring its preserving.
2) No. Social justice is “neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor
anarchy,” but the humanization of laws and the equalization of social and
economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and objectively
secular conception may at least be approximated. Social justice means the
promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the Government of
measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent elements
of society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and social
equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the community,
constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-
constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the existence of all
governments on the time-honored principles of salus populi estsuprema lex.
Social justice must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of
interdependence among divers and diverse units of a society and of the
protection that should be equally and evenly extended to all groups as a
combined force in our social and economic life, consistent with the
fundamental and paramount objective of the state of promoting health, comfort
and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about “the greatest good to the
greatest number.”
Calalang v Williams (Labor Standards)
Calalang v Williams
GR No. 47800
December 2, 1940
FACTS:
Pursuant to the power delegated to it by the Legislature, the Director of Public
Works promulgated rules and regulations pertaining to the closure of Rosario
Street and Rizal Avenue to traffic of animal-drawn vehicles for a year from the
date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic.
Among others, the petitioner Calalang, concerned citizen, aver that the rules
and regulations complained of:
infringe upon constitutional precept on the promotion of social justice to
insure the well being and economic security of all people;
and that it constitutes unlawful interference with legitimate business or trade
and abridge the right to personal liberty and freedom of locomotion.
ISSUE: Whether or not the rules and regulation promote social justice.
HELD:
YES, it still promotes social justice. In enacting the said law, the National
Assembly was prompted by considerations of public convenience and welfare.
The promotion of Social Justice is to be adhered not through a mistaken
sympathy towards any given group (e.g. the poor - because social justice is
bringing the greatest good to the greatest number, not necessarily just the poor
like the drivers of the animal-drawn vehicles).
Social justice:
: "neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy," but the
humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic force by the
State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at
least be approximated.
: the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the Government
of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent
elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and social
equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the community,
constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-
constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the existence of all
governments on the time-honored principle of salus populi est suprema lex
: must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence
among divers and diverse units of a society and of the protection that should
be equally and evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in our social
and economic life, consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective
of the state of promoting the health, comfort and quiet of all persons, and of
bringing about "the greatest good to the greatest number."
RATIO:
(1) Liberty is a blessing without which life is a misery, but liberty should not be
made to prevail over authority because then society will fall into anarchy.
(2)The citizen should achieve the required balance of liberty and authority in
his mind through education and personal discipline so that there may be
established the resultant equilibrium, which means peace and order and
happiness of all.
 EN BANC
[G.R. No. 120295. June 28, 1996]
JUAN G. FRIVALDO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and
RAUL R. LEE, respondents.
[G.R. No. 123755. June 28, 1996]
RAUL R. LEE, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JUAN G.
FRIVALDO, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The ultimate question posed before this Court in these twin cases is: Who
should be declared the rightful governor of Sorsogon
(i) Juan G. Frivaldo, who unquestionably obtained the highest number of
votes in three successive elections but who was twice declared by this Court
to be disqualified to hold such office due to his alien citizenship, and who
now claims to have re-assumed his lost Philippine citizenship thru
repatriation;
(ii) Raul R. Lee, who was the second placer in the canvass, but who claims
that the votes cast in favor of Frivaldo should be considered void; that the
electorate should be deemed to have intentionally thrown away their ballots;
and that legally, he secured the most number of valid votes; or
(iii) The incumbent Vice-Governor, Oscar G. Deri, who obviously was not
voted directly to the position of governor, but who according to prevailing
jurisprudence should take over the said post inasmuch as, by the ineligibility
of Frivaldo, a "permanent vacancy in the contested office has occurred"?
In ruling for Frivaldo, the Court lays down new doctrines on repatriation,
clarifies/reiterates/amplifies existing jurisprudence on citizenship and
elections, and upholds the superiority of substantial justice over pure
legalisms.
G.R. No. 123755.
This is a special civil action under Rules 65 and 58 of the Rules of Court
for certiorari and preliminary injunction to review and annul a Resolution of the
respondent Commission on Elections (Comelec), First Division, 1 promulgated
on December 19,19952 and another Resolution of the Comelec en
bane promulgated February 23, 19963 denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.
The Facts
On March 20, 1995, private respondent Juan G. Frivaldo filed his
Certificate of Candidacy for the office of Governor of Sorsogon in the May 8,
1995 elections. On March 23, 1995, petitioner Raul R. Lee, another candidate,
filed a petition4 with the Comelec docketed as SPA No. 95-028 praying that
Frivaldo "be disqualified from seeking or holding any public office or position
by reason of not yet being a citizen of the Philippines," and that his Certificate
of Candidacy be cancelled. On May 1, 1995, the Second Division of the
Comelec promulgated a Resolution5 granting the petition with the following
disposition:6
"WHEREFORE, this Division resolves to GRANT the petition and declares
that respondent is DISQUALIFIED to run for the Office of Governor of
Sorsogon on the ground that he is NOT a citizen of thePhilippines.
Accordingly, respondent's certificate of candidacy is cancelled."
The Motion for Reconsideration filed by Frivaldo remained unacted upon
until after the May 8, 1995 elections. So, his candidacy continued and he was
voted for during the elections held on said date. On May 11, 1995, the
Comelec en banc7 affirmed the aforementioned Resolution of the Second
Division.
The Provincial Board of Canvassers completed the canvass of the
election returns and a Certificate of Votes8.dated May 27, 1995 was issued
showing the following votes obtained by the candidates for the position of
Governor of Sorsogon:
Antonio H. Escudero, Jr. 51,060
Juan G. Frivaldo 73,440
RaulR.Lee 53,304
Isagani P. Ocampo 1,925
On June 9, 1995, Lee filed in said SPA No. 95-028, a (supplemental)
petition9 praying for his proclamation as the duly-elected Governor of
Sorsogon.
In an order10 dated June 21, 1995, but promulgated according to the
petition "only on June 29, 1995," the Comelec en bane directed "the Provincial
Board of Canvassers of Sorsogon to reconvene for the purpose of proclaiming
candidate Raul Lee as the winning gubernatorial candidate in the province of
Sorsogon on June 29,1995 x x x." Accordingly, at 8:30 in the evening of June
30,1995, Lee was proclaimed governor of Sorsogon.
On July 6, 1995, Frivaldo filed with the Comelec a new
petition,11 docketed as SPC No. 95-317, praying for the annulment of the June
30, 1995 proclamation of Lee and for his own proclamation. He alleged that
on June 30, 1995, at 2:00 in the afternoon, he took his oath of allegiance as a
citizen of the Philippines after "his petition for repatriation under P.D. 725
which he filed with the Special Committee on Naturalization in September 1994
had been granted." As such, when "the said order (dated June 21, 1995) (of
the Comelec) x x x was released and received by Frivaldo on June 30, 1995
at 5:30 o'clock in the evening, there was no more legal impediment to the
proclamation (of Frivaldo) as governor x x x." In the alternative, he averred that
pursuant to the two cases of Labo vs. Comelec,12 the Vice-Governor not Lee
should occupy said position of governor.
On December 19, 1995, the Comelec First Division promulgated the
herein assailed Resolution13 holding that Lee, "not having garnered the highest
number of votes," was not legally entitled to be proclaimed as duly-elected
governor; and that Frivaldo, "having garnered the highest number of votes,
and xxx having reacquired his Filipino citizenship by repatriation on June 30,
1995 under the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 725 xxx (is) qualified to
hold the office of governor of Sorsogon"; thus:
"PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Commission (First Division), therefore
RESOLVES to GRANT the Petition.
Consistent with the decisions of the Supreme Court, the proclamation of Raul
R. Lee as Governor of Sorsogon is hereby ordered annulled, being contrary
to law, he not having garnered the highest number of votes to warrant his
proclamation.
Upon the finality of the annulment of the proclamation of Raul R. Lee, the
Provincial Board of Canvassers is directed to immediately reconvene and, on
the basis of the completed canvass, proclaim petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo as
the duly elected Governor of Sorsogon having garnered the highest number
of votes, and he having reacquired his Filipino citizenship by repatriation on
June 30,1995 under the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 725 and, thus,
qualified to hold the office of Governor of Sorsogon.
Conformably with Section 260 of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg.
881), the Clerk of the Commission is directed to notify His Excellency the
President of the Philippines, and the Secretary of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of the Province of Sorsogon of this resolution immediately
upon the due implementation thereof."
On December 26,1995, Lee filed a motion for reconsideration which was
denied by the Comelec en banc in its Resolution14 promulgated on February
23, 1996. On February 26, 1996, the present petition was filed. Acting on the
prayer for a temporary restraining order, this Court issued on February 27,
1996 a Resolution which inter alia directed the parties "to maintain the status
quo prevailing prior to the filing of this petition."
The Issues in G.R. No. 123755
Petitioner Lee's "position on the matter at hand briefly be capsulized in
the following propositions":15
"First - The initiatory petition below was so far insufficient in form and
substance to warrant the exercise by the COMELEC of its jurisdiction with
the result that, in effect, the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction in taking
cognizance of and deciding said petition;
Second- The judicially declared disqualification of respondent was a
continuing condition and rendered him ineligible to run for, to be elected to
and to hold the Office of Governor;
Third - The alleged repatriation of respondent was neither valid nor is the
effect thereof retroactive as to cure his ineligibility and qualify him to hold the
Office of Governor; and
Fourth - Correctly read and applied, the Labo Doctrine fully supports the
validity of petitioner's proclamation as duly elected Governor of Sorsogon."
G.R. No. 120295
This is a petition to annul three Resolutions of the respondent Comelec,
the first two of which are also at issue in G.R. No. 123755, as follows:
1. Resolution16 of the Second Division, promulgated on May 1, 1995,
disqualifying Frivaldo from running for governor of Sorsogon in the May 8,
1995 elections "on the ground that he is not a citizen of thePhilippines";
2. Resolution17 of the Comelec en bane, promulgated on May 11, 1995; and
3. Resolution18 of the Comelec en bane, promulgated also on May 11,
1995 suspending the proclamation of, among others, Frivaldo.
The Facts and the Issue
 The facts of this case are essentially the same as those in G.R. No.
123755. However, Frivaldo assails the above-mentioned resolutions on a
different ground: that under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, which
is reproduced hereinunder:
"Section 78. Petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of
candidacy. A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a
certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground
that any material representation contained therein as required under Section
74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-
five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be
decided, after notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the
election." (Italics supplied.)
the Comelec had no jurisdiction to issue said Resolutions because they were
not rendered "within the period allowed by law," i.e., "not later than fifteen days
before the election."
Otherwise stated, Frivaldo contends that the failure of the Comelec to act
on the petition for disqualification within the period of fifteen days prior to the
election as provided by law is a jurisdictional defect which renders the said
Resolutions null and void.
By Resolution on March 12, 1996, the Court consolidated G.R. Nos.
120295 and 123755 since they are intimately related in their factual
environment and are identical in the ultimate question raised, viz., who should
occupy the position of governor of the province of Sorsogon.
On March 19, 1995, the Court heard oral argument from the parties and
required them thereafter to file simultaneously their respective memoranda.
The Consolidated Issues
From the foregoing submissions, the consolidated issues may be restated
as follows:
1. Was the repatriation of Frivaldo valid and legal? If so, did it seasonably
cure his lack of citizenship as to qualify him to be proclaimed and to hold the
Office of Governor? If not, may it be given retroactive effect? If so, from
when?
2. Is Frivaldo's "judicially declared" disqualification for lack of Filipino
citizenship a continuing bar to his eligibility to run for, be elected to or hold
the governorship of Sorsogon?
3. Did the respondent Comelec have jurisdiction over the initiatory petition in
SPC No. 95-317 considering that : said petition is not "a pre-proclamation
case, an election protest or a quo warranto case"?
4. Was the proclamation of Lee, a runner-up in the election, valid and legal in
light of existing jurisprudence?
5. Did the respondent Commission on Elections exceed its jurisdiction in
promulgating the assailed Resolutions, all of which prevented Frivaldo from
assuming the governorship of Sorsogon, considering that they were not
rendered within ( the period referred to in Section 78 of the Omnibus Election
Code, viz., "not later than fifteen days before the elections"?
The First Issue: Frivaldo's Repatriation
The validity and effectivity of Frivaldo's repatriation is the lis mota, the
threshold legal issue in this case. All the other matters raised are secondary
to this.
The Local Government Code of 199119 expressly requires Philippine
citizenship as a qualification for elective local officials, including that of
provincial governor, thus:
"Sec. 39. Qualifications. (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the
Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province
or, in the case of a member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang
panlungsod, or sangguniang bayan, the district where he intends to be
elected; a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the
day of the election; and able to read and write Filipino or any other local
language or dialect.
(b) Candidates for the position of governor, vice governor or member of the
sangguniang panlalawigan, or mayor, vice mayor or member of the
sangguniang panlungsod of highly urbanized cities must be at least twenty-
three (23) years of age on election day.
xxx xxx xxx
Inasmuch as Frivaldo had been declared by this Court20 as a non-citizen,
it is therefore incumbent upon him to show that he has reacquired citizenship;
in fine, that he possesses the qualifications prescribed under the said statute
(R. A. 7160).
Under Philippine law,21 citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of
Congress, by naturalization or by repatriation. Frivaldo told this Court in G.R.
No. 10465422 and during the oral argument in this case that he tried to resume
his citizenship by direct act of Congress, but that the bill allowing him to do so
"failed to materialize, notwithstanding the endorsement of several members of
the House of Representatives" due, according to him, to the "maneuvers of his
political rivals." In the same case, his attempt at naturalization was rejected by
this Court because of jurisdictional, substantial and procedural defects.
Despite his lack of Philippine citizenship, Frivaldo was overwhelmingly
elected governor by the electorate of Sorsogon, with a margin of 27,000 votes
in the 1988 elections, 57,000 in 1992, and 20,000 in 1995 over the same
opponent Raul Lee. Twice, he was judicially declared a non-Filipino and thus
twice disqualified from holding and discharging his popular mandate. Now, he
comes to us a third time, with a fresh vote from the people of Sorsogon and a
favorable decision from the Commission on Elections to boot. Moreover, he
now boasts of having successfully passed through the third and last mode of
reacquiring citizenship: by repatriation under P.D. No. 725, with no less than
the Solicitor General himself, who was the prime opposing counsel in the
previous cases he lost, this time, as counsel for co-respondent Comelec,
arguing the validity of his cause (in addition to his able private counsel Sixto
S. Brillantes, Jr.). That he took his oath of allegiance under the provisions of
said Decree at 2:00 p.m. on June 30, 1995 is not disputed. Hence, he insists
that henot Leeshould have been proclaimed as the duly-elected governor of
Sorsogon when the Provincial Board of Canvassers met at 8:30 p.m. on the
said date since, clearly and unquestionably, he garnered the highest number
of votes in the elections and since at that time, he already reacquired his
citizenship.
En contrario, Lee argues that Frivaldo's repatriation is tainted ; with
serious defects, which we shall now discuss in seriatim.
First, Lee tells us that P.D. No. 725 had "been effectively repealed,"
asserting that "then President Corazon Aquino exercising legislative powers
under the Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution, forbade the grant of
citizenship by Presidential Decree or Executive Issuances as the same poses
a serious and contentious issue of policy which the present government, in the
exercise of prudence and sound discretion, should best leave to the judgment
of the first Congress under the 1987 Constitution," adding that in her
memorandum dated March 27,1987 to the members of the Special Committee
on Naturalization constituted for purposes of Presidential Decree No. 725,
President Aquino directed them "to cease and desist from undertaking any and
all proceedings within your functional area of responsibility as defined under
Letter of Instructions (LOI) No. 270 dated April 11, 1975, as amended."23
This memorandum dated March 27, 198724 cannot by any stretch of legal
hermeneutics be construed as a law sanctioning or authorizing a repeal of P.D.
No. 725. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones 25 and a repeal may be
express or implied. It is obvious that no express repeal was made because
then President Aquino in her memorandum based on the copy furnished us by
Lee did not categorically and/or impliedly state that P.D. 725 was being
repealed or was being rendered without any legal effect. In fact, she did not
even mention it specifically by its number or text. On the other hand, it is a
basic rule of statutory construction that repeals by implication are not favored.
An implied repeal will not be allowed "unless it is convincingly and
unambiguously demonstrated that the two laws are clearly repugnant and
patently inconsistent that they cannot co-exist."26
The memorandum of then President Aquino cannot even be regarded as
a legislative enactment, for not every pronouncement of the Chief Executive
even under the Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution can nor should
be regarded as an exercise of her law-making powers. At best, it could be
treated as an executive policy addressed to the Special Committee to halt the
acceptance and processing of applications for repatriation pending whatever
"judgment the first Congress under the 1987 Constitution" might make. In other
words, the former President did not repeal P.D. 725 but left it to the first
Congress once createdto deal with the matter. If she had intended to repeal
such law, she should have unequivocally said so instead of referring the matter
to Congress. The fact is she carefully couched her presidential issuance in
terms that clearly indicated the intention of "the present government, in the
exercise of prudence and sound discretion" to leave the matter of repeal to the
new Congress. Any other interpretation of the said Presidential Memorandum,
such as is now being proffered to the Court by Lee, would visit unmitigated
violence not only upon statutory construction but on common sense as well.
Second. Lee also argues that "serious congenital irregularities flawed the
repatriation proceedings," asserting that Frivaldo's application therefor was
"filed on June 29, 1995 x x x (and) was approved in just one day or on June
30, 1995 x x x," which "prevented a judicious review and evaluation of the
merits thereof." Frivaldo counters that he filed his application for repatriation
with the Office of the President in Malacanang Palace on August 17, 1994.
This is confirmed by the Solicitor General. However, the Special Committee
was reactivated only onJune 8, 1995, when presumably the said Committee
started processing his application. On June 29, 1995, he filled up and re-
submitted the FORM that the Committee required. Under these
circumstances, it could not be said that there was "indecent haste" in the
processing of his application.
Anent Lee's charge that the "sudden reconstitution of the Special
Committee on Naturalization was intended solely for the personal interest of
respondent,"27 the Solicitor General explained during the oral argument on
March 19, 1996 that such allegation is simply baseless as there were many
others who applied and were considered for repatriation, a list of whom was
submitted by him to this Court, through a Manifestation 28 filed on April 3, 1996.
On the basis of the parties' submissions, we are convinced that the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty and the
presumption of legality in the repatriation of Frivaldo have not been
successfully rebutted by Lee. The mere fact that the proceedings were
speeded up is by itself not a ground to conclude that such proceedings were
necessarily tainted. After all, the requirements of repatriation under P.D. No.
725 are not difficult to comply with, nor are they tedious and cumbersome. In
fact, P.D. 72529 itself requires very little of an applicant, and even the rules and
regulations to implement the said decree were left to the Special Committee
to promulgate. This is not unusual since, unlike in naturalization where an alien
covets a first-time entry into Philippine political life, in repatriation the applicant
is a former natural-born Filipino who is merely seeking to reacquire his
previous citizenship. In the case of Frivaldo, he was undoubtedly a natural-
born citizen who openly and faithfully served his country and his province prior
to his naturalization in the United States a naturalization he insists was made
necessary only to escape the iron clutches of a dictatorship he abhorred and
could not in conscience embrace and who, after the fall of the dictator and the
re-establishment of democratic space, wasted no time in returning to his
country of birth to offer once more his talent and services to his people.
So too, the fact that ten other persons, as certified to by the Solicitor
General, were granted repatriation argues convincingly and conclusively
against the existence of favoritism vehemently posited by Raul Lee. At any
rate, any contest on the legality of Frivaldo's repatriation should have been
pursued before the Committee itself, and, failing there, in the Office of the
President, pursuant to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.
Third. Lee further contends that assuming the assailed repatriation to be
valid, nevertheless it could only be effective as at 2:00 p.m. of June 30, 1995
whereas the citizenship qualification prescribed by the Local Government
Code "must exist on the date of his election, if not when the certificate of
candidacy is filed," citing our decision in G.R. 104654 30 which held that "both
the Local Government Code and the Constitution require that only Philippine
citizens can run and be elected to Public office" Obviously, however, this was
a mere obiter as the only issue in said case was whether Frivaldo's
naturalization was valid or not and NOT the effective date thereof. Since the
Court held his naturalization to be invalid, then the issue ofwhen an aspirant
for public office should be a citizen was NOT resolved at all by the Court. Which
question we shall now directly rule on.
Under Sec. 39 of the Local Government Code, "(a)n elective local official
must be:
* a citizen of the Philippines;
* a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province x
x x where he intends to be elected;
* a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding
the day of the election;
* able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or
dialect."
* In addition, "candidates for the position of governor x x x must be
at least twenty-three (23) years of age on election day."
From the above, it will be noted that the law does not specify any
particular date or time when the candidate must possess citizenship, unlike
that for residence (which must consist of at least one year's residency
immediately preceding the day of election) and age (at least twenty three years
of age on election day).
Philippine citizenship is an indispensable requirement for holding an
elective public office,31 and the purpose of the citizenship qualification is none
other than to ensure that no alien, i.e., no person owing allegiance to another
nation, shall govern our people and our country or a unit of territory thereof.
Now, an official begins to govern or to discharge his functions only upon his
proclamation and on the day the law mandates his term of office to begin.
Since Frivaldo re-assumed his citizenship on June 30, 1995the very day32 the
term of office of governor (and other elective officials) beganhe was therefore
already qualified to be proclaimed, to hold such office and to discharge the
functions and responsibilities thereof as of said date. In short, at that time, he
was already qualified to govern his native Sorsogon. This is the liberal
interpretation that should give spirit, life and meaning to our law on
qualifications consistent with the purpose for which such law was enacted. So
too, even from a literal (as distinguished from liberal) construction, it should be
noted that Section 39 of the Local Government Code speaks of
"Qualifications" of "ELECTIVE OFFICIALS," not of candidates. Why then
should such qualification be required at the time of election or at the time of
the filing of the certificates of candidacies, as Lee insists? Literally, such
qualifications unless otherwise expressly conditioned, as in the case of age
and residence should thus be possessed when the "elective [or elected]
official" begins to govern, i.e., at the time he is proclaimed and at the start of
his term in this case, on June 30, 1995. Paraphrasing this Court's ruling
in Vasquez vs. Giapand Li Seng Giap & Sons,33 if the purpose of the
citizenship requirement is to ensure that our people and country do not end up
being governed by aliens, i.e., persons owing allegiance to another nation, that
aim or purpose would not be thwarted but instead achieved by construing the
citizenship qualification as applying to the time of proclamation of the elected
official and at the start of his term.
But perhaps the more difficult objection was the one raised during the oral
argument34 to the effect that the citizenship qualification should be possessed
at the time the candidate (or for that matter the elected official) registered as a
voter. After all, Section 39, apart from requiring the official to be a citizen, also
specifies as another item of qualification, that he be a "registered voter." And,
under the law35 a "voter" must be a citizen of the Philippines. So therefore,
Frivaldo could not have been a voter-much less a validly registered one if he
was not a citizen at the time of such registration.
