Smart & Prohaska: Disaster Capitalism & Housing Vulnerability

International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters

March 2017, Vol. 35, No. 1, pp 1-19.

Disaster Capitalism, Housing Vulnerability, and the Tuscaloosa Tornado: A

Critical Analysis of Rebuilding Efforts

Kasi Smart

and

Ariane Prohaska
The University of Alabama
Email: aprohaska@ ua.edu.

In this paper, we assess how social vulnerability to disasters continued into the
recovery phase following the April 27, 2011 Tuscaloosa tornado, particularly by
examining how social class affected housing availability approximately three years
after the storm. Data from multiple sources indicated that apartment complexes that
were constructed to replace destroyed or damaged housing are generally demanding
higher rents and have fewer units available than the complexes which existed before
the storm. Additionally, even as a residential construction boom has occurred in
Tuscaloosa following the storm, the new complexes are almost entirely marketed to the
college student population, even though none of the multifamily housing complexes
destroyed in the storm solely housed college students. These findings support a disaster
capitalism model of recovery that has mainly focused on building high-end student
housing, resulting in the perpetuation of vulnerability for lower-income, permanent
Tuscaloosa residents. We discuss some of the potential consequences of the
reconstruction of Tuscaloosa, and propose suggestions to reduce vulnerability in the
rebuilding process for cities that have been decimated by natural disasters.

Key words: Social vulnerability, disaster capitalism, tornadoes, economic inequality.

Introduction

The tornadoes that struck Tuscaloosa, AL and surrounding areas on April 27, 2011
caused tremendous destruction to both residences and businesses. Out of 6,850
households in the area impacted by the tornado, 5,144 were damaged or destroyed.
(ACRE 2012). Although people of all socioeconomic statuses were affected by the
storm, the areas most impacted by the April 27th tornadoes were lower-income, minority,
and renter-occupied sections of the city (City of Tuscaloosa 2011).

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A body of research has focused on the social consequences of the rebuilding of

cities after natural disasters, especially when low-income areas are decimated by these
events. In many cases, when neighbourhoods that once housed low-income residents
are rebuilt, affordable housing is replaced with higher-end, more costly residences
(Bullard and Wright 2009a). This phenomenon is one component of “disaster
capitalism” (Klein 2007), which involves, among other factors, “orchestrated raids on
the public sphere in the wake of catastrophic events, combined with the treatment of
disasters as exciting market opportunities” (p. 6). In other words, neo-liberal private
sector interests, rather than real public needs, dictate rebuilding and recovery following
a crisis when residents are “still reeling from the shock” (p. 7). Based on the economic
philosophy of Milton Friedman and his colleagues, the “shock doctrine” posits that real,
sustainable change is only possible after a catastrophic event (Klein 2007). Friedman’s
conception of change, however, involves “a fundamentalist version of capitalism” as
the saving grace. For example, Friedman suggested using the funds allocated for
rebuilding after Hurricane Katrina to create a school voucher system, allowing parents
to send their children to private, for-profit schools subsidized by the state rather than
rebuilding the public schools destroyed by the storm. Following his lead, developers
arrived in New Orleans to profit from the rebuilding of higher-end housing in the city,
while low-income survivors of the storm struggled to find temporary and long term
shelter.
Klein also affixes the label of disaster capitalism to the rebuilding of Sri Lanka and
other South Asian countries after the 2004 South Asian tsunami, which she claimed
involved “deliberate destruction of their culture and way of life and theft of their land”
(2007, p. 492). After the storm, fishing villages were prohibited from rebuilding in order
to allow the government to expand the tourism industry. American investors were key
funders for the recovery, and as a result many United States businesses secured contacts
to rebuild these resort towns. It was clear that rebuilding efforts were focused on the
potential profitability of new resorts rather than on rebuilding traditional communities.
The scenarios discussed above demonstrate how privileging profits over people
perpetuates the vulnerability of marginalized populations after disasters. When post-
disaster decisions support a disaster capitalism approach, they assure that vulnerability
will persist throughout the recovery process. Social or hazard vulnerability theory
examines how resources such as education levels, income, wealth, and power, along
with geographic location and history, affect susceptibility to natural and manmade
disasters (Blaikie et al. 1994; Bolin 2006; Morrow 1999; Phillips and Fordham 2010).
The social statuses of race, gender, age, and ability also determine how individuals,
families, and/or communities will be affected by a disaster. In contrast, traditional
disaster theory asserts that disasters are caused by nature and humans can do little to
protect communities from their incidence and consequences (Philips and Fordham
2010). However, critics of the traditional disaster perspective believe it ignores the role
of social and political forces in providing basic protections from harm when a natural
disaster occurs (Blaikie et al. 1994). Vulnerability to disaster varies due to “the ways in
which social systems are constructed, choices are made, and groups are (or sometimes
not) protected” (Phillips and Fordham 2010, p. 11). Social scientists began rejecting the

