J Forensic Sci, 2017

doi: 10.1111/1556-4029.13380
PAPER Available online at: onlinelibrary.wiley.com

CRIMINALISTICS

William R. King,1 Ph.D.; Bradley A. Campbell,2 Ph.D.; Matthew C. Matusiak,3 Ph.D.; and
Charles M. Katz,4 Ph.D.

Forensic Evidence and Criminal Investigations:

The Impact of Ballistics Information on the
Investigation of Violent Crime in Nine Cities*,†

ABSTRACT: We explore the impact of information from ballistics imaging hit reports on the investigation into violent crimes. Ballistics
imaging hits link two crimes involving the same firearm by forensically matching tool marks on the fired bullets or cartridge cases. Interview
data collected from detectives who received a hit report were used to explore the relationship between the presence of a hit report and outcomes
in 65 gun-related violent crime investigations in nine U.S. police agencies. Findings indicate hit reports rarely contribute to identification, arrest,
charging, or sentencing of suspects, because of delays in producing hit reports. On average, hit reports were completed 181.4 days after the
focal crime. This delay forces investigations to proceed without the benefit of information from ballistics analysis. Additionally, hit reports
rarely contained detailed information that was immediately useful to investigators. Instead, hit reports required additional research by the
investigator to unlock useful information.

KEYWORDS: forensic science, ballistic, evidence, National Integrated Ballistics Information Network, homicide, investigation, gun crime

The intersection of three issues has captivated the attention of
the public, academics, and policymakers in recent years: guns,
homicide, and forensics. Gun crime generally, but mass shooting
incidents (especially those in schools), have grabbed headlines
and fueled public debate in recent years (e.g., Virginia Tech,
Sandy Hook Elementary School, Charleston, S.C., Umpqua
Community College). Guns play a significant role in homicides
in the United States. In 2013, 69.0% of homicides were commit-
ted with firearms (1). Homicide has long intrigued the public,
from murder mystery novels to docudrama television series such
as The First 48. Similarly, a considerable effort is expended in
understanding homicide from both an academic perspective (e.g.,
the journal Homicide Studies) and policy perspective. Related
and embedded within the popular discourse and academic dis-
cussion of guns and homicide is forensics—as seen in the CSI
franchise and the alleged existence of “the CSI effect” (e.g., the
expectation that forensic evidence is always available and
1
College of Criminal Justice, Sam Houston State University, Box 2296,
Huntsville, TX, 77341-2296.
2
Department of Criminal Justice, University of Louisville, 2301 South
Third Street Room 223, Louisville, KY, 40292.
3
Department of Criminal Justice, University of Central Florida, 12805
Pegasus Drive, Orlando, FL, 32816.
4
School of Criminology and Criminal Justice, Arizona State University,
411 N. Central Street, Suite 680, Phoenix, AZ 85004.
*Funded by the U.S. Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice
(award number 2010-DN-BX-0001).
†
Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the authors and do not
necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of
Justice.
Received 2 Aug. 2016; and in revised form 26 Oct. 2016; accepted 28
Oct. 2016.
processed in criminal cases) (2,3), as well as in research and pol-
icy, evidenced by professional organizations such as the Ameri-
can Academy of Forensic Sciences, journals such as the Journal
of Forensic Sciences, and recent reports by the National
Research Council (4) among others.
An advancement in forensic science technology has emerged
as a potentially powerful tool for addressing the intersection
among gun-related homicide and forensic information: ballistics
imaging. Simply, information from analyses conducted in crime
laboratories should assist investigators in solving homicides,
which is an empirical question we test in this manuscript. To
understand ballistics imaging, it is helpful to briefly review the
ways in which firearms impart toolmarks. When fired, a gun
imparts unique, individual toolmarks upon the cartridge case and
the bullet. Much like fingerprints or DNA are unique to individ-
ual people, toolmarks are unique to individual firearms. If the
bullet or cartridge case can be retrieved from a crime scene, or a
firearm confiscated (from a suspect or crime scene) by the police
and test fired to collect projectiles and casing, then, the evidence
the evidence from one crime scene or test fire can be entered
into the ballistics imaging programs and compared to evidence
from other crime scenes, to determine whether the same gun
was used in both incidents (5,6). If the evidence from one crime
scene is matched with evidence from another crime scene (or a
test fire), that linkage is called a “hit.” Before the advent of bal-
listics imaging technology, comparisons were conducted manu-
ally, by firearms examiners visually comparing evidence in a
time-consuming process. Ballistics imaging technology made the
process of comparing large quantities of evidence more efficient.
