Must read cases under Civil Procedure Brondial Syllabus
2018
I. Jurisdiction
July 15, 2015. G.R. No. 191894.*
DANILO A. DUNCANO, petitioner, vs. HON.
SANDIGANBAYAN (2nd DIVISION), and HON.
OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR,
respondents.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Courts;
Sandiganbayan; The creation of the Sandiganbayan
was mandated by Section 5, Article XIII of the 1973
Constitution.—The creation of
the Sandiganbayan was mandated by Section 5,
Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution. By virtue of the
powers vested in him by the Constitution and
pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081, dated September
21, 1972, former President Ferdinand E. Marcos
issued P.D. No. 1486. The decree was later amended
by P.D. No. 1606, Section 20 of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129, P.D. No. 1860, and P.D. No. 1861. With the
advent of the 1987 Constitution, the special court was
retained as provided for in Section 4, Article XI
thereof. Aside from Executive Order Nos. 14 and 14-a,
and R.A. 7080, which expanded the jurisdiction of
the Sandi-
_______________
* THIRD DIVISION.
664
664 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Duncano vs. Sandiganbayan (2nd Division)
ganbayan, P.D. No. 1606 was further modified
by R.A. No. 7975, R.A. No. 8249, and just this year,
R.A. No. 10660.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Jurisdiction; Those
that fall within the original jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan are: (1) officials of the executive
branch with Salary Grade 27 or higher, and (2)
officials specifically enumerated in Section 4(A)(1)(a)
to (g), regardless of their salary grades.—Those that
fall within the original jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan are: (1) officials of the executive
branch with Salary Grade 27 or higher, and (2)
officials specifically enumerated in Section 4(A)(1)(a)
to (g), regardless of their salary grades. While the first
part of Section 4(A) covers only officials of the
executive branch with Salary Grade 27 and higher, its
second part specifically includes other executive
officials whose positions may not be of Salary Grade
27 and higher but who are by express provision of law
placed under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The legislative intent
is to allow the Sandiganbayan to devote its time and
expertise to big-time cases involving the so-called “big
fishes” in the government rather than those accused
who are of limited means who stand trial for “petty
crimes,” the so-called “small fry,” which, in turn, helps
the court decongest its dockets.—The legislative intent
is to allow the Sandiganbayan to devote its time and
expertise to big-time cases involving the so-called “big
fishes” in the government rather than those accused
who are of limited means who stand trial for “petty
crimes,” the so-called “small fry,” which, in turn, helps
the court decongest its dockets. Yet, those that are
classified as Salary Grade 26 and below may still fall
within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan,
provided that they hold the positions enumerated by
the law. In this category, it is the position held, not
the salary grade, which determines the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan. The specific inclusion constitutes
an exception to the general qualification relating to
“officials of the executive branch occupying the
positions of regional director and higher, otherwise
classified as Grade ‘27’ and higher, of the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of
1989.”
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court.
Certiorari.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
665
VOL. 762, JULY 15, 2015 665
Duncano vs. Sandiganbayan (2nd Division)
Siegfried M. Zosa for petitioner.
PERALTA,J.:
This petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court (Rules) with prayer for issuance of
preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining
order seeks to reverse and set aside the August 18,
2009 Resolution1 and February 8, 2010 Order2 of
respondent SandiganbayanSecond Division in
Criminal Case No. SB-09-CRM-0080, which denied
petitioner’s Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction.
The facts are plain and undisputed.
Petitioner Danilo A. Duncano is, at the time
material to the case, the Regional Director of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) with Salary Grade
26 as classified under Republic Act (R.A.) No.
6758.3 On March 24, 2009,4 the Office of the Special
Prosecutor (OSP), Office of the Ombudsman, filed a
criminal case against him for violation of Section 8, in
relation to Section 11 of R.A. No. 6713,5allegedly
committed as follows:
 That on or about April 15, 2003, or sometime prior
or subsequent thereto, in Quezon City, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
accused DANILO DUNCANO y ACIDO, a high
ranking public officer, being the Regional Director of
Revenue Region No. 7, of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue, Quezon City, and as such is under an
obligation to accomplish and submit
_______________
1 Penned by Associate Justice Teresita V. Diaz-
Baldos, with Associate Justices Edilberto G. Sandoval
and Samuel R. Martires, concurring; Rollo, pp. 28-34.
2 Id., at pp. 35-38.
3 Otherwise known as the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989.
4 Rollo, p. 39.
5 Otherwise known as the Code of Conduct and
Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees.
666
666 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Duncano vs. Sandiganbayan (2nd Division)
declarations under oath of his assets, liabilities
and net worth and financial and business interests,
did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and
criminally fail to disclose in his Sworn Statement of
Assets and Liabilities and Networth (SALN) for the
year 2002, his financial and business
interests/connection in Documail Provides
Corporation and Don Plus Trading of which he and
his family are the registered owners thereof, and the
1993 Nissan Patrol motor vehicle registered in the
name of his son VINCENT LOUIS P. DUNCANO
which are part of his assets, to the damage and
prejudice of public interest.
CONTRARY TO LAW.6
Prior to his arraignment, petitioner filed a Motion
to Dismiss With Prayer to Defer the Issuance of
Warrant of Arrest7 before
respondent Sandiganbayan Second Division. As the
OSP alleged, he admitted that he is a Regional
Director with Salary Grade 26. Citing Inding v.
Sandiganbayan8 and Serana v. Sandiganbayan, et
al.,9 he asserted that under Presidential Decree (P.D.)
No. 1606, as amended by Section 4(A)(1) of R.A No.
8249,10 the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction to try
and hear the case because he is an official of the
executive branch occupying the position of a Regional
Director but with a compensation that is classified as
below Salary Grade 27.
In its Opposition,11 the OSP argued that a reading
of Section 4(A)(1)(a) to (g) of the subject law would
clearly show that the qualification as to Salary Grade
27 and higher applies only to officials of the executive
branch other than the Re
_______________
6 Rollo, pp. 39-40.
7 Id., at pp. 42-46.
8 478 Phil. 506; 434 SCRA 388 (2004).
9 566 Phil. 224; 542 SCRA 224 (2008).
10 An Act Further Defining the Jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, Amending for the Purpose
Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended, Providing
Funds Therefor, and for Other Purposes.
11 Rollo, pp. 47-60.
667
VOL. 762, JULY 15, 2015 667
Duncano vs. Sandiganbayan (2nd Division)
gional Director and those specifically enumerated.
This is so since the term “Regional Director” and
“higher” are separated by the conjunction “and,”
which signifies that these two positions are different,
apart and distinct, words but are conjoined together
“relating one to the other” to give effect to the purpose
of the law. The fact that the position of Regional
Director was specifically mentioned without
indication as to its salary grade signifies the
lawmakers’ intention that officials occupying such
position, regardless of salary grade, fall within the
original and exclusive jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan. This issue, it is claimed, was
already resolved in Inding. Finally, the OSP
contended that the filing of the motion to dismiss is
premature considering that the Sandiganbayan has
yet to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the
accused.
Still not to be outdone, petitioner invoked the
applicability of Cuyco v. Sandiganbayan12 and Organo
v. Sandiganbayan13 in his rejoinder.
On August 18, 2009, the Sandiganbayan Second
Division promulgated its Resolution, disposing:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the
Court hereby DENIES the instant Motion to Dismiss
for being devoid of merit. Let a Warrant of Arrest be
therefore issued against the accused.
SO ORDERED.14
The respondent court ruled that the position of
Regional Director is one of those exceptions where
the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction even if such
position is not Salary Grade 27. It was opined that
Section 4(A)(1) of R.A No. 8249 unequivocally provides
that respondent court has jurisdiction over officials of
the executive branch of the government occupying
_______________
12 381 Phil. 906; 325 SCRA 95 (2000).
13 372 Phil. 816; 314 SCRA 135 (1999).
14 Rollo, p. 33.
 21, 1972, former President Ferdinand E. Marcos
668 issued P.D. No. 1486.19 The decree was later amended
668 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED by P.D. No. 1606,20Section 20 of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129,21 P.D. No. 1860,22and P.D. No. 1861.23
Duncano vs. Sandiganbayan (2nd Division)
With the advent of the 1987 Constitution, the
special court was retained as provided for in Section
the position of regional director and higher,
4, Article XI thereof.24
otherwise classified as Salary Grade 27 and higher, of
R.A. No. 6758, including those officials who are
expressly enumerated in subparagraphs (a) to (g). In
_______________
support of the ruling, this Court’s pronouncements
in Inding and Binay v. Sandiganbayan15 were cited.
19 Entitled Creating a Special Court to be known
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but
as “Sandiganbayan” and for Other Purposes, effective
it was denied.16 Hence, this petition.
on June 11, 1978.
Instead of issuing a temporary restraining order or
20 Entitled Revising Presidential Decree
writ of preliminary injunction, the Court required
No. 1486 Creating a Special Court to be known as
respondents to file a comment on the petition without
“Sandiganbayan” and for Other Purposes, effective on
necessarily giving due course thereto.17 Upon
December 10, 1978.
compliance of the OSP, a Rejoinder (supposedly a
21 The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980
Reply) was filed by petitioner.
(August 14, 1981) provided:
At the heart of the controversy is the
20. Sec.Jurisdiction in criminal cases.—
determination of whether, according to P.D. No. 1606,
Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original
as amended by Section 4(A)(1) of R.A No. 8249, only
jurisdiction in all criminal cases not within the
Regional Directors with Salary Grade of 27 and
exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal or body,
higher, as classified under R.A. No. 6758, fall within
except those now falling under the exclusive and
the exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
concurrent jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan which
Arguing that he is not included among the public
shall hereafter be exclusively taken cognizance of by
officials specifically enumerated in Section 4(A)(1)(a)
the latter. (See Lacson v. Executive Secretary, 361
to (g) of the law and heavily relying as well on Cuyco,
Phil. 251, 264; 301 SCRA 298, 313 [1999] and Garcia
petitioner insists that respondent court lacks
v. Sandiganbayan, 499 Phil. 589, 607; 460 SCRA 600,
jurisdiction over him, who is merely a Regional
614 [2005])
Director with Salary Grade 26. On the contrary, the
22 Entitled Amending the Pertinent Provisions of
OSP maintains that a Regional Director, irrespective
Presidential Decree No. 1606 and Batas Pambansa
of salary grade, falls within the exclusive original
Blg. 129 Relative to the Jurisdiction of the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Sandiganbayan and for Other Purposes, effective on
We find merit in the petition.
January 14, 1983.
The creation of the Sandiganbayan was mandated
23 Entitled Amending the Pertinent Provisions of
by Section 5, Article XIII of the 1973
Presidential Decree No. 1606 and Batas Pambansa
Constitution.18 By virtue of the
Blg. 129 Relative to the Jurisdiction of the
_______________
Sandiganbayan and for Other Purposes, effective on
March 23, 1983.
15 374 Phil. 413; 316 SCRA 65 (1999).
24 The present anti-graft court known as the 4.
16 Rollo, pp. 35-38, 61-70.
Section Sandiganbayan shall continue to function
17 Id., at p. 73.
and exercise its jurisdiction as now or hereafter may
18 5 SEC..The Batasang Pambansa shall create
be provided by law.
a special court, to be known as Sandiganbayan, which
shall have jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases
involving graft and corrupt practices and such other
offenses committed by public officers and employees 670
including those in government-owned or -controlled
670 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
corporations, in relation to their office as may be
determined by law. Duncano vs. Sandiganbayan (2nd Division)

Aside from Executive Order Nos. 1425 and 14-a,26 and

669
VOL. 762, JULY 15, 2015 669
Duncano vs. Sandiganbayan (2nd Division)
powers vested in him by the Constitution and
pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081, dated September
R.A. 7080,27 which expanded the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan, P.D. No. 1606 was further
modified by R.A. No. 7975,28 R.A. No. 8249,29 and just
this year, R.A. No. 10660.30
For the purpose of this case, the relevant provision
is Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249, which states:
 Section 4 of the same decree is hereby further
amended to read as follows: 4. SEC.
4. “SEC. Jurisdiction.—The Sandiganbayan shall
exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases
involving:
Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II,
Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal
Code, “A.
_______________
25 Entitled Defining the Jurisdiction Over Cases
Involving the Ill-Gotten Wealth of Former President
Ferdinand E. Marcos, Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos,
Members of their Immediate Family, Close Relatives,
Subordinates, Close and/or Business Associates,
Dummies, Agents and Nominees, effective on May 7,
1986.
26 Effective on August 18, 1986.
27 Entitled An Act Defining and Penalizing the
Crime of Plunder,approved on July 12, 1991.
28 Entitled An Act to Strengthen the Functional
and Structural Organization of the Sandiganbayan,
Amending for that Purpose Presidential Decree
No. 1606, as Amended, approved on March 30, 1995
and took effect on May 16, 1995 (See Lacson v.
Executive Secretary, supranote 21 at p. 264; p. 310.
29 Entitled An Act Further Defining the
Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, amending for the
Purpose Presidential Decree No. 1606, as Amended,
Providing Funds Therefor, and for Other Purposes,
approved on February 5, 1997.
30 Entitled An Act Strengthening Further the
Functional and Structural Organization of the
Sandiganbayan, Further Amending Presidential
Decree No. 1606, as Amended, and Appropriating
Funds Therefor, approved on April 16, 2015.
671
VOL. 762, JULY 15, 2015 671
Duncano vs. Sandiganbayan (2nd Division)
where one or more of the accused are officials
occupying the following positions in the government,
whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at
the time of the commission of the offense:
Officials of the executive branch occupying the
positions of regional director and higher, otherwise
classified as Grade ‘27’ and higher, of the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989
(Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including: “(1)
Provincial governors, vice governors, members of
the “(a) sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial
treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other provincial
department heads;
City mayor, vice mayors, members of the
“(b) sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers,
assessors, engineers, and other city department
heads;
Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the
position of consul and higher; “(c)
Philippine army and air force colonels, naval
captains, and all officers of higher rank; “(d)
Officers of the Philippine National Police while
occupying the position of provincial director and those
holding the rank of senior superintendent or higher;
“(e)
City and provincial prosecutors and their
assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the Office
of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor; “(f)
Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of
government-owned or -controlled corporations, state
universities or educational institutions or
foundations. “(g)
672
672 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Duncano vs. Sandiganbayan (2nd Division)
Members of Congress and officials thereof
classified as Grade ‘27’ and up under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;
“(2)
Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the
provisions of the Constitution; “(3)
Chairmen and members of Constitutional
Commission, without prejudice to the provisions of the
Constitution; and “(4)
All other national and local officials classified as
Grade ‘27’ and higher under the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989. “(5)
Other offenses or felonies whether simple or
complexed with other crimes committed by the public
officials and employees mentioned in subsection a of
this section in relation to their office. “B.
Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in
connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-
A, issued in 1986. “C.
x x x”
Based on the aforequoted, those that fall within
the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan are: (1)
officials of the executive branch with Salary Grade 27
or higher, and (2) officials specifically enumerated in
Section 4(A)(1)(a) to (g), regardless of their salary
grades.31 While the first part of Section 4(A) covers
only officials of the executive branch with Salary
Grade 27 and higher, its second part specifically
includes other executive officials whose positions may
not be of
_______________
 31 See Inding v. Sandiganbayan, supra note 8 at
pp. 520-521; p. 398. ficials whose salary grades were at Grade
“27” or higher and over other specific public
officials holding important positions in
673 government regardless of salary grade;
VOL. 762, JULY 15, 2015 673 x x x34(Emphasis supplied)
Duncano vs. Sandiganbayan (2nd Division)
Salary Grade 27 and higher but who are by
The legislative intent is to allow
express provision of law placed under the jurisdiction
the Sandiganbayan to devote its time and expertise to
of the Sandiganbayan.32
big-time cases involving the so-called “big fishes” in
That the phrase “otherwise classified as Grade ‘27’
the government rather than those accused who are of
and higher” qualifies “regional director and higher” is
limited means who stand trial for “petty crimes,” the
apparent from the Sponsorship Speech of Senator
so-called “small fry,” which, in turn, helps the court
Raul S. Roco on Senate Bill Nos. 1353 and 844, which
decongest its dockets.35
eventually became R.A. Nos. 7975 and 8249,
Yet, those that are classified as Salary Grade 26
respectively:
and below may still fall within the jurisdiction of
As proposed by the Committee,
the Sandiganbayan, provided that they hold the
the Sandiganbayan shall exercise original jurisdiction
positions enumerated by the law.36 In this category, it
over the cases assigned to it only in instances where
is the position held, not the salary grade, which
one or more of the principal accused are officials
determines the jurisdiction of
occupying the positions of regional director and higher
the Sandiganbayan.37 The specific inclusion
or are otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher by
constitutes an exception to the general qualification
the Compensation and Position Classification Act of
relating to “officials of the executive branch occupying
1989, whether in a permanent, acting or interim
the positions of regional director and higher,
capacity at the time of the commission of the
otherwise classified as Grade ‘27’ and higher, of the
offense. The jurisdiction, therefore, refers to a
Compensation and Position Classification Act of
certain grade upwards, which shall remain with
1989.”38 As ruled in Inding:
the Sandiganbayan.33 (Emphasis supplied)
Following this disquisition, the paragraph of
To speed up trial in the Sandiganbayan, Republic
Section 4 which provides that if the accused is
Act No. 7975 was enacted for that Court to
occupying a position lower than SG 27, the proper
concentrate on the “larger fish” and leave the “small
trial court has jurisdiction, can only be properly
fry” to the lower courts. This law became effective on
interpreted as applying to those cases where the
May 6, 1995 and it provided a two-pronged solution to
principal accused is occupying a position lower than
the clogging of the dockets of that court, to wit:
SG 27 and not among those specifically included in
It divested the Sandiganbayan of
the enumeration in Section 4(a)(1)(a) to
jurisdiction over public officials whose salary
grades were at Grade “26” or lower, devolving _______________
thereby these cases to the lower courts, and
retaining the jurisdiction of 35 See Record of the Senate, Vol. IV, No. 60,
the Sandiganbayan only over public of- February 8, 1995, pp. 700-701.
36 People v. Sandiganbayan (Third Division), 613
_______________
Phil. 407; 596 SCRA 49 (2009).
37 Alzaga v. Sandiganbayan
32 Geduspan v. People, 491 Phil. 375, 380; 451
(2nd Division), supra note 32.
SCRA 187, 192 (2005), as cited in Lazarte, Jr. v.
38 See Inding v. Sandiganbayan, supra note 8 at
Sandiganbayan (First Division), 600 Phil. 475, 497;
p. 520; p. 398.
581 SCRA 431, 452 (2009); Serana v.
Sandiganbayan, supra note 9 at p. 249; p. 248;
and Alzaga v. Sandiganbayan (2nd Division), 536 675
Phil. 726, 731; 505 SCRA 848, 853 (2006).
VOL. 762, JULY 15, 2015 675
33 Record of the Senate, Vol. IV, No. 60, February
8, 1995, p. 701. Duncano vs. Sandiganbayan (2nd Division)
34 Record of the Senate, Vol. I, No. 24, September
25, 1996, p. 799. (g). Stated otherwise, except for those officials
specifically included in Section 4(a)(1)(a) to
(g), regardless of their salary grades, over whom
674 the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction, all other public
674 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED officials below SG 27 shall be under the jurisdiction of
the proper trial courts “where none of the principal
Duncano vs. Sandiganbayan (2nd Division)
accused are occupying positions corresponding to SG
27 or higher.” By this construction, the entire Section
4 is given effect. The cardinal rule, after all, in
statutory construction is that the particular words,
clauses and phrases should not be studied as detached
and isolated expressions, but the whole and every
part of the statute must be considered in fixing the
meaning of any of its parts and in order to produce a
harmonious whole. And courts should adopt a
construction that will give effect to every part of a
statute, if at all possible. Ut magis valeat quam
pereat or that construction is to be sought which gives
effect to the whole of the statute — its every word.39
Thus, to cite a few, We have held that a member of
the Sangguniang Panlungsod,40 a department
manager of the Philippine Health Insurance
Corporation (Philhealth),41 a student regent of the
University of the Philippines,42 and a Head of the
Legal Department and Chief of the Documentation
with corresponding ranks of Vice Presidents and
Assistant Vice President of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines Retirement and Separation Benefits
System (AFP-RSBS)43 fall within the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan.
_______________
39 Id., at pp. 526-527.
40 People v. Sandiganbayan (Third Division), 645
Phil. 53; 630 SCRA 489 (2010); People v.
Sandiganbayan (Third Division), supra note 36;
and Inding v. Sandiganbayan, supra note 8.
41 Geduspan v. People, supra note 32.
42 Serana v. Sandiganbayan, supra note 9.
43 Alzaga v. Sandiganbayan
(2nd Division), supra note 32, citing People v.
Sandiganbayan, 456 Phil. 136; 408 SCRA 672 (2003);
and Ramiscal, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, 487 Phil. 384;
446 SCRA 166 (2004).
676
676 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Duncano vs. Sandiganbayan (2nd Division)
Petitioner is not an executive official with Salary
Grade 27 or higher. Neither does he hold any position
particularly enumerated in Section 4(A)(1)(a) to (g).
As he correctly argues, his case is, in fact, on all fours
with Cuyco. Therein, the accused was the Regional
Director of the Land Transportation Office, Region IX,
Zamboanga City, but at the time of the commission of
the crime in 1992, his position was classified as
Director II with Salary Grade 26.44 It was opined:
Petitioner contends that at the time of the
commission of the offense in 1992, he was occupying
the position of Director II, Salary Grade 26, hence,
jurisdiction over the cases falls with the Regional
Trial Court.
We sustain petitioner’s contention.
The Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over
violations of Section 3(a) and (e), Republic Act No.
3019, as amended, unless committed by public
officials and employees occupying positions of regional
director and higher with Salary Grade “27” or higher,
under the Compensation and Position Classification
Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758) in relation to their
office.
In ruling in favor of its jurisdiction, even though
petitioner admittedly occupied the position of Director
II with Salary Grade “26” under the Compensation
and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act
No. 6758), the Sandiganbayan incurred in serious
error of jurisdiction, and acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in
suspending petitioner from office, entitling petitioner
to the reliefs prayed for.45
In the same way, a certification issued by the OIC-
Assistant Chief, Personnel Division of the BIR shows
that, although petitioner is a Regional Director of the
BIR, his position is classified as Director II with
Salary Grade 26.46
_______________
44 See Geduspan v. People, supra note 32 at p.
379; p. 189.
45 Cuyco v. Sandiganbayan, supra note 12 at p.
910; pp. 97-98.
46 Rollo, p. 71.
677
VOL. 762, JULY 15, 2015 677
Duncano vs. Sandiganbayan (2nd Division)
There is no merit in the OSP’s allegation that the
petition was prematurely filed on the ground that
respondent court has not yet acquired jurisdiction
over the person of petitioner. Records disclose that
when a warrant of arrest was issued by respondent
court, petitioner voluntarily surrendered and posted a
cash bond on September 17, 2009. Also, he was
arraigned on April 14, 2010, prior to the filing of the
petition on April 30, 2010.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the
instant petition for certiorari is GRANTED. The
August 18, 2009 Resolution and February 8, 2010
Order of the Sandiganbayan Second Division, which
denied petitioner’s Motion to Dismiss on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction, are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
 Velasco, Jr. (Chairperson), Leonardo-De
Castro,** Villarama, Jr. and Perez,*** JJ., concur.
Petition granted, resolution and order reversed and
set aside.
Note.—The Sandiganbayan is a special criminal
court which has exclusive original jurisdiction in all
cases involving violations of Republic Act (R.A.) 3019
committed by certain public officers, as enumerated in
Presidential Decree (P.D.) 1606 as amended by R.A.
8249. This includes private individuals who are
charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories
with the said public officers. (People vs. Go, 719
SCRA 704 [2014])
——o0o——
_______________
** Designated acting member, in lieu of Associate
Justice Francis H. Jardeleza, per Special Order No.
2095 dated July 1, 2015.
*** Designated acting member, in lieu of
Associate Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes, per Special
Order No. 2084 dated June 29, 2015.
VOL. 373, JANUARY 4, 2002 11
Duero vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 131282. January 4, 2002.*
GABRIEL L. DUERO, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT
OF APPEALS, and BERNARDO A. ERADEL,
respondents.
Actions; Evidence; Xerox copies are obviously
without evidentiary weight or value.—At the outset,
however, we note that petitioner through counsel
submitted to this Court pleadings that contain
inaccurate statements. Thus, on page 5 of his petition,
we find that to bolster the claim that the appellate
court erred in holding that the RTC had no
jurisdiction, petitioner pointed to Annex E of his
petition which supposedly is the Certification issued
by the Municipal Treasurer of San Miguel, Surigao,
specifically containing the notation, “Note: Subject for
General Revision Effective 1994.” But it appears
that Annex E of his petition is not a Certification but a
xerox copy of a Declaration of Real Property. Nowhere
does the document contain a notation, “Note: Subject
for General Revision Effective 1994.” Petitioner also
asked this Court to refer to Annex F, where he said
the zonal value of the disputed land was P1.40 per
sq.m., thus placing the computed value of the land at
the time the complaint was filed before the RTC at
P57,113.98, hence beyond the jurisdiction of the
municipal court and within the jurisdiction of the
regional trial court. However, we find that these
annexes are both merely xerox copies. They are
obviously without evidentiary weight or value.
Certiorari; Words and Phrases; By “grave abuse
of discretion” is meant such capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment which is equivalent to an excess
or a lack of jurisdiction, and the abuse of discretion
must be so patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to
perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in
contemplation of law as where the power is exercised
in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of
passion or hostility.—Coming now to the principal
issue, petitioner contends that respondent appellate
court acted with grave abuse of discretion. By “grave
abuse of discretion” is meant such capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment which is equivalent to
an excess or a lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of
discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount
to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to
perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in
contemplation of law as where the power is exercised
in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of
passion or hostility. But here we find that in its
decision holding that the municipal court has
jurisdiction over the case and that private
_______________
* SECOND DIVISION.
12
1 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
2 ANNOTATED
Duero vs. Court of Appeals
respondent was not estopped from questioning
the jurisdiction of the RTC, respondent Court of
Appeals discussed the facts on which its decision is
grounded as well as the law and jurisprudence on the
matter. Its action was neither whimsical nor
capricious.
Actions; Jurisdiction; Estoppel; While
participation in all stages of a case before the trial
court, including invocation of its authority in asking
for affirmative relief, effectively bars a party by
estoppel from challenging the court’s jurisdiction, the
Court notes that estoppel has become an equitable
defense that is both substantive and remedial and its
successful invocation can bar a right and not merely
its equitable enforcement; For estoppel to apply, the
action giving rise thereto must be unequivocal and
intentional because, if misapplied, estoppel may
become a tool of injustice.—Was private respondent
estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the
RTC? In this case, we are in agreement with the
Court of Appeals that he was not. While participation
in all stages of a case before the trial court, including
invocation of its authority in asking for affirmative
relief, effectively bars a party by estoppel from
challenging the court’s jurisdiction, we note that
estoppel has become an equitable defense that is both
substantive and remedial and its successful
invocation can bar a right and not merely its equitable
enforcement. Hence, estoppel ought to be applied with
caution. For estoppel to apply, the action giving rise
thereto must be unequivocal and intentional because,
if misapplied, estoppel may become a tool of injustice.
Same; Same; Same; The fundamental rule is
that, the lack of jurisdiction of the court over an action
cannot be waived by the parties, or even cured by their
silence, acquiescence or even by their express consent;
Even if a party actively participated in the proceedings
before the trial court, the doctrine of estoppel cannot
still be properly invoked against him because the
question of lack of jurisdiction may be raised at
anytime and at any stage of the action.—Under these
circumstances, we could not fault the Court of
Appeals in overruling the RTC and in holding that
private respondent was not estopped from questioning
the jurisdiction of the regional trial court. The
fundamental rule is that, the lack of jurisdiction of the
court over an action cannot be waived by the parties,
or even cured by their silence, acquiescence or even by
their express consent. Further, a party may assail the
jurisdiction of the court over the action at any stage of
the proceedings and even on appeal. The appellate
court did not err in saying that the RTC should have
declared itself barren of jurisdiction over the action.
Even if private respondent actively participated in the
proceedings before said court, the doctrine of estoppel
cannot still be properly invoked against him because
the question of lack of jurisdiction may be
13
VOL. 373, JANUARY 4, 2002 1 On June 16, 1995, petitioner filed before the RTC a
3 complaint for Recovery of Possession and Ownership
Duero vs. Court of Appeals
raised at anytime and at any stage of the action.
Precedents tell us that as a general rule, the
jurisdiction of a court is not a question of acquiescence
as a matter of fact, but an issue of conferment as a
matter of law. Also, neither waiver nor estoppel shall
apply to confer jurisdiction upon a court, barring
highly meritorious and exceptional circumstances.
Same; Same; Appeals; Certiorari; Since a basis for a partial judgment rendered on January 12,
decision of a court without jurisdiction is null and
void, it could logically never become final and
executory, hence appeal therefrom by writ of error
would be out of the question—a petition for certiorari
would be in order.—Since a decision of a court without
jurisdiction is null and void, it could logically never
become final and executory, hence appeal therefrom
by writ of error would be out of the question. Resort
by private respondent to a petition for certiorari
before the Court of Appeals was in order.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the
Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Sua & Alambra Law Offices for petitioner.
Gerardo M. Maglinte for private respondent.
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for certiorari assails the Decision 1 dated
September 17, 1997, of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. No. SP No. 2340-UDK, entitled Bernardo Eradel
vs. Hon. Ermelino G. Andal, setting aside all
proceedings in Civil Case No. 1075, Gabriel L. Duero
vs. Bernardo Eradel,before the Branch 27 of the
Regional Trial Court of Tandag, Surigao del Sur.
The pertinent facts are as follows:
Sometime in 1988, according to petitioner, private
respondent Bernardo Eradel2 entered and occupied
petitioner’s land covered by Tax Declaration No. A-16-
13-302, located in Baras, San Miguel, Surigao del Sur.
As shown in the tax declaration, the land had an
assessed value of P5,240. When petitioner politely
informed private
_______________
1 Rollo, pp. 13-27.
2 Bernardo Kradel in the CA Decision, Rollo, p. 13.
14
14 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Duero vs. Court of Appeals
respondent that the land was his and requested the
latter to vacate the land, private respondent refused,
but instead threatened him with bodily harm. Despite
repeated demands, private respondent remained
steadfast in his refusal to leave the land.
with Damages and Attorney’s Fees against private
respondent and two others, namely, Apolinario and
Inocencio Ruena. Petitioner appended to the
complaint the aforementioned tax declaration. The
counsel of the Ruenas asked for extension to file their
Answer and was given until July 18, 1995.
Meanwhile, petitioner and the Ruenas executed a
compromise agreement, which became the trial court’s
1996. In this agreement, the Ruenas through their
counsel, Atty. Eusebio Avila, entered into a
Compromise Agreement with herein petitioner,
Gabriel Duero. Inter alia, the agreement stated that
the Ruenas recognized and bound themselves to
respect the ownership and possession of
Duero.3 Herein private respondent Eradel was not a
party to the agreement, and he was declared in
default for failure to file his answer to the complaint.4
Petitioner presented his evidence ex parte on
February 13, 1996. On May 8, 1996, judgment was
rendered in his favor, and private respondent was
ordered to peacefully vacate and turn over Lot No.
1065 Cad. 537-D to petitioner; pay petitioner P2,000
annual rental from 1988 up the time he vacates the
land, and P5,000 as attorney’s fees and the cost of the
suit.5 Private respondent received a copy of the
decision on May 25, 1996.
On June 10, 1996, private respondent filed a
Motion for New Trial, alleging that he has been
occupying the land as a tenant of Artemio Laurente,
Sr., since 1958. He explained that he turned over the
complaint and summons to Laurente in the honest
belief that as landlord, the latter had a better right to
the land and was responsible to defend any adverse
claim on it. However, the trial court denied the motion
for new trial.
_______________
3 Records, p. 24.
4 Id. at 29.
5 Rollo, pp. 15-16.
15
VOL. 373, JANUARY 4, 2002 15
Duero vs. Court of Appeals
Meanwhile, RED Conflict Case No. 1029, an
administrative case between petitioner and applicant-
contestants Romeo, Artemio and Jury Laurente,
remained pending with the Office of the Regional
Director of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources in Davao City. Eventually, it was
forwarded to the DENR Regional Office in
Prosperidad, Agusan del Sur.
On July 24, 1996, private respondent filed before
the RTC a Petition for Relief from Judgment,
reiterating the same allegation in his Motion for New
Trial. He averred that unless there is a determination
on who owned the land, he could not be made to
vacate the land. He also averred that the judgment of
the trial court was void inasmuch as the heirs of
Artemio Laurente, Sr., who are indispensable parties,
were not impleaded.
On September 24, 1996, Josephine, Ana Soledad
and Virginia, all surnamed Laurente, grandchildren
of Artemio who were claiming ownership of the land,
filed a Motion for Intervention. The RTC denied the
motion.
On October 8, 1996, the trial court issued an order
denying the Petition for Relief from Judgment. In a
Motion for Reconsideration of said order, private
respondent alleged that the RTC had no jurisdiction
over the case, since the value of the land was only
P5,240 and therefore it was under the jurisdiction of
the municipal trial court. On November 22, 1996, the
RTC denied the motion for reconsideration.
On January 22, 1997, petitioner filed a Motion for
Execution, which the RTC granted on January 28. On
February 18, 1997, Entry of Judgment was made of
record and a writ of execution was issued by the RTC
on February 27, 1997. On March 12, 1997, private
respondent filed his petition for certiorari before the
Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals gave due course to the
petition, maintaining that private respondent is not
estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the RTC,
Branch 27 in Tandag, Surigao del Sur, when private
respondent filed with said court his Motion for
Reconsideration And/Or Annulment of Judgment. The
Court of Appeals decreed as follows:
16
16 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Duero vs. Court of Appeals
IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the
Petition is GRANTED. All proceedings in “Gabriel L.
Duero vs. Bernardo Eradel, et al. Civil Case 1075”
filed in the Court a quo, including its Decision, Annex
“E” of the petition, and its Orders and Writ of
Execution and the turn over of the property to the
Private Respondent by the Sheriff of the Court a
quo, are declared null and void and hereby SET
ASIDE, No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.6
Petitioner now comes before this Court, alleging that
the Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or in excess of
jurisdiction when it held that:
I
. . . THE LOWER COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION
OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE.
II
. . . PRIVATE RESPONDENT WAS NOT
THEREBY ESTOPPED FROM QUESTIONING THE
JURISDICTION OF THE LOWER COURT EVEN
AFTER IT SUCCESSFULLY SOUGHT
AFFIRMATIVE RELIEF THEREFROM.
III
. . . THE FAILURE OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT
TO FILE HIS ANSWER IS JUSTIFIED.7
The main issue before us is whether the Court of
Appeals gravely abused its discretion when it held
that the municipal trial court had jurisdiction, and
that private respondent was not estopped from
assailing the jurisdiction of the RTC after he had filed
several motions before it. The secondary issue is
whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that
private respondent’s failure to file an answer to the
complaint was justified.
At the outset, however, we note that petitioner
through counsel submitted to this Court pleadings
that contain inaccurate state-
_______________
6 Id., at 26.
7 Id., at 6.
 17 trial court, including invocation of its authority in
VOL. 373, JANUARY 4, 2002 17 asking for affirmative relief, effectively bars a party
by estoppel from challenging the court’s
Duero vs. Court of Appeals
jurisdiction,13 we note that estoppel has become an
ments. Thus, on page 5 of his petition, 8 we find that to
equitable defense that is both substantive and
bolster the claim that the appellate court erred in
remedial and its successful invocation can bar a right
holding that the RTC had no jurisdiction, petitioner
and not merely its equitable enforcement.14 Hence,
pointed to Annex E 9 of his petition which supposedly
estoppel ought to be applied with caution. For
is the Certification issued by the Municipal Treasurer
estoppel to apply, the action giving rise thereto must
of San Miguel, Surigao, specifically containing the
be unequivocal and intentional because, if misapplied,
notation, “Note: Subject for General Revision Effective
estoppel may become a tool of injustice.15
1994.” But it appears that Annex E of his petition is
In the present case, private respondent questions
not a Certification but a xerox copy of a Declaration of
the jurisdiction of RTC in Tandag, Surigao del Sur, on
Real Property. Nowhere does the document contain a
legal grounds. Recall that it was petitioner who filed
notation, “Note: Subject for General Revision Effective
the complaint against private respondent and two
1994.” Petitioner also asked this Court to refer
other parties before the said court,16 believing that the
to Annex F,10 where he said the zonal value of the
RTC had jurisdiction over his complaint. But by then,
disputed land was P1.40 per sq.m., thus placing the
Republic Act 769117 amending BP 129 had become
computed value of the land at the time the complaint
effective, such
was filed before the RTC at P57,113.98, hence beyond
_______________
the jurisdiction of the municipal court and within the
jurisdiction of the regional trial court. However, we 13 PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation vs.
find that these annexes are both merely xerox copies.
Court of Appeals,G.R. No. 107518, 297 SCRA 402, 428
They are obviously without evidentiary weight or
(1998).
value. 14 Philippine Bank of Communication vs. Court of
Coming now to the principal issue, petitioner
Appeals, G.R. No. 109803, 289 SCRA 178, 185 (1998).
contends that respondent appellate court acted with 15 La Naval Drugs Corporation vs. Court of
grave abuse of discretion. By “grave abuse of
Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 103200, 236 SCRA 78, 87-88
discretion” is meant such capricious and whimsical
(1994).
exercise of judgment which is equivalent to an excess 16 Records, pp. 1-5.
or a lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must 17 SEC. 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial
be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a
Courts, Municipal Trial Court and Municipal Circuit
positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty
Trial Courts in Criminal Cases.—Except in cases
enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of
falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of
law as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary
Regional Trial Courts and of the Sandiganbayan,
and despotic manner by reason of passion or
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts,
hostility.11 But here we find that in its decision
and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
holding that the municipal court has jurisdiction over
xxx
the case and that private respondent was not
(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil
estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the RTC,
actions which involve title to, or possession of, real
respondent Court of Appeals discussed the facts on
property, or any interest therein where the assessed
which its decision is grounded as well as the law and
value of the property or interest therein does not
jurisprudence on the matter.12 Its action was neither
exceed Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil
whimsical nor capricious.
actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value
_______________
does not exceed Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00)
exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind,
Id., at 7.
8
attorney’s fees, litigation expenses and
Id., at 40.
9
10 Id., at 41.
costs; Provided, That in cases of land not declared for
11 Cuison
taxa-
vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
128540, 289 SCRA 159, 177 (1998). 19
12 Rollo, pp. 23-25.
VOL. 373, JANUARY 4, 2002 19
18 Duero vs. Court of Appeals
18 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED that jurisdiction already belongs not to the RTC but to
the MTC pursuant to said amendment. Private
Duero vs. Court of Appeals
respondent, an unschooled farmer, in the mistaken
Was private respondent estopped from questioning
belief that since he was merely a tenant of the late
the jurisdiction of the RTC? In this case, we are in
Artemio Laurente, Sr., his landlord, gave the
agreement with the Court of Appeals that he was not.
summons to a Hipolito Laurente, one of the surviving
While participation in all stages of a case before the
heirs of Artemio, Sr., who did not do anything about
the summons. For failure to answer the complaint,
private respondent was declared in default. He then
filed a Motion for New Trial in the same court and
explained that he defaulted because of his belief that
the suit ought to be answered by his landlord. In that
motion he stated that he had by then the evidence to
prove that he had a better right than petitioner over
the land because of his long, continuous and
uninterrupted possession as bona-fidetenant-lessee of
the land.18 But his motion was denied. He tried an
alternative recourse. He filed before the RTC a Motion
for Relief from Judgment. Again, the same court
denied his motion, hence he moved for reconsideration
of the denial. In his Motion for Reconsideration, he
raised for the first time the RTC’s lack of jurisdiction.
This motion was again denied. Note that private
respondent raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction, not
when the case was already on appeal, but when the
case was still before the RTC that ruled him in
default, denied his motion for new trial as well as for
relief from judgment, and denied likewise his two
motions for reconsideration. After the RTC still
refused to reconsider the denial of private
respondent’s motion for relief from judgment, it went
on to issue the order for entry of judgment and a writ
of execution.
Under these circumstances, we could not fault the
Court of Appeals in overruling the RTC and in holding
that private respondent was not estopped from
questioning the jurisdiction of the regional trial court.
The fundamental rule is that, the lack of jurisdiction
of the court over an action cannot be waived by the
parties, or even cured by their silence, acquiescence or
even by their express consent.19 Further, a party may
assail the jurisdiction of the court over
_______________
tion purposes, the value of such property shall be
determined by the assessed value of the adjacent lots.
18 Id., at 65-66.
19 Republic vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. L-
31303-04, 83 SCRA 453, 475 (1978).
20
20 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Duero vs. Court of Appeals
the action at any stage of the proceedings and even on
appeal.20 The appellate court did not err in saying
that the RTC should have declared itself barren of
jurisdiction over the action. Even if private
respondent actively participated in the proceedings
before said court, the doctrine of estoppel cannot still
be properly invoked against him because the question
of lack of jurisdiction may be raised at anytime and at
any stage of the action.21 Precedents tell us that as a
general rule, the jurisdiction of a court is not a
question of acquiescence as a matter of fact, but an
issue of conferment as a matter of law. 22 Also, neither
waiver nor estoppel shall apply to confer jurisdiction
upon a court, barring highly meritorious and
exceptional circumstances.23The Court of Appeals
found support for its ruling in our decision in Javier
vs. Court of Appeals, thus:
x x x The point simply is that when a party commits
error in filing his suit or proceeding in a court that
lacks jurisdiction to take cognizance of the same, such
act may not at once be deemed sufficient basis of
estoppel. It could have been the result of an honest
mistake, or of divergent interpretations of doubtful
legal provisions. If any fault is to be imputed to a
party taking such course of action, part of the blame
should be placed on the court which shall entertain the
suit, thereby lulling the parties into believing that they
pursued their remedies in the correct forum.Under the
rules, it is the duty of the court to dismiss an action
‘whenever it appears that the court has no jurisdiction
over the subject matter.’ (Sec. 2, Rule 9, Rules of
Court) Should the Court render a judgment without
jurisdiction, such judgment may be impeached or
annulled for lack of jurisdiction (Sec. 30, Rule
132, Ibid.), within ten (10) years from the finality of
the same. [Emphasis ours.]24
_______________
20 De Leon vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No.
96107, 245 SCRA 166, 172 (1995).
21 Art. 1144. The following actions must be brought
within ten years from the time the right of action
accrues:
1. (1)Upon a written contract;
2. (2)Upon an obligation created by law;
3. (3)Upon a judgment. (n)
22 Fabian vs. Desierto, G.R. No. 129742, 295 SCRA
470, 488 (1998).