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dominant approach to studying disasters in favor of a more comprehensive approach

that acknowledges the role of access to scarce resources in shaping preparedness,
response, and recovery from disasters. Related, community vulnerability perspective
(Van Zandt et al. 2012) purports that some areas or neighborhoods of cities are more
vulnerable than others, resulting in uneven amounts of time to partial or full recovery.
Although less vulnerable areas of cities may recover quickly, uneven recovery can
hamper “the overall vitality and resiliency of a community” (p. 30). Scholars have
argued the need for community vulnerability mapping to identify pockets of
vulnerability in the present in order to help mitigate and plan for recovery after potential
disasters.
Previous research has shown overwhelming support for the social vulnerability
perspective, particularly that individuals in poverty (e.g. Dash et al. 1997, Fothergill
and Peek 2004, Peacock et al. 2007, Phillips and Fordham 2010, Powers 2006, Van
Zandt et al. 2012) and persons of colour (e.g. Bullard, Johnson, and Torres 2009;
Phillips and Fordham 2010; Peacock et al. 2007; Peacock and Girard 1997; Van Zandt
et al. 2012) are differentially affected by natural disasters. In addition, renters are
particularly vulnerable following a natural disaster. Previous research has revealed that
renters are less likely to evacuate (Van Zandt et al. 2012), more likely to live in housing
that recovers at a slow pace (Zhang and Peacock 2009), and more likely to live in
properties that will be abandoned than owner-occupied homes (Peacock, Van Zandt,
Zhang, and Highfield 2015; Zhang and Peacock 2009). Most of these studies, however,
focus on single family rentals, and scholars have called for more research on recovery
of multifamily homes (Peacock, Dash, and Zhang 2007). The lone study that focuses
on the rebuilding of multifamily homes concludes that these structures are appraised at
15% less than their pre-storm values, and only average a rebuilding rate of 45-50%
(Peacock et al. 2015). Renters must rely on property owners not only to rebuild, but to
price homes similarly to the pre-storm costs.
Although past studies have assessed housing recovery by examining both the rate
of rebuilding of homes and if home values of single-family rented homes have returned
to pre-storm levels, no research has been conducted that examines if multifamily
structures are rebuilt to house the population previously served by the structure. In other
words, research has yet to address if populations served by multifamily housing
complexes pre-storm are able to afford the new rental home.
The city of Tuscaloosa provides an interesting case-study for examining this type
of housing recovery after a natural disaster. The population of the city of Tuscaloosa
in 2011 was 91,604, of whom 31,747 were college students (United States Census
Bureau 2011). When the April 27th disaster struck, unprecedented student growth was
occurring at The University of Alabama. From Fall 2009 to Fall 2011, the student
population increased from 28,807 students to 31,747 students. Rental housing was at
almost full capacity in Tuscaloosa at the time of the storm, and contracts for student
housing complexes were being completed throughout the city. Rental housing
accounted for 61% of the living quarters damaged by the tornado (ACRE 2012).
Although most University of Alabama students are not permanent residents in
Tuscaloosa, they spend considerable money on housing and other services during their

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stay at the university. Thus, city leaders were faced with difficult decisions about the
allocation of post-disaster resources.
This paper examines the prioritization of housing recovery in Tuscaloosa following
the April 27th, 2011 tornado and during the midst of the immense growth of the student
population. To our knowledge, only two studies have looked at the housing recovery
of a university town after a large natural disaster, and in both of these cases, the
campuses were damaged by earthquakes (Cassachia 2012; Comerio 1997). The
situation in Tuscaloosa was different, however, because the University of Alabama
campus and all student-designated housing complexes were spared from the storm,
which struck mostly low-income areas of town. However, the college town is an
intriguing setting in which to assess whether disaster capitalism is occurring because
we can determine if priority is given to the college student or to the lower-income,
permanent resident of the city. In addition, our research fills a gap by evaluating the
ability of displaced individuals to return to their communities by investigating the cost
of the post-storm rents. Past studies have focused on rebuilding of single-family
housing after disasters rather than multifamily complexes, rates of rebuilding, and the
values of homes after disasters. Although our findings are specific to Tuscaloosa and
not generalizable to a wider population, by examining data from multiple sources,
including city planning resources, apartment websites, and local newspaper archives,
we can answer the following research questions:

(1) Have destroyed and damaged complexes been rebuilt?

(2) Are the new rents of rebuilt complexes similar to the pre-storm cost of rents?

Since student-focused, rent-by-room housing units are more profitable than multi-
family, full-unit apartments or single-family rental homes, allocating more resources to
developing student housing would provide evidence of disaster capitalism if more
student housing has been built, and the notion that low-income individuals continue to
be vulnerable during the recovery process will be supported. First, we review the
literature on housing vulnerability after disasters.