 The answer to this problem again lies in discerning the purpose of the
requirement. If the law intended the citizenship qualification to be possessed
prior to election consistent with the requirement of being a registered voter,
then it would not have made citizenship a SEPARATE qualification. The law
abhors a redundancy. It therefore stands to reason that the law intended
CITIZENSHIP to be a qualification distinct from being a VOTER, even if being
a voter presumes being a citizen first. It also stands to reason that the voter
requirement was included as another qualification (aside from "citizenship"),
not to reiterate the need for nationality but to require that the official be
registered as a voter IN THE AREA OR TERRITORY he seeks to govern, i.e.,
the law states: "a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or
province x x x where he intends to be elected." It should be emphasized that
the Local Government Code requires an elective official to be a registered
voter. It does not require him to vote actually. Hence, registrationnot the actual
votingis the core of this "qualification." In other words, the law's purpose in this
second requirement is to ensure that the prospective official is actually
registered in the area he seeks to govern and not anywhere else.
Before this Court, Frivaldo has repeatedly emphasizedand Lee has not
disputed that he "was and is a registered voter of Sorsogon, and his
registration as a voter has been sustained as valid by judicial declaration x x x
In fact, he cast his vote in his precinct on May 8, 1995."36
So too, during the oral argument, his counsel stead-fastly maintained that
"Mr. Frivaldo has always been a registered voter of Sorsogon. He has voted
in 1987,1988,1992, then he voted again in 1995. In fact, his eligibility as a voter
was questioned, but the court dismissed (sic) his eligibility as a voter and he
was allowed to vote as in fact, he voted in all the previous elections including
on May 8,1995.37
It is thus clear that Frivaldo is a registered voter in the province where he
intended to be elected.
There is yet another reason why the prime issue of citizenship should be
reckoned from the date of proclamation, not necessarily the date of election or
date of filing of the certificate of candidacy. Section 253 of the Omnibus
Election Code38 gives any voter, presumably including the defeated candidate,
the opportunity to question the ELIGIBILITY (or the disloyalty) of a candidate.
This is the only provision of the Code that authorizes a remedy on how to
contest before the Comelec an incumbent's ineligibility arising from failure to
meet the qualifications enumerated under Sec. 39 of the Local Government
Code. Such remedy of Quo Warranto can be availed of "within ten days after
proclamation" of the winning candidate. Hence, it is only at such time that the
issue of ineligibility may be taken cognizance of by the Commission. And since,
at the very moment of Lee's proclamation (8:30 p.m., June 30, 1995), Juan G.
Frivaldo was already and indubitably a citizen, having taken his oath of
allegiance earlier in the afternoon of the same day, then he should have been
the candidate proclaimed as he unquestionably garnered the highest number
of votes in the immediately preceding elections and such oath had already
cured his previous "judicially-declared" alienage. Hence, at such time, he was
no longer ineligible.
But to remove all doubts on this important issue, we also hold that the
repatriation of Frivaldo RETRO ACTED to the date of the filing of his
application on August 17,1994.
It is true that under the Civil Code of the Philippines,39 "(l)aws shall have
no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided." But there are settled
exceptions40 to this general rule, such as when the statute is CURATIVE or
REMEDIAL in nature or when it CREATES NEW RIGHTS.
According to Tolentino,41 curative statutes are those which undertake to
cure errors and irregularities, thereby validating judicial or administrative
proceedings, acts of public officers, or private deeds and contracts which
otherwise would not produce their intended consequences by reason of some
statutory disability or failure to comply with some technical requirement.They
operate on conditions already existing, and are necessarily retroactive in
operation. Agpalo,42 on the other hand, says that curative statutes are "healing
acts x x x curing defects and adding to the means of enforcing existing
obligations x x x (and) are intended to supply defects, abridge superfluities in
existing laws, and curb certain evils x x x By their very nature, curative statutes
are retroactive xxx (and) reach back to past events to correct errors or
irregularities and to render valid and effective attempted acts which would be
otherwise ineffective for the purpose the parties intended."
On the other hand, remedial or procedural laws, i.e., those statutes
relating to remedies or modes of procedure, which do not create new or take
away vested rights, but only operate in furtherance of the remedy or
confirmation of such rights, ordinarily do not come within the legal meaning of
a retrospective law, nor within the general rule against the retrospective
operation of statutes.43
A reading of P.D. 725 immediately shows that it creates a new right, and
also provides for a new remedy, thereby filling certain voids in our laws. Thus,
in its preamble, P.D. 725 expressly recognizes the plight of "many Filipino
women (who) had lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens" and
who could not, under the existing law (C. A. No. 63, as amended) avail of
repatriation until "after the death of their husbands or the termination of their
marital status" and who could neither be benefitted by the 1973 Constitution's
new provision allowing "a Filipino woman who marries an alien to retain her
Philippine citizenship xxx" because "such provision of the new Constitution
does not apply to Filipino women who had married aliens before said
constitution took effect." Thus, P.D. 725 granted a new right to these
womenthe right to re-acquire Filipino citizenship even during their marital
coverture, which right did not exist prior to P.D. 725. On the other hand, said
statute also provided a new remedy and a new right in favor of other "natural
born Filipinos who (had) lost their Philippine citizenship but now desire to re-
acquire Philippine citizenship," because prior to the promulgation of P.D. 725
such former Filipinos would have had to undergo the tedious and cumbersome
process of naturalization, but with the advent of P.D. 725 they could now re-
acquire their Philippine citizenship under the simplified procedure of
repatriation.
The Solicitor General44 argues:
"By their very nature, curative statutes are retroactive, (DBP vs. CA, 96
SCRA 342), since they are intended to supply defects, abridge superfluities
in existing laws (Del Castillo vs. Securities and Exchange Commission, 96
Phil. 119) and curb certain evils (Santos vs. Duata, 14 SCRA 1041).
In this case, P.D. No. 725 was enacted to cure the defect in the existing
naturalization law, specifically C. A. No. 63 wherein married Filipino women
are allowed to repatriate only upon the death of their husbands, and natural-
born Filipinos who lost their citizenship by naturalization and other causes
faced the difficulty of undergoing the rigid procedures of C.A. 63 for
reacquisition of Filipino citizenship by naturalization.
Presidential Decree No. 725 provided a remedy for the aforementioned legal
aberrations and thus its provisions are considered essentially remedial and
curative."
In light of the foregoing, and prescinding from the wording of the
preamble, it is unarguable that the legislative intent was precisely to give the
statute retroactive operation. "(A) retrospective operation is given to a statute
or amendment where the intent that it should so operate clearly appears from
a consideration of the act as a whole, or from the terms thereof."45It is obvious
to the Court that the statute was meant to "reach back" to those persons,
events and transactions not otherwise covered by prevailing law and
jurisprudence. And inasmuch as it has been held that citizenship is a political
and civil right equally as important as the freedom of speech, liberty of abode,
the right against unreasonable searches and seizures and other guarantees
enshrined in the Bill of Rights, therefore the legislative intent to give
retrospective operation to P.D. 725 must be given the fullest effect possible.
"(I)t has been said that a remedial statute must be so construed as to make it
effect the evident purpose for -which it was enacted, so that if the reason of
the statute extends to past transactions, as well as to those in the future, then
it will be so applied although the statute does not in terms so direct, unless to
do so would impair some vested right or violate some constitutional
guaranty."46 This is all the more true of P.D. 725, which did not specify any
restrictions on or delimit or qualify the right of repatriation granted therein.
At this point, a valid question may be raised: How can the retroactivity of
P.D. 725 benefit Frivaldo considering that said law was enacted on June
5,1975, while Frivaldo lost his Filipino citizenship much later, on January 20,
1983, and applied for repatriation even later, on August 17, 1994?
While it is true that the law was already in effect at the time that Frivaldo
became an American citizen, nevertheless, it is not only the law itself (P.D.
725) which is tobe given retroactive effect, but even the repatriation granted
under said law to Frivaldo on June 30, 1995 is to be deemed to have retroacted
to the date of his application therefor, August 17, 1994. The reason for this is
simply that if, as in this case, it was the intent of the legislative authority that
the law should apply to past events i.e., situations and transactions existing
even before the law came into being in order to benefit the greatest number of
former Filipinos possible thereby enabling them to enjoy and exercise the
constitutionally guaranteed right of citizenship, and such legislative intention is
to be given the fullest effect and expression, then there is all the more reason
to have the law apply in a retroactive or retrospective manner to situations,
events and transactions subsequent to the passage of such law. That is, the
repatriation granted to Frivaldo on June 30, 1995 can and should be made to
take effect as of date of his application. As earlier mentioned, there is nothing
in the law that would bar this or would show a contrary intention on the part of
the legislative authority; and there is no showing that damage or prejudice to
anyone, or anything unjust or injurious would result from giving retroactivity to
his repatriation. Neither has Lee shown that there will result the impairment of
any contractual obligation, disturbance of any vested right or breach of some
constitutional guaranty.
Being a former Filipino who has served the people repeatedly, Frivaldo
deserves a liberal interpretation of Philippine laws and whatever defects there
were in his nationality should now be deemed mooted by his repatriation.
Another argument for retroactivity to the date of filing is that it would
prevent prejudice to applicants. If P.D. 725 were not to be given retroactive
effect, and the Special Committee decides not to act, i.e., to delay the
processing of applications for any substantial length of time, then the former
Filipinos who may be stateless, as Frivaldohaving already renounced his
American citizenship was, may be prejudiced for causes outside their control.
This should not be. In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws,
it is to be presumed that the law-making body intended right and justice to
prevail.47
And as experience will show, the Special Committee was able to process, act
upon and grant applications for repatriation within relatively short spans of time
after the same were filed.48The fact that such interregna were relatively
insignificant minimizes the likelihood of prejudice to the government as a result
of giving retroactivity to repatriation. Besides, to the mind of the Court, direct
prejudice to the government is possible only where a person's repatriation has
the effect of wiping out a liability of his to the government arising in connection
with or as a result of his being an alien, and accruing only during the
interregnum between application and approval, a situation that is not present
in the instant case.
And it is but right and just that the mandate of the people, already twice
frustrated, should now prevail. Under the circumstances, there is nothing
unjust or iniquitous in treating Frivaldo's repatriation as having become
effective as of the date of his application, i.e., on August 17, 1994. This being
so, all questions about his possession of the nationality qualification whether
at the date of proclamation (June 30, 1995) or the date of election (May 8,
1995) or date of filing his certificate of candidacy (March 20, 1995) would
become moot.
Based on the foregoing, any question regarding Frivaldo's status as a
registered voter would also be deemed settled. Inasmuch as he is
considered as having been repatriatedi.e., his Filipino citizenship restored as
of August 17, 1994, his previous registration as a voter is likewise deemed
validated as of said date.
It is not disputed that on January 20, 1983 Frivaldo became an American.
Would the retroactivity of his repatriation not effectively give him dual
citizenship, which under Sec. 40 of the Local Government Code would
disqualify him "from running for any elective local position?"49 We answer this
question in the negative, as there is cogent reason to hold that Frivaldo was
really STATELESS at the time he took said oath of allegiance and even
before that, when he ran for governor in 1988. In his Comment, Frivaldo
wrote that he "had long renounced and had long abandoned his American
citizenshiplong before May 8, 1995. At best, Frivaldo was stateless in the
interim when he abandoned and renounced his US citizenship but before he
was repatriated to his Filipino citizenship."50
On this point, we quote from the assailed Resolution dated December 19,
1995:51
"By the laws of the United States, petitioner Frivaldo lost his American
citizenship when he took his oath of allegiance to the Philippine Government
when he ran for Governor in 1988, in 1992, and in 1995. Every certificate of
candidacy contains an oath of allegiance to the Philippine Government."
These factual findings that Frivaldo has lost his foreign nationality long
before the elections of 1995 have not been effectively rebutted by Lee.
Furthermore, it is basic that such findings of the Commission are conclusive
upon this Court, absent any showing of capriciousness or arbitrariness or
abuse.52
The Second Issue: Is Lack of Citizenship a Continuing Disqualification?
Lee contends that the May 1,1995 Resolution53 of the Comelec Second
Division in SPA No. 95-028 as affirmed in toto by Comelec En Banc in its
Resolution of May 11, 1995 "became final and executory after five (5) days or
on May 17,1995, no restraining order having been issued by this Honorable
Court."54 Hence, before Lee "was proclaimed as the elected governor on June
30, 1995, there was already a final and executory judgment disqualifying"
Frivaldo. Lee adds that this Court's two rulings (which Frivaldo now concedes
were legally "correct") declaring Frivaldo an alien have also become final and
executory way before the 1995 elections, and these "judicial pronouncements
of his political status as an American citizen absolutely and for all time
disqualified (him) from running for, and holding any public office in the
Philippines."
We do not agree.
It should be noted that our first ruling in G.R. No. 87193 disqualifying
Frivaldo was rendered in connection with the 1988 elections while that in G.R.
No. 104654 was in connection with the 1992 elections. That he was
disqualified for such elections is final and can no longer be changed. In the
words of the respondent Commission (Second Division) in its assailed
Resolution:55
"The records show that the Honorable Supreme Court had decided that
Frivaldo was not a Filipino citizen and thus disqualified for the purpose of the
1988 and 1992 elections. However, there is no record of any 'final judgment'
of the disqualification of Frivaldo as a candidate for the May 8,
1995 elections. What the Commission said in its Order of June 21, 1995
(implemented on June 30, 1995), directing the proclamation of Raul R. Lee,
was that Frivaldo was not a Filipino citizen 'having been declared by the
Supreme Court in its Order dated March 25, 1995, not a citizen of the
Philippines.' This declaration of the Supreme Court, however, was in
connection with the 1992 elections."
Indeed, decisions declaring the acquisition or denial of citizenship cannot
govern a person's future status with finality. This is because a person may
subsequently reacquire, or for that matter lose, his citizenship under any of the
modes recognized by law for the purpose. Hence, in Lee vs. Commissioner of
Immigration,56 we held:
"Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a
judicial or administrative case, whatever the corresponding court or
administrative authority decides therein as to such citizenship is generally not
considered res judicata, hence it has to be threshed out again and again, as
the occasion demands."
 The Third Issue: Comelec's Jurisdiction
Over The Petition in SPC No. 95-317
Lee also avers that respondent Comelec had no jurisdiction to entertain
the petition in SPC No. 95-317 because the only "possible types of
proceedings that may be entertained by the Comelec are a pre-proclamation
case, an election protest or a quo warranto case." Again, Lee reminds us that
he was proclaimed on June 30, 1995 but that Frivaldo filed SPC No. 95-317
questioning his (Lee's) proclamation only on July 6, 1995 "beyond the 5-day
reglementary period." Hence, according to him, Frivaldo's "recourse was to file
either an election protest or aquo warranto action."
This argument is not meritorious. The Constitution57 has given the
Comelec ample power to "exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all
contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of all elective x x x
provincial x x x officials." Instead of dwelling at length on the various petitions
that Comelec, in the exercise of its constitutional prerogatives, may entertain,
suffice
it to say that this Court has invariably recognized the Commission's
authority to hear and decide petitions for annulment of proclamations of which
SPC No. 95-317 obviously is one.58Thus, in Mentang vs. COMELEC,59 we
ruled:
"The petitioner argues that after proclamation and assumption of office, a
pre-proclamation controversy is no longer viable. Indeed, we are aware of
cases holding that pre-proclamation controversies may no longer be
entertained by the COMELEC after the winning candidate has been
proclaimed, (citing Gallardo vs. Rimando, 187 SCRA 463;
Salvacion vs. COMELEC, 170 SCRA 513; Casimiro vs. COMELEC, 171
SCRA 468.) This rule, however, is premised on an assumption that the
proclamation is no proclamation at all and the proclaimed candidate's
assumption of office cannot deprive the COMELEC of the power to make
such declaration of nullity. (citing Aguam vs. COMELEC, 23 SCRA 883;
Agbayani vs. COMELEC, 186 SCRA 484.)"
The Court however cautioned that such power to annul a proclamation
must "be done within ten (10) days following the proclamation." Inasmuch as
Frivaldo's petition was filed only six (6) days after Lee's proclamation, there is
no question that the Comelec correctly acquired jurisdiction over the same.
The Fourth Issue: Was Lee's Proclamation Valid
Frivaldo assails the validity of the Lee proclamation. We uphold him for
the following reasons:
First. To paraphrase this Court in Labo vs. COMELEC,60 "the fact remains
that he (Lee) was not the choice of the sovereign will," and in Aquino vs.
COMELEC,61 Lee is "a second placer, xxx just that, a second placer."
In spite of this, Lee anchors his claim to the governorship on the
pronouncement of this Court in the aforesaid Labo62 case, as follows:
"The rule would have been different if the electorate fully aware in fact and in
law of a candidate's disqualification so as to bring such awareness within the
realm of notoriety, would nonetheless cast their votes in favor of the ineligible
candidate. In such case, the electorate may be said to have waived the
validity and efficacy of their votes by notoriously misapplying their franchise
or throwing away their votes, in which case, the eligible candidate obtaining
the next higher number of votes may be deemed elected."
But such holding is qualified by the next paragraph, thus:
"But this is not the situation obtaining in the instant dispute. It has not been
shown, and none was alleged, that petitioner Labo was notoriously known as
an ineligible candidate, much less the electorate as having known of such
fact. On the contrary, petitioner Labo was even allowed by no less than the
Comelec itself in its resolution dated May 10, 1992 to be voted for the office
of the city mayor as its resolution dated May 9,1992 denying due course to
petitioner Labo's certificate of candidacy had not yet become final and
subject to the final outcome of this case."
The last-quoted paragraph in Labo, unfortunately for Lee, is the ruling
appropriate in this case because Frivaldo was in 1995 in an identical situation
as Labo was in 1992 when the Comelec's cancellation of his certificate of
candidacy was not yet final on election day as there was in both cases a
pending motion for reconsideration, for which reason Comelec issued an
(omnibus) resolution declaring that Frivaldo (like Labo in 1992) and several
others can still be voted for in the May 8, 1995 election, as in fact, he was.
Furthermore, there has been no sufficient evidence presented to show
that the electorate of Sorsogon was "fully aware in fact and in law" of Frivaldo's
alleged disqualification as to "bring such awareness within the realm of
notoriety", in other words, that the voters intentionally wasted their ballots
knowing that, in spite of their voting for him, he was ineligible. If Labohas any
relevance at all, it is that the vice-governor and not Leeshould be proclaimed,
since in losing the election, Lee was, to paraphrase Labo again, "obviously not
the choice of the people" of Sorsogon. This is the emphatic teaching of Labo:
"The rule, therefore, is: the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes
does not entitle the eligible candidate receiving the next highest number of
votes to be declared elected. A minority or defeated candidate cannot be
deemed elected to the office."
Second. As we have earlier declared Frivaldo to have seasonably re-
acquired his citizenship and inasmuch as he obtained the highest number of
votes in the 1995 elections, henot Lee should be proclaimed. Hence, Lee's
proclamation was patently erroneous and should now be corrected.
The Fifth Issue: Is Section 78 of the Election Code Mandatory?
In G.R. No. 120295, Frivaldo claims that the assailed Resolution of the
Comelec (Second Division) dated May 1, 1995 and the confirmatory en
banc Resolution of May 11, 1995 disqualifying him for want of citizenship
should be annulled because they were rendered beyond the fifteen (15) day
period prescribed by Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code which reads as
follows:
"Section 78. Petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of
candidacy. A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a
certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground
that any material representation contained therein as required under Section
74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-
five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be
decided after notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the
election" (italics supplied.)
This claim is now moot and academic inasmuch as these resolutions are
deemed superseded by the subsequent ones issued by the Commission (First
Division) on December 19, 1995, affirmed en banc63 on February 23, 1996,
which both upheld his election. At any rate, it is obvious that Section 78 is
merely directory as Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 authorizes the Commission to
try and decide petitions for disqualifications even after the elections, thus:
"SEC. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. Any candidate who has been
declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the
votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not
declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is
voted for and receives the -winning number of votes in such election, the
Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action,
inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may
during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of
such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong." (Italics
supplied)
Refutation of Mr. Justice Davide's Dissent
In his dissenting opinion, the esteemed Mr. Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr.
argues that President Aquino's memorandum dated March 27, 1987 should be
viewed as a suspension (not a repeal, as urged by Lee) of P.D. 725. But
whether it decrees a suspension or a repeal is a purely academic distinction
because the said issuance is not a statute that can amend or abrogate an
existing law. The existence and subsistence of P.D. 725 were recognized in
the first Frivaldo case;64 viz, "(u)nder CA No. 63 as amended by CA No. 473
and P.D. No. 725, Philippine citizenship maybe reacquired by xxx
repatriation" He also contends that by allowing Frivaldo to register and to
remain as a registered voter, the Comelec and in effect this Court abetted a
"mockery" of our two previous judgments declaring him a non-citizen. We do
not see such abetting or mockery. The retroactivity of his repatriation, as
discussed earlier, legally cured whatever defects there may have been in his
registration as a voter for the purpose of the 1995 elections. Such retroactivity
did not change his disqualifications in 1988 and 1992, which were the subjects
of such previous rulings.
Mr. Justice Davide also believes that Quo Warranto is not the sole
remedy to question the ineligibility of a candidate, citing the Comelec's
authority under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code allowing the denial
of a certificate of candidacy on the ground of a false material representation
therein as required by Section 74. Citing Loong, he then states his
disagreement with our holding that Section 78 is merely directory. We really
have no quarrel. Our point is that Frivaldo was in error in his claim in G.R. No.
120295 that the Comelec Resolutions promulgated on May 1, 1995 and May
11, 1995 were invalid because they were issued "not later than fifteen days
before the election" as prescribed by Section 78. In dismissing the petition in
G.R. No. 120295, we hold that the Comelec did not commit grave abuse of
discretion because "Section 6 of R. A. 6646 authorizes the Comelec to try and
decide disqualifications even after the elections." In spite of his disagreement
with us on this point, i.e., that Section 78 "is merely directory," we note that just
like us, Mr. Justice Davide nonetheless votes to "DISMISS G.R. No. 120295."
One other point. Loong, as quoted in the dissent, teaches that a petition to
deny due course under Section 78 must be filed within the 25-day period
prescribed therein. The present case however deals with the period during
which the Comelec may decide such petition. And we hold that it may be
decided even after thefifteen day period mentioned in Section 78. Here, we
rule that a decision promulgated by the Comelec even after the elections is
valid but Loong held that a petition filed beyond the 25-day period is out of
time. There is no inconsistency nor conflict.
Mr. Justice Davide also disagrees with the Court's holding that, given the
unique factual circumstances of Frivaldo, repatriation may be given retroactive
effect. He argues that such retroactivity "dilutes" our holding in the first Frivaldo
case. But the first (and even the second Frivaldo) decision did not directly
involve repatriation as a mode of acquiring citizenship. If we may repeat, there
is no question that Frivaldo was not a Filipino for purposes of determining his
qualifications in the 1988 and 1992 elections. That is settled. But his
supervening repatriation has changed his political status not in 1988 or 1992,
but only in the 1995 elections.
Our learned colleague also disputes our holding that Frivaldo was
stateless prior to his repatriation, saying that "informal renunciation or
abandonment is not a ground to lose American citizenship." Since our courts
are charged only with the duty of the determining who are Philippine nationals,
we cannot rule on the legal question of who are or who are not Americans. It
is basic in international law that a State determines ONLY those who are its
own citizens not who are the citizens of other countries.65 The issue here is:
the Comelec made a finding of fact that Frivaldo was stateless and such finding
has not been shown by Lee to be arbitrary or whimsical. Thus, following settled
case law, such finding is binding and final.