23 Asset Privatization Trust vs. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 121171, 300 SCRA 579, 599 (1998).
24 G.R. No. 96617, 214 SCRA 572, 577 (1992);
Rollo, pp. 25-26.
21
VOL. 373, JANUARY 4, 2002 21
Duero vs. Court of Appeals
Indeed, “. . . the trial court was duty-bound to take
judicial notice of the parameters of its jurisdiction and
its failure to do so, makes its decision a ‘lawless’
thing.”25
Since a decision of a court without jurisdiction is null
and void, it could logically never become final and
executory, hence appeal therefrom by writ of error
would be out of the question. Resort by private
respondent to a petition for certiorari before the Court
of Appeals was in order.
 In holding that estoppel did not prevent private
respondent from questioning the RTC’s jurisdiction,
the appellate court reiterated the doctrine that
estoppel must be applied only in exceptional cases, as
its misapplication could result in a miscarriage of
justice. Here, we find that petitioner, who claims
ownership of a parcel of land, filed his complaint
before a court without appropriate jurisdiction.
Defendant, a farmer whose tenancy status is still
pending before the proper administrative agency
concerned, could have moved for dismissal of the case
on jurisdictional grounds. But the farmer as
defendant therein could not be expected to know the
nuances of jurisdiction and related issues. This
farmer, who is now the private respondent, ought not
to be penalized when he claims that he made an
honest mistake when he initially submitted his
motions before the RTC, before he realized that the
controversy was outside the RTC’s cognizance but
within the jurisdiction of the municipal trial court. To
hold him in estoppel as the RTC did would amount to
foreclosing his avenue to obtain a proper resolution of
his case. Furthermore, if the RTC’s order were to be
sustained, he would be evicted from the land
prematurely, while RED Conflict Case No. 1029 would
remain unresolved. Such eviction on a technicality if
allowed could result in an injustice, if it is later found
that he has a legal right to till the land he now
occupies as tenant-lessee.
Having determined that there was no grave abuse
of discretion by the appellate court in ruling that
private respondent was not estoppel from questioning
the jurisdiction of the RTC, we need not tarry to
consider in detail the second issue. Suffice it to say
that, given the circumstances in this case, no error
was committed on
_______________
25 Rollo, p. 20.
22
22 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Duero vs. Court of Appeals
this score by respondent appellate court. Since the
RTC had no jurisdiction over the case, private
respondent had justifiable reason in law not to file an
answer, aside from the fact that he believed the suit
was properly his landlord’s concern.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The
assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED. The decision of the Regional Trial Court
in Civil Case No. 1075 entitled Gabriel L. Duero vs.
Bernardo Eradel, its Order that private respondent
turn over the disputed land to petitioner, and the Writ
of Execution it issued, are ANNULLED and SET
ASIDE. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo (Chairman), Mendoza and De Leon,
Jr., JJ., concur.
Buena, J., On official leave.
Petition dismissed, judgment affirmed.
Notes.—Estoppel may be successfully invoked if
the party fails to raise the question in the early stages
of the proceedings. (Huerta Alba Resort, Inc. vs. Court
of Appeals,339 SCRA 534 [2000])
While it is a rule that jurisdictional questions may
be raised at any time, an exception arises where
estoppel has supervened. (Bayoca vs. Nogales, 340
SCRA 154 [2000])
——o0o——
July 14, 2008. G.R. No. 147406.*
VENANCIO FIGUEROA y
CERVANTES,1 petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondent.
Actions; Jurisdiction; Statutes; Applied
uniformly is the familiar rule that the jurisdiction of
the court to hear and decide a case is conferred by the
law in force at the time of the institution of the action,
unless such statute provides for a retroactive
application thereof.—Applied uniformly is the familiar
rule that the jurisdiction of the court to hear and
decide a case is conferred by the law in force
_______________
* THIRD DIVISION.
1 In the records, “Venancio” is also spelled as
“Vinancio.”
64
6 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
4 ANNOTATED
Figueroa vs. People
at the time of the institution of the action, unless
such statute provides for a retroactive application
thereof. In this case, at the time the criminal
information for reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide with violation of the Automobile Law (now
Land Transportation and Traffic Code) was filed,
Section 32(2) of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 129 had
already been amended by Republic Act No. 7691.
Same; Same; Estoppel by Laches; The general
rule should be, as it has always been, that the issue of
jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the
proceedings, even on appeal, and is not lost by waiver
or by estoppel—estoppel by laches, to bar a litigant
from asserting the court’s absence or lack of
jurisdiction, only supervenes in exceptional cases
similar to the factual milieu of Tijam v. Sibonghanoy,
23 SCRA 29 (1968).—The Court, thus, wavered on
when to apply the exceptional circumstance
in Sibonghanoy and on when to apply the general rule
enunciated as early as in De La Santa and expounded
at length in Calimlim. The general rule should,
however, be, as it has always been, thatthe issue of
jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the
proceedings, even on appeal, and is not lost by waiver
or by estoppel. Estoppel by laches, to bar a litigant
from asserting the court’s absence or lack of
jurisdiction, only supervenes in exceptional cases
similar to the factual milieu of Tijam v. Sibonghanoy.
Indeed, the fact that a person attempts to invoke
unauthorized jurisdiction of a court does not estop
him from thereafter challenging its jurisdiction over
the subject matter, since such jurisdiction must arise
by law and not by mere consent of the parties. This is
especially true where the person seeking to invoke
unauthorized jurisdiction of the court does not
thereby secure any advantage or the adverse party
does not suffer any harm.
Same; Same; Same; Delay alone, though
unreasonable, will not sustain the defense of “estoppel
by laches” unless it further appears that the party,
knowing his rights, has not sought to enforce them
until the condition of the party pleading laches has in
good faith become so changed that he cannot be
restored to his former state, if the rights be then
enforced, due to loss of evidence, change of title,
intervention of equities, and other causes.—Applying
the said doctrine to the instant case, the petitioner is
in no way estopped by laches in assailing the
jurisdiction of the RTC, considering that he raised the
lack thereof in his appeal before the appellate court.
At that time, no considerable period had yet elapsed
for laches to attach. True, delay alone, though
unreasonable, will not sustain the65
VOL. 558, JULY 14, 2008 6 Criminal Case No. 2235-M-94.5 Trial on the merits
5 ensued and on August 19, 1998, the trial court
Figueroa vs. People
defense of “estoppel by laches” unless it further
appears that the party, knowing his rights, has not
sought to enforce them until the condition of the party
pleading laches has in good faith become so changed
that he cannot be restored to his former state, if the
rights be then enforced, due to loss of evidence, change
of title, intervention of equities, and other causes. In
applying the principle of estoppel by laches in the
exceptional case of Sibonghanoy, the Court therein
considered the patent and revolting inequity and
unfairness of having the judgment creditors go up
their Calvary once more after more or less 15 years.
The same, however, does not obtain in the instant
case.
Same; Same; Same; Estoppel, being in the nature
of a forfeiture, is not favored by law—it is to be applied
rarely, only from necessity, and only in extraordinary
circumstances; When misapplied, the doctrine of
estoppel may be a most effective weapon for the
accomplishment of injustice.—We note at this point
that estoppel, being in the nature of a forfeiture, is not
favored by law. It is to be applied rarely—only from
necessity, and only in extraordinary circumstances.
The doctrine must be applied with great care and the
equity must be strong in its favor. When misapplied,
the doctrine of estoppel may be a most effective
weapon for the accomplishment of injustice. Moreover,
a judgment rendered without jurisdiction over the
subject matter is void. Hence, the Revised Rules of
Court provides for remedies in attacking judgments
rendered by courts or tribunals that have no
jurisdiction over the concerned cases. No laches will
even attach when the judgment is null and void for
want of jurisdiction.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the
Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Roderick M. Santos for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondent.
NACHURA,J.:
When is a litigant estopped by laches from assailing
the jurisdiction of a tribunal? This is the paramount
issue raised in66
66 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Figueroa vs. People
this petition for review of the February 28, 2001
Decision2of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR
No. 22697.
Pertinent are the following antecedent facts and
proceedings:
On July 8, 1994, an information3 for reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide was filed against
the petitioner before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Bulacan, Branch 18.4 The case was docketed as
convicted the petitioner as charged.6 In his appeal
before the
_______________
2 Penned by Associate Justice Conchita Carpio-
Morales (now an Associate Justice of this Court), with
Associate Justices Candido V. Rivera and Rebecca de
Guia-Salvador concurring; Rollo, pp. 23-31.
3 The indictment reads:
That on or about the 16th day of January 1994, in
the Municipality of Bocaue, Province of Bulacan,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being
then the driver and person-in-charge of German
Espiritu Bus bearing plate no. PHZ-542, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously drive and
operate the same along the highway in the said
municipality, in a negligent, careless and imprudent
manner, without due regard to the traffic laws, rules
and regulations and without taking the necessary
precautions to prevent death or injuries to persons
and damage to property, causing by such negligence,
carelessness and imprudence, said German Espiritu
Bus driven by him to hit and bump one Rodolfo Lopez
y Amparado, thereby causing physical injuries to the
latter which caused his death. (Id., at pp. 23-24.)
4 Id., at p. 26.
5 Id., at p. 55.
6 The dispositive portion of the trial court’s
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court
finds the accused Vinancio Figueroa y Cervantes
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
reckless imprudence resulting to (sic) homicide, as
defined and penalized under Article 365 of the
Revised Penal Code, sentencing him to suffer
imprison-
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VOL. 558, JULY 14, 2008 67
Figueroa vs. People
CA, the petitioner questioned, among others, for the
first time, the trial court’s jurisdiction.7
The appellate court, however, in the challenged
decision, considered the petitioner to have actively
participated in the trial and to have belatedly
attacked the jurisdiction of the RTC; thus, he was
already estopped by laches from asserting the trial
court’s lack of jurisdiction. Finding no other ground to
reverse the trial court’s decision, the CA affirmed the
petitioner’s conviction but modified the penalty
imposed and the damages awarded.8
_______________
ment of two (2) years, ten (10) months and twenty-one
(21) days to four (4) years and two (2) months and to
indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the amount of:
P50,000.00 indemnity; 1.
2.P3,034,560.00 for loss of earning capacity;
P24,000 for cemetery lot; 3.
P45,000 for funeral expenses; 4.
P54,221.00 for wake expenses. 5.
SO ORDERED.
(Id., at pp. 24-25 and 56.)
7 Id., at p. 25.
8 The dispositive portion of the CA decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. As modified, the
judgment reads: Appellant Vinancio Figueroa is found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Homicide Through
Reckless Imprudence with violation of the Land
Transportation and Traffic Code (formerly the
Automobile Law) and is accordingly hereby sentenced
to suffer an indeterminate penalty of One (1) Year,
Four (4) Months and One (1) Day of prision
correccional as minimum to Three (3) Years, Six (6)
Months and Twenty (20) Days of prision
correccional as maximum, and to pay the heirs of the
victim the following:
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity; 1.
P339,840.00 as damages for loss of earning
capacity; 2.
P45,000 for funeral expenses; and 3.
P24,000 for burial expenses 4.
SO ORDERED. (Id., at 30.)
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68 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Figueroa vs. People
Dissatisfied, the petitioner filed the instant
petition for review on certiorari raising the following
issues for our resolution:
Does the fact that the petitioner failed to raise the
issue of jurisdiction during the trial of this case, which
was initiated and filed by the public prosecutor before
the wrong court, constitute laches in relation to the
doctrine laid down in a. Tijam v. Sibonghanoy,
notwithstanding the fact that said issue was
immediately raised in petitioner’s appeal to the
Honorable Court of Appeals? Conversely, does the
active participation of the petitioner in the trial of his
case, which is initiated and filed not by him but by the
public prosecutor, amount to estoppel?
Does the admission of the petitioner that it is
difficult to b. immediately stop a bus while it is
running at 40 kilometers per hour for the purpose of
avoiding a person who unexpectedly crossed the
road, constitute enough incriminating evidence to
warrant his conviction for the crime charged?
Is the Honorable Court of Appeals justified in
considering the place of accident as falling within
Item 4 of Section 35 (b) of the Land Transportation
and Traffic Code, and subsequently ruling that the
speed limit thereto is only 20 kilometers per hour,
when no evidence whatsoever to that effect was ever
presented by the prosecution during the trial of this
case? c.
Is the Honorable Court of Appeals justified in
convicting the petitioner for homicide through
reckless imprudence (the legally correct designation is
“reckless imprudence resulting to homicide”) d. with
violation of the Land Transportation and
Traffic Code when the prosecution did not prove this
during the trial and, more importantly, the
information filed against the petitioner does not
contain an allegation to that effect?
Does the uncontroverted testimony of the defense
witness Leonardo Hernal that the victim
unexpectedly crossed the road resulting in him
getting hit by the bus driven by the petitioner not
enough evidence to acquit him of the crime charged?
e.9
_______________
9 Id., at pp. 156-158.
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Figueroa vs. People
 Applied uniformly is the familiar rule that the
jurisdiction of the court to hear and decide a case is
conferred by the law in force at the time of the
institution of the action, unless such statute provides
for a retroactive application thereof.10 In this case, at
the time the criminal information for reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide with violation of the
Automobile Law (now Land Transportation and
Traffic Code) was filed, Section 32(2) of Batas
Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 12911 had already been
amended by Republic Act No. 7691. 12 The said
provision thus reads:
32. “Sec.Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial
Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts in Criminal Cases.—Except in cases
falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of
Regional Trial Courts and the Sandiganbayan, the
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts,
and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
xxxx
Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses
punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six (6)
years irrespective of the amount of fine, and
regardless of other imposable accessory or other
penalties, including the civil liability arising from
such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of
kind, nature, value or amount thereof: (2) Provided,
however, That in offenses involving damage to
property through criminal negligence, they shall have
exclusive original jurisdiction thereof.”
_______________
10 Alarilla v. Sandiganbayan, 393 Phil. 143, 155;
338 SCRA 485 (2000); Escobal v. Justice
Garchitorena, 466 Phil. 625, 635; 422 SCRA 45, 53
(2004).
11 Entitled “The Judiciary Reorganization Act of
1980,” approved on August 14, 1981.
12 Entitled “An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of
the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts,
Amending for the Purpose Batas Pambansa Blg. 129,
Otherwise Known as the ‘Judiciary Reorganization
Act of 1980,’ ” approved on March 25, 1994, and took
effect on April 15, 1994, fifteen days after publication
in the Malaya and in the Times Journal on March 30,
1994, pursuant to Section 8 thereof.
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70 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Figueroa vs. People
As the imposable penalty for the crime charged
herein is prision correccional in its medium and
maximum periods or imprisonment for 2 years, 4
months and 1 day to 6 years,13jurisdiction to hear and
try the same is conferred on the Municipal Trial
Courts (MTCs). Clearly, therefore, the RTC of
Bulacan does not have jurisdiction over Criminal Case
No. 2235-M-94.
While both the appellate court and the Solicitor
General acknowledge this fact, they nevertheless are
of the position that the principle of estoppel by laches
has already precluded the petitioner from questioning
the jurisdiction of the RTC—the trial went on for 4
years with the petitioner actively participating
therein and without him ever raising the
jurisdictional infirmity. The petitioner, for his part,
counters that the lack of jurisdiction of a court over
the subject matter may be raised at any time even for
the first time on appeal. As undue delay is further
absent herein, the principle of laches will not be
applicable.
To settle once and for all this problem of
jurisdiction vis-à-vis estoppel by laches, which
continuously confounds the bench and the bar, we
shall analyze the various Court decisions on the
matter.
As early as 1901, this Court has declared
that unless jurisdiction has been conferred by some
legislative act, no court or tribunal can act on a matter
submitted to it.14 We went on to state in U.S. v. De La
Santa15 that:
“It has been frequently held that a lack of jurisdiction
over the subject-matter is fatal, and subject to
objection at any stage of the proceedings, either in the
court below or on appeal (Ency. of Pl. & Pr., vol. 12, p.
189, and large array of cases there cited), and
indeed, where the subject-matter is not within
the jurisdiction, the court may dismiss the
proceeding ex mero motu. (4 Ill., 133; 190 Ind.,
79; Chipman vs. Waterbury, 59 Conn., 496.)
_______________
13 Revised Penal Code, Art. 365.
14 In Re: Calloway, 1 Phil. 11, 12 (1901).
15 9 Phil. 22 (1907).
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Figueroa vs. People
Jurisdiction over the subject-matter in a judicial
proceeding is conferred by the sovereign authority
which organizes the court; it is given only by law and
in the manner prescribed by law and an objection
based on the lack of such jurisdiction can not be
waived by the parties. x x x16
Later, in People v. Casiano,17 the Court explained:
4.The operation of the principle of estoppel
on the question of jurisdiction seemingly
depends upon whether the lower court actually
had jurisdiction or not. If it had nojurisdiction,
but the case was tried and decided upon the
theory that it had jurisdiction, the parties are
not barred, on appeal, from assailing such
jurisdiction, for the same “must exist as a
matter of law, and may not be conferred by
consent of the parties or by estoppel” (5 C.J.S.,
861-863). However, if the lower court had jurisdiction,
and the case was heard and decided upon a given
theory, such, for instance, as that the court
had no jurisdiction, the party who induced it to adopt
such theory will not be permitted, on appeal, to
assume an inconsistent position—that the lower
court had jurisdiction. Here, the principle of estoppel
applies. The rule that jurisdiction is conferred by law,
and does not depend upon the will of the parties,
has no bearing thereon. Thus, Corpus Juris
Secundum says:
Where accused has secured a decision that the
indictment is void, or has been granted an
instruction based on its defective character
directing the jury to acquit, he is estopped, when
subsequently indicted, to assert that the former
indictment was valid. In such case, there may be
a new prosecution whether the indictment in the
former prosecution was good or bad.
Similarly, where, after the jury was impaneled
and sworn, the court on accused's motion quashed
the information on the erroneous assumption that
the court had no jurisdiction, accused cannot
successfully plead former jeopardy to a new
information. x x x (22 C.J.S., sec. 252, pp. 388-
389; italics ours.)
Where accused procured a prior conviction to
be set aside on the ground that the court
was without jurisdiction, he is es-
_______________
16 Id., at p. 26. (Emphasis ours.)
17 111 Phil. 73; 1 SCRA 478, 496 (1961).
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72 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Figueroa vs. People
topped subsequently to assert, in support of a
defense of previous jeopardy, that such court had
jurisdiction.” (22 C.J.S. p. 378.)18
But in Pindañgan Agricultural Co., Inc. v.
Dans,19 the Court, in not sustaining the plea of lack of
jurisdiction by the plaintiff-appellee therein, made the
following observations:
“It is surprising why it is only now, after the
decision has been rendered, that the plaintiff-appellee
presents the question of this Court’s jurisdiction over
the case. Republic Act No. 2613 was enacted on
August 1, 1959. This case was argued on January 29,
1960. Notwithstanding this fact, the jurisdiction of
this Court was never impugned until the adverse
decision of this Court was handed down. The conduct
of counsel leads us to believe that they must have
always been of the belief that notwithstanding said
enactment of Republic Act 2613 this Court has
jurisdiction of the case, such conduct being born out of
a conviction that the actual real value of the
properties in question actually exceeds the
jurisdictional amount of this Court (over P200,000).
Our minute resolution in G.R. No. L-10096, Hyson
Tan, et al. vs. Filipinas Compaña de Seguros, et al., of
March 23, 1956, a parallel case, is applicable to the
conduct of plaintiff-appellee in this case, thus:
x x x that an appellant who files his brief and
submits his case to the Court of Appeals for
decision, without questioning the latter’s
jurisdiction until decision is rendered therein,
should be considered as having voluntarily
waived so much of his claim as would exceed the
jurisdiction of said Appellate Court; for the
reason that a contrary rule would encourage the
undesirable practice of appellants submitting
their cases for decision to the Court of Appeals in
expectation of favorable judgment, but with
intent of attacking its jurisdiction should the
decision be unfavorable: x x x”20
_______________
18 Id., at pp. 93-94. (Emphasis ours).
19 No. L-14591, September 26, 1962, 6 SCRA 14.
20 Id., at pp. 16-17.
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Figueroa vs. People
Then came our ruling in Tijam v.
Sibonghanoy21 that a party may be barred by laches
from invoking lack of jurisdiction at a late hour for the
purpose of annulling everything done in the case with
the active participation of said party invoking the
plea. We expounded, thus:
“A party may be estopped or barred from
raising a question in different ways and for
different reasons. Thus, we speak of estoppel in
pais, of estoppel by deed or by record, and of
estoppel by laches.
Laches, in a general sense, is failure or
neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained
length of time, to do that which, by exercising due
diligence, could or should have been done earlier;
it is negligence or omission to assert a right
within a reasonable time, warranting a
presumption that the party entitled to assert it
either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.
The doctrine of laches or of “stale demands” is
based upon grounds of public policy which
requires, for the peace of society, the
discouragement of stale claims and, unlike the
statute of limitations, is not a mere question of
time but is principally a question of the inequity
 or unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be
enforced or asserted.
It has been held that a party cannot invoke
the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative
relief against his opponent and, after obtaining or
failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question
that same jurisdiction (Dean vs. Dean, 136 Or.
694, 86 A.L.R. 79). In the case just cited, by way
of explaining the rule, it was further said that the
question whether the court had jurisdiction
either of the subject matter of the action or of the
parties was not important in such cases because
the party is barred from such conduct not because
the judgment or order of the court is valid and
conclusive as an adjudication, but for the reason
that such a practice cannot be tolerated—
obviously for reasons of public policy.
Furthermore, it has also been held that after
voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering
an adverse decision on
_______________
21 131 Phil. 556; 23 SCRA 29 (1968).
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74 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Figueroa vs. People
the merits, it is too late for the loser to question
the jurisdiction or power of the court (Pease vs.
Rathbun-Jones etc., 243 U.S. 273, 61 L. Ed. 715,
37 S.Ct. 283; St. Louis etc. vs. McBride, 141 U.S.
127, 35 L. Ed. 659). And in Littleton vs. Burgess,
16 Wyo. 58, the Court said that it is not right for
a party who has affirmed and invoked the
jurisdiction of a court in a particular matter to
secure an affirmative relief, to afterwards deny
that same jurisdiction to escape a penalty.
Upon this same principle is what We said in
the three cases mentioned in the resolution of the
Court of Appeals of May 20, 1963 (supra)—to the
effect that we frown upon the “undesirable
practice” of a party submitting his case for
decision and then accepting the judgment, only if
favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction,
when adverse—as well as in Pindañgan etc. vs.
Dans, et al., G.R. L-14591, September 26,
1962; Montelibano, et al. vs. Bacolod-Murcia
Milling Co., Inc., G.R. L-15092; Young Men Labor
Union, etc. vs. The Court of Industrial Relations,
et al., G.R. L-20307, Feb. 26, 1965, and Mejia vs.
Lucas, 100 Phil. p. 277.
The facts of this case show that from the time the
Surety became a quasi-party on July 31, 1948, it could
have raised the question of the lack of jurisdiction of
the Court of First Instance of Cebu to take cognizance
of the present action by reason of the sum of money
involved which, according to the law then in force,
was within the original exclusive jurisdiction of
inferior courts. It failed to do so. Instead, at several
stages of the proceedings in the court a quo, as well as
in the Court of Appeals, it invoked the jurisdiction of
said courts to obtain affirmative relief and submitted
its case for a final adjudication on the merits. It was
only after an adverse decision was rendered by the
Court of Appeals that it finally woke up to raise the
question of jurisdiction. Were we to sanction such
conduct on its part, We would in effect be declaring as
useless all the proceedings had in the present case
since it was commenced on July 19, 1948 and compel
the judgment creditors to go up their Calvary once
more. The inequity and unfairness of this is not only
patent but revolting.”22
For quite a time since we made this
pronouncement in Sibonghanoy, courts and tribunals,
in resolving issues that
_______________
22 Id., at pp. 563-565.
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VOL. 558, JULY 14, 2008 75
Figueroa vs. People
involve the belated invocation of lack of jurisdiction,
have applied the principle of estoppel by laches. Thus,
in Calimlim v. Ramirez,23 we pointed out
that Sibonghanoy was developing into a general
rule rather than the exception:
“A rule that had been settled by unquestioned
acceptance and upheld in decisions so numerous to
cite is that the jurisdiction of a court over the subject-
matter of the action is a matter of law and may not be
conferred by consent or agreement of the parties. The
lack of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any
stage of the proceedings, even on appeal. This doctrine
has been qualified by recent pronouncements which
stemmed principally from the ruling in the cited case
of Sibonghanoy. It is to be regretted, however, that
the holding in said case had been applied to situations
which were obviously not contemplated therein. The
exceptional circumstance involved
in Sibonghanoy which justified the departure from the
accepted concept of non-waivability of objection to
jurisdiction has been ignored and, instead a blanket
doctrine had been repeatedly upheld that rendered
the supposed ruling in Sibonghanoy not as the
exception, but rather the general rule, virtually
overthrowing altogether the time-honored principle
that the issue of jurisdiction is not lost by waiver or by
estoppel.
In Sibonghanoy, the defense of lack of jurisdiction
of the court that rendered the questioned ruling was
held to be barred by estoppel by laches. It was ruled
that the lack of jurisdiction having been raised for the
first time in a motion to dismiss filed almost fifteen
(15) years after the questioned ruling had been
rendered, such a plea may no longer be raised for
being barred by laches. As defined in said case, laches
is “failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and
unexplained length of time, to do that which, by
exercising due diligence, could or should have been
done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a
right within a reasonable time, warranting a
presumption that the party entitled to assert has
abandoned it or declined to assert it.”24
In Calimlim, despite the fact that the one who
benefited from the plea of lack of jurisdiction was the
one who invoked
_______________
23 204 Phil. 25; 118 SCRA 399 (1982).
24 Id., at pp. 34-35.
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76 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Figueroa vs. People
the court’s jurisdiction, and who later obtained an
adverse judgment therein, we refused to apply the
ruling in Sibonghanoy. The Court accorded
supremacy to the time-honored principle that
the issue of jurisdiction is not lost by waiver or
by estoppel.
Yet, in subsequent cases decided after Calimlim,
which by sheer volume are too plentiful to mention,
the Sibonghanoy doctrine, as foretold in Calimlim,
became the rule rather than the exception. As such,
in Soliven v. Fastforms Philippines, Inc.,25 the Court
ruled:
“While it is true that jurisdiction may be raised at
any time, “this rule presupposes that estoppel has not
supervened.” In the instant case, respondent actively
participated in all stages of the proceedings before the
trial court and invoked its authority by asking for an
affirmative relief. Clearly, respondent is estopped
from challenging the trial court’s jurisdiction,
especially when an adverse judgment has been
rendered. In PNOC Shipping and Transport
Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, we held:
Moreover, we note that petitioner did not
question at all the jurisdiction of the lower court
x x x in its answers to both the amended
complaint and the second amended complaint. It
did so only in its motion for reconsideration of the
decision of the lower court after it had received
an adverse decision. As this Court held
in Pantranco North Express, Inc. vs. Court of
Appeals (G.R. No. 105180, July 5, 1993, 224
SCRA 477, 491), participation in all stages of the
case before the trial court, that included invoking
its authority in asking for affirmative relief,
effectively barred petitioner by estoppel from
challenging the court’s jurisdiction. Notably, from
the time it filed its answer to the second amended
complaint on April 16, 1985, petitioner did not
question the lower court’s jurisdiction. It was
only on December 29, 1989 when it filed its
motion for reconsideration of the lower court’s
decision that petitioner raised the question of the
lower court’s lack of jurisdiction. Petitioner thus
foreclosed its right to raise the issue of jurisdiction
by its own inaction. (italics ours)
_______________
25 G.R. No. 139031, October 18, 2004, 440 SCRA
389.
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Figueroa vs. People
Similarly, in the subsequent case of Sta. Lucia
Realty and Development, Inc. vs. Cabrigas, we ruled:
In the case at bar, it was found by the trial
court in its 30 September 1996 decision in LCR
Case No. Q-60161(93) that private respondents
(who filed the petition for reconstitution of titles)
failed to comply with both sections 12 and 13 of
RA 26 and therefore, it had no jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the case. However, private
respondents never questioned the trial court’s
jurisdiction over its petition for reconstitution
throughout the duration of LCR Case No. Q-
60161(93). On the contrary, private respondents
actively participated in the reconstitution
proceedings by filing pleadings and presenting its
evidence. They invoked the trial court’s
jurisdiction in order to obtain affirmative relief—
the reconstitution of their titles. Private
respondents have thus foreclosed their right to
raise the issue of jurisdiction by their own actions.
The Court has constantly upheld the doctrine
that while jurisdiction may be assailed at any
stage, a litigant’s participation in all stages of the
case before the trial court, including the
invocation of its authority in asking for
affirmative relief, bars such party from
challenging the court’s jurisdiction (PNOC
Shipping and Transport Corporation vs. Court of
Appeals, 297 SCRA 402 [1998]). A party cannot
invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure
affirmative relief against his opponent and after
obtaining or failing to obtain such relief,
repudiate or question that same
jurisdiction (Asset Privatization Trust vs. Court of
Appeals, 300 SCRA 579 [1998]; Province of
Bulacan vs. Court of Appeals, 299 SCRA 442
[1998]). The Court frowns upon the undesirable
practice of a party participating in the
proceedings and submitting his case for decision
and then accepting judgment, only if favorable,
and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when
adverse (Producers Bank of the Philippines vs.
NLRC, 298 SCRA 517 [1998], citing Ilocos Sur
 Electric Cooperative, Inc. vs. NLRC, 241 SCRA 36
[1995]). (italics ours)26
Noteworthy, however, is that, in the 2005 case
of Metromedia Times Corporation v. Pastorin,27 where
the issue of lack of
_______________
26 Id., at pp. 395-396.
27 G.R. No. 154295, July 29, 2005, 465 SCRA 320.
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78 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Figueroa vs. People
jurisdiction was raised only in the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) on appeal, we stated,
after examining the doctrines of jurisdiction vis-à-
vis estoppel, that the ruling in Sibonghanoy stands
as an exception, rather than the general rule.
Metromedia, thus, was not estopped from assailing
the jurisdiction of the labor arbiter before the NLRC
on appeal.28
Later, in Francel Realty Corporation v. Sycip,29 the
Court clarified that:
“Petitioner argues that the CA’s affirmation of the
trial court’s dismissal of its case was erroneous,
considering that a full-blown trial had already been
conducted. In effect, it contends that lack of
jurisdiction could no longer be used as a ground for
dismissal after trial had ensued and ended.
The above argument is anchored on estoppel by
laches, which has been used quite successfully in a
number of cases to thwart dismissals based on lack of
jurisdiction. Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, in which this
doctrine was espoused, held that a party may be
barred from questioning a court’s jurisdiction after
being invoked to secure affirmative relief against its
opponent. In fine, laches prevents the issue of lack of
jurisdiction from being raised for the first time on
appeal by a litigant whose purpose is to annul
everything done in a trial in which it has actively
participated.
Laches is defined as the “failure or neglect for an
unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do
that which, by exercising due diligence, could or
should have been done earlier; it is negligence or
omission to assert a right within a reasonable time,
warranting a presumption that the party entitled to
assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert
it.”
The ruling in Sibonghanoy on the matter of
jurisdiction is, however, the exception rather than the
rule. Estoppel by laches may be invoked to bar the
issue of lack of jurisdiction only in cases in which the
factual milieu is analogous to that in the cited case. In
such controversies, laches should be clearly present;
that is, lack of jurisdiction must have been raised so
belatedly as to warrant the
_______________
28 Id., at p. 337.
29 G.R. No. 154684, September 8, 2005, 469 SCRA
424.
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VOL. 558, JULY 14, 2008 79
Figueroa vs. People
presumption that the party entitled to assert it had
abandoned or declined to assert it.
That Sibonghanoy applies only to exceptional
circumstances is clarified in Calimlim v. Ramirez,
which we quote:
A rule that had been settled by unquestioned
acceptance and upheld in decisions so numerous
to cite is that the jurisdiction of a court over the
subject-matter of the action is a matter of law
and may not be conferred by consent or
agreement of the parties. The lack of jurisdiction
of a court may be raised at any stage of the
proceedings, even on appeal. This doctrine has
been qualified by recent pronouncements which
stemmed principally from the ruling in the cited
case of Sibonghanoy. It is to be regretted, however,
that the holding in said case had been applied to
situations which were obviously not contemplated
therein. The exceptional circumstance involved
in Sibonghanoywhich justified the departure
from the accepted concept of non-waivability of
objection to jurisdiction has been ignored and,
instead a blanket doctrine had been repeatedly
upheld that rendered the supposed ruling
in Sibonghanoy not as the exception, but rather
the general rule, virtually overthrowing
altogether the time-honored principle that the
issue of jurisdiction is not lost by waiver or
by estoppel.
Indeed, the general rule remains: a court’s lack of
jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the
proceedings, even on appeal. The reason is that
jurisdiction is conferred by law, and lack of it affects
the very authority of the court to take cognizance of
and to render judgment on the action. Moreover,
jurisdiction is determined by the averments of the
complaint, not by the defenses contained in the
answer.”30
Also, in Mangaliag v. Catubig-Pastoral,31 even if
the pleader of lack of jurisdiction actively took part in
the trial proceedings by presenting a witness to seek
exoneration, the Court, reiterating the doctrine in
Calimlim, said:
“Private respondent argues that the defense of lack of
jurisdiction may be waived by estoppel through active
participation in the trial. Such, however, is not the
general rule but an exception, best charac-
_______________
30 Id., at pp. 429-431.
 31 G.R. No. 143951, October 25, 2005, 474 SCRA
153.
80
80 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Figueroa vs. People
terized by the peculiar circumstances in Tijam vs.
Sibonghanoy. In Sibonghanoy, the party invoking lack
of jurisdiction did so only after fifteen years and at a
stage when the proceedings had already been elevated
to the CA. Sibonghanoy is an exceptional case because
of the presence of laches, which was defined therein
as failure or neglect for an unreasonable and
unexplained length of time to do that which, by
exercising due diligence, could or should have been
done earlier; it is the negligence or omission to assert
a right within a reasonable time, warranting a
presumption that the party entitled to assert has
abandoned it or declined to assert it.”32
And in the more recent Regalado v. Go,33 the Court
again emphasized that laches should be clearly
present for the Sibonghanoy doctrine to be applicable,
thus:
“Laches is defined as the “failure or neglect for an
unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do
that which, by exercising due diligence, could or
should have been done earlier, it is negligence or
omission to assert a right within a reasonable length
of time, warranting a presumption that the party
entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or
declined to assert it.”
The ruling in People v. Regalario that was based
on the landmark doctrine enunciated in Tijam v.
Sibonghanoy on the matter of jurisdiction
by estoppel is the exception rather than the
rule. Estoppel by laches may be invoked to bar the
issue of lack of jurisdiction only in cases in which the
factual milieu is analogous to that in the cited case. In
such controversies, laches should have been clearly
present; that is, lack of jurisdiction must have been
raised so belatedly as to warrant the presumption
that the party entitled to assert it had abandoned or
declined to assert it.
In Sibonghanoy, the defense of lack of jurisdiction
was raised for the first time in a motion to dismiss
filed by the Surety almost 15 years after the
questioned ruling had been rendered. At several
stages of the proceedings, in the court a quo as well as
in the Court of Appeals, the Surety invoked the
jurisdiction of the said courts to obtain affirmative
relief and submitted its case for final adjudication on
the merits. It was only when the adverse decision was
rendered
_______________
32 Id., at p. 162.
33 G.R. No. 167988, February 6, 2007, 514 SCRA
616.
81
VOL. 558, JULY 14, 2008 81
Figueroa vs. People
by the Court of Appeals that it finally woke up to
raise the question of jurisdiction.
Clearly, the factual settings attendant
in Sibonghanoy are not present in the case at bar.
Petitioner Atty. Regalado, after the receipt of the
Court of Appeals resolution finding her guilty of
contempt, promptly filed a Motion for Reconsideration
assailing the said court’s jurisdiction based on
procedural infirmity in initiating the action. Her
compliance with the appellate court’s directive to
show cause why she should not be cited for contempt
and filing a single piece of pleading to that effect could
not be considered as an active participation in the
judicial proceedings so as to take the case within the
milieu of Sibonghanoy. Rather, it is the natural fear
to disobey the mandate of the court that could lead to
dire consequences that impelled her to comply.”34
The Court, thus, wavered on when to apply the
exceptional circumstance in Sibonghanoy and on
when to apply the general rule enunciated as early as
in De La Santa and expounded at length in Calimlim.
The general rule should, however, be, as it has always
been, that the issue of jurisdiction may be raised at
any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal, and is
not lost by waiver or by estoppel. Estoppel by laches, to
bar a litigant from asserting the court’s absence or lack
of jurisdiction, only supervenes in exceptional cases
similar to the factual milieu of Tijam v.
Sibonghanoy. Indeed, the fact that a person attempts
to invoke unauthorized jurisdiction of a court does not
estop him from thereafter challenging its jurisdiction
over the subject matter, since such jurisdiction must
arise by law and not by mere consent of the parties.
This is especially true where the person seeking to
invoke unauthorized jurisdiction of the court does not
thereby secure any advantage or the adverse party
does not suffer any harm.35
Applying the said doctrine to the instant case, the
petitioner is in no way estopped by laches in assailing
the juris-
_______________
34 Id., at pp. 635-636. (Citations omitted.)
35 Jolley v. Martin Bros. Box Co., 109 N.E. 2d,
652, 661 (1952).
82
82 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Figueroa vs. People
diction of the RTC, considering that he raised the lack
thereof in his appeal before the appellate court. At
that time, no considerable period had yet elapsed for
laches to attach. True, delay alone, though
unreasonable, will not sustain the defense of “estoppel
by laches” unless it further appears that the party,
knowing his rights, has not sought to enforce them
until the condition of the party pleading laches has in
good faith become so changed that he cannot be
restored to his former state, if the rights be then
enforced, due to loss of evidence, change of title,
intervention of equities, and other causes.36 In
applying the principle of estoppel by laches in the
exceptional case of Sibonghanoy, the Court therein
considered the patent and revolting inequity and
unfairness of having the judgment creditors go up
their Calvary once more after more or less 15
years.37The same, however, does not obtain in the
instant case.
We note at this point that estoppel, being in the
nature of a forfeiture, is not favored by law. It is to be
applied rarely—only from necessity, and only in
extraordinary circumstances. The doctrine must be
applied with great care and the equity must be strong
in its favor.38 When misapplied, the doctrine of
estoppel may be a most effective weapon for the
accomplishment of injustice.39 Moreover, a judgment
rendered without jurisdiction over the subject matter
is void.40 Hence, the Revised Rules of Court provides
for remedies in attacking judgments rendered by
courts or tribunals that have no jurisdiction over the
concerned cases. No laches will even attach when the
judgment is null and void for want of jurisdiction.41
_______________
36 Wisdom’s Adm’r v. Sims, 144 S.W. 2d 232, 235,
236, 284 Ky. 258.
37 Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, supra, at p. 37.
38 C & S Fishfarm Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 442
Phil. 279, 290-291; 394 SCRA 82, 91 (2002).
39 Smith v. Smith, 265 N.C. 18, 27; 143 S.E. 2d
300, 306 (1965).
40 Veneracion v. Mancilla, G.R. No. 158238, July
20, 2006; 495 SCRA 712.
41 Arcelona v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 102900,
October 2, 1997, 280 SCRA 20, 53.
83
VOL. 558, JULY 14, 2008 83
Figueroa vs. People
As we have stated in Heirs of Julian Dela Cruz and
Leonora Talaro v. Heirs of Alberto Cruz,42
“It is axiomatic that the jurisdiction of a tribunal,
including a quasi-judicial officer or government
agency, over the nature and subject matter of a
petition or complaint is determined by the material
allegations therein and the character of the relief
prayed for, irrespective of whether the petitioner or
complainant is entitled to any or all such
reliefs. Jurisdiction over the nature and subject matter
of an action is conferred by the Constitution and the
law, and not by the consent or waiver of the parties
where the court otherwise would have no jurisdiction
over the nature or subject matter of the action. Nor can
it be acquired through, or waived by, any act or
omission of the parties. Moreover, estoppel does not
apply to confer jurisdiction to a tribunal that has none
over the cause of action. x x x
Indeed, the jurisdiction of the court or tribunal is
not affected by the defenses or theories set up by the
defendant or respondent in his answer or motion to
dismiss. Jurisdiction should be determined by
considering not only the status or the relationship of
the parties but also the nature of the issues or
questions that is the subject of the controversy.
x x x x The proceedings before a court or tribunal
without jurisdiction, including its decision, are null
and void, hence, susceptible to direct and collateral
attacks.”43
With the above considerations, we find it
unnecessary to resolve the other issues raised in the
petition.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition
for review on certiorari is GRANTED. Criminal Case
No. 2235-M-94 is hereby DISMISSED without
prejudice.
SO ORDERED.
Quisumbing,** Ynares-Santiago, Austria-
Martinez and Reyes, JJ., concur.
_______________
42 G.R. No. 162890, November 22, 2005, 475
SCRA 743.
43 Id., at pp. 755-757. (Italics supplied.)
** In lieu of Associate Justice Minita V. Chico-
Nazario per Special Order No. 508, dated June 25,
2008.
© Copyright 2018 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights
reserved.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Serana vs. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 162059. January 22, 2008.*
HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA,
petitioner, vs.SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Criminal Procedure; Pleadings and
Practice; Appeals; Certiorari; Well-established is the
rule that when a motion to quash in a criminal case is
denied, the remedy is not a petition for certiorari, but
for petitioners to go to trial, without prejudice to
reiterating the special defenses invoked in their motion
to quash.—We would ordinarily dismiss this petition
for certiorari outright on procedural grounds. Well-
established is the rule that when a motion to quash in
a criminal case is denied, the remedy is not a petition
for certiorari, but for petitioners to go to trial, without
prejudice to reiterating the special defenses invoked
in their motion to quash. Remedial measures as
regards interlocutory orders, such as a motion to
quash, are frowned upon and often dismissed. The
evident reason for this rule is to avoid multiplicity of
appeals in a single action.
Criminal Law; Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act (R.A. No. 3019); Jurisdictions; It is P.D. No. 1606,
as amended, rather than R.A. No. 3019, as amended,
that determines the jurisdiction of the
_______________
*THIRD DIVISION.
225
VOL. 542, JANUARY 22, 2008 2
25
Serana vs. Sandiganbayan
Sandiganbayan.—We first address petitioner’s
contention that the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
is determined by Section 4 of R.A. No. 3019 (The Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as amended). We
note that petitioner refers to Section 4 of the said law
yet quotes Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, in
her motion to quash before the Sandiganbayan. She
repeats the reference in the instant petition
for certiorari and in her memorandum of authorities.