Ballistics imaging technology uses hardware and software to
convert items of evidence (fired cartridge cases or bullets) into

© 2017 American Academy of Forensic Sciences 1

2 JOURNAL OF FORENSIC SCIENCES
detailed images that are transformed into data signatures. These
signatures can be searched and compared through an algorithm
to identify possible matches with evidence in the database (7,8).
The possible matches—called high confidence candidates—are
then reviewed by a firearms examiner or technician, and matches
may be visually confirmed. Confirmed matches are designated
hits. The adoption of ballistics imaging technology has led to a
600% increase in the number of hits produced from fired car-
tridge cases (9) and a 500% increase in bullet hits retrieved from
crime scenes (10) identified by the Firearms Analysis Unit in the
Boston Police Department.
In the United States, the process of ballistics imaging by law
enforcement agencies is coordinated by the National Integrated
Ballistics Information Network (NIBIN), which is administered
by the Federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and
Explosives (ATF). ATF provides the hardware and software to
local agencies, manages the servers, and provides guidance for
making the system run efficiently. Local agencies (municipal,
state, and regional crime laboratories and police agencies)
retrieve the physical evidence from crime scenes and test fires,
input the evidence into NIBIN, and review and confirm hits.
Local agencies are in turn responsible for operating their local
equipment (8,11). The utility of NIBIN is in its capacity to net-
work multiple ballistics imaging systems, which allows local
NIBIN sites to search the databases of other NIBIN sites in
order to identify hits. Since its inception in December, 1999,
NIBIN has produced an impressive number of hits. As of Octo-
ber 2015, there were 150 NIBIN sites in the United States and
the program had produced about 74,000 hits (S. Buchanan,
personal communication, October 9, 2015).
A hit represents different things to different people. For a fire-
arms section and a crime laboratory, it is a tangible indicator of
performance and success (7). For police executives and crime
analysts, the analysis of multiple hits may serve strategic goals,
by revealing patterns of gun use, crime, and criminal networks
(12:5). For criminal investigators working a case that involves a
ballistics imaging hit, a hit represents a potentially crucial piece
of information. A hit is like a key that unlocks information about
two or more different incidents (different crimes involving the
illegal use of the same firearm). A hit adds information to one
case by linking it with information about a second case, pro-
vided there is useful information associated with the cases, such
as a suspect in custody, a vehicle description, gang affiliation, or
similar motive in multiple crime incidents. When there is useful
information, it may help an investigator advance their case, for
example, by helping to identify a suspect. Or a hit may provide
additional evidence to validate that a suspect, already identified
by an investigator, is most likely the perpetrator. This informa-
tion could help the investigator obtain a warrant or provide the
information needed to justify continued interrogation of a sus-
pect. A hit may also assist an investigator by excluding a possi-
ble suspect from further investigation or eliminating a suspect
from a pool of possible suspects. In sum, for investigators, hits
are useful when they unlock, from a second case, information
relevant to their current investigation.
At present, however, we know little about the utility of ballis-
tics imaging hits for criminal investigations. To our knowledge,
there have been only two studies of the utility of ballistics imag-
ing hits for criminal investigators during the course of specific
investigations. We refer here to ballistics imaging hits only, not
the presence of ballistics evidence. Ballistics evidence may
include a gun, fired cartridge cases, bullets, ammunition, or gun-
shot residue (GSR). This evidence may be recorded, collected,
and submitted to a laboratory for analysis. But only a small per-
centage of submitted ballistics evidence results in a ballistics
imaging hit. Of the extant research, one study reported an
analysis of nine NIBIN hits in Boston and indicated that detec-
tives found hits useful (10). The second study, using data from a
Caribbean country, revealed that hits were not helpful for inves-
tigations because of time delays in processing the evidence and
issues with routing hit reports to the correct investigator (13).
Although these studies shed light on the utility of hits, the data
analyzed in these studies prevented an understanding regarding
why the hits were useful, or what hit characteristics made this
evidence more or less helpful to investigators.
This study explores the utility of ballistic imaging hits for
homicide investigations in nine U.S. cities. We analyze data
derived from face-to-face interviews with police officers who
investigated a combined 65 specific cases involving a violent
crime in which a ballistics hit report was produced. Our method-
ology allows us to determine the impact of the timing of the hit
report relative to the progression of the investigation and the role
that timeliness plays in the utility of a ballistics imaging report
for an investigation. We turn first, however, to the general
literature on the role of information derived from forensic
analysis for criminal investigations.
