Balacuit v CFI

[G.R. No. L-38429 June 30, 1988]

Facts: The Municipal Board of the City of Butuan passed Ordinance 640 which makes it
unlawful for movie theaters to charge the full ticket price for any movie or other public
exhibitions, games, contests, or other performances to children 7-12 years old. Owners
of movie theaters filed a complaint to declare Ordinance 640 unconstitutional on the
ground that it is an invalid exercise of police power. The City of Butuan justifies
Ordinance 640 by invoking the general welfare clause embodied in its charter.

Issue: Whether or not it is within the power of the City of Butuan to fix the prices of
admission tickets to movies and similar public exhibitions?

Held: No. Although the operation of theaters, cinematographs and other places of
public exhibition are subject to regulation by the municipal council in the exercise of
delegated police power by the local government, it does not include the fixing of
admission ticket prices.

There must be public necessity which demands the adoption of proper measures to
secure the ends sought to be attained by the enactment of the ordinance, and the large
discretion is necessarily vested in the legislative authority to determine not only what the
interests of the public require, but what measures are necessary for the protection of
such interests. The methods or means used to protect the public health, morals, safety
or welfare, must have some relation to the end in view, for under the guise of the police
power, personal rights and those pertaining to private property will not be permitted to
be arbitrarily invaded by the legislative department. In this case, the ordinance is not
justified by any necessity for the public interest. The police power legislation must be
firmly grounded on public interest and welfare, and a reasonable relation must exist
between purposes and means. The evident purpose of the ordinance is to help ease the
burden of cost on the part of parents who have to shell out the same amount of money
for the admission of their children, as they would for themselves, a reduction in the
price of admission would mean corresponding savings for the parents; however, the
petitioners are the ones made to bear the cost of these savings. There is no discernible
relation between the ordinance and the promotion of public health, safety, morals and
the general welfare. While it is true that a business may be regulated, it is equally true
that such regulation must be within the bounds of reason, that is, the regulatory
ordinance must be reasonable, and its provisions cannot be oppressive amounting to an
arbitrary interference with the business or calling subject of regulation. A lawful business
or calling may not, under the guise of regulation, be unreasonably interfered with even
by the exercise of police power. Ordinance 640 clearly invades the personal and
property rights of theater owners for being unreasonable and an undue restraint of
trade.
 Tan v COMELEC
[G.R. No. 73155 July 11, 1986]

Facts: Batas Pambansa Blg. 885-An Act Creating a New Province in the Island of
Negros to be known as the Province of Negros del Norte was enacted. The Cities of
Silay, Cadiz, and San Carlos and the municipalities of Calatrava, Taboso, Escalante,
Sagay, Manapla, Victorias, E.R. Magalona; and Salvador Benedicto, all in the northern
portion of the Island of Negros, are separated from the province and shall composed a
new one to be called as the Province of Negros del Norte. A plebiscite was held on
January 3, 1986 and was confined only to the inhabitants of the cities and municipalities
that will comprise the new province. Petitioners questioned the constitutionality of the
law and prayed that the plebiscite be declared void for its noncompliance with the
Constitution because of the exclusions of the voters from the rest of the province of
Negros Occidental.

Issue: Whether or not the plebiscite held which only includes the voters of the cities and
towns which would comprise the New Province is unconstitutional as it excluded the
voters in the remaining areas of Negros Occidental?

Held: Yes. Article XI Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution provides that “No province, city,
municipality or barrio may be created, divided, merged abolished, or its boundary
substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local
government code, and subject to the approval by a majority of the votes in a plebiscite
in the unit or units affected.” It is thus inescapable to conclude that the boundaries of the
existing province of Negros Occidental would necessarily be substantially altered by the
division of its existing boundaries in order that there can be created the proposed new
province of Negros del Norte. Plain and simple logic will demonstrate than that two
political units would be affected. The first would be the parent province of Negros
Occidental because its boundaries would be substantially altered. The other affected
entity would be composed of those in the area subtracted from the mother province to
constitute the proposed province of Negros del Norte. To form the new province of
Negros del Norte no less than three cities and eight municipalities will be subtracted
from the parent province of Negros Occidental. This will result in the removal of
approximately 2,768.4 square kilometers from the land area of an existing province
whose boundaries will be consequently substantially altered. It becomes easy to realize
that the consequent effects of the division of the parent province necessarily will affect
all the people living in the separate areas of Negros Occidental and the proposed
province of Negros del Norte. The economy of the parent province as well as that of the
new province will be inevitably affected, either for the better or for the worse. Whatever
be the case, either or both of these political groups will be affected and they are,
therefore, the unit or units referred to in Section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution which
must be included in the plebiscite contemplated therein.
 Padilla v COMELEC
[G.R. No. 103328 October 19, 1992]