Post-Disaster Housing Vulnerability

Research on vulnerability after disasters examines how patterns of early response,

along with short- and long-term recovery affect marginalized individuals. However, all
stages of vulnerability are connected. Most of the research on post-disaster housing
vulnerability has focused on the aftermaths of Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Andrew
(Bullard and Wright 2009a, 2009b; David and Enarson 2012). During a hurricane event
the physical place of a home or business leads to greater vulnerability, as lower-income
populations are more likely to live in the areas most susceptible to storms (Bullard and
Wright 2009). Rebuilding after a hurricane can further entrench an area’s vulnerability.
For example, wealthy citizens are able to rebuild in areas that have more natural
protections against storms, (for example, higher ground) or completely abandon the site

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of the destroyed home and rebuild in a different location. Additionally, less costly
housing is sometimes only rebuilt within areas that are vulnerable to storm impacts,
such as low lying areas or areas that have been repeatedly affected by prior storms
(Bassett 2009). Rebuilding in these susceptible areas perpetuates the cycle of
vulnerability for low-income individuals.
Scholars have documented the various ways that the intersections of race and class
result in housing vulnerability during the rebuilding process after a natural disaster.
Being poor and a person of colour has been associated with a lack of housing options
after a disaster strikes (Groen and Polivka 2010; Peacock et al. 2007). Multiple studies
cite evidence of racial discrimination by landlords who subtly or openly offered their
rental units solely to white evacuees (Weil 2007; Crowley 2006). Race and class also
affect residents’ abilities to return to their original homes. After Katrina, some African
Americans were prevented from returning to their homes by state agencies, developers,
and city planners whose priorities were to increasing the economic vitality of the
communities rather than allowing previous residents to return home (Nelson,
Ehrenfeucht, and Laska 2007). In areas with the largest proportions of low-income
individuals, the length of time to achieve full recovery averages around five years.
Housing for low-income African Americans was among the last to be rebuilt or repaired
after disasters (Bates and Green 2009). Rebuilding is easiest for populations who have
savings and access to forms of social currency such as community connections, political
clout, and higher education (Morrow 1997). Without access to these resources, areas
with higher concentrations of African-American and/or low-income residents receive
less government, charitable, and personal assistance, and individuals living in these
areas are less likely to be able to navigate the post-storm political landscape (Morrow
1997; Simmons and Sutter 2011).
Access to renter’s or homeowner’s insurance, including expensive additions such
as hurricane or flood insurance, also affects vulnerability post-disaster (Bassett 2009;
Peacock et al. 2007; Phillips and Fordham 2010). Bassett (2009) discovered that the
Louisiana recovery program The Road Home used access to insurance to determine
how much assistance would be granted to Hurricane Katrina victims. Without
homeowner’s insurance, a household received 70 % of the amount of assistance granted
to victims with insurance. Mississippi’s rebuilding program of the same name would
not assist any uninsured homeowners and required registration with FEMA, a process
that can be intimidating and difficult for low-income individuals (Bassett 2009). Due
to these challenges, uninsured homeowners may not be able to navigate assistance
programs or fully take advantage of their options after disasters, resulting in the slow
recovery of vulnerable pre-storm neighbourhoods.
The race and class composition of neighbourhoods also matter when locating
permanent homes. Low-income and African American residents have a more difficult
time finding permanent housing after natural disasters than their wealthy, white
counterparts. After Katrina, the population of wealthy and upper middle class
neighbourhoods increased from their pre-Katrina population levels. For example, only
9.9% of residents in the historically black Lower Ninth Ward returned to their pre-
Katrina homes, while the more racially diverse areas of New Orleans experienced return

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rates as high as 37 %, likely because of the historical significance of the neighbourhood