The Role of Forensic Information in Criminal Investigations
Over the last three decades, advancements in forensic evi-
dence technologies have increased the capacity of law enforce-
ment to collect forensic evidence from crime scenes (14–16).
These improvements have increased the amount of evidence sub-
mitted to crime laboratories, but have also contributed to crime
laboratory evidence backlogs (16–20). One of the primary goals
of forensic processing organizations, such as police agencies and
crime laboratories, is to produce tactical information that is
useful for criminal investigators during the course of an
investigation (12:5; 21:168).
Research on the effectiveness of forensic evidence in criminal
investigations has produced mixed results. Several studies have
indicated that forensic evidence is often not collected from a
crime scene, and is frequently unavailable to police during the
course of an investigation (22–27). For example, Strom and
Hickman (16) estimated that 14% of open U.S. homicide cases
have evidence that has not been submitted to laboratories for
analysis. Some of the limited utility of forensic evidence for
investigations is due to nonsubmission of evidence, processing
delays, and backlogs, which sometimes plague crime laborato-
ries. Nonsubmission occurs when a law enforcement agency
holds the physical evidence and does not send it to a laboratory
for analysis. Nonsubmission is a major contributor to the issues
involving large stockpiles of unanalyzed sexual assault kits (28).
Processing delays refer to any process that impedes the speedy
analysis of evidence. For example, 85.5% of laboratories that
serve as NIBIN sites reported they route firearms through their
DNA and/or fingerprint sections before the firearm is sent to the
firearms section for processing (7:32). Finally, a backlog refers
to any delay that produces time lags in processing of >30 days.
Each of these scenarios prevents investigators from receiving
valuable evidence in a timely manner. Notably, research from
one jurisdiction indicated that when DNA evidence was col-
lected, it was available to investigators in just 6.7% of homicide
cases during the pre-arrest investigative process (29). This body
of the literature suggests that because of processing delays,
forensic evidence might not play a large role during an
 KING ET AL.
investigation, but is more often used during the prosecution
stage (5,23,24).
Another stream of the forensic evidence/investigations literature
generally suggests a positive relationship between forensic
evidence and case outcomes. Briody’s (30) study of 150 homi-
cide investigations in Australia indicated that DNA helped move
prosecutions through court and assisted in sentencing. Briody
selected 75 homicide cases in which DNA evidence was avail-
able, had incriminated a suspect, the suspect had been identified,
arrested, and processed by a court. These DNA cases were
compared to 75 homicide cases without DNA, which means the
sample was drawn based on the dependent variable. An early
examination of 2700 property crime cases indicated that when
forensic evidence was available and analyzed, burglary and rob-
bery cases were three time more likely to be cleared, and offend-
ers received longer sentences in comparison with cases lacking
forensic evidence (26). More contemporary studies have also
found that forensic evidence in property crimes, specifically
DNA, has enhanced the likelihood of arrest and prosecution in
property crimes (15,31). When controlling for crime type (e.g.,
burglary, robbery, assault, rape, homicide), for example, Peterson
et al. (14) found that arrest was more likely in cases where
forensic evidence was present, and when this evidence was pro-
cessed, cases were more likely to result in charges filed, convic-
tion at trial, and longer sentence lengths for perpetrators.
Research focused on the utility of ballistics evidence has also
examined the relationship between the collection of firearms evi-
dence with crime clearance rates. In their analysis of 315 homi-
cide cases, McEwen and Regoeczi (32) found that the quantity
of ballistics evidence (e.g., shell casings, bullets) reduced the
odds of case clearance by 0.57. However, when a GSR kit was
available and processed, the odds of case closure were increased
by 1.37 (32). Conversely, recent research by Reno and Kotas
(33) detailed two instances in which a coordinated, crime-gun
intelligence approach, which used NIBIN and ballistics imaging
hits, helped lead to the arrest and prosecution of two suspects in
Denver, CO. Their discussion suggests that these two cases were
successfully resolved because NIBIN is used in Denver as a
proactive investigative tool. In Denver, the Police Department
has an in-house crime laboratory that employs firearms examin-
ers, an arrangement that led to the timely processing of the evi-
dence, and prompt feedback to investigators when a hit was
identified (33). These findings led to the Bureau of Justice
Assistance’s allocation of up to $2 million to fund their (i.e.,
crime-gun intelligence centers) replication in two additional
cities (34).