We cannot bring ourselves to write this off as a mere
clerical or typographical error. It bears stressing that
petitioner repeated this claim twice despite
corrections made by the Sandiganbayan. Her claim
has no basis in law. It is P.D. No. 1606, as amended,
rather than R.A. No. 3019, as amended, that
determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. A
brief legislative history of the statute creating the
Sandiganbayan is in order. The Sandiganbayan was
created by P.D. No. 1486, promulgated by then
President Ferdinand E. Marcos on June 11, 1978. It
was promulgated to attain the highest norms of
official conduct required of public officers and
employees, based on the concept that public officers
and employees shall serve with the highest degree of
responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency and
shall remain at all times accountable to the people.
Same; Same; Same; Statutory Construction; The
rule is wellestablished in this jurisdiction that statutes
should receive a sensible construction so as to avoid an
unjust or an absurd conclusion—the intention of the
legislator must be ascertained from the whole text of
the law and every part of the act is to be taken into
view.—The rule is well-established in this jurisdiction
that statutes should receive a sensible construction so
as to avoid an unjust or an absurd
conclusion. Interpretatio talis in ambiguis semper
fienda est, ut evitetur inconveniens et absurdum.
Where there is ambiguity, such interpretation as will
avoid inconvenience and absurdity is to be
adopted. Kung saan mayroong kalabuan, ang
pagpapaliwanag ay hindi dapat maging
mahirap at katawa-tawa. Every section, provision
or clause of the statute must be expounded by
reference to each other in order to arrive at the effect
contemplated by the legislature. The intention of the
legislator must be ascertained from the whole text of
the law and every part of the act is to be taken into
view. In other words, petitioner’s interpretation lies in
direct opposition to the rule that a statute must be
interpreted as a whole under the principle that the
best interpreter of a statute is the statute
itself. Optima statuti interpretatrix est ipsum
statutum. Ang isang
226
2 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
26 ANNOTATED
Serana vs. Sandiganbayan
batas ay marapat na bigyan ng kahulugan
sa kanyang kabuuan sa ilalim ng prinsipyo na
ang pinakamainam na interpretasyon ay ang
mismong batas.
Same; Same; Same; Estafa; Plainly, estafa is one
of those felonies within the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, subject to the twin requirements that
(a) the offense is committed by public officials and
employees mentioned in Section 4(A) of P.D. No. 1606,
as amended, and that (b) the offense is committed in
relation to their office.—The Sandiganbayan has
jurisdiction over other felonies committed by public
officials in relation to their office. We see no plausible
or sensible reason to exclude estafa as one of the
offenses included in Section 4(B) of P.D. No. 1606.
Plainly, estafais one of those other felonies. The
jurisdiction is simply subject to the twin requirements
that (a) the offense is committed by public officials
and employees mentioned in Section 4(A) of P.D. No.
1606, as amended, and that (b) the offense is
committed in relation to their office.
Same; Same; Same; Public Office; University of
the Philippines (U.P.); Words and Phrases; A
University of the Philippines (UP) Student Regent is a
public officer; A public office is the right, authority,
and duty created and conferred by law, by which for a
given period, either fixed by law or enduring at the
pleasure of the creating power, an individual is
invested with some portion of the sovereign functions
of the government, to be exercise by him for the benefit
of the public.—Petitioner also contends that she is not
a public officer. She does not receive any salary or
remuneration as a UP student regent. This is not the
first or likely the last time that We will be called upon
to define a public officer. In Khan, Jr. v. Office of the
Ombudsman, 495 SCRA 452 (2006), We ruled that it
is difficult to pin down the definition of a public
officer. The 1987 Constitution does not define who are
public officers. Rather, the varied definitions and
concepts are found in different statutes and
jurisprudence. In Aparri v. Court of Appeals, 127
SCRA 231 (1984), the Court held that: A public office
is the right, authority, and duty created and conferred
by law, by which for a given period, either fixed by
law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power,
an individual is invested with some portion of the
sovereign functions of the government, to be exercise
by him for the benefit of the public ([Mechem Public
Offices and Officers,] Sec. 1). The right to hold a public
office under our political system is therefore not a
natural right. It exists, when it exists at all
227
VOL. 542, JANUARY 22, 2008 2
27
Serana vs. Sandiganbayan
only because and by virtue of some law expressly
or impliedly creating and conferring it (Mechem Ibid.,
Sec. 64). There is no such thing as a vested interest or
an estate in an office, or even an absolute right to hold
office. Excepting constitutional offices which provide
for special immunity as regards salary and tenure, no
one can be said to have any vested right in an office or
its salary (42 Am. Jur. 881).
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; It is not
only the salary grade that determines the jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan—the Sandiganbayan also has
jurisdiction over other officers enumerated in P.D. No.
1606.—Petitioner claims that she is not a public
officer with Salary Grade 27; she is, in fact, a regular
tuition fee-paying student. This is likewise bereft of
merit. It is not only the salary grade that determines
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. The
Sandiganbayan also has jurisdiction over other
officers enumerated in P.D. No. 1606. In Geduspan v.
People, 451 SCRA 187 (2005), We held that while the
first part of Section 4(A) covers only officials with
Salary Grade 27 and higher, its second part
specifically includes other executive officials whose
positions may not be of Salary Grade 27 and higher
but who are by express provision of law placed under
the jurisdiction of the said court. Petitioner falls
under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as she is
placed there by express provision of law. Section
4(A)(1)(g) of P.D. No. 1606 explictly vested the
Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction over Presidents,
directors or trustees, or managers of government-
owned or controlled corporations, state universities or
educational institutions or foundations. Petitioner
falls under this category. As the Sandiganbayan
pointed out, the BOR performs functions similar to
those of a board of trustees of a non-stock corporation.
By express mandate of law, petitioner is, indeed, a
public officer as contemplated by P.D. No. 1606.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; It is
well-established that compensation is not an essential
element of public office.—It is well established that
compensation is not an essential element of public
office. At most, it is merely incidental to the public
office. Delegation of sovereign functions is essential in
the public office. An investment in an individual of
some portion of the sovereign functions of the
government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of
the public makes one a public officer.
228
2 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
28 ANNOTATED
Serana vs. Sandiganbayan
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The
administration of the University of the Philippines
(UP) is a sovereign function in line with Article XIV of
the Constitution.—The administration of the UP is a
sovereign function in line with Article XIV of the
Constitution. UP performs a legitimate governmental
function by providing advanced instruction in
literature, philosophy, the sciences, and arts, and
giving professional and technical training. Moreover,
UP is maintained by the Government and it declares
no dividends and is not a corporation created for
profit.
Criminal Procedure; Jurisdictions; Pleadings
and Practice; It is axiomatic that jurisdiction is
determined by the averments in the information.—It is
axiomatic that jurisdiction is determined by the
averments in the information. More than that,
jurisdiction is not affected by the pleas or the theories
set up by defendant or respondent in an answer, a
motion to dismiss, or a motion to quash. Otherwise,
jurisdiction would become dependent almost entirely
upon the whims of defendant or respondent.
Legal Ethics; Attorneys; A lawyer owes candor,
fairness and honesty to the Court—a lawyer should
not misquote or misrepresent; Petitioner’s counsel
admonished to be more careful and accurate in his
citation.—Petitioner’s counsel, Renato G. dela Cruz,
misrepresented his reference to Section 4 of P.D. No.
1606 as a quotation from Section 4 of R.A. No. 3019. A
review of his motion to quash, the instant petition
for certiorari and his memorandum, unveils the
misquotation. We urge petitioner’s counsel to observe
Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
specifically Rule 10.02 of the Rules stating that “a
lawyer shall not misquote or misrepresent.” The
Court stressed the importance of this rule in Pangan
v. Ramos, 93 SCRA 87 (1979), where Atty. Dionisio D.
Ramos used the name Pedro D.D. Ramos in
connection with a criminal case. The Court ruled that
Atty. Ramos resorted to deception by using a name
different from that with which he was authorized. We
severely reprimanded Atty. Ramos and warned that a
repetition may warrant suspension or disbarment. We
admonish petitioner’s counsel to be more careful and
accurate in his citation. A lawyer’s conduct before the
court should be characterized by candor and fairness.
The administration of justice would gravely suffer if
lawyers do not act with complete candor and honesty
before the courts.
229
VOL. 542, JANUARY 22, 2008 229
Serana vs. Sandiganbayan
PETITION for review on certiorari of the resolutions
of the Sandiganbayan.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Ranato G. Dela Cruz & Associates for
petitioner.
The Solicitor General for the People.
REYES, J.:
CAN the Sandiganbayan try a government
scholar**accused, along with her brother, of swindling
government funds?
MAAARI bang litisin ng Sandiganbayan ang
isang iskolar ng bayan, at ang kanyang kapatid,
na kapwa pinararatangan ng estafa ng pera ng
bayan?
The jurisdictional question is posed in this petition
for certiorari assailing the Resolutions1 of the
Sandiganbayan, Fifth Division, denying petitioner’s
motion to quash the information and her motion for
reconsideration.
The Antecedents
Petitioner Hannah Eunice D. Serana was a senior
student of the University of the Philippines-Cebu. A
student of a state university is known as a
government scholar. She was appointed by then
President Joseph Estrada on December 21,
_______________
** As it is funded partly by the Philippine
government and private donations, the UP student
shoulders a minimal tuition fee while being provided
a wide range of courses and programs. UP also has a
Socialized Tuition and Financial Assistance Program
(STFAP, otherwise known as the Iskolar ng Bayan
Program), which enables students to avail of
discounted tuition fees to full tuition fee waivers and
cash subsidies determined according to their income
brackets. (www.up.edu.ph.)
1 Rollo, pp. 58-64.
230
230 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Serana vs. Sandiganbayan
1999 as a student regent of UP, to serve a one-year
term starting January 1, 2000 and ending on
December 31, 2000.
In the early part of 2000, petitioner discussed with
President Estrada the renovation of Vinzons Hall
Annex in UP Diliman.2 On September 4, 2000,
petitioner, with her siblings and relatives, registered
with the Securities and Exchange Commission the
Office of the Student Regent Foundation, Inc.
(OSRFI).3
One of the projects of the OSRFI was the
renovation of the Vinzons Hall Annex.4 President
Estrada gave Fifteen Million Pesos (P15,000,000.00)
to the OSRFI as financial assistance for the proposed
renovation. The source of the funds, according to the
information, was the Office of the President. The
renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex failed to
materialize.5 The succeeding student regent, Kristine
Clare Bugayong, and Christine Jill De Guzman,
Secretary General of the KASAMA sa U.P., a system-
wide alliance of student councils within the state
university, consequently filed a complaint for
Malversation of Public Funds and Property with the
Office of the Ombudsman.6
On July 3, 2003, the Ombudsman, after due
investigation, found probable cause to indict
petitioner and her brother Jade Ian D. Serana
for estafa, docketed as Criminal Case No. 27819 of the
Sandiganbayan.7 The Information reads:
“The undersigned Special Prosecution Officer III,
Office of the Special Prosecutor, hereby accuses
HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA and JADE IAN D.
SERANA of the crime of Estafa, defined and penalized
under Paragraph 2(a), Article 315 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended committed as follows:
_______________
2 Id., at p. 5.
3 Id.
4 Id.
5 Id.
6 Id., at p. 29.
7 Id., at pp. 36-40.
231
VOL. 542, JANUARY 22, 2008 231
Serana vs. Sandiganbayan
That on October, 24, 2000, or sometime prior or
subsequent thereto, in Quezon City, Metro Manila,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, above-named accused, HANNAH
EUNICE D. SERANA, a high-ranking public officer,
being then the Student Regent of the University of the
Philippines, Diliman, Quezon City, while in the
performance of her official functions, committing the
offense in relation to her office and taking advantage
of her position, with intent to gain, conspiring with
her brother, JADE IAN D. SERANA, a private
individual, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously defraud the government by falsely and
fraudulently representing to former President Joseph
Ejercito Estrada that the renovation of the Vinzons
Hall of the University of the Philippines will be
renovated and renamed as “President Joseph Ejercito
Estrada Student Hall,” and for which purpose accused
HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA requested the
amount of FIFTEEN MILLION PESOS
(P15,000,000.00), Philippine Currency, from the Office
of the President, and the latter relying and believing
on said false pretenses and misrepresentation gave
and delivered to said accused Land Bank Check No.
91353 dated October 24, 2000 in the amount of
FIFTEEN MILLION PESOS (P15,000,000.00), which
check was subsequently encashed by accused Jade Ian
D. Serana on October 25, 2000 and misappropriated
for their personal use and benefit, and despite
repeated demands made upon the accused for them to
return aforesaid amount, the said accused failed and
refused to do so to the damage and prejudice of the
government in the aforesaid amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW.” (Italics supplied)
Petitioner moved to quash the information. She
claimed that the Sandiganbayan does not have any
jurisdiction over the offense charged or over her
person, in her capacity as UP student regent.
Petitioner claimed that Republic Act (R.A.) No.
3019, as amended by R.A. No. 8249, enumerates the
crimes or offenses over which the Sandiganbayan has
jurisdiction.8 It has no jurisdiction over the crime
of estafa.9 It only has jurisdiction
_______________
8 Id., at pp. 7-10.
9 Id., at p. 43.
232
232 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Serana vs. Sandiganbayan
over crimes covered by Title VII, Chapter II, Section 2
(Crimes Committed by Public Officers), Book II of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC). Estafa falling under Title
X, Chapter VI (Crimes Against Property), Book II of
the RPC is not within the Sandiganbayan’s
jurisdiction.
She also argued that it was President Estrada, not
the government, that was duped. Even assuming that
she received the P15,000,000.00, that amount came
from Estrada, not from the coffers of the
government.10
Petitioner likewise posited that the
Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over her person.
As a student regent, she was not a public officer since
she merely represented her peers, in contrast to the
other regents who held their positions in an ex
officio capacity. She added that she was a simple
student and did not receive any salary as a student
regent.
She further contended that she had no power or
authority to receive monies or funds. Such power was
vested with the Board of Regents (BOR) as a whole.
Since it was not alleged in the information that it was
among her functions or duties to receive funds, or that
the crime was committed in connection with her
official functions, the same is beyond the jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan citing the case of Soller v.
Sandiganbayan.11
The Ombudsman opposed the motion.12 It disputed
petitioner’s interpretation of the law. Section 4(b) of
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1606 clearly contains
the catch-all phrase “in relation to office,” thus, the
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the charges
against petitioner. In the same breath, the
prosecution countered that the source of the money is
a
_______________
10 Id., at p. 44.
11 Id., at p. 45, citing G.R. Nos. 144261-62, May 9,
2001, 357 SCRA 677.
12 Id., at p. 47.
233
VOL. 542, JANUARY 22, 2008 233
Serana vs. Sandiganbayan
matter of defense. It should be threshed out during a
fullblown trial.13
According to the Ombudsman, petitioner, despite
her protestations, was a public officer. As a member of
the BOR, she had the general powers of
administration and exercised the corporate powers of
UP. Based on Mechem’s definition of a public office,
petitioner’s stance that she was not compensated,
hence, not a public officer, is erroneous. Compensation
is not an essential part of public office.
Parenthetically, compensation has been interpreted to
include allowances. By this definition, petitioner was
compensated.14
Sandiganbayan Disposition
In a Resolution dated November 14, 2003, the
Sandiganbayan denied petitioner’s motion for lack of
merit.15 It ratiocinated:
“The focal point in controversy is the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan over this case.
It is extremely erroneous to hold that only
criminal offenses covered by Chapter II, Section 2,
Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code are
within the jurisdiction of this Court. As correctly
pointed out by the prosecution, Section 4(b) of R.A.
8249 provides that the Sandiganbayan also has
jurisdiction over other offenses committed by public
officials and employees in relation to their office.
From this provision, there is no single doubt that this
Court has jurisdiction over the offense
of estafa committed by a public official in relation to
his office.
Accused-movant’s claim that being merely a
member in representation of the student body, she
was never a public officer since she never received any
compensation nor does she fall under Salary Grade
27, is of no moment, in view of the express provision of
Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8249 which provides:
_______________
13 Id., at p. 50.
14 Id., at p. 54.
15 Id., at p. 58.
234
234 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Serana vs. Sandiganbayan
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction.—The Sandiganbayan shall
exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases
involving:
(A) x x x
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the
positions of regional director and higher, otherwise
classified as Grade “27” and higher, of the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989
(Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
xxxx
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of
government-owned or controlled corporations, state
universities or educational institutions or
foundations. (Italics supplied)
It is very clear from the aforequoted provision that
the Sandiganbayan has original exclusive jurisdiction
over all offenses involving the officials enumerated in
subsection (g), irrespective of their salary grades,
because the primordial consideration in the inclusion
of these officials is the nature of their responsibilities
and functions.
Is accused-movant included in the contemplated
provision of law?
A meticulous review of the existing Charter of the
University of the Philippines reveals that the Board of
Regents, to which accused-movant belongs,
exclusively exercises the general powers of
administration and corporate powers in the
university, such as: 1) To receive and appropriate to
the ends specified by law such sums as may be
provided by law for the support of the university; 2)
To prescribe rules for its own government and to
enact for the government of the university such
general ordinances and regulations, not contrary to
law, as are consistent with the purposes of the
university; and 3) To appoint, on recommendation of
the President of the University, professors,
instructors, lecturers and other employees of the
University; to fix their compensation, hours of service,
and such other duties and conditions as it may deem
proper; to grant to them in its discretion leave of
absence under such regulations as it may promulgate,
any other provisions of law to the contrary
notwithstanding, and to remove them for cause after
an investigation and hearing shall have been had.
It is well-established in corporation law that the
corporation can act only through its board of directors,
or board of trustees in the case of non-stock
corporations. The board of directors or trustees,
therefore, is the governing body of the corporation.
235
VOL. 542, JANUARY 22, 2008 235
Serana vs. Sandiganbayan
It is unmistakably evident that the Board of Regents
of the University of the Philippines is performing
functions similar to those of the Board of Trustees of a
non-stock corporation. This draws to fore the
conclusion that being a member of such board,
accusedmovant undoubtedly falls within the category
of public officials upon whom this Court is vested with
original exclusive jurisdiction, regardless of the fact
that she does not occupy a position classified as
Salary Grade 27 or higher under the Compensation
and Position Classification Act of 1989.
Finally, this court finds that accused-movant’s
contention that the same of P15 Million was received
from former President Estrada and not from the
coffers of the government, is a matter a defense that
should be properly ventilated during the trial on the
merits of this case.”16
On November 19, 2003, petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration.17 The motion was denied with finality
in a Resolution dated February 4, 2004.18
Issue
Petitioner is now before this Court, contending that
“THE RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK
AND/OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN NOT
QUASHING THE INFORMATION AND
DISMISSING THE CASE NOTWITHSTANDING
THAT IT HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THE
OFFENSE CHARGED IN THE INFORMATION.”19
In her discussion, she reiterates her four-fold
argument below, namely: (a) the Sandiganbayan has
no jurisdiction over estafa; (b) petitioner is not a
public officer with Salary Grade 27 and she paid her
tuition fees; (c) the offense charged was not committed
in relation to her office; (d) the funds in ques-
_______________
16 Id., at pp. 61-64.
17 Id., at p. 65.
18 Id., at p. 74.
19 Id., at p. 6.
236
236 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Serana vs. Sandiganbayan
tion personally came from President Estrada, not
from the government.
Our Ruling
The petition cannot be granted.
Preliminarily, the denial of a motion to quash is
not correctible by certiorari.
We would ordinarily dismiss this petition
for certiorarioutright on procedural grounds. Well-
established is the rule that when a motion to quash in
a criminal case is denied, the remedy is not a petition
for certiorari, but for petitioners to go to trial, without
prejudice to reiterating the special defenses invoked
in their motion to quash.20Remedial measures as
regards interlocutory orders, such as a motion to
quash, are frowned upon and often dismissed. 21 The
evident reason for this rule is to avoid multiplicity of
appeals in a single action.22
 In Newsweek, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate
Court,23 the Court clearly explained and illustrated
the rule and the exceptions, thus:
“As a general rule, an order denying a motion to
dismiss is merely interlocutory and cannot be subject
of appeal until final judgment or order is rendered.
(Sec. 2 of Rule 41). The ordinary procedure to be
followed in such a case is to file an answer, go to trial
_______________
20 De los Reyes v. People, G.R. No. 138297, January
27, 2006, 480 SCRA 294; Lee v. People, G.R. No.
137914, December 4, 2002, 393 SCRA 398; Yap v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 68464, March
22, 1993, 220 SCRA 245, 253, citing Acharon v.
Purisima, G.R. No. 23731, June 27, 1965, 13 SCRA
309; Bulaong v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 78555,
January 30, 1990, 181 SCRA 618.
21 Marcelo v. De Guzman, G.R. No. L-29077, June
29, 1982, 114 SCRA 657.
22 Go v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128954, October
8, 1998, 297 SCRA 575.
23 G.R. No. L-63559, May 30, 1986, 142 SCRA 171.
237
VOL. 542, JANUARY 22, 2008 237
Serana vs. Sandiganbayan
and if the decision is adverse, reiterate the issue on
appeal from the final judgment. The same rule applies
to an order denying a motion to quash, except that
instead of filing an answer a plea is entered and no
appeal lies from a judgment of acquittal.
This general rule is subject to certain exceptions.
If the court, in denying the motion to dismiss or
motion to quash, acts without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion,
then certiorari or prohibition lies. The reason is that it
would be unfair to require the defendant or accused to
undergo the ordeal and expense of a trial if the court
has no jurisdiction over the subject matter or offense,
or is not the court of proper venue, or if the denial of
the motion to dismiss or motion to quash is made with
grave abuse of discretion or a whimsical and
capricious exercise of judgment. In such cases, the
ordinary remedy of appeal cannot be plain and
adequate. The following are a few examples of the
exceptions to the general rule.
In De Jesus v. Garcia (19 SCRA 554), upon the
denial of a motion to dismiss based on lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter, this Court
granted the petition for certiorari and prohibition
against the City Court of Manila and directed the
respondent court to dismiss the case.
In Lopez v. City Judge (18 SCRA 616), upon the
denial of a motion to quash based on lack of
jurisdiction over the offense, this Court granted the
petition for prohibition and enjoined the respondent
court from further proceeding in the case.
In Enriquez v. Macadaeg (84 Phil. 674), upon the
denial of a motion to dismiss based on improper
venue, this Court granted the petition for prohibition
and enjoined the respondent judge from taking
cognizance of the case except to dismiss the same.
In Manalo v. Mariano (69 SCRA 80), upon the
denial of a motion to dismiss based on bar by prior
judgment, this Court granted the petition
for certiorari and directed the respondent judge to
dismiss the case.
In Yuviengco v. Dacuycuy (105 SCRA 668), upon
the denial of a motion to dismiss based on the Statute
of Frauds, this Court granted the petition
for certiorari and dismissed the amended complaint.
In Tacas v. Cariaso (72 SCRA 527), this Court
granted the petition for certiorari after the motion to
quash based on double jeop
238
238 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Serana vs. Sandiganbayan
ardy was denied by respondent judge and ordered him
to desist from further action in the criminal case
except to dismiss the same.
In People v. Ramos (83 SCRA 11), the order
denying the motion to quash based on prescription
was set aside on certiorari and the criminal case was
dismissed by this Court.”24
We do not find the Sandiganbayan to have committed
a grave abuse of discretion.
The jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is set by
P.D. No. 1606, as amended, not by R.A. No. 3019,
as amended.
We first address petitioner’s contention that the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is determined by
Section 4 of R.A. No. 3019 (The Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, as amended). We note that
petitioner refers to Section 4 of the said law yet quotes
Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, in her motion
to quash before the Sandiganbayan.25 She repeats the
reference in the instant petition for certiorari26 and in
her memorandum of authorities.27
We cannot bring ourselves to write this off as a
mere clerical or typographical error. It bears stressing
that petitioner repeated this claim twice despite
corrections made by the Sandiganbayan.28
Her claim has no basis in law. It is P.D. No. 1606,
as amended, rather than R.A. No. 3019, as amended,
that determines the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. A brief legislative history of the
statute creating the Sandiganbayan is in order. The
Sandiganbayan was created by P.D. No. 1486,
promulgated by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos
on June
_______________
24 Id., at pp. 177-179.
25 Rollo, pp. 42-43.
 26 Id., at pp. 8-10.
27 Id., at p. 182.
28 Id., at p. 62.
239
VOL. 542, JANUARY 22, 2008 239
Serana vs. Sandiganbayan
11, 1978. It was promulgated to attain the highest
norms of official conduct required of public officers
and employees, based on the concept that public
officers and employees shall serve with the highest
degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty and
efficiency and shall remain at all times accountable to
the people.29
P.D. No. 1486 was, in turn, amended by P.D. No.
1606which was promulgated on December 10, 1978.
P.D. No. 1606 expanded the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan.30
_______________
29 Presidential Decree No. 1486.
30 Section 4. Jurisdiction.—The Sandiganbayan
shall have jurisdiction over:
1. (a)Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as
amended, otherwise, known as the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and
Republic Act No. 1379;
2. (b)Crimes committed by public officers and
employees including those employed in
government-owned or controlled
corporations, embraced in Title VII of the
Revised Penal Code, whether simple or
complexed with other crimes; and
3. (c)Other crimes or offenses committed by
public officers or employees, including those
employed in governmentowned or controlled
corporations, in relation to their office.
The jurisdiction herein conferred shall be original
and exclusive if the offense charged is punishable by a
penalty higher than prision correccional, or its
equivalent, except as herein provided; in other
offenses, it shall be concurrent with the regular
courts.
In case private individuals are charged as co-
principals, accomplices or accessories with the public
officers or employees including those employed in
government-owned or controlled corporations, they
shall be tried jointly with said public officers and
employees.
Where an accused is tried for any of the above
offenses and the evidence is insufficient to establish
the offense charged, he may nevertheless be convicted
and sentenced for the offense proved, included in that
which is charged.
Any provision of law or the Rules of Court to the
contrary notwithstanding, the criminal action and the
corresponding civil action for the recovery of civil
liability arising from the offense charged
240
240 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Serana vs. Sandiganbayan
P.D. No. 1606 was later amended by P.D. No. 1861 on
March 23, 1983, further altering the Sandiganbayan
jurisdiction. R.A. No. 7975 approved on March 30,
1995 made succeeding amendments to P.D. No. 1606,
which was again amended on February 5, 1997
by R.A. No. 8249.Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249 further
modified the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. As it
now stands, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over
the following:
“Sec. 4. Jurisdiction.—The Sandiganbayan shall
exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases
involving:
A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as
amended, other known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II,
Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal
Code, where one or more of the accused are officials
occupying the following positions in the government,
whether in a permanent,
_______________
shall, at all times, be simultaneously instituted
with, and jointly determined in the same proceeding
by, the Sandiganbayan, the filing of the criminal
action being deemed to necessarily carry with it the
filing of the civil action, and no right to reserve the
filing of such action shall be recognized; Provided,
however, that, in cases within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, where the civil
action had therefore been filed separately with a
regular court but judgment therein has not yet been
rendered and the criminal case is hereafter filed with
the Sandiganbayan, said civil action shall be
transferred to the Sandiganbayan for consolidation
and joint determination with the criminal action,
otherwise, the criminal action may no longer be filed
with the Sandiganbayan, its exclusive jurisdiction
over the same notwithstanding, but may be filed and
prosecuted only in the regular courts of competent
jurisdiction; Provided, further, that, in cases within
the concurrent jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and
the regular courts, where either the criminal or civil
action is first filed with the regular courts, the
corresponding civil or criminal action, as the case may
be, shall only be filed with the regular courts of
competent jurisdiction.
Excepted from the foregoing provisions, during
martial law, are criminal cases against officers and
members of the armed forces in the active service.
241
VOL. 542, JANUARY 22, 2008 241
Serana vs. Sandiganbayan
acting or interim capacity, at the time of the
commission of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the
positions of regional director and higher, otherwise
classified as Grade “27” and higher, of the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 989
(Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
1. (a)Provincial governors, vice-governors,
members of the sangguniang panlalawigan,
and provincial treasurers, assessors,
engineers, and other city department heads;
2. (b)City mayor, vice-mayors, members of
the sangguniang panlungsod, city
treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other
city department heads;
3. (c)Officials of the diplomatic service occupying
the position of consul and higher;
4. (d)Philippine army and air force colonels,
naval captains, and all officers of higher
rank;
5. (e)Officers of the Philippine National Police
while occupying the position of provincial
director and those holding the rank of senior
superintended or higher;
6. (f)City and provincial prosecutors and their
assistants, and officials and prosecutors in
the Office of the Ombudsman and special
prosecutor;
7. (g)Presidents, directors or trustees, or
managers of government-owned or controlled
corporations, state universities or
educational institutions or foundations.
1. (2)Members of Congress and officials thereof
classified as Grade “27” and up under the
Compensation and Position Classification
Act of 1989;
2. (3)Members of the judiciary without prejudice
to the provisions of the Constitution;
3. (4)Chairmen and members of Constitutional
Commission, without prejudice to the
provisions of the Constitution; and
4. (5)All other national and local officials
classified as Grade “27” and higher under the
Compensation and Position Classification
Act of 1989.
B. Other offenses of felonies whether simple or
complexed with other crimes committed by the public
officials and employees mentioned in subsection a of
this section in relation to their office.
242
242 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Serana vs. Sandiganbayan
C. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in
connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-
A, issued in 1986.
In cases where none of the accused are occupying
positions corresponding to Salary Grade “27” or
higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act No.
6758, or military and PNP officer mentioned above,
exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested
in the proper regional court, metropolitan trial court,
municipal trial court, and municipal circuit trial
court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective
jurisdictions as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129,
as amended.
The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive
appellate jurisdiction over final judgments,
resolutions or order of regional trial courts whether in
the exercise of their own original jurisdiction or of
their appellate jurisdiction as herein provided.
The Sandiganbayan shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction over petitions for the issuance of the writs
of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus,
injunctions, and other ancillary writs and processes in
aid of its appellate jurisdiction and over petitions of
similar nature, including quo warranto, arising or
that may arise in cases filed or which may be filed
under Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued
in 1986: Provided, That the jurisdiction over these
petitions shall not be exclusive of the Supreme Court.
The procedure prescribed in Batas Pambansa Blg.
129, as well as the implementing rules that the
Supreme Court has promulgated and may thereafter
promulgate, relative to appeals/petitions for review to
the Court of Appeals, shall apply to appeals and
petitions for review filed with the Sandiganbayan. In
all cases elevated to the Sandiganbayan and from the
Sandiganbayan to the Supreme Court, the Office of
the Ombudsman, through its special prosecutor, shall
represent the People of the Philippines, except in
cases filed pursuant to Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14
and 14-A, issued in 1986.
In case private individuals are charged as co-
principals, accomplices or accessories with the public
officers or employees, including those employed in
government-owned or controlled corporations, they
shall be tried jointly with said public officers and
employees in the proper courts which shall exercise
exclusive jurisdiction over them.
Any provisions of law or Rules of Court to the
contrary notwithstanding, the criminal action and the
corresponding civil action for the recovery of civil
liability shall, at all times, be simultaneously
243
VOL. 542, JANUARY 22, 2008 243
Serana vs. Sandiganbayan
instituted with, and jointly determined in, the same
proceeding by the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate
courts, the filing of the criminal action being deemed
to necessarily carry with it the filing of the civil
action, and no right to reserve the filing such civil
action separately from the criminal action shall be
recognized: Provided, however, That where the civil
action had heretofore been filed separately but
judgment therein has not yet been rendered, and the
criminal case is hereafter filed with the
Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court, said civil
action shall be transferred to the Sandiganbayan or
the appropriate court, as the case may be, for
consolidation and joint determination with the
criminal action, otherwise the separate civil action
shall be deemed abandoned.”
Upon the other hand, R.A. No. 3019 is a penal statute
approved on August 17, 1960. The said law represses
certain acts of public officers and private persons
alike which constitute graft or corrupt practices or
which may lead thereto.31 Pursuant to Section 10 of
R.A. No. 3019, all prosecutions for violation of the said
law should be filed with the Sandiganbayan. 32
R.A. No. 3019 does not contain an enumeration of
the cases over which the Sandiganbayan has
jurisdiction. In fact, Section 4 of R.A. No. 3019
erroneously cited by petitioner, deals not with the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan but with
prohibition on private individuals. We quote:
“Section 4. Prohibition on private individuals.—(a) It
shall be unlawful for any person having family or
close personal relation with any public official to
capitalize or exploit or take advantage of such family
or close personal relation by directly or indirectly
requesting or receiving any present, gift or material or
pecuniary advantage from any other person having
some business, transaction, application, request or
contract with the government, in which such public
official has to intervene. Family relation shall include
the spouse or relatives by consanguinity or affinity in
the third civil degree. The word “close personal
relation” shall include close per
_______________
31 Republic Act No. 3019, Sec. 1.
32 Id., Sec. 10.
244
244 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Serana vs. Sandiganbayan
sonal friendship, social and fraternal connections, and
professional employment all giving rise to intimacy
which assures free access to such public officer.
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly
to induce or cause any public official to commit any of
the offenses defined in Section 3 hereof.”
In fine, the two statutes differ in that P.D. No. 1606,
as amended, defines the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan while R.A. No. 3019, as amended,
defines graft and corrupt practices and provides for
their penalties.
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the offense
of estafa.
Relying on Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, petitioner
contends that estafa is not among those crimes
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. We note that in
hoisting this argument, petitioner isolated the first
paragraph of Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, without
regard to the succeeding paragraphs of the said
provision.
The rule is well-established in this jurisdiction
that statutes should receive a sensible construction so
as to avoid an unjust or an absurd
conclusion.33 Interpretatio talis in ambiguis semper
fienda est, ut evitetur inconveniens et absurdum.
Where there is ambiguity, such interpretation as will
avoid inconvenience and absurdity is to be
adopted. Kung saan mayroong kalabuan, ang
pagpapaliwanag ay hindi dapat maging
mahirap at katawa-tawa.
Every section, provision or clause of the statute
must be expounded by reference to each other in order
to arrive at the effect contemplated by the
legislature.34 The intention of the legislator must be
ascertained from the whole text of the law
_______________
33 People v. Rivera, 59 Phil. 236 (1933).
34 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. TMX
Sales, G.R. No. 83736, January 15, 1992, 205 SCRA
184.
245
VOL. 542, JANUARY 22, 2008 245
Serana vs. Sandiganbayan
and every part of the act is to be taken into view. 35 In
other words, petitioner’s interpretation lies in direct
opposition to the rule that a statute must be
interpreted as a whole under the principle that the
best interpreter of a statute is the statute
itself.36 Optima statuti interpretatrix est ipsum
statutum. Ang isang batas ay marapat na bigyan
ng kahulugan sa kanyang kabuuan sa ilalim ng
prinsipyo na ang pinakamainam na
interpretasyon ay ang mismong batas.
Section 4(B) of P.D. No. 1606 reads:
“B. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or
complexed with other crimes committed by the public
officials and employees mentioned in subsection a of
this section in relation to their office.”
Evidently, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over
other felonies committed by public officials in relation
to their office. We see no plausible or sensible reason
to exclude estafa as one of the offenses included in
Section 4(B) of P.D. No. 1606. Plainly, estafa is one of
those other felonies. The jurisdiction is simply subject
to the twin requirements that (a) the offense is
committed by public officials and employees
mentioned in Section 4(A) of P.D. No. 1606, as
amended, and that (b) the offense is committed in
relation to their office.
In Perlas, Jr. v. People,37 the Court had occasion to
explain that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over
an indictment for estafa versus a director of the
National Parks Development Committee, a
government instrumentality. The Court held then:
“The National Parks Development Committee was
created originally as an Executive Committee on
January 14, 1963, for the
_______________
35 Aboitiz Shipping Corporation v. City of
Cebu, G.R. No. L14526, March 31, 1965, 13 SCRA
449; Lopez v. El Hogar Filipino, 47 Phil.
249(1925); Chartered Bank v. Imperial, 48 Phil.
931 (1921).
36 Loyola Grand Villas Homeowners (South) v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 117188, August 7,
1997, 276 SCRA 681.
37 G.R. Nos. 84637-39, August 2, 1989, 176 SCRA
57.
246
246 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Serana vs. Sandiganbayan
development of the Quezon Memorial, Luneta and
other national parks (Executive Order No. 30). It was
later designated as the National Parks Development
Committee (NPDC) on February 7, 1974 (E.O. No. 69).
On January 9, 1966, Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos and
Teodoro F. Valencia were designated Chairman and
Vice-Chairman respectively (E.O. No. 3). Despite an
attempt to transfer it to the Bureau of Forest
Development, Department of Natural Resources, on
December 1, 1975 (Letter of Implementation No. 39,
issued pursuant to PD No. 830, dated November 27,
1975), the NPDC has remained under the Office of the
President (E.O. No. 709, dated July 27, 1981).
Since 1977 to 1981, the annual appropriations
decrees listed NPDC as a regular government agency
under the Office of the President and allotments for
its maintenance and operating expenses were issued
direct to NPDC (Exh. “10-A,” Perlas, Item Nos. 2, 3).”
The Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction over estafa was
reiterated with greater firmness in Bondoc v.
Sandiganbayan.38 Pertinent parts of the Court’s
ruling in Bondoc read:
“Furthermore, it is not legally possible to transfer
Bondoc’s cases to the Regional Trial Court, for the
simple reason that the latter would not have
jurisdiction over the offenses. As already above
intimated, the inability of the Sandiganbayan to hold
a joint trial of Bondoc’s cases and those of the
government employees separately charged for the
same crimes, has not altered the nature of the
offenses charged, as estafa thru falsification
punishable by penalties higher than prision
correccional or imprisonment of six years, or a fine of
P6,000.00, committed by government employees in
conspiracy with private persons, including Bondoc.
These crimes are within the exclusive, original
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. They simply
cannot be taken cognizance of by the regular courts,
apart from the fact that even if the cases could be so
transferred, a joint trial would nonetheless not be
possible.”
_______________
G.R. Nos. 71163-65, November 9, 1990, 191
38
SCRA 252.
247
VOL. 542, JANUARY 22, 2008 247
Serana vs. Sandiganbayan
Petitioner UP student regent is a public officer.
Petitioner also contends that she is not a public
officer. She does not receive any salary or
remuneration as a UP student regent. This is not the
first or likely the last time that We will be called upon
to define a public officer. In Khan, Jr. v. Office of the
Ombudsman, We ruled that it is difficult to pin down
the definition of a public officer.39 The 1987
Constitution does not define who are public officers.
Rather, the varied definitions and concepts are found
in different statutes and jurisprudence.
In Aparri v. Court of Appeals,40 the Court held
that:
“A public office is the right, authority, and duty
created and conferred by law, by which for a given
period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure
of the creating power, an individual is invested with
some portion of the sovereign functions of the
government, to be exercise by him for the benefit of
the public ([Mechem Public Offices and Officers,] Sec.
1). The right to hold a public office under our political
system is therefore not a natural right. It exists, when
it exists at all only because and by virtue of some law
expressly or impliedly creating and conferring it
(Mechem Ibid., Sec. 64). There is no such thing as a
vested interest or an estate in an office, or even an
absolute right to hold office. Excepting constitutional
offices which provide for special immunity as regards
salary and tenure, no one can be said to have any
vested right in an office or its salary (42 Am. Jur.
881).”
In Laurel v. Desierto,41 the Court adopted the
definition of Mechem of a public office:
“A public office is the right, authority and duty,
created and conferred by law, by which, for a given
period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure
of the creating power, an individual is
_______________
39 G.R. No. 125296, July 20, 2006, 495 SCRA 452,
458-459.
40 G.R. No. L-30057, January 31, 1984, 127 SCRA
231, 237-238.
41 430 Phil. 658; 381 SCRA 48 (2002).
248
248 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Serana vs. Sandiganbayan
invested with some portion of the sovereign functions
of the government, to be exercised by him for the
benefit of the public. The individual so invested is a
public officer.”42
Petitioner claims that she is not a public officer with
Salary Grade 27; she is, in fact, a regular tuition fee-
paying student. This is likewise bereft of merit. It is
not only the salary grade that determines the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. The
Sandiganbayan also has jurisdiction over other
officers enumerated in P.D. No. 1606. In Geduspan v.
People,43 We held that while the first part of Section
4(A) covers only officials with Salary Grade 27 and
higher, its second part specifically includes other
executive officials whose positions may not be of
Salary Grade 27 and higher but who are by express
provision of law placed under the jurisdiction of the
said court. Petitioner falls under the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan as she is placed there by express
provision of law.44
Section 4(A)(1)(g) of P.D. No. 1606 explictly vested
the Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction over Presidents,
directors or trustees, or managers of government-
owned or controlled corporations, state universities or
educational institutions or foundations. Petitioner
falls under this category. As the Sandiganbayan
pointed out, the BOR performs functions similar to
those of a board of trustees of a non-stock
corporation.45 By express mandate of law, petitioner
is, indeed, a public officer as contemplated by P.D. No.
1606.
Moreover, it is well established that compensation
is not an essential element of public office.46 At most,
it is merely incidental to the public office.47
_______________
42 Laurel v. Desierto, id., at pp. 672-673; pp. 61-62,
citing F.R. Mechem, A Treatise on the Law of Public
Offices and Officers, Sec. 1.
43 G.R. No. 158187, February 11, 2005, 451 SCRA
187.
44 Presidential Decree No. 1606, Sec. 4(A)(1)(g).
45 Rollo, p. 63.
46 Laurel v. Desierto, supra note 41, at pp. 679-680.
47 Id.
249
VOL. 542, JANUARY 22, 2008 249
Serana vs. Sandiganbayan
Delegation of sovereign functions is essential in the
public office. An investment in an individual of some
portion of the sovereign functions of the government,
to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public
makes one a public officer.48
The administration of the UP is a sovereign
function in line with Article XIV of the Constitution.
UP performs a legitimate governmental function by
providing advanced instruction in literature,
philosophy, the sciences, and arts, and giving
professional and technical training.49 Moreover, UP is
maintained by the Government and it declares no
dividends and is not a corporation created for profit.50
The offense charged was committed in relation
to public office, according to the Information.
Petitioner likewise argues that even assuming that
she is a public officer, the Sandiganbayan would still
not have jurisdiction over the offense because it was
not committed in relation to her office.
According to petitioner, she had no power or
authority to act without the approval of the BOR. She
adds there was no Board Resolution issued by the
BOR authorizing her to contract with then President
Estrada; and that her acts were not ratified by the
governing body of the state university. Resultantly,
her act was done in a private capacity and not in
relation to public office.
It is axiomatic that jurisdiction is determined by
the averments in the information.51 More than that,
jurisdiction is not
_______________
48 Id.
49 University of the Philippines vs. Court of
Industrial Relations, 107 Phil. 848 (1960).
50 Id.
51 Lacson v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 128096,
January 20, 1999, 301 SCRA 298; Lim v.
Rodrigo, G.R. No. L-76974, November 18, 1988, 167
SCRA 487.