Facts: Pursuant to RA 7155 which creates the Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa in the

Province of Camarines Norte to be composed of Barangays Tulay-Na-Lupa, Lugui, San
Antonio, Mabilo I, Napaod, Benit, Bayan-Bayan, Matanlang, Pag-Asa, Maot, and
Calabasa, all in the Municipality of Labo, same province, a plebiscite was held
throughout the Municipality of Labo. The result was the rejection and and disapproval of
the independent Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa. Consequently, the Governor of
Camarines Norte sought to set aside the said plebiscite arguing that the plebiscite was
a complete failure and that the results obtained were invalid and illegal because the
plebiscite should have been conducted only in the political unit or units affected, i.e. the
12 barangays comprising the new Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa and should not have
included the remaining area of the mother unit of the Municipality of Labo, Camarines
Norte.

Issue: Whether or not the inhabitants of the remaining area of the mother unit of the
Municipality of Labo, Camarines Norte should have been excluded in the plebiscite?

Held: No. When the law states that the plebiscite shall be conducted "in the political
units directly affected," it means that residents of the political entity who would be
economically dislocated by the separation of a portion thereof have a right to vote in
said plebiscite. Evidently, what is contemplated by the phase "political units directly
affected," is the plurality of political units which would participate in the plebiscite.
Logically, those to be included in such political areas are the inhabitants of the 12
barangays of the proposed Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa as well as those living in the
parent Municipality of Labo, Camarines Norte.
 Tatel v Virac
[G.R. No. 40243 March 11, 1992]

Facts: Municipal officials of Virac, Catanduanes found the warehouse owned by

Celestino Tatel, a businessman engaged in the import and export of abaca and other
products, in violation of Ordinance No. 13, series of 1952 which prohibits the
construction of warehouses near a block of houses either in the poblacion or barrios
without maintaining the necessary distance of 200 meters from said block of houses to
avoid loss of lives and properties by accidental fire. Based from the complaints the
disturbance caused by the operation of the abaca bailing machine inside the warehouse
of Tatel which affected the peace and tranquility of the neighborhood due to the smoke,
obnoxious odor and dust emitted by the machine, a committee was appointed by the
municipal council of Virac to investigate the matter. Consequently, the Municipal Council
passed Resolution No. 29 which declares Tatel’s warehouse a public nuisance within
the purview of Article 694 of the Civil Code of the Philippines and directing him to
remove and transfer said warehouse to a more suitable place within two (2) months
from receipt of the said resolution.

Issue: Whether or not Ordinance No. 13 series of 1952 is a legitimate and valid
exercise of police power of the Municipal Council?

Held: Yes. Ordinance No. 13, series of 1952, was passed by the Municipal Council of
Virac in the exercise of its police power. It is a settled principle of law that municipal
corporations are agencies of the State for the promotion and maintenance of local self-
government and as such are endowed with the police powers in order to effectively
accomplish and carry out the declared objects of their creation. Its authority emanates
from the general welfare clause under the Administrative Code. For an ordinance to be
valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the municipality to enact but
must also be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law, and must be in
consonance with certain well established and basic principles of a substantive nature.
These principles require that a municipal ordinance (1) must not contravene the
Constitution or any statute (2) must not be unfair or oppressive (3) must not be partial or
discriminatory (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade (5) must be general and
consistent with public policy, and (6) must not be unreasonable. Ordinance No. 13,
Series of 1952, meets these criteria. The purpose of the Ordinance is well within the
objectives of sound government. No undue restraint is placed upon the petitioner or for
anybody to engage in trade but merely a prohibition from storing inflammable products
in the warehouse because of the danger of fire to the lives and properties of the people
residing in the vicinity. As far as public policy is concerned, there can be no better policy
than what has been conceived by the municipal government.
 Solicitor General v The Metropolitan Manila Authority
[G.R. No. 102782 December 11, 1991]