(Gonzales 2008). Gonzales reported, “The Garden District has seen 107 % of its
population return, the French Quarter 103 %, and an adjacent neighbourhood called
Faubourg Marigny has a 100.3 % return rate” (para. 16). However, low-income areas
of the city damaged by Katrina (and four weeks later, Rita) did not see this population
boom. Gonzales also estimated that over 41,000 low-income housing units were
destroyed in the state of Louisiana and only 43 % of these residences were slated to be
rebuilt through federal programs during recovery (2008).
One explanation for the hasty return of whites to their pre-Katrina neighbourhoods
was that these homes were generally less damaged, better insured, and built on higher
ground (Groen and Polivka 2010). However, Crowley (2006) noted that the rebuilding
debate centred on “who has the right to return” (p.141), arguing that properties with the
most damage were being converted to “greenspace”, and government emphasis on the
reduction of the environmental footprint of New Orleans led to the displacement of
many African Americans from their previous communities. Crowley recommended that
officials view Katrina as an opportunity to desegregate and create inclusive, mixed-
income neighbourhoods, even though she was sceptical that “NIMBY fights will
prevent the siting of affordable housing in poor neighbourhoods” (p. 142). To make
matters more difficult, rents have increased across many low-income areas of New
Orleans and other cities affected by Hurricane Katrina, with no plans for rebuilding low
income housing (Bullard and Wright 2009).
Renters face a particular set of challenges when trying to secure permanent housing
post-disaster, specifically because they must wait longer for affordable options to
become available (Comerio, Landis, and Rofe 1994; Peacock, Dash and Zhang 2007).
Peacock, Dash, and Zhang (2007) reported that low-income rental housing construction
is unlikely to be a priority because housing construction in the United States is a market-
driven process. New housing is constructed for those who can afford it, while older
housing is left behind for low-income residents. The post-disaster housing recovery
follows the same “trickle-down” pattern, with wealthy homeowners finding permanent
residences at much higher rates than low-income renters (Peacock et al. 2007). Low-
income residents are left with undesirable housing that is vulnerable to the next weather
disaster.
By May 2008, nearly three years after Katrina, low-income, African American
storm victims were over three times more likely to still be living in FEMA trailers than
their white counterparts, while 47 % of black households affected by the storm were
living in different locations than pre-storm (Alfred 2008). These numbers reflect the
neglect to rebuild areas with predominantly low-income and African-American
populations. These populations are also the least likely to receive long-term aid and/or
recovery in an efficient amount of time (Morrow 1999).
Ultimately, research concludes that low-income individuals and people of colour
face significant barriers when trying to locate permanent post-storm housing. During
the rebuilding process, wealthier areas are rebuilt more quickly. The lack of funding
funnelled to areas with high populations of individuals in poverty and/or people of
colour impede successful and timely rebuilding, especially reconstruction of rental

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properties (Bates and Green 2009; Comerio et al. 1994; Peacock et al. 2007). The
overall recommendation among researchers is that focusing on rebuilding low-income
housing results in many positive outcomes, including a reduction in vulnerability for
the future and faster recovery throughout all affected areas (Comerio et al. 1998;
Khunwishit and McEntire 2012).

The Economic and Housing Climate in Tuscaloosa, 2011

The tornado that struck on April 27th, 2011 occurred at a time when several factors
were influencing the economic development in the city of Tuscaloosa. The population
had increased from 77,906 in 2000 to 90,637 in 2010 (United States Census Bureau
2011). The University of Alabama was, and still is, the city’s largest employer and the
centre of Tuscaloosa’s economy (Amon 2013). Over the past decade, the increase in
the student population at the University of Alabama has been unprecedented, with
enrolments skyrocketing from 20,969 students in 2004 to 34,852 in 2013 (University
of Alabama 2014). As could be expected, the number of student housing complexes
increased simultaneously with the record enrolment increase (Rupinski 2012), thus a
student housing boom was already in progress before the April 27th, 2011 tornado.
Developers from outside of Tuscaloosa, dealing with a depressed national housing
market, viewed Tuscaloosa’s need for student housing, coupled with the availability of
land after the tornado, as the perfect investment opportunity. Despite disagreements
between the mayor, city council, and local business leaders, by January 2012 three new
student housing developments were in progress in areas untouched by the storm. It
should be noted that in the official housing needs analysis provided by ACRE, the
recommendations for student housing read, in bolded font,
“…the forecasted growth [of University of Alabama enrolment] is at a lessening
level than recent years. We wish to express extreme caution to not presume extreme
demand growth for student housing based on the recent enrolment trends as well as
projections only within the term of this forecast.” (ACRE 2012, p. 24).
Tuscaloosa leaders were juggling the concurrent events of student population
growth and the major rebuilding necessary in areas of the city devastated by a natural
disaster. The timing of these two events allows for a fascinating case study about how
housing resources are prioritized when multiple factions are under-served by the
housing market.
The findings from previous research suggest that lack of access to affordable rental
housing is a problem cities face in the aftermath of storms. We are interested in if
Tuscaloosa’s recovery adequately addresses the needs of residents seeking multifamily
housing or if student population growth was prioritized in the development of housing
in tornado-stricken areas. In other words, are lower-income individuals vulnerable in
the housing recovery process, and are higher-cost, higher-rent student housing projects
privileged, reflecting a disaster capitalism approach?

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Date and Methods

Our analysis focuses on the rebuilding of apartment complexes in Tuscaloosa after