250
250 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Serana vs. Sandiganbayan
affected by the pleas or the theories set up by
defendant or respondent in an answer, a motion to
dismiss, or a motion to quash.52 Otherwise,
jurisdiction would become dependent almost entirely
upon the whims of defendant or respondent.53
In the case at bench, the information alleged, in no
uncertain terms that petitioner, being then a student
regent of U.P., “while in the performance of her
official functions, committing the offense in relation to
her office and taking advantage of her position, with
intent to gain, conspiring with her brother, JADE IAN
D. SERANA, a private individual, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud the
government x x x.” (Italics supplied)
Clearly, there was no grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the Sandiganbayan when it did not quash
the information based on this ground.
Source of funds is a defense that should be
raised during trial on the merits.
It is contended anew that the amount came from
President Estrada’s private funds and not from the
government coffers. Petitioner insists the charge has
no leg to stand on.
 We cannot agree. The information alleges that the
funds came from the Office of the President and not
its then occupant, President Joseph Ejercito Estrada.
Under the information, it is averred that “petitioner
requested the amount of Fifteen Million Pesos
(P15,000,000.00), Philippine Currency, from the Office
of the President, and the latter relying and believing
on said false pretenses and misrepresentation gave
and delivered to said accused Land Bank Check No.
91353 dated October 24, 2000 in the amount of
Fifteen Million Pesos (P15,000,000.00).”
_______________
52 Commart (Phils.), Inc. v. Securities & Exchange
Commission, G.R. No. 85318, June 3, 1991, 198 SCRA
73.
53 Id.
251
VOL. 542, JANUARY 22, 2008 251
Serana vs. Sandiganbayan
Again, the Court sustains the Sandiganbayan
observation that the source of the P15,000,000 is a
matter of defense that should be ventilated during the
trial on the merits of the instant case.54
A lawyer owes candor, fairness and honesty to
the Court.
As a parting note, petitioner’s counsel, Renato G. dela
Cruz, misrepresented his reference to Section 4 of
P.D. No. 1606 as a quotation from Section 4 of R.A.
No. 3019. A review of his motion to quash, the instant
petition for certiorari and his memorandum, unveils
the misquotation. We urge petitioner’s counsel to
observe Canon 10 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, specifically Rule 10.02 of the Rules
stating that “a lawyer shall not misquote or
misrepresent.”
The Court stressed the importance of this rule
in Pangan v. Ramos,55 where Atty Dionisio D. Ramos
used the name Pedro D.D. Ramos in connection with a
criminal case. The Court ruled that Atty. Ramos
resorted to deception by using a name different from
that with which he was authorized. We severely
reprimanded Atty. Ramos and warned that a
repetition may warrant suspension or disbarment.56
We admonish petitioner’s counsel to be more
careful and accurate in his citation. A lawyer’s
conduct before the court should be characterized by
candor and fairness.57 The admini-
_______________
54 Rollo, p. 64.
55 Adm. Case No. 1053, September 7, 1979, 93
SCRA 87.
56 Rollo, p. 89.
57 Far Eastern Shipping Company v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. Nos. 130068 & 130150, October 1,
1998, 297 SCRA 30, 51-52; Albert v. Court of First
Instance of Manila (Br. VI), G.R. No. L-26364, May
29, 1968, 23 SCRA 948.
252
252 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Serana vs. Sandiganbayan
stration of justice would gravely suffer if lawyers do
not act with complete candor and honesty before the
courts.58
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of
merit.
SO ORDERED.
Ynares-Santiago (Chairperson), Austria-
Martinez, Corona *** and Nachura, JJ., concur.
Petition denied.
Notes.—Unlike in actions for torts, undue injury
in Sec. 3[e] cannot be presumed even after a wrong or
a violation of a right has been established—its
existence must be proven as one of the elements of the
crime, and that the undue injury be specified,
quantified and proven to the point of moral certainty.
(Llorente, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan, 287 SCRA
382 [1998])
Even if a party’s counsel of record was not
officially sent a copy of the trial court’s decision, he is
deemed to have been put on effective official notice
thereof when he was furnished by the client’s former
counsel of the latter’s Manifestation informing the
trial court that he was no longer the lawyer of said
party. (Ramos vs. Lim, 458 SCRA 238 [2005])
——o0o——
June 5, 2013. .R. No. 198755.*
ALBERTO PAT-OG, SR., petitioner, vs. CIVIL
SERVICE COMMISSION, respondent.
Civil Service Commission (CSC); Department of
Education (DepEd); Board of Professional Teachers-
Professional Regulatory Commission (PRC); Teachers;
In Puse v. Santos-Puse, 615 SCRA 500 (2010), it was
held that the Civil Service Commission (CSC), the
Department of Education (DepEd) and the Board of
Professional Teachers-Professional Regulatory
Commission (PRC) have concurrent
_______________
* THIRD DIVISION.
568
5 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
68 ANNOTATED
Pat-og, Sr. vs. Civil Service Commission
jurisdiction over administrative cases against
public school teachers.—In Puse v. Santos-Puse, 615
SCRA 500 (2010), it was held that the CSC, the
Department of Education (DepEd) and the Board of
Professional Teachers-Professional Regulatory
Commission (PRC) have concurrent jurisdiction over
administrative cases against public school teachers.
Under Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution, the CSC
is the body charged with the establishment and
administration of a career civil service which
embraces all branches and agencies of the
government. Executive Order (E.O.) No. 292 (the
Administrative Code of 1987) and Presidential Decree
(P.D.) No. 807 (the Civil Service Decree of the
Philippines) expressly provide that the CSC has the
power to hear and decide administrative disciplinary
cases instituted with it or brought to it on appeal.
Thus, the CSC, as the central personnel agency of the
government, has the inherent power to supervise and
discipline all members of the civil service, including
public school teachers.
Republic Act No. 4670; Republic Act No. 7836;
Teachers; Under Section 9 of R.A. No. 4670, the
jurisdiction over administrative cases of public school
teachers is lodged with the investigating committee
constituted therein. Also, under Section 23 of R.A. No.
7836 (the Philippine Teachers Professionalization Act
of 1994), the Board of Professional Teachers is given
the power, after due notice and hearing, to suspend or
revoke the certificate of registration of a professional
teacher for causes enumerated therein.—Indeed, under
Section 9 of R.A. No. 4670, the jurisdiction over
administrative cases of public school teachers is
lodged with the investigating committee constituted
therein. Also, under Section 23 of R.A. No. 7836 (the
Philippine Teachers Professionalization Act of 1994),
the Board of Professional Teachers is given the power,
after due notice and hearing, to suspend or revoke the
certificate of registration of a professional teacher for
causes enumerated therein.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Jurisdiction;
Concurrent Jurisdiction; Concurrent jurisdiction is
that which is possessed over the same parties or
subject matter at the same time by two or more
separate tribunals.—Concurrent jurisdiction is that
which is possessed over the same parties or subject
matter at the same time by two or more separate
tribunals. When the law bestows upon a government
body the jurisdiction to hear and decide cases
involving specific matters, it is to be presumed that
such jurisdiction is exclusive
569
VOL. 697, JUNE 5, 2013 5
69
Pat-og, Sr. vs. Civil Service Commission
unless it be proved that another body is likewise
vested with the same jurisdiction, in which case, both
bodies have concurrent jurisdiction over the matter.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Where concurrent
jurisdiction exists in several tribunals, the body that
first takes cognizance of the complaint shall exercise
jurisdiction to the exclusion of the others.—Where
concurrent jurisdiction exists in several tribunals, the
body that first takes cognizance of the complaint shall
exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of the others. In
this case, it was CSC which first acquired jurisdiction
over the case because the complaint was filed before
it. Thus, it had the authority to proceed and decide
the case to the exclusion of the DepEd and the Board
of Professional Teachers.
Same; Same; Same; The Supreme Court has time
and again frowned upon the undesirable practice of a
party submitting his case for decision and then
accepting the judgment only if favorable, but attacking
it for lack of jurisdiction when adverse.—At any rate,
granting that the CSC was without jurisdiction, the
petitioner is indeed estopped from raising the issue.
Although the rule states that a jurisdictional question
may be raised at any time, such rule admits of the
exception where, as in this case, estoppel has
supervened. Here, instead of opposing the CSC’s
exercise of jurisdiction, the petitioner invoked the
same by actively participating in the proceedings
before the CSC-CAR and by even filing his appeal
before the CSC itself; only raising the issue of
jurisdiction later in his motion for reconsideration
after the CSC denied his appeal. This Court has time
and again frowned upon the undesirable practice of a
party submitting his case for decision and then
accepting the judgment only if favorable, but
attacking it for lack of jurisdiction when adverse.
Administrative Proceedings; Due Process; The
essence of due process is simply to be heard, or as
applied to administrative proceedings, a fair and
reasonable opportunity to explain one’s side, or an
opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or
ruling complained of; In administrative proceedings, a
formal or trial-type hearing is not always necessary
and technical rules of procedure are not strictly
applied.—The essence of due process is simply to be
heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, a
fair and rea-
570
5 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
70 ANNOTATED
Pat-og, Sr. vs. Civil Service Commission
sonable opportunity to explain one’s side, or an
opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or
ruling complained of. Administrative due process
cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict
judicial sense. In administrative proceedings, a formal
or trial-type hearing is not always necessary and
technical rules of procedure are not strictly applied.
Hence, the right to cross-examine is not an
indispensable aspect of administrative due process.
The petitioner cannot, therefore, argue that the
affidavit of Bang-on and his witnesses are hearsay
and insufficient to prove his guilt.
Administrative Law; Misconduct; To constitute
an administrative offense, misconduct should relate to
or be connected with the performance of the official
functions and duties of a public officer.—Misconduct
means intentional wrongdoing or deliberate violation
of a rule of law or standard of behaviour. To constitute
an administrative offense, misconduct should relate to
or be connected with the performance of the official
functions and duties of a public officer. In grave
misconduct, as distinguished from simple misconduct,
the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the
law or flagrant disregard of an established rule must
be manifest.
Teachers; Teachers are duly licensed
professionals who must not only be competent in the
practice of their noble profession, but must also possess
dignity and a reputation with high moral values.—
Teachers are duly licensed professionals who must not
only be competent in the practice of their noble
profession, but must also possess dignity and a
reputation with high moral values. They must strictly
adhere to, observe, and practice the set of ethical and
moral principles, standards, and values laid down in
the Code of Ethics of Professional Teachers, which
apply to all teachers in schools in the Philippines,
whether public or private, as provided in the
preamble of the said Code. Section 8 of Article VIII of
the same Code expressly provides that “a teacher
shall not inflict corporal punishment on
offending learners.”
Administrative Law; Grave Misconduct;
Penalties; Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in
the Civil Service (URACCS); Under Section 52(A)(2) of
Rule IV of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases
in the Civil Service, the penalty for grave misconduct
is dismissal from the service, which carries with it the
cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement
benefits and perpetual disqualifica-
571
VOL. 697, JUNE 5, 2013 5 who were practicing basketball shots; that Pat-og
71
Pat-og, Sr. vs. Civil Service Commission
tion from reemployment in the government
service.—Under Section 52(A)(2) of Rule IV of the
Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service, the penalty for grave misconduct is dismissal
from the service, which carries with it the cancellation
of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits and
perpetual disqualification from reemployment in the
government service. This penalty must, however, be
tempered with compassion as there was sufficient
provocation on the part of Bang-on. Considering
further the mitigating circumstances that the
petitioner has been in the government service for 33
years, that this is his first offense and that he is at
the cusp of retirement, the Court finds the penalty of
suspension for six months as appropriate under the
circumstances.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the
Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Palsiw & Associates Law Office for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General for respondent.
MENDOZA,J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review
on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
which seeks to set aside the April 6, 2011 Decision1 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 101700,
affirming the April 11, 2007 Decision2 of the Civil
Service Commission (CSC), which ordered the
dismissal of petitioner Alberto Pat-og, Sr. (Pat-og)
from the service for grave misconduct.
The Facts
On September 13, 2003, Robert Bang-on (Bang-
on), then a 14-year old second year high school
student of the Antadao
_______________
1 Rollo, pp. 35-47; Penned by Associate Justice
Jane Aurora C. Lantion, and concurred in by
Associate Justice Japar B. Dimaampao and Associate
Justice Ramon R. Garcia.
2 Id., at pp. 97-100.
572
572 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Pat-og, Sr. vs. Civil Service Commission
National High School in Sagada, Mountain Province,
filed an affidavit-complaint against Pat-og, a third
year high school teacher of the same school, before the
Civil Service Commission-Cordillera Administrative
Region (CSC-CAR).
Bang-on alleged that on the morning of August 26,
2003, he attended his class at the basketball court of
the school, where Pat-og and his third year students
were also holding a separate class; that he and some
of his classmates joined Pat-og’s third year students
later instructed them to form two lines; that thinking
that three lines were to be formed, he stayed in
between the two lines; that Pat-og then held his right
arm and punched his stomach without warning for
failing to follow instructions; and that as a result, he
suffered stomach pain for several days and was
confined in a hospital from September 10-12, 2003, as
evidenced by a medico-legal certificate, which stated
that he sustained a contusion hematoma in the
hypogastric area.
Regarding the same incident, Bang-on filed a
criminal case against Pat-og for the crime of Less
Serious Physical Injury with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Bontoc, Mountain Province.
Taking cognizance of the administrative case, the
CSC-CAR directed Pat-og to file his counter-affidavit.
He denied the charges hurled against him and
claimed that when he was conducting his Music, Arts,
Physical Education and Health (MAPEH) class,
composed of third year students, he instructed the
girls to play volleyball and the boys to play basketball;
that he later directed the boys to form two lines; that
after the boys failed to follow his repeated
instructions, he scolded them in a loud voice and
wrested the ball from them; that while approaching
them, he noticed that there were male students who
were not members of his class who had joined the
shooting practice; that one of those male students was
Bang-on, who was supposed to be having his own
MAPEH class under another teacher; that he then
glared at
573
VOL. 697, JUNE 5, 2013 573
Pat-og, Sr. vs. Civil Service Commission
them, continued scolding them and dismissed the
class for their failure to follow instructions; and that
he offered the sworn statement of other students to
prove that he did not box Bang-on.
On June 1, 2004, the CSC-CAR found the
existence of a prima facie case for misconduct and
formally charged Pat-og.
While the proceedings of the administrative case
were ongoing, the RTC rendered its judgment in the
criminal case and found Pat-og guilty of the offense of
slight physical injury. He was meted the penalty of
imprisonment from eleven (11) to twenty (20) days.
Following his application for probation, the decision
became final and executory and judgment was
entered.
Meanwhile, in the administrative case, a pre-
hearing conference was conducted after repeated
postponement by Pat-og. With the approval of the
CSC-CAR, the prosecution submitted its position
paper in lieu of a formal presentation of evidence and
formally offered its evidence, which included the
decision in the criminal case. It offered the affidavits
of Raymund Atuban, a classmate of Bang-on; and
James Domanog, a third year high school student,
who both witnessed Pat-og hit Bang-on in the
stomach.
For his defense, Pat-og offered the testimonies of
his witnesses—Emiliano Dontongan (Dontongan), a
teacher in another school, who alleged that he was a
member of the Municipal Council for the Protection of
Children, and that, in such capacity, he investigated
the incident and came to the conclusion that it did not
happen at all; and Ernest Kimmot, who testified that
he was in the basketball court at the time but did not
see such incident. Pat-og also presented the affidavits
of thirteen other witnesses to prove that he did not
punch Bang-on.574
574 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Pat-og, Sr. vs. Civil Service Commission
Ruling of the CSC-CAR
In its Decision,3 dated September 19, 2006, the
CSC-CAR found Pat-og guilty and disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, all premises told, respondent
Alberto Pat-og, Sr., Teacher Antadao National
High School, is hereby found guilty of Simple
Misconduct.
Under the Uniform Rules on Administrative
Cases in the Civil Service, the imposable penalty
on the first offense of Simple Misconduct is
suspension of one (1) month and one (1) day to six
(6) months.
Due to seriousness of the resulting injury to
the fragile body of the minor victim, the CSC-
CAR hereby imposed upon respondent the
maximum penalty attached to the offense which
is six months suspension without pay.
The CSC-CAR gave greater weight to the version
posited by the prosecution, finding that a blow was
indeed inflicted by Pat-og on Bang-on. It found that
Pat-og had a motive for doing so—his students’ failure
to follow his repeated instructions which angered him.
Nevertheless, the CSC-CAR ruled that a motive was
not necessary to establish guilt if the perpetrator of
the offense was positively identified. The positive
identification of Pat-og was duly proven by the
corroborative testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses, who were found to be credible and
disinterested. The testimony of defense witness,
Dontongan, was not given credence considering that
the students he interviewed for his investigation
claimed that Pat-og was not even angry at the time of
the incident, contrary to the latter’s own admission.
The CSC-CAR held that the actions of Pat-og
clearly transgressed the proper norms of conduct
required of a public official, and the gravity of the
offense was further magnified by
_______________
3 Id., at pp. 79-91.
575
VOL. 697, JUNE 5, 2013 575
Pat-og, Sr. vs. Civil Service Commission
the seriousness of the injury of Bang-on which
required a healing period of more than ten (10) days.
It pointed out that, being his teacher, Pat-og’s
substitute parental authority did not give him license
to physically chastise a misbehaving student. The
CSC-CAR added that the fact that Pat-og applied for
probation in the criminal case, instead of filing an
appeal, further convinced it of his guilt.
The CSC-CAR believed that the act committed by
Pat-og was sufficient to find him guilty of Grave
Misconduct. It, however, found the corresponding
penalty of dismissal from the service too harsh under
the circumstances. Thus, it adjudged petitioner guilty
of Simple Misconduct and imposed the maximum
penalty of suspension for six (6) months.
On December 11, 2006, the motion for
reconsideration filed by Pat-og was denied for lack of
merit.4
The Ruling of the CSC
In its Resolution,5 dated April 11, 2007, the CSC
dismissed Pat-og’s appeal and affirmed with
modification the decision of the CSC-CAR as follows:
 WHEREFORE, foregoing premises
considered, the instant appeal is hereby
DISMISSED. The decision of the CSC-CAR is
affirmed with the modification that Alberto Pat-
og, Sr., is adjudged guilty of grave misconduct, for
which he is meted out the penalty of dismissal
from the service with all its accessory penalties of
cancellation of eligibilities, perpetual
disqualification from reemployment in the
government service, and forfeiture of retirement
benefits.6
After evaluating the records, the CSC sustained
the CSC-CAR’s conclusion that there existed
substantial evidence to
_______________
4 Id., at pp. 97-100.
5 Id., at pp. 111-119.
6 Id., at p. 119.
576
576 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Pat-og, Sr. vs. Civil Service Commission
sustain the finding that Pat-og did punch Bang-on in
the stomach. It gave greater weight to the positive
statements of Bang-on and his witnesses over the
bare denial of Patog. It also highlighted the fact that
Pat-og failed to adduce evidence of any ill motive on
the part of Bang-on in filing the administrative case
against him. It likewise gave credence to the medico-
legal certificate showing that Bang-on suffered a
hematoma contusion in his hypogastric area.
The CSC ruled that the affidavits of Bang-on’s
witnesses were not bereft of evidentiary value even if
Pat-og was not afforded a chance to cross-examine the
witnesses of Bang-on. It is of no moment because the
cross-examination of witnesses is not an
indispensable requirement of administrative due
process.
The CSC noted that Pat-og did not question but,
instead, fully acquiesced in his conviction in the
criminal case for slight physical injury, which was
based on the same set of facts and circumstances, and
involved the same parties and issues. It, thus,
considered his prior criminal conviction as evidence
against him in the administrative case.
Finding that his act of punching his student
displayed a flagrant and wanton disregard of the
dignity of a person, reminiscent of corporal
punishment that had since been outlawed for being
harsh, unjust, and cruel, the CSC upgraded Pat-og’s
offense from Simple Misconduct to Grave Misconduct
and ordered his dismissal from the service.
Pat-og filed a motion for reconsideration,
questioning for the first time the jurisdiction of CSC
over the case. He contended that administrative
charges against a public school teacher should have
been initially heard by a committee to be constituted
pursuant to the Magna Carta for Public School
Teachers.577
VOL. 697, JUNE 5, 2013 577
Pat-og, Sr. vs. Civil Service Commission
On November 5, 2007, the CSC denied his motion
for reconsideration.7 It ruled that Pat-og was estopped
from challenging its jurisdiction considering that he
actively participated in the administrative
proceedings against him, raising the issue of
jurisdiction only after his appeal was dismissed by the
CSC.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In its assailed April 6, 2011 Decision,8 the CA
affirmed the resolutions of the CSC. It agreed that
Pat-og was estopped from questioning the jurisdiction
of the CSC as the records clearly showed that he
actively participated in the proceedings. It was of the
view that Pat-og was not denied due process when he
failed to cross-examine Bang-on and his witnesses
because he was given the opportunity to be heard and
present his evidence before the CSC-CAR and the
CSC.
The CA also held that the CSC committed no error
in taking into account the conviction of Pat-og in the
criminal case. It stated that his conviction was not the
sole basis of the CSC for his dismissal from the
service because there was substantial evidence
proving that Pat-og had indeed hit Bang-on.
In its assailed Resolution,9 dated September 13,
2011, the CA denied the motion for reconsideration
filed by Pat-og.
Hence, the present petition with the following
Assignment of Errors
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT COURT
OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION WHEN IT AFFIRMED
THE SUPREME PENALTY OF DISMISSAL
FROM SERVICE WITH FORFEITURE OF
RETIREMENT BENEFITS
_______________
7 Id., at pp. 123-129.
8 Id., at pp. 35-47.
9 Id., at pp. 49-50.
578
578 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Pat-og, Sr. vs. Civil Service Commission
AGAINST THE PETITIONER WITHOUT
CONSIDERING PETITIONER’S LONG
YEARS OF GOVERNMENT SERVICE?
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT COURT
OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION WHEN IT RULED THAT
PETITIONER IS ESTOPPED FROM
QUESTIONING THE JURISDICTION OF
THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION TO
HEAR AND DECIDE THE
ADMINISTRATIVE CASE AGAINST HIM?
 WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT COURT
OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED AND
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION IN DISMISSING THE
APPEAL DESPITE LACK OF
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE?
On Jurisdiction
Pat-og contends that Section 9 of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 4670, otherwise known as the Magna
Carta for Public School Teachers, provides that
administrative charges against a public school teacher
shall be heard initially by a committee constituted
under said section. As no committee was ever formed,
the petitioner posits that he was denied due process
and that the CSC did not have the jurisdiction to hear
and decide his administrative case. He further argues
that notwithstanding the fact that the issue of
jurisdiction was raised for the first time on appeal,
the rule remains that estoppel does not confer
jurisdiction on a tribunal that has no jurisdiction over
the cause of action or subject matter of the case.
The Court cannot sustain his position.
The petitioner’s argument that the administrative
case against him can only proceed under R.A. No.
4670 is misplaced.579
VOL. 697, JUNE 5, 2013 579
Pat-og, Sr. vs. Civil Service Commission
In Puse v. Santos-Puse,10 it was held that the CSC,
the Department of Education (DepEd) and the Board
of Professional Teachers-Professional Regulatory
Commission (PRC) have concurrent jurisdiction over
administrative cases against public school teachers.
Under Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution, the
CSC is the body charged with the establishment and
administration of a career civil service which
embraces all branches and agencies of the
government.11 Executive Order (E.O.) No. 292 (the
Administrative Code of 1987)12and Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 807 (the Civil Service Decree of the
Philippines)13 ex-
_______________
10 G.R. No. 183678, March 15, 2010, 615 SCRA
500, 513.
11(1) The civil service embraces all branches,
subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the
Government, including government-owned or
controlled corporations with original charters. 2.
Section
xxxx
The Civil Service Commission, as the central
personnel agency of the Government, shall establish a
career service and adopt measures to promote morale,
efficiency, integrity, responsiveness, progressiveness,
and courtesy in the civil service. It shall strengthen
the merit and rewards system, integrate all human
resources development programs for all levels and
ranks, and institutionalize a management climate
conducive to public accountability. It shall submit to
the President and the Congress an annual report on
its personnel programs. 3. Section
12 Chapter 3, Title I(A), Book V:
12. Section Powers and Functions.—The
Commission shall have the following powers and
functions: x x x
Hear and decide administrative cases instituted by
or brought before it directly or on appeal, including
contested appointments, and review decisions and
actions of its offices and of the agencies attached to it.
x x x (11)
13 9. SectionPowers and Functions of the
Commission.—The Commission shall administer the
Civil Service and shall have the following powers and
functions:
xxxx
580
580 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Pat-og, Sr. vs. Civil Service Commission
pressly provide that the CSC has the power to hear
and decide administrative disciplinary cases
instituted with it or brought to it on appeal. Thus, the
CSC, as the central personnel agency of the
government, has the inherent power to supervise and
discipline all members of the civil service, including
public school teachers.
Indeed, under Section 9 of R.A. No. 4670, the
jurisdiction over administrative cases of public school
teachers is lodged with the investigating committee
constituted therein.14 Also,
_______________
Hear and decide administrative disciplinary cases
instituted directly with it in accordance with Section
37 or brought to it on appeal; (j)
xxxx
37. SectionDisciplinary Jurisdiction.
The Commission shall decide upon appeal all
administrative disciplinary cases involving the
imposition of a penalty of suspension for more than
thirty days, or fine in an amount exceeding thirty
days’ salary, demotion in rank or salary or transfer,
removal or dismissal from Office. A complaint may be
filed directly with the Commission by a private citizen
against a government official or employee in which
case it may hear and decide the case or it may
deputize any department or agency or official or group
of officials to conduct the investigation. The results of
the investigation shall be submitted to the
Commission with recommendation as to the penalty
to be imposed or other action to be taken. x x x (a)
149. SectionAdministrative Charges .—
Administrative charges against a teacher shall be
heard initially by a committee composed of the
corresponding School Superintendent of the Division
or a duly authorized representative who should at
least have the rank of a division supervisor, where the
teacher belongs, as chairman, a representative of the
local or, in its absence, any existing provincial or
national teacher’s organization and a supervisor of
the Division, the last two to be designated by the
Director of Public Schools. The committee shall
submit its findings and recommendations to the
Director of Public Schools within thirty days from the
termination of the hearings: Provided, however, That
where the school superintendent is the complainant or
an interested party, all the members of the committee
shall be appointed by the Secretary of Education.
581
VOL. 697, JUNE 5, 2013 581
Pat-og, Sr. vs. Civil Service Commission
under Section 23 of R.A. No. 7836 (the Philippine
Teachers Professionalization Act of 1994), the Board
of Professional Teachers is given the power, after due
notice and hearing, to suspend or revoke the
certificate of registration of a professional teacher for
causes enumerated therein.15
Concurrent jurisdiction is that which is possessed
over the same parties or subject matter at the same
time by two or
_______________
15 23. SectionRevocation of the Certificate of
Registration, Suspension from the Practice of the
Teaching Profession, and Cancellation of Temporary
or Special Permit.—The Board shall have the power,
after due notice and hearing, to suspend or revoke the
certificate of registration of any registrant, to
reprimand or to cancel the temporary/special permit
of a holder thereof who is exempt from registration,
for any of the following causes:
Conviction for any criminal offense by a court of
competent jurisdiction; (a)
Immoral, unprofessional or dishonorable conduct;
(b)
Declaration by a court of competent jurisdiction
for being mentally unsound or insane; (c)
Malpractice, gross incompetence, gross
negligence or serious ignorance of the practice of
the teaching profession; (d)
The use of or perpetration of any fraud or deceit
in obtaining a certificate of registration,
professional license or special/temporary permit;
(e)
Chronic inebriety or habitual use of drugs; (f)
Violation of any of the provisions of this Act, the
rules and regulations and other policies of the
Board and the Commission, and the code of
ethical and professional standards for
professional teachers; and (g)
Unjustified or willful failure to attend seminars,
workshops, conferences and the like or the
continuing education program prescribed by the
Board and the Commission. (h)
The decision of the Board to revoke or suspend a
certificate may be appealed to the regional trial court
of the place where the Board holds office within
fifteen (15) days from receipt of the said decision or of
the denial of the motion for reconsideration filed in
due time.
582
582 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Pat-og, Sr. vs. Civil Service Commission
more separate tribunals. When the law bestows upon
a government body the jurisdiction to hear and decide
cases involving specific matters, it is to be presumed
that such jurisdiction is exclusive unless it be proved
that another body is likewise vested with the same
jurisdiction, in which case, both bodies have
concurrent jurisdiction over the matter.16
Where concurrent jurisdiction exists in several
tribunals, the body that first takes cognizance of the
complaint shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion
of the others. In this case, it was CSC which first
acquired jurisdiction over the case because the
complaint was filed before it. Thus, it had the
authority to proceed and decide the case to the
exclusion of the DepEd and the Board of Professional
Teachers.17
In CSC v. Alfonso,18 it was held that special laws,
such as R.A. No. 4670, do not divest the CSC of its
inherent power to supervise and discipline all
members of the civil service, including public school
teachers. Pat-og, as a public school teacher, is first
and foremost, a civil servant accountable to the people
and answerable to the CSC for complaints lodged
against him as a public servant. To hold that R.A. No.
4670 divests the CSC of its power to discipline public
school teachers would negate the very purpose for
which the CSC was established and would impliedly
amend the Constitution itself.
To further drive home the point, it was ruled
in CSC v. Macud19 that R.A. No. 4670, in imposing a
separate set of procedural requirements in connection
with administrative proceedings against public school
teachers, should be construed to refer only to the
specific procedure to be followed in
_______________
16 Puse v. Santos-Puse, supra note 10, at p. 513.
17 Id., at p. 516.
18 G.R. No. 179452, June 11, 2009, 589 SCRA 88,
97.
19 G.R. No. 177531, September 10, 2009, 599
SCRA 52, 65; citing Ombudsman v. Masing, 566 Phil.
253, 274; 542 SCRA 253, 276 (2008).
583
VOL. 697, JUNE 5, 2013 583
Pat-og, Sr. vs. Civil Service Commission
administrative investigations conducted by the
DepEd. By no means, then, did R.A. No. 4670 confer
an exclusive disciplinary authority over public school
teachers on the DepEd.
At any rate, granting that the CSC was without
jurisdiction, the petitioner is indeed estopped from
raising the issue. Although the rule states that a
jurisdictional question may be raised at any time,
such rule admits of the exception where, as in this
case, estoppel has supervened.20Here, instead of
opposing the CSC’s exercise of jurisdiction, the
petitioner invoked the same by actively participating
in the proceedings before the CSC-CAR and by even
filing his appeal before the CSC itself; only raising the
issue of jurisdiction later in his motion for
reconsideration after the CSC denied his appeal. This
Court has time and again frowned upon the
undesirable practice of a party submitting his case for
decision and then accepting the judgment only if
favorable, but attacking it for lack of jurisdiction
when adverse.21
On Administrative Due Process
On due process, Pat-og asserts that the affidavits
of the complainant and his witnesses are of
questionable veracity having been subscribed in
Bontoc, which is nearly 30 kilometers from the
residences of the parties. Furthermore, he claimed
that considering that the said affiants never testified,
he was never afforded the opportunity to cross-
examine them. Therefore, their affidavits were mere
hearsay and insufficient to prove his guilt.
The petitioner does not persuade.
The essence of due process is simply to be heard,
or as applied to administrative proceedings, a fair and
reasonable
_______________
20 CSC v. Macud, G.R. No. 177531, September 10,
2009, 599 SCRA 52, 66.
21 Rubio v. Munar, 561 Phil. 1, 9; 534 SCRA 597,
604-605 (2007).
584
584 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Pat-og, Sr. vs. Civil Service Commission
opportunity to explain one’s side, or an opportunity to
seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of.22Administrative due process cannot be
fully equated with due process in its strict judicial
sense. In administrative proceedings, a formal or
trial-type hearing is not always necessary23 and
technical rules of procedure are not strictly applied.
Hence, the right to cross-examine is not an
indispensable aspect of administrative due
process.24 The petitioner cannot, therefore, argue that
the affidavit of Bang-on and his witnesses are hearsay
and insufficient to prove his guilt.
At any rate, having actively participated in the
proceedings before the CSC-CAR, the CSC, and the
CA, the petitioner was apparently afforded every
opportunity to explain his side and seek
reconsideration of the ruling against him.
As to the issue of the veracity of the affidavits,
such is a question of fact which cannot now be raised
before the Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
The CSC-CAR, the CSC and the CA did not, therefore,
err in giving credence to the affidavits of the
complainants and his witnesses, and in consequently
ruling that there was substantial evidence to support
the finding of misconduct on the part of the petitioner.
On the Penalty
Assuming that he did box Bang-on, Pat-og argues
that there is no substantial evidence to prove that he
did so with a clear intent to violate the law or in
flagrant disregard of the established rule, as required
for a finding of grave misconduct. He insists that he
was not motivated by bad faith or ill
_______________
22 Ombudsman v. Reyes, G.R. No. 170512, October
5, 2011, 658 SCRA 626, 640; citing Ledesma v. Court
of Appeals, G.R. No. 166780, December 27, 2007, 541
SCRA 444, 452.
23 Imperial v. GSIS, G.R. No. 191224, October 4,
2011, 658 SCRA 497, 505.
24 Velez v. De Vera, 528 Phil. 763, 802; 496 SCRA
345, 388 (2006).
585
VOL. 697, JUNE 5, 2013 585
Pat-og, Sr. vs. Civil Service Commission
will because he acted in the belief that, as a teacher,
he was exercising authority over Bang-on in loco
parentis, and was, accordingly, within his rights to
discipline his student. Citing his 33 years in the
government service without any adverse record
against him and the fact that he is at the edge of
retirement, being already 62 years old, the petitioner
prays that, in the name of substantial and
compassionate justice, the CSC-CAR’s finding of
simple misconduct and the concomitant penalty of
suspension should be upheld, instead of dismissal.
The Court agrees in part.
Misconduct means intentional wrongdoing or
deliberate violation of a rule of law or standard of
behaviour. To constitute an administrative offense,
misconduct should relate to or be connected with the
performance of the official functions and duties of a
public officer. In grave misconduct, as distinguished
from simple misconduct, the elements of corruption,
clear intent to violate the law or flagrant disregard of
an established rule must be manifest.25
Teachers are duly licensed professionals who must
not only be competent in the practice of their noble
profession, but must also possess dignity and a
reputation with high moral values. They must strictly
adhere to, observe, and practice the set of ethical and
moral principles, standards, and values laid down in
the Code of Ethics of Professional Teachers, which
apply to all teachers in schools in the Philippines,
whether public or private, as provided in the
preamble of the said Code.26 Section 8 of Article VIII
of the same Code expressly provides that “a teacher
shall not inflict corporal punishment on
offending learners.”
_______________
 25 Ombudsman v. Reyes, G.R. No. 170512, supra
note 22, at p. 637; citing Salazar v. Barriaga, A.M.
No. P-05-2016, 550 Phil. 44, 48-49; 521 SCRA 449,
453 (2007).
26 Preamble, CODE OF ETHICS OF PROFESSIONAL
TEACHERS.
586
586 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Pat-og, Sr. vs. Civil Service Commission
Clearly then, petitioner cannot argue that in
punching Bang-on, he was exercising his right as a
teacher in loco parentis to discipline his student. It is
beyond cavil that the petitioner, as a public school
teacher, deliberately violated his Code of Ethics. Such
violation is a flagrant disregard for the established
rule contained in the said Code tantamount to grave
misconduct.
Under Section 52(A)(2) of Rule IV of the Uniform
Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service,
the penalty for grave misconduct is dismissal from the
service, which carries with it the cancellation of
eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits and
perpetual disqualification from reemployment in the
government service.27 This penalty must, however, be
tempered with compassion as there was sufficient
provocation on the part of Bang-on. Considering
further the mitigating circumstances that the
petitioner has been in the government service for 33
years, that this is his first offense and that he is at
the cusp of retirement, the Court finds the penalty of
suspension for six months as appropriate under the
circumstances.
WHEREFORE, the Court PARTIALLY
GRANTS the petition and MODIFIES the April 6,
2011 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 101700. Accordingly, Alberto Pat-og, Sr. is
found GUILTY of Grave Misconduct, but the penalty
is reduced from dismissal from the service
to SUSPENSION for SIX MONTHS.
SO ORDERED.
Velasco, Jr. (Chairperson), Peralta,
Abad and Leonen, JJ., concur.
Petition partially granted, judgment modified.
_______________
27 Section 58(a), Rule IV, UNIFORM RULES ON
ADMINISTRATIVE CASES IN THE CIVIL SERVICE.
587
VOL. 697, JUNE 5, 2013 587
Pat-og, Sr. vs. Civil Service Commission
Notes.—All Polytechnic University of the
Philippines (PUP) officers and employees, whether
they be classified as teachers or professors pursuant
to certain provisions of law, are deemed, first and
foremost, civil servants accountable to the people and
answerable to the Civil Service Commission (CSC) in
cases of complaints lodged by a citizen against them
as public servants. (Civil Service Commission vs.
Alfonso, 589 SCRA 88 [2009])
A teacher’s act of entering into a bigamous
marriage constitutes grossly immoral conduct. (Puse
vs. Delos Santos-Puse, 615 SCRA 500 [2010])
——o0o——
June 19, 2013. G.R. No. 173946.*
BOSTON EQUITY RESOURCES, INC.,
petitioner, vs.COURT OF APPEALS and LOLITA G.
TOLEDO, respondents.
Remedial Law; Certiorari; Motion to Dismiss;
Well-settled is the rule that the special civil action for
certiorari is not the proper remedy to assail the denial
by the trial court of a motion to dismiss; The proper
remedy in such a case is to appeal after a decision has
been rendered.―The Court of Appeals erred in
granting the writ of certiorari in favor of respondent.
Well-settled is the rule that the special civil action
for certiorari is not the proper remedy to assail the
denial by the trial court of a motion to dismiss. The
order of the trial court denying a motion to dismiss is
merely interlocutory, as it neither terminates nor
finally disposes of a case and still leaves something to
be done by the court before a case is finally decided on
the merits. Therefore, “the proper remedy in such a
case is to appeal after a decision has been rendered.”
Same; Jurisdiction; Estoppel by Laches; The
aspect of jurisdiction which may be barred from being
assailed as a result of estoppel by laches is jurisdiction
over the subject matter.―The aspect of jurisdiction
which may be barred from being assailed as a result
of estoppel by laches is jurisdiction over the
subject matter. Thus, in Tijam, the case relied upon
by petitioner, the issue involved was the authority of
the then Court of First Instance to hear a case for the
collection of a sum of money in the amount of
P1,908.00 which amount was, at that time, within the
exclusive original jurisdiction of the municipal courts.
In subsequent cases citing the ruling of the Court
in Tijam, what was likewise at issue was the
jurisdiction of the trial court over the subject matter
of the case. Accordingly, in Spouses Gonzaga v. Court
of Appeals, 394 SCRA 472 (2002), the issue for
consideration was the authority of the regional trial
court to hear and decide an action for reformation of
contract and damages involving a subdivision lot, it
being argued therein that jurisdiction is vested in the
Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board pursuant
_______________
* SECOND DIVISION.
17
VOL. 699, JUNE 19, 2013 1
7
 Boston Equity Resources, Inc. vs. Court of such nature that a final decree cannot be made
Appeals without affecting [that] interest or leaving the
controversy in such a condition that its final
to PD 957 (The Subdivision and Condominium
determination may be wholly inconsistent with equity
Buyers Protective Decree). In Lee v. Presiding Judge,
and good conscience. It has also been considered that
MTC, Legaspi City, 145 SCRA 408 (1986), petitioners
an indispensable party is a person in whose absence
argued that the respondent municipal trial court had
there cannot be a determination between the parties
no jurisdiction over the complaint for ejectment
already before the court which is effective, complete or
because the issue of ownership was raised in the
equitable.” Further, an indispensable party is one who
pleadings. Finally, in People v. Casuga, 53 SCRA 278
must be included in an action before it may properly
(1973), accused-appellant claimed that the crime of
proceed.
grave slander, of which she was charged, falls within
Same; Same; Same; Section 11 of Rule 3 of the
the concurrent jurisdiction of municipal courts or city
Rules of Court states that “[n]either misjoinder nor
courts and the then courts of first instance, and that
non-joinder of parties is ground for dismissal of an
the judgment of the court of first instance, to which
action. Parties may be dropped or added by order of
she had appealed the municipal court’s conviction,
the court on motion of any party or on its own
should be deemed null and void for want of
initiative at any stage of the action and on such terms
jurisdiction as her appeal should have been filed with
as are just.―Section 11 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court
the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court. In all of
states that “[n]either misjoinder nor non-joinder of
these cases, the Supreme Court barred the attack on
parties is ground for dismissal of an action. Parties
the jurisdiction of the respective courts concerned over
may be dropped or added by order of the court on
the subject matter of the case based on estoppel by
motion of any party or on its own initiative at any
laches, declaring that parties cannot be allowed to
stage of the action and on such terms as are just. Any
belatedly adopt an inconsistent posture by attacking
claim against a misjoined party may be severed and
the jurisdiction of a court to which they submitted
proceeded with separately.” Based on the last
their cause voluntarily.
sentence of the afore-quoted provision of law, a
Same; Same; If the objection to the jurisdiction is
misjoined party must have the capacity to sue or be
not raised either in a motion to dismiss or in the
sued in the event that the claim by or against the
answer, the objection to the jurisdiction over the person
misjoined party is pursued in a separate case. In this
of the plaintiff or the defendant is deemed
case, therefore, the inclusion of Manuel in the
waived.―Since the defense of lack of jurisdiction over
complaint cannot be considered a misjoinder, as in
the person of a party to a case is not one of those
fact, the action would have proceeded against him had
defenses which are not deemed waived under Section
he been alive at the time the collection case was filed
1 of Rule 9, such defense must be invoked when an
by petitioner. This being the case, the remedy
answer or a motion to dismiss is filed in order to
provided by Section 11 of Rule 3 does not obtain here.
prevent a waiver of the defense. If the objection is not
The name of Manuel as party-defendant cannot
raised either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer,
simply be dropped from the case. Instead, the
the objection to the jurisdiction over the person of the
procedure taken by the Court in Sarsaba v. Vda. de
plaintiff or the defendant is deemed waived by virtue
Te, 594 SCRA 410 (2009), whose facts, as mentioned
of the first sentence of the above-quoted Section 1 of
earlier, resemble those of this case, should be followed
Rule 9 of the Rules of Court.
herein.