Additionally, in their qualitative description of nine gun crime
incidents, Braga and Pierce (10) found that ballistics imaging
hits were helpful in the Boston Police Department’s investiga-
tions. They noted that although cases often proceeded through
the system without this evidence, NIBIN hits had meaningfully
altered the trajectory of cases. Specifically, investigators in Bos-
ton believed that hits provided critical leads in their cases. In
short, anecdotal evidence has indicated that when ballistics evi-
dence is processed quickly, and information concerning hits is
promptly relayed to investigators, NIBIN can have an impact on
investigations.
These findings are important because research has shown that
crime laboratory and police department cooperation is critical to
how and when ballistics imaging hits are provided to investiga-
tors (13,35). King and Wells (13) document several impediments
in interorganizational processes that prevented the effective rout-
ing of ballistics imaging hits to criminal investigators in a
. FORENSIC EVIDENCE AND CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS 3
developing Caribbean nation. Their findings indicated that back-
logs in the national crime laboratory, lag times in confirming
ballistics hits, and inefficiencies in routing hit information to
criminal investigators prevented the hits from being used effec-
tively by investigators. Similar findings were reported in Stock-
ton, CA, where research indicated that organizational changes
improved ballistics evidence processing productivity (35). In
Stockton, the Police Department’s Crime Lab was restructured
by hiring a part-time ballistics evidence examiner. This examiner
brought with him an innovative program, GunOps, that strategi-
cally analyzes information associated with ballistics evidence
before the evidence is entered in NIBIN. Using this program, the
firearms examiner prioritizes inputs, based on the likelihood a
match will be found.
Methods and Data
Our data are derived from a NIJ-funded evaluation of NIBIN
in the United States (7). To understand the effect of a ballistics
imaging hit on the investigation into violent crime, we initially
selected 10 forensic crime laboratories that served as NIBIN
sites. These NIBIN sites had reputations for high performance
and/or being innovative and had produced a reasonable number
of ballistics imaging hits. Of the 10 sites selected for additional
study, eight were ranked in the 83rd percentile (or greater) for
total number of NIBIN hits, as compared to all other NIBIN
sites, for the period of October 1, 2007 to July 2012. The two
lowest performing sites ranked in the 22.9th and the 58.3rd per-
centiles, respectively. Thus, we sought to maximize the likeli-
hood we would select laboratories that produced many hits in a
timely manner, and the hits would prove useful to investigators.
Additionally, one site was selected because it was a regional lab-
oratory that served multiple agencies (Onondaga County, NY)
and another was selected because it served a rural area and was
part of a multilaboratory, state system (Bowling Green, OH).
Finally, some sites were selected, in part, because they were
geographically proximate to a site visitor, a condition of the
grant award. In sum, the sites were not randomly selected;
rather, they were chosen based in part upon their performance.
We seek to understand the usefulness and utility of ballistics
imaging hits during the investigation into violent crimes. ATF
provided the research team with data to identify criminal cases,
usually homicides, which had occurred recently, and in which
the 10 local NIBIN sites had produced a ballistics hit report. We
focused on recent criminal cases, to maximize the chances that
the original investigator would still be accessible for an inter-
view and that they would recall the case and the usefulness of
the hit report. We initially wanted to select at least 10 homicide
cases from each site. Some sites had a sufficient number of gun
crimes with ballistics hit reports, so the catchment period was
relatively recent. For the Kansas City, MO PD, a catchment per-
iod of 2 years yielded 18 homicide cases with hit reports. For
other sites, the catchment period had to be extended to capture a
sufficient number of homicide cases with hit reports. For exam-
ple, the catchment period for Santa Ana, CA, extended between
January 2009 and March 2012 and yielded 12 homicide cases.
Austin, TX, had just two, recent homicides with NIBIN hits
(from 2005 and 2006), so we included six assaults with deadly
weapon cases, with a hit report, that had occurred since January
2010.
Despite extending the catchment period and including other
violent crimes, we could not identify 10 eligible cases for three
sites (Austin, TX, Phoenix, AZ, and Onondaga County, NY).