the April 27, 2011 tornado. We chose this particular aspect of the rebuilding process
for two main reasons. First, apartment complexes in areas hit by the tornado housed a
diverse group of low- to middle-income Tuscaloosa residents, including students,
young adults, and working families. Second, the data on apartment complexes was
easily accessible compared to data on the rebuilding of houses and businesses, and we
will address our problems in accessing this data in the findings section. Thus, the
availability of apartment complex data enabled us to assess the availability of this type
of housing after the storm.
The apartment analysis required a two-step data gathering process. We first
consulted the Tuscaloosa, AL Housing Needs Analysis, conducted by the Alabama
Centre for Real Estate (ACRE) and completed on February 14, 2012, to access
information about all apartment complexes that were destroyed or damaged in the path
of the April 27th tornadoes. The names of apartments that were damaged or destroyed
are listed on pages 123-130 of ACRE’s report. Additional information that was
available for each apartment complex included the level of damages (undetectable, light,
heavy, or destroyed), the total number of units in the complexes, the total number of
bedrooms in the complexes, the assessed value of the properties, and the assessed value
of each unit. For our purposes, we were most interested in the names of the apartments,
the level of damages for each complex, and the total number of bedrooms and units in
each complex.
The second step involved locating essential characteristics of the complexes before-
and-after the storm, namely the cost of rent before the tornadoes struck and the cost of
rent after the storm (if the complexes were being rebuilt). To find the rents of the
complexes pre-April 27th, we contacted four of the large property management
companies and attempted to locate individual property owners. However, three
companies refused to give us the pre-storm rents for the complexes and one company
never returned our phone calls. Many of the other properties had individual owners for
whom we could not find current contact information. However, we were able to gather
most of our data for the apartments using the tool “The Wayback Machine” (2013). The
Wayback Machine allows users to access a website as it existed on a particular date in
history. For properties that were once listed on websites such as apartmentfinder.com
and similar housing search engines, it was possible to locate pre-storm rental
information. We used April 26th, 2011 as our search date to locate complexes before
the storm via The Wayback Machine. Still, there were several properties listed for
which we could not find any pre-April 27th rental information. Of the 32 multifamily
(non-condominium) units in the tornado zone, we were able to retrieve pre-tornado
information on twelve properties.
To find current information on the properties, we used two methods. First, we
searched the addresses of apartment complexes on Google to gather information about
what types of housing were replacing the pre-April 27th complexes. If we could not find

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information online, we drove to the addresses to see if any rebuilding was occurring.
Many properties were renamed or sold to new property owners, therefore physically
visiting the sites of former complexes was necessary to find out if the property had a
new name or was up for sale by a particular property owner. After completing these
searches in March 2013, we were able to locate pre- and post-April 27th information on
a total of ten properties, twelve when counting the new construction of The Lofts, an
apartment complex built in the location of a former shopping centre, and Arlington
Apartments, which was destroyed in the tornado but not included in the ACRE report.
The available data allows us to answer three main research questions. First, have
damaged or destroyed complexes been rebuilt? Second, what are the rent costs of the
rebuilt apartments? Do the rent prices suggest the complex has been rebuilt for the
resident who lived there prior to the tornado? In order to answer this question, we first
needed to operationalize lower-income rentals. To do this, we searched for median rent
prices per bedroom for the zip codes 35401 and 35404, the locations of most of the
tornado damage and where all of the damaged apartment complexes were located.
According to the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development, the
median monthly rental costs in Tuscaloosa are $611 per month for a one-bedroom
apartment, $808 dollars per month for a two-bedroom unit and $1014 for a three-
bedroom unit (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development 2013).
Tuscaloosa’s monthly rents are below the national averages of $973 per month for a
one-bedroom apartment, $1208 per month for a two-bedroom rental, and $1,511 per
month for a three-bedroom unit (My Apartment Map 2015). As such, we decided to
operationalize lower-income rentals as any complexes whose rents were less than the
average monthly rental costs listed for these particular Tuscaloosa zip codes.
Answering these research questions will allow us to determine if the needs of lower-
income renters are being met since the storm or if Tuscaloosa is participating in disaster
capitalism, creating a higher cost market for student renters.

Findings

We were able to find considerable before-and-after storm information on twelve of

the thirty-one multifamily housing units listed on the Tuscaloosa Forward website, as
well as information for an additional new construction (The Lofts) and an apartment
complex (Arlington Square) which had not been included in the ACRE report despite
being destroyed by the tornado. Table 1 presents the following information; apartment
name before and after the storm (if the name changed), the severity of damage as
reported in the Tuscaloosa Forward report, if the property has been rebuilt or repaired,
the typical resident before and after the storm, rent per bedroom before and after the
storm, number of units in the complex before and after the storm, and the percent (%)
increase in rent for each property. We discuss the highlights of these findings below.

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Table 1: Apartment Complex Information

Apartment Name Severity of Income of Resident Income of

(Before/After) Damage Rebuilt/Repaired Before Storm Resident After # Units Before
Charleston Destroyed No Low Income None 272
Chastain Manor Destroyed Yes Retirement Retirement 112
Forest Lake Apartments Light Yes Low Income/Student Low Income/Student 60
Graceland Destroyed No, Seized by City Low Income Alberta Elementary 194
Rosedale Destroyed Yes Public Housing Public Housing 382
Wood Manor Destroyed No Student/Mid income None 76
Pine Meadow/Ashley Heavy Yes Low Income Student 40
Cedar Crest/The Gates Destroyed Yes Low Income Student/Higher Income 64
Cedar Crest Square/The Gates Light (Torn down) Yes Mid Income Student/Higher income 64
The Lofts New Construction New Construction Shopping Plaza Student N/A
2111 University Blvd East Destroyed No Low Income None 40
Arlington Square Apartments Destroyed No Low Income/Student None N/A