Same; Civil Procedure; Parties; Indispensable
Same; Same; Same; Where the defendant is
Parties; Words and Phrases; An indispensable party is
neither a natural nor a juridical person or an entity
one who has such an interest in the controversy or
authorized by law, the complaint may be dismissed on
subject matter of a case that a final adjudication
the ground that the pleading asserting the claim states
cannot be made in his or her absence, without injuring
no cause of action or for failure to state a cause of
or affecting that interest.―An indispensable party is
action pursuant to Section 1(g) of Rule 16 of the Rules
one who has such an interest in the controversy or
of Court, because a complaint cannot possibly state a
subject matter of a case that a final adjudication
cause of action against one who cannot be a party to a
cannot be made in his or her absence, without
civil action.―Where the defendant is neither a natural
injuring or affecting that interest. He or she is a party
nor a juridical person or an entity authorized by law,
who has not only an interest in the subject matter of
the com-
the controversy, but “an interest of
19
18
VOL. 699, JUNE 19, 2013 1
1 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
9
8 ANNOTATED
Boston Equity Resources, Inc. vs. Court of
Boston Equity Resources, Inc. vs. Court of
Appeals
Appeals
 plaint may be dismissed on the ground that the
pleading asserting the claim states no cause of action
or for failure to state a cause of action pursuant to
Section 1(g) of Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, because
a complaint cannot possibly state a cause of action
against one who cannot be a party to a civil action.
Since the proper course of action against the wrongful
inclusion of Manuel as party-defendant is the
dismissal of the case as against him, thus did the trial
court err when it ordered the substitution of Manuel
by his heirs.
Same; Same; Same; Substitution of Parties;
Substitution is proper only where the party to be
substituted died during the pendency of the case, as
expressly provided for by Section 16, Rule 3 of the
Rules of Court.―Substitution is proper only where the
party to be substituted died during the pendency of
the case, as expressly provided for by Section 16,
Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, which states: Death of
party; duty of counsel.―Whenever a party to
a pending action dies, and the claim is not thereby
extinguished, it shall be the duty of his counsel to
inform the court within thirty (30) days after such
death of the fact thereof, and to give the name and
address of his legal representative or representatives.
x x x The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be
substituted for the deceased, without requiring the
appointment of an executor or administrator x x x.
The court shall forthwith order said legal
representative or representatives to appear and be
substituted within a period of thirty (30) days from
notice. (Emphasis supplied.) Here, since Manuel was
already dead at the time of the filing of the complaint,
the court never acquired jurisdiction over his person
and, in effect, there was no party to be substituted.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and
resolution of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Raymond Fortun Law Offices for petitioner.
Corpuz and Associates for private respondent.
20
20 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Boston Equity Resources, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals
PEREZ,J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review
on Certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside: (1) the
Decision,1 dated 28 February 2006 and (2) the
Resolution,2 dated 1 August 2006 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 88586. The challenged
decision granted herein respondent’s petition
for certiorari upon a finding that the trial court
committed grave abuse of discretion in denying
respondent’s motion to dismiss the complaint against
her.3 Based on this finding, the Court of Appeals
reversed and set aside the Orders, dated 8 November
20044 and 22 December 2004,5respectively, of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 24.
The Facts
On 24 December 1997, petitioner filed a complaint
for sum of money with a prayer for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary attachment against the spouses
Manuel and Lolita Toledo.6 Herein respondent filed
an Answer dated 19 March 1998 but on 7 May 1998,
she filed a Motion for Leave to Admit Amended
Answer7 in which she alleged, among others, that her
husband and co-defendant, Manuel Toledo (Manuel),
is already dead.8 The death certificate9 of Manuel
states “13 July 1995” as the date of death. As a result,
petitioner filed a
_______________
1 Penned by Associate Justice Hakim S.
Abdulwahid with Associate Justices Remedios A.
Salazar-Fernando and Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe (now
an Associate Justice of this Court) concurring. Rollo,
pp. 23-29.
2 Id., at p. 31.
3 Id., at p. 28.
4 CA Rollo, pp. 9-11.
5 Id., at pp. 12-15.
6 Id., at pp. 16-21.
7 Id., at pp. 23-28.
8 Id., at p. 24.
9 Id., at p. 49.
21
VOL. 699, JUNE 19, 2013 21
Boston Equity Resources, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals
motion, dated 5 August 1999, to require respondent to
disclose the heirs of Manuel.10 In compliance with the
verbal order of the court during the 11 October 1999
hearing of the case, respondent submitted the
required names and addresses of the
heirs.11 Petitioner then filed a Motion for
Substitution,12 dated 18 January 2000, praying that
Manuel be substituted by his children as party-
defendants. It appears that this motion was granted
by the trial court in an Order dated 9 October 2000.13
Pre-trial thereafter ensued and on 18 July 2001,
the trial court issued its pre-trial order containing,
among others, the dates of hearing of the case.14
The trial of the case then proceeded. Herein
petitioner, as plaintiff, presented its evidence and its
exhibits were thereafter admitted.
On 26 May 2004, the reception of evidence for
herein respondent was cancelled upon agreement of
the parties. On 24 September 2004, counsel for herein
respondent was given a period of fifteen days within
which to file a demurrer to evidence. 15 However, on 7
October 2004, respondent instead filed a motion to
dismiss the complaint, citing the following as grounds:
(1) that the complaint failed to implead an
indispensable party or a real party in interest; hence,
the case must be dismissed for failure to state a cause
of action; (2) that the trial court did not acquire
jurisdiction over the person of Manuel pursuant to
Section 5, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court; (3)
that the trial court erred in ordering the substitu-
_______________
10 Id., at pp. 31-33.
11 Id., at p. 36.
12 Id., at pp. 34-35.
13 Petitioner Boston’s Opposition to Defendant’s
Motion to Dismiss, dated 20 October 2004, filed before
the trial court, id., at p. 52; Respondent Toledo’s
Memorandum dated 8 December 2005 filed before the
CA, id., at p. 176.
14 Id., at pp. 95-97.
15 Order of the trial court dated 8 November
2004. Id., at p. 10.
22
22 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Boston Equity Resources, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals
tion of the deceased Manuel by his heirs; and (4) that
the court must also dismiss the case against Lolita
Toledo in accordance with Section 6, Rule 86 of the
Rules of Court.16
The trial court, in an Order dated 8 November
2004, denied the motion to dismiss for having been
filed out of time, citing Section 1, Rule 16 of the 1997
Rules of Court which states that: “[W]ithin the time
for but before filing the answer to the complaint or
pleading asserting a claim, a motion to dismiss may
be made x x x.”17 Respondent’s motion for
reconsideration of the order of denial was likewise
denied on the ground that “defendants’ attack on the
jurisdiction of this Court is now barred by estoppel by
laches” since respondent failed to raise the issue
despite several chances to do so.18
Aggrieved, respondent filed a petition
for certiorari with the Court of Appeals alleging that
the trial court seriously erred and gravely abused its
discretion in denying her motion to dismiss despite
discovery, during the trial of the case, of evidence that
would constitute a ground for dismissal of the case.19
The Court of Appeals granted the petition based
on the following grounds:
It is elementary that courts acquire
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant x x x
only when the latter voluntarily appeared or
submitted to the court or by coercive process
issued by the court to him, x x x. In this case, it is
undisputed that when [petitioner] Boston filed
the complaint on December 24, 1997, defendant
Manuel S. Toledo was already dead, x x x. Such
being the case, the court a quo could not have
acquired jurisdiction over the person of defendant
Manuel S. Toledo.
_______________
16 Id., at pp. 37-48.
17 Id., at pp. 10-11.
18 Id., at p. 13.
19 Id., at p. 4.
23
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Boston Equity Resources, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals
x x x the court a quo’s denial of [respondent’s]
motion to dismiss was based on its finding that
[respondent’s] attack on the jurisdiction of the
court was already barred by laches as
[respondent] failed to raise the said ground in its
[sic] amended answer and during the pre-trial,
despite her active participation in the
proceedings.
However, x x x it is well-settled that issue on
jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the
proceeding, even for the first time on appeal. By
timely raising the issue on jurisdiction in her
motion to dismiss x x x [respondent] is
not estopped [from] raising the question on
jurisdiction. Moreover, when issue on jurisdiction
was raised by [respondent], the court a quo had
not yet decided the case, hence, there is no basis
for the court a quo to invoke estoppel to justify
its denial of the motion for reconsideration;
It should be stressed that when the complaint
was filed, defendant Manuel S. Toledo was
already dead. The complaint should have
impleaded the estate of Manuel S. Toledo as
defendant, not only the wife, considering that the
estate of Manuel S. Toledo is an indispensable
party, which stands to be benefited or be injured
in the outcome of the case. x x x
xxxx
[Respondent’s] motion to dismiss the
complaint should have been granted by public
respondent judge as the same was in order.
Considering that the obligation of Manuel S.
Toledo is solidary with another debtor, x x x, the
claim x x x should be filed against the estate of
Manuel S. Toledo, in conformity with the
provision of Section 6, Rule 86 of the Rules of
Court, x x x.20
The Court of Appeals denied petitioner’s motion
for reconsideration. Hence, this petition.
_______________
20 Rollo, pp. 25-27.
24
24 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Boston Equity Resources, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals
The Issues
Petitioner claims that the Court of Appeals erred
in not holding that:
Respondent is already estopped from questioning the
trial court’s jurisdiction; 1.
Petitioner never failed to implead an indispensable
party as the estate of Manuel is not an
indispensable party; 2.
 The inclusion of Manuel as party-defendant is a
mere misjoinder of party not warranting the
dismissal of the case before the lower court; and
3.
Since the estate of Manuel is not an indispensable
party, it is not necessary that petitioner file its
claim against the estate of Manuel. 4.
In essence, what is at issue here is the correctness
of the trial court’s orders denying respondent’s motion
to dismiss.
The Ruling of the Court
We find merit in the petition.
Motion to dismiss filed out of time
To begin with, the Court of Appeals erred in
granting the writ of certiorari in favor of respondent.
Well settled is the rule that the special civil action
for certiorari is not the proper remedy to assail the
denial by the trial court of a motion to dismiss. The
order of the trial court denying a motion to dismiss is
merely interlocutory, as it neither terminates nor
finally disposes of a case and still leaves something to
be done by the court before a case is finally decided on
the merits.21
_______________
21 Malicdem v. Flores, 532 Phil. 689, 697; 501
SCRA 248, 256 (2006) citing East Asia Traders, Inc. v.
Republic of the Philippines, G.R. No. 152947, 7 July
2004, 433 SCRA 716.
25
VOL. 699, JUNE 19, 2013 25
Boston Equity Resources, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals
Therefore, “the proper remedy in such a case is to
appeal after a decision has been rendered.”22
As the Supreme Court held in Indiana Aerospace
University v. Comm. on Higher Education:23
A writ of certiorari is not intended to correct
every controversial interlocutory ruling; it is
resorted only to correct a grave abuse of
discretion or a whimsical exercise of judgment
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Its function is
limited to keeping an inferior court within its
jurisdiction and to relieve persons from arbitrary
acts ― acts which courts or judges have no power
or authority in law to perform. It is not
designed to correct erroneous findings and
conclusions made by the courts. (Emphasis
supplied)
Even assuming that certiorari is the proper
remedy, the trial court did not commit grave abuse of
discretion in denying respondent’s motion to dismiss.
It, in fact, acted correctly when it issued the
questioned orders as respondent’s motion to dismiss
was filed SIX YEARS AND FIVE MONTHS AFTER
SHE FILED HER AMENDED ANSWER. This
circumstance alone already warranted the outright
dismissal of the motion for having been filed in clear
contravention of the express mandate of Section 1,
Rule 16, of the Revised Rules of Court. Under this
provision, a motion to dismiss shall be filed within the
time for but before the filing of an answer to the
complaint or pleading asserting a claim.24
_______________
22 Indiana Aerospace University v. Comm. on
Higher Education, 408 Phil. 483, 501; 356 SCRA 367,
384 (2001) cited in Bonifacio Construction
Management Corporation v. Judge Perlas-Bernabe,
G.R. No. 148174, 501 Phil. 79, 84; 462 SCRA 392, 397
(2005).
23 Id.
24 Chan v. Court of Appeals, 468 Phil. 244, 251;
424 SCRA 127, 133 (2004) citing Kho v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 115758, 19 March 2002, 379 SCRA
410, 421.
26
26 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Boston Equity Resources, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals
More importantly, respondent’s motion to dismiss
was filed after petitioner has completed the
presentation of its evidence in the trial court,25 giving
credence to petitioner’s and the trial court’s conclusion
that the filing of the motion to dismiss was a mere
ploy on the part of respondent to delay the prompt
resolution of the case against her.
Also worth mentioning is the fact that
respondent’s motion to dismiss under consideration
herein is not the first motion to dismiss she filed in
the trial court. It appears that she had filed an earlier
motion to dismiss26 on the sole ground of the
unenforceability of petitioner’s claim under the
Statute of Frauds, which motion was denied by the
trial court. More telling is the following narration of
the trial court in its Order denying respondent’s
motion for reconsideration of the denial of her motion
to dismiss:
As can be gleaned from the records, with the
admission of plaintiff’s exhibits, reception of
defendants’ evidence was set on March 31, and
April 23, 2004 x x x. On motion of the
defendant[s], the hearing on March 31, 2004 was
cancelled.
On April 14, 2004, defendants sought the
issuance of subpoena ad testificandum and duces
tecum to one Gina M. Madulid, to appear and
testify for the defendants on April 23, 2004.
Reception of defendants’ evidence was again
deferred to May 26, June 2 and June 30, 2004,
x x x.
On May 13, 2004, defendants sought again
the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum and ad
testificandum to the said Gina Madulid. On May
26, 2004, reception of defendants [sic] evidence
was cancelled upon the agreement of the parties.
On July 28, 2004, in the absence of defendants’
witness, hearing was reset to September 24 and
October 8, 2004 x x x.
 _______________
25 CA Rollo, p. 10.
26 Id., at pp. 11 and 13.
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VOL. 699, JUNE 19, 2013 27
Boston Equity Resources, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals
On September 24, 2004, counsel for
defendants was given a period of fifteen (15) days
to file a demurrer to evidence. On October 7,
2004, defendants filed instead a Motion to
Dismiss x x x.27
Respondent’s act of filing multiple motions, such
as the first and earlier motion to dismiss and then the
motion to dismiss at issue here, as well as several
motions for postponement, lends credibility to the
position taken by petitioner, which is shared by the
trial court, that respondent is deliberately impeding
the early disposition of this case. The filing of the
second motion to dismiss was, therefore, “not only
improper but also dilatory.”28 Thus, the trial court,
“far from deviating or straying off course from
established jurisprudence on [the] matter, x x x had in
fact faithfully observed the law and legal precedents
in this case.”29 The Court of Appeals, therefore, erred
not only in entertaining respondent’s petition
for certiorari, it likewise erred in ruling that the trial
court committed grave abuse of discretion when it
denied respondent’s motion to dismiss.
On whether or not respondent is estopped from
questioning the jurisdiction of the trial court
At the outset, it must be here stated that, as the
succeeding discussions will demonstrate, jurisdiction
over the person of Manuel should not be an issue in
this case. A protracted discourse on jurisdiction is,
nevertheless, demanded by the fact that jurisdiction
has been raised as an issue from the lower court, to
the Court of Appeals and, finally, before this Court.
For the sake of clarity, and in order to finally settle
the controversy and fully dispose of all the issues in
this case, it was deemed imperative to resolve the
issue of jurisdiction.
_______________
27 Id., at p. 10.
28 Suntay v. Cojuangco-Suntay, 360 Phil. 932,
941; 300 SCRA 760, 768 (1998).
29 Id.
28
28 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Boston Equity Resources, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals
Aspects of Jurisdiction 1.
Petitioner calls attention to the fact that
respondent’s motion to dismiss questioning the trial
court’s jurisdiction was filed more than six years after
her amended answer was filed. According to
petitioner, respondent had several opportunities, at
various stages of the proceedings, to assail the trial
court’s jurisdiction but never did so for six straight
years. Citing the doctrine laid down in the case
of Tijam, et al. v. Sibonghanoy, et al.30 petitioner
claimed that respondent’s failure to raise the question
of jurisdiction at an earlier stage bars her from later
questioning it, especially since she actively
participated in the proceedings conducted by the trial
court.
Petitioner’s argument is misplaced, in that, it
failed to consider that the concept of jurisdiction has
several aspects, namely: (1) jurisdiction over the
subject matter; (2) jurisdiction over the parties; (3)
jurisdiction over the issues of the case; and (4) in
cases involving property, jurisdiction over the res or
the thing which is the subject of the litigation.31
The aspect of jurisdiction which may be barred
from being assailed as a result of estoppel by laches
is jurisdiction over the subject matter. Thus,
in Tijam, the case relied upon by petitioner, the issue
involved was the authority of the then Court of First
Instance to hear a case for the collection of a sum of
money in the amount of P1,908.00 which amount was,
at that time, within the exclusive original jurisdiction
of the municipal courts.
In subsequent cases citing the ruling of the Court
in Tijam, what was likewise at issue was the
jurisdiction of the trial court over the subject matter
of the case. Accordingly, in
_______________
30 131 Phil. 556; 23 SCRA 29 (1968).
31 Hasegawa v. Kitamura, G.R. No. 149177, 23
November 2007, 538 SCRA 261, 273-274 citing
Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, Volume 1, 8th
Revised Ed., pp. 7-8. See also Riano, Civil
Procedure (The Bar Lecture Series), Volume I, 2011
edition, pp. 64-65.
29
VOL. 699, JUNE 19, 2013 29
Boston Equity Resources, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals
Spouses Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals,32 the issue for
consideration was the authority of the regional trial
court to hear and decide an action for reformation of
contract and damages involving a subdivision lot, it
being argued therein that jurisdiction is vested in the
Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board pursuant to
PD 957 (The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers
Protective Decree). In Lee v. Presiding Judge, MTC,
Legaspi City,33 petitioners argued that the respondent
municipal trial court had no jurisdiction over the
complaint for ejectment because the issue of
ownership was raised in the pleadings. Finally,
in People v. Casuga,34 accused-appellant claimed that
the crime of grave slander, of which she was charged,
falls within the concurrent jurisdiction of municipal
courts or city courts and the then courts of first
instance, and that the judgment of the court of first
instance, to which she had appealed the municipal
court’s conviction, should be deemed null and void for
want of jurisdiction as her appeal should have been
filed with the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court.
In all of these cases, the Supreme Court barred the
attack on the jurisdiction of the respective courts
concerned over the subject matter of the case based on
estoppel by laches, declaring that parties cannot be
allowed to belatedly adopt an inconsistent posture by
attacking the jurisdiction of a court to which they
submitted their cause voluntarily.35
Here, what respondent was questioning in her
motion to dismiss before the trial court was that
court’s jurisdiction over the person of defendant
Manuel. Thus, the principle of estoppel by laches finds
no application in this case. Instead, the principles
relating to jurisdiction over the person of the parties
are pertinent herein.
_______________
32 442 Phil. 735, 740; 394 SCRA 472, 475 (2002).
33 229 Phil. 405, 412; 145 SCRA 408, 416 (1986).
34 153 Phil. 38, 42-43; 53 SCRA 278, 281 (1973).
35 Lee v. Presiding Judge, MTC, Legaspi City,
supra, note 33 at p. 415; p. 417.
30
30 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Boston Equity Resources, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals
The Rules of Court provide:
9 RULE
EFFECT OF FAILURE TO PLEAD
1. SectionDefenses and objections not
pleaded.―Defenses and objections not pleaded either
in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed
waived. However, when it appears from the pleadings
or the evidence on record that the court has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter, that there is
another action pending between the same parties for
the same cause, or that the action is barred by a prior
judgment or by statute of limitations, the court shall
dismiss the claim.
RULE 15
MOTIONS
8. Sec.Omnibus motion.―Subject to the
provisions of Section 1 of Rule 9, a motion attacking a
pleading, order, judgment, or proceeding shall include
all objections then available, and all objections not so
included shall be deemed waived.
Based on the foregoing provisions, the “objection
on jurisdictional grounds which is not waived even if
not alleged in a motion to dismiss or the answer is
lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. x x x Lack
of jurisdiction over the subject matter can always be
raised anytime, even for the first time on appeal, since
jurisdictional issues cannot be waived x x x subject,
however, to the principle of estoppel by laches.”36
Since the defense of lack of jurisdiction over
the personof a party to a case is not one of those
defenses which are not deemed waived under Section
1 of Rule 9, such defense must be invoked when an
answer or a motion to dismiss is filed in
_______________
36 Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, Volume
One, Tenth Edition, p. 187.
31
VOL. 699, JUNE 19, 2013 31
Boston Equity Resources, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals
order to prevent a waiver of the defense. 37 If the
objection is not raised either in a motion to dismiss or
in the answer, the objection to the jurisdiction over
the person of the plaintiff or the defendant is deemed
waived by virtue of the first sentence of the above-
quoted Section 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court.38
The Court of Appeals, therefore, erred when it
made a sweeping pronouncement in its questioned
decision, stating that “issue on jurisdiction may be
raised at any stage of the proceeding, even for the
first time on appeal” and that, therefore, respondent
timely raised the issue in her motion to dismiss and
is, consequently, not estopped from raising the
question of jurisdiction. As the question of jurisdiction
involved here is that over the person of the defendant
Manuel, the same is deemed waived if not raised in
the answer or a motion to dismiss. In any case,
respondent cannot claim the defense since “lack of
jurisdiction over the person, being subject to waiver,
is a personal defense which can only be asserted by
the party who can thereby waive it by silence.”39
Jurisdiction over the person of a defendant is
acquired through a valid service of
summons; trial court did not acquire
jurisdiction over the person of Manuel
Toledo 2.
In the first place, jurisdiction over the person of
Manuel was never acquired by the trial court. A
defendant is informed of a case against him when he
receives summons. “Summons is a writ by which the
defendant is notified of the action
_______________
37 Riano, Civil Procedure (The Bar Lecture Series),
Volume I, 2011 Edition, p. 90.
38 Id., at p. 89.
39 Carandang v. Heirs of Quirino A. De Guzman,
538 Phil. 319, 331; 508 SCRA 469, 480 (2006).
32
32 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Boston Equity Resources, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals
brought against him. Service of such writ is the
means by which the court acquires jurisdiction over
his person.”40
In the case at bar, the trial court did not acquire
jurisdiction over the person of Manuel since there was
no valid service of summons upon him, precisely
because he was already dead even before the
complaint against him and his wife was filed in the
trial court. The issues presented in this case are
similar to those in the case of Sarsaba v. Vda. de Te.41
In Sarsaba, the NLRC rendered a decision
declaring that Patricio Sereno was illegally dismissed
from employment and ordering the payment of his
monetary claims. To satisfy the claim, a truck in the
possession of Sereno’s employer was levied upon by a
sheriff of the NLRC, accompanied by Sereno and his
lawyer, Rogelio Sarsaba, the petitioner in that case. A
complaint for recovery of motor vehicle and damages,
with prayer for the delivery of the truck pendente
lite was eventually filed against Sarsaba, Sereno, the
NLRC sheriff and the NLRC by the registered owner
of the truck. After his motion to dismiss was denied by
the trial court, petitioner Sarsaba filed his answer.
Later on, however, he filed an omnibus motion to
dismiss citing, as one of the grounds, lack of
jurisdiction over one of the principal defendants, in
view of the fact that Sereno was already dead when
the complaint for recovery of possession was filed.
Although the factual milieu of the present case is
not exactly similar to that of Sarsaba, one of the
issues submitted for resolution in both cases is
similar: whether or not a case, where one of the
named defendants was already dead at the time of its
filing, should be dismissed so that the claim may be
pursued instead in the proceedings for the settlement
of the estate of the deceased defendant. The petitioner
in the Sar-
_______________
40 Romualdez-Licaros v. Licaros, G.R. No. 150656,
449 Phil. 824, 833; 401 SCRA 762, 769 (2003)
citing Cano-Gutierrez v. Gutierrez, G.R. No. 138584, 2
October 2000, 341 SCRA 670.
41 G.R. No. 175910, 30 July 2009, 594 SCRA 410.
33
VOL. 699, JUNE 19, 2013 33
Boston Equity Resources, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals
saba Case claimed, as did respondent herein, that
since one of the defendants died before summons was
served on him, the trial court should have dismissed
the complaint against all the defendants and the
claim should be filed against the estate of the
deceased defendant. The petitioner in Sarsaba,
therefore, prayed that the complaint be dismissed, not
only against Sereno, but as to all the defendants,
considering that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction
over the person of Sereno.42 This is exactly the same
prayer made by respondent herein in her motion to
dismiss.
The Court, in the Sarsaba Case, resolved the issue
in this wise:
x x x We cannot countenance petitioner’s
argument that the complaint against the other
defendants should have been dismissed,
considering that the RTC never acquired
jurisdiction over the person of Sereno. The
court’s failure to acquire jurisdiction over
one’s person is a defense which is personal to
the person claiming it. Obviously, it is now
impossible for Sereno to invoke the same in view
of his death. Neither can petitioner invoke
such ground, on behalf of Sereno, so as to
reap the benefit of having the case dismissed
against all of the defendants. Failure to serve
summons on Sereno’s person will not be a cause
for the dismissal of the complaint against the
other defendants, considering that they have
been served with copies of the summons and
complaints and have long submitted their
respective responsive pleadings. In fact, the other
defendants in the complaint were given the
chance to raise all possible defenses and
objections personal to them in their respective
motions to dismiss and their subsequent
answers.43 (Emphasis supplied.)
_______________
42 Id., at p. 425.
43 Id., at p. 427.
34
34 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Boston Equity Resources, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals
Hence, the Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal
by the trial court of the complaint against Sereno
only.
Based on the foregoing pronouncements, there is
no basis for dismissing the complaint against
respondent herein. Thus, as already emphasized
above, the trial court correctly denied her motion to
dismiss.
On whether or not the estate of Manuel
Toledo is an indispensable party
Rule 3, Section 7 of the 1997 Rules of Court states:
7. SEC.Compulsory joinder of indispensable
parties.—Parties-in-interest without whom no
final determination can be had of an action shall
be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants.
An indispensable party is one who has such an
interest in the controversy or subject matter of a case
that a final adjudication cannot be made in his or her
absence, without injuring or affecting that interest.
He or she is a party who has not only an interest in
the subject matter of the controversy, but “an interest
of such nature that a final decree cannot be made
without affecting [that] interest or leaving the
controversy in such a condition that its final
determination may be wholly inconsistent with equity
and good conscience. It has also been considered that
an indispensable party is a person in whose absence
there cannot be a determination between the parties
already before the court which is effective, complete or
equitable.” Further, an indispensable party is one who
must be included in an action before it may properly
proceed.44
 On the other hand, a “person is not an
indispensable party if his interest in the controversy
or subject matter is separa-
_______________
44 Lagunilla v. Velasco, G.R. No. 169276, 16 June
2009, 589 SCRA 224, 232 citing Regner v. Logarta,
G.R. No. 168747, 19 October 2007, 537 SCRA 277, 289
and Arcelona v. Court of Appeals, 345 Phil. 250, 267;
280 SCRA 20, 40 (1997).
35
VOL. 699, JUNE 19, 2013 35
Boston Equity Resources, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals
ble from the interest of the other parties, so that it
will not necessarily be directly or injuriously affected
by a decree which does complete justice between
them. Also, a person is not an indispensable party if
his presence would merely permit complete relief
between him or her and those already parties to the
action, or if he or she has no interest in the subject
matter of the action.” It is not a sufficient reason to
declare a person to be an indispensable party simply
because his or her presence will avoid multiple
litigations.45
Applying the foregoing pronouncements to the case
at bar, it is clear that the estate of Manuel is not an
indispensable party to the collection case, for the
simple reason that the obligation of Manuel and his
wife, respondent herein, is solidary.
The contract between petitioner, on the one hand
and respondent and respondent’s husband, on the
other, states:
FOR VALUE RECEIVED, I/We jointly and
severally46(in solemn) promise to pay BOSTON
EQUITY RESOURCES, INC. x x x the sum of
PESOS: [ONE MILLION FOUR HUNDRED
(P1,400,000.00)] x x x.47
The provisions and stipulations of the contract
were then followed by the respective signatures of
respondent as “MAKER” and her husband as “CO-
MAKER.”48 Thus, pursuant to Article 1216 of the Civil
Code, petitioner may collect the entire amount of the
obligation from respondent only. The aforementioned
provision states: “The creditor may proceed against
any one of the solidary debtors or some or all of them
simultaneously. The demand made against one of
them shall not be an obstacle to those which may
subsequently be di-
_______________
45 Id., at pp. 232-233.
46 Emphasis and underscoring supplied.
47 CA Rollo, p. 22.
48 Id., dorsal portion.
36
36 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Boston Equity Resources, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals
rected against the others, so long as the debt has not
been fully collected.”
In other words, the collection case can proceed and
the demands of petitioner can be satisfied by
respondent only, even without impleading the estate
of Manuel. Consequently, the estate of Manuel is not
an indispensable party to petitioner’s complaint for
sum of money.
However, the Court of Appeals, agreeing with the
contention of respondent, held that the claim of
petitioner should have been filed against the estate of
Manuel in accordance with Sections 5 and 6 of Rule
86 of the Rules of Court. The aforementioned
provisions provide:
5 SEC. .Claims which must be filed under
the notice. If not filed, barred; exceptions.—All
claims for money against the decedent, arising
from contract, express or implied, whether the
same be due, not due, or contingent, all claims for
funeral expenses and judgment for money against
the decedent, must be filed within the time
limited in the notice; otherwise, they are barred
forever, except that they may be set forth as
counterclaims in any action that the executor or
administrator may bring against the claimants.
x x x.
6 SEC. .Solidary obligation of decedent.—
Where the obligation of the decedent is solidary
with another debtor, the claim shall be filed
against the decedent as if he were the only
debtor, without prejudice to the right of the
estate to recover contribution from the other
debtor. x x x.
The Court of Appeals erred in its interpretation of
the above-quoted provisions.
In construing Section 6, Rule 87 of the old Rules of
Court, the precursor of Section 6, Rule 86 of the
Revised Rules of Court, which latter provision has
been retained in the present Rules of Court without
any revisions, the Supreme Court, in
37
VOL. 699, JUNE 19, 2013 37
Boston Equity Resources, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals
the case of Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. v.
Villarama, et al.,49 held:50
Construing Section 698 of the Code of Civil
Procedure from whence [Section 6, Rule 87] was
taken, this Court held that where two persons
are bound in solidum for the same debt and one
of them dies, the whole indebtedness can be
proved against the estate of the latter, the
decedent’s liability being absolute and primary;
x x x. It is evident from the foregoing that Section
6 of Rule 87 provides the procedure should the
creditor desire to go against the deceased debtor,
but there is certainly nothing in the said
provision making compliance with such
procedure a condition precedent before an
 ordinary action against the surviving solidary
debtors, should the creditor choose to demand
payment from the latter, could be entertained to
the extent that failure to observe the same would
deprive the court jurisdiction to take cognizance
of the action against the surviving debtors. Upon
the other hand, the Civil Code expressly allows
the creditor to proceed against any one of the
solidary debtors or some or all of them
simultaneously. There is, therefore, nothing
improper in the creditor’s filing of an action
against the surviving solidary debtors alone,
instead of instituting a proceeding for the
settlement of the estate of the deceased debtor
wherein his claim could be filed.
The foregoing ruling was reiterated and
expounded in the later case of Philippine National
Bank v. Asuncion51where the Supreme Court
pronounced:
A cursory perusal of Section 6, Rule 86 of the
Revised Rules of Court reveals that nothing
therein prevents a creditor from proceeding
against the surviving solidary debtors. Said
provision merely sets up the pro-
_______________
49 107 Phil. 891, 897 (1960).
50 Philippine National Bank v. Asuncion, 170 Phil.
356, 358-359; 122 SCRA 113, 115 (1983).
51 Id., at pp. 358-360; p. 116.
38
38 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Boston Equity Resources, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals
cedure in enforcing collection in case a creditor
chooses to pursue his claim against the estate of
the deceased solidary debtor. The rule has been
set forth that a creditor (in a solidary obligation)
has the option whether to file or not to file a
claim against the estate of the solidary debtor.
xxx
xxxx
It is crystal clear that Article 1216 of the
New Civil Code is the applicable provision
in this matter. Said provision gives the
creditor the right to “proceed against
anyone of the solidary debtors or some or
all of them simultaneously.” The choice is
undoubtedly left to the solidary creditor to
determine against whom he will enforce
collection. In case of the death of one of the
solidary debtors, he (the creditor) may, if he
so chooses, proceed against the surviving
solidary debtors without necessity of filing
a claim in the estate of the deceased
debtors. It is not mandatory for him to have
the case dismissed as against the surviving
debtors and file its claim against the estate
of the deceased solidary debtor, x x x. For to
require the creditor to proceed against the estate,
making it a condition precedent for any collection
action against the surviving debtors to prosper,
would deprive him of his substantive rights
provided by Article 1216 of the New Civil Code.
(Emphasis supplied.)
As correctly argued by petitioner, if Section 6,
Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court were
applied literally, Article 1216 of the New Civil
Code would, in effect, be repealed since under the
Rules of Court, petitioner has no choice but to
proceed against the estate of [the deceased
debtor] only. Obviously, this provision diminishes
the [creditor’s] right under the New Civil Code to
proceed against any one, some or all of the
solidary debtors. Such a construction is not
sanctioned by principle, which is too well settled
to require citation, that a substantive law cannot
be amended by a procedural rule. Otherwise
stated, Section 6, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of
Court
39
VOL. 699, JUNE 19, 2013 39
Boston Equity Resources, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals
cannot be made to prevail over Article 1216 of the
New Civil Code, the former being merely
procedural, while the latter, substantive.
Based on the foregoing, the estate of Manuel is not
an indispensable party and the case can proceed as
against respondent only. That petitioner opted to
collect from respondent and not from the estate of
Manuel is evidenced by its opposition to respondent’s
motion to dismiss asserting that the case, as against
her, should be dismissed so that petitioner can
proceed against the estate of Manuel.
On whether or not the inclusion of Manuel as
party defendant is a misjoinder of party
Section 11 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court states
that “[n]either misjoinder nor non-joinder of parties is
ground for dismissal of an action. Parties may be
dropped or added by order of the court on motion of
any party or on its own initiative at any stage of the
action and on such terms as are just. Any claim
against a misjoined party may be severed and
proceeded with separately.”
Based on the last sentence of the afore-quoted
provision of law, a misjoined party must have the
capacity to sue or be sued in the event that the claim
by or against the misjoined party is pursued in a
separate case. In this case, therefore, the inclusion of
Manuel in the complaint cannot be considered a
misjoinder, as in fact, the action would have
proceeded against him had he been alive at the time
the collection case was filed by petitioner. This being
the case, the remedy provided by Section 11 of Rule 3
does not obtain here. The name of Manuel as party-
defendant cannot simply be dropped from the case.
Instead, the procedure taken by the Court in Sarsaba
v. Vda. de Te,52whose facts, as mentioned earlier,
resemble those of this case, should be followed herein.
There,
_______________
52 Supra note 41.
40
40 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Boston Equity Resources, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals
the Supreme Court agreed with the trial court when it
resolved the issue of jurisdiction over the person of
the deceased Sereno in this wise:
As correctly pointed by defendants, the
Honorable Court has not acquired jurisdiction
over the person of Patricio Sereno since there was
indeed no valid service of summons insofar as
Patricio Sereno is concerned. Patricio Sereno died
before the summons, together with a copy of the
complaint and its annexes, could be served upon
him.
However, the failure to effect service of
summons unto Patricio Sereno, one of the
defendants herein, does not render the action
DISMISSIBLE, considering that the three (3)
other defendants, x x x, were validly served with
summons and the case with respect to the
answering defendants may still proceed
independently. Be it recalled that the three (3)
answering defendants have previously filed a
Motion to Dismiss the Complaint which was
denied by the Court.
Hence, only the case against Patricio
Sereno will be DISMISSED and the same may
be filed as a claim against the estate of Patricio
Sereno, but the case with respect to the three (3)
other accused [sic] will proceed. (Emphasis
supplied.)53
As a result, the case, as against Manuel, must be
dismissed.
In addition, the dismissal of the case against
Manuel is further warranted by Section 1 of Rule 3 of
the Rules of Court, which states that: [o]nly natural or
juridical persons, or entities authorized by law may be
parties in a civil action.” Applying this provision of
law, the Court, in the case of Ventura v.
Militante,54 held:
_______________
53 Id., at pp. 427-428.
54 374 Phil. 562, 571-573; 316 SCRA 226, 233-234
(1999) citing 59 Am Jur 2d, Sec. 19, p. 407, 59 Am Jur
2d, Sec. 41, pp. 438 and 439 and 59 Am Jur 2d, Sec.
20, p. 440.
41
VOL. 699, JUNE 19, 2013 41
Boston Equity Resources, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals
Parties may be either plaintiffs or defendants.
x x x. In order to maintain an action in a court of
justice, the plaintiff must have an actual legal
existence, that is, he, she or it must be a person
in law and possessed of a legal entity as either a
natural or an artificial person, and no suit can be
lawfully prosecuted save in the name of such a
person.
The rule is no different as regards party
defendants. It is incumbent upon a plaintiff,
when he institutes a judicial proceeding, to name
the proper party defendant to his cause of action.
In a suit or proceeding in personam of an
adversary character, the court can acquire no
jurisdiction for the purpose of trial or judgment
until a party defendant who actually or legally
exists and is legally capable of being sued, is
brought before it. It has even been held that the
question of the legal personality of a party
defendant is a question of substance going to the
jurisdiction of the court and not one of procedure.
The original complaint of petitioner named
the “estate of Carlos Ngo as represented by
surviving spouse Ms. Sulpicia Ventura” as the
defendant. Petitioner moved to dismiss the same
on the ground that the defendant as named in the
complaint had no legal personality. We agree.
x x x. Considering that capacity to be sued is a
correlative of the capacity to sue, to the same
extent, a decedent does not have the
capacity to be sued and may not be named a
party defendant in a court action. (Emphases
supplied.)
Indeed, where the defendant is neither a natural
nor a juridical person or an entity authorized by law,
the complaint may be dismissed on the ground that
the pleading asserting the claim states no cause of
action or for failure to state a cause of action pursuant
to Section 1(g) of Rule 16 of the Rules of Court,
because a complaint cannot possibly state a
42
42 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Boston Equity Resources, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals
cause of action against one who cannot be a party to a
civil action.55
Since the proper course of action against the
wrongful inclusion of Manuel as party-defendant is
the dismissal of the case as against him, thus did the
trial court err when it ordered the substitution of
Manuel by his heirs. Substitution is proper only
where the party to be substituted died during the
pendency of the case, as expressly provided for by
Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, which states:
Death of party; duty of counsel.―Whenever
a party to a pending action dies, and the claim
is not thereby extinguished, it shall be the duty of
his counsel to inform the court within thirty (30)
days after such death of the fact thereof, and to
 give the name and address of his legal
representative or representatives. x x x
The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to
be substituted for the deceased, without requiring
the appointment of an executor or administrator
x x x.
The court shall forthwith order said legal
representative or representatives to appear and
be substituted within a period of thirty (30) days
from notice. (Emphasis supplied.)
Here, since Manuel was already dead at the time
of the filing of the complaint, the court never acquired
jurisdiction over his person and, in effect, there was
no party to be substituted.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The
Decision dated 28 February 2006 and the Resolution
dated 1 August 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 88586 are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The Orders of the Regional Trial Court dated
8 November 2004 and 22 December 2004,
respectively, in Civil Case No. 97-86672,
are REINSTATED. The Regional Trial Court,
Branch 24, Manila is hereby DI-
_______________
55 Riano, Civil Procedure (The Bar Lecture Series),
Volume I, 2011 Edition, p. 229.
43
VOL. 699, JUNE 19, 2013 43
Boston Equity Resources, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals
RECTED to proceed with the trial of Civil Case No.
97-86672 against respondent Lolita G. Toledo only, in
accordance with the above pronouncements of the
Court, and to decide the case with dispatch.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio (Chairperson), Brion, Del
Castillo and Villarama, Jr.,** JJ., concur.
Petition granted, judgment and resolution reversed
and set aside.
Notes.―Estoppel by laches or “stale demands”
ordains that the failure or neglect, for an
unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do
that which by exercising due diligence could or should
have been done earlier, or the negligence or omission
to assert a right within a reasonable time, warrants a
presumption that the party entitled to assert it either
has abandoned it or declined to assert it. (Garcia vs.
Garcia, 660 SCRA 1 [2011])
Court has ruled that formal substitution of parties
is not necessary when the heirs themselves
voluntarily appeared, participated and presented
evidence during the proceedings. (Sy vs. Fairland
Knitcraft Co., Inc., 662 SCRA 67 [2011])
——o0o——
March 25, 2014. G.R. No. 168539.*
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
petitioner, vs. HENRY T. GO, respondent.
Criminal Law; Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices;
Public Officers; Corrupt Practices of Public Officers;
Elements of.—Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019 provides: Sec.
3. Corrupt practices of public officers.—In addition to
acts or omissions of public officers already penalized
by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt
practices of any public officer and are hereby declared
to be unlawful: x x x x (g) Entering, on behalf of the
Government, into any contract or transaction
manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the same,
whether or not the public officer profited or will profit
thereby. The elements of the above provision are: (1)
that the accused is a public officer; (2) that he entered
into a contract or transaction on behalf of the
government; and (3) that such contract or transaction
is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the
government.
Same; Same; Conspiracy; Private persons, when
acting in conspiracy with public officers, may be
indicted and, if found guilty, held
_______________
* EN BANC.
705liable for the pertinent offenses under Section
3 of Republic Act (R.A.) 3019, in consonance with the
avowed policy of the anti-graft law to repress certain
acts of public officers and private persons alike
constituting graft or corrupt practices act or which
may lead thereto.—At the outset, it bears to reiterate
the settled rule that private persons, when acting in
conspiracy with public officers, may be indicted and, if
found guilty, held liable for the pertinent offenses
under Section 3 of R.A. 3019, in consonance with the
avowed policy of the anti-graft law to repress certain
acts of public officers and private persons alike
constituting graft or corrupt practices act or which
may lead thereto. This is the controlling doctrine as
enunciated by this Court in previous cases, among
which is a case involving herein private respondent.
Same; Same; Same; It is true that by reason of
Secretary Enrile’s death, there is no longer any public
officer with whom respondent can be charged for
violation of Republic Act (R.A.) 3019. It does not mean,
however, that the allegation of conspiracy between
them can no longer be proved or that their alleged
conspiracy is already expunged.—It is true that by
reason of Secretary Enrile’s death, there is no longer
any public officer with whom respondent can be
charged for violation of R.A. 3019. It does not mean,
however, that the allegation of conspiracy between
them can no longer be proved or that their alleged
conspiracy is already expunged. The only thing
extinguished by the death of Secretary Enrile is his
criminal liability. His death did not extinguish the
crime nor did it remove the basis of the charge of
conspiracy between him and private respondent.
Stated differently, the death of Secretary Enrile does
not mean that there was no public officer who
allegedly violated Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019. In fact,
the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon found
probable cause to indict Secretary Enrile for
infringement of Sections 3(e) and (g) of R.A. 3019.
Were it not for his death, he should have been
charged.