The dissenting opinion also submits that Lee who lost by chasmic margins
to Frivaldo in all three previous elections, should be declared winner because
"Frivaldo's ineligibility for being an American was publicly known." First, there
is absolutely no empirical evidence for such "public" knowledge. Second, even
if there is, such knowledge can be true post facto only of the last two previous
elections. Third, even the Comelec and now this Court were/are still
deliberating on his nationality before, during and after the 1995 elections. How
then can there be such "public" knowledge?
Mr. Justice Davide submits that Section 39 of the Local Government Code
refers to the qualifications of elective local officials, i.e., candidates, and
not elected officials, and that the citizenship qualification [under par. (a) of that
section] must be possessed by candidates, not merely at the commencement
of the term, but by election day at the latest. We see it differently. Section 39,
par. (a) thereof speaks of "elective local official" while par. (b) to (f) refer to
"candidates." If the qualifications under par. (a) were intended to apply to
"candidates" and not elected officials, the legislature would have said so,
instead of differentiating par. (a) from the rest of the paragraphs. Secondly, if
Congress had meant that the citizenship qualification should be possessed at
election day or prior thereto, it would have specifically stated such detail, the
same way it did in pars. (b) to (f) for other qualifications of candidates for
governor, mayor, etc.
Mr. Justice Davide also questions the giving of retroactive effect to
Frivaldo's repatriation on the ground, among others, that the law specifically
provides that it is only after taking the oath of allegiance that applicants shall
be deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship. We do not question what
the provision states. We hold however that the provision should be understood
thus: that after taking the oath of allegiance the applicant is deemed to have
reacquired Philippine citizenship, which reacquisition (or repatriation) is
deemed for all purposes and intents to have retroacted to the date of his
application therefor.
In any event, our "so too" argument regarding the literal meaning of the
word "elective" in reference to Section 39 of the Local Government Code, as
well as regarding Mr. Justice Davide's thesis that the very wordings of P.D.
725 suggest non-retroactivity, were already taken up rather extensively earlier
in this Decision.
Mr. Justice Davide caps his paper with a clarion call: "This Court must be
the first to uphold the Rule of Law." We agree we must all follow the rule of
law. But that is NOT the issue here. The issue is how should the law be
interpreted and applied in this case so it can be followed, so it can rule!
At balance, the question really boils down to a choice of philosophy and
perception of how to interpret and apply laws relating to elections: literal or
liberal; the letter or the spirit; the naked provision or its ultimate purpose; legal
syllogism or substantial justice; in isolation or in the context of social
conditions; harshly against or gently in favor of the voters' obvious choice. In
applying election laws, it would be far better to err in favor of popular
sovereignty than to be right in complex but little understood legalisms. Indeed,
to inflict a thrice rejected candidate upon the electorate of Sorsogon would
constitute unmitigated judicial tyranny and an unacceptable assault upon this
Court's conscience.
EPILOGUE
In sum, we rule that the citizenship requirement in the Local Government
Code is to be possessed by an elective official at the latest as of the time he
is proclaimed and at the start of the term of office to which he has been
elected. We further hold P.D. No. 725 to be in full force and effect up to the
present, not having been suspended or repealed expressly nor impliedly at
any time, and Frivaldo's repatriation by virtue thereof to have been properly
granted and thus valid and effective. Moreover, by reason of the remedial or
curative nature of the law granting him a new right to resume his political status
and the legislative intent behind it, as well as his unique situation of having
been forced to give up his citizenship and political aspiration as his means of
escaping a regime he abhorred, his repatriation is to be given retroactive effect
as of the date of his application therefor, during the pendency of which he was
stateless, he having given ' up his U. S. nationality. Thus, in contemplation of
law, he possessed the vital requirement of Filipino citizenship as of the start of
the term of office of governor, and should have been proclaimed instead of
Lee. Furthermore, since his reacquisition of citizenship retroacted to August
17, 1994, his registration as a voter of Sorsogon is deemed to have been
validated as of said date as well. The foregoing, of course, are precisely
consistent with our holding that lack of the citizenship requirement is not a
continuing disability or disqualification to run for and hold public office. And
once again, we emphasize herein our previous rulings recognizing the
Comelec's authority and jurisdiction to hear and decide petitions for annulment
of proclamations.
 This Court has time and again liberally and equitably construed the
electoral laws of our country to give fullest effect to the manifest will of our
people,66 for in case of doubt, political laws must be
interpreted to give life and spirit to the popular mandate freely expressed
through the ballot. Otherwise stated, legal niceties and technicalities cannot
stand in the way of the sovereign will. Consistently, we have held:
"x x x (L)aws governing election contests must be liberally construed to the
end that the will of the people in the choice of public officials may not be
defeated by mere technical objections (citations omitted)."67
The law and the courts must accord Frivaldo every possible protection,
defense and refuge, in deference to the popular will. Indeed, this Court has
repeatedly stressed the importance of giving effect to the sovereign will in
order to ensure the survival of our democracy. In any action involving the
possibility of a reversal of the popular electoral choice, this Court must exert
utmost effort to resolve the issues in a manner that would give effect to the will
of the majority, for it is merely sound public policy to cause elective offices to
be filled by those who are the choice of the majority. To successfully
challenge a winning candidate's qualifications, the petitioner must clearly
demonstrate that the ineligibility is so patently antagonistic 68 to constitutional
and legal principles that overriding such ineligibility and thereby giving effect
to the apparent will of the people, would ultimately create greater prejudice to
the very democratic institutions and juristic traditions that our Constitution and
laws so zealously protect and promote. In this undertaking, Lee has miserably
failed.
In Frivaldo's case, it would have been technically easy to find fault with
his cause. The Court could have refused to grant retroactivity to the effects of
his repatriation and hold him still ineligible due to his failure to show his
citizenship at the time he registered as a voter before the 1995 elections. Or,
it could have disputed the factual findings of the Comelec that he was stateless
at the time of repatriation and thus hold his consequent dual citizenship as a
disqualification "from running for any elective local position." But the real
essence of justice does not emanate from quibblings over patchwork legal
technicality. It proceeds from the spirit's gut consciousness of the dynamic role
of law as a brick in the ultimate development of the social edifice. Thus, the
Court struggled against and eschewed the easy, legalistic, technical and
sometimes harsh anachronisms of the law in order to evoke substantial justice
in the larger social context consistent with Frivaldo's unique situation
approximating venerability in Philippine political life. Concededly, he sought
American citizenship only to escape the clutches of the dictatorship. At this
stage, we cannot seriously entertain any doubt about his loyalty and dedication
to this country. At the first opportunity, he returned to this land, and sought to
serve his people once more. The people of Sorsogon overwhelmingly voted
for him three times. He took an oath of allegiance to this Republic every time
he filed his certificate of candidacy and during his failed naturalization bid. And
let it not be overlooked, his demonstrated tenacity and sheer determination to
re-assume his nationality of birth despite several legal set-backs speak more
loudly, in spirit, in fact and in truth than any legal technicality, of his consuming
intention and burning desire to re-embrace his native Philippines even now at
the ripe old age of 81 years. Such loyalty to and love of country as well as
nobility of purpose cannot be lost on this Court of justice and equity. Mortals
of lesser mettle would have given up. After all, Frivaldo was assured of a life
of ease and plenty as a citizen of the most powerful country in the world. But
he opted, nay, single-mindedly insisted on returning to and serving once more
his struggling but beloved land of birth. He therefore deserves every liberal
interpretation of the law which can be applied in his favor. And in the final
analysis, over and above Frivaldo himself, the indomitable people of Sorsogon
most certainly deserve to be governed by a leader of their overwhelming
choice.
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing:
(1) The petition in G.R. No. 123755 is hereby DISMISSED. The assailed
Resolutions of the respondent Commission are AFFIRMED.
(2) The petition in G.R. No. 120295 is also DISMISSED for being moot
and academic. In any event, it has no merit.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., J. dissenting opinion
Puno., J. concurring opinion
Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr., and Torres, JJ., concur.
Padilla, Regalado, Romero, and Bellosillo, JJ., pro hac vice.
Melo, Vitug, and Kapunan, JJ., concur in the result.
Narvasa, C.J. and Mendoza, J., took no part.
1
Composed of Pres. Comm. Regalado E. Maambong, ponente; Comm.
Graduacion A.R. Claravall, concurring, and Comm. Julio F. Desamito,
dissenting.
2In SPC No. 95-317, entitled Juan G. Frivaldo, petitioner, vs. Raul R.
Lee, respondent; Rollo, pp. 110-129.
3Signed by Chairman Bernardo P. Pardo, Comms. Regalado E. Maambong,
Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando, Manolo B. Gorospe and Teresita Dy-Liaco
Flores. Chairman Pardo certified that "Commissioner Julio F. Desamito was
on official travel at the time of the deliberation and resolution of this case.
However, the Commission has reserved to Comm. Desamito the right to 20 See footnote no. 6, supra.
submit a dissenting opinion." Rollo, pp. 159-171. 21In debunking Frivaldo's claim of citizenship, this Court in G.R. No.
4 Rollo, pp. 46-49. 87193, supra, p. 254, observed that "(i)f he (Frivaldo) really wanted to disavow
5
his American citizenship and reacquire Philippine citizenship, petitioner should
Rollo, pp. 50-55. The Second Division was composed of Pres. Comm. have done so in accordance with the laws of our country. Under C.A. No. 63
Remedies A. Salazar-Fernando, ponente; Comm. Teresita Dy-Liaco Flores, as amended by C.A. No. 473 and P.D. 725, Philippine citizenship may be
concurring, and Comm. Manolo B. Gorospe ("on official business"). reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation."
6 Frivaldo was naturalized as an American citizen on January 20, 1983. In G.R. 22 Supra, p. 794.
No. 87193, Frivaldo vs. Commission on Elections, 174 SCRA 245 (June 23,
1989), the Supreme Court, by reason of such naturalization, declared Frivaldo 23 Petition, p. 27; Rollo, p. 29.
"not a citizen of the Philippines and therefore DISQUALIFIED from serving as 24
Governor of the Province of Sorsogon." On February 28, 1992, the Regional The full text of said memorandum reads as follows:
Trial Court of Manila granted the petition for naturalization of Frivaldo. "MEMORANDUM
However, the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 104654, Republic of the Philippines
vs. De la Rosa, et al, 232 SCRA 785 (June 6,1994), overturned this grant, and TO : The Solicitor General
Frivaldo was "declared not a citizen of the Philippines" and ordered to vacate The Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs
his office. On the basis of this latter Supreme Court ruling, the Comelec The Director-General
disqualified Frivaldo in SPA No. 95-028. National Intelligence Coordinating Agency
7Signed by Chairman Bernardo P. Pardo and the six incumbent The previous administration's practice of granting citizenship by Presidential
commissioners, namely, Regalado E. Maambong, Remedios A. Salazar- Decree or any other executive issuance, and the derivative administrative
Femando, Manolo B. Gorospe, Graduacion A. Reyes-Claravall, Julio F. authority thereof, poses a serious and contentious issue of policy which the
Desamito and Teresita Dy-Liaco Flores; Rollo, pp. 56-57. present government, in the exercise of prudence and sound discretion, should
best leave to the judgment of the first Congress under the 1987 Constitution.
8. Rollo, p. 60.
In view of the foregoing, you as Chairman and members of the Special
9 Rollo, pp. 61-67. Committee on Naturalization, are hereby directed to cease and desist from
10 Rollo, pp. 86-87. The Comelec considered the votes cast for Frivaldo as undertaking any and all proceedings within your functional area of
"stray votes," and thus Lee was held as having garnered the "highest number responsibility, as defined in Letter of Instructions No. 270 dated April 11, 1975,
of votes." as amended, Presidential Decree No. 836 dated December 3, 1975, as
amended, and Presidential Decree No. 1379 dated May 17, 1978, relative to
11 Rollo, pp. 88-97. This is the forerunner of the present case. the grant of citizenship under the said laws, and any other related laws, orders,
12
issuances and rules and regulations.
211 SCRA 297 (July 3, 1992) and 176 SCRA 1 (August 1, 1989).
13
(Sgd.) Corazon C. Aquino
Rollo, pp. 110-128.
14
Manila, March 27, 1987. "
Rollo, pp. 159-170.
25 Art. 7, Civil Code of the Philippines.
15 Rollo, pp. 16-17; petition, pp. 14-15.
26 Cf. Ty, et al. vs. Trampe, et al, G.R. No. 117577 (December 1, 1995).
16 Rollo, pp. 10-15. This is the same resolution referred to in footnote no. 5.
27 Petition, p. 28; Rollo p. 30.
17 Rollo, pp. 16-17. This is the same resolution referred to in footnote no. 7.
28 The aforesaid Manifestation reads as follows:
18Rollo, pp. 18-21. This is signed also by the Chairman and the six other
Comelec Commissioners "MANIFESTATION
19 Republic Act No. 7160.
The Solicitor General, as Chairman of the Special Committee on Now, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines,
Naturalization, hereby manifests that the following persons have been by virtue of the powers in me vested by the Constitution, do hereby decree and
repatriated by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 725, since June 8, 1995: order that: (1) Filipino women who lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage
to aliens; and (2) natural born Filipinos who have lost their Philippine
1. Juan Gallanosa Frivaldo R-000900 citizenship may reacquire Philippine citizenship through repatriation by
2. Manuel Reyes Sanchez 901 applying with the Special Committee on Naturalization created by Letter of
Instructions No. 270, and, if their applications are approved, taking the
3. Ma. Nelly Dessalla Ty 902 necessary oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, after which
they shall be deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship. The
4. Terry Herrera and
Commission on Immigration and Deportation shall thereupon cancel their
Antonio Ching 903 certificate of registration.

5. Roberto Salas Benedicto 904
6. Winthrop Santos Liwag 905
7. Samuel M. Buyco 906
8. Joselito Holganza Ruiz 907
9. Samuel Villanueva 908
10. Juan Leonardo Collas, Jr. 909
11. Felicilda Otilla Sacnanas-Chua 910
29 The text of P.D. 725 is reproduced below:
"PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No. 725
PROVIDING FOR REPATRIATION OF FILIPINO WOMEN WHO HAD LOST
THEIR PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP BY MARRIAGE TO ALIENS AND OF
NATURAL BORN FILIPINOS.
WHEREAS, there are many Filipino women who had lost their Philippine
citizenship by marriage to aliens;
WHEREAS, while the new Constitution allows a Filipino woman who marries
an alien to retain her Philippine citizenship unless by her act or omission, she
is deemed under the law to have renounced her Philippine citizenship, such
provision of the new Constitution does not apply to Filipino women who had
married aliens before said constitution took effect;
WHEREAS, the existing law (C.A. No. 63, as amended) allows the repatriation
of Filipino women who lost their citizenship by reason of their marriage to
aliens only after the death of their husbands or the termination of their marital
status; and
WHEREAS, there are natural born Filipinos who have lost their Philippine
citizenship but now desire to re-acquire Philippine citizenship;
The aforesaid Special Committee is hereby authorized to promulgate rules and
regulations and prescribe the appropriate forms and the required fees for the
effective implementation of this Decree.
This Decree shall take effect immediately.
Done in the City of Manila, this 5th day of June, in the year of Our Lord,
nineteen hundred and seventy-five. "
30 See footnote no. 6, supra
31 Cf. Labo, Jr. vs. Comelec, 211 SCRA 297 (July 3, 1992).
32 "The term of office of all local elective officials elected after the effectivity of
this Code shall be three (3) years, starting from noon of June 30, 1992 or such
date as may be provided for by law, x x x." Sec. 43, Local Government Code.
33 96 Phil. 447,453 (1955).
34
The following are excerpts from the transcript of stenographic notes of the
oral argument held on March 19, 1996:
"JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: Mr. Counsel, it is your position then that the
candidate should be a citizen at the time of proclamation?
ATTY. BRILLANTES: Yes, Your Honor, it is required that he must be a citizen
at the time of proclamation and not only that, at the time that he assumes the
office he must have the continuing qualification as a citizen.
JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: Should that not be reckoned from the time of filing
of certificate of candidacy or at least the day of the election?
ATTY. BRILLANTES: Yes, Your Honor, there are positions taken that it should
be reckoned from the date of certificate of candidacy as in the case of
qualification for Batasang Pambansa before under B.P. 53 it says that for
purposes of residence it must be reckoned x x x from the time of the filing of
the certificate, for purposes of age, from the time of the date of the election.
But when we go over all the provisions of law under current laws, Your Honor,
there is no qualification requirement insofar as citizenship is concern(ed) as to
when, as to when you should be a citizen of the Philippines and we say that if
there is no provision under any existing law which requires that you have to be
a citizen of the Philippines on the date of the filing or on the date of election
then it has to be equitably interpreted to mean that if you are already qualified
at the time that the office is supposed to be assumed then you should be
allowed to assume the office.
JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: Is it not also true that under the Local Autonomy
Code the candidate should also be a registered voter and to be a registered
voter one must be a citizen?
ATTY. BRILLANTES: Yes, Your Honor, in fact, Mr. Frivaldo has always been
a registered voter of Sorsogon. He has voted in 1987, 1988, 1992, then he
voted again in 1995. In fact, his eligibility as a voter was questioned but the
Court dismissed (sic) his eligibility as a voter and he was allowed to vote as in
fact, he voted in all the previous elections including on May 8, 1995.
JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: But the fact that he voted does not make him a
citizen. The fact is, he was declared not a citizen by this Court twice.
ATTY. BRILLANTES: That is true, Your Honor, we admit that he has been
twice declared not citizen and we admit the ruling of the Supreme Court is
correct but the fact is, Your Honor, the matter of his eligibility to vote as being
a registered voter was likewise questioned before the judiciary. There was a
ruling by the Municipal Court, there was a ruling by the Regional Trial Court
and he was sustained as a valid voter, so he voted.
JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: I raised this question in connection with your
contention that citizenship should be determined as of the time of proclamation
and not as of the time of the election or at the time'of the filing of the certificate
of candidacy.
ATTY. BRILLANTES: That is true, Your Honor.
JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: And is it your contention that under the law,
particularly the Local Autonomy Code, the law does not specify when
citizenship should be possessed by the candidate, is that not correct?
ATTY. BRILLANTES: That is right, Your Honor, there is no express provision.
JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: I am also asking you that under the Local Autonomy
Code the candidate for governor or for other local positions should be a voter
and to be a voter one must be a citizen?
ATTY. BRILLANTES: That is right, Your Honor, but the fact of voting is not an
issue here because he was allowed to vote and . he did in fact vote and in fact,
he was a registered voter." (TSN, March 19. 1996.)
35Section 117, Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known as "The Omnibus
Election Code of the Philippines," as amended, provides for the various
qualifications of voters, one of which is Filipino citizenship
36 Comment, p. 11; Rollo, p. 259.
37
See footnote no. 33.
38 Section 253 reads as follows:
"Section 253. Petition for quo warranto. Any voter contesting the election of
any member of the Congress, regional, provincial, or city officer on the ground
of ineligibility or of disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines shall file a sworn
petition for quo warranto with the Commission within ten days after the
proclamation of the results of the election. (Art. XIV, Sec. 60, BP 697; Art.
XVIII, Sec. 189, par. 2, 1978 EC).
Any voter contesting the election of any municipal or barangay officer on the
ground of ineligibility or of disloyally to the Republic of the Philippines shall file
a sworn petition for quo warranto with the regional trial court or metropolitan
or municipal trial court, respectively, within ten days after the proclamation of
the results of the election. (Art. XVIII, Sec. 189, par. 2, 1978 EC)."
39Art. 4, New Civil Code. See also Gallardo vs. Borromeo, 161 SCRA 500
(May 25,1988), and Nilo vs. Court of Appeals, 128 SCRA 519 (April 2,1984).
40Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of
the Philippines, Vol. I, 1990 ed., p. 23 states:
"Exceptions to Rule. Statutes can be given retroactive effect in the following
cases: (1) when the law itself so expressly provides, (2) in case of remedial
statutes, (3) in case of curative statutes, (4) in case of laws interpreting others,
and (5) in case of laws creating new rights."
41 id., p. 25.
42 Agpalo, Statutory Construction, 1990 ed., pp. 270-271.
4373 Am Jur 2d, sec. 354, p. 489, cited in Castro vs. Sagales, 94 Phil. 208,210
(1953).
44 Memorandum, p. 9.
45 73 Am Jur 2d, Sec. 351, p. 488.
46 73 Am Jur 2d, Sec. 354, p. 490; italics supplied.
47 Art. 10, Civil Code of the Philippines.
48Based on the "Corrected Compliance" dated May 16, 1996 filed by Solicitor
General, it appears that, excluding the case of Frivaldo, the longest interval
between date of filing of an application for repatriation and its approval was
three months and ten days; the swiftest action was a same-day approval.
49"SEC. 40. Disqualifications. The following persons are disqualified from
running for any elective local position:
xxx xxx xxx 66 In Espinosa vs. Aquino, (Electoral Case No. 9, Senate Electoral Tribunal
[SET]), the election of the late Senator Benigno S. Aquino, Jr. was upheld,
(d) Those with dual citizenship"; despite his not being of the required age on the day of the election, although
50 P. 11; Rollo, p. 259. he celebrated his thirty-fifth birthday before his proclamation. Much later, in
1990, this Court held in Aznar vs. Comelec (185 SCRA 703, May 25, 1990)
51 Resolution, p. 12; Rollo, p. 121. that even if Emilio "Lito" Osmena held an Alien Certificate of Registration as
52 an American citizen, he was still not disqualified from occupying the local
Cf. Navarro vs. Commission on Elections, 228 SCRA 596 (December 17,
elective post of governor, since such certificate did not preclude his
1993); Arao vs. Commission on Elections, 210 SCRA 290 (June 23, 1992).
being "still a Filipino." The holding in Aquino was subsequently nullified by the
53 The dispositive portion of said Resolution reads: adoption of the 1987 Constitution (Art. VI, Sec. 3), which specified that the age
qualification must be possessed on the day of the elections, and not on the
"WHEREFORE, this Division resolves to GRANT the petition and declares that day of the proclamation of the winners by the board of canvassers. On the
respondent is DISQUALIFIED to run for the office of Provincial Governor of other hand, Sec. 40 of Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code of
Sorsogon on the ground that he is not a citizen of the Philippines. Accordingly 1991 ) which took effect on January 1, 1992 , provides that those with dual
respondent's certificate of candidacy is cancelled." citizenship are disqualified from running for any elective local position, and
54 Petition, p. 19; Rollo, p. 21. effectively overturns the ruling in Aznar. But the point is that to the extent
possible, and unless there exist provisions to the contrary, the laws have
55 Resolution promulgated on December 19, 1995, p. 7; Rollo, p. 116 always been interpreted to give fullest effect to the political will.
5642 SCRA 561, 565 (December 20, 1971), citing Moy Ya Lim Yao vs. 67 Benito vs. Commission on Elections, 235 SCRA 436, 442 (August 17, 1994).
