Ursal v.

CTA, 101 Phil 209 (1957)

The issue in this case is whether the assessor had the personality to bring the matter before the
CTA.

The law provides, the assessor had no personality to resort to the Court of Tax Appeals. The
rulings of the Board of Assessment Appeals did not "adversely affect" him. At most it was the City
of Cebu 1 that had been adversely affected in the sense that it could not thereafter collect higher
realty taxes from, the above-mentioned property owners. His opinion, it is true had been
overruled; but the overruling inflicted no material damage upon him or his office. And the Court
of Tax Appeals was not created to decide mere conflicts of opinion between administrative officers
or agencies.

In this case, Genaro Ursal as City Assessor of Cebu challenges the correctness of the order of the
Court of Tax Appeals dismissing Ms appeals to that body from two rulings of the Cebu Board of
Assessment Appeals.

The record shows that said city assessors in the exercise of his powers assessed for taxation
certain real properties of Consuelo Noel and Jesusa Samson in the City of Cebu, and that upon
protest of the taxpayers, the Gebu Board of Assessment Appeals reduced the assessments. It also
shows he took the matter to the Court of Tax Appeals insisting on his valuation; but said Court
refused to entertain the appeal saying it was late, and, besides. The assessor had no personality to
bring the matter before it under section 11 of Republic Act No. 1125, which reads as follows:

"SEC. 11. Who may appeal effect of appeal. Any person, association or corporation adversely
affected by a. decision or ruling of the Collector of Internal Revenue, the Collector of Customs or
any provincial or city Board of Assessment Appeals may file an appeal in the Court of Tax Appeals
within thirty days after the receipt of such decision or ruling."

Therefore, the challenged ruling is affirmed.

Acting Collecor v. CTA, 102 Phil 244 (1958)

The issue in this case is whether the Collector of Customs, in his official capacity, can institute an
appeal from a decision of the Commissioner of Customs of the Court of Tax Appeals, even
granting that he (the Collector) was directed to do so by the Secretary of Finance.

The law provides, Republic Act No. 1125, which was approved on June 16, 1954, became very
specific when it gave an enumeration of those who may appeal from a decision or ruling of the
Collector of Internal Revenue, the Commissioner of Customs or Board of Assessment Appeals.
Under this law, the right to appeal from decisions or rulings of said officials is allowed only to
persons, associations or corporations adversely affected by the same, and as well knowing the
notation of the legal maxim "inclusio unius est exclusio alterius", the Government is certainly not
one of them.
In virtue of the foregoing conclusions, i.e., that the Court of Tax Appeals has no jurisdiction to
entertain the appeal of the Acting Collector of Customs in this matter and of the procedural defect
just pointed out, there is no need for us to pass upon the merits of the question regarding the
nature of the article contained in the issue of the magazine "Pageant" objected to.