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Table 1. Apartment Complex Information (continued)

# of Bedrooms # of Bedrooms Average Rent Average Rent

Apartment Name Before After Before After Percent Increase
Charleston 1-2 bedrooms Not rebuilt $485-$535 Not Rebuilt Not Rebuilt
Chastain Manor N/A N/A N/A $390-$585 N/A
Forest Lake Apartments 1-2 bedrooms 1-2 Bedrooms $450-$625 $475-$750 5.50% - 20.00%
Graceland N/A Not rebuilt N/A Not Rebuilt Not Rebuilt
Rosedale N/A N/A Income based Income Based N/A
Wood Manor 2 Bedroom Not Rebuilt $650 Not Rebuilt Not Rebuilt
Pine Meadow/Ashley 2 Bedroom 1 Bedroom $485 $695 43.00%
Cedar Crest/The Gates 2 Bedroom 2 Bedroom $550 $1,350 108.00%
Cedar Crest Square/The Gates 2 Bedroom 2 Bedroom $650 $1,350 108.00%
The Lofts New Construction 2-5 Bedroom New Construction $655/ Bedroom New Construction
2111 University BLVD E 1 Bedroom Not Rebuilt $400 Not Rebuilt Not Rebuilt
Arlington Square Apartments 1-2 Bedrooms Not Rebuilt $479 Not Rebuilt Not Rebuilt

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Rebuilding of Complexes
The Tuscaloosa Forward report lists ten multifamily complexes as destroyed, nine
as heavily damaged, seven as lightly damaged and five as having undetectable damage.
Of the twelve complexes for which we had information, eight were completely
destroyed, two had light damage, one had undetectable damage and one had heavy
damage after the storm. One of the new multifamily housing complexes being built was
formerly a shopping centre with stores and entertainment catering to a lower-income
population (e.g. Big Lots and Chuck E. Cheese). Of the eleven apartments that existed
before the storm, all but three (Arlington Square, Graceland, and Charleston) were
rebuilt or in the process of rebuilding. According to Tuscaloosa Forward, the 194-
bedroom Graceland Apartments was seized by the city of Tuscaloosa under eminent
domain to build the new Alberta Elementary School after the former school was
destroyed in the tornado. The owner of Graceland Apartments received $500,000 for
his property, but there have been no plans to rebuild a comparable complex for a similar
demographic. For these lower-income residents of Graceland, Charleston, and
Arlington Square, approximately 466 bedrooms (excluding Arlington Square, for
which we lacked this information) that were once available to be rented have
disappeared, reducing the affordable housing options in Tuscaloosa.
These findings are similar to those of Bullard and Wright (2009), who found that a
considerable amount of housing (approximately 43%) would not be repaired or rebuilt
in low-income areas of New Orleans Post-Katrina. Similarly, Comerio et al. (1994)
found that after the Loma Prieta earthquake in San Francisco in 1989, 90% of
multifamily residences were not rebuilt one year after the earthquake, and 50% of
multifamily residences were not rebuilt four years later. Lu, Peacock, Zhang, and Dash
(2005) found that rental housing was much slower to recover than owner-occupied
housing in Miami after Hurricane Andrew. Although we do not have data on single-
family rental housing units, we can conclude that multifamily complexes have not been
rebuilt to replace residences that were destroyed by the tornado, affecting housing
availability for low-income families three years after the storm.
The sole public housing development that was destroyed in the storm was Rosedale
Court, a 382-bedroom complex. Remodelling of this facility had already been
scheduled before the storm decimated the community. Although the government was
fulfilling its duty to house the poorest citizens of Tuscaloosa, housing for individuals
on the margins has not been replaced. Additionally, it is important to remember that the
goal of public housing is to transition individuals to the private market, and a lack of
affordable rental options may be detrimental to those trying to improve their housing
situations.

Cost of Units
According to Table 1, eight of the apartment complexes were classified as lower-
income rentals before the storm. Out of these eight residences, seven are being repaired,
but only two of these complexes are or will be housing lower-income residents. These
new residences are renting at higher rates, sometimes charging up to twice the rent as