Commissioner of Immigration, L-21289, October 4, 1971. 68This antagonism was clearly present in the two earlier cases involving
57 Art. IX, Sec. 2. Frivaldo. See footnote no. 6.
58 SPC No. 95-317 is entitled "Annulment of Proclamation" and contains the
following prayer:
"WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed of this Honorable Commission
that after due notice and hearing an Oder (sic) /Resolution/ Decision be issued
as follows:
a) Annulling/setting aside the 30 June 1995 proclamation of respondent as the
duly election (sic), Governor of Sorsogon for being contrary to law;
b) Ordering the proclamation of the petitioner as duly elected governor of
Sorsogon;
xxx xxx xxx
59 229 SCRA 666, 674 (February 4, 1994).
60 211 SCRA 297, 309 (July 3, 1992),
61 G.R. No. 120265, September 18, 1995.
62 Supra, at p. 312.
63 See footnotes 2 and 3.
64 174 SCRA 245, 254 (June 23,1959).
65 Salonga and Yap, Public International Law, 1966 ed., p. 239.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.M. No. 93-7-696-0 February 21, 1995
In Re JOAQUIN T. BORROMEO, Ex Rel. Cebu City Chapter of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
It is said that a little learning is a dangerous thing; and that he who acts as
his own lawyer has a fool for a client. There would seem to be more than a
grain of truth in these aphorisms; and they appear to find validation in the
proceeding at bench, at least.
The respondent in this case, Joaquin T. Borromeo, is not a lawyer but has
apparently read some law books, and ostensibly come to possess some
superficial awareness of a few substantive legal principles and procedural
rules. Incredibly, with nothing more than this smattering of learning, the
respondent has, for some sixteen (16) years now, from 1978 to the present,
been instituting and prosecuting legal proceedings in various courts,
dogmatically pontificating on errors supposedly committed by the courts,
including the Supreme Court. In the picturesque language of former Chief
Justice Enrique M. Fernando, he has "with all the valor of ignorance," 1 been
verbally jousting with various adversaries in diverse litigations; or in the
words of a well-known song, rushing into arenas "where angels fear to
tread." Under the illusion that his trivial acquaintance with the law had given
him competence to undertake litigation, he has ventured to represent himself
in numerous original and review proceedings. Expectedly, the results have
been disastrous. In the process, and possibly in aid of his interminable and
quite unreasonable resort to judicial proceedings, he has seen fit to compose
and circulate many scurrilous statements against courts, judges and their
employees, as well as his adversaries, for which he is now being called to
account.
Respondent Borromeo's ill-advised incursions into lawyering were generated
by fairly prosaic transactions with three (3) banks which came to have
calamitous consequences for him chiefly because of his failure to comply
with his contractual commitments and his stubborn insistence on imposing
his own terms and conditions for their fulfillment. These banks were: Traders
Royal Bank (TRB), United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB), Security Bank &
Trust Co. (SBTC). Borromeo obtained loans or credit accommodation from
them, to secure which he constituted mortgages over immovables belonging
to him or members of his family, or third persons. He failed to pay these
obligations, and when demands were made for him to do so, laid down his
own terms for their satisfaction which were quite inconsistent with those
agreed upon with his obligees or prescribed by law. When, understandably,
the banks refused to let him have his way, he brought suits right and left,
successively if not contemporaneously, against said banks, its officers, and
even the lawyers who represented the banks in the actions brought by or
against him. He sued, as well, the public prosecutors, the Judges of the Trial
Courts, and the Justices of the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court who
at one time or another, rendered a judgment, resolution or order adverse to
him, as well as the Clerks of Court and other Court employees signing the
notices thereof. In the aggregate, he has initiated or spawned in different fora
the astounding number of no less-than fifty (50) original or review
proceedings, civil, criminal, administrative. For some sixteen (16) years now,
to repeat, he has been continuously cluttering the Courts with his repetitive,
and quite baseless if not outlandish complaints and contentions.
I. CASES INVOLVING TRADERS
ROYAL BANK (TRB)
The first bank that Joaquin T. Borromeo appears to have dealt with was the
Traders Royal Bank (TRB). On June 2, 1978, he got a loan from it in the sum
of P45,000.00. This he secured by a real estate mortgage created over two
parcels of land covered by TCT No. 59596 and TCT No. 59755 owned,
respectively, by Socorro Borromeo-Thakuria (his sister) and Teresita
Winniefred Lavarino. On June 16, 1978, Borromeo obtained a second loan
from TRB in the amount of P10,000.00, this time giving as security a
mortgage over a parcel of land owned by the Heirs of Vicente V. Borromeo,
covered by TCT No. RT-7634. Authority to mortgage these three lots was
vested in him by a Special Power of Attorney executed by their respective
owners.
Additionally, on April 23, 1980, Borromeo obtained a Letter of Credit from
TRB in the sum of P80,000.00, in consideration of which he executed a Trust
Receipt (No. 595/80) falling due on July 22, 1980. 2
Borromeo failed to pay the debts as contracted despite demands therefor.
Consequently, TRB caused the extra-judicial foreclosure of the mortgages
given to secure them. At the public sale conducted by the sheriff on
September 7, 1981, the three mortgaged parcels of land were sold to TRB as
the highest bidder, for P73,529.09.
Within the redemption period, Borromeo made known to the Bank his
intention to redeem the properties at their auction price. TRB manager Blas
C. Abril however made clear that Borromeo would also have to settle his
outstanding account under Trust Receipt No. 595/80 (P88,762.78), supra.
Borromeo demurred, and this disagreement gave rise to a series of lawsuits
commenced by him against the Bank, its officers and counsel, as
aforestated.
A. CIVIL CASES
1. RTC Case No. R-22506; CA G.R.
CV No. 07015; G.R. No. 83306
On October 29, 1982 Borromeo filed a complaint in the Cebu City Regional
Trial Court for specific performance and damages against TRB and its local
manager, Blas Abril, docketed as Civil Case No. R-22506. The complaint
sought to compel defendants to allow redemption of the foreclosed properties
only at their auction price, with stipulated interests and charges, without need
of paying the obligation secured by the trust receipt above mentioned.
Judgment was rendered in his favor on December 20, 1984 by Branch 23 of
the Cebu City RTC; but on defendants' appeal to the Court of Appeals —
docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 07015 — the judgment was reversed, by
decision dated January 27, 1988. The Court of Appeals held that the "plaintiff
(Borromeo) has lost his right of redemption and can no longer compel
defendant to allow redemption of the properties in question."
Borromeo elevated the case to this court where his appeal was docketed as
G.R. No. 83306. By Resolution dated August 15, 1988, this Court's First
Division denied his petition for review "for failure . . . to sufficiently show that
the respondent Court of Appeals had committed any reversible error in its
questioned judgment, it appearing on the contrary that the said decision is
supported by substantial evidence and is in accord with the facts and
applicable law." Reconsideration was denied, by Resolution dated November
23, 1988. A second motion for reconsideration was denied by Resolution
dated January 30, 1989, as was a third such motion, by Resolution dated
April 19, 1989. The last resolution also directed entry of judgment and the
remand of the case to the court of origin for prompt execution of judgment.
Entry of judgment was made on May 12, 1989. By Resolution dated August
7, 1989, the Court denied another motion of Borromeo to set aside judgment;
and by Resolution dated December 20, 1989, the Court merely noted without
action his manifestation and motion praying that the decision of the Court of
Appeals be overturned, and declared that "no further motion or pleading . . .
shall be entertained . . . ."
2. RTC Case No. CEB 8750;
CA-G.R. SP No. 22356
The ink was hardly dry on the resolutions just mentioned before Borromeo
initiated another civil action in the same Cebu City Regional Court by which
he attempted to litigate the same issues. The action, against the new TRB
Branch Manager, Jacinto Jamero, was docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-
8750. As might have been anticipated, the action was, on motion of the
defense, dismissed by Order dated May 18, 1990, 3 on the ground ofres
judicata, the only issue raised in the second action — i.e., Borromeo's right to
redeem the lots foreclosed by TRB — having been ventilated in Civil Case
No. R-22506 (Joaquin T. Borromeo vs. Blas C. Abril and Traders Royal
Bank) (supra) and, on appeal, decided with finality by the Court of Appeals
and the Supreme Court in favor of defendants therein.
The Trial Court's judgment was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 22356.
3. RTC Case No. CEB-9485;
CA-G.R. SP No. 28221
In the meantime, and during the pendency of Civil Case No. R-22506, TRB
consolidated its ownership over the foreclosed immovables. Contending that
act of consolidation amounted to a criminal offense, Borromeo filed
complaints in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Cebu against the bank
officers and lawyers. These complaints were however, and quite correctly,
given short shrift by that Office. Borromeo then filed suit in the Cebu City
RTC, this time not only against the TRB, TRB officers Jacinto Jamero and
Arceli Bustamante, but also against City Prosecutor Jufelinito Pareja and his
assistants, Enriqueta Belarmino and Eva A. Igot, and the TRB lawyers, Mario
Ortiz and the law, firm, HERSINLAW. The action was docketed as Civil Case
No. CEB-9485. The complaint charged Prosecutors Pareja, Belarmino and
Igot with manifest partiality and bias for dismissing the criminal cases just
mentioned; and faulted TRB and its manager, Jamero, as well as its lawyers,
for consolidating the titles to the foreclosed properties in favor of the bank
despite the pendency of Case No. R-22506. This action also failed. On
defendants' motion, it was dismissed on February 19, 1992 by the RTC.
(Branch 22) on the ground of res judicata(being identical with Civil Case Nos.
R-22506 and CEB-8750, already decided with finality in favor of TRB), and
lack of cause of action (as to defendants Pareja, Belarmino and Igot).
Borromeo's certiorari petition to the Court of Appeals (CA G.R. SP No.
28221) was dismissed by that Court's 16th Division 4 on October 6, 1992, for
the reason that the proper remedy was appeal.
4. RTC Case No. CEB-10368;
CA-G.R. SP No. 27100
Before Case No. CEB-9845 was finally decided, Borromeo filed, on May 30,
1991, still another civil action for the same cause against TRB, its
manager, Jacinto Jamero, and its lawyers, Atty. Mario Ortiz and the
HERSINLAW law office. This action was docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-
10368, and was described as one for "Recovery of Sums of Money,
Annulment of Titles with Damages." The case met the same fate as the
others. It was, on defendants' motion, dismissed on September 9, 1991 by
the RTC (Branch 14 5) on the ground of litis pendentia.
The RTC ruled that —
Civil Case No. CEB-9485 will readily show that the defendants therein,
namely the Honorable Jufelinito Pareja, Enriqueta Belarmino, Eva Igot,
Traders Royal Bank, Arceli Bustamante, Jacinto Jamero, Mario Ortiz and
HERSINLAW are the same persons or nearly all of them who are impleaded
as defendants in the present Civil Case No. CEB-10368, namely, the Traders
Royal Bank, Jacinto Jamero, Mario Ortiz and HERSINLAW. The only
difference is that more defendants were impleaded in Civil Case No. CEB-
9485, namely, City Prosecutor Jufelinito Pareja and his assistants Enriqueta
Belarmino and Eva Igot. The inclusion of the City Prosecutor and his two
assistants in Civil Case No. CEB-9485 was however merely incidental as
apparently they had nothing to do with the questioned transaction in said
case. . . .
The Court likewise found that the reliefs prayed for were the same as those
sought in Civil Case No. CEB-9485, and the factual bases of the two cases
were essentially the same — the alleged fraudulent foreclosure and
consolidation of the three properties mortgaged years earlier by Borromeo to
TRB.
For some reason, the Order of September 9, 1991 was set aside by an Order
rendered by another Judge on November 11, 1991 6 — the Judge who
previously heard the case having inhibited himself; but this Order of
November 11, 1991 was, in turn, nullified by the Court of Appeals (9th
Division), by Decision promulgated on March 31, 1992 in CA-G.R. SP No.
27100 (Traders Royal Bank vs. Hon. Celso M. Gimenez, etc. and Joaquin T.
Borromeo), 7 which decision also directed dismissal of Borromeo's complaint.
5. RTC Case No. CEB-6452
When a new branch manager, Ronald Sy, was appointed for TRB, Cebu
City, Borromeo forthwith made that event the occasion for another new
action, against TRB, Ronald Sy, and the bank's attorneys — Mario Ortiz,
Honorato Hermosisima, Jr., Wilfredo Navarro and HERSINLAW firm. This
action was docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-6452, and described as one for
"Annulment of Title with Damages." The complaint, dated October 20, 1987,
again involved the foreclosure of the three (3) immovables above mentioned,
and was anchored on the alleged malicious, deceitful, and premature
consolidation of titles in TRB's favor despite the pendency of Civil Case No.
22506. On defendant's motion, the trial court 8 dismissed the case on the
ground of prematurity, holding that "(a)t this point . . ., plaintiff's right to seek
annulment of defendant Traders Royal Bank's title will only accrue if and
when plaintiff will ultimately and finally win Civil Case No. R-22506."
6. RTC Case No. CEB-8236
Having thus far failed in his many efforts to demonstrate to the courts the
"merit" of his cause against TRB and its officers and lawyers, Borromeo now
took a different tack by also suing (and thus also venting his ire on) the
members of the appellate courts who had ruled adversely to him. He filed in
the Cebu City RTC, Civil Case No. CEB-8236, impleading as defendants not
only the same parties he had theretofore been suing — TRB and its officers
and lawyers (HERSINLAW, Mario Ortiz) — but also the Chairman and
Members of the First Division of the Supreme Court who had repeatedly
rebuffed him in G.R. No. 83306 (SEE sub-head I, A, 1, supra), as well as the
Members of the 5th, 9th and 10th Divisions of the Court of Appeals who had
likewise made dispositions unfavorable to him. His complaint, dated August
22, 1989, aimed to recover damages from the defendants Justices for —
. . . maliciously and deliberately stating blatant falsehoods and disregarding
evidence and pertinent laws, rendering manifestly unjust and biased
resolutions and decisions bereft of signatures, facts or laws in support
thereof, depriving plaintiff of his cardinal rights to due process and against
deprivation of property without said process, tolerating, approving and
legitimizing the patently illegal, fraudulent, and contemptuous acts of
defendants TRB, (which) constitute a) GRAVE DERELICTION OF DUTY
AND ABUSE OF POWER emanating from the people, b) FLAGRANT
VIOLATIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION, CARDINAL PRIMARY RIGHTS
DUE PROCESS, ART. 27, 32, CIVIL CODE, Art. 208, REV. PENAL CODE,
and R.A. 3019, for which defendants must be held liable under said laws.
The complaint also prayed for reconveyance of the "fake titles obtained
fraudulently by TRB/HERSINLAW," and recovery of "100,000.00 moral
damages; 30,000.00 exemplary damages; and P5,000.00 litigation
expenses." This action, too, met a quick and unceremonious demise. On
motion of defendants TRB and HERSINLAW, the trial court, by Order dated
November 7, 1989, 9 dismissed the case.
7. RTC Case No. CEB-13069
It appears that Borromeo filed still another case to litigate the same cause
subject of two (2) prior actions instituted by him. This was RTC Case No.
CEB-13069, against TRB and the latter's lawyers, Wilfredo Navarro and
Mario Ortiz. The action was dismissed in an Order dated October 4,
1993, 10 on the ground of res judicata — the subject matter being the same
as that in Civil Case No. R-22506, decision in which was affirmed by the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 07015 as well as by this Court in G.R.
No. 83306 11 — and litis pendentia — the subject matter being also the same
as that in Civil Case No. CEB-8750, decision in which was affirmed by the
Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP No. 22356. 12
8. RTC Criminal Case No. CBU-19344;
CA-G.R. SP No. 28275; G.R. No. 112928
On April 17, 1990 the City Prosecutor of Cebu City filed an information with
the RTC of Cebu (Branch 22) against Borromeo charging him with a violation
of the Trust Receipts Law. 13 The case was docketed as Criminal Case No.
CBU-19344. After a while, Borromeo moved to dismiss the case on the
ground of denial of his right to a speedy trial. His motion was denied by Order
of Judge Pampio A. Abarintos dated April 10, 1992. In the same order, His
Honor set an early date for Borromeo's arraignment and placed the case
"under a continuous trial system on the dates as may be agreed by the
defense and prosecution." Borromeo moved for reconsideration. When his
motion was again found without merit, by Order dated May 21, 1992, he
betook himself to the Court of Appeals on a special civil action of certiorari, to
nullify these adverse orders, his action being docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
28275.
Here again, Borromeo failed. The Court of Appeals declared that the facts
did not show that there had been unreasonable delay in the criminal action
against him, and denied his petition for being without merit. 14
Borromeo then filed a petition for review with this Court (G.R. No. 112928),
but by resolution dated January 31, 1994, the same was dismissed for failure
of Borromeo to comply with the requisites of Circulars Numbered 1-88 and
19-91. His motion for reconsideration was subsequently denied by
Resolution dated March 23, 1994.
a. Clarificatory Communications to
Borromeo Re "Minute Resolutions"
He next filed a Manifestation dated April 6, 1994 calling the Resolution of
March 23, 1994 "Un-Constitutional, Arbitrary and tyrannical and a gross
travesty of 'Justice,'" because it was "signed only by a mere clerk and . . .
(failed) to state clear facts and law," and "the petition was not resolved on
MERITS nor by any Justice but by a mere clerk." 15
The Court responded with another Resolution, promulgated on June 22,
1994, and with some patience drew his attention to the earlier resolution "in
his own previous case (Joaquin T. Borromeo vs. Court of Appeals and
Samson Lao, G.R. No. 82273, 1 June 1990; 186 SCRA 1) 16 and on the
same issue he now raises." Said Resolution of June 22, 1994, after
reiterating that the notices sent by the Clerk of Court of the Court En Banc or
any of the Divisions simply advise of and quote the resolution actually
adopted by the Court after deliberation on a particular matter, additionally
stated that Borromeo "knew, as well, that the communications (notices)
signed by the Clerk of Court start with the opening clause —
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of the First Division of
this Court dated. _________,
thereby indisputably showing that it is not the Clerk of Court who prepared or
signed the resolutions."
This was not, by the way, the first time that the matter had been explained to
Borromeo. The record shows that on July 10, 1987, he received a letter from
Clerk of Court Julieta Y. Carreon (of this Court's Third Division) dealing with
the subject, in relation to G.R. No. 77243. 17 The same matter was also dealt
with in the letter received by him from Clerk of Court Luzviminda D. Puno,
dated April 4, 1989, and in the letter to him of Clerk of Court (Second
Division) Fermin J. Garma, dated May 19, 1989. 18 And the same subject was
treated of in another Resolution of this Court, notice of which was in due
course served on him, to wit: that dated July 31, 1989, in G.R. No. 87897. 19
B. CRIMINAL CASES
Mention has already been made of Borromeo's attempt — with "all the valor
of ignorance" — to fasten not only civil, but also criminal liability on TRB, its
officers and lawyers. 20 Several other attempts on his part to cause criminal
prosecution of those he considered his adversaries, will now be dealt with
here.
1. I. S. Nos. 90-1187 and 90-1188
On March 7, 1990, Borromeo filed criminal complaints with the Office of the
Cebu City Prosecutor against Jacinto Jamero (then still TRB Branch
Manager), "John Doe and officers of Traders Royal Bank." The complaints
(docketed as I.S. Nos. 90-1187-88) accused the respondents of "Estafa and
Falsification of Public Documents." He claimed, among others that the bank
and its officers, thru its manager, Jacinto Jamero, sold properties not owned
by them: that by fraud, deceit and false pretenses, respondents negotiated
and effected the purchase of the (foreclosed) properties from his
(Borromeo's) mother, who "in duress, fear and lack of legal knowledge,"
agreed to the sale thereof for only P671,000.00, although in light of then
prevailing market prices, she should have received P588,030.00 more.
In a Joint Resolution dated April 11, 1990, 21 the Cebu City Fiscal's office
dismissed the complaints observing that actually, the Deed of Sale was not
between the bank and Borromeo's mother, but between the bank and Mrs.
Thakuria (his sister), one of the original owners of the foreclosed properties;
and that Borromeo, being a stranger to the sale, had no basis to claim injury
or prejudice thereby. The Fiscal ruled that the bank's ownership of the
foreclosed properties was beyond question as the matter had been raised
and passed upon in a judicial litigation; and moreover, there was no proof of
the document allegedly falsified nor of the manner of its falsification.
a. I.S. Nos. 87-3795 and 89-4234
Evidently to highlight Borromeo's penchant for reckless filing of unfounded
complaints, the Fiscal also adverted to two other complaints earlier filed in
his Office by Borromeo — involving the same foreclosed properties and
directed against respondent bank officers' predecessors (including the former
Manager, Ronald Sy) and lawyers — both of which were dismissed for lack
of merit. These were:
a. I. S. No. 87-3795 (JOAQUIN T. BORROMEO vs. ATTY. MARIO ORTIZ
and RONALD SY) for "Estafa Through Falsification of Public Documents,
Deceit and False Pretenses." — This case was dismissed by Resolution
dated January 19, 1988 of the City Prosecutor's Office because based on
nothing more than a letter dated June 4, 1985, sent by Bank Manager
Ronald Sy to the lessee of a portion of the foreclosed immovables, advising
the latter to remit all rentals to the bank as new owner thereof, as shown by
the consolidated title; and there was no showing that respondent Atty. Ortiz
was motivated by fraud in notarizing the deed of sale in TRB's favor after the
lapse of the period of redemption, or that Ortiz had benefited pecuniarily from
the transaction to the prejudice of complainant; and
b. I.S. No. 89-4234 (JOAQUIN T. BORROMEO vs. RONALD SY, ET AL.) for
"Estafa Through False Pretenses and Falsification of Public Documents." —
This case was dismissed by Resolution dated January 31, 1990.
2. I.S.Nos. 88-205 to 88-207
While Joaquin Borromeo's appeal (G.R. No. 83306) was still pending before
the Supreme Court, 22 an affidavit was executed in behalf of TRB by Arceli
Bustamante, in connection with the former's fire insurance claim over
property registered in its name — one of two immovables formerly owned by
Socorro B. Thakuria (Joaquin Borromeo's sister) and foreclosed by said
bank. 23 In that affidavit, dated September 10, 1987, Bustamante stated that
"On 24 June 1983, TRB thru foreclosure acquired real property together with
the improvements thereon which property is located at F. Ramos St., Cebu
City covered by TCT No. 87398 in the name or TRB." The affidavit was
notarized by Atty. Manuelito B. Inso.
Claiming that the affidavit was "falsified and perjurious" because the claim of
title by TRB over the foreclosed lots was a "deliberate, wilful and blatant
fasehood in that, among others: . . . the consolidation was premature, illegal
and invalid," Borromeo filed a criminal complaint with the Cebu City Fiscal's
Office against the affiant (Bustamante) and the notarizing lawyer (Atty. Inso)
for "falsification of public document, false pretenses, perjury." On September
28, 1988, the Fiscal's Office dismissed the complaint. 24 It found no untruthful
statements in the affidavit or any malice in its execution, considering that
Bustamante's statement was based on the Transfer Certificate of Title in
TRB's file, and thus the document that Atty. Inso notarized was legally in
order.