In this case, in October, 1953, The Philippine Education Co., Inc., imported by mail from the
Hillman Periodicals, Inc. of New York, New York U.S.A., 1,463 copies of the October, 1953, issue
of the magazine "Pageant" which carried on pages 16-25 thereof an article by one Laura Berquist
entitled "Check Your Sex-Life Against the New Kinsey Report". After hearing upon the
recommendation of the Board of Censors of the Bureau of Customs, herein petitioner Collector of
Customs rendered decision dated March 4, 1954, Manila Seizure Identification Case No. 1307,
holding that the article in question appearing in said issue of the "Pageant" magazine, which
contained quotations and excerpts from the treatise of Dr. Alfred Kinsey, "The Sexual Behavior of
the Human Female", violated the provisions of Section 3-(b) of the Philippine Tariff Act of 1909
which prohibits the entry of obscene and indecent reading materials in the Philippines and
consequently ordered the seizure, forfeiture and burning of the 1,463 copies of the magazine. The
importer of the seized article, Philippine Education Co., Inc., appealed the decision in due time to
the Commissioner of Customs in conformity with the procedure established by Section 1380 of
the Administrative Code, and on August 28, 1954, the Commissioner rendered judgment
reversing the Collector of Customs' view by holding that the magazine "Pageant" did not contain
obscene or indecent article. The Collector of Customs was, therefore, ordered to release the
magazine covered by Manila Seizure Identification No. 1307 to the claimant Philippine Education
Co., Inc., Upon receipt of a copy of the respondent Commissioner's decision, the Secretary of
Finance directed said official to transmit the original record of the seizure case to the Court of Tax
Appeals for review which directive was complied with by the Commissioner on September 15,
1954. On September 24, 1954, the Court of Tax Appeals returned to records to the Commissioner
of Customs informing him that the under Republic Act No. 1125, said Court is not empowered nor
under legal obligation to review motu proprio decisions of the Collector of Internal Revenue,
Commissioner of Customs or the provincial or city Boards of Assessment Appeals, unlike the
defunct Board of Tax Appeals which was conferred that prerogative. It was further explained by
said Court that jurisdiction to review on appeal decisions of the aforementioned officials can only
be acquired by the Court upon the filing of a formal petition for review within the reglementary
period of the person, association or corporation adversely affected by the decision sought to be
reviewed.

On September 27, 1954, the Acting Collector of Customs filed a notice of appeal from the decision
of the Commissioner of Customs to the Court of Tax Appeals, allegedly in accordance with the
provisions of Section 11 of Republic Act. No. 1125 in resolution to Section 7 (2) of the same Act.

Therefore, the petition is dismissed.

Lozada v. Commission on Elections, 120 SCRA 337 (1983)

The issue in this case is whether or not the SC can compel COMELEC to hold a special election to
fill vacancies in the legislature.
The law provides, No. The SC’s jurisdiction over the COMELEC is only to review by certiorari the
latter’s decision, orders or rulings. This is as clearly provided in Article XII-C, Section 11 of the
New Constitution which reads:
Any decision, order, or ruling of the Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on
certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from his receipt of a copy thereof

There is in this case no decision, order or ruling of the COMELEC which is sought to be reviewed
by this Court under its certiorari jurisdiction as provided for in the aforequoted provision, which
is the only known provision conferring jurisdiction or authority on the Supreme Court over the
COMELEC.
It is obvious that the holding of special elections in several regional districts where vacancies
exist, would entail huge expenditure of money. Only the Batasang Pambansa (BP) can make the
necessary appropriation for the purpose, and this power of the BP may neither be subject to
mandamus by the courts much less may COMELEC compel the BP to exercise its power of
appropriation. From the role BP has to play in the holding of special elections, which is to
appropriate the funds for the expenses thereof, it would seem that the initiative on the matter
must come from the BP, not the COMELEC, even when the vacancies would occur in the regular
not IBP. The power to appropriate is the sole and exclusive prerogative of the legislative body, the
exercise of which may not be compelled through a petition for mandamus. What is more, the
provision of Section 5(2), Article VIII of the Constitution was intended to apply to vacancies in the
regular National Assembly, now BP, not to the IBP.

In this case, Jose Mari Eulalio Lozada together with Romeo Igot filed a petition for mandamus
compelling the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to hold an election to fill the vacancies in
the Interim Batasang Pambansa (IBP). They anchor their contention on Section 5 (2), Art. VIII of
the 1973 Constitution which provides:
In case a vacancy arises in the Batasang Pambansa eighteen months or more before a regular
election, the Commission on Election shall call a special election to be held within sixty (60) days
after the vacancy occurs to elect the Member to serve the unexpired term.
COMELEC opposed the petition alleging that 1) petitioners lack standing to file the instant
petition for they are not the proper parties to institute the action; 2) the Supreme Court has no
jurisdiction to entertain the petition; and 3) Section 5(2), Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution
does not apply to the Interim Batasan Pambansa.
Therefore, SC cannot compel COMELEC to hold a special election to fill vacancies in the
legislature.

• Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., 224 SCRA 792 (1993)

The issue in this case is whether or not the petitioners have the right to bring action to the judicial
power of the Court.

The law provides that the petitioners have the right to bring action to the judicial power of the
Court.
The case at bar is subject to judicial review by the Court. Justice Davide, Jr. precisely identified in
his opinion the requisites for a case to be subjected for the judicial review by the Court. According
to him, the subject matter of the complaint is of common interest, making this civil case a class
suit and proving the existence of an actual controversy. He strengthens this conclusion by citing
in the decision Section 1, Article 7 of the 1987 Constitution.
The petitioners can file a class suit because they represent their generation as well as generations
yet unborn. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on
the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful
ecology is concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter expounded, considers the “rhythm and harmony
of nature.” Nature means the created world in its entirety. Such rhythm and harmony
indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and
conservation of the country’s forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and
other natural resources to the end that their exploration, development and utilization be equitably
accessible to the present as well as future generations.
Every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full
enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minors’ assertion of
their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their
obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come.

In this case, the principal petitioners, all minors duly represented and joined by their respective
parents. Impleaded as an additional plaintiff is the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), a
domestic, non-stock and non-profit corporation organized for the purpose of, inter alia, engaging
in concerted action geared for the protection of our environment and natural resources. The
petitioners alleged the respondent, Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., then Secretary of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), continued approval of the Timber
License Agreements (TLAs) to numerous commercial logging companies to cut and deforest the
remaining forests of the country. Petitioners request the defendant, his agents, representatives
and other persons acting in his behalf to:
Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country;
Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license
agreements.
Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental consequences of continued and
deforestation are so capable of unquestionable demonstration that the same may be submitted as
a matter of judicial notice. This act of defendant constitutes a misappropriation and/or
impairment of the natural resource property he holds in trust for the benefit of plaintiff minors
and succeeding generations. Plaintiff have exhausted all administrative remedies with the
defendant’s office. On March 2, 1990, plaintiffs served upon defendant a final demand to cancel
all logging permits in the country. Defendant, however, fails and refuses to cancel the existing
TLA’s to the continuing serious damage and extreme prejudice of plaintiffs.

Therefore, the petitioners have the right to bring action to the judicial power of the Court.

• Joya v. Presidential Commission on Good Government, 225 SCRA 568 (1993)

The issue in this case is whether or not the petitioners have legal standing.
The law provides that the petition for prohibition and mandamus dismissed for lack of
merit. Legal standing means a personal and substantial interest ion the case such that the party
has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being
challenged. The paintings legally belongs to the foundation or the members of thereof and the
silverware are gifts to the Marcos couple. When the Marcos administration was toppled and the
said objects were confiscated it did not mean that ownership has passed to the government
without complying with constitutional and statutory requirements of due process and just
compensation. If these were already acquired, any defect in the acquisition must be raised by the
true owners. Petitioners failed to show that they are the legal owners of the said objects that have
become publicly owned.

In this case, the PCGG Chairman Mateo Caparas wrote on 09 August 1990 to President Corazon
Aquino regarding the scheduled sale between the Republic of the Philippines and Christie’s of 82
Old Masers Painting housed in Metropolitan Museum of Manila and 7 boxes of antique silverware
in the custody of Central Bank. This was approved on 14 August 1990 and the consignment was
signed the following day. On 26 October 1990 the Commission on Audit submitted audit findings
to the President – the assets subject of auction were historical relics and had cultural significance
and thereby prohibited by law. As Filipino citizens, taxpayers and artists, petitioners Dean Jose
Joya et al contended that they have legal personality to restrain respondent from acting contrary
to preserving artistic creations pursuant to Sec 14-18 Article XIV of the Constitution.

Therefore, the petitioners do not have a legal standing on the issue.