Facts: In Metropolitan Traffic Command, West Traffic District vs. Hon. Arsenio M.
Gonong, the Court held that the confiscation of the license plates of motor vehicles for
traffic violations was not among the sanctions that could be imposed by the Metro
Manila Commission under PD 1605. Despite this ruling, several cases of confiscation of
driver’s license and removal of license plates by traffic enforcers for alleged violation of
traffic rules were filed in contradiction of the mentioned ruling of the Court.
Consequently, the Metropolitan Manila Authority issued Ordinance No. 11, Series of
1991, authorizing itself "to detach the license plate/tow and impound attended/
unattended/ abandoned motor vehicles illegally parked or obstructing the flow of traffic
in Metro Manila. Traffic enforces in Mandaluyong invoked Ordinance No. 7, Series of
1988, of the Municipality of Mandaluyong which authorizes them to confiscate driver's
licenses and the removal of license plates of motor vehicles for traffic violations.

Issue: Whether or not Ordinance No.11, Seriesof l991 of the Metropolitan Manila
Authority and Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1988 of the Municipality of Mandaluyong are
void for being contrary to existing law?

Held: Yes. It is not disputed that both measures were enacted to promote the comfort
and convenience of the public and to alleviate the worsening traffic problems in
Metropolitan Manila due in large part to violations of traffic rules. The measures in
question are enactments of local governments acting only as agents of the national
legislature. Necessarily, the acts of these agents must reflect and conform to the will of
their principal. To test the validity of such acts in the specific case, the particular
requisites of a valid ordinance as laid down by the accepted principles governing
municipal corporations shall be applied. According to Elliot, a municipal ordinance, to be
valid: 1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; 2) must not be unfair or
oppressive; 3) must not be partial or discriminatory; 4) must not prohibit but may
regulate trade; 5) must not be unreasonable; and 6) must be general and consistent
with public policy. The measures in this case do not pass the first criterion because they
do not conform to the existing law. The pertinent law is PD 1605. PD 1605 does not
allow either the removal of license plates or the confiscation of driver's licenses for
traffic violations committed in Metropolitan Manila. In fact, it prohibits the imposition of
such sanctions in Metro Manila. The measures in question do not merely add to the
requirement of PD 1605 but, worse, impose sanctions the decree does not allow and in
fact actually prohibits. In so doing, the ordinances disregard and violate and in effect
partially repeal the law.
 Binay v Domingo
[G.R. No. 92389 September 11, 1991]

Facts: The Municipality of Makati approved Resolution No. 60 which provides burial
assistance program. Qualified beneficiaries are bereaved families of Makati whose
gross family income does not exceed two thousand pesos (P2,000.00) a month. The
beneficiaries, upon fulfillment of other requirements, would receive the amount of five
hundred pesos (P500.00) cash relief from the Municipality of Makati. Resolution No. 60
was referred to Commission on Audit (COA) for its expected allowance in audit but the
COA disapproved Resolution No. 60 and disallowed in audit the disbursement of finds
for the implementation thereof.

Issue: Whether or not Resolution No. 60, re-enacted under Resolution No. 243, of the
Municipality of Makati is a valid exercise of police power under the general welfare
clause?