3. OMB-VIS-89-00136
This Resolution of this Court (First Division) in G.R. No. 83306 dated August
15, 1988 — sustaining the judgment of the Court of Appeals (10th Division)
of January 27, 1988 in CA-G.R. CV No. 07015, supra, was made the subject
of a criminal complaint by Borromeo in the Office of the Ombudsman,
Visayas, docketed as OMB-VIS-89-00136. His complaint — against
"Supreme Court Justice (First Div.) and Court of Appeals Justice (10th Div)"
— was dismissed for lack of merit in a Resolution issued on February 14,
1990 25 which, among other things, ruled as follows:
It should be noted and emphasized that complainant has remedies available
under the Rules of Court, particularly on civil procedure and existing laws. It
is not the prerogative of this Office to make a review of Decisions and
Resolutions of judicial courts, rendered within their competence. The records
do not warrant this Office to take further proceedings against the
respondents.
In addition, Sec. 20. of R.A. 6770, "the Ombudsman Act states that the Office
of the Ombudsman may not conduct the necessary investigation of any
administrative act or omission complained of if it believes that (1) the
complainant had adequate remedy in another judicial or quasi-judicial body;"
and Sec. 21 the same law provides that the Office of the Ombudsman does
not have disciplinary authority over members of the Judiciary.
II. CASES INVOLVING UNITED COCONUT
PLANTERS BANK (UCPB)
As earlier stated, 26 Borromeo (together with a certain Mercader) also
borrowed money from the United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) and
executed a real estate mortgage to secure repayment thereof. The mortgage
was constituted over a 122-square-meter commercial lot covered by TCT No.
75680 in Borromeo's name. This same lot was afterwards sold on August 7,
1980 by Borromeo to one Samson K. Lao for P170,000.00, with a stipulation
for its repurchase (pacto de retro) by him (Borromeo, as the vendor). The
sale was made without the knowledge and consent of UCPB.
A. CIVIL CASES
Now, just as he had defaulted in the payment of the loans and credit
accommodations he had obtained from the Traders Royal Bank, Borromeo
failed in the fulfillment of his obligations to the UCPB.
Shortly after learning of Borromeo's default, and obviously to obviate or
minimize the ill effects of the latter's delinquency, Lao applied with the same
bank (UCPB) for a loan, offering the property he had purchased from
Borromeo as collateral. UCPB was not averse to dealing with Lao but
imposed several conditions on him, one of which was for Lao to consolidate
his title over the property. Lao accordingly instituted a suit for consolidation of
title, docketed as Civil Case No. R-21009. However, as will shortly be
narrated, Borromeo opposed the consolidation prayed for. As a result, UCPB
cancelled Lao's application for a loan and itself commenced proceedings
foreclose the mortgage constituted by Borromeo over the property.
This signaled the beginning of court battles waged by Borromeo not only
against Lao, but also against UCPB and the latter's lawyers, battles which he
(Borromeo) fought contemporaneously with his court war with Traders Royal
Bank.
1. RTC Case No. R-21009; AC-G.R.
No. CV-07396; G.R. No. 82273
The first of this new series of court battles was, as just stated, the action
initiated by Samson Lao in the Regional Trial Court of Cebu (Branch 12),
docketed as Case No. R-21009, for consolidation of title in his favor over the
122-square-meter lot subject of the UCPB mortgage, in accordance with
Article 1007 of the Civil Code. In this suit Lao was represented by Atty.
Alfredo Perez, who was later substituted by Atty. Antonio Regis. Borromeo
contested Lao's application.
Judgment was in due course rendered by the RTC (Branch 12, Hon. Francis
Militante, presiding) denying consolidation because the transaction between
the parties could not be construed as a sale with pacto de retrobeing in law
an equitable mortgage; however, Borromeo was ordered to pay Lao the sum
of P170,000.00, representing the price stipulated in the sale a retro, plus the
amounts paid by Lao for capital gains and other taxes in connection with the
transaction (P10,497.50).
Both Lao and Borromeo appealed to the Court of Appeals. Lao's appeal was
dismissed for failure of his lawyer to file brief in his behalf. Borromeo's appeal
— AC-G.R. No. CV-07396 — resulted in a Decision by the Court of Appeals
dated December 14, 1987, affirming the RTC's judgment in toto.
The Appellate Court's decision was, in turn, affirmed by this Court (Third
Division) in a four-page Resolution dated September 13, 1989, promulgated
in G.R. No. 82273 — an appeal also taken by Borromeo. Borromeo filed a
motion for reconsideration on several grounds, one of which was that the
resolution of September 13, 1989 was unconstitutional because contrary to
"Sec. 4 (3), Art. VIII of the Constitution," it was not signed by any Justice of
the Division, and there was "no way of knowing which justices had
deliberated and voted thereon, nor of any concurrence of at least three of the
members." Since the motion was not filed until after there had been an entry
of judgment, Borromeo having failed to move for reconsideration within the
reglementary period, the same was simply noted without action, in a
Resolution dated November 27, 1989.
Notices of the foregoing Resolutions were, in accordance with established
rule and practice, sent to Borromeo over the signatures of the Clerk of Court
and Assistant Clerk of Court (namely: Attys. Julieta Y. CARREON and
Alfredo MARASIGAN, respectively).
a. RTC Case No. CEB-8679
Following the same aberrant pattern of his judicial campaign against Traders
Royal Bank, Borromeo attempted to vent his resentment even against the
Supreme Court officers who, as just stated, had given him notices of the
adverse dispositions of this Court's Third Division. He filed Civil Case No.
CEB-8679 in the Cebu City RTC (CFI) for recovery of damages against
"Attys. Julieta Y. Carreon and Alfredo Marasigan, Division Clerk of Court and
Asst. Division Clerk of Court, Third Division, and Atty. Jose I. Ilustre, Chief of
Judicial Records Office." He charged them with usurpation of judicial
functions, for allegedly "maliciously and deviously issuing biased, fake,
baseless and unconstitutional 'Resolution' and 'Entry of Judgment' in G.R.
No. 82273."
Summonses were issued to defendants by RTC Branch 18 (Judge Rafael R.
Ybañez, presiding). These processes were brought to the attention of this
Court's Third Division. The latter resolved to treat the matter as an incident in
G.R. No. 82273, and referred it to the Court En Banc on April 25, 1990. By
Resolution (issued in said G.R. No. 82273, supra) dated June 1, 1990, the
Court En Banc ordered Judge Ybañez to quash the summonses, to dismiss
Civil Case No. CEB-8679, and "not to issue summons or otherwise to
entertain cases of similar nature which may in the future be filed in his court."
Accordingly, Judge Ibañez issued an Order on June 6, 1990 quashing the
summonses and dismissing the complaint in said Civil Case No. CEB-8679.
The Resolution of June 1, 1990 27 explained to Borromeo in no little detail the
nature and purpose of notices sent by the Clerks of Court of decisions or
resolutions of the Court En Banc or the Divisions, in this wise:
This is not the first time that Mr. Borromeo has filed charges/complaints
against officials of the Court. In several letter complaints filed with the courts
and the Ombudsman, Borromeo had repeatedly alleged that he "suffered
injustices," because of the disposition of the four (4) cases he separately
appealed to this Court which were resolved by minute resolutions, allegedly
in violation of Sections 4 (3), 13 and 14 of Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution. His invariable complaint is that the resolutions which disposed
of his cases do not bear the signatures of the Justices who participated in the
deliberations and resolutions and do not show that they voted therein. He
likewise complained that the resolutions bear no certification of the Chief
Justice and that they did not state the facts and the law on which they were
based and were signed only by the Clerks of Court and therefore
"unconstitutional, null and void."
xxx xxx xxx
The Court reminds all lower courts, lawyers, and litigants that it disposes of
the bulk of its cases by minute resolutions and decrees them as final and
executory, as were a case is patently without merit, where the issues raised
are factual in nature, where the decision appealed from is in accord with the
facts of the case and the applicable laws, where it is clear from the records
that the petition is filed merely to forestall the early execution of judgment
and for non-compliance with the rules. The resolution denying due course
always gives the legal basis. As emphasized in In Re: Wenceslao Laureta,
148 SCRA 382, 417 [1987], "[T]he Court is not 'duty bound' to render signed
Decisions all the time. It has ample discretion to formulate Decisions and/or
Minute Resolutions, provided a legal basis is given, depending on its
evaluation of a case" . . . This is the only way whereby it can act on all cases
filed before it and, accordingly, discharge its constitutional functions. . . .
. . . (W)hen the Court, after deliberating on a petition and any subsequent
pleadings, manifestations, comments, or motions decides to deny due course
to the petition and states that the questions raised are factual, or no
reversible error in the respondent court's decision is shown, or for some
other legal basis stated in the resolution, there is sufficient compliance with
the constitutional requirement . . . (of Section 14, Article VIII of the
Constitution "that no petition for review or motion for reconsideration shall be
refused due course or denied without stating the legal basis thereof").
For a prompt dispatch of actions of the Court, minute resolutions are
promulgated by the Court through the Clerk of Court, who takes charge of
sending copies thereof to the parties concerned by quoting verbatim the
resolution issued on a particular case. It is the Clerk of Court's duty to inform
the parties of the action taken on their cases quoting the resolution adopted
by the Court. The Clerk of Court never participates in the deliberations of a
case. All decisions and resolutions are actions of the Court. The Clerk of
Court merely transmits the Court's action. This was explained in the case —
G.R. No. 56280, "Rhine Marketing Corp. v. Felix Gravante, et al.," where, in
a resolution dated July 6, 1981, the Court
said — "[M]inute resolutions of this Court denying or dismissing
unmeritorious petitions like the petition in the case at bar, are the result of a
thorough deliberation among the members of this Court, which does not and
cannot delegate the exercise of its judicial functions to its Clerk of Court or
any of its subalterns, which should be known to counsel. When a petition is
denied or dismissed by this Court, this Court sustains the challenged
decision or order together with its findings of facts and legal conclusions.
Minute resolutions need not be signed by the members of the Court who took
part in the deliberations of a case nor do they require the certification of the
Chief Justice. For to require members of the Court to sign all resolutions
issued would not only unduly delay the issuance of its resolutions but a great
amount of their time would be spent on functions more properly performed by
the Clerk of Court and which time could be more profitably used in the
analysis of cases and the formulation of decisions and orders of important
nature and character. Even with the use of this procedure, the Court is still
struggling to wipe out the backlogs accumulated over the years and meet the
ever increasing number of cases coming to it. . . .
b. RTC CIVIL CASE NO. CEB-(6501)
6740; G.R. No. 84054
It is now necessary to digress a little and advert to actions which, while
having no relation to the UCPB, TRB or SBTC, are relevant because they
were the predicates for other suits filed by Joaquin Borromeo against
administrative officers of the Supreme Court and the Judge who decided one
of the cases adversely to him.
The record shows that on or about December 11, 1987, Borromeo filed a civil
action for damages against a certain Thomas B. Tan and Marjem Pharmacy,
docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-6501. On January 12, 1988, the trial court
dismissed the case, without prejudice, for failure to state a cause of action
and prematurity (for non-compliance with P.D. 1508).
What Borromeo did was simply to re-file the same complaint with the same
Court, on March 18, 1988. This time it was docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-
6740, and assigned to Branch 17 of the RTC of Cebu presided by Hon. Mario
Dizon. Again, however, on defendants' motion, the trial court dismissed the
case, in an order dated May 28, 1988. His first and second motions for
reconsideration having been denied, Borromeo filed a petition for review
before this Court, docketed as G.R. No. 84054 (Joaquin T. Borromeo vs.
Tomas Tan and Non. Mario Dizon).
In a Resolution dated August 3, 1988, the Court required petitioner to comply
with the rules by submitting a verified statement of material dates and paying
the docket and legal research fund fees; it also referred him to the Citizens
Legal Assistance Office for help in the case. His petition was eventually
dismissed by Resolution of the Second Division dated November 21, 1988,
for failure on his part to show any reversible error in the trial court's
judgment. His motion for reconsideration was denied with finality, by
Resolution dated January 18, 1989.
Borromeo wrote to Atty. Fermin J. Garma (Clerk of Court of the Second
Division) on April 27, 1989 once more remonstrating that the resolutions
received by him had not been signed by any Justice, set forth no findings of
fact or law, and had no certification of the Chief Justice. Atty. Garma replied
to him on May 19, 1989, pointing out that "the minute resolutions of this
Court denying dismissing petitions, like the petition in the case at bar, which
was denied for failure of the counsel and/or petitioner to sufficiently show that
the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, Branch 17, had committed any reversible
error in the questioned judgment [resolution dated November 21, 1988], are
the result of a thorough deliberation among the members of this Court, which
does not and cannot delegate the exercise of its judicial function to its Clerk
of Court or any of its subalterns. When the petition is denied or dismissed by
the Court, it sustains the challenged decision or order together with its
findings of facts and legal conclusions."
Borromeo obviously had learned nothing from the extended Resolution of
June 1, 1990 in G.R. No. 82273, supra(or the earlier communications to him
on the same subject) which had so clearly pointed out that minute resolutions
of the Court are as much the product of the Members' deliberations as full-
blown decisions or resolutions, and that the intervention of the Clerk consists
merely in the ministerial and routinary function of communicating the Court's
action to the parties concerned.
c. RTC Case No. CEB-9042
What Borromeo did next, evidently smarting from this latest judicial rebuff,
yet another in an already long series, was to commence a suit against
Supreme Court (Second Division) Clerk of Court Fermin J. Garma and
Assistant Clerk of Court Tomasita Dris. They were the officers who had sent
him notices of the unfavorable resolutions in G.R. No. 84054, supra. His suit,
filed on June 1, 1990, was docketed as Case No. CEB-9042 (Branch 8, Hon.
Bernardo Salas presiding). Therein he complained essentially of the same
thing he had been harping on all along: that in relation to G.R. No. 91030 —
in which the Supreme Court dismissed his petition for "technical reasons"
and failure to demonstrate any reversible error in the challenged judgment —
the notice sent to him — of the "unsigned and unspecific" resolution of
February 19, 1990, denying his motion for reconsideration — had been
signed only by the defendant clerks of court and not by the Justices.
According to him, he had thereupon written letters to defendants demanding
an explanation for said "patently unjust and un-Constitutional resolutions,"
which they ignored; defendants had usurped judicial functions by issuing
resolutions signed only by them and not by any Justice, and without stating
the factual and legal basis thereof; and defendants' "wanton, malicious and
patently abusive acts" had caused him "grave mental anguish, severe moral
shock, embarrassment, sleepless nights and worry;" and consequently, he
was entitled to moral damages of no less than P20,000.00 and exemplary
damages of P10,000.00, and litigation expenses of P5,000.00.
On June 8, 1990, Judge Renato C. Dacudao ordered the records of the case
transmitted to the Supreme Court conformably with its Resolution dated June
1, 1990 in G.R. No. 82273, entitled "Joaquin T. Borromeo vs. Hon. Court of
Appeals and Samson-Lao," supra — directing that all complaints against
officers of that Court be forwarded to it for appropriate action. 28
Borromeo filed a "Manifestation/Motion" dated June 27, 1990 asking the
Court to "rectify the injustices" committed against him in G.R. Nos. 83306,
84999, 87897, 77248 and 84054. This the Court ordered expunged from the
record (Resolution, July 19, 1990).
2. RTC Case No. R-21880; CA-G.R.
CV No. 10951; G.R. No. 87897
Borromeo also sued to stop UCPB from foreclosing the mortgage on his
property. In the Cebu City RTC, he filed a complaint for "Damages with
Injunction," which was docketed as Civil Case No. R-21880 (Joaquin T.
Borromeo vs. United Coconut Planters Bank, et al.). Named defendants in
the complaint were UCPB, Enrique Farrarons(UCPB Cebu Branch Manager)
and Samson K. Lao. UCPB was represented in the action by Atty. Danilo
Deen, and for a time, by Atty. Honorato Hermosisima (both being then
resident partners of ACCRA Law Office). Lao was represented by Atty.
Antonio Regis. Once again, Borromeo was rebuffed. The Cebu RTC (Br. 11,
Judge Valeriano R. Tomol, Jr. presiding) dismissed the complaint, upheld
UCPB's right to foreclose, and granted its counterclaim for moral damages in
the sum of P20,000.00; attorney's fees amounting to P10,000.00; and
litigation expenses of P1,000.00.
Borromeo perfected an appeal to the Court of Appeals where it was docketed
as CA-G.R. CV No. 10951. That Court, thru its Ninth Division (per
Martinez, J., ponente, with de la Fuente and Pe, JJ., concurring), dismissed
his appeal and affirmed the Trial Court's judgment.
Borromeo filed a petition far review with the Supreme Court which, in G.R.
No. 87897 dismissed it for insufficiency in form and substance and for being
"largely unintelligible." Borromeo's motion for reconsideration was denied by
Resolution dated June 25, 1989. A second motion for reconsideration was
denied in a Resolution dated July 31, 1989 which directed as well entry of
judgment (effected on August 1, 1989). In this Resolution, the Court (First
Division) said:
The Court considered the Motion for Reconsideration dated July 4, 1989 filed
by petitioner himself and Resolved to DENY the same for lack of merit, the
motion having been filed without "express leave of court" (Section 2, Rule 52,
Rules of Court) apart from being a reiteration merely of the averments of the
Petition for Review dated April 14, 1989 and the Motion for Reconsideration
dated May 25, 1989. It should be noted that petitioner's claims have already
been twice rejected as without merit, first by the Regional Trial Court of Cebu
and then by the Court of Appeals. What petitioner desires obviously is to
have a third ruling on the merits of his claims, this time by this Court.
Petitioner is advised that a review of a decision of the Court of Appeals is not
a matter of right but of sound judicial discretion and will be granted only when
there is a special and important reason therefor (Section 4, Rule 45); and a
petition for review may be dismissed summarily on the ground that "the
appeal is without merit, or is prosecuted manifestly for delay or the question
raised is too unsubstantial to require consideration" (Section 3, Rule 45), or
that only questions of fact are raised in the petition, or the petition otherwise
fails to comply with the formal requisites prescribed therefor (Sections 1 and
2, Rule 45; Circular No. 1-88). Petitioner is further advised that the first
sentence of Section 14, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution refers to
a decision, and has no application to aresolution as to which said section
pertinently provides that a resolution denying a motion for reconsideration
need state only the legal basis therefor; and that the resolution of June 26,
1989 denying petitioner's first Motion for Reconsideration dated May 25,
1989 does indeed state the legal reasons therefor. The plain and patent
signification of the grounds for denial set out in the Resolution of June 26,
1989 is that the petitioner's arguments — aimed at the setting aside of the
resolution denying the petition for review and consequently bringing about a
review of the decision of the Court of Appeals — had failed to persuade the
Court that the errors imputed to the Court of Appeals had indeed been
committed and therefore, there was no cause to modify the conclusions set
forth in that judgment; and in such a case, there is obviously no point in
reproducing and restating the conclusions and reasons therefor of the Court
of Appeals.
Premises considered, the Court further Resolved to DIRECT ENTRY OF
JUDGMENT.
On August 13, 1989 Borromeo wrote to Atty. Estrella C. Pagtanac, then the
Clerk of Court of the Court's First Division, denouncing the resolution above
mentioned as "a LITANY OF LIES, EVASIONS, and ABSURD SELF-
SERVING LOGIC from a Supreme Court deluded and drunk with power
which it has forgotten emanates from the people," aside from being "patently
UNCONSTITUTIONAL for absence of signatures and facts and law: . . . and
characterizing the conclusions therein as "the height of ARROGANCE and
ARBITRARINESS assuming a KING-LIKE AND EVEN GOD-LIKE
POWER totally at variance and contradicted by . . . CONSTITUTIONAL
provisions . . ." To the letter Borromeo attached copies of (1) his "Open Letter
to the Ombudsman" dated August 10, 1989 protesting the Court's "issuing
UNSIGNED, UNSPECIFIC, and BASELESS 'MINUTE RESOLUTIONS;'" (2)
his "Open Letter of Warning" dated August 12, 1989; and (3) a
communication of Domingo M. Quimlat, News Ombudsman, Phil. Daily
Inquirer, dated August 10, 1989. His letter was ordered expunged from the
record because containing "false, impertinent and scandalous matter
(Section 5, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court)." Another letter of the same ilk,
dated November 7, 1989, was simply "NOTED without action" by Resolution
promulgated on December 13, 1989.
3. RTC Case No. CEB-4852; CA G.R.
SP No. 14519; G.R. No. 84999
In arrant disregard of established rule and practice, Borromeo filed another
action to invalidate the foreclosure effected at the instance of UCPB, which
he had unsuccessfully tried to prevent in Case No. CEB-21880. This was
Civil Case No. CEB-4852 of the Cebu City RTC (Joaquin T. Borromeo vs.
UCPB, et al.) for "Annulment of Title with Damages." Here, UCPB was
represented by Atty. Laurence Fernandez, in consultation with Atty. Deen.
On December 26, 1987, the Cebu City RTC (Br. VII, Hon. Generoso A.
Juaban, presiding) dismissed the complaint on the ground of litis
pendentia and ordered Borromeo to pay attorney's fees (P5,000.00) and
litigation expenses (P1,000.00).
Borromeo instituted a certiorari action in the Court of Appeals to annul this
judgment (CA G.R. SP No. 14519); but his action was dismissed by the
Appellate Court on June 7, 1988 on account of his failure to comply with that
Court's Resolution of May 13, 1988 for submission of certified true copies of
the Trial Court's decision of December 26, 1987 and its Order of February
26, 1988, and for statement of "the dates he received . . . (said) decision and
. . . order."
Borromeo went up to this Court on appeal, his appeal being docketed as
G.R. No. 84999. In a Resolution dated October 10, 1988, the Second
Division required comment on Borromeo's petition for review by the
respondents therein named, and required Borromeo to secure the services of
counsel. On November 9, 1988, Atty. Jose L. Cerilles entered his
appearance for Borromeo. After due proceedings, Borromeo's petition was
dismissed, by Resolution dated March 6, 1989 of the Second Division for
failure to sufficiently show that the Court of Appeals had committed any
reversible error in the questioned judgment. His motion for reconsideration
dated April 4, 1989, again complaining that the resolution contained no
findings of fact and law, was denied.
a. RTC Case No. CEB-8178
Predictably, another action, Civil Case No. CEB-8178, was commenced by
Borromeo in the RTC of Cebu City, this time against the Trial Judge who had
lately rendered judgment adverse to him, Judge Generoso Juaban. Also
impleaded as defendants were UCPB, and Hon. Andres Narvasa (then
Chairman, First Division), Estrella G.Pagtanac and Marissa Villarama (then,
respectively, Clerk of Court and Assistant Clerk of Court of the First Division),
and others. Judge German G. Lee of Branch 15 of said Court — to which the
case was raffled — caused issuance of summonses which were in due
course served on September 22, 1989, among others, on said defendants in
and of the Supreme Court. In an En Banc Resolution dated October 2, 1989
— in G.R. No. 84999 — this Court, required Judge Lee and the Clerk of
Court and Assistant Clerk of Court of the Cebu RTC to show cause why no
disciplinary action should be taken against them for issuing said summonses.