4 JOURNAL OF FORENSIC SCIENCES

The NIBIN site in Bowling Green, OH, had been recently deac- TABLE 1––Completed detective interview case frequencies (N = 65).
tivated by ATF, and we were unable to access their hit data, to
identify investigators for interviews. The BCII laboratory in Valid
Variable and Response Categories N Percent
Bowling Green, OH, serves a predominantly rural part of north-
west Ohio. During the time as a NIBIN site, it processed a suffi- Agency (N = 65)
cient amount of evidence, but because guns are rarely re-used in Austin Police Department 7 10.8
Houston Police Department 11 16.9
crimes in the region, the laboratory identified just three ballistics Indianapolis Metro Police Department (Marion County, IN) 13 20.0
hits. As such, the Bowling Green site would not have provided Kansas City Police Department 14 21.5
sufficient interview data to change our results. Similarly, ATF New Orleans Police Department 1 1.5
could not provide the New Orleans, LA, hit data before the Phoenix Police Department 3 4.6
interview visit, so a sample of homicide cases could not be Santa Ana Police Department 4 6.2
Stockton Police Department 8 12.3
selected. By chance, the site visitor encountered a New Orleans Syracuse Police Department (Onondaga County, NY) 4 6.2
PD detective who had received a hit report as part of a homicide Type of Criminal Case (Case A) (N = 65)
investigation, so that detective was interviewed. In all, 104 vio- Homicide 54 83.1
lent crime cases were selected for interviews, and during 2012 Robbery 2 3.1
Assault with a Deadly Weapon 5 7.7
and early 2013, we collected data concerning 65 of these cases Other 4 6.2
(a 62.5% completion rate). Type of Criminal Case (Case B) (N = 63)*
For most of the cases, we conducted face-to-face interviews Homicide 11 17.5
with the investigator who was assigned to the focal case; a crime Robbery 6 9.5
involving a firearm in which a NIBIN hit had linked the focal Felon in Possession/Test fire 2 3.2
Assault with a Deadly Weapon 15 23.8
crime to a second crime. In-person interviews are ideal for gather- Test fire/Unlawful Carrying of a Weapon 2 3.2
ing information about criminal investigations. Investigations Aggravated Assault 3 4.8
evolve with time (36). Vital information in the early hours of an Deadly Conduct 1 1.6
investigation, such as a suspect’s street name, may become less Test fire 10 15.9
Unknown 1 1.6
useful later in the investigation. Because investigations are a pro- Other 12 19.0
cess, it is important for researchers to understand the changing, Number of Cases Linked to Focal Case (N = 64)
evolving nature of each case. For the current project, we seek to One other Case (i.e., a hit dyad) 36 56.3
understand the utility, impact, and effect of the information Two 17 26.6
unlocked by a ballistics imaging hit report, for an investigator, at Three 5 7.8
Four 5 7.8
the moment they received the hit report. The best way to under- Five 1 1.6
stand this nuanced interaction between an investigation and the Detective’s Assigned Investigative Unit at time of Crime (N = 61)
introduction of information is via face-to-face interviews involving Homicide 53 86.9
a specific case. A face-to-face interaction allows the interviewer to Robbery 1 1.6
Aggravated Assault 1 1.6
read the body language, tone, gestures, and paralinguistic behav- Gang 2 3.3
iors of the investigator. Interviews are rich with nuanced, informa- Criminal Investigations Department 4 6.6
tion-rich communication, which gives an interviewer an
opportunity to ask follow-up questions and gives the interviewee *The sample for the categories “Type of Criminal Case (Case B),”
“Number of Cases Linked to Focal Case,” and “Detective’s Assigned
an opportunity to clarify their meaning (37). In sum, although they Investigative Unit at time of Crime” has Ns <65 due to missing information
are expensive, time-consuming, difficult to coordinate, and can for these categories.
produce modest completion rates, we argue that face-to-face inter-
views are ideal for gathering data about aspects of investigations
that are iterative, sensitive, or nuanced. Interviewees were also Table 1 shows that the majority (83.1%) of focal cases (desig-
aware of the nature of the project, in that we sought to learn about nated Case A) were homicides. Each focal case (Case A) is
the role of ballistics hit reports in investigations. Therefore, inter- linked via a ballistics imaging hit to at least one other case (Case
viewees had ample opportunity to explain when or how ballistics B). The majority of Case Bs were assault with deadly weapon
hit reports were helpful. We were able to conduct face-to-face cases (23.8%), other cases (19.0%), or homicides (17.5%). In
interviews with the focal investigator for 45 of the 65 completed 22.2% of the cases, Case B involved a test fire, which indicates
cases. In one site (Marion County/Indianapolis), investigators a crime gun was recovered at a second crime scene by the police
wrote answers to written questions concerning their cases. In Aus- and subsequently test fired. The majority (56.3%) of focal cases
tin, an investigator extracted information from the agency’s elec- were linked to one other crime (a hit dyad linking two crimes),
tronic data system to provide information about the selected cases. with 43.7% of cases hitting with three or more other crimes.