Held: Yes. Municipal governments exercise police power under the general welfare
clause: pursuant thereto they are clothed with authority to "enact such ordinances and
issue such regulations as may be necessary to carry out and discharge the
responsibilities conferred upon it by law, and such as shall be necessary and proper to
provide for the health, safety, comfort and convenience, maintain peace and order,
improve public morals, promote the prosperity and general welfare of the municipality
and the inhabitants thereof, and insure the protection of property therein." The police
power of a municipal corporation is broad, and has been said to be commensurate with,
but not to exceed, the duty to provide for the real needs of the people in their health,
safety, comfort, and convenience as consistently as may be with private rights. It
extends to all the great public needs, and, in a broad sense includes all legislation and
almost every function of the municipal government. It covers a wide scope of subjects,
and, while it is especially occupied with whatever affects the peace, security, health,
morals, and general welfare of the community, it is not limited thereto, but is broadened
to deal with conditions which exists so as to bring out of them the greatest welfare of the
people by promoting public convenience or general prosperity, and to everything
worthwhile for the preservation of comfort of the inhabitants of the corporation (62
C.J.S. Sec. 128). Thus, it is deemed inadvisable to attempt to frame any definition which
shall absolutely indicate the limits of police power. The care for the poor is generally
recognized as a public duty. The support for the poor has long been an accepted
exercise of police power in the promotion of the common good. Resolution No. 60, re-
enacted under Resolution No. 243, of the Municipality of Makati is a paragon of the
continuing program of our government towards social justice. The Burial Assistance
Program is a relief of pauperism, though not complete. The loss of a member of a family
is a painful experience, and it is more painful for the poor to be financially burdened by
such death. Resolution No. 60 vivifies the very words of the late President Ramon
Magsaysay 'those who have less in life, should have more in law."
 Villacorta v Bernardo
[G.R. No. L-31249. August 19, 1986]

Facts: The Court of First Instance of Pangasinan declared Ordinance 22 null and void
for being violative of a general law. Ordinance 22 requires the subdivision plans to be
submitted to the City Engineer before the same is submitted for approval to and
verification by the General Land Registration Office or by the Director of Lands,
imposing a service fee of P0.03 per square meter of every lot subject of such
subdivision application, and requires a certification to be made by the City Engineer
before the Register of Deeds allows registration of the subdivision plan. The provisions
of the said Ordinance run in conflict with Act 496.

Issue: Whether or not Ordinance 22 is an invalid exercise of police power?

Held: Yes. To sustain the ordinance would be to open the floodgates to other
ordinances amending and so violating national laws in the guise of implementing them.
In the instant case, Ordinance No. 22 suffers from the defect of violating this authority
for legislation in contravention of the national law by adding to its requirements.
 Cruz v Paras
[G.R. No. L-42571-72, July 25, 1983]

Facts: The Municipal Council of Bocaue, Bulacan passed Ordinance No. 84 which
prohibits and orders the closure of night clubs in the municipality. Clubowners assailed
the validity of the said ordinance as allegedly, it infringes on their property rights as a
municipality has no authority to prohibit a lawful business, occupation or calling.

Issue: Whether or not a municipal corporation can prohibit the exercise of a lawful trade
in its exercise of its police power?

Held: No. If night clubs were merely then regulated and not prohibited, certainly the
assailed ordinance would pass the test of validity. It cannot be said that such a
sweeping exercise of a lawmaking power by Bocaue could qualify under the term
reasonable. The objective of fostering public morals, a worthy and desirable end can be
attained by a measure that does not encompass too wide a field. Certainly the
ordinance on its face is characterized by overbreadth. The purpose sought to be
achieved could have been attained by reasonable restrictions rather than by an
absolute prohibition. It is clear that in the guise of a police regulation, there was in this
instance a clear invasion of personal or property rights, personal in the case of those
individuals desirous of patronizing those night clubs and property in terms of the
investments made and salaries to be earned by those therein employed.
 City Government of Quezon City v Vicente Ericta
[G.R. No. L-34915 June 24, 1983]