Shortly thereafter, Atty. Jose L. Cerilles — who, as already stated, had for a
time represented Borromeo in G.R. No. 84999 — filed with this Court his
withdrawal of appearance, alleging that there was "no compatibility" between
him and his client, Borromeo — because "Borromeo had been filing
pleadings, papers; etc. without . . . (his) knowledge and advice" — and
declaring that he had "not advised and . . . (had) no hand in the filing of (said)
Civil Case CEB 8178 before the Regional Trial Court in Cebu. On the other
hand, Judge Lee, in his "Compliance" dated October 23, 1989, apologized to
the Court and informed it that he had already promulgated an order
dismissing Civil Case No. CEB-8178 on motion of the principal defendants
therein, namely, Judge Generoso Juaban and United Coconut Planters Bank
(UCPB). Atty. Cerilles' withdrawal of appearance, and Judge Lee's
compliance, were noted by the Court in its Resolution dated November 29,
1989.
4. RTC Case No. CEB-374; CA-G.R.
CV No. 04097; G.R. No. 77248
It is germane to advert to one more transaction between Borromeo and
Samson K. Lao which gave rise to another action that ultimately landed in
this Court. 29 The transaction involved a parcel of land of Borromeo's known
as the "San Jose Property" (TCT No. 34785). Borromeo sued Lao and
another person (Mariano Logarta) in the Cebu Regional Trial Court on the
theory that his contract with the latter was not an absolute sale but an
equitable mortgage. The action was docketed as Case No. CEB-374.
Judgment was rendered against him by the Trial Court (Branch 12) declaring
valid and binding the purchase of the property by Lao from him, and the
subsequent sale thereof by Lao to Logarta. Borromeo appealed to the Court
of Appeals, but that Court, in CA-G.R. CV No. 04097, affirmed the Trial
Court's judgment, by Decision promulgated on October 10, 1986.
Borromeo came up to this Court. on appeal, his review petition being
docketed as G.R. No. 77248. By Resolution of the Second Division of March
16, 1987, however, his petition was denied for the reason that "a) the petition
as well as the docket and legal research fund fees were filed and paid late;
and (b) the issues raised are factual and the findings thereon of the Court of
Appeals are final." He moved for reconsideration; this was denied by
Resolution dated June 3, 1987.
He thereafter insistently and persistently still sought reconsideration of said
adverse resolutions through various motions and letters, all of which were
denied. One of his letters — inter alia complaining that the notice sent to him
by the Clerk of Court did not bear the signature of any Justice — elicited the
following reply from Atty. Julieta Y. Carreon, Clerk of Court of the Third
Division, dated July 10, 1987, reading as follows:
Dear Mr. Borromeo:
This refers to your letter dated June 9, 1987 requesting for a copy of the
actual resolution with the signatures of all the Justices of the Second Division
in Case G.R. No. 77243 whereby the motion for reconsideration of the
dismissal of the petition was denied for lack of merit.
In connection therewith, allow us to cite for your guidance, Resolution dated
July 6, 1981 in G.R. No. 56280, Rhine Marketing Corp. v. Felix Gravante, Jr.,
et al., wherein the Supreme Court declared that "(m)inute resolutions of this
Court denying or dismissing unmeritorious petitions like the petition in the
case at bar, are the result of a thorough deliberation among the members of
this Court, which does not and cannot delegate the exercise of its judicial
functions to its Clerk of Court or any of its subalterns, which should be known
to counsel. When a petition is denied or dismissed by this Court, this Court
sustains the challenged decision or order together with its findings of facts
and legal conclusions." It is the Clerk of Court's duty to notify the parties of
the action taken on their case by quoting the resolution adopted by the Court.
Very truly yours,
JULIETA Y. CARREON
B. CRIMINAL CASES
Just as he had done with regard to the cases involving the Traders Royal
Bank, and similarly without foundation, Borromeo attempted to hold his
adversaries in the cases concerning the UCPB criminally liable.
1. Case No; OMB-VIS-89-00181
In relation to the dispositions made of Borromeo's appeals and other
attempts to overturn the judgment of the RTC in Civil Case No.
21880, 30 Borromeo filed with the Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas) on
August 18, 1989, a complaint against the Chairman and Members of the
Supreme Court's First Division; the Members of the Ninth Division of the
Court of Appeals, Secretary of Justice Sedfrey Ordoñez, Undersecretary of
Justice Silvestre Bello III, and Cebu City Prosecutor Jufelinito Pareja,
charging them with violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and
the Revised Penal Code.
By Resolution dated January 12, 1990, 31 the Office of the Ombudsman
dismissed Borromeo's complaint, opining that the matters therein dealt with
had already been tried and their merits determined by different courts
including the Supreme Court (decision, June 26, 1989, in G.R. No. 87987).
The resolution inter alia stated that, "Finally, we find it unreasonable for
complainant to dispute and defiantly refuse to acknowledge the authority of
the decree rendered by the highest tribunal of the land in this case. . . ."
2. Case No. OMB-VIS-90-00418
A second complaint was filed by Borromeo with the Office of the
Ombudsman (Visayas), dated January 12, 1990, against Atty. Julieta
Carreon, Clerk of Court of the Third Division, Supreme Court, and others,
charging them with a violation of R.A. 3019 (and the Constitution, the Rules
of Court, etc.) for supposedly usurping judicial functions in that they issued
Supreme Court resolutions (actually, notices of resolutions) in connection
with G.R. No. 82273 which did not bear the justices' signatures. 32 In a
Resolution dated March 19, 1990, the Office of the Ombudsman dismissed
his complaint for "lack of merit" declaring inter alia that "in all the questioned
actuations of the respondents alleged to constitute usurpation . . . it cannot
be reasonably and fairly inferred that respondents really were the ones
rendering them," and "it is not the prerogative of this office to review the
correctness of judicial resolutions." 33
III. CASES INVOLVING SECURITY
BANK & TRUST CO. (SBTC)
A. CIVIL CASES
1. RTC Case No. 21615; CA-
G.R. No. 20617; G.R. No. 94769
The third banking institution which Joaquin T. Borromeo engaged in running
court battles, was the Security Bank & Trust Company (SBTC). From it
Borromeo had obtained five (5) loans in the aggregate sum of P189,126.19,
consolidated in a single Promissory Note on May 31, 1979. To secure
payment thereof, Summa Insurance Corp. (Summa) issued a performance
bond which set a limit of P200,000.00 on its liability thereunder. Again, as in
the case of his obligations to Traders Royal Bank and UCPB, Borromeo
failed to discharge his contractual obligations. Hence, SBTC brought an
action in the Cebu City RTC against Borromeo and Summa for collection.
The action was docketed as Civil Case No. R-21615, and was assigned to
Branch 10, Judge Leonardo Cañares, presiding. Plaintiff SBTC was
represented by Atty. Edgar Gica, who later withdrew and was substituted by
the law firm, HERSINLAW. The latter appeared in the suit through Atty.
Wilfredo Navarro.
Judgment by default was rendered in the case on January 5, 1989; both
defendents were sentenced to pay to SBTC, solidarily, the amount of
P436,771.32; 25% thereof as attorney's fees (but in no case less than
P20,000.00); and P5,000.00 as litigation expenses; and the costs. A writ of
execution issued in due course pursuant to which an immovable of Borromeo
was levied on, and eventually sold at public auction on October 19, 1989 in
favor of the highest bidder, SBTC.
On February 5, 1990, Borromeo filed a motion to set aside the judgment by
default, but the same was denied on March 6, 1990. His Motion for
Reconsideration having likewise been denied, Borromeo went to the Court of
Appeals for relief (CA-G.R. No. 20617), but the latter dismissed his petition.
Failing in his bid for reconsideration, Borromeo appealed to this Court
on certiorari — his appeal being docketed as G.R. No. 94769. On September
17, 1990, this Court dismissed his petition, and subsequently denied with
finality his motion for reconsideration. Entry of Judgment was made on
December 26, 1990.
However, as will now be narrated, and as might now have been anticipated
in light of his history of recalcitrance and bellicosity, these proceedings did
not signify the end of litigation concerning Borromeo's aforesaid contractual
commitments to SBTC, but only marked the start of another congeries of
actions and proceedings, civil and criminal concerning the same matter,
instituted by Borromeo.
2. RTC Case No. CEB-9267
While G.R. No. 94769 was yet pending in the Supreme Court, Borromeo
commenced a suit of his own in the Cebu RTC against SBTC; the lawyers
who represented it in Civil Case No. R-21625 — HERSINLAW, Atty.Wilfredo
Navarro, Atty. Edgar Gica; and even the Judge who tried and disposed of the
suit, Hon. Leonardo Cañares. He denominated his action, docketed as Civil
Case No. CEB-9267, as one for "Damages from Denial of Due Process,
Breach of Contract, Fraud, Unjust Judgment, with Restraining Order and
Injunction." His complaint accused defendants of "wanton, malicious and
deceitful acts" in "conniving to deny plaintiff due process and defraud him
through excessive attorney's fees," which acts caused him grave mental and
moral shock, sleepless nights, worry, social embarrassment and severe
anxiety for which he sought payment of moral and exemplary damages as
well as litigation expenses.
By Order dated May 21, 1991, the RTC of Cebu City, Branch 16 (Hon.
Godardo Jacinto, presiding) granted the demurrer to evidence filed by
defendants and dismissed the complaint, holding that "since plaintiff failed to
introduce evidence to support . . . (his) causes of action asserted . . ., it
would be superfluous to still require defendants to present their own
evidence as there is nothing for them to controvert."
2. RTC Case No. CEB-10458;
CA-G.R. CV No. 39047
Nothing daunted, and running true to form, Borromeo filed on July 2, 1991
still another suit against the same parties — SBTC, HERSINLAW, and Judge
Cañares — but now including Judge Godardo Jacinto, 34 who had rendered
the latest judgment against him. This suit, docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-
10458, was, according to Borromeo, one "for Damages (For Unjust
Judgment and Orders, Denial of Equal Protection of the Laws Violation of the
Constitution, Fraud and Breach of Contract)." Borromeo faulted Judges
Cañares and Jacinto "for the way they decided the two cases (CVR-21615 &
CEB NO. 9267)," and contended that defendants committed "wanton,
malicious, and unjust acts" by "conniving to defraud plaintiff and deny him
equal protection of the laws and due process," on account of which he had
been "caused untold mental anguish, moral shock, worry, sleepless nights,
and embarrassment for which the former are liable under Arts. 20, 21, 27,
and 32 of the Civil Code."
The defendants filed motions to dismiss. By Order dated August 30, 1991,
the RTC of Cebu City, Branch 15 (Judge German G. Lee, Jr., presiding)
dismissed the complaint on grounds of res judicata, immunity of judges from
liability in the performance of their official functions, and lack of jurisdiction.
Borromeo took an appeal to the Court of Appeals, which docketed it as CA-
G.R. CV No. 39047.
In the course thereof, he filed motions to cite Atty. Wilfredo F. Navarro,
lawyer of SBTC, for contempt of court. The motions were denied by
Resolution of the Court of Appeals (Special 7th Division) dated April 13,
1993. 35Said the Court:
Stripped of their disparaging and intemperate innuendoes, the subject
motions, in fact, proffer nothing but a stark difference in opinion as to what
can, or cannot, be considered res judicata under the circumstances.
xxx xxx xxx
By their distinct disdainful tenor towards the appellees, and his apparent
penchant for argumentum ad hominen, it is, on the contrary the appellant
who precariously treads the acceptable limits of argumentation and personal
advocacy. The Court, moreover, takes particular note of the irresponsible
leaflets he admits to have authored and finds them highly reprehensible and
needlessly derogatory to the dignity, honor and reputation of the Courts. That
he is not a licensed law practitioner is, in fact, the only reason that his
otherwise contumacious behavior is presently accorded the patience and
leniency it probably does not deserve. Considering the temperament he has,
by far, exhibited, the appellant is, however, sufficiently warned that similar
displays in the future shall accordingly be dealt with with commensurate
severity.
IV. OTHER CASES
A. RTC Case No. CEB-2074; CA-G.R,
CV No. 14770; G.R. No. 98929
One other case arising from another transaction of Borromeo with Samson K.
Lao is pertinent. This is Case No. CEB-2974 of the Regional Trial Court of
Cebu. It appears that sometime in 1979, Borromeo was granted a loan of
P165,000.00 by the Philippine Bank of Communications (PBCom) on the
security of a lot belonging to him in San Jose Street, Cebu City, covered by
TCT No. 34785. 36 Later, Borromeo obtained a letter of credit in the amount
of P37,000.00 from Republic Planters Bank, with Samson Lao as co-maker.
Borromeo failed to pay his obligations; Lao agreed to, and did pay
Borromeo's obligations to both banks (PBCom and Republic), in
consideration of which a deed of sale was executed in his favor by Borromeo
over two (2) parcels of land, one of which was that mortgaged to PBCom, as
above stated. Lao then mortgaged the land to PBCom as security for his own
loan in the amount of P240,000.00.
Borromeo subsequently sued PBCom, some of its personnel, and Samson
Lao in the Cebu Regional Trial Court alleging that the defendants had
conspired to deprive him of his property. Judgment was rendered against him
by the Trial Court. Borromeo elevated the case to the Court of Appeals
where his appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 14770. On March 21,
1990, said Court rendered judgment affirming the Trial Court's decision, and
on February 7, 1991, issued a Resolution denying Borromeo's motion for
reconsideration. His appeal to this Court, docketed as G.R. No. 98929, was
given short shrift. On May 29, 1991, the Court (First Division) promulgated a
Resolution denying his petition for review "for being factual and for failure . . .
to sufficiently show that respondent court had committed any reversible error
in its questioned judgment."
Stubbornly, in his motion for reconsideration, he insisted the notices of the
resolutions sent to him were unconstitutional and void because bearing no
signatures of the Justices who had taken part in approving the resolution
therein mentioned.
B. RTC Case No. CEB-11528
What would seem to be the latest judicial dispositions rendered against
Borromeo, at least as of date of this Resolution, are two orders issued in Civil
Case No. CEB-11528 of the Regional Trial Court at Cebu City (Branch 18),
which was yet another case filed by Borromeo outlandishly founded on the
theory that a judgment promulgated against him by the Supreme Court (Third
Division) was wrong and "unjust." Impleaded as defendant in the action was
former Chief Justice Marcelo B. Fernan, as Chairman of the Third Division at
the time in question. On August 31, 1994 the presiding judge, Hon. Galicano
O. Arriesgado, issued a Resolution inter aliadismissing Borromeo's complaint
"on grounds of lack of jurisdiction and res judicata." His Honor made the
following pertinent observations:
. . . (T)his Court is of the well-considered view and so holds that this Court
has indeed no jurisdiction to review, interpret or reverse the judgment or
order of the Honorable Supreme Court. The acts or omissions complained of
by the plaintiff against the herein defendant and the other personnel of the
highest Court of the land as alleged in paragraphs 6 to 12 of plaintiff's
complaint are certainly beyond the sphere of this humble court to consider
and pass upon to determine their propriety and legality. To try to review,
interpret or reverse the judgment or order of the Honorable Supreme Court
would appear not only presumptuous but also contemptuous. As argued by
the lawyer for the defendant, a careful perusal of the allegations in the
complaint clearly shows that all material allegations thereof are directed
against a resolution of the Supreme Court which was allegedly issued by the
Third Division composed of five (5) justices. No allegation is made directly
against defendant Marcelo B. Fernan in his personal capacity. That being the
case, how could this Court question the wisdom of the final order or judgment
of the Supreme Court (Third Division) which according to the plaintiff himself
had issued a resolution denying plaintiffs petition and affirming the Lower
Court's decision as reflected in the "Entry of Judgment." Perhaps, if there
was such violation of the Rules of Court, due process and Sec. 14, Art. 8 of
the Constitution by the defendant herein, the appropriate remedy should not
have been obtained before this Court. For an inferior court to reverse,
interpret or review the acts of a superior court might be construed to a certain
degree as a show of an uncommon common sense. Lower courts are without
supervising jurisdiction to interpret or to reverse the judgment of the higher
courts.
Borromeo's motion for reconsideration dated September 20, 1994 was
denied "for lack of sufficient factual and legal basis" by an Order dated
November 15, 1994.
V. ADMINISTRATIVE CASE No. 3433
A. Complaint Against Lawyers
of his Court Adversaries
Borromeo also initiated administrative disciplinary proceedings against the
lawyers who had appeared for his adversaries — UCPB and Samson K. Lao
— in the actions above mentioned, and others. As already mentioned, these
lawyers were: Messrs. Laurence Fernandez, Danilo Deen, Honorato
Hermosisima, Antonio Regis, and Alfredo Perez. His complaint against them,
docketed as Administrative Case No. 3433, prayed for their disbarment.
Borromeo averred that the respondent lawyers connived with their clients in
(1) maliciously misrepresenting a deed of sale with pacto de retro as a
genuine sale, although it was actually an equitable mortgage; (2) fraudulently
depriving complainant of his proprietary rights subject of the Deed of Sale;
and (3) defying two lawful Court orders, all in violation of their lawyer's oath
to do no falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in Court. Borromeo
alleged that respondents Perez and Regis falsely attempted to consolidate
title to his property in favor of Lao.
B. Answer of Respondent Lawyers
The respondent lawyers denounced the disbarment complaint as "absolutely
baseless and nothing but pure harassment." In a pleading dated July 10,
1990, entitled "Comments and Counter Motion to Cite Joaquin Borromeo in
Contempt of Court;" July 10, 1990, filed by the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines Cebu City Chapter, signed by Domero C. Estenzo (President),
Juliano Neri (Vice-President), Ulysses Antonio C. Yap (Treasurer); Felipe B.
Velasquez (Secretary), Corazon E. Valencia (Director), Virgilio U. Lainid
(Director), Manuel A. Espina (Director), Ildefonsa A. Ybañez (Director), Sylvia
G. Almase (Director), and Ana Mar Evangelista P. Batiguin (Auditor). The
lawyers made the following observations:
It is ironic. While men of the legal profession regard members of the Judiciary
with deferential awe and respect sometimes to the extent of cowering before
the might of the courts, here is a non-lawyer who, with gleeful abandon and
unmitigated insolence, has cast aspersions and shown utter disregard to the
authority and name of the courts.
And lawyers included. For indeed, it is very unfortunate that here is a non-
lawyer who uses the instruments of justice to harass lawyers and courts who
crosses his path more especially if their actuations do not conform with his
whims and caprices.
Adverting to letters publicly circulated by Borromeo, inter alia charging then
Chief Justice Marcelo B. Fernan with supposed infidelity and violation of the
constitution, etc., the lawyers went on to say the following:
The conduct and statement of Borromeo against this Honorable Court, and
other members of the Judiciary are clearly and grossly disrespectful, insolent
and contemptuous. They tend to bring dishonor to the Judiciary and subvert
the public confidence on the courts. If unchecked, the scurrilous attacks will
undermine the dignity of the courts and will result in the loss of confidence in
the country's judicial system and administration of justice.
. . . (S)omething should be done to protect the integrity of the courts and the
legal profession. So many baseless badmouthing have been made by
Borromeo against this Honorable Court and other courts that for him to go
scot-free would certainly be demoralizing to members of the profession who
afforded the court with all the respect and esteem due them.
Subsequently, in the same proceeding; Borromeo filed another pleading
protesting the alleged "refusal" of the Cebu City Chapter of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines to act on his disbarment cases "filed against its
members."
C. Decision of the IBP
On March 28, 1994, the National Executive Director, IBP (Atty. Jose Aguila
Grapilon) transmitted to this Court the notice and copy of the decision in the
case, reached after due investigation, as well as the corresponding records
in seven (7) volumes. Said decision approved and adopted the Report and
Recommendation dated December 15, 1993 of Atty. Manuel P. Legaspi,
President, IBP, Cebu City Chapter, representing the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline, recommending dismissal of the complaint as against all the
respondents and the issuance of a "warning to Borromeo to be more
cautious and not be precipitately indiscriminate in the filing of administrative
complaints against lawyers." 37
VI. SCURRILOUS WRITINGS
Forming part of the records of several cases in this Court are copies of letters
("open" or otherwise), "circulars," flyers or leaflets harshly and quite
unwarrantedly derogatory of the many court judgments or directives against
him and defamatory of his adversaries and their lawyers and employees, as
well as the judges and court employees involved in the said adverse
dispositions — some of which scurrilous writings were adverted to by the
respondent lawyers in Adm. Case No. 3433, supra. The writing and
circulation of these defamatory writing were apparently undertaken by
Borromeo as a parallel activity to his "judicial adventures." The Court of
Appeals had occasion to refer to his "apparent penchant for argumentum ad
hominen" and of the "irresponsible leaflets he admits to have authored . . .
(which were found to be) highly reprehensible and needlessly derogatory to
the dignity, honor and reputation of the Courts."
In those publicly circulated writings, he calls judges and lawyers ignorant,
corrupt, oppressors, violators of the Constitution and the laws, etc.
Sometime in July, 1990, for instance, he wrote to the editor of the "Daily Star"
as regards the reported conferment on then Chief Justice Marcelo B. Fernan
of an "Award from the University of Texas for his contributions in upholding
the Rule of Law, Justice, etc.," stressing that Fernan "and the Supreme Court
persist in rendering rulings patently violative of the Constitution, Due Process
and Rule of Law, particularly in their issuance of so-called Minute
Resolutions devoid of FACT or LAW or SIGNATURES . . ." He sent a copy of
his letter in the Supreme Court.
He circulated an "OPEN LETTER TO SC justices, Fernan," declaring that he
had "suffered INJUSTICE after INJUSTICE from you who are sworn to
render TRUE JUSTICE but done the opposite, AND INSTEAD OF
RECTIFYING THEM, labeled my cases as 'frivolous, nuisance, and
harassment suits' while failing to refute the irrefutable evidences therein . . .;"
in the same letter, he specified what he considered to be some of "the
terrible injustices inflicted on me by this Court."
In another letter to Chief Justice Fernan, he observed that "3 years after
EDSA, your pledges have not been fulfilled. Injustice continues and as you
said, the courts are agents of oppression, instead of being saviours and
defenders of the people. The saddest part is that (referring again to minute
resolutions) even the Supreme Court, the court of last resort, many times,
sanctions injustice and the trampling of the rule of law and due process, and
does not comply with the Constitution when it should be the first to uphold
and defend it . . . ." Another circulated letter of his, dated June 21, 1989 and
captioned, "Open Letter to Supreme Court Justices Marcelo Fernan and
Andres Narvasa," repeated his plaint of having "been the victim of many . . .
'Minute Resolutions' . . . which in effect sanction the theft and landgrabbing
and arson of my properties by TRADERS ROYAL BANK, UNITED
COCONUT PLANTERS BANK, AND one TOMAS B. TAN — all without
stating any FACT or LAW to support your dismissal of . . . (my) cases,
despite your firm assurances (Justice Fernan) that you would cite me such
facts or laws (during our talk in your house last March 12 1989);" and that
"you in fact have no such facts or laws but simply want to ram down a most
unjust Ruling in favor of a wrongful party. . . ."