In all remaining sites, investigators either had a copy of their case Most (86.9%) of the investigators assigned with a focal case
file in front of them during the interview, or reviewed the case file were assigned to a homicide unit.
prior to participating in the interview. Table 1 presents the descrip- Table 2 reports the number of days between crime and hit
tive statistics concerning the 65 cases. confirmation for all ballistics evidence that produced a NIBIN
Our methodology and data are more extensive than most prior hit across the sites included in the study. We use data on all hits
studies of forensics and criminal investigations. Because our inter- (see 7:tables 16 and 18), and not only the sample of hits selected
views were tied to a focal case, we avoided the vagaries of more in this study, to leverage the statistical power provided by larger
generally worded questions about the utility of forensics and sample sizes. Table 2 demonstrates the median days between
investigations writ large. Our interviews allow subjects to describe crime occurrence and hit confirmation in the nine sites ranged
the utility of hit reports for their investigations. Unlike single-site from a low of 43.5 days in the Santa Ana to a high of 2103.0 in
studies, our data also accommodate differences in agencies and Stockton. For the 65 violent crime cases included in our analy-
how they might integrate forensics into criminal investigations. sis, Table 3 reveals considerable time delays between the
 KING ET AL. . FORENSIC EVIDENCE AND CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS 5

TABLE 2––Number of hits and elapsed time in days between crime hit
confirmation for all NIBIN hits (October 1, 2007 to July, 2012).
TABLE 4––Detective interview case frequencies (N = 65).
Site N Mean Median Min Max SD
Variable and Response Categories N Valid Percent
Austin Police 98 133.24 101.5 7 1472 188.19
Department Was the suspect identified before the NIBIN hit (N = 60)
Houston Police 575 147.26 112.0 0 1539 164.66 No 29 48.3
Department Yes 30 50.0
Indianapolis 295 186.39 83.0 2 3018 342.81 Unknown 1 1.7
Metro Police Was the suspect arrested before the NIBIN hit (N = 58)
Department No 36 62.1
Kansas City Police 414 185.70 86.0 1 2465 323.82 Yes 20 34.5
Department Unknown 1 1.9
New Orleans Police 412 387.19 273.0 1 1689 368.21 Suspect dead 1 1.9
Department Was the suspect charged/pleaded before the NIBIN hit (N = 55)
Phoenix Police 336 641.04 416.5 15 5948 739.34 No 43 78.2
Department Yes 10 18.2
Santa Ana Police 492 608.66 43.50 0 5987 1281.27 Unknown 1 1.8
Department Suspect dead 1 1.8
Stockton Police 391 1911.93 2103.0 7 3568 953.85 Was the suspect sentenced before the NIBIN hit (N = 52)
Department No 48 92.3
Syracuse Police 594 334.61 55.5 7 3089 604.72 Yes 2 3.8
Department Unknown 1 1.9
Suspect dead 1 1.9
Source: King et al. (7): tables 16 and 18. Did the NIBIN hit identify a suspect (N = 62)
No 55 88.7
Yes 6 9.7
Unknown 1 1.6
TABLE 3––Elapsed days between crime and hit confirmation for 65 violent Did the NIBIN hit lead to an arrest (N = 61)
gun crime cases. No 59 96.7
Yes 1 1.6
N Mean Median Min Max SD Unknown 1 1.6
Did the NIBIN hit help with obtaining charges or a plea (N = 61)
65 181.4 105.0 4.0 1374 224.85 No 57 93.4
Yes 3 4.9
Unknown 1 1.6
occurrence of Case B and when the hit was confirmed by the
agency. The median days between crime occurrence and hit con-
firmation for all 65 cases was 105 days (mean = 181.4 days). This initial analysis indicates that hit reports rarely contribute
The shortest time delay was 4 days, and the longest was to advancing homicide investigations. It is possible that their
1374 days. These time delays are substantial, and we will return lack of contribution to the investigations is attributable to the
to this issue later. unavailability of hit reports during the course of an investigation.