Facts: Ordinance No. 6118, S-64 provides that at least six (6) percent of the total area
of the memorial park cemetery shall be set aside for charity burial of deceased persons
who are paupers and have been residents of Quezon City for at least 5 years prior to
their death, to be determined by competent City Authorities. For several years, this
section of the Ordinance was not enforced but seven years after, the Quezon City
Council passed a resolution requesting the City Engineer, Quezon City, to stop any
further selling and/or transaction of memorial park lots in Quezon City where the owners
thereof have failed to donate the required 6% space intended for paupers burial. The
QC City Engineer then notified Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. in writing that Section 9 of
Ordinance No. 6118, S-64 would be enforced. Himlayang Pilipino then challenged the
validity of the said ordinance as it constitutes taking of property without just
compensation. It points out that if an owner is deprived of his property outright under the
State's police power, the property is generally not taken for public use but is urgently
and summarily destroyed in order to promote the general welfare.On the other hand, the
City Government contends that the Ordinance is a valid and reasonable exercise of
police power and that the land is taken for a public use as it is intended for the burial
ground of paupers.

Issue: Whether or not Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118 a valid exercise of police
power?

Held: No. The police power is usually exercised in the form of mere regulation or
restriction in the use of liberty or property for the promotion of the general welfare. It
does not involve the taking or confiscation of property with the exception of a few cases
where there is a necessity to confiscate private property in order to destroy it for the
purpose of protecting the peace and order and of promoting the general welfare as for
instance, the confiscation of an illegally possessed article, such as opium and firearms.
Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, Series of 1964 of Quezon City is not a mere police
regulation but an outright confiscation. It deprives a person of his private property
without due process of law, nay, even without compensation. There is no reasonable
relation between the setting aside of at least six (6) percent of the total area of an
private cemeteries for charity burial grounds of deceased paupers and the promotion of
health, morals, good order, safety, or the general welfare of the people. The ordinance
is actually a taking without compensation of a certain area from a private cemetery to
benefit paupers who are charges of the municipal corporation. Instead of building or
maintaining a public cemetery for this purpose, the city passes the burden to private
cemeteries.
 Ortigas, Co. v FEATI
[G.R. No. L-24670 December 14, 1979]

Facts: Ortigas, Co. is a limited partnership engaged in real estate business, developing
and selling lots to the public, particularly the Highway Hills Subdivision along Epifanio
de los Santos Avenue, Mandaluyong, Rizal. In 1952, Ortigas Co sold to Augusto Padilla
y Angeles and Natividad Angeles two parcels of land in Highway Hills Subdivision,
situated at Mandaluyong, Rizal. In 1962, the Angeles transferred their rights and
interests over the lots in favor of one Emma Chavez. The Deed of Sale contained
stipulations restricting the use of the lots exclusively for residential purposes.
Eventually, FEATI acquired the lots with the building restrictions annotated in the titles.
In 1963, FEATI began laying the foundation and commenced the construction of a
building on Lots Nos. 5 and 6, to be devoted to banking purposes. Ortigas, Co.
demanded in writing that FEATI stop the construction of the commercial building on the
said lots. The latter refused to comply with the demand, contending that the building
was being constructed in accordance with the zoning regulations, that the area along
the western part of Epifanio de los Santos Avenue (EDSA) from Shaw Boulevard to
Pasig River, has been declared a commercial and industrial zone, per Resolution No.
27, dated February 4, 1960 of the Municipal Council of Mandaluyong, Rizal. Ortigas Co
then filed a civil action asking for a writ of preliminary injunction to prevent FEATI from
continuing or completing the construction of a commercial bank building in the
premises.

Issues:
(1) Whether or not Resolution No. 27 s-1960 is a valid exercise of police power?
(2) Whether the said Resolution can nullify or supersede the contractual obligations
assumed by FEATI?

Held:
(1) Yes. Section 3 of R.A. No. 2264, otherwise known as the Local Autonomy Act,"
empowers a Municipal Council "to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or
regulations"; for the municipality. Clearly, the law does not restrict the exercise of the
power through an ordinance. Therefore, granting that Resolution No. 27 is not an
ordinance, it certainly is a regulatory measure within the intendment or ambit of the
word "regulation" under the provision. As a matter of fact the same section declares that
the power exists "(A)ny provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding ... " An
examination of Section 12 of the same law which prescribes the rules for its
interpretation likewise reveals that the implied power of a municipality should be
"liberally construed in its favor" and that "(A)ny fair and reasonable doubt as to the
existence of the power should be interpreted in favor of the local government and it shall
be presumed to exist." The same section further mandates that the general welfare
clause be liberally interpreted in case of doubt, so as to give more power to local
governments in promoting the economic conditions, social welfare and material
progress of the people in the community. The only exceptions under Section 12 are
existing vested rights arising out of a contract between "a province, city or municipality
on one hand and a third party on the other," in which case the original terms and
provisions of the contract should govern. The exceptions, clearly, do not apply in the
case at bar.