In another flyer entitled in big bold letters, "A Gov't That Lies! Blatant attempt
to fool people!" he mentions what he regards as "The blatant lies and
contradictions of the Supreme Court, CA to support the landgrabbing by
Traders Royal Bank of Borromeos' Lands." Another flyer has at the center
the caricature of a person, seated on a throne marked Traders Royal Bank,
surrounded by such statements as, "Sa TRB para kami ay royalty. Nakaw at
nakaw! Kawat Kawat! TRB WILL STEAL!" etc Still another "circular"
proclaims: "So the public may know: Supreme Court minute resolutions w/o
facts, law, or signatures violate the Constitution" and ends with the
admonition: "Supreme Court, Justice Fernan: STOP VIOLATING THE
CHARTER." 38
One other "circular" reads:
SC, NARVASA — TYRANTS!!!
— CODDLERS OF CROOKS!
— VIOLATOR OF LAWS
by: JOAQUIN BORROMEO
NARVASA's SC has denied being a DESPOT nor has it shielded CROOKS
in the judiciary. Adding "The SCRA (SC Reports) will attest to this continuing
vigilance Of the supreme Court." These are lame, cowardly and self-serving
denials and another "self-exoneration" belied by evidence which speak for
themselves (Res Ipsa Loquitor) (sic) — the SCRA itself.
It is pure and simply TYRANNY when Narvasa and associates issued
UNSIGNED, UNCLEAR, SWEEPING "Minute Resolutions" devoid of CLEAR
FACTS and LAWS in patent violation of Secs. 4(3), 14, Art. 8 of the
Constitution. It is precisely through said TYRANNICAL, and
UNCONSTITUTIONAL sham rulings that Narvasa & Co. have CODDLED
CROOKS like crony bank TRB, UCPB, and SBTC, and through said fake
resolutions that Narvasa has LIED or shown IGNORANCE of the LAW in
ruling that CONSIGNATION IS NECESSARY IN RIGHT OF REDEMPTION
(GR 83306). Through said despotic resolutions, NARVASA & CO. have
sanctioned UCPB/ACCRA's defiance of court orders and naked land
grabbing — What are these if not TYRANNY? (GR 84999).
Was it not tyranny for the SC to issue an Entry of Judgment without first
resolving the motion for reconsideration (G.R No. 82273). Was it not tyranny
and abuse of power for the SC to order a case dismissed against SC clerks
(CEBV-8679) and declare justices and said clerks "immune from suit" —
despite their failure to file any pleading? Were Narvasa & Co. not in fact
trampling on the rule of law and rules of court and DUE PROCESS in so
doing? (GR No. 82273).
TYRANTS will never admit that they are tyrants. But their acts speak for
themselves! NARVASA & ASSOC: ANSWER AND REFUTE THESE
SERIOUS CHARGES OR RESIGN!!
IMPEACH NARVASA
• ISSUING UNSIGNED, SWEEPING, UNCLEAR, UNCONSTITUTIONAL
"MINUTE RESOLUTIONS" VIOLATIVE OF SECS. 4(3), 14, ART. 8,
Constitution
• VIOLATING RULES OF COURT AND DUE PROCESS IN ORDERING
CASE AGAINST SC CLERKS (CEB-8679) DISMISSED DESPITE THE
LATTER'S FAILURE TO FILE PLEADINGS; HENCE IN DEFAULT
• CORRUPTION AND/OR GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW IN RULING,
THAT CONSIGNATION IS NECESSARY IN RIGHT OF REDEMPTION,
CONTRADICTING LAW AND SC'S OWN RULINGS — TO ALLOW CRONY
BANK TRB TO STEALS LOTS WORTH P3 MILLION
• CONDONING CRONY BANK UCPB'S DEFIANCE OF TWO LAWFUL
COURT ORDERS AND STEALING OF TITLE OF PROPERTY WORTH P4
MILLION
• BEING JUDGE AND ACCUSED AT THE SAME TIME AND PREDICTABLY
EXONERATING HIMSELF AND FELLOW CORRUPT JUSTICES
• DECLARING HIMSELF, JUSTICES, and even MERE CLERKS TO BE
IMMUNE FROM SUIT AND UN-ACCOUNTABLE TO THE PEOPLE and
REFUSING TO ANSWER AND REFUTE CHARGES AGAINST HIMSELF
JOAQUIN T. BORROMEO
Mabolo, Cebu City
Te. 7-56-49.
VI. IMMEDIATE ANTECEDENTS
OF PROCEEDINGS AT BAR
A. Letter of Cebu City Chapter
IBP, dated June 21, 1992
Copies of these circulars evidently found their way into the hands, among
others, of some members of the Cebu City Chapter of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines. Its President thereupon addressed a letter to this Court,
dated June 21, 1992, which (1) drew attention to one of them — that last
quoted, above — " . . . .sent to the IBP Cebu City Chapter and probably other
officers . . . in Cebu," described as containing "highly libelous and defamatory
remarks against the Supreme Court and the whole justice system"— and (2)
in behalf of the Chapter's "officers and members," strongly urged the Court
"to impose sanctions against Mr. Borromeo for his condemnable act."
B. Resolution of July 22, 1993
Acting thereon, the Court En Banc issued a Resolution on July 22, 1993,
requiring comment by Borromeo on the letter, notice of which was sent to
him by the Office of the Clerk of Court. The resolution pertinently reads as
follows:
xxx xxx xxx
The records of the Court disclose inter alia that as early as April 4, 1989, the
Acting Clerk of Court, Atty. Luzviminda D. Puno, wrote a four page letter to
Mr. Borromeo concerning G.R. No. 83306 (Joaquin T. Borromeo vs. Traders
Royal Bank [referred to by Borromeo in the "circular" adverted to by the
relator herein, the IBP Cebu City Chapter]) and two (2) other cases also filed
with the Court by Borromeo: G.R. No. 77248 (Joaquin T. Borromeo v.
Samson Lao and Mariano Logarta) and G.R. No. 84054 (Joaquin T.
Borromeo v. Hon. Mario Dizon and Tomas Tan), all resolved adversely to
him by different Divisions of the Court. In that letter Atty. Puno explained to
Borromeo very briefly the legal principles applicable to his cases and dealt
with the matters mentioned in his circular.
The records further disclose subsequent adverse rulings by the Court in
other cases instituted by Borromeo in this Court, i.e., G.R. No. 87897
(Joaquin T. Borromeo v. Court of Appeals, et al.) and No. 82273 (Joaquin T.
Borromeo v. Court of Appeals and Samson Lao), as well as the existence of
other communications made public by Borromeo reiterating the arguments
already passed upon by the court in his cases and condemning the court's
rejection of those arguments.
Acting on the letter dated June 21, 1993 of the Cebu City Chapter of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines thru its above named, President, and taking
account of the related facts on record, the Court Resolved:
1) to REQUIRE:
(a) the Clerk of Court (1) to DOCKET the matter at bar as a proceeding for
contempt against Joaquin T. Borromeo instituted at the relation of said Cebu
City Chapter, Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and (2) to SEND to the City
Sheriff, Cebu City, notice of this resolution and copies of the Chapter's letter
dated June 21, 1993 together with its annexes; and
(b) said City Sheriff of Cebu City to CAUSE PERSONAL SERVICE of said
notice of resolution and a copy of the Chapter's letter dated June 21, 1993,
together with its annexes, on Joaquin T. Borromeo at his address at Mabolo,
Cebu City; and
2) to ORDER said Joaquin T. Borromeo, within ten (10) days from receipt of
such notice and the IBP Chapter's letter of June 21, 1993 and its annexes, to
file a comment on the letter and its annexes as well as on the other matters
set forth in this resolution, serving copy thereof on the relator, the Cebu City
Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Palace of Justice Building,
Capitol, Cebu City.
SO ORDERED.
1. Atty. Puno's Letter of April 4, 1989
Clerk of Court Puno's letter to Borromeo of April 4, 1989, referred to in the
first paragraph of the resolution just mentioned, explained to Borromeo for
perhaps the second time, precisely the principles and established practice
relative to "minute resolutions" and notices thereof, treated of in several other
communications and resolutions sent to him by the Supreme Court, to wit:
the letter received by him on July 10, 1987, from Clerk of Court Julieta Y.
Carreon (of this Court's Third Division) (in relation to G.R No. 77243 39) the
letter to him of Clerk of Court (Second Division) Fermin J. Garma, dated May
19,
1989, 40 and three resolutions of this Court, notices of which were in due
course served on him, to wit: that dated July 31, 1989, in G.R. No.
87897; 41 that dated June 1, 1990 in G.R. No. 82274 (186 SCRA 1), 42 and
that dated June 11, 1994 in G. R. No. 112928. 43
C. Borromeo's Comment of August 27, 1993
In response to the Resolution of July 22, 1993, Borromeo filed a Comment
dated August 27, 1993 in which he alleged the following:
1) the resolution of July 22, 1993 (requiring comment) violates the
Constitution which requires "signatures and concurrence of majority of
members of the High Court;" hence, "a certified copy duly signed by Justices
is respectfully requested;"
2) the Chief Justice and other Members of the Court should inhibit
themselves "since they cannot be the Accused and Judge at the same time, .
. . (and) this case should be heard by an impartial and independent body;"
3) the letter of Atty. Legaspi "is not verified nor signed by members of said
(IBP Cebu Chapter) Board; . . . is vague, unspecific, and sweeping" because
failing to point out "what particular statements in the circular are allegedly
libelous and condemnable;" and does not appear that Atty. Legaspi has
authority to speak or file a complaint "in behalf of those accused in the
"libelous circular;"
4) in making the circular, he (Borromeo) "was exercising his rights of freedom
of speech, of expression, and to petition the government for redress of
grievances as guaranteed by the Constitution (Sec. 4, Art. III) and in
accordance with the accountability of public officials;" the circular merely
states the truth and asks for justice based on the facts and the
law; . . . it is not libelous nor disrespectful but rather to be commended and
encouraged; . . . Atty. Legaspi . . . should specify under oath which
statements are false and lies;
5) he "stands by the charges in his circular and is prepared to support them
with pertinent facts, evidence and law;" and it is "incumbent on the Hon.
Chief Justice and members of the High Court to either refute said charges or
dispense the justice that they are duty bound to dispense.
D. Resolution of September 30, 1993
After receipt of the comment, and desiring to accord Borromeo the fullest
opportunity to explain his side, and be reprsented by an attorney, the Court
promulgated the following Resolution on September 30, 1993, notice of
which was again served on him by the Office of the Clerk of Court.
. . . The return of service filed by Sheriff Jessie A. Belarmino, Office of the
Clerk of Court Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, dated August 26, 1993, and
the Comment of Joaquin Borromeo, dated August 27, 1993, on the letter of
President Manuel P. Legaspi of the relator dated June 21, 1993, are both
NOTED. After deliberating on the allegations of said Comment, the Court
Resolved to GRANT Joaquin T. Borromeo an additional period of fifteen (15)
days from notice hereof within which to engage the services or otherwise
seek the assistance of a lawyer and submit such further arguments in
addition to or in amplification of those set out in his Comment dated August
27, 1993, if he be so minded.
SO ORDERED.
E. Borromeo's Supplemental Comment
of October 15, 1992
Borromeo filed a "Supplemental Comment" dated October 15, 1992,
reiterating the arguments and allegations in his Comment of August 27,
1993, and setting forth "additional arguments and amplification to . . . (said)
Comment," viz.:
1) the IBP and Atty. Legaspi have failed "to specify and state under oath the
alleged 'libelous' remarks contained in the circular . . .; (they should) be
ordered to file a VERIFIED COMPLAINT . . .(failing in which, they should) be
cited in contempt of court for making false charges and wasting the precious
time of this Highest Court by filing a baseless complaint;
2) the allegations in their circular are not libelous nor disrespectful but "are
based on the TRUTH and the LAW", namely:
a) "minute resolutions" bereft of signatures and clear facts and laws are
patent violations of Secs. 4(32), 13, 14, Art. VIII of the Constitution;
b) there is no basis nor thruth to this Hon. Court's affirmation to the Appelate
Court's ruling that the undersigned "lost" his right of redemption price, since
no less than this Hon. Court has ruled in many rulings that CONSIGNATION
IS UNNECESSARY in right of redemption;
c) this Hon. Court has deplorably condoned crony banks TRB and UCPB's
frauds and defiance of court orders in G.R. Nos. 83306 and 878997 and
84999.
F. Borromeo's "Manifestation" of
November 26, 1993
Borromeo afterwards filed a "Manifestation" under date of November 26,
1993, adverting to "the failure of the IBP and Atty. Legaspi to substantiate his
charges under oath and the failure of the concerned Justices to refute the
charges in the alledged "libelous circular" and, construing these as "and
admission of the thruth in said circular," theorized that it is "incumbent on the
said Justices to rectify their grave as well as to dismiss Atty. Legaspi's
baseless and false charges."
VII. THE COURT CONCLUSIONS
A. Respondent's Liability
for Contempt of Court
Upon the indubitable facts on record, there can scarcely be any doubt of
Borromeo's guilt of contempt, for abuse of and interference with judicial rules
and processes, gross disrespect to courts and judges and improper conduct
directly impeding, obstructing and degrading the administration of
justice. 44 He has stubbornly litigated issues already declared to be without
merit, obstinately closing his eyes to the many rulings rendered adversely to
him in many suits and proceedings, rulings which had become final and
executory, obdurately and unreasonably insisting on the application of his
own individual version of the rules, founded on nothing more than his
personal (and quite erroneous) reading of the Constitution and the law; he
has insulted the judges and court officers, including the attorneys appearing
for his adversaries, needlessly overloaded the court dockets and sorely tried
the patience of the judges and court employees who have had to act on his
repetitious and largely unfounded complaints, pleadings and motions. He has
wasted the time of the courts, of his adversaries, of the judges and court
employees who have had the bad luck of having to act in one way or another
on his unmeritorious cases. More particularly, despite his attention having
been called many times to the egregious error of his theory that the so-called
"minute resolutions" of this Court should contain findings of fact and
conclusions of law, and should be signed or certified by the Justices
promulgating the same, 45 he has mulishly persisted in ventilating that self-
same theory in various proceedings, causing much loss of time, annoyance
and vexation to the courts, the court employees and parties involved.
1. Untenability of Proffered Defenses
The first defense that he proffers, that the Chief Justice and other Members
of the Court should inhibit themselves "since they cannot be the Accused
and Judge at the same time . . . (and) this case should be heard by an
impartial and independent body, is still another illustration of an entirely
unwarranted, arrogant and reprehensible assumption of a competence in the
field of the law: he again uses up the time of the Court needlessly by invoking
an argument long since declared and adjudged to be untenable. It is
axiomatic that the "power or duty of the court to institute a charge for
contempt against itself, without the intervention of the fiscal or prosecuting
officer, is essential to the preservation of its dignity and of the respect due it
from litigants, lawyers and the public. Were the intervention of the
prosecuting officer required and judges obliged to file complaints for
contempts against them before the prosecuting officer, in order to bring the
guilty to justice, courts would be inferior to prosecuting officers and impotent
to perform their functions with dispatch and absolute independence. The
institution of charges by the prosecuting officer is not necessary to hold
persons guilty of civil or criminal contempt amenable to trial and punishment
by the court. All that the law requires is that there be a charge in writing duly
filed in court and an opportunity to the person charged to be heard by himself
or counsel. The charge may be made by the fiscal, by the judge, or even by a
private person. . . ." 46
His claim — that the letter of Atty. Legaspi "is not verified nor signed by
members of said (IBP Cebu Chapter) Board; . . . is vague, unspecific, and
sweeping" because failing to point out what particular statements in the
circular are allegedly libelous and condemnable;" and it does not appear that
Atty. Legaspi has authority to speak or file a complaint "in behalf of those
accused in the 'libelous' circular" — is in the premises, plainly nothing but
superficial philosophizing, deserving no serious treatment.
Equally as superficial, and sophistical, is his other contention that in making
the allegations claimed to be contumacious, he "was exercising his rights of
freedom of speech, of expression, and to petition the government for redress
of grievances as guaranteed by the Constitution (Sec. 4, Art. III) and in
accordance with the accountablity of public officials." The constitutional rights
invoked by him afford no justification for repetitious litigation of the same
causes and issues, for insulting lawyers, judges, court employees; and other
persons, for abusing the processes and rules of the courts, wasting their
time, and bringing them into disrepute and disrespect.
B. Basic Principles Governing
the Judicial Function
The facts and issues involved in the proceeding at bench make necessary a
restatement of the principles governing finality of judgments and of the
paramount need to put an end to litigation at some point, and to lay down
definite postulates concerning what is perceived to be a growing predilection
on the part of lawyers and litigants — like Borromeo — to resort to
administrative prosecution (or institution of civil or criminal actions) as a
substitute for or supplement to the specific modes of appeal or review
provided by law from court judgments or orders.
1. Reason for courts; Judicial
Hierarchy
Courts exist in every civilized society for the settlement of controversies. In
every country there is a more or less established hierarchical organization of
courts, and a more or less comprehensive system of review of judgments
and final orders of lower courts.
The judicial system in this jurisdiction allows for several levels of
litigation, i.e., the presentation of evidence by the parties — a trial or hearing
in the first instance — as well as a review of the judgments of lower courts by
higher tribunals, generally by consideration anew and ventilation of the
factual and legal issues through briefs or memoranda. The procedure for
review is fixed by law, and is in the very nature of things, exclusive to the
courts.
2. Paramount Need to end
Litigation at Some Point
It is withal of the essence of the judicial function that at some point, litigation
must end. Hence, after the procedures and processes for lawsuits have been
undergone, and the modes of review set by law have been exhausted, or
terminated, no further ventilation of the same subject matter is allowed. To be
sure, there may be, on the part of the losing parties, continuing disagreement
with the verdict, and the conclusions therein embodied. This is of no moment,
indeed, is to be expected; but, it is not their will, but the Court's, which must
prevail; and, to repeat, public policy demands that at some definite time, the
issues must be laid to rest and the court's dispositions thereon accorded
absolute finality. 47 As observed by this Court in Rheem of the Philippines
v. Ferrer, a 1967 decision, 48 a party "may think highly of his intellectual
endowment. That is his privilege. And he may suffer frustration at what he
feels is others' lack of it. This is his misfortune. Some such frame of mind,
however, should not be allowed to harden into a belief that he may attack a
court's decision in words calculated to jettison the time-honored aphorism
that courts are the temples of right."
3. Judgments of Supreme Court
Not Reviewable
The sound, salutary and self-evident principle prevailing in this as in most
jurisdictions, is that judgments of the highest tribunal of the land may not be
reviewed by any other agency, branch, department, or official of
Government. Once the Supreme Court has spoken, there the matter must
rest. Its decision should not and cannot be appealed to or reviewed by any
other entity, much less reversed or modified on the ground that it is tainted by
error in its findings of fact or conclusions of law, flawed in its logic or
language, or otherwise erroneous in some other respect. 49 This, on the
indisputable and unshakable foundation of public policy, and constitutional
and traditional principle.
In an extended Resolution promulgated on March 12, 1987 in In
Re: Wenceslao Laureta — involving an attempt by a lawyer to prosecute
before the Tanod bayan "members of the First Division of this Court
collectively with having knowingly and deliberately rendered an 'unjust
extended minute Resolution' with deliberate bad faith in violation of Article
204 of the Revised penal Code ". . . and for deliberatly causing "undue injury"
to respondent . . . and her co-heirs because of the "unjust Resolution"
promulgated, in violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act . . . —
the following pronouncements were made in reaffirmation of established
doctrine: 50
. . . As aptly declared in the Chief Justice's Statement of December 24, 1986,
which the Court hereby adopts in toto, "(I)t is elementary that the Supreme
Court is supreme — the third great department of government entrusted
exclusively with the judicial power to adjudicate with finality all justiciable
disputes, public and private. No other department or agency may pass upon
its judgments or declare them "unjust." It is elementary that "(A)s has ever
been stressed since the early case of Arnedo vs.Llorente (18 Phil. 257, 263
[1911]) "controlling and irresistible reasons of public policy and of sound
practice in the courts demand that at the risk of occasional error, judgments
of courts determining controversies submitted to them should become final at
some definite time fixed by law, or by a rule of practice recognized by law, so
as to be thereafter beyond the control even of the court which rendered them
for the purpose of correcting errors of fact or of law, into which, in the opinion
of the court it may have fallen. The very purpose for which the courts are
organized is to put an end to controversy, to decide the questions submitted
to the litigants, and to determine the respective rights of the parties. (Luzon
Brokerage Co., Inc. vs. Maritime Bldg., Co., Inc., 86 SCRA 305, 316-317)
xxx xxx xxx
Indeed, resolutions of the Supreme Court as a collegiate court, whether
an en banc or division, speak for themselves and are entitled to full faith and
credence and are beyond investigation or inquiry under the same principle of
conclusiveness of enrolled bills of the legislature. (U.S. vs. Pons, 34 Phil.
729; Gardiner, et al. vs. Paredes, et al., 61 Phil. 118; Mabanag vs. Lopez
Vito, 78 Phil. 1) The Supreme Court's pronouncement of the doctrine that "(I)t
is well settled that the enrolled bill . . . is conclusive upon the courts as
regards the tenor of the measure passed by Congress and approved by the
President. If there has been any mistake in the printing of the bill before it
was certified by the officers of Congress and approved by the Executive [as
claimed by petitioner-importer who unsuccessfully sought refund of margin
fees] — on which we cannot speculate, without jeopardizing the principle of
separation of powers and undermining one of the cornerstones of our
democractic system — the remedy is by amendment or curative legislation,
not by judicial decree" is fully and reciprocally applicable to Supreme Court
orders, resolutions and decisions, mutatis mutandis. (Casco Phil. Chemical
Co., Inc. vs. Gimenez, 7 SCRA 347, 350. (Citing Primicias vs. Paredes, 61
Phil. 118, 120; Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1; Macias vs. Comelec, 3
SCRA 1).
The Court has consistently stressed that the "doctrine of separation of
powers calls for the executive, legislative and judicial departments being left
alone to discharge their duties as they see fit" (Tan vs. Macapagal, 43 SCRA
677). It has thus maintained in the same way that the judiciary has a right to
expect that neither the President nor Congress would cast doubt on the
mainspring of its orders or decisions, it should refrain from speculating as to
alleged hidden forces at work that could have impelled either coordinate
branch into acting the way it did. The concept of separation of powers
presupposes mutual respect by and between the three departments of the
government. (Tecson vs. Salas, 34 SCRA 275, 286-287).
4. Final and Executory Judgments of
Lower Courts Not Reviewable
Even by Supreme Court
In respect of Courts below the Supreme Court, the ordinary remedies
available under law to a party who is adversely affected by their decisions or
orders are a motion for new trial (or reconsideration) under Rule 37, and an
appeal to either the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court, depending on
whether questions of both fact and law, or of law only, are raised, in
accordance with fixed and familiar rules and conformably with the hierarchy
of courts. 51 Exceptionally, a review of a ruling or act of a court on the ground
that it was rendered without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion, may be had through the special civil action
of certiorari or prohibition pursuant to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
However, should judgments of lower courts — which may normally be
subject to review by higher tribunals — become final and executory before,
or without, exhaustion of all recourse of appeal, they, too, become inviolable,
impervious to modification. They may, then, no longer be reviewed, or in
anyway modified directly or indirectly, by a higher court, not even by the
Supreme Court, much less by any other official, branch or department of
Government. 52
C. Administrative Civil or Criminal Action
against Judge. Not Substitute for Appeal;
Proscribed by Law and Logic
Now, the Court takes judicial notice of the fact that there has been of late a
regrettable increase in the resort to administrative prosecution — or the
institution of a civil or criminal action — as a substitute for or supplement to
appeal. Whether intended or not, such a resort to these remedies operates
as a form of threat or intimidation to coerce judges into timorous surrender of
their prerogatives, or a reluctance to exercise them. With rising frequency,
administrative complaints are being presented to the Office of the Court
Administrator; criminal complaints are being filed with the Office of the
Ombudsman or the public prosecutor's office; civil actions for recovery of
damages commenced in the Regional Trial Courts against trial judges, and
justices of the Court of Appeals and even of the Supreme Court.