Same; Same; Same; The requirement before a
private person may be indicted for violation of Section
3(g) of Republic Act (R.A.) 3019, among others, is that
such private person must be alleged to have acted in
conspiracy with a public officer; If circumstances exist
where the public officer may no longer be charged in
court, as in the present case where the public officer
has already died, the private person may be indicted
alone.—The requirement before a private
706person may be indicted for violation of
Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019, among others, is that such
private person must be alleged to have acted in
conspiracy with a public officer. The law, however,
does not require that such person must, in all
instances, be indicted together with the public officer.
If circumstances exist where the public officer may no
longer be charged in court, as in the present case
where the public officer has already died, the private
person may be indicted alone.
Same; Same; Same; The death of one of two or
more conspirators does not prevent the conviction of
the survivor or survivors.—Indeed, it is not necessary
to join all alleged co-conspirators in an indictment for
conspiracy. If two or more persons enter into a
conspiracy, any act done by any of them pursuant to
the agreement is, in contemplation of law, the act of
each of them and they are jointly responsible therefor.
This means that everything said, written or done by
any of the conspirators in execution or furtherance of
the common purpose is deemed to have been said,
done, or written by each of them and it makes no
difference whether the actual actor is alive or dead,
sane or insane at the time of trial. The death of one of
two or more conspirators does not prevent the
conviction of the survivor or survivors. Thus, this
Court held that: x x x [a] conspiracy is in its nature a
joint offense. One person cannot conspire alone. The
crime depends upon the joint act or intent of two or
more persons. Yet, it does not follow that one
person cannot be convicted of conspiracy. So
long as the acquittal or death of a co-
conspirator does not remove the bases of a
charge for conspiracy, one defendant may be
found guilty of the offense.
Same; Same; Same; The avowed policy of the
State and the legislative intent to repress “acts of
public officers and private persons alike, which
constitute graft or corrupt practices,” would be
frustrated if the death of a public officer would bar the
prosecution of a private person who conspired with
such public officer in violating the Anti-Graft Law.—
The Court agrees with petitioner that the avowed
policy of the State and the legislative intent to repress
“acts of public officers and private persons alike,
which constitute graft or corrupt practices,” would be
frustrated if the death of a public officer would bar the
prosecution of a private person who conspired with
such public officer in violating the Anti-Graft Law.
707
Same; Same; Same; It is settled that the absence
or presence of conspiracy is factual in nature and
involves evidentiary matters.—It is settled that the
absence or presence of conspiracy is factual in nature
and involves evidentiary matters. Hence, the
allegation of conspiracy against respondent is better
left ventilated before the trial court during trial,
where respondent can adduce evidence to prove or
disprove its presence.
Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure;
Jurisdiction; The rule is well settled that the act of an
accused in posting bail or in filing motions seeking
affirmative relief is tantamount to submission of his
person to the jurisdiction of the court.—Respondent
should be reminded that prior to this Court’s ruling in
G.R. No. 168919, he already posted bail for his
provisional liberty. In fact, he even filed a Motion for
Consolidation in Criminal Case No. 28091. The Court
agrees with petitioner’s contention that private
respondent’s act of posting bail and filing his Motion
for Consolidation vests the SB with jurisdiction over
his person. The rule is well settled that the act of an
accused in posting bail or in filing motions seeking
affirmative relief is tantamount to submission of his
person to the jurisdiction of the court. Thus, it has
been held that: When a defendant in a criminal case is
brought before a competent court by virtue of a
warrant of arrest or otherwise, in order to avoid the
submission of his body to the jurisdiction of the court
he must raise the question of the court’s jurisdiction
over his person at the very earliest opportunity. If he
gives bail, demurs to the complaint or files any
dilatory plea or pleads to the merits, he thereby
gives the court jurisdiction over his
person. (State ex rel. John Brown vs. Fitzgerald, 51
Minn., 534)
Same; Same; Same; Courts; Sandiganbayan;The
Sandiganbayan is a special criminal court which has
exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving
violations of Republic Act (R.A.) 3019 committed by
certain public officers, as enumerated in Presidential
Decree (P.D.) 1606 as amended by R.A. 8249. This
includes private individuals who are charged as co-
principals, accomplices or accessories with the said
public officers.—The SB is a special criminal court
which has exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases
involving violations of R.A. 3019 committed by certain
public officers, as enumerated in P.D. 1606 as
amended by R.A. 8249. This includes private
individuals who are charged as co-principals,
accomplices or accesso-
 708ries with the said public officers. In the
instant case, respondent is being charged for violation
of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019, in conspiracy with then
Secretary Enrile. Ideally, under the law, both
respondent and Secretary Enrile should have been
charged before and tried jointly by
the Sandiganbayan. However, by reason of the death
of the latter, this can no longer be done. Nonetheless,
for reasons already discussed, it does not follow that
the SB is already divested of its jurisdiction over the
person of and the case involving herein respondent.
To rule otherwise would mean that the power of a
court to decide a case would no longer be based on the
law defining its jurisdiction but on other factors, such
as the death of one of the alleged offenders.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a resolution of
the Sandiganbayan (Third Division).
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Cirilo E. Doronilla for respondent.
PERALTA,J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review
on certiorariassailing the Resolution1 of the Third
Division2 of the Sandiganbayan (SB) dated June 2,
2005 which quashed the Information filed against
herein respondent for alleged violation of Section 3(g)
of Republic Act No. 3019 (R.A. 3019), otherwise
known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
The Information filed against respondent is an
offshoot of this Court’s Decision3 in Agan, Jr. v.
Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc. which
nullified the various contracts awarded by the
Government, through the Department of
_______________
1 Annex “A” to petition, Rollo, p. 59.
2 Composed of Associate Justice Godofredo L.
Legaspi as Chairman, with Associate Justices Efren
N. De La Cruz and Norberto Y. Geraldez (now
deceased), as members.
3 G.R. Nos. 155001, 155547 and 155661, May 5,
2003, 402 SCRA 612.
709Transportation and Communications (DOTC),
to Philippine Air Terminals, Co., Inc. (PIATCO) for
the construction, operation and maintenance of the
Ninoy Aquino International Airport International
Passenger Terminal III (NAIA IPT III). Subsequent to
the above Decision, a certain Ma. Cecilia L. Pesayco
filed a complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman
against several individuals for alleged violation of
R.A. 3019. Among those charged was herein
respondent, who was then the Chairman and
President of PIATCO, for having supposedly conspired
with then DOTC Secretary Arturo Enrile (Secretary
Enrile) in entering into a contract which is grossly
and manifestly disadvantageous to the government.
On September 16, 2004, the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for Luzon found probable cause to indict,
among others, herein respondent for violation of
Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019. While there was likewise a
finding of probable cause against Secretary Enrile, he
was no longer indicted because he died prior to the
issuance of the resolution finding probable cause.
Thus, in an Information dated January 13, 2005,
respondent was charged before the SB as follows:
On or about July 12, 1997, or sometime prior or
subsequent thereto, in Pasay City, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the late ARTURO ENRILE, then
Secretary of the Department of Transportation and
Communications (DOTC), committing the offense in
relation to his office and taking advantage of the
same, in conspiracy with accused, HENRY T. GO,
Chairman and President of the Philippine
International Air Terminals, Co., Inc. (PIATCO), did
then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally
enter into a Concession Agreement, after the project
for the construction of the Ninoy Aquino International
Airport International Passenger Terminal III (NAIA
IPT III) was awarded to Paircargo
Consortium/PIATCO, which Concession Agreement
substantially amended the draft Concession
Agreement covering the construction of the NAIA IPT
III under Republic Act
7106957, as amended by Republic Act 7718 (BOT
law), specifically the provision on Public Utility
Revenues, as well as the assumption by the
government of the liabilities of PIATCO in the event
of the latter’s default under Article IV, Section 4.04
(b) and (c) in relation to Article 1.06 of the Concession
Agreement, which terms are more beneficial to
PIATCO while manifestly and grossly
disadvantageous to the government of the Republic of
the Philippines.4
The case was docketed as Criminal Case
No. 28090.
On March 10, 2005, the SB issued an Order, to
wit:
The prosecution is given a period of ten (10) days
from today within which to show cause why this case
should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over
the person of the accused considering that the accused
is a private person and the public official Arturo
Enrile, his alleged co-conspirator, is already deceased,
and not an accused in this case.5
The prosecution complied with the above Order
contending that the SB has already acquired
jurisdiction over the person of respondent by reason of
his voluntary appearance, when he filed a motion for
consolidation and when he posted bail. The
prosecution also argued that the SB has exclusive
jurisdiction over respondent’s case, even if he is a
private person, because he was alleged to have
conspired with a public officer.6
On April 28, 2005, respondent filed a Motion to
Quash7the Information filed against him on the
ground that the operative facts adduced therein do
not constitute an offense under Section 3(g) of R.A.
3019. Respondent, citing the show cause order of the
SB, also contended that, independently of the
_______________
4 Annex “B” to petition, Rollo, pp. 61-62.
5 Annex “C” to petition, id., at p. 64.
6 See Annex “F” to petition, id., at pp. 74-82.
7 Annex “G” to petition, id., at pp. 84-88.
711deceased Secretary Enrile, the public officer
with whom he was alleged to have conspired,
respondent, who is not a public officer nor was
capacitated by any official authority as a government
agent, may not be prosecuted for violation of Section
3(g) of R.A. 3019.
The prosecution filed its Opposition.8
On June 2, 2005, the SB issued its assailed
Resolution, pertinent portions of which read thus:
Acting on the Motion to Quash filed by accused
Henry T. Go dated April 22, 2005, and it appearing
that Henry T. Go, the lone accused in this case is a
private person and his alleged co-conspirator-public
official was already deceased long before this case was
filed in court, for lack of jurisdiction over the person of
the accused, the Court grants the Motion to Quash
and the Information filed in this case is hereby
ordered quashed and dismissed.9
Hence, the instant petition raising the following
issues, to wit:
I 11 Go v. Fifth Division, Sandiganbayan, 549 Phil.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO
GRAVELY ERRED AND DECIDED A QUESTION
OF SUBSTANCE IN A MANNER NOT IN ACCORD
WITH LAW
_______________
8 Annex “H” to petition, id., at pp. 90-101.
9 Annex “A” to petition, id., at p. 59.
712OR APPLICABLE JURISPRUDENCE IN
GRANTING THE DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE AND
IN DISMISSING CRIMINAL CASE NO. 28090 ON
THE GROUND THAT IT HAS NO JURISDICTION
OVER THE PERSON OF RESPONDENT GO.
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO
GRAVELY ERRED AND DECIDED A QUESTION
OF SUBSTANCE IN A MANNER NOT IN ACCORD
WITH LAW OR APPLICABLE JURISPRUDENCE,
IN RULING THAT IT HAS NO JURISDICTION
OVER THE PERSON OF RESPONDENT GO
DESPITE THE IRREFUTABLE FACT THAT HE
HAS ALREADY POSTED BAIL FOR HIS
PROVISIONAL LIBERTY
III
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO
GRAVELY ERRED WHEN, IN COMPLETE
DISREGARD OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION
CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION, IT QUASHED
THE INFORMATION AND DISMISSED CRIMINAL
CASE NO. 2809010
The Court finds the petition meritorious.
Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019 provides:
3. Sec.Corrupt practices of public officers.—In
addition to acts or omissions of public officers already
penalized by existing law, the following shall
constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and
are hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxxx
Entering, on behalf of the Government, into
any contract or transaction manifestly and
grossly disadvantageous to the same, whether or
not the public officer profited or will profit
thereby. (g)
The elements of the above provision are:
that the accused is a public officer; (1)
that he entered into a contract or transaction on
behalf of the government; and (2)
that such contract or transaction is grossly and
manifestly disadvantageous to the government. (3)11
_______________
10 Rollo, p. 27.
783, 799; 521 SCRA 270, 279 (2007).
713At the outset, it bears to reiterate the settled
rule that private persons, when acting in conspiracy
with public officers, may be indicted and, if found
guilty, held liable for the pertinent offenses under
Section 3 of R.A. 3019, in consonance with the avowed
policy of the anti-graft law to repress certain acts of
public officers and private persons alike constituting
graft or corrupt practices act or which may lead
thereto.12 This is the controlling doctrine as
enunciated by this Court in previous cases, among
which is a case involving herein private respondent.13
The only question that needs to be settled in the
present petition is whether herein respondent, a
private person, may be indicted for conspiracy in
violating Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019 even if the public
officer, with whom he was alleged to have conspired,
has died prior to the filing of the Information.
Respondent contends that by reason of the death
of Secretary Enrile, there is no public officer who was
charged in the Information and, as such, prosecution
against respondent may not prosper.
 The Court is not persuaded.
It is true that by reason of Secretary Enrile’s
death, there is no longer any public officer with whom
respondent can be charged for violation of R.A. 3019.
It does not mean, however, that the allegation of
conspiracy between them can no longer be proved or
that their alleged conspiracy is already expunged. The
only thing extinguished by the death of Secretary
Enrile is his criminal liability. His death did not
extin-
_______________
12 Gregorio Singian, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, et al.,
G.R. Nos. 195011-19, September 30, 2013, 706 SCRA
451; Santillano v. People, G.R. Nos. 175045-46, March
3, 2010, 614 SCRA 164; Go v. Fifth Division,
Sandiganbayan, supra; Singian, Jr. v.
Sandiganbayan, 514 Phil. 536; 478 SCRA 348
(2005); Domingo v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 149175,
October 25, 2005, 474 SCRA 203; Luciano v. Estrella,
No. L-31622, August 31, 1970, 34 SCRA 769.
13 See Go v. Fifth Division,
Sandiganbayan, supra note 11.
714guish the crime nor did it remove the basis of
the charge of conspiracy between him and private
respondent. Stated differently, the death of Secretary
Enrile does not mean that there was no public officer
who allegedly violated Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019. In
fact, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon
found probable cause to indict Secretary Enrile for
infringement of Sections 3(e) and (g) of R.A.
3019.14 Were it not for his death, he should have been
charged.
The requirement before a private person may be
indicted for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019,
among others, is that such private person must be
alleged to have acted in conspiracy with a public
officer. The law, however, does not require that such
person must, in all instances, be indicted together
with the public officer. If circumstances exist where
the public officer may no longer be charged in court,
as in the present case where the public officer has
already died, the private person may be indicted
alone.
Indeed, it is not necessary to join all alleged co-
conspirators in an indictment for conspiracy.15 If two
or more persons enter into a conspiracy, any act done
by any of them pursuant to the agreement is, in
contemplation of law, the act of each of them and they
are jointly responsible therefor.16 This means that
everything said, written or done by any of the
conspirators in execution or furtherance of the
common purpose is deemed to have been said, done, or
written by each of them and it makes no difference
whether the actual actor is alive or dead, sane or
insane at the time of trial.17 The death of one of two or
more conspirators does not prevent the conviction of
the survivor or survivors.18 Thus, this Court held that:
14 Records, Vol. I, p. 106.
15 15 C.J.S. Conspiracy § 82, p. 1115.
16 §14 16 Am Jur 2d, pp. 134-135.
17 Id.
18 §19 16 Am Jur 2d, pp. 137-138.
715
x x x [a] conspiracy is in its nature a joint offense. One
person cannot conspire alone. The crime depends
upon the joint act or intent of two or more
persons. Yet, it does not follow that one person
cannot be convicted of conspiracy. So long as
the acquittal or death of a co-conspirator does
not remove the bases of a charge for conspiracy,
one defendant may be found guilty of the
offense.19
The Court agrees with petitioner’s contention that,
as alleged in the Information filed against respondent,
which is deemed hypothetically admitted in the
latter’s Motion to Quash, he (respondent) conspired
with Secretary Enrile in violating Section 3(g) of R.A.
3019 and that in conspiracy, the act of one is the act of
all. Hence, the criminal liability incurred by a co-
conspirator is also incurred by the other co-
conspirators.
Moreover, the Court agrees with petitioner that
the avowed policy of the State and the legislative
intent to repress “acts of public officers and private
persons alike, which constitute graft or corrupt
practices,”20 would be frustrated if the death of a
public officer would bar the prosecution of a private
person who conspired with such public officer in
violating the Anti-Graft Law.
In this regard, this Court’s disquisition in the
early case of People v. Peralta21 as to the nature of and
the principles governing conspiracy, as construed
under Philippine jurisdiction, is instructive, to wit:
x x x A conspiracy exists when two or more
persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it.
Generally, conspiracy is not a
_______________
19 Villa v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 87186,
87281, 87466 and 87524, April 24, 1992, 208 SCRA
283, 297-298, citing U.S. v. Remigio, 37 Phil. 599
(1918). (Emphasis supplied)
20 See R.A. 3019, Sec. 1.
21 No. L-19069, October 29, 1968, 25 SCRA 759.
716crime except when the law specifically
provides a penalty therefor as in treason, rebellion
and sedition. The crime of conspiracy known to the
common law is not an indictable offense in the
Philippines. An agreement to commit a crime is a
reprehensible act from the view-point of morality, but
as long as the conspirators do not perform overt acts
in furtherance of their malevolent design, the
sovereignty of the State is not outraged and the
tranquility of the public remains undisturbed.
However, when in resolute execution of a
common scheme, a felony is committed by two
or more malefactors, the existence of a
conspiracy assumes pivotal importance in the
determination of the liability of the
perpetrators. In stressing the significance of
conspiracy in criminal law, this Court in U.S. vs.
Infante and Barreto opined that
While it is true that the penalties cannot be
imposed for the mere act of conspiring to commit
a crime unless the statute specifically prescribes
a penalty therefor, nevertheless the existence of a
conspiracy to commit a crime is in many cases a
fact of vital importance, when considered
together with the other evidence of record, in
establishing the existence, of the consummated
crime and its commission by the conspirators.
Once an express or implied conspiracy is
proved, all of the conspirators are liable as co-
principals regardless of the extent and
character of their respective active
participation in the commission of the crime or
crimes perpetrated in furtherance of the
conspiracy because in contemplation of law the
act of one is the act of all. The foregoing rule is
anchored on the sound principle that “when two
or more persons unite to accomplish a criminal
object, whether through the physical volition of
one, or all, proceeding severally or collectively,
each individual whose evil will actively
contributes to the wrong-doing is in law
717responsible for the whole, the same as
though performed by himself alone.” Although it
is axiomatic that no one is liable for acts other than
his own, “when two or more persons agree or conspire
to commit a crime, each is responsible for all the acts
of the others, done in furtherance of the agreement or
conspiracy.” The imposition of collective liability upon
the conspirators is clearly explained in one case where
this Court held that
x x x it is impossible to graduate the separate
liability of each (conspirator) without taking into
consideration the close and inseparable relation
of each of them with the criminal act, for the
commission of which they all acted by common
agreement x x x. The crime must therefore in
view of the solidarity of the act and intent which
existed between the x x x accused, be regarded as
the act of the band or party created by them, and
they are all equally responsible x x x
Verily, the moment it is established that the
malefactors conspired and confederated in the
commission of the felony proved, collective liability of
the accused conspirators attaches by reason of the
conspiracy, and the court shall not speculate nor even
investigate as to the actual degree of participation of
each of the perpetrators present at the scene of the
crime. Of course, as to any conspirator who was
remote from the situs of aggression, he could be drawn
within the enveloping ambit of the conspiracy if it be
proved that through his moral ascendancy over the
rest of the conspirators the latter were moved or
impelled to carry out the conspiracy.
In fine, the convergence of the wills of the
conspirators in the scheming and execution of
the crime amply justifies the imputation to all of
them the act of any one of them. It is in this
light that conspiracy is generally viewed not as
a separate indictable offense, but a rule for
collectivizing criminal liability.
x x x x718
x x x A time-honored rule in the corpus of our
jurisprudence is that once conspiracy is proved, all of
the conspirators who acted in furtherance of the
common design are liable as co-principals. This rule of
collective criminal liability emanates from the
ensnaring nature of conspiracy. The concerted action
of the conspirators in consummating their common
purpose is a patent display of their evil partnership,
and for the consequences of such criminal enterprise
they must be held solidarily liable.22
This is not to say, however, that private
respondent should be found guilty of conspiring with
Secretary Enrile. It is settled that the absence or
presence of conspiracy is factual in nature and
involves evidentiary matters.23Hence, the allegation of
conspiracy against respondent is better left ventilated
before the trial court during trial, where respondent
can adduce evidence to prove or disprove its presence.
Respondent claims in his Manifestation and
Motion24 as well as in his Urgent Motion to
Resolve25 that in a different case, he was likewise
indicted before the SB for conspiracy with the late
Secretary Enrile in violating the same Section 3(g) of
R.A. 3019 by allegedly entering into another
agreement (Side Agreement) which is separate from
the Concession Agreement subject of the present case.
The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 28091.
Here, the SB, through a Resolution, granted
respondent’s motion to quash the Information on the
ground that the SB has no jurisdiction over the person
of respondent. The prosecution questioned the said SB
Resolution before this Court via a petition for review
on certiorari. The petition was docketed as G.R. No.
168919. In a minute resolution dated August 31, 2005,
this Court denied the peti-
_______________
22 Id., at pp. 771-777. (Italics in the original;
emphasis supplied)
23 People v. Dumlao, G.R. No. 168918, March 2,
2009, 580 SCRA 409, 432; Heirs of the late Nestor Tria
v. Obias, G.R. No. 175887, November 24, 2010, 636
SCRA 91, 116.
24 Rollo, pp. 176-180.
 25 Id., at pp. 186-192.
719tion finding no reversible error on the part of
the SB. This Resolution became final and executory
on January 11, 2006. Respondent now argues that
this Court’s resolution in G.R. No. 168919 should be
applied in the instant case.
The Court does not agree. Respondent should be
reminded that prior to this Court’s ruling in G.R. No.
168919, he already posted bail for his provisional
liberty. In fact, he even filed a Motion for
Consolidation26 in Criminal Case No. 28091. The
Court agrees with petitioner’s contention that private
respondent’s act of posting bail and filing his Motion
for Consolidation vests the SB with jurisdiction over
his person. The rule is well settled that the act of an
accused in posting bail or in filing motions seeking
affirmative relief is tantamount to submission of his
person to the jurisdiction of the court.27
Thus, it has been held that:
When a defendant in a criminal case is brought
before a competent court by virtue of a warrant of
arrest or otherwise, in order to avoid the submission
of his body to the jurisdiction of the court he must
raise the question of the court’s jurisdiction over his
person at the very earliest opportunity. If he gives
bail, demurs to the complaint or files any
dilatory plea or pleads to the merits, he thereby
gives the court jurisdiction over his person.
(State ex rel. John Brown vs. Fitzgerald, 51 Minn.,
534)
xxxx
As ruled in La Naval Drug vs. CA [236 SCRA 78,
86]:
_______________
26 Annex “J” to petition, id., at p. 112.
27 Miranda v. Tuliao, 520 Phil. 907, 918; 486
SCRA 377, 389 (2006), citing Santiago v. Vasquez,
G.R. Nos. 99289-90, January 27, 1993, 217 SCRA 633,
643; Cojuangco v. Sandiganbayan, 360 Phil. 559, 581;
300 SCRA 367, 387 (1998); Velasco v. Court of
Appeals, 315 Phil. 757, 770; 245 SCRA 677, 686
(1995).
720
“[L]ack of jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant may be waived either expressly or
impliedly. When a defendant voluntarily appears,
he is deemed to have submitted himself to the
jurisdiction of the court. If he so wishes not to
waive this defense, he must do so seasonably by
motion for the purpose of objecting to the
jurisdiction of the court; otherwise, he shall be
deemed to have submitted himself to that
jurisdiction.”
Moreover, “[w]here the appearance is by motion
for the purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the
court over the person, it must be for the sole and
separate purpose of objecting to said jurisdiction. If
the appearance is for any other purpose, the
defendant is deemed to have submitted himself
to the jurisdiction of the court. Such an
appearance gives the court jurisdiction over the
person.”
Verily, petitioner’s participation in the proceedings
before the Sandiganbayan was not confined to his
opposition to the issuance of a warrant of arrest but
also covered other matters which called for
respondent court’s exercise of its jurisdiction.
Petitioner may not be heard now to deny said court’s
jurisdiction over him. x x x.28
In the instant case, respondent did not make any
special appearance to question the jurisdiction of the
SB over his person prior to his posting of bail and
filing his Motion for Consolidation. In fact, his Motion
to Quash the Information in Criminal Case No. 28090
only came after the SB issued an Order requiring the
prosecution to show cause why the case should not be
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over his person.
_______________
28 Cojuangco v. Sandiganbayan, supra, at pp. 582-
583; p. 388. (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)
721
As a recapitulation, it would not be amiss to point
out that the instant case involves a contract entered
into by public officers representing the government.
More importantly, the SB is a special criminal court
which has exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases
involving violations of R.A. 3019 committed by certain
public officers, as enumerated in P.D. 1606 as
amended by R.A. 8249. This includes private
individuals who are charged as co-principals,
accomplices or accessories with the said public
officers. In the instant case, respondent is being
charged for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019, in
conspiracy with then Secretary Enrile. Ideally, under
the law, both respondent and Secretary Enrile should
have been charged before and tried jointly by
the Sandiganbayan. However, by reason of the death
of the latter, this can no longer be done. Nonetheless,
for reasons already discussed, it does not follow that
the SB is already divested of its jurisdiction over the
person of and the case involving herein respondent.
To rule otherwise would mean that the power of a
court to decide a case would no longer be based on the
law defining its jurisdiction but on other factors, such
as the death of one of the alleged offenders.
Lastly, the issues raised in the present petition
involve matters which are mere incidents in the main
case and the main case has already been pending for
over nine (9) years. Thus, a referral of the case to the
Regional Trial Court would further delay the
resolution of the main case and it would, by no means,
promote respondent’s right to a speedy trial and a
speedy disposition of his case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The
Resolution of the Sandiganbayan dated June 2, 2005,
granting respondent’s Motion to Quash, is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The Sandiganbayan is forthwith DIRECTED to
proceed with deliberate dispatch in the disposition of
Criminal Case No. 28090.
722
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Brion,
Bersamin, Abad, Villarama, Jr., Perez, Mendoza and
Reyes, JJ., concur.
Sereno, CJ., No part, former counsel in related
cases.
Del Castillo, J., No part.
Perlas-Bernabe, J., On Leave.
Leonen, J., On Leave.
Petition granted, resolution reversed and set aside.
Notes.—Private persons found acting in
conspiracy with public officers may be held liable for
the applicable offenses found in Section 3 of the law.
(Santillano vs. People, 614 SCRA 164 [2010])
An accepted badge of conspiracy is when the
accused by their acts aimed at the same object, one
performing one part and another performing another
so as to complete it with a view to the attainment of
the same object, and their acts though apparently
independent were in fact concerted and cooperative,
indicating closeness of personal association, concerted
action and concurrence of sentiments. (People vs.
Seraspe, 688 SCRA 289 [2013])
——o0o——
February 4, 2014. G.R. No. 175723.*
THE CITY OF MANILA, represented by MAYOR
JOSE L. ATIENZA, JR., and MS. LIBERTY M.
TOLEDO, in her capacity as the City Treasurer of
Manila, petitioners, vs. HON. CARIDAD H. GRECIA-
CUERDO, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 112, Pasay City; SM
MART, INC.; SM PRIME HOLDINGS, INC.; STAR
APPLIANCES CENTER; SUPERVALUE, INC.; ACE
HARDWARE PHILIPPINES, INC.; WATSON
PERSONAL CARE STORES, PHILS., INC.;
JOLLIMART PHILS., CORP.; SURPLUS
MARKETING CORPORATION and SIGNATURE
LINES, respondents.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Moot and
Academic; Well-entrenched is the rule that where the
issues have become moot and academic, there is no
justiciable controversy, thereby rendering the
resolution of the same of no practical use or value.—It
clearly appears that the issues raised in the present
petition, which merely involve the incident on the
preliminary injunction issued by the RTC, have
already become moot and academic considering that
the trial court, in its decision on the merits in the
main case, has already ruled in favor of respondents
and that the same decision is now final and executory.
Well-entrenched is the rule that where the issues
have become moot and academic, there is no
justiciable controversy, thereby rendering the
resolution of the same of no practical use or value.
Same; Same; Appeals; It is settled that in cases
where an assailed judgment or order is considered
final, the remedy of the aggrieved party is appeal.—
Petitioners availed of the wrong remedy when they
filed the instant special civil action for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court in assailing the
Resolutions of the CA which dismissed their petition
filed with the said court and their motion for
reconsideration of such dismissal. There is no dispute
that the assailed Resolutions of the CA are in the
nature of a final order as they disposed of the petition
completely. It is settled that in
_______________
* EN BANC.
183cases where an assailed judgment or order is
considered final, the remedy of the aggrieved party is
appeal. Hence, in the instant case, petitioner should
have filed a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45, which is a continuation of the appellate
process over the original case.
Same; Same; Same; Petition for Review on
Certiorari; In accordance with the liberal spirit
pervading the Rules of Court and in the interest of
substantial justice, the Supreme Court has, before,
treated a petition for certiorari as a petition for review
on certiorari, particularly (1) if the petition for
certiorari was filed within the reglementary period
within which to file a petition for review on certiorari;
(2) when errors of judgment are averred; and (3) when
there is sufficient reason to justify the relaxation of the
rules.—In accordance with the liberal spirit pervading
the Rules of Court and in the interest of substantial
justice, this Court has, before, treated a petition
for certiorari as a petition for review on certiorari,
particularly (1) if the petition for certiorari was filed
within the reglementary period within which to file a
petition for review on certiorari; (2) when errors of
judgment are averred; and (3) when there is sufficient
reason to justify the relaxation of the rules.
Considering that the present petition was filed within
the 15-day reglementary period for filing a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45, that an error of
judgment is averred, and because of the significance
of the issue on jurisdiction, the Court deems it proper
and justified to relax the rules and, thus, treat the
instant petition for certiorari as a petition for review
on certiorari.
Same; Same; Courts; Court of Tax Appeals; On
March 30, 2004, the Legislature passed into law
Republic Act No. 9282 (RA 9282) amending RA 1125
by expanding the jurisdiction of the Court of Tax
Appeals (CTA), enlarging its membership and
elevating its rank to the level of a collegiate court with
special jurisdiction.Decisions of the Commissioner of
Customs in cases involving liability —On June 16,
1954, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 1125 (RA
1125) creating the CTA and giving to the said court
jurisdiction over the following: (1) Decisions of the
Collector of Internal Revenue in cases involving
disputed assessments, refunds of internal revenue
taxes, fees or other charges, penalties imposed in
relation thereto, or other matters arising under the
National Internal Revenue Code or other law or part
of law administered by the Bureau of Internal
Revenue; (2)
184for customs duties, fees or other money
charges; seizure, detention or release of property
affected fines, forfeitures or other penalties imposed
in relation thereto; or other matters arising under the
Customs Law or other law or part of law administered
by the Bureau of Customs; and (3) Decisions of
provincial or City Boards of Assessment Appeals in
cases involving the assessment and taxation of real
property or other matters arising under the
Assessment Law, including rules and regulations
relative thereto. On March 30, 2004, the Legislature
passed into law Republic Act No. 9282 (RA 9282)
amending RA 1125 by expanding the jurisdiction of
the CTA, enlarging its membership and elevating its
rank to the level of a collegiate court with special
jurisdiction.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Jurisdiction;
Certiorari; While it is clearly stated that the Court of
Tax Appeals (CTA) has exclusive appellate jurisdiction
over decisions, orders or resolutions of the Regional
Trial Courts (RTCs) in local tax cases originally
decided or resolved by them in the exercise of their
original or appellate jurisdiction, there is no
categorical statement under RA 1125 as well as the
amendatory RA 9282, which provides that the Court of
Tax Appeals has jurisdiction over petitions for
certiorari assailing interlocutory orders issued by the
Regional Trial Court in local tax cases filed before it;
The prevailing doctrine is that the authority to issue
writs of certiorari involves the exercise of original
jurisdiction which must be expressly conferred by the
Constitution or by law and cannot be implied from the
mere existence of appellate jurisdiction.—While it is
clearly stated that the CTA has exclusive appellate
jurisdiction over decisions, orders or resolutions of the
RTCs in local tax cases originally decided or resolved
by them in the exercise of their original or appellate
jurisdiction, there is no categorical statement under
RA 1125 as well as the amendatory RA 9282, which
provides that the CTA has jurisdiction over petitions
for certiorari assailing interlocutory orders issued by
the RTC in local tax cases filed before it. The
prevailing doctrine is that the authority to issue writs
of certiorariinvolves the exercise of original
jurisdiction which must be expressly conferred by the
Constitution or by law and cannot be implied from the
mere existence of appellate jurisdiction. Thus, in the
cases of Pimentel v. COMELEC, 101 SCRA 769
(1980), Garcia v. De Jesus, 206 SCRA 779
(1992), Veloria v. COMELEC, 211 SCRA 907
(1992); Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication
Board v. Lubrica, 457 SCRA 800 (2005), and Garcia v.
Sandiganbayan, 237 SCRA 552
185(1994), this Court has ruled against the
jurisdiction of courts or tribunals over petitions
for certiorari on the ground that there is no law which
expressly gives these tribunals such power. It must be
observed, however, that with the exception of Garcia
v. Sandiganbayan, 237 SCRA 552 (1994), these
rulings pertain not to regular courts but to tribunals
exercising quasi-judicial powers. With respect to the
Sandiganbayan, Republic Act No. 8249 now provides
that the special criminal court has exclusive original
jurisdiction over petitions for the issuance of the writs
of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus,
injunctions, and other ancillary writs and processes in
aid of its appellate jurisdiction.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; While
there is no express grant of the power to issue writ of
certiorari, with respect to the Court of Tax Appeals
(CTA), Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution
provides, nonetheless, that judicial power shall be
vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts
as may be established by law and that judicial power
includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.—Section 5 (1), Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution grants power to the Supreme Court, in
the exercise of its original jurisdiction, to issue writs
of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. With respect
to the Court of Appeals, Section 9 (1) of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129 (BP 129) gives the appellate court,
also in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, the
power to issue, among others, a writ of certiorari,
whether or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. As
to Regional Trial Courts, the power to issue a writ
of certiorari, in the exercise of their original
jurisdiction, is provided under Section 21 of BP 129.
The foregoing notwithstanding, while there is no
express grant of such power, with respect to the CTA,
Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution
provides, nonetheless, that judicial power shall be
vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts
as may be established by law and that judicial power
includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.
186
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; It can be
fairly interpreted that the power of the Court of Tax
Appeals (CTA) includes that of determining whether or
not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC
in issuing an interlocutory order in cases falling
within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the tax
court.—It can be fairly interpreted that the power of
the CTA includes that of determining whether or not
there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC in
issuing an interlocutory order in cases falling within
the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the tax court. It,
thus, follows that the CTA, by constitutional mandate,
is vested with jurisdiction to issue writs
of certiorari in these cases. Indeed, in order for any
appellate court to effectively exercise its appellate
jurisdiction, it must have the authority to issue,
among others, a writ of certiorari. In transferring
exclusive jurisdiction over appealed tax cases to the
CTA, it can reasonably be assumed that the law
intended to transfer also such power as is deemed
necessary, if not indispensable, in aid of such
appellate jurisdiction. There is no perceivable reason
why the transfer should only be considered as partial,
not total.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The
Supreme Court has held as early as the case of J.M.
Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Jaramillo, et al., 9 SCRA 189
(1963), that “if a case may be appealed to a particular
court or judicial tribunal or body, then said court or
judicial tribunal or body has jurisdiction to issue the
extraordinary writ of certiorari, in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction.”—Consistent with the above
pronouncement, this Court has held as early as the
case of J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Jaramillo, et al., 9
SCRA 189 (1963), that “if a case may be appealed to a
particular court or judicial tribunal or body, then said
court or judicial tribunal or body has jurisdiction to
issue the extraordinary writ of certiorari, in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction.” This principle was affirmed
in De Jesus v. Court of Appeals, 212 SCRA 823 (1992),
where the Court stated that “a court may issue a writ
of certiorari in aid of its appellate jurisdiction if said
court has jurisdiction to review, by appeal or writ of
error, the final orders or decisions of the lower court.”
The rulings in J.M. Tuason and De Jesus were
reiterated in the more recent cases of Galang, Jr. v.
Geronimo, 643 SCRA 631 (2011) and Bulilis v. Nuez,
655 SCRA 241 (2011). Furthermore, Section 6, Rule
135 of the present Rules of Court provides that when
by law, jurisdiction is con-
187ferred on a court or judicial officer, all
auxiliary writs, processes and other means necessary
to carry it into effect may be employed by such court
or officer.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The
Supreme Court agrees with the ruling of the Court of
Appeals (CA) that since appellate jurisdiction over
private respondents’ complaint for tax refund is vested
in the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA), it follows that a
petition for certiorari seeking nullification of an
interlocutory order issued in the said case should,
likewise, be filed with the same court.—If this Court
were to sustain petitioners’ contention that
jurisdiction over their certiorari petition lies with the
CA, this Court would be confirming the exercise by
two judicial bodies, the CA and the CTA, of
jurisdiction over basically the same subject matter —
precisely the split — jurisdiction situation which is
anathema to the orderly administration of justice. The
Court cannot accept that such was the legislative
motive, especially considering that the law expressly
confers on the CTA, the tribunal with the specialized
competence over tax and tariff matters, the role of
judicial review over local tax cases without mention of
any other court that may exercise such power. Thus,
the Court agrees with the ruling of the CA that since
appellate jurisdiction over private respondents’
complaint for tax refund is vested in the CTA, it
follows that a petition for certiorari seeking
nullification of an interlocutory order issued in the
said case should, likewise, be filed with the same
court. To rule otherwise would lead to an absurd
situation where one court decides an appeal in the
main case while another court rules on an incident in
the very same case.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The
supervisory power or jurisdiction of the Court of Tax
Appeals (CTA) to issue a writ of certiorari in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction should coexist with, and be a
complement to, its appellate jurisdiction to review, by
appeal, the final orders and decisions of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), in order to have complete
supervision over the acts of the latter.—It would be
somewhat incongruent with the pronounced judicial
abhorrence to split jurisdiction to conclude that the
intention of the law is to divide the authority over a
local tax case filed with the RTC by giving to the CA
or this Court jurisdiction to issue a writ
of certiorari against interlocutory orders of the RTC
but giving to the CTA the jurisdiction over the appeal
from the decision of the trial court in the same case. It
is more in consonance with logic and legal soundness
to
188conclude that the grant of appellate
jurisdiction to the CTA over tax cases filed in and
decided by the RTC carries with it the power to issue
a writ of certiorari when necessary in aid of such
appellate jurisdiction. The supervisory power or
jurisdiction of the CTA to issue a writ of certiorari in
aid of its appellate jurisdiction should coexist with,
and be a complement to, its appellate jurisdiction to
review, by appeal, the final orders and decisions of the
RTC, in order to have complete supervision over the
acts of the latter.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; A grant
of appellate jurisdiction implies that there is included
in it the power necessary to exercise it effectively, to
make all orders that will preserve the subject of the
action, and to give effect to the final determination of
the appeal.—A grant of appellate jurisdiction implies
that there is included in it the power necessary to
exercise it effectively, to make all orders that will
preserve the subject of the action, and to give effect to
the final determination of the appeal. It carries with it
the power to protect that jurisdiction and to make the
decisions of the court thereunder effective. The court,
in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, has authority to
control all auxiliary and incidental matters necessary
to the efficient and proper exercise of that jurisdiction.
For this purpose, it may, when necessary, prohibit or
restrain the performance of any act which might
interfere with the proper exercise of its rightful
jurisdiction in cases pending before it.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The
Supreme Court has held that “while a court may be
expressly granted the incidental powers necessary to
effectuate its jurisdiction, a grant of jurisdiction, in the
absence of prohibitive legislation, implies the necessary
and usual incidental powers essential to effectuate it,
and, subject to existing laws and constitutional
provisions, every regularly constituted court has power
to do all things that are reasonably necessary for the
administration of justice within the scope of its
jurisdiction and for the enforcement of its judgments
and mandates.”—Indeed, courts possess certain
inherent powers which may be said to be implied from
a general grant of jurisdiction, in addition to those
expressly conferred on them. These inherent powers
are such powers as are necessary for the ordinary and
efficient exercise of jurisdiction; or are essential to the
existence, dignity and functions of the courts, as well
as to the due administration of justice; or are directly
appropriate, convenient and suitable to the execution
of their
189granted powers; and include the power to
maintain the court’s jurisdiction and render it
effective in behalf of the litigants. Thus, this Court
has held that “while a court may be expressly granted
the incidental powers necessary to effectuate its
jurisdiction, a grant of jurisdiction, in the absence of
prohibitive legislation, implies the necessary and
usual incidental powers essential to effectuate it, and,
subject to existing laws and constitutional provisions,
every regularly constituted court has power to do all
things that are reasonably necessary for the
administration of justice within the scope of its
jurisdiction and for the enforcement of its judgments
and mandates.” Hence, demands, matters or
questions ancillary or incidental to, or growing out of,
the main action, and coming within the above
principles, may be taken cognizance of by the court
and determined, since such jurisdiction is in aid of its
authority over the principal matter, even though the
court may thus be called on to consider and decide
matters which, as original causes of action, would not
be within its cognizance.
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court.
Certiorari.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
The City Legal Officer for petitioners.
Salvador & Associates for private respondents.
PERALTA,J.:
Before the Court is a special civil action
for certiorariunder Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
seeking to reverse and set aside the
Resolutions1 dated April 6, 2006 and November 29,
2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
87948.
The antecedents of the case, as summarized by the
CA, are as follows:
_______________
1 Penned by Associate Justice Rebecca de Guia-
Salvador, with Associate Justices Ruben T. Reyes
(now a retired member of this Court) and Aurora
Santiago-Lagman, concurring; Annexes “A” and
“B,” Rollo, pp. 43-48; 49-51.
190
The record shows that petitioner City of Manila,
through its treasurer, petitioner Liberty Toledo,
assessed taxes for the taxable period from January to
December 2002 against private respondents SM Mart,
Inc., SM Prime Holdings, Inc., Star Appliances
Center, Supervalue, Inc., Ace Hardware Philippines,
Inc., Watsons Personal Care Stores Phils., Inc.,
Jollimart Philippines Corp., Surplus Marketing Corp.
and Signature Lines. In addition to the taxes
purportedly due from private respondents pursuant to
Section 14, 15, 16, 17 of the Revised Revenue Code
of Manila (RRCM), said assessment covered the
local business taxes petitioners were authorized to
collect under Section 21 of the same Code. Because
payment of the taxes assessed was a precondition for
the issuance of their business permits, private
respondents were constrained to pay the
P19,316,458.77 assessment under protest.
On January 24, 2004, private respondents filed
[with the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City] the
complaint denominated as one for “Refund or
Recovery of Illegally and/or Erroneously-Collected
Local Business Tax, Prohibition with Prayer to Issue
TRO and Writ of Preliminary Injunction” which was
docketed as Civil Case No. 04-0019-CFM before public
respondent’s sala [at Branch 112]. In the amended
complaint they filed on February 16, 2004, private
respondents alleged that, in relation to Section 21
thereof, Sections 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19 and 20 of
the RRCM were violative of the limitations and
guidelines under Section 143 (h) of Republic Act No.