To assess the possible utility of hit reports for unsolved cases,
we reran the analysis using only the 29 cases in which the sus-
Findings pect had not been identified or arrested before the hit report was
The results of the investigator interviews are presented in produced. We use the investigators’ assessment of the hit’s util-
Table 4. To account for the impact of a hit report occurring dur- ity to their investigation. This second analysis is a best case
ing different steps of an investigation, we asked investigators analysis of the utility of a hit report. Bear in mind that given the
about the status of their case prior to receiving the hit report. In retrospective nature of our interviews, a hit report could, for
half of the cases (50%), a suspect had been identified prior to example, be helpful to the identification, arrest, plea bargain,
the hit report. In about one-third of cases (34.5%), a suspect had and sentence in a case in which the suspect was not identified at
already been arrested, and in 18.2% of cases, a suspect had been the time the hit report was received. The results of our analysis
charged or had pled before the hit report was produced. Only a of these best case scenarios are presented in Table 5.
handful (3.8%) of cases had been sentenced prior to the hit Table 5 shows that, for cases in which a suspect was not iden-
report. Overall, a substantial proportion of cases proceed through tified at the time the hit report was received (n = 29 cases), the
the identification and arrest of a suspect before the hit is con-
firmed by the firearms section, and before a hit report is deliv- TABLE 5––Case outcomes at time of interview for cases that were uncleared
ered to the investigator. Obviously, ballistics imaging hits when the hit was confirmed.
confirmed after an event (e.g., an arrest) could not have con-
tributed to that event. Additionally, we asked investigators Variable and Response Categories N Valid Percent
whether the ballistics imaging hit was helpful to their investiga- Suspect was unidentified at the time of the NIBIN hit (N = 29)
tion. We asked whether the hit had helped identify a suspect Hit helped ID the suspect 5 17.2
(9.7% reported yes), contributed to the arrest of a suspect (1.6% Hit lead to an arrest 1 3.4
said yes), assisted with obtaining a conviction or a plea bargain Hit helped with obtaining charges or plea 1 3.4
Hit helped with charging suspect 1 3.4
(4.9% said yes), or was helpful with the sentencing of a suspect Suspect was not arrested at the time of the NIBIN hit (N = 36)
(1.7% said yes). Again, the results indicate that a ballistics imag- Hit helped ID the suspect 6 16.7
ing hit report has a very small effect on the identification, appre- Hit lead to an arrest 1 2.8
hension, or processing of a suspect by the criminal justice Hit helped with obtaining charges or plea 1 2.8
system. Hit helped with charging suspect 1 2.8
6 JOURNAL OF FORENSIC SCIENCES
hit report was viewed as helpful in identifying the suspect. In
five cases (17.2%), investigators stated the report helped them
identify the suspect, and in one case (3.4%), the hit report led to
the arrest of a suspect. When we examine cases in which the
suspect was not arrested when the hit report was received
(n = 36), the outcomes were similar. In six cases (16.7%), the
hit report helped identify a suspect. Again, the hit report only
assisted in the arrest of a suspect in one case (2.8% of cases),
after the hit report was produced.
In sum, our analyses indicate that hit reports are of limited
utility to most investigators as they proceed through different
steps in the investigation into violent crimes. In the full sample,
hit reports assisted in the identification of a suspect in 9.7%
(n = 6) of all cases, and a hit report helped an investigator
obtain an arrest in just one case. Additionally, hit reports were
only helpful in obtaining a conviction or plea bargain, assisting
in these decision points in 4.9% (n = 3) of all cases. Finally,
when we examined the 29 cases in which a suspect was not
identified prior to an investigator’s reception of a hit report, we
found that reports helped identify a suspect in just 17.2%
(n = 6) of cases, and helped obtain a conviction or plea bargain
in 3.4% (n = 1) of the cases included in the sample.
Discussion and Conclusions
Our results indicate that the utility of ballistics imaging reports
for investigators is limited, and investigators do not often use
these reports during the course of an investigation. There are
several reasons why these hit reports go unused. First, the
reports are rarely produced and provided to an investigator in a
timely manner. On average, hit reports were completed
181.4 days after the focal crime. This lag in evidence processing
forces investigators to move on with their investigations, without
the benefit of information produced from ballistics analysis.
Some of these cases may represent what the prior literature calls
“dunkers” or “self-solvers” (29,38), cases that are solved rela-
tively quickly (39). For example, Wellford et al. (40:10) found
that about half of the homicides included in a sample of U.S.
cities were cleared by arrest within 7–17 days (40). Similarly,
McEwen and Regoeczi (32) report that c. 50% of cases were
cleared within 3 days, and 80% of cases were cleared within
20 days in Cleveland, OH. If the cases included in our analyses
fit this trend, it could explain why ballistics evidence was
unhelpful to identifying or arresting suspects in the majority of
cases (32).