Resolution No. 27, s-1960 declaring the western part of highway 54, now E. de los
Santos Avenue (EDSA, for short) from Shaw Boulevard to the Pasig River as an
industrial and commercial zone, was obviously passed by the Municipal Council of
Mandaluyong, Rizal in the exercise of police power to safeguard or promote the health,
safety, peace, good order and general welfare of the people in the locality, Judicial
notice may be taken of the conditions prevailing in the area, especially where lots Nos.
5 and 6 are located. The lots themselves not only front the highway; industrial and
commercial complexes have flourished about the place. EDSA, a main traffic artery
which runs through several cities and municipalities in the Metro Manila area, supports
an endless stream of traffic and the resulting activity, noise and pollution are hardly
conducive to the health, safety or welfare of the residents in its route. Having been
expressly granted the power to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or regulations,
the municipality of Mandaluyong, through its Municipal 'council, was reasonably, if not
perfectly, justified under the circumstances, in passing the subject resolution.

(2) Yes. While non-impairment of contracts is constitutionally guaranteed, the rule is not
absolute, since it has to be reconciled with the legitimate exercise of police power, i.e.,
"the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education,
good order or safety and general welfare of the people. The motives behind the
passage of the questioned resolution being reasonable, and it being a " legitimate
response to a felt public need," not whimsical or oppressive, the non-impairment of
contracts clause of the Constitution will not bar the municipality's proper exercise of the
power.
 Magtajas v Pryce Properties Corporation
[G.R. No. 111097 July 20, 1994]

Facts: In 1992, PAGCOR decided to expand its operations in Cagayan De Oro City. To
this end, it leased a portion of a building belonging to Pryce Properties Corporation, Inc.,
renovated and equipped the same, and prepared to inaugurate its casino there during
the Christmas season. Consequently, the Sangguniang Panglungsod of CDO City
enacted Ordinance No. 3353 which prohibits the issuance of business permit and
cancelling existing business permits to any establishment for the using and allowing to
be used its premises for the operation of a casino. It also adopted Ordinance No. 3375-
93 which prohibits the operation of casino. Pryce and PAGCOR assailed the the validity
of the ordinances.

Issue: Whether or not Ordinance No. 3355 and Ordinance No. 3375-93 are valid
exercise of police power?

Held: No. For an ordinance to be valid, an ordinance must conform to the following
substantive requirements:

(1) It must not contravene the constitution or any statute.

(2) It must not be unfair or oppressive.
(3) It must not be partial or discriminatory.
(4) It must not prohibit but may regulate trade.
(5) It must be general and consistent with public policy.
(6) It must not be unreasonable.

Under Sec. 458 of the Local Government Code, local government units are authorized
to prevent or suppress, among others, "gambling and other prohibited games of
chance." Obviously, this provision excludes games of chance which are not prohibited
but are in fact permitted by law. The apparent flaw in the ordinances in question is that
they contravene P.D. 1869 which gives PAGCOR the power to centralize and regulate
all games of chance, including casinos on land and sea within the territorial jurisdiction
of the Philippines and the public policy embodied therein insofar as they prevent
PAGCOR from exercising the power conferred on it to operate a casino in Cagayan de
Oro City. The rationale of the requirement that the ordinances should not contravene a
statute is obvious. Municipal governments are only agents of the national government.
Local councils exercise only delegated legislative powers conferred on them by
Congress as the national lawmaking body. The delegate cannot be superior to the
principal or exercise powers higher than those of the latter. It is a heresy to suggest that
the local government units can undo the acts of Congress, from which they have
derived their power in the first place, and negate by mere ordinance the mandate of the
statute.