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the pre-storm complex. For example, the former Cedar Crest Square apartments, now
named The Gates, previously rented at $600 a month for a two-bedroom apartment. In
contrast, The Gates are now renting at $1350 a month for a two-bedroom apartment, a
108% increase. Additionally, Pine Place, renamed Ashley Manor post-tornado,
previously rented at $458 a month for a two-bedroom apartment and is now being
advertised as a one-bedroom apartment at $695 a month (a 43% per bedroom increase).
Overall, rents increased an average of 48% for all rebuilt structures. Affordable housing
units not being rebuilt combined with skyrocketing rents further burdens lower-income
Tuscaloosa residents in terms of housing options. The table reveals that there are now
no lower-income options for former residents of storm damaged areas. Residents either
have to pay higher rents, move to other neighbourhoods, relocate to other cities, or
move in with family members or friends in the same neighbourhoods or other parts of
town.
Ultimately, the rebuilding of complexes is resulting in the shifting of
neighbourhood dynamics and a privileging of University student needs over the needs
of permanent residents of Tuscaloosa. By neglecting to rebuild low cost housing options,
the low-income populations of Tuscaloosa are unable to return to their previous
neighbourhoods. This also results in a slower rate of rebuilding of infrastructure and
businesses in these communities. Additionally, victims of the tornado may be
perpetually stuck in a state of limbo, with no home to return to and no alternative
affordable housing options available. Adams, Hattum, and English (2009) argue that
disaster survivors often suffer what they call “chronic disaster syndrome”, which is a
manifestation of the combination of personal trauma, disaster capitalism and permanent
displacement from pre-storm neighbourhoods and social lives. A consequence of
chronic disaster syndrome is long-term stress which comes from the prolonged
instability that results from the initial disaster. The on-going financial and
psychological stressors created by the trauma effect survivors many years after the
recovery process has officially ended. Chronic disaster syndrome may also occur when
individuals who can return to their neighbourhoods discover that the physical and social
landscapes have been irreversibly changed. Ultimately, disaster-related consequences
for low-income survivors persist far longer than for their wealthier counterparts, and
Tuscaloosa’s current housing situation is replicating trends following other natural
disasters.
Besides individual concerns, without lower-income housing to return to, many
residents may leave the city entirely. Relocation of lower-income individuals is
detrimental to the city of Tuscaloosa and to the University. Without low wage workers,
the city and University may become increasingly dependent on student workers who
are not permanent residents of the city and are less likely to become long-term low
wage employees, such as janitors, fast food workers, servers, and security workers. In
the zip code 35401, where most of the damaged complexes were located, the median
income for 2010 was $17, 806 (Population Studies Center 2015). At this income, any
rent higher than $494 dollars a month exceeds the standard stating that individuals
should not spend more than one-third of their income on housing (Pivo 2013).

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Furthermore, the high cost of housing may lead lower-income individuals to become
temporarily or permanently homeless.
It does appear that the Tuscaloosa student housing boom may be ending. During
Fall 2013, a Student Housing Commission was developed to empirically validate the
need for more student housing in Tuscaloosa. This commission was only assembled
after a contentious battle between lower-income residents in Downtown Tuscaloosa and
city planners and council members (who sided with housing developers) over building
a housing complex for “young professionals”. The building of this complex would lead
to the movement of several historical buildings and houses from a neighbourhood in
Tuscaloosa with a historic past (Rupinski 2013). Along with voicing their issues about
the treatment of historical neighbourhoods, the current residents of this area (who would
be displaced upon approval of the complex), claimed the new building would house
mostly students. As of November 26th, 2013, the Student Housing Commission
recommended a “moratorium on building student apartment complexes with 200 or
more beds” (Morton 2013). The commission’s report revealed that many of the
apartment complexes in town that cater specifically to students are below capacity,
compared to the same time in 2012. Evidence for overbuilding of student housing
provides further support to the argument that city leaders did not view the housing needs
of lower-income residents of Tuscaloosa as a priority and instead privileged the needs
of the temporary student residents.

Discussion

The goals of our study were to (1) assess if apartment complexes were rebuilt after
the April 27th Tuscaloosa tornado and (2) if these complexes were rebuilt with the
previous tenants in mind by assessing number of units, bedrooms, and cost of rents.
Our research reveals that after the Tuscaloosa tornado, lower-income individuals were
not prioritized in the recovery process. On the contrary, the multi-family complexes
that have been rebuilt since the storm have been almost exclusively built for the
university student population, with the exception of the Rosedale Public Housing. This
focus on student housing developments occurred contrary to the recommendation of the
official housing needs analysis that was commissioned by the city in 2012. Out of the
twelve apartment complexes included in this study, eight housed lower-income
individuals before the storm. Out of the seven complexes being rebuilt, only two have
rents below the median cost of housing, making it almost impossible for past residents
of these complexes to return to their pre-storm neighbourhoods. Additionally, rents for
the complexes included in this study have risen by 48% since the storm. While the
Rosedale Public Housing complex was rebuilt swiftly, public housing only helps the
poorest of the poor, and also exists to transition residents on housing assistance to
renting in the private market. At the current speed of rebuilding, it is unlikely that the
vulnerable populations affected by the storm will be able to find affordable housing
options in the storm-damaged neighbourhoods in the immediate future. Greene (1992;
as cited in Fothergill and Peek 2003) citing the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban

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Development, stated that low-income housing is rebuilt or replaced 3 to 8 years after a

disaster event, and if Tuscaloosa follows that trend, lower-income residents will have
to creatively negotiate the housing market in order to find shelter.
Our results are concerning because past research has indicated the importance of
the inclusion of low-income citizens in rebuilding efforts (Khunwishit and McEntire
2012). In a University town, working-class individuals are necessary for the functioning
of the economy; these citizens are the service workers on which the city and population
rely. Without housing options, many renters may choose or have no other option but to
leave the city in order to relocate to a more hospitable area of the state or country
(Adams, Hattum, and English 2009; Crowley 2006). Additionally, the goal of
rebuilding efforts should ideally be to reduce or eliminate the vulnerability to disaster
for all citizens, no matter their socioeconomic status (Fothergill and Peek 2003). It is
also important to find out what happens to these individuals when their communities
have not been rebuilt. Furthermore, since lower-income citizens are less likely to be
able to voice and protect their interests during post-disaster recovery, safeguarding the
interests of these residents should be a priority for city officials.
The practical applications of our research should be acknowledged. Although it may
be too late to turn back the clock to April 28th, 2011 and rewrite the rebuilding
procedures for Tuscaloosa, our results offer a warning to political leaders and
emergency managers in Dixie Alley and beyond about the allocation of resources
during housing recovery. We agree with authors (including, Comerio, Landis, and Rofe
1994, Morrow 1999, Van Zandt et al. 2012) who encourage preventative measures such
as community vulnerability mapping to reduce post-storm vulnerabilities for
individuals who are already marginalized pre-storm. For example, Morrow (1999)
argues that emergency managers should first locate vulnerable populations in their
communities (e.g. the elderly, low-income residents, ethnic minorities, and immigrants)
and then coordinate relief efforts based on localized community needs. This involves
trusting that residents of these neighbourhoods are knowledgeable about the strengths
and the needs of their communities. Grassroots activism, partnered with GIS mapping
of community vulnerability, results in not only building back what was destroyed, but
builds a sustainable community that can address the deep-rooted causes of vulnerability.
In addition, to ensure that rental housing is a focus in post-disaster recovery, local, state
and national leaders should be prepared to implement emergency policies including
incentives to rebuild rental properties, mortgage assistance for rental property owners
in federal disaster areas, and emergency procedures to quicken the pace at which
governments can acquire abandoned land (Zhang and Peacock 2009).
Our research fills an important gap in the literature on housing recovery after natural
disasters by exposing the inequality experienced by low income renters who desire to
live in multifamily complexes. These renters are either unable to find housing in their
communities, or they find housing that is not affordable or built with a different type of
tenant in mind (in this case, college students). Our findings also support the growing
body of research argues that the United States increasingly uses neoliberal approaches
to problem solving, including solutions to disaster recovery. The needs of low-income
residents are trumped by the profit motive.

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The findings from our analysis must be interpreted with caution due to the limited
number of apartments for which we were able to obtain pre-and post-tornado
information. However, we are able to present a snapshot of the allocation of resources
during rebuilding in Tuscaloosa. Our paper does not assess the replacement and
rebuilding of single family homes because that information was not readily available
when our data was collected, and as such we cannot generalize our findings to explain
the rebuilding of single-family housing. Future research in Tuscaloosa should compare
the number single family homes available for both rental and purchase before the storm
to the number available after the storm in order to find out about the availability of low-
income housing options of these types. Future research should also investigate the
extent to which residents from low-income neighbourhoods who were affected by the
Tuscaloosa tornado (and other disasters) are involved in the recovery process in both
the immediate aftermath of the events and many years later.

Conclusion

Social vulnerability theory states that marginalized populations will be the most
susceptible to the harms and impacts of natural and manmade disasters (Bolin 2006).
This vulnerability extends into the recovery process; lower-income and minority
residents are often among the last to return home if they are able to return at all.
Vulnerability persists when civic leaders privilege profits over community housing
needs. In Tuscaloosa, the student residents spend tens of thousands of dollars on
housing and tuition each year. Their presence in the college town allows for local
restaurants, shopping centres, and entertainment complexes to profit substantially.
Overall, the rebuilding trend in Tuscaloosa is similar to previous post-disaster
recovery efforts that have resulted in increased inequality and vulnerability for affected
populations while privileging the needs of non-permanent residents as a means of
generating profits (Adams et al. 2009; Bullard and Wright 2009a; Fothergill and Peek
2003). The housing boom that occurred in Tuscaloosa after the tornado and concurrent
with University growth has resulted in cumulative vulnerabilities for individuals who
were left homeless after the storm and cumulative advantages for developers of student
apartment complexes. The University of Alabama needs not only students, but also
maintenance workers, janitorial staff, and cafeteria workers to be able to function. City
leaders must consider the livelihoods of all of their citizens during the recovery process
in order for both the Tuscaloosa economy and community to thrive.

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