7160 [Local Government Code] on double taxation.
They further averred that petitioner city’s Ordinance
No. 8011 which amended pertinent portions of
the RRCM had already been declared to be illegal and
unconstitutional by the Department of Justice.2
_______________
2 Rollo, p. 44. (Italics and emphasis in the original;
citations omitted)
191
In its Order3 dated July 9, 2004, the RTC granted
private respondents’ application for a writ of
preliminary injunction. Petitioners filed a Motion for
Reconsideration4but the RTC denied it in its
Order5 dated October 15, 2004. Petitioners then filed
a special civil action for certiorariwith the CA
assailing the July 9, 2004 and October 15, 2004
Orders of the RTC.6
In its Resolution promulgated on April 6, 2006, the
CA dismissed petitioners’ petition
for certiorari holding that it has no jurisdiction over
the said petition. The CA ruled that since appellate
jurisdiction over private respondents’ complaint for
tax refund, which was filed with the RTC, is vested in
the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA), pursuant to its
expanded jurisdiction under Republic Act No. 9282
(RA 9282), it follows that a petition
for certiorari seeking nullification of an interlocutory
order issued in the said case should, likewise, be filed
with the CTA.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, 7 but
the CA denied it in its Resolution dated November 29,
2006.
Hence, the present petition raising the following
issues:
I — Whether or not the Honorable Court of
Appeals gravely erred in dismissing the case for
lack of jurisdiction.
II — Whether or not the Honorable Regional
Trial Court gravely abuse[d] its discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
enjoining by issuing a Writ of Injunction the
petitioners[,] their agents and/or authorized
representatives from implementing Section 21
of the Revised Revenue
_______________
3 Records, Vol. II, pp. 476-480.
4 Id., at pp. 481-490.
5 Id., at p. 513.
6 CA Rollo, pp. 2-31.
7 Id., at pp. 321-326.
192Code of Manila, as amended, against private
respondents.
III — Whether or not the Honorable Regional
Trial Court gravely abuse[d] its discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
issuing the Writ of Injunction despite failure of
private respondents to make a written claim for
tax credit or refund with the City Treasurer of
Manila.
IV — Whether or not the Honorable Regional
Trial Court gravely abuse[d] its discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
considering that under Section 21 of the Manila
Revenue Code, as amended, they are mere
collecting agents of the City Government.
V — Whether or not the Honorable Regional
Trial Court gravely abuse[d] its discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
issuing the Writ of Injunction because
petitioner City of Manila and its constituents
would result to greater damage and prejudice
thereof. (sic)8
Without first resolving the above issues, this Court
finds that the instant petition should be denied for
being moot and academic.
Upon perusal of the original records of the instant
case, this Court discovered that a Decision9 in the
main case had already been rendered by the RTC on
August 13, 2007, the dispositive portion of which
reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this
Court hereby renders JUDGMENT in favor of the
plaintiff and against the defendant to grant a tax
refund or credit for taxes paid pursuant to Section 21
of the Revenue Code of
_______________
8 Rollo, p. 20. (Emphasis in the original).
9 Records, Vol. II, pp. 761-762.
193the City of Manila as amended for the year
2002 in the following amounts:
To plaintiff SM Mart, Inc. -
P11,462,525.02
To plaintiff SM Prime Holdings, Inc. -
3,118,104.63
To plaintiff Star Appliances Center -
2,152,316.54
To plaintiff Supervalue, Inc. -
1,362,750.34
To plaintiff Ace Hardware Phils., Inc. -
419,689.04
To plaintiff Watsons Personal Care -
231,453.62
Health Stores Phils., Inc.
To plaintiff Jollimart Phils., Corp. -
140,908.54
To plaintiff Surplus Marketing Corp. -
220,204.70
To plaintiff Signature Mktg. Corp. -
94,906.34
TOTAL: -
P19,316,458.77
Defendants are further enjoined from collecting
taxes under Section 21, Revenue Code of Manila from
herein plaintiff.
SO ORDERED.10

The parties did not inform the Court but based on
the records, the above Decision had already become
final and executory per the Certificate of
Finality11 issued by the same trial court on October
20, 2008. In fact, a Writ of Execution12 was issued by
the RTC on November 25, 2009.
In view of the foregoing, it clearly appears that the
issues raised in the present petition, which merely
involve the incident on the preliminary injunction
issued by the RTC, have already become moot and
academic considering that the trial court, in its
decision on the merits in the main case, has already
ruled in favor of respondents and that the same
decision is now final and executory. Well-entrenched
is the rule that where the issues have become moot
and academic, there
_______________
10 Id., at p. 762. (Emphasis in the original)
11 Id., at p. 822.
12 Id., at p. 837.
194is no justiciable controversy, thereby rendering
the resolution of the same of no practical use or
value.13
In any case, the Court finds it necessary to resolve
the issue on jurisdiction raised by petitioners owing to
its significance and for future guidance of both bench
and bar. It is a settled principle that courts will decide
a question otherwise moot and academic if it is
capable of repetition, yet evading review.14
However, before proceeding, to resolve the
question on jurisdiction, the Court deems it proper to
likewise address a procedural error which petitioners
committed.
Petitioners availed of the wrong remedy when they
filed the instant special civil action
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court in
assailing the Resolutions of the CA which dismissed
their petition filed with the said court and their
motion for reconsideration of such dismissal. There is
no dispute that the assailed Resolutions of the CA are
in the nature of a final order as they disposed of the
petition completely. It is settled that in cases where
an assailed judgment or order is considered final, the
remedy of the aggrieved party is appeal. Hence, in the
instant case, petitioner should have filed a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45, which is a
continuation of the appellate process over the original
case.15
Petitioners should be reminded of the equally-
settled rule that a special civil action
for certiorari under Rule 65 is an original or
independent action based on grave abuse of discre-
_______________
13 Garcia v. COMELEC, 328 Phil. 288, 292; 258
SCRA 754, 757 (1996).
14 Caneland Sugar Corporation v. Alon, G.R. No.
142896, September 12, 2007, 533 SCRA 28, 33.
15 Republic of the Philippines, represented by
Abusama M. Alid, Officer-in-Charge, Department of
Agriculture-Regional Field Unit XII (DA-RFU-XII) v.
Abdulwahab A. Bayao, et al., G.R. No. 179492, June 5,
2013, 697 SCRA 313.
195tion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
and it will lie only if there is no appeal or any other
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law.16 As such, it cannot be a substitute for a
lost appeal.17
Nonetheless, in accordance with the liberal spirit
pervading the Rules of Court and in the interest of
substantial justice, this Court has, before, treated a
petition for certiorari as a petition for review
on certiorari, particularly (1) if the petition
for certiorari was filed within the reglementary period
within which to file a petition for review on certiorari;
(2) when errors of judgment are averred; and (3) when
there is sufficient reason to justify the relaxation of
the rules.18 Considering that the present petition was
filed within the 15-day reglementary period for filing
a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, that
an error of judgment is averred, and because of the
significance of the issue on jurisdiction, the Court
deems it proper and justified to relax the rules and,
thus, treat the instant petition for certiorari as a
petition for review on certiorari.
Having disposed of the procedural aspect, we now
turn to the central issue in this case. The basic
question posed before this Court is whether or not the
CTA has jurisdiction over a special civil action
for certiorariassailing an interlocutory order issued by
the RTC in a local tax case.
This Court rules in the affirmative.
_______________
16 Mendez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 174937,
June 13, 2012, 672 SCRA 200, 207.
17 Id.
18 Tagle v. Equitable PCI Bank, G.R. No. 172299,
April 22, 2008, 552 SCRA 424, 444, citing Oaminal v.
Castillo, 459 Phil. 542, 556; 413 SCRA 189, 202
(2003); Republic v. Court of Appeals, 379 Phil. 92, 98;
322 SCRA 81, 88-89 (2000); Delsan Transport Lines,
Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 335 Phil. 1066, 1075; 268
SCRA 597, 605 (1997); Banco Filipino Savings and
Mortgage Bank v. Court of Appeals, 389 Phil. 644,
655; 334 SCRA 305, 316-317 (2000).
196
On June 16, 1954, Congress enacted Republic Act
No. 1125 (RA 1125) creating the CTA and giving to
the said court jurisdiction over the following:
Decisions of the Collector of Internal Revenue in cases
involving disputed assessments, refunds of internal
revenue taxes, fees or other charges, penalties
imposed in relation thereto, or other matters arising
under the National Internal Revenue Code or other
law or part of law administered by the Bureau of
Internal Revenue; (1)
Decisions of the Commissioner of Customs in cases
involving liability for customs duties, fees or other
money charges; seizure, detention or release of
property affected fines, forfeitures or other penalties
imposed in relation thereto; or other matters arising
under the Customs Law or other law or part of law
administered by the Bureau of Customs; and (2)
Decisions of provincial or City Boards of Assessment
Appeals in cases involving the assessment and
taxation of real property or other matters arising
under the Assessment Law, including rules and
regulations relative thereto. (3)
On March 30, 2004, the Legislature passed into
law Republic Act No. 9282 (RA 9282) amending RA
1125 by expanding the jurisdiction of the CTA,
enlarging its membership and elevating its rank to
the level of a collegiate court with special jurisdiction.
Pertinent portions of the amendatory act provides
thus:
7. Sec.Jurisdiction .—The CTA shall exercise:
a. Exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review
by appeal, as herein provided:
Decisions of the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue in cases involving disputed
assessments, refunds 1. of internal revenue
taxes, fees or other charges, penalties in
relation thereto, or other
197matters arising under the National
Internal Revenue or other laws administered
by the Bureau of Internal Revenue;
Inaction by the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue in cases involving disputed
assessments, refunds of internal revenue
taxes, fees or other charges, penalties in
relations thereto, or other matters arising
under the National Internal Revenue Code
or other laws administered by the Bureau of
Internal Revenue, where the National
Internal Revenue Code provides a specific
period of action, in which case the inaction
shall be deemed a denial; 2.
3.Decisions, orders or resolutions of
the Regional Trial Courts in local tax
cases originally decided or resolved by
them in the exercise of their original or
appellate jurisdiction;
Decisions of the Commissioner of Customs in
cases involving liability for customs duties,
fees or other money charges, seizure,
detention or release of property affected,
fines, forfeitures or other penalties in
relation thereto, or other matters arising
under the Customs Law or other laws
administered by the Bureau of Customs; 4.
Decisions of the Central Board of
Assessment Appeals in the exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction over cases involving
the assessment and taxation of real property
originally decided by the provincial or city
board of assessment appeals; 5.
198
Decisions of the Secretary of Finance on
customs cases elevated to him automatically
for review from decisions of the
Commissioner of Customs which are adverse
to the Government under Section 2315 of the
Tariff and Customs Code; 6.
Decisions of the Secretary of Trade and
Industry, in the case of nonagricultural
product, commodity or article, and the
Secretary of Agriculture in the case of
agricultural product, commodity or article,
involving dumping and countervailing duties
under Section 301 and 302, respectively, of
the Tariff and Customs Code, and safeguard
measures under Republic Act No. 8800,
where either party may appeal the decision
to impose or not to impose said duties. 7.
Jurisdiction over cases involving criminal
offenses as herein provided: b.
Exclusive original jurisdiction over all
criminal offenses arising from violations of
the National Internal Revenue Code or Tariff
and Customs Code and other laws
administered by the Bureau of Internal
Revenue or the Bureau of Customs:
Provided, however, That offenses or felonies
mentioned in this paragraph where the
principal amount of taxes and fees, exclusive
of charges and penalties, claimed is less than
One million pesos (P1,000,000.00) or where
there is no specified amount claimed shall be
tried by the regular Courts and the
jurisdiction of the CTA shall be appellate.
Any provision of law or the Rules of Court to
the contrary notwithstanding, the criminal
action and the corresponding civil action for
the recovery of civil liability for taxes 1.
199and penalties shall at all times be
simultaneously instituted with, and jointly
determined in the same proceeding by the
CTA, the filing of the criminal action being
deemed to necessarily carry with it the filing
of the civil action, and no right to reserve the
filing of such civil action separately from the
criminal action will be recognized.
Exclusive appellate jurisdiction in criminal
offenses: 2.
Over appeals from the judgments,
resolutions or orders of the Regional
Trial Courts in tax cases originally
decided by them, in their respected
territorial jurisdiction. a.
Over petitions for review of the
judgments, resolutions or orders of the
Regional Trial Courts in the exercise of
their appellate jurisdiction over tax
 cases originally decided by the
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal
Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts in their respective jurisdiction.
b.
Jurisdiction over tax collection cases as herein
provided: c.
Exclusive original jurisdiction in tax
collection cases involving final and executory
assessments for taxes, fees, charges and
penalties: 1. Provided, however, that
collection cases where the principal amount
of taxes and fees, exclusive of charges and
penalties, claimed is less than One million
pesos (P1,000,000.00) shall be tried by the
proper Municipal Trial Court, Metropolitan
Trial Court and Regional Trial Court.
Exclusive appellate jurisdiction in tax
collection cases: 2.
200
Over appeals from the judgments,
resolutions or orders of the Regional
Trial Courts in tax collection cases
originally decided by them, in their
respective territorial jurisdiction. a.
Over petitions for review of the
judgments, resolutions or orders of the
Regional Trial Courts in the Exercise of
their appellate jurisdiction over tax
collection cases originally decided by the
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal
Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts, in their respective jurisdiction.
b.19
A perusal of the above provisions would show that,
while it is clearly stated that the CTA has exclusive
appellate jurisdiction over decisions, orders or
resolutions of the RTCs in local tax cases originally
decided or resolved by them in the exercise of their
original or appellate jurisdiction, there is no
categorical statement under RA 1125 as well as the
amendatory RA 9282, which provides that the CTA
has jurisdiction over petitions for certiorariassailing
interlocutory orders issued by the RTC in local tax
cases filed before it.
The prevailing doctrine is that the authority to
issue writs of certiorari involves the exercise of
original jurisdiction which must be expressly
conferred by the Constitution or by law and cannot be
implied from the mere existence of appellate
jurisdiction.20 Thus, in the cases of Pimentel v. COME-
_______________
19 Emphasis supplied.
20 Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication
Board v. Lubrica, 497 Phil. 313, 322; 457 SCRA 800,
809 (2005); Veloria v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 94771,
July 29, 1992, 211 SCRA 907, 915.
201LEC,21 Garcia v. De Jesus,22 Veloria v.
COMELEC, Department
23 of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board v. Lubrica,24 and Garcia v.
Sandiganbayan,25 this Court has ruled against the
jurisdiction of courts or tribunals over petitions
for certiorari on the ground that there is no law which
expressly gives these tribunals such power.26 It must
be observed, however, that with the exception
of Garcia v. Sandiganbayan,27 these rulings pertain
not to regular courts but to tribunals exercising quasi-
judicial powers. With respect to the Sandiganbayan,
Republic Act No. 824928 now provides that the special
criminal court has exclusive original jurisdiction over
petitions for the issuance of the writs of mandamus,
prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, injunctions, and
other ancillary writs and processes in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction.
In the same manner, Section 5 (1), Article VIII of
the 1987 Constitution grants power to the Supreme
Court, in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, to
issue writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus.
With respect to the Court of Appeals, Section 9 (1) of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (BP 129) gives the appellate
court, also in the exercise of its original jurisdiction,
the power to issue, among others, a writ of certiorari,
whether or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. As
to
_______________
21 189 Phil. 581; 101 SCRA 769 (1980).
22 G.R. Nos. 88158 and 97108-09, March 4, 1992,
206 SCRA 779.
23 Supra note 20.
24 Supra note 20.
25 G.R. No. 114135, October 7, 1994, 237 SCRA
552.
26 Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication
Board v. Lubrica, supra note 20; Veloria v.
COMELEC, supra note 20; Garcia v. Sandiganbayan,
id., at pp. 563-564; Garcia v. De Jesus, supra note 22,
at pp. 787-788; Pimentel v. COMELEC, supra note 21,
at p. 587; p. 782.
27 Supra note 25.
28 An Act Further Defining the Jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, Amending for the Purpose
Presidential Decree No. 1606, As Amended, Providing
Funds Therefor, And for Other Purposes.
202Regional Trial Courts, the power to issue a writ
of certiorari, in the exercise of their original
jurisdiction, is provided under Section 21 of BP 129.
The foregoing notwithstanding, while there is no
express grant of such power, with respect to the CTA,
Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution
provides, nonetheless, that judicial power shall be
vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts
as may be established by law and that judicial power
includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.
On the strength of the above constitutional
provisions, it can be fairly interpreted that the power
of the CTA includes that of determining whether or
not there has been grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
of the RTC in issuing an interlocutory order in cases
falling within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of
the tax court. It, thus, follows that the CTA, by
constitutional mandate, is vested with jurisdiction to
issue writs of certiorari in these cases.
Indeed, in order for any appellate court to
effectively exercise its appellate jurisdiction, it must
have the authority to issue, among others, a writ
of certiorari. In transferring exclusive jurisdiction
over appealed tax cases to the CTA, it can reasonably
be assumed that the law intended to transfer also
such power as is deemed necessary, if not
indispensable, in aid of such appellate jurisdiction.
There is no perceivable reason why the transfer
should only be considered as partial, not total.
Consistent with the above pronouncement, this
Court has held as early as the case of J.M. Tuason &
Co., Inc. v.
203Jaramillo, et al.29 that “if a case may be appealed
to a particular court or judicial tribunal or body, then
said court or judicial tribunal or body has jurisdiction
to issue the extraordinary writ of certiorari, in aid of
its appellate jurisdiction.”30 This principle was
affirmed in De Jesus v. Court of Appeals,31 where the
Court stated that “a court may issue a writ
of certiorari in aid of its appellate jurisdiction if said
court has jurisdiction to review, by appeal or writ of
error, the final orders or decisions of the lower
court.”32 The rulings in J.M. Tuason and De
Jesuswere reiterated in the more recent cases
of Galang, Jr. v. Geronimo33 and Bulilis v. Nuez.34
Furthermore, Section 6, Rule 135 of the present
Rules of Court provides that when by law, jurisdiction
is conferred on a court or judicial officer, all auxiliary
writs, processes and other means necessary to carry it
into effect may be employed by such court or officer.
If this Court were to sustain petitioners’
contention that jurisdiction over
their certiorari petition lies with the CA, this Court
would be confirming the exercise by two judicial
bodies, the CA and the CTA, of jurisdiction over
basically the same subject matter — precisely the
split — jurisdiction situation which is anathema to
the orderly administration of justice.35 The Court
cannot accept that such was the legislative motive,
especially considering that the law expressly confers
on the CTA, the tribunal with the specialized
competence over tax and tariff matters, the role of
judicial review over local tax cases without mention of
any other court that may exercise
_______________
29 118 Phil. 1022; 9 SCRA 189 (1963).
30 J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Jaramillo, et al.,
supra, at p. 1026; p. 193.
31 G.R. No. 101630, August 24, 1992, 212 SCRA
823.
32 De Jesus v. Court of Appeals, supra, at pp. 827-
828.
33 G.R. No. 192793, February 22, 2011, 643 SCRA
631, 635-636.
34 G.R. No. 195953, August 9, 2011, 655 SCRA
241, 246-247.
35 Southern Cross Cement Corporation v.
Philippine Cement Manufacturers Corp., 478 Phil. 85,
125; 434 SCRA 65, 85 (2004).
204such power. Thus, the Court agrees with the
ruling of the CA that since appellate jurisdiction over
private respondents’ complaint for tax refund is
vested in the CTA, it follows that a petition
for certiorari seeking nullification of an interlocutory
order issued in the said case should, likewise, be filed
with the same court. To rule otherwise would lead to
an absurd situation where one court decides an appeal
in the main case while another court rules on an
incident in the very same case.
Stated differently, it would be somewhat
incongruent with the pronounced judicial abhorrence
to split jurisdiction to conclude that the intention of
the law is to divide the authority over a local tax case
filed with the RTC by giving to the CA or this Court
jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari against
interlocutory orders of the RTC but giving to the CTA
the jurisdiction over the appeal from the decision of
the trial court in the same case. It is more in
consonance with logic and legal soundness to conclude
that the grant of appellate jurisdiction to the CTA
over tax cases filed in and decided by the RTC carries
with it the power to issue a writ of certiorari when
necessary in aid of such appellate jurisdiction. The
supervisory power or jurisdiction of the CTA to issue a
writ of certiorari in aid of its appellate jurisdiction
should coexist with, and be a complement to, its
appellate jurisdiction to review, by appeal, the final
orders and decisions of the RTC, in order to have
complete supervision over the acts of the latter.36
A grant of appellate jurisdiction implies that there
is included in it the power necessary to exercise it
effectively, to make all orders that will preserve the
subject of the action, and to give effect to the final
determination of the appeal. It carries with it the
power to protect that jurisdiction and to make the
decisions of the court thereunder effective. The court,
in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, has authority to
_______________
36 Breslin v. Luzon Stevedoring Company, 84 Phil.
618, 623 (1949).
205control all auxiliary and incidental matters
necessary to the efficient and proper exercise of that
jurisdiction. For this purpose, it may, when necessary,
prohibit or restrain the performance of any act which
might interfere with the proper exercise of its rightful
jurisdiction in cases pending before it.37
Lastly, it would not be amiss to point out that a
court which is endowed with a particular jurisdiction
should have powers which are necessary to enable it
to act effectively within such jurisdiction. These
should be regarded as powers which are inherent in
its jurisdiction and the court must possess them in
order to enforce its rules of practice and to suppress
any abuses of its process and to defeat any attempted
thwarting of such process.
In this regard, Section 1 of RA 9282 states that the
CTA shall be of the same level as the CA and shall
possess all the inherent powers of a court of justice.
Indeed, courts possess certain inherent powers
which may be said to be implied from a general grant
of jurisdiction, in addition to those expressly conferred
on them. These inherent powers are such powers as
are necessary for the ordinary and efficient exercise of
jurisdiction; or are essential to the existence, dignity
and functions of the courts, as well as to the due
administration of justice; or are directly appropriate,
convenient and suitable to the execution of their
granted powers; and include the power to maintain
the court’s jurisdiction and render it effective in
behalf of the litigants.38
Thus, this Court has held that “while a court may
be expressly granted the incidental powers necessary
to effectuate its jurisdiction, a grant of jurisdiction, in
the absence of prohibitive legislation, implies the
necessary and usual incidental powers essential to
effectuate it, and, subject to existing
_______________
37 4 Am. Jur. 2d, Appeal and Error, §5, p. 536; 2
Am. Jur., Appeal and Error, §9, 850.
38 Santiago v. Vasquez, G.R. Nos. 99289-90,
January 27, 1993, 217 SCRA 633, 648.
206laws and constitutional provisions, every
regularly constituted court has power to do all things
that are reasonably necessary for the administration
of justice within the scope of its jurisdiction and for
the enforcement of its judgments and
mandates.”39 Hence, demands, matters or questions
ancillary or incidental to, or growing out of, the main
action, and coming within the above principles, may
be taken cognizance of by the court and determined,
since such jurisdiction is in aid of its authority over
the principal matter, even though the court may thus
be called on to consider and decide matters which, as
original causes of action, would not be within its
cognizance.40
Based on the foregoing disquisitions, it can be
reasonably concluded that the authority of the CTA to
take cognizance of petitions for certiorari questioning
interlocutory orders issued by the RTC in a local tax
case is included in the powers granted by the
Constitution as well as inherent in the exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction.
Finally, it would bear to point out that this Court
is not abandoning the rule that, insofar as quasi-
judicial tribunals are concerned, the authority to issue
writs of certiorari must still be expressly conferred by
the Constitution or by law and cannot be implied from
the mere existence of their appellate jurisdiction. This
doctrine remains as it applies only to quasi-judicial
bodies.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
_______________
39 Treasurer-Assessor v. University of the
Philippines, 148 Phil. 526, 539; 38 SCRA 509, 521
(1971); Amalgamated Laborers’ Association v. Court of
Industrial Relations, 131 Phil. 374, 380; 22 SCRA
1266, 1272 (1968); Philippine Air Lines Employees’
Association v. Philippine Air Lines, Inc., 120 Phil. 383,
390; 11 SCRA 387, 393 (1964). (Citations omitted).
40 Id.
207
SO ORDERED.
Sereno (CJ.), Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De
Castro, Brion, Bersamin, Abad, Villarama, Jr., Perez,
Mendoza, Reyes, Perlas-Bernabe and Leonen, JJ.,
concur.
Del Castillo, J., No part.
Petition denied.
Notes.—The Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) is a
highly specialized court dedicated exclusively to the
study and consideration of revenue-related problems,
in which it has necessarily developed an expertise.
(Western Mindanao Power Corporation vs.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 672 SCRA 350
[2012])
As amended by RA No. 9282, paragraph c (2) [a],
Section 7 of RA No. 1125 has vested the Court of Tax
Appeals (CTA) with the exclusive appellate
jurisdiction over, among others, appeals from the
judgments, resolutions or orders of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) in tax collection cases originally decided
by them in their respective territorial jurisdiction.
(Team Pacific Corporation vs. Daza, 676 SCRA 82
[2012])
——o0o——
July 13, 2015. G.R. No. 192463.*
OMAIRA LOMONDOT and SARIPA LOMONDOT,
petitioners, vs. HON. RASAD G. BALINDONG,
Presiding Judge, Shari’a District Court, 4th Shari’a
Judicial District, Marawi City, Lanao del Sur and
AMBOG PANGANDAMUN and SIMBANATAO
DIACA, respondents.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Courts; Shari’a
Appellate Courts; The Shari’a Appellate Court (SAC)
shall exercise appellate jurisdiction over petitions for
certiorari of decisions of the Shari’a District Courts
(SDCs).—Under Republic Act No. 9054, An Act to
Strengthen and Expand the Organic Act for the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, amending
for the purpose Republic Act No. 6734, entitled, “An
Act Providing for the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao, as amended,” the Shari’a Appellate Court
shall exercise appellate jurisdiction over petitions
for certiorari of decisions of the Shari’a District
Courts.
Same; Same; Judgments; Execution of
Judgments; It is settled that there are recognized
exceptions to the execution as a matter of right of a
final and immutable judgment, and one (1) of which is
a supervening event.—It is settled that there are
recognized exceptions to the execution as a matter of
right of a final and immutable judgment, and one of
which is a supervening event. In Abrigo v. Flores, 698
SCRA 559 (2013), we said: We deem it highly relevant
to point out that a supervening event is an exception
to the execution as a matter of right of a final and
immutable judgment rule, only if it directly affects the
matter already litigated and settled, or substantially
changes the rights or relations of the parties therein
as to render the execution unjust, impossible or
inequitable. A supervening event consists of facts that
transpire after the judgment became final and
executory, or of new circumstances that
develop after the judgment attained finality, including
matters that the parties were not aware of prior to or
during the trial because such matters were not yet in
existence at that time. In that event, the interested
party may properly seek the stay of execution or the
quashal of the writ of
_______________
* THIRD DIVISION.
495
VOL. 762, JULY 13, 2015 495
Lomondot vs. Balindong
execution, or he may move the court to modify or
alter the judgment in order to harmonize it with
justice and the supervening event. The party who
alleges a supervening event to stay the execution
should necessarily establish the facts by competent
evidence; otherwise, it would become all too easy to
frustrate the conclusive effects of a final and
immutable judgment. In this case, the matter of
whether respondents’ houses intruded petitioners’
land is the issue in the recovery of possession
complaint filed by petitioners in the SDC which was
already ruled upon, thus cannot be considered a
supervening event that would stay the execution of a
final and immutable judgment. To allow a survey as
ordered by the SDC to determine whether
respondents’ houses are within petitioners’ land is
tantamount to modifying a decision which had
already attained finality.
Same; Same; Same; Same; A judgment, if left
unexecuted, would be nothing but an empty victory for
the prevailing party.—We find that the SDC
committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied
petitioners’ motion for the issuance a writ of
demolition. The issuance of a special order of
demolition would certainly be the necessary and
logical consequence of the execution of the final and
immutable decision. Section 10(d) of Rule 39, Rules of
Court provides: Section 10. Execution of judgments for
specific act.—x x x x (d) Removal of improvements on
property subject of execution.—When the property
subject of the execution contains improvements
constructed or planted by the judgment obligor or his
agent, the officer shall not destroy, demolish or
remove said improvements except upon special order
of the court, issued upon motion of the judgment
obligee after due hearing and after the former has
failed to remove the same within a reasonable time
fixed by the court. Notably, this case was decided in
2005 and its execution has already been delayed for
years now. It is almost trite to say that execution is
the fruit and end of the suit and is the life of law. A
judgment, if left unexecuted, would be nothing but an
empty victory for the prevailing party.
PETITION for certiorari of the Orders of the Shari’a
District Court, Fourth Shari’a Judicial District,
Marawi City.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Casan B. Macabanding for petitioners.
496
496 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Lomondot vs. Balindong
Dimnatang T. Saro for respondents.
PERALTA,J.:
Before us is a petition for certiorari with prayer for
the issuance of a writ of demolition seeking to annul
the Order1dated November 9, 2009 of the Shari’a
District Court (SDC), Fourth Shari’a Judicial District,
Marawi City, issued in Civil Case No. 055-91, denying
petitioners’ motion for the issuance of a writ of
demolition, and the Orders2dated January 5, 2010
and February 10, 2010 denying petitioners’ first and
second motions for reconsideration, respectively.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
On August 16, 1991, petitioners Omaira and
Saripa Lomondot filed with the SDC, Marawi City, a
complaint for recovery of possession and damages
with prayer for mandatory injunction and temporary
restraining order against respondents Ambog
Pangandamun (Pangandamun) and Simbanatao
Diaca (Diaca). Petitioners claimed that they are the
owners by succession of a parcel of land located at
Bangon, Marawi City, consisting an area of about 800
sq. meters; that respondent Pangandamun illegally
entered and encroached 100 sq. meters of their land,
while respondent Diaca occupied 200 sq. meters, as
indicated in Exhibits “A” and “K” submitted as
evidence. Respondents filed their Answer arguing
that they are the owners of the land alleged to be
illegally occupied. Trial thereafter ensued.
On January 31, 2005, the SDC rendered a
Decision,3 the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered as follows:
_______________
1 Rollo, pp. 65-66; per Judge Rasad G. Balindong.
2 Id., at pp. 69A, 73.
3 Per Judge Rasad G. Balindong; id., at pp. 15-21.
497
VOL. 762, JULY 13, 2015 497
Lomondot vs. Balindong
DECLARING plaintiffs owners of the 800-square-
meter land borrowed and turned over by BPI and
described in the complaint and Exhibits “A” and “K”;
1.
ORDERING defendants to VACATE the portions
or areas they illegally encroached as indicated in
Exhibits “A” and “K” and to REMOVE whatever
improvements thereat introduced; 2.
ORDERING defendants to jointly and severally
pay plain 3.tiffs (a) P50,000.00 as moral damages;
(b) P30,000.00 as exemplary damages; (c) P50,000.00
as attorney’s fees and the costs of the suit.
SO ORDERED.4
Respondents filed an appeal5 with us and
petitioners were required to file their Comment
thereto. In a Resolution6 dated March 28, 2007, we
dismissed the petition for failure of respondents to
sufficiently show that a grave abuse of discretion was
committed by the SDC as the decision was in accord
with the facts and the applicable law and
jurisprudence. Respondents’ motion for
reconsideration was denied with finality on
September 17, 2007.7 The SDC Decision dated
January 31, 2005 became final and executory on
October 31, 2007 and an entry of judgment8 was
subsequently made.
Petitioners filed a motion9 for issuance of a writ of
execution with prayer for a writ of demolition.
On February 7, 2008, the SDC granted the
motion10 for a writ of execution and the writ was
issued with the following fallo:
_______________
4 Id., at p. 21.
5 Docketed as G.R. No. 171022.
6 Rollo, p. 26.
7 Id., at p. 27.
8 Records, p. 554.
9 Rollo, pp. 47-49.
10 Id., at pp. 50-51.
498
498 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Lomondot vs. Balindong
NOW THEREFORE, you are hereby commanded
to cause the execution of the aforesaid judgment. If
defendants do not vacate the premises and remove the
improvements, you must secure a special order of the
court to destroy, demolish or remove the
improvements on the property. The total amount
awarded to and demanded by the prevailing party is
P150,000.00 (damages, attorney’s fees and the cost)
which defendants must satisfy, pursuant to Section
8(d) and (e), Rule 39, Rules of Court.11
The Sheriff then sent a demand letter 12 to
respondents for their compliance.
On February 3, 2009, petitioners filed a
Motion13 for the Issuance of a Writ of Demolition to
implement the SDC Decision dated January 31, 2005.
The motion was set for hearing.
On March 4, 2009, the SDC issued an
Order14 reading as follows:
The plaintiffs, the prevailing party, filed a Motion
for Writ of Demolition and the motion was set for
hearing on February 16, 2009. On this date, the
plaintiffs, without counsel, appeared. The defendants
failed to appear. Thus, the court issued an order
submitting the motion for resolution.
Resolution of the motion for issuance of a Writ of
Demolition should be held in abeyance. First,
defendant Ambog Pangandamun has filed on
February 6, 2009 an Urgent Manifestation praying
deferment of the hearing on the motion for writ of
execution. Second, Atty. Dimnatang T. Saro filed on
February 13, 2009 a Notice of Appearance with
Motion to Postpone the hearing set on February 16,
2009 to study the records of the case as the records
are not yet in his possession. Third, the recent
periodic report dated January 26, 2009 of the Sheriff
_______________
11 Id., at p. 53.
12 Id., at p. 54.
13 Id., at pp. 55-57.
14 Id., at p. 60.
499
VOL. 762, JULY 13, 2015 499
Lomondot vs. Balindong
shows Sultan Alioden of Kabasaran is negotiating
the parties whereby the defendant Ambog
Pangandamun will be made to pay the five (5)-meter
land of the plaintiffs encroached by him and that
what remains to be ironed out is the fixing of the
amount.
WHEREFORE, the resolution on the Motion for
Writ of Demolition is HELD IN ABEYANCE. The
Sheriff is DIRECTED to exert efforts to bring the
parties back to the negotiating table seeing to it that
Sultan Alioden of Kabasaran is involved in the
negotiation. Atty. Saro is REQUIRED to file his
comment on the motion for writ of execution within
fifteen (15) days from notice to guide the court in
resolving the incident in the event the negotiation
fails.
SO ORDERED.15
On May 5, 2009, the SDC issued another
Order16 which held in abeyance the resolution of the
motion for issuance of a writ of demolition and
granted an ocular inspection or actual measurement
of petitioners’ 800-sq.-meter land.
The SDC issued another Order17 dated May 14,
2009, which stated, among others, that:
While the decision has become final and executory
and a Writ of Execution has been issued, there are
instances when a Writ of Execution cannot be
enforced as when there is a supervening event that
prevents the Sheriff to execute a Writ of Execution.
The defendants claimed they have not encroached
as they have already complied with the Writ of
Execution and their buildings are not within the area
claimed by the plaintiffs. This to the Court is the
supervening event, thus the order granting the
request of Atty. Jimmy Saro, counsel for the
defendants, to conduct a survey to deter-
_______________
15 Id.
16 Id., at p. 61.
17 Id., at pp. 62-63.
500
500 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Lomondot vs. Balindong
mine whether there is encroachment or not. Thus,
the Order dated May 5, 2009.
WHEREFORE, Engr. Hakim Laut Balt is hereby
commissioned to conduct a survey of the 800-square
meters claimed by the plaintiffs. Said Eng. Balt is
given a period of one (1) month from notice within
which to conduct the survey in the presence of the
parties.18
On November 9, 2009, the SDC issued the assailed
Order19 denying petitioners’ motion for demolition.
The Order reads in full:
It was on February 3, 2009 that the plaintiffs filed
a Motion for Issuance of a Writ of Demolition. The
defendants filed their comment thereto on March 24,
2009. They prayed that an ocular inspection and/or
actual measurement of the 800-square-meter land of
the plaintiffs be made which the court granted, in the
greater interest of justice, considering that defendants
claimed to have complied with the writ of execution,
hence there is no more encroachment of plaintiffs’
land.
The intercession of concerned leaders to effect
amicable settlement and the order to conduct a survey
justified the holding in abeyance of the resolution of
the pending incident, motion for writ of demolition.
After attempts for settlement failed and after the
commissioned Geodetic Engineer to conduct the
needed survey asked for relief, plaintiffs asked anew
for a writ of demolition. Defendants opposed the grant
of the motion, alleging compliance with the writ of
execution, and prayed for appointment of another
Geodetic Engineer to conduct a survey and actual
measurement of plaintiffs’ 800-square-meter land.
At this point in time, the court cannot issue a
special order to destroy, demolish or remove
defendants’
_______________
18 Id.
19 Id., at pp. 65-66.
501
VOL. 762, JULY 13, 2015 501
Lomondot vs. Balindong
houses, considering their claim that they no longer
encroach any portion of plaintiffs’ land.
Gleaned from Engineer Hakim Laut Balt’s
Narrative Report, he could have conducted the
required survey had not the plaintiffs dictated him
where to start the survey.
WHEREFORE, the motion for issuance of a writ of
demolition is DENIED. A survey is still the best way
to find out if indeed defendants’ houses are within
plaintiffs’ 800-square-meter land. Parties are,
therefore, directed to choose and submit to the court
their preferred Geodetic Engineer to conduct the
survey within ten (10) days from notice.20
Petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration
which the SDC denied in an Order21 dated January 5,
2010 saying that the motion failed to state the
timeliness of the filing of said motion and failed to
comply with the requirements of notice of hearing.
Petitioners’ second motion for reconsideration was
also denied in an Order22dated February 10, 2010.
The SDC directed the parties to choose and submit
their preferred Geodetic Engineer to conduct the
survey within 15 days from notice.
 Undaunted, petitioners filed with the CA-Cagayan
de Oro City a petition for certiorari assailing the
Orders issued by the SDC on November 9, 2009,
January 5, 2010 and February 10, 2010.
In a Resolution23 dated April 27, 2010, the CA
dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction, saying,
among others, that:
_______________
20 Id.
21 Id., at p. 69A.
22 Id., at p. 73.
23 Penned by Associate Justice Leoncia R.
Dimagiba, with Associate Justices Edgardo A.
Camello and Edgardo T. Lloren, concurring; id., at pp.
83-85.
502
502 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Lomondot vs. Balindong
xxxx
In pursuing the creation of Shari’a Appellate
Court, the Supreme Court En Banc even approved
A.M. No. 99-4-06, otherwise known as Resolution
Authorizing the Organization of the Shari’a Appellate
Court.
However, the Shari’a Appellate Court has not yet
been organized until the present. We, on our part,
therefore, cannot take cognizance of the instant case
because it emanates from the Shari’a Courts, which is
not among those courts, bodies or tribunals
enumerated under Chapter 1, Section 9 of
[Batas] Pambansa Bilang 129, as amended over which
We can exercise appellate jurisdiction. Thus, the
instant Petition should be filed directly with the
Supreme Court.24
Petitioners filed the instant petition
for certiorariassailing the SDC Orders, invoking the
following grounds:
RESPONDENT JUDGE, HONORABLE RASAD
G. BALINDONG, COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF
JURISDICTION OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION
IN DENYING THE MOTION FOR ISSUANCE OF
THE WRIT OF DEMOLITION AFTER THE WRIT
OF EXECUTION ISSUED BY THE COURT COULD
NOT BE IMPLEMENTED AND INSTEAD DIRECT
THE CONDUCT OF THE SURVEY.
RESPONDENT JUDGE HAD COMMITTED
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN MAKING IT
APPEAR THAT HE WAS IN COURT AT
HIS SALA IN MARAWI CITY LAST JANUARY 28,
2010 WHEN THE PARTIES WERE PRESENT AND
HE WAS NOT THERE.25
Preliminarily, we would deal with a procedural
matter. Petitioners, after receipt of the SDC Order
denying their second
_______________
24 Id., at pp. 84-85.
25 Id., at p. 8.
503
VOL. 762, JULY 13, 2015 503
Lomondot vs. Balindong
motion for reconsideration of the Order denying
their motion for the issuance of a writ of demolition,
filed a petition for certiorari with the CA. The CA
dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction in a
Resolution dated April 27, 2010 saying that, under RA
9054, it is the Shari’a Appellate Court (SAC) which
shall exercise jurisdiction over petition for certiorari;
that, however, since SAC has not yet been organized,
it cannot take cognizance of the case as it emanates
from the Shari’a Courts, which is not among those
courts, bodies or tribunals enumerated under Chapter
1, Section 9 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129, as
amended, over which it can exercise appellate
jurisdiction.
Under Republic Act No. 9054, An Act to Strengthen
and Expand the Organic Act for the Autonomous
Region in Muslim Mindanao, amending for the
purpose Republic Act No. 6734, entitled, “An Act
Providing for the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao, as amended,” the Shari’a Appellate Court
shall exercise appellate jurisdiction over petitions
for certiorari of decisions of the Shari’a District
Courts. In Villagracia v. Fifth (5th) Shari’a District
Court,26 we said:
x x x We call for the organization of the court
system created under Republic Act No. 9054 to
effectively enforce the Muslim legal system in our
country. After all, the Muslim legal system — a legal
system complete with its own civil, criminal,
commercial, political, international, and religious
laws — is part of the law of the land, and Shari’a
courts are part of the Philippine judicial system.
The Shari’a Appellate Court created under
Republic Act No. 9054 shall exercise appellate
jurisdiction over all cases tried in the Shari’a District
Courts. It shall also exercise original jurisdiction over
petitions for certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus, habeas corpus, and other
auxiliary writs and processes in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction. The decisions of the Shari’a Appellate
Court shall be
_______________
26 G.R. No. 188832, April 23, 2014, 723 SCRA
550.
504
504 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Lomondot vs. Balindong
final and executory, without prejudice to the
original and appellate jurisdiction of this court.27
and
In Tomawis v. Hon. Balindong,28 we stated that:
x x x [t]he Shari’a Appellate Court has yet to be
organized with the appointment of a Presiding Justice
and two Associate Justices. Until such time that the
Shari’a Appellate Court shall have been organized,
however, appeals or petitions from final orders or
decisions of the SDC filed with the CA shall be
referred to a Special Division to be organized in any of
the CA stations preferably composed of Muslim CA
Justices.29
Notably, Tomawis case was decided on March 5, 2010,
while the CA decision was rendered on April 27, 2010.
The CA’s reason for dismissing the petition, i.e., the
decision came from SDC which the CA has no
appellate jurisdiction is erroneous for failure to follow
the Tomawis ruling. However, we need not remand
the case, as we have, on several occasions, 30 passed
upon and resolved petitions and cases emanating from
Shari’a courts.