1. Common Basis of Complaints
Against Judges
Many of these complaints set forth a common indictment: that the respondent
Judges or Justices rendered manifestly unjust judgments or interlocutory
orders 53 — i.e., judgments or orders which are allegedly not in accord with
the evidence, or with law or jurisprudence, or are tainted by grave abuse of
discretion — thereby causing injustice, and actionable and compensable
injury to the complainants (invariably losing litigants). Resolution of
complaints of this sort quite obviously entails a common requirement for the
fiscal, the Ombudsman or the Trial Court: a review of the decision or order of
the respondent Judge or Justice to determine its correctness or
erroneousness, as basic premise for a pronouncement of liability.
2. Exclusivity of Specific Procedures for
Correction of Judgments and Orders
The question then, is whether or not these complaints are proper; whether or
not in lieu of the prescribed recourses for appeal or review of judgments and
orders of courts, a party may file an administrative or criminal complaint
against the judge for rendition of an unjust judgment, or, having opted for
appeal, may nonetheless simultaneously seek also such administrative or
criminal remedies.
Given the nature of the judicial function, the power vested by the Constitution
in the Supreme Court and the lower courts established by law, the question
submits to only one answer: the administrative or criminal remedies are
neither alternative nor cumulative to judicial review where such review is
available, and must wait on the result thereof.
Simple reflection will make this proposition amply clear, and demonstrate that
any contrary postulation can have only intolerable legal implications. Allowing
a party who feels aggrieved by a judicial order or decision not yet final and
executory to mount an administrative, civil or criminal prosecution for unjust
judgment against the issuing judge would, at a minimum and as an
indispensable first step, confer the prosecutor (or Ombudsman) with an
incongruous function pertaining, not to him, but to the courts: the
determination of whether the questioned disposition is erroneous in its
findings of fact or conclusions of law, or both. If he does proceed despite that
impediment, whatever determination he makes could well set off a
proliferation of administrative or criminal litigation, a possibility here after
more fully explored.
Such actions are impermissible and cannot prosper. It is not, as already
pointed out, within the power of public prosecutors, or the Ombudsman or his
deputies, directly or vicariously, to review judgments or final orders or
resolutions of the Courts of the land. The power of review — by appeal or
special civil action — is not only lodged exclusively in the Courts themselves
but must be exercised in accordance with a well-defined and long
established hierarchy, and long-standing processes and procedures. No
other review is allowed; otherwise litigation would be interminable, and
vexatiously repetitive.
These principles were stressed in In Re: Wenceslao Laureta, supra. 54
Respondents should know that the provisions of Article 204 of the Revised
Penal Code as to "rendering knowingly unjust judgment," refer to an
individual judge who does so "in any case submitted to him for decision" and
even then, it is not the prosecutor who would pass judgment on the
"unjustness" of the decision rendered by him but the proper appellate court
with jurisdiction to review the same, either the Court of Appeals and/or the
Supreme Court. Respondents should likewise know that said penal article
has no application to the members of a collegiate court such as this Court or
its Divisions who reach their conclusions in consultation and accordingly
render their collective judgment after due deliberation. It also follows,
consequently, that a charge of violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act on the ground that such a collective decision is "unjust" cannot
prosper.
xxx xxx xxx
To subject to the threat and ordeal of investigation and prosecution, a judge,
more so a member of the Supreme Court for official acts done by him in good
faith and in the regular exercise of official duty and judicial functions is to
subvert and undermine that very independence of the judiciary, and
subordinate the judiciary to the executive. "For it is a general principle of the
highest importance to the proper administration of justice that a judicial
officer in exercising the authority vested in him, shall be free to act upon his
own convictions, without apprehension of personal consequences to himself.
Liability to answer to everyone who might feel himself aggrieved by the
action of the judge would be inconsistent with the possession of this freedom,
and would destroy that independence without which no judiciary can be
either respectable or useful." (Bradley vs. Fisher, 80 U. S. 335).
xxx xxx xxx
To allow litigants to go beyond the Court's resolution and claim that the
members acted "with deliberate bad faith" and rendered an "unjust
resolution" in disregard or violation of the duty of their high office to act upon
their own independent consideration and judgment of the matter at hand
would be to destroy the authenticity, integrity and conclusiveness of such
collegiate acts and resolutions and to disregard utterly the presumption of
regular performance of official duty. To allow such collateral attack would
destroy the separation of powers and undermine the role of the Supreme
Court as the final arbiter of all justiciable disputes.
Dissatisfied litigants and/or their counsels cannot without violating the
separation of powers mandated by the Constitution relitigate in another forum
the final judgment of this Court on legal issues submitted by them and their
adversaries for final determination to and by the Supreme Court and which
fall within the judicial power to determine and adjudicate exclusively vested
by the Constitution in the Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as may
be established by law.
This is true, too, as regards judgments, otherwise appealable, which have
become final and executory. Such judgments, being no longer reviewable by
higher tribunals, are certainly not reviewable by any other body or authority.
3. Only Courts Authorized, under Fixed
Rules to Declare Judgments or Orders
Erroneous or Unjust
To belabor the obvious, the determination of whether or not a judgement or
order is unjust — or was (or was not) rendered within the scope of the
issuing judge's authority, or that the judge had exceeded his jurisdiction and
powers or maliciously delayed the disposition of a case — is an essentially
judicial function, lodged by existing law and immemorial practice in a
hierarchy of courts and ultimately in the highest court of the land. To repeat,
no other entity or official of the Government, not the prosecution or
investigation service or any other branch; nor any functionary thereof, has
competence to review a judicial order or decision — whether final and
executory or not — and pronounce it erroneous so as to lay the basis for a
criminal or administrative complaint for rendering an unjust judgment or
order. That prerogative belongs to the courts alone.
4. Contrary Rule Results in Circuitousness
and Leads to Absurd Consequences
Pragmatic considerations also preclude prosecution for supposed rendition of
unjust judgments or interlocutory orders of the type above described, which,
at bottom, consist simply of the accusation that the decisions or interlocutory
orders are seriously wrong in their conclusions of fact or of law, or are tainted
by grave abuse of discretion — as distinguished from accusations of
corruption, or immorality, or other wrongdoing. To allow institution of such
proceedings would not only be legally improper, it would also result in a futile
and circuitous exercise, and lead to absurd consequences.
Assume that a case goes through the whole gamut of review in the judicial
hierarchy; i.e., a judgment is rendered by a municipal trial court; it is reviewed
and affirmed by the proper Regional Trial Court; the latter's judgment is
appealed to and in due course affirmed by the Court of Appeals; and finally,
the appellate court's decision is brought up to and affirmed by the Supreme
Court. The prosecution of the municipal trial court judge who rendered the
original decision (for knowingly rendering a manifestly unjust judgment)
would appear to be out of the question; it would mean that the Office of the
Ombudsman or of the public prosecutor would have to find, at the preliminary
investigation, not only that the judge's decision was wrong and unjust, but by
necessary implication that the decisions or orders of the Regional Trial Court
Judge, as well as the Justices of the Court of Appeals and the Supreme
Court who affirmed the original judgment were also all wrong and unjust —
most certainly an act of supreme arrogance and very evident supererogation.
Pursuing the proposition further, assuming that the public prosecutor or
Ombudsman should nevertheless opt to undertake a review of the decision in
question — despite its having been affirmed at all three (3) appellate levels
— and thereafter, disagreeing with the verdict of all four (4) courts, file an
information in the Regional Trial Court against the Municipal Trial Court
Judge, the fate of such an indictment at the hands of the Sandiganbayan or
the Regional Trial Court would be fairly predictable.
Even if for some reason the Municipal Trial Court Judge is convicted by the
Sandiganbayan or a Regional Trial Court, the appeal before the Supreme
Court or the Court of Appeals would have an inevitable result: given the
antecedents, the verdict of conviction would be set aside and the correctness
of the judgment in question, already passed upon and finally resolved by the
same appellate courts, would necessarily be sustained.
Moreover, in such a scenario, nothing would prevent the Municipal Trial
Judge, in his turn, from filing a criminal action against the Sandiganbayan
Justices, or the Regional Trial Court Judge who should convict him of the
offense, for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment, or against the Justices
of the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court who should affirm his
conviction.
The situation is ridiculous, however the circumstances of the case may be
modified, and regardless of whether it is a civil, criminal or administrative
proceeding that is availed of as the vehicle to prosecute the judge for
supposedly rendering an unjust decision or order.
5. Primordial Requisites for Administrative
Criminal Prosecution
This is not to say that it is not possible at all to prosecute judges for this
impropriety, of rendering an unjust judgment or interlocutory order; but,
taking account of all the foregoing considerations, the indispensable
requisites are that there be a final declaration by a competent court in some
appropriate proceeding of the manifestly unjust character of the challenged
judgment or order, and there be also evidence of malice or bad faith,
ignorance or inexcusable negligence, on the part of the judge in rendering
said judgement or order. That final declaration is ordinarily contained in the
judgment rendered in the appellate proceedings in which the decision of the
trial court in the civil or criminal action in question is challenged.
What immediately comes to mind in this connection is a decision of acquittal
or dismissal in a criminal action, as to which — the same being unappealable
— it would be unreasonable to deny the State or the victim of the crime (or
even public-spirited citizens) the opportunity to put to the test of proof such
charges as they might see fit to press that it was unjustly rendered, with
malice or by deliberate design, through inexcusable ignorance or negligence,
etc. Even in this case, the essential requisite is that there be an authoritative
judicial pronouncement of the manifestly unjust character of the judgment or
order in question. Such a pronouncement may result from either (a) an action
of certiorari or prohibition in a higher court impugning the validity of the;
judgment, as having been rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction, or
with grave abuse of discretion; e.g., there has been a denial of due process
to the prosecution; or (b) if this be not proper, an administrative proceeding in
the Supreme Court against the judge precisely for promulgating an unjust
judgment or order. Until and unless there is such a final,
authoritative judicial declaration that the decision or order in question is
"unjust," no civil or criminal action against the judge concerned is legally
possible or should be entertained, for want of an indispensable requisite.
D. Judges Must be Free from
Influence or Pressure
Judges must be free to judge, without pressure or influence from external
forces or factors. They should not be subject to intimidation, the fear of civil,
criminal or administrative sanctions for acts they may do and dispositions
they may make in the performance of their duties and functions. Hence it is
sound rule, which must be recognized independently of statute, that judges
are not generally liable for acts done within the scope of their jurisdiction and
in good faith.
This Court has repeatedly and uniformly ruled that a judge may not be held
administratively accountable for every erroneous order or decision he
renders. 55 To hold otherwise would be nothing short of harassment and
would make his position doubly unbearable, for no one called upon to try the
facts or interpret the law in the process of administering justice can be
infallible in his judgment. 56 The error must be gross or patent, deliberate and
malicious, or incurred with evident bad faith; 57 it is only in these cases that
administrative sanctions are called for as an imperative duty of the Supreme
Court.
As far as civil or criminal liability is concerned, existing doctrine is that
"judges of superior and general jurisdiction are not liable to respond in civil
action for damages for what they may do in the exercise of their judicial
functions when acting within their legal powers and jurisdiction." 58 Based on
Section 9, Act No. 190, 59 the doctrine is still good law, not inconsistent with
any subsequent legislative issuance or court rule: "No judge, justice of the
peace or assessor shall be liable to a civil action for the recovery of damages
by reason of any judicial action or judgment rendered by him in good faith,
and within the limits of his legal powers and jurisdiction."
Exception to this general rule is found in Article 32 of the Civil Code,
providing that any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who
directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or
impairs any of the enumerated rights and liberties of another person — which
rights are the same as those guaranteed in the Bill of Rights (Article III of the
Constitution); — shall be liable to the latter for damages. However, such
liability is not demandable from a judge unless his act or omission constitutes
a violation of the Penal Code or other penal statute. But again, to the extent
that the offenses therein described have "unjust judgment or "unjust
interlocutory order" for an essential element, it need only be reiterated that
prosecution of a judge for any of them is subject to the caveat already
mentioned: that such prosecution cannot be initiated, much less maintained,
unless there be a final judicial pronouncement of the unjust character of the
decision or order in issue.
E. Afterword
Considering the foregoing antecedents and long standing doctrines, it may
well be asked why it took no less than sixteen (16) years and some fifty (50)
grossly unfounded cases lodged by respondent Borromeo in the different
rungs of the Judiciary before this Court decided to take the present
administrative measure. The imposition on the time of the courts and the
unnecessary work occasioned by respondent's crass adventurism are self-
evident and require no further elaboration. If the Court, however, bore with
him with Jobian patience, it was in the hope that the repeated rebuffs he 2 SEE Sub-Head I, A, 7, Infra.
suffered, with the attendant lectures on the error of his ways, would
somehow seep into his understanding and deter him from further forays
along his misguided path. After all, as has repeatedly been declared, the 3 Per Judge Benigno G. Gaviola, Branch 9, RTC, Cebu.
power of contempt is exercised on the preservative and not the vindictive
principle. Unfortunately the Court's forbearance had no effect on him. 4 Ramirez, J., ponente, with whom concurred Francisco (Cezar) and
Vailoces, JJ.
Instead, the continued leniency and tolerance extended to him were read as
signs of weakness and impotence. Worse, respondent's irresponsible 5 Judge Renato C. Dacudao, presiding.
audacity appears to have influenced and emboldened others to just as
flamboyantly embark on their own groundless and insulting proceedings
against the courts, born of affected bravado or sheer egocentrism, to the 6 Judge Celso M. Gimenez, Branch 5.
extent of even involving the legislative and executive departments, the
Ombudsman included, in their assaults against the Judiciary in pursuit of 7 Guingona, J., ponente, with whom concurred Javellana and Imperial, JJ.
personal agendas. But all things, good or bad, must come to an end, and it is
time for the Court to now draw the line, with more promptitude, between
reasoned dissent and self-seeking pretense. The Court accordingly serves 8 Branch 24, Hon. Priscila S. Agana, presiding.
notice to those with the same conceit or delusions that it will henceforth deal
with them, decisively and fairly, with a firm and even hand, and resolutely 9 Per Judge Jose P. Burgos, Branch 17.
impose such punitive sanctions as may be appropriate to maintain the
integrity and independence of the judicial institutions of the country.
10 Per Judge (now CA Associate Justice) Godardo Jacinto.
WHEREFORE, Joaquin T. Borromeo is found and declared GUILTY of
constructive contempt repeatedly committed over time, despite warnings and 11 SEE Sub-Head I, A, 1, supra.
instructions given to him, and to the end that he may ponder his serious
errors and grave misconduct and learn due respect for the Courts and their
12 SEE Sub-Head I, A, 2, supra.
authority, he is hereby sentenced to serve a term of imprisonment of TEN
(10) DAYS in the City Jail of Cebu City and to pay a fine of ONE THOUSAND
PESOS (P1,000.00). He is warned that a repetition of any of the offenses of 13 SEE Sub-Head I, supra.
which he is herein found guilty, or any similar or other offense against courts,
judges or court employees, will merit further and more serious sanctions.
14 Decision dated May 21, 1993: Austria-Martinez, J., ponente, with whom
concurred Puno and Ramirez, JJ.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
15 As every lawyer knows, the Clerk of Court of a Division or of the Court En
Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Banc is, of course, not a "mere clerk," but the highest administrative officer in
Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza and Francisco, JJ., the Division or Court, next only to the Justices.
concur.
16 Sub-Head II, A, 1, infra.
Puno, J., took no part.
17 Sub-Head II, A, 4, infra Sub-Heads VI, B, 1, and II, A, 1,c, infra.
Footnotes
18 Sub-Heads VI, B, 1, and II, A, 1, c, infra, respectively.
1 Barrera v. Barrera, 34 SCRA 98, 106; Peo v. Catolico, 38 SCRA 389, 407.
19 Sub-Head II, A, 3, infra. 34 Judge Jacinto has, to repeat, since been promoted to the Court of
Appeals.
20 See sub-head I, A, 3, supra —Because TRB consolidated its ownership
over the foreclosed immovables during the pendency of Civil Case No. R- 35 Rollo, Vol. VII, p. 115.
22506, Borromeo filed criminal complaints in the Office of the City Prosecutor
of Cebu against the bank officers and lawyers, which were however, and
36 SEE Sub-Head II, A, 5, supra.
quite correctly, given short shrift by that Office.

37 During the entire period that the administrative case was pending (1990 to
21 Per 3rd Assistant Fiscal Enriqueta Roquillano-Belarmino.
1994), Borromeo wrote an unceasing stream of letters, leaflets, flyers to IBP,
harshly critical of the courts and the lawyers who had in one way or-another
22 See sub-head I, A, 1, supra. taken measures adverse to him. One of the last was an "OPEN LETTER to
IBP Prexy Manuel Legaspi" dated April 19, 1994.
23 See sub-head I, supra.
38 There are at least ten (10) other such."circulars, flyers, or letters in the
record, all amounting more or less the same errors and defamatory
24 By resolution of Fiscal Rodulfo T. Ugsal, approved by City Fiscal Jufelinito
imputations.
R. Pareja.

39 Sub-Head II; A, 1, infra.

25 Per Investigator Mario E. Camomot, recommended for approval by
Director IV V. V. Varela, and approved by Juan M. Hagad, Deputy
Ombudsman, Visayas. 40 Sub-Heads VI, B, 1, and II, A, 1 c, infra, respectively.

26 In the third paragraph of this opinion. 41 Sub-Head II, A, 3, infra.

27 Like the letter written to Borromeo, dated July 10, 1987, Sub-head A, 1, 42 Sub-Head II, A, 1, a, infra.
5, supra.
43 Sub-Head I, A, 7, supra.
28 Rollo G.R. 82273.
44 Rule 71, Sec, (c) and (d), Rules of Court.
29 This concerned a fourth bank, the Philippine Bank of Communications.
45 SEE Sub-head II, A, 1, a, supra.
30 Sub-head II, A ,3, supra.
46 Peo v. Venturanza, et al., 98 Phil. 211, cited in Gavieres v. Falcis, 193
31 Written by Felicito C. Latoja, Asso. Graft Investigation Officer II, and SCRA 649, 660 (1991); see also Fernandez v. Hon. Bello, 107 Phil. 1140.
approved by Juan M. Hagad, DOMB.
47 Garbo v. Court of Appeals, 226 SCRA 250, G.R. No. 100474, September
32 SEE Sub-Head II, A, 1, supra. 10, 1993; GSIS v. Gines, 219 SCRA 724, G.R. No. 85273, March 9, 1993;
Gesulgon v. NLRC, 219 SCRA 561, G.R. No. 90349, March 5, 1993;
Paramount Insurance Corporation v. Japson, 211 SCRA 879, G.R. No.
33 SEE also sub-head II, A, 2, supra.
68073, July 29, 1992; Cachola v. CA, 208 SCRA 496, G.R. No. 97822, May
7, 1992; Enriquez v. CA, 202 SCRA 487, G.R. No. 83720, October 4, 1991;
Alvendia v. IAC, 181 SCRA 252, G.R. No. 72138, January 22, 1990;
Turqueza v. Hernando, 97 SCRA 483, G.R. No. L-51626, April 30, 1980; Lee
Bun Ting v. Aligaen, 76 SCRA 416, G.R. No. L-30523, April 22, 1977.
48 20 SCRA 441, 444.
53 Articles 204-206 of the Revised Penal Code define and penalize offenses
which have "unjust judgment" or "unjust interlocutory order" for an essential
element.
54 148 SCRA 283, 418, 419, 420-42155 Rodrigo v. Quijano, etc., 79 SCRA
10 (Sept. 9, 1977).

49 Against judgments of the Supreme Court since obviously no appeal to a 56 Lopez v. Corpus, 78 SCRA 374 (Alug. 31, 1977); Pilipinas Bank v. Tirona-
higher court or authority is possible, the only remedies are those set forth in Liwag, 190 SCRA 834 (Oct. 18, 1990).
the Rules of Court, particularly Rule 56 in relation to Rules 52 and 53, with
regard to civil cases and proceedings, and Rule 125 in relation to Rule 124,
in respect of criminal cases. SEE Calalang v. Register of Deeds, 208 SCRA 57 Quizon v Baltazar, Jr., 65 SCRA 293 (July 25, 1975).
215, G.R. No. 76265, April 22, 1992; Tan v. Court of Appeals 199 SCRA 212
G.R. No. 97238, July 15, 1991; Church Assistance Program v. Sibulo, 171 58 Alzua, et. al v. Johnson, 21 Phil. 308, 326.
SCRA 408 G.R. No. 76552, March 21, 1989; Ver v. Quetulio, 163 SCRA 80,
G. R. No. 77526, June 29, 1988 Ang Ping v. RTC of Manila, 154 SCRA 77,
G.R. No. 75860, September 17, 1987; Vir-Jen Shipping and Marine Services, 59 The old Code of Civil Procedure.
Inc. v. NLRC, 125 SCRA 577, G.R. Nos. L-58011-2, November 18. 1983;
Tugade v. CA 83 SCRA 226; Barrera v. Barrera, 34 SCRA 98, G.R. No. L-
31589, July 31, 1970; Albert v. CFI, 23 SCRA 948, G.R. No L-23636, May 29
1968; Shoji v. Harvey, 43 Phil. 333(1922); SEE also Concurring Opinion of
Gutierrez J. in Enrile v. Salazar, 186 SCRA 217, G.R. Nos. 92163 and
92164, June 5, 1990.

50 148 SCRA 382, 417-418.

51 Against a final and executory judgment, the extraordnary, equitable

remedy of relief from judgment under Rule 38 may be availed of, or in
extreme situations, an action to annul the judgment on the ground of extrinsic
fraud.

52 Miranda v. CA, 141 SCRA 302, G.R. No. L-59370, February 11, 1986,
citing Malia v. IAC, 138 SCRA 116, G.R. No. L-66395, August 7, 1985;
Castillo v. Donato, 137 SCRA 210, G.R. No. L-70230, June 24, 1985; Bethel
Temple, Inc. v. General Council of Assemblies of God, Inc., 136 SCRA 203,
G.R. No.
L-35563, April 30, 1985; Insular Bank of Asia and America Employees' Union
(IBAAEU) v. Inciong, 132 SCRA 663, G.R. No. L-52415, October 23, 1984
and the cases cited therein pertaining to "immutability of judgments;" Heirs of
Pedro Guminpin v. CA, 120 SCRA 687, G.R. No. L-34220, February 21,
1983; Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Visayan Electric Co., 19 SCRA
696, G.R. No. L-24921, March 31, 1967; Daquis v. Bustos, 94 Phil. 913;
Sawit v. Rodas, 73 Phil. 310.