Second, hit reports often lack information that is immediately
useful to investigators. The hit reports we reviewed at the nine
sites were simple, short, written reports of a few sentences. The
reports usually explained that the gun used in one crime (identi-
fied by a case number, date, and crime type) was linked to the
firearm used in a second crime (also identified by a case num-
ber, date, and crime type). Reports rarely included a suspect or
victim name, addresses, possible gang involvement, motive, or
other intelligence that might be useful. An investigator would
have to conduct additional research to unlock useful, actionable
information for their investigation. For example, if an investiga-
tor has to research how the second case (Case B) involved in
the hit is related to their focal case, in order to learn information
useful to their investigation, they are less likely to conduct this
labor-intensive research. If the research process is time-consum-
ing, spreads across multiple days (e.g., the investigator must call
another police agency, determine the identity of the investigator
assigned to Case B, then leave a message, and wait for that
investigator to call back), or rarely produces useful information,
they are even less likely to invest resources into this research.
Thus, the utility of a hit report is not the mere presence of a hit.
Rather, the utility of a hit is contingent on the information con-
tained in the second case (Case B), and the amount of effort an
investigator must expend to unlock that information. In other
words, confirming a hit is only the beginning of a process for
investigators, it is not the end.
To this end, research has consistently shown that police inves-
tigators often do not receive forensic evidence testing results
until after their investigation has concluded (24,29,41). These
time lags prevent investigators from using this critical evidence
in the manner that we expect it to be used: to assist in identify-
ing suspects in criminal cases. Our findings suggest that forensic
crime laboratories might need to process ballistics evidence in a
more timely manner. Additionally, law enforcement agencies
and crime laboratories should incorporate information about each
case that produced physical evidence, so that hit reports will
include information regarding the characteristics of Case B (e.g.,
crime type, date, location, suspects involved, and modus oper-
andi). This will save investigators the toil of tracking down
information from Case B while trying to identify suspects in
their focal case. Producing untimely ballistics hits does not
appear to benefit investigators or law enforcement agencies.
Likewise, because the utility of a hit is locked in information
about the two crimes that produced the hit (i.e., the utility of a
hit is not a characteristic of the physical evidence itself), labora-
tories or police agencies should maintain a system of tracking
the amount of actionable information associated with each piece
of physical evidence before it is processed. Information such as
suspect identification, descriptions of the crime, and gang affilia-
tions should be used to prioritize processing and entry of ballis-
tics evidence into NIBIN. The system should be updateable,
so information concerning this evidence can be refreshed as
investigations evolve.
Additionally, guns are not people, and hence, the individual
characteristics of guns cannot be linked to a single, unique
human in the same manner as DNA and fingerprints. As one
detective noted, “Guns get passed around, we often have no idea
who the suspects are.” This fact might portend a unique situation
for our findings regarding ballistics imaging hits and criminal
investigations. Perhaps investigators find that DNA and finger-
prints are more helpful in their investigations, although prior
research does not support this position (29).
Finally, our sample size limits our ability to statistically detect
small effects regarding the role of ballistics evidence in investi-
gations. Likewise, perhaps our questions concerning suspect
identification, arrest, conviction, and plea bargaining and sen-
tencing were too broad. It may be that investigators work who-
dunits by systematically shoveling information into their
working understanding of their case with a teaspoon, not a sho-
vel, and thus, the big breakthroughs in a case may result from
multiple, small pieces of information, and not from one, large
piece of information. Asking investigators to identify the impact
of a single piece of information may be expecting too much.
This possibility is partially supported by our interviews with
investigators. In most instances, investigators state that they
loved receiving a ballistic hit, because they wanted to get as
much information about their case as possible. As one robbery
detective stated, “When I work an investigation, it’s like I’m
hopping down a bunny trail. I want to gather as much informa-
tion from anyone and anywhere as I can. Anything might prove
helpful.” It may be that investigators like hit reports because of
 KING ET AL.
the possibility of illumination, not because the hit reports “crack
the case” or yield a tremendous insight.
Overall, our findings suggest that the investigative contribution
of hit reports produced by NIBIN is modest. Anecdotally, how-
ever, the modest impact on investigations has not reduced the
desire of investigators for this information. The primary limiting
factor for usefulness of a hit report is time. The processing of
ballistics evidence and production of a hit report is simply out-
paced by the investigations into the focal cases discussed above.
Although investigators desire this information, we need to better
understand how to maximize its utility. Improving people, pro-
cesses, and technology can increase the productivity of ballistics
evidence processing systems (35). Future research should iden-
tify additional processes, practices, and technologies that can be
employed to produce a meaningful reduction in the time lag that
is currently present between the submission of evidence and the
production of a hit report.
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Additional information and reprint requests:
William R. King, Ph.D.
College of Criminal Justice
Sam Houston State University
Box 2296
Huntsville, TX 77341-2296
E-mail: william.king@shsu.edu