Petitioners contend that their land was specific
and shown by the areas drawn in Exhibits “A” and “K”
and by oral and documentary evidence on record
showing that respondents have occupied portions of
their land, i.e., respondent Pangandamun’s house
encroached a 100-sq.-meter portion, while respondent
Diaca occupied 200 sq. meters; and that the SDC had
rendered a decision ordering respondents to vacate
the portions or areas they had illegally encroached as
indicated in
_______________
27 Id., at pp. 577-578.
28 628 Phil. 252; 614 SCRA 354 (2010).
29 Id., at pp. 258-259. (Emphasis omitted)
30 Id., at p. 259, citing Batugan v. Balindong, 600
Phil. 518; 581 SCRA 473 (2009).
505
VOL. 762, JULY 13, 2015 505
Lomondot vs. Balindong
Exhibits “A” and “K” and to remove whatever
improvements thereat introduced. Such decision had
already attained finality and a corresponding entry of
judgment had been made and a writ of execution was
issued. Petitioners’ claim that the SDC’s order for a
conduct of a survey to determine whether
respondents’ land are within petitioners’ 800-sq.-
meter land would, in effect, be amending a final and
executory decision.
Only respondent Pangandamun filed his
Comment, arguing that petitioners’ motion for the
issuance of a writ of demolition has no factual and
legal basis because his houses are clearly outside the
800-sq.-meter land of petitioners; that his house had
been constructed in 1964 within full view of the
petitioners but none of them ever questioned the
same.
We find for the petitioners.
The SDC Decision dated January 31, 2005 ordered
respondents to vacate the portions or areas they had
illegally encroached as indicated in Exhibits “A” and
“K” and to remove whatever improvements thereat
introduced. Thus, petitioners had established that
they are recovering possession of 100 sq. meters of
their land which was occupied by respondent
Pangandamun’s house as indicated in Exhibit “K-1,”
and 200-sq.-meter portion being occupied by Diaca as
indicated in Exhibit “K-2.” Such decision had become
final and executory after we affirmed the same and an
entry of judgment was made. Such decision can no
longer be modified or amended. In Dacanay v.
Yrastorza, Sr.,31 we explained the concept of a final
and executory judgment, thus:
Once a judgment attains finality, it becomes
immutable and unalterable. A final and executory
judgment may no longer be modified in any respect,
even if the modification is meant to correct what is
perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law
and regardless of whether the modification is
attempted to be made by the court rendering it or by
the highest court of the land.
_______________
31 614 Phil. 216; 598 SCRA 20 (2009).
506
506 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Lomondot vs. Balindong
This is the doctrine of finality of judgment. It is
grounded on fundamental considerations of public
policy and sound practice that, at the risk of
occasional errors, the judgments or orders of courts
must become final at some definite time fixed by law.
Otherwise, there will be no end to litigations, thus
negating the main role of courts of justice to assist in
the enforcement of the rule of law and the
maintenance of peace and order by settling justiciable
controversies with finality.32
However, the SDC later found that while the
decision has become final and executory and a writ of
execution has been issued, there are instances when a
writ of execution cannot be enforced as when there is
a supervening event that prevents the sheriff to
execute the writ of execution. It found that
respondents’ claim that their buildings are not within
the area claimed by petitioners is a supervening event
and ordered a survey of the land, hence, denied the
motion for a writ of demolition.
We do not agree.
It is settled that there are recognized exceptions to
the execution as a matter of right of a final and
immutable judgment, and one of which is a
supervening event.
In Abrigo v. Flores,33 we said:
We deem it highly relevant to point out that a
supervening event is an exception to the execution as
a matter of right of a final and immutable judgment
rule, only if it directly affects the matter already
litigated and settled, or substantially changes the
rights or relations of the parties therein as to render
the execution unjust, impossible or inequitable. A
supervening event consists of facts that
transpire after the judgment became final and
executory, or of new circumstances that
develop after the judgment attained finality, including
matters that the
_______________
32 Id., at pp. 220-221; pp. 25-26
33 G.R. No. 160786, June 17, 2013, 698 SCRA
559.
507
VOL. 762, JULY 13, 2015 507
Lomondot vs. Balindong
parties were not aware of prior to or during the
trial because such matters were not yet in existence at
that time. In that event, the interested party may
properly seek the stay of execution or the quashal of
the writ of execution, or he may move the court to
modify or alter the judgment in order to harmonize it
with justice and the supervening event. The party
who alleges a supervening event to stay the execution
should necessarily establish the facts by competent
evidence; otherwise, it would become all too easy to
frustrate the conclusive effects of a final and
immutable judgment.34
In this case, the matter of whether respondents’
houses intruded petitioners’ land is the issue in the
recovery of possession complaint filed by petitioners in
the SDC which was already ruled upon, thus cannot
be considered a supervening event that would stay the
execution of a final and immutable judgment. To
allow a survey as ordered by the SDC to determine
whether respondents’ houses are within petitioners’
land is tantamount to modifying a decision which had
already attained finality.
We find that the SDC committed grave abuse of
discretion when it denied petitioners’ motion for the
issuance a writ of demolition. The issuance of a
special order of demolition would certainly be the
necessary and logical consequence of the execution of
the final and immutable decision.35 Section 10(d) of
Rule 39, Rules of Court provides:
10. SectionExecution of judgments for specific
act.—
xxxx
(d)Removal of improvements on property subject
of execution.—When the property subject of the
execution contains improvements constructed or
planted by the judgment obligor or his agent, the
officer shall not de-
_______________
34 Id., at pp. 571-572. (Italics in the original)
35 Id., at p. 572.
508
508 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Lomondot vs. Balindong
stroy, demolish or remove said improvements
except upon special order of the court, issued upon
motion of the judgment obligee after due hearing and
after the former has failed to remove the same within
a reasonable time fixed by the court.
Notably, this case was decided in 2005 and its
execution has already been delayed for years now. It
is almost trite to say that execution is the fruit and
end of the suit and is the life of law. 36 A judgment, if
left unexecuted, would be nothing but an empty
victory for the prevailing party.37
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The
Orders dated November 9, 2009, January 5, 2010 and
February 10, 2010, of the Shari’a District Court,
Fourth Shari’a Judicial District, Marawi City are
hereby CANCELLED and SET ASIDE. The Shari’a
District Court is hereby ORDERED to ISSUE a writ
of demolition to enforce its Decision dated January 31,
2005 in Civil Case No. 055-91.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the
Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals for whatever
action he may undertake in light of our
pronouncement in the Tomawis v. Hon.
Balindong case quoted earlier on the creation of a
Special Division to handle appeals or petitions from
trial orders or decisions of the Shari’a District Court.
SO ORDERED.
Velasco, Jr. (Chairperson), Leonardo-De
Castro,**Villarama, Jr. and Perez,*** JJ., concur.
_______________
36 Villasi v. Garcia, G.R. No. 190106, January 15,
2014, 713 SCRA 629, 642.
37 Id.Florentino v. Rivera
** Designated acting member, in lieu of Associate
Justice Francis H. Jardeleza, per Special Order No.
2095 dated July 1, 2015.
 *** Designated acting member, in lieu of Associate
Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes, per Special Order No.
2084 dated June 29, 2015.
509
VOL. 762, JULY 13, 2015 509
Lomondot vs. Balindong
Petition granted.
Notes.—Foremost rule in execution of judgments
is that “a writ of execution must conform strictly to
every essential particular of the judgment
promulgated, and may not vary the terms of the
judgment it seeks to enforce, nor may it go beyond the
terms of the judgment sought to be executed.”
(Raymundo vs. Galen Realty and Mining Corporation,
707 SCRA 515 [2013])
A party cannot frustrate execution of a judgment
for a specific act on the pretext of inability to do so as
the Rules provide ample means by which it can be
satisfied. (Id.)
——o0o——
January 11, 2017. G.R. No. 193340.*
THE MUNICIPALITY OF TANGKAL, PROVINCE
OF LANAO DEL NORTE, petitioner, vs. HON.
RASAD B. BALINDONG, in his capacity as Presiding
Judge, Shari’a District Court, 4th Judicial District,
Marawi City, and HEIRS OF THE LATE
MACALABO ALOMPO, represented by SULTAN
DIMNANG B. ALOMPO, respondents.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Motion to
Dismiss; Courts; Shari’a District Courts; Although the
Special Rules of Procedure in Shari’a Courts prohibits
the filing of a motion to dismiss, this procedural rule
may be relaxed when the ground relied on is lack of
jurisdiction which is patent on the face of the
complaint.—Although the Special Rules of Procedure
in Shari’a Courts prohibits the filing of a motion to
dismiss, this procedural rule may be relaxed when the
ground relied on is lack of jurisdiction which is patent
on the face of the complaint. As we held in Rulona-Al
Awadhi v. Astih, 165 SCRA 771 (1988): Instead of
invoking a procedural technicality, the respondent
court should have recognized its lack of jurisdiction
over the parties and promptly dismissed the action,
for, without jurisdiction, all its proceedings would be,
as they were, a futile and invalid exercise. A summary
rule prohibiting the filing of a motion to dismiss
should not be a bar to the dismissal of the action for
lack of jurisdiction when the jurisdictional infirmity is
patent on the face of the complaint itself, in view of
the fundamental procedural doctrine that the
jurisdiction of a court may be challenged at anytime
and at any stage of the action.
Same; Same; Same; Interlocutory Orders; An
order denying a motion to dismiss is an interlocutory
order which neither terminates nor finally disposes of
a case as it leaves something to be done by the court
before the case is finally decided on the merits.—An
order denying a motion to dismiss is an interlocutory
order which neither terminates nor finally disposes of
a case as it leaves something to be done by the court
before the case is finally decided on the merits. Thus,
as a general rule, the denial of a motion to dismiss
cannot be questioned in a special civil action
for certiorari which is a remedy
_______________
* THIRD DIVISION.
238
238 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Municipality of Tangkal, Province of Lanao del Norte
vs. Balindong
designed to correct errors of jurisdiction and not
errors of judgment. As exceptions, however, the
defendant may avail of a petition for certiorari if the
ground raised in the motion to dismiss is lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant or over
the subject matter, or when the denial of the motion
to dismiss is tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
Same; Same; Courts; Shari’a District Courts;
Jurisdiction; Consistent with the purpose of the law to
provide for an effective administration and
enforcement of Muslim personal laws among Muslims,
it has a catchall provision granting Shari’a district
courts’ original jurisdiction over personal and real
actions except those for forcible entry and unlawful
detainer; There is, however, a limit to the general
jurisdiction of Shari’a district courts over matters
ordinarily cognizable by regular courts: such
jurisdiction may only be invoked if both parties are
Muslims. If one party is not a Muslim, the action must
be filed before the regular courts.—The matters over
which Shari’a district courts have jurisdiction are
enumerated in the Code of Muslim Personal Laws,
specifically in Article 143. Consistent with the
purpose of the law to provide for an effective
administration and enforcement of Muslim personal
laws among Muslims, it has a catchall provision
granting Shari’a district courts’ original jurisdiction
over personal and real actions except those for forcible
entry and unlawful detainer. The Shari’a district
courts’ jurisdiction over these matters is concurrent
with regular civil courts, i.e., municipal trial courts
and regional trial courts. There is, however, a limit to
the general jurisdiction of Shari’a district courts over
matters ordinarily cognizable by regular courts: such
jurisdiction may only be invoked if both parties are
Muslims. If one party is not a Muslim, the action
must be filed before the regular courts.
 Same; Same; Parties; When an action is defended
by a representative, that representative is not — and
neither does he become — a real party-in-interest. The
person represented is deemed the real party-in-interest;
the representative remains to be a third party to the
action.—It is clear from the title and the averments in
the complaint that Mayor Batingolo was impleaded
only in a representative capacity, as chief executive of
the local government of Tangkal. When an action is
defended by a representative, that representative is
not — and neither does he become — a real party-in-
interest. The person represented is deemed the real
party-in-interest; the representative remains to be a
third party to the action. That Mayor Batingolo is a
239
VOL. 814, JANUARY 11, 2017 239
Municipality of Tangkal, Province of Lanao del Norte
vs. Balindong
Muslim is therefore irrelevant for purposes of
complying with the jurisdictional requirement under
Article 143(2)(b) that both parties be Muslims. To
satisfy the requirement, it is the real party-defendant,
the Municipality of Tangkal, who must be a Muslim.
Such a proposition, however, is a legal impossibility.
Muslim; Words and Phrases; The Code of
Muslim Personal Laws defines a “Muslim” as “a
person who testifies to the oneness of God and the
Prophethood of Muhammad and professes Islam.”—
The Code of Muslim Personal Laws defines a
“Muslim” as “a person who testifies to the oneness of
God and the Prophethood of Muhammad and
professes Islam.” Although the definition does not
explicitly distinguish between natural and juridical
persons, it nonetheless connotes the exercise of
religion, which is a fundamental personal right. The
ability to testify to the “oneness of God and the
Prophethood of Muhammad” and to profess Islam is,
by its nature, restricted to natural persons. In
contrast, juridical persons are artificial beings with
“no consciences, no beliefs, no feelings, no thoughts,
no desires.” They are considered persons only by
virtue of legal fiction. The Municipality of Tangkal
falls under this category. Under the Local
Government Code, a municipality is a body politic and
corporate that exercises powers as a political
subdivision of the national government and as a
corporate entity representing the inhabitants of its
territory.
Constitutional Law; Local Government Units;
Non-establishment Clause; Courts; Shari’a District
Courts; Jurisdiction; As a government instrumentality,
the Municipality of Tangkal can only act for secular
purposes and in ways that have primarily secular
effects — consistent with the nonestablishment clause;
The Shari’a District Court appears to have understood
the foregoing principles, as it conceded that the
Municipality of Tangkal “is neither a Muslim nor a
Christian”; The Shari’a District Court had no
jurisdiction under the law to decide private
respondents’ complaint because not all of the parties
involved in the action are Muslims.—As a government
instrumentality, the Municipality of Tangkal can only
act for secular purposes and in ways that have
primarily secular effects — consistent with the
nonestablishment clause. Hence, even if it is assumed
that juridical persons are capable of practicing
religion, the Municipality of Tangkal is
constitutionally proscribed from adopting, much less
exercising, any religion, including Islam. The Shari’a
District Court appears to have under-
240
240 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Municipality of Tangkal, Province of Lanao del Norte
vs. Balindong
stood the foregoing principles, as it conceded that
the Municipality of Tangkal “is neither a Muslim nor
a Christian.” Yet it still proceeded to attribute the
religious affiliation of the mayor to the municipality.
This is manifest error on the part of the Shari’a
District Court. It is an elementary principle that a
municipality has a personality that is separate and
distinct from its mayor, vice mayor, sanggunian, and
other officers composing it. And under no
circumstances can this corporate veil be pierced on
purely religious considerations — as the Shari’a
District Court has done — without running afoul the
inviolability of the separation of Church and State
enshrined in the Constitution. In view of the
foregoing, the Shari’a District Court had no
jurisdiction under the law to decide private
respondents’ complaint because not all of the parties
involved in the action are Muslims. Since it was clear
from the complaint that the real party-defendant was
the Municipality of Tangkal, the Shari’a District
Court should have simply applied the basic doctrine of
separate juridical personality and motu
proprio dismissed the case.
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS in the Supreme Court.
Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Edgar A. Masorong for petitioner.
Daud R. Calala for private respondents.
JARDELEZA,J.:
The Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the
Philippines1(Code of Muslim Personal Laws) vests
concurrent jurisdiction upon Shari’a district courts
over personal and real actions wherein the parties
involved are Muslims, except those for forcible entry
and unlawful detainer. The question presented is
whether the Shari’a District Court of Marawi City has
jurisdiction in an action for recovery of possession
filed by Muslim individuals against a municipality
whose mayor is a Muslim. The respondent judge held
that it has. We reverse.
_______________
1 Presidential Decree No. 1083 (1977).
241
VOL. 814, JANUARY 11, 2017 241
Municipality of Tangkal, Province of Lanao del Norte
vs. Balindong
I District Court. The Shari’a District Court also ordered
The private respondents, heirs of the late
Macalabo Alompo, filed a Complaint2 with the Shari’a
District Court of Marawi City (Shari’a District Court)
against the petitioner, Municipality of Tangkal, for
recovery of possession and ownership of a parcel of
land with an area of approximately 25 hectares
located at BarangayBanisilon, Tangkal, Lanao del
Norte. They alleged that Macalabo was the owner of
the land, and that in 1962, he entered into an
agreement with the Municipality of Tangkal allowing
the latter to “borrow” the land to pave the way for the
construction of the municipal hall and a health center
building. The agreement allegedly imposed a
condition upon the Municipality of Tangkal to pay the
value of the land within 35 years, or until 1997;
otherwise, ownership of the land would revert to
Macalabo. Private respondents claimed that the
Municipality of Tangkal neither paid the value of the
land within the agreed period nor returned the land to
its owner. Thus, they prayed that the land be
returned to them as successors-in-interest of
Macalabo.
The Municipality of Tangkal filed an Urgent
Motion to Dismiss3 on the ground of improper venue
and lack of jurisdiction. It argued that since it has no
religious affiliation and represents no cultural or
ethnic tribe, it cannot be considered as a Muslim
under the Code of Muslim Personal Laws. Moreover,
since the complaint for recovery of land is a real
action, it should have been filed in the appropriate
Regional Trial Court of Lanao del Norte.
In its Order4 dated March 9, 2010, the Shari’a
District Court denied the Municipality of Tangkal’s
motion to dismiss. It held that since the mayor of
Tangkal, Abdulazis A.M. Batingolo, is a Muslim, the
case “is an action involving Muslims,
_______________
2 Rollo, pp. 39-47.
3 Id., at pp. 48-53.
4 Id., at p. 57A.
242
242 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Municipality of Tangkal, Province of Lanao del Norte
vs. Balindong
hence, the court has original jurisdiction concurrently
with that of regular/civil courts.” It added that venue
was properly laid because the Shari’a District Court
has territorial jurisdiction over the provinces of Lanao
del Sur and Lanao del Norte, in addition to the cities
of Marawi and Iligan. Moreover, the filing of a motion
to dismiss is a disallowed pleading under the Special
Rules of Procedure in Shari’a Courts.5
The Municipality of Tangkal moved for
reconsideration, which was denied by the Shari’a
the Municipality of Tangkal to file its answer within
10 days.6 The Municipality of Tangkal timely filed its
answer7 and raised as an affirmative defense the
court’s lack of jurisdiction.
Within the 60-day reglementary period, the
Municipality of Tangkal elevated the case to
us via petition for certiorari, prohibition,
and mandamus with prayer for a temporary
restraining order8 (TRO). It reiterated its arguments
in its earlier motion to dismiss and answer that the
Shari’a District Court has no jurisdiction since one
party is a municipality which has no religious
affiliation.
In their Comment,9 private respondents argue that
under the Special Rules of Procedure in Shari’a
Courts, a petition for certiorari, mandamus, or
prohibition against any interlocutory order issued by
the district court is a prohibited pleading. Likewise,
the Municpality of Tangkal’s motion to dismiss is
disallowed by the rules. They also echo the reasoning
of the Shari’a District Court that since both the
plaintiffs below and the mayor of defendant
municipality are Muslims, the Shari’a District Court
has jurisdiction over the case.
_______________
5 En Banc Resolution promulgated by the
Supreme Court on September 20, 1983.
6 Rollo, p. 76.
7 Id., at pp. 84-89.
8 Id., at pp. 6-37.
9 Id., at pp. 96-105.
243
VOL. 814, JANUARY 11, 2017 243
Municipality of Tangkal, Province of Lanao del Norte
vs. Balindong
In the meantime, we issued a TRO10 against the
Shari’a District Court and its presiding judge, Rasad
Balindong, from holding any further proceedings in
the case below.
II
In its petition, the Municipality of Tangkal
acknowledges that generally, neither certiorari nor
prohibition is an available remedy to assail a court’s
interlocutory order denying a motion to dismiss. But
it cites one of the exceptions to the rule, i.e., when the
denial is without or in excess of jurisdiction to justify
its remedial action.11 In rebuttal, private respondents
rely on the Special Rules of Procedure in Shari’a
Courts which expressly identifies a motion to dismiss
and a petition for certiorari, mandamus, or
prohibition against any interlocutory order issued by
the court as prohibited pleadings.12
A judgment.18 As exceptions, however, the defendant
Although the Special Rules of Procedure in Shari’a
Courts prohibits the filing of a motion to dismiss, this
procedural rule may be relaxed when the ground
relied on is lack of jurisdiction which is patent on the
face of the complaint. As we held in Rulona-Al
Awadhi v. Astih:13
Instead of invoking a procedural technicality, the
respondent court should have recognized its lack of
jurisdiction over the parties and promptly dismissed
the action, for, without jurisdiction, all its proceedings
would be, as they were, a futile and invalid exercise. A
summary rule prohibiting the filing of a motion to
dismiss should not be a bar to the dismissal of the
action for lack of jurisdiction
_______________
10 Id., at pp. 122-123.
11 Id., at pp. 6-8.
12 Id., at pp. 96-97, citing the Special Rules of
Procedure in Shari’a Courts, Sec. 13(a) & (f).
13 No. L-81969, September 26, 1988, 165 SCRA
771.
244
244 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Municipality of Tangkal, Province of Lanao del Norte
vs. Balindong
when the jurisdictional infirmity is patent on the face
of the complaint itself, in view of the fundamental
procedural doctrine that the jurisdiction of a court
may be challenged at anytime and at any stage of the
action.14
Indeed, when it is apparent from the pleadings
that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject
matter, it is duty-bound to dismiss the case regardless
of whether the defendant filed a motion to
dismiss.15 Thus, in Villagracia v. Fifth Shari’a District
Court,16 we held that once it became apparent that
the Shari’a court has no jurisdiction over the subject
matter because the defendant is not a Muslim, the
court should have motu proprio dismissed the case.17
B
An order denying a motion to dismiss is an
interlocutory order which neither terminates nor
finally disposes of a case as it leaves something to be
done by the court before the case is finally decided on
the merits. Thus, as a general rule, the denial of a
motion to dismiss cannot be questioned in a special
civil action for certiorari which is a remedy designed
to correct errors of jurisdiction and not errors of
may avail of a petition for certiorari if the ground
raised in the motion to dismiss is lack of jurisdiction
over the person of the defendant or over the subject
matter,19 or when the denial of the motion to dismiss
is tainted with grave abuse of discretion.20
_______________
14 Id., at p. 777. Citations omitted.
15 RULES OF COURT, Rule 9, Sec. 1.
16 G.R. No. 188832, April 23, 2014, 723 SCRA
550.
17 Id., at pp. 565-566.
18 Republic v. Transunion Corporation, G.R. No.
191590, April 21, 2014, 722 SCRA 273, 279.
19 Tung Ho Steel Enterprises Corporation v. Ting
Guan Trading Corporation, G.R. No. 182153, April 7,
2014, 720 SCRA 707, 720.
20 Republic v. Transunion Corporation, supra at
p. 279.
245
VOL. 814, JANUARY 11, 2017 245
Municipality of Tangkal, Province of Lanao del Norte
vs. Balindong
The reason why lack of jurisdiction as a ground for
dismissal is treated differently from others is because
of the basic principle that jurisdiction is conferred by
law, and lack of it affects the very authority of the
court to take cognizance of and to render judgment on
the action21 — to the extent that all proceedings
before a court without jurisdiction are void. 22 We
grant certiorari on this basis. As will be shown below,
the Shari’a District Court’s lack of jurisdiction over
the subject matter is patent on the face of the
complaint, and therefore, should have been dismissed
outright.
III

The matters over which Shari’a district courts
have jurisdiction are enumerated in the Code of
Muslim Personal Laws, specifically in Article
143.23 Consistent with the purpose of the
_______________
21 Francel Realty Corporation v. Sycip, G.R. No.
154684, September 8, 2005, 469 SCRA 424, 431.
22 Monsanto v. Lim, G.R. No. 178911, September
17, 2014, 735 SCRA 252, 265-266.
23 143. Art.Original jurisdiction.—
The Shari’a District Court shall have exclusive
original jurisdiction over: (1)
(a) All cases involving custody, guardianship,
legitimacy, paternity and filiation arising under
this Code;
(b) All cases involving disposition, distribution
and settlement of the estate of deceased Muslims,
probate of wills, issuance of letters of
administration or appointment of administrator
or executors regardless of the nature or the
aggregate value of the property;
(c) Petitions for the declaration of absence and
death and for the cancellation or correction of
entries in the Muslim Registries mentioned in
Title VI of Book Two of this Code;
(d) All actions arising from customary
contracts in which the parties are Muslims, if
they have not specified which law shall govern
their relations; and
246
246 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Municipality of Tangkal, Province of Lanao del Norte
vs. Balindong
law to provide for an effective administration and
enforcement of Muslim personal laws among
Muslims,24 it has a catchall provision granting Shari’a
district courts original jurisdiction over personal and
real actions except those for forcible entry and
unlawful detainer.25 The Shari’a district courts’
jurisdiction over these matters is concurrent with
regular civil courts, i.e., municipal trial courts and
regional trial courts.26 There is, however, a limit to
the general jurisdiction of Shari’a district courts over
matters ordinarily cognizable by regular courts: such
jurisdiction may only be invoked if both parties are
Muslims. If one party is not a Muslim, the action
must be filed before the regular courts.27
_______________
(e) All petitions for mandamus, prohibition,
injunction, certiorari, habeas corpus, and all
other auxiliary writs and processes in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction.
Concurrently with existing civil courts, the Shari’a
District Court shall have original jurisdiction over:
(2)
(a) Petitions by Muslims for the constitution
of a family home, change of name and
commitment of an insane person to an asylum;
(b) All other personal and real actions not
mentioned in paragraph 1(d) wherein the parties
involved are Muslims except those for forcible
entry and unlawful detainer, which shall fall
under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
Municipal Circuit Court; and
(c) All special civil actions for interpleader or
declaratory relief wherein the parties are
Muslims or the property involved belongs
exclusively to Muslims.
24 CODE OF MUSLIM PERSONAL LAWS, Art. 2(c).
25 Id., Art. 143(2)(b).
26 Tomawis v. Balindong, G.R. No. 182434,
March 5, 2010, 614 SCRA 354, 364-365.
27 Villagracia v. Fifth (5th) Shari’a District
Court, supra note 16 at p. 566.
247
VOL. 814, JANUARY 11, 2017 247
Municipality of Tangkal, Province of Lanao del Norte
vs. Balindong
The complaint below, which is a real
action28 involving title to and possession of the land
situated at BarangayBanisilon, Tangkal, was filed by
private respondents before the Shari’a District Court
pursuant to the general jurisdiction conferred by
Article 143(2)(b). In determining whether the Shari’a
District Court has jurisdiction over the case, the
threshold question is whether both parties are
Muslims. There is no disagreement that private
respondents, as plaintiffs below, are Muslims. The
only dispute is whether the requirement is satisfied
because the mayor of the defendant municipality is
also a Muslim.
When Article 143(2)(b) qualifies the conferment of
jurisdiction to actions “wherein the parties involved
are Muslims,” the word “parties” necessarily refers to
the real parties-in-interest. Section 2 of Rule 3 of the
Rules of Court defines real parties-in-interest as those
who stand to be benefited or injured by the judgment
in the suit, or are entitled to the avails of the suit. In
this case, the parties who will be directly benefited or
injured are the private respondents, as real party-
plaintiffs, and the Municipality of Tangkal, as the real
party-defendant. In their complaint, private
respondents claim that their predecessor-in-interest,
Macalabo, entered into an agreement with the
Municipality of Tangkal for the use of the land. Their
cause of action is based on the Municipality of
Tangkal’s alleged failure and refusal to return the
land or pay for its reasonable value in accordance
with the agreement. Accordingly, they pray for the
return of the land or the payment of reasonable
rentals thereon. Thus, a judgment in favor of private
respondents, either allowing them to recover
possession or entitling them to rentals, would
undoubtedly be beneficial to them; correlatively, it
would be prejudicial to the Municipality of Tangkal
which would either be deprived possession of the land
on which its municipal hall currently stands or be
required to allocate funds for payment of rent.
_______________
28 A real action is one affects title to or possession
of real property, or an interest therein. Rules of Court,
Rule 4, Sec. 1.
248
248 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Municipality of Tangkal, Province of Lanao del Norte
vs. Balindong
Conversely, a judgment in favor of the Municipality of
Tangkal would effectively quiet its title over the land
and defeat the claims of private respondents.
It is clear from the title and the averments in the
complaint that Mayor Batingolo was impleaded only
in a representative capacity, as chief executive of the
local government of Tangkal. When an action is
defended by a representative, that representative is
not — and neither does he become — a real party-in-
interest. The person represented is deemed the real
party-in-interest;29 the representative remains to be a
third party to the action.30That Mayor Batingolo is a
Muslim is therefore irrelevant for purposes of
complying with the jurisdictional requirement under
Article 143(2)(b) that both parties be Muslims. To
satisfy the requirement, it is the real party-defendant,
the Municipality of Tangkal, who must be a Muslim.
Such a proposition, however, is a legal impossibility.
The Code of Muslim Personal Laws defines a
“Muslim” as “a person who testifies to the oneness of
God and the Prophethood of Muhammad and
professes Islam.”31Although the definition does not
explicitly distinguish between natural and juridical
persons, it nonetheless connotes the exercise of
religion, which is a fundamental personal right. 32 The
ability to testify to the “oneness of God and the
Prophethood of Muhammad” and to profess Islam is,
by its nature, restricted to natural persons. In
contrast, juridical persons are artificial beings with
“no consciences, no beliefs, no feelings, no thoughts,
no desires.”33 They are considered persons only by
virtue of legal fiction. The Municipality of Tangkal
falls under this category.
_______________
29 RULES OF COURT, Rule 3, Sec. 3.
30 Ang v. Ang, G.R. No. 186993, August 22, 2012,
678 SCRA 699, 708-709.
31 Code of Muslim Personal Laws, Art. 7(g).
32 Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers’ Union,
No. L-25246, September 12, 1974, 59 SCRA 54, 72.
33 Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm’n,
558 U.S. 310, 466 (2010), J. Stevens, dissenting.
249
VOL. 814, JANUARY 11, 2017 249
Municipality of Tangkal, Province of Lanao del Norte
vs. Balindong
Under the Local Government Code, a municipality
is a body politic and corporate that exercises powers
as a political subdivision of the national government
and as a corporate entity representing the inhabitants
of its territory.34
Furthermore, as a government instrumentality,
the Municipality of Tangkal can only act for secular
purposes and in ways that have primarily secular
effects35 — consistent with the nonestablishment
clause.36 Hence, even if it is assumed that juridical
persons are capable of practicing religion, the
Municipality of Tangkal is constitutionally proscribed
from adopting, much less exercising, any religion,
including Islam.
The Shari’a District Court appears to have
understood the foregoing principles, as it conceded
that the Municipality of Tangkal “is neither a Muslim
nor a Christian.”37 Yet it still proceeded to attribute
the religious affiliation of the mayor to the
municipality. This is manifest error on the part of the
Shari’a District Court. It is an elementary principle
that a municipality has a personality that is separate
and distinct from its mayor, vice mayor, sanggunian,
and other officers composing it.38And under no
circumstances can this corporate veil be pierced on
purely religious considerations — as the Shari’a
District Court has done — without running afoul the
_______________
34 LOCAL GOV’T CODE, Sec. 15.
35 Ang Ladlad LGBT Party v. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. 190582, April 8, 2010, 618 SCRA
32, 59.
36 CONSTITUTION , Art. III, Sec. 5.No law shall
be made respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The
free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession
and worship, without discrimination or preference,
shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be
required for the exercise of civil or political rights.
37 Rollo, p. 57A.
38 Torio v. Fontanilla, No. L-29993, October 23,
1978, 85 SCRA 599, 615.

250
250 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Municipality of Tangkal, Province of Lanao del Norte
vs. Balindong
inviolability of the separation of Church and State
enshrined in the Constitution.39
In view of the foregoing, the Shari’a District Court
had no jurisdiction under the law to decide private
respondents’ complaint because not all of the parties
involved in the action are Muslims. Since it was clear
from the complaint that the real party-defendant was
the Municipality of Tangkal, the Shari’a District
Court should have simply applied the basic doctrine of
separate juridical personality and motu
proprio dismissed the case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The
assailed orders of the Shari’a District Court of Marawi
City in Civil Case No. 201-09
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, Civil
Case No. 201-09 is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Velasco, Jr. (Chairperson), Bersamin,
Reyes and Caguioa,** JJ., concur.
Petition granted, orders of Shari’a District Court of
Marawi City reversed and set aside. Civil Case No.
201-09 dismissed.
Notes.—An order denying a motion to dismiss is
an interlocutory order which neither terminates nor
finally disposes of a case as it leaves something to be
done by the court before the case is finally decided on
the merits. (Corales vs. Republic, 703 SCRA 623
[2013])
An order of the trial court denying a motion to
dismiss is an interlocutory order, and to use a writ
of certiorari to assail it is improper. (Sangguniang
Panlungsod ng Baguio City vs. Jadewell Parking
Systems Corporation, 723 SCRA350 [2014])
——o0o——
January 25, 2016. G.R. No. 198172.*
REGULUS DEVELOPMENT, INC.,
petitioner, vs. ANTONIO DELA CRUZ, respondent.
Pleadings and Practice; Verification; A defect in
the verification does not necessarily render the
pleading fatally defective.—The lack of notarial seal in
the notarial certificate is a defect in a document that
is required to be executed under oath. Nevertheless, a
defect in the verification does not necessarily render
the pleading fatally defective. The court may order its
submission or correction, or act on the pleading if the
attending circumstances are such that strict
compliance with the Rule may be dispensed with in
order that the ends of justice may be served.
Same; Certification Against Forum Shopping;
Noncompliance or a defect in a certification against
forum shopping, unlike in the case of a verification, is
generally not curable by its subsequent submission or
correction, unless the covering Rule is relaxed on the
ground of “substantial compliance” or based on the
presence of “special circumstances or compelling
reasons.”—Noncompliance or a defect in a certification
against forum shopping, unlike in the case of a
verification, is generally not curable by its subsequent
submission or correction, unless the covering Rule is
relaxed on the ground of
_______________
* SECOND DIVISION.
608
608 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Regulus Development, Inc. vs. Dela Cruz
“substantial compliance” or based on the
presence of “special circumstances or compelling
reasons.” Although the submission of a certificate
against forum shopping is deemed obligatory, it is not
however jurisdictional.
Procedural Rules and Technicalities; Every
party-litigant must be afforded ample opportunity for
the proper and just determination of his case, free from
the unacceptable plea of technicalities.—The rule is
that courts should not be unduly strict on procedural
lapses that do not really impair the proper
administration of justice. The higher objective of
procedural rules is to ensure that the substantive
rights of the parties are protected. Litigations should,
as much as possible, be decided on the merits and not
on technicalities. Every party-litigant must be
afforded ample opportunity for the proper and just
determination of his case, free from the unacceptable
plea of technicalities.
Moot and Academic; A case or issue is considered
moot and academic when it ceases to present a
justiciable controversy because of supervening events,
rendering the adjudication of the case or the resolution
of the issue without any practical use or value.—A case
or issue is considered moot and academic when it
ceases to present a justiciable controversy because of
supervening events, rendering the adjudication of the
case or the resolution of the issue without any
practical use or value. Courts generally decline
jurisdiction over such case or dismiss it on the ground
of mootness except when, among others, the case is
capable of repetition yet evades judicial review.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Jurisdiction; It
is well-settled in jurisprudence that jurisdiction is
vested by law and cannot be conferred or waived by the
parties.—It is well-settled in jurisprudence that
jurisdiction is vested by law and cannot be conferred
or waived by the parties. “Even on appeal and even if
the reviewing parties did not raise the issue of
jurisdiction, the reviewing court is not precluded from
ruling that the lower court had no jurisdiction over
the case.” Even assuming that the case has been
rendered moot due to the respondent’s redemption of
the property, the CA may still entertain the
jurisdictional issue since it poses a situation capable
of repetition yet evading judicial review.
609
VOL. 781, JANUARY 25, 2016 609
Regulus Development, Inc. vs. Dela Cruz
Same; Same; Same; “Appellate Jurisdiction” and
“Equity Jurisdiction,” Distinguished.—The appellate
jurisdiction of courts is conferred by law. The
appellate court acquires jurisdiction over the subject
matter and parties when an appeal is perfected. On
the other hand, equity jurisdiction aims to provide
complete justice in cases where a court of law is
unable to adapt its judgments to the special
circumstances of a case because of a resulting legal
inflexibility when the law is applied to a given
situation. The purpose of the exercise of equity
jurisdiction, among others, is to prevent unjust
enrichment and to ensure restitution. The RTC orders
which allowed the withdrawal of the deposited funds
for the use and occupation of the subject units were
issued pursuant to the RTC’s equity jurisdiction, as
the CA held in the petition docketed as C.A.-G.R. S.P.
No. 81277. The RTC’s equity jurisdiction is separate
and distinct from its appellate jurisdiction on the
ejectment case. The RTC could not have issued its
orders in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction since
there was nothing more to execute on the dismissed
ejectment case. As the RTC orders explained, the
dismissal of the ejectment case effectively and
completely blotted out and cancelled the complaint.
Hence, the RTC orders were clearly issued in the
exercise of the RTC’s equity jurisdiction, not on the
basis of its appellate jurisdiction.
Same; Jurisdiction; Execution of Judgments;
Execution shall be applied for in the court of origin, in
accordance with Section 1,Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court.—Execution shall be applied for in the court of
origin, in accordance with Section 1, Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court. The court of origin with respect to the
assailed RTC orders is the court which issued these
orders. The RTC is the court with jurisdiction to order
the execution of the issued RTC orders. Hence, the
petitioner correctly moved for the issuance of the writ
of execution and levy of the respondent’s real property
before the RTC as the court of origin.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and
resolution of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Esguerra & Blanco for petitioner.
Evaristo Velicaria for respondent.
610
610 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Regulus Development, Inc. vs. Dela Cruz
BRION,J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari filed
by petitioner Regulus Development, Inc. (petitioner) to
challenge the November 23, 2010 decision 1 and
August 10, 2011 resolution2 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 105290. CA Associate
Justice Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr. penned the rulings,
concurred in by Associate Justices Ramon M. Bato, Jr.
and Florito S. Macalino.
Antecedent Facts
The petitioner is the owner of an apartment (San
Juan Apartments) located at San Juan Street, Pasay
City. Antonio dela Cruz (respondent) leased two units
(Unit 2002-A and Unit 2002-B) of the San Juan
Apartments in 1993 and 1994. The contract of lease
for each of the two units similarly provides a lease
period of one (1) month, subject to automatic
renewals, unless terminated by the petitioner upon
written notice.
The petitioner sent the respondent a letter to
terminate the lease of the two subject units. Due to
the respondent’s refusal to vacate the units, the
petitioner filed a complaint3for ejectment before the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) of Pasay City,
Manila, on May 1, 2001.
The MTC resolved the case in the petitioner’s favor
and ordered the respondent to vacate the premises,
and pay the rentals due until the respondent
actually complies.4
The respondent appealed to the Regional Trial
Court (RTC). Pending appeal, the respondent
consigned the monthly rentals to the RTC due to the
petitioner’s refusal to receive the rentals.
_______________
1 Rollo, pp. 29-38.
2 Id., at pp. 39-40.
3 Id., at pp. 80-83.
4 Id., at pp. 99-102.
611
VOL. 781, JANUARY 25, 2016 611
Regulus Development, Inc. vs. Dela Cruz
The RTC affirmed5 the decision of the MTC in
toto and denied the motion for reconsideration filed by
the respondent.
 equity jurisdiction, in accordance with Section 5,
C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 69504: Rule 39,14 and Rules 515
Dismissal of Ejectment Case _______________

In a Petition for Review filed by the respondent, 12 Id., at p. 141.

the CA reversed the lower courts’ decisions and 13 Id., at pp. 138, 140-144.
dismissed the ejectment case.6 On March 19, 2003, 14 Section 5. Effect of reversal of executed
the dismissal of the case became final and judgment.—Where the executed judgment is reversed
executory.7 totally or partially, or annulled, on appeal or
otherwise, the trial court may, on motion, issue such
Orders dated July 25, 2003 orders of restitution or reparation of damages as
and November 28, 2003 for equity and justice may warrant under the
payment of rentals due under circumstances. (5a)
lease contracts 15 5 Section. Inherent powers of court.—Every
court shall have power:
The petitioner filed a motion (to withdraw funds (a) To preserve and enforce order in its immediate
deposited by the defendant-appellant as presence;
lessee)8 praying for the withdrawal of the rentals (b) To enforce order in proceedings before it, or
consigned by the respondent with the RTC. before a person or persons empowered to conduct a
In an order dated July 25, 2003,9 the RTC judicial investigation under its authority;
granted the petitioner’s motion. The RTC explained (c) To compel obedience to its judgments, orders
that the effect of the complaint’s dismissal would and processes, and to the lawful orders of a judge out
mean that there was no complaint filed at all. The of court, in a case pending therein;
petitioner, however, is entitled to the amount of (d) To control, in furtherance of justice, the
rentals for the use and occupation of the subject units, conduct of its ministerial officers, and of all other
as provided in the executed contracts of lease and on persons in any manner connected with a case before
the basis of justice and equity. it, in every manner appertaining thereto;
The court denied the respondent’s motion for (e) To compel the attendance of persons to testify
reconsideration10 in an order dated November 28, in a case pending therein;
2003.11 (f) To administer or cause to be administered oaths
_______________ in a case pending therein, and in all other cases where
it may be necessary in the exercise of its powers;
5 Id., at pp. 103-104.
6 Id., at pp. 110-120.
7 Id., at p. 121.
8 Id., at pp. 122-125. 613
9 Id., at pp. 126-127. VOL. 781, JANUARY 25, 2016 613
10 Id., at pp. 128-130. Regulus Development, Inc. vs. Dela Cruz
11 Id., at p. 131. and 616 of Rule 135 of the Rules of Court. The
respondent’s motion for reconsideration was similarly
denied.
612
G.R. S.P. No. 171429: Affirmed
612 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED CA Ruling on RTC Orders
Regulus Development, Inc. vs. Dela Cruz
On the petitioner’s motion, the RTC issued a writ The respondent filed a petition for review
of execution on December 18, 2003, to cause the on certiorari before this Court to assail the decision of
enforcement of its order dated July 25, 2003. 12 the CA in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 81277. In a resolution
dated June 7, 2006,17we denied the petition for
C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 81277: insufficiency in form and for failure to show any
Affirmed RTC Orders reversible error committed by the CA.
Our resolution became final and executory and an
The respondent filed a petition for certiorari under entry of judgment18 was issued.
Rule 65 before the CA to assail the RTC Orders dated
July 25, 2003 and November 28, 2003 (RTC orders), Execution of RTC Orders
which granted the petitioner’s motion to withdraw
funds. The petitioner returned to the RTC and moved for
The CA dismissed13 the petition and held that the the issuance of a writ of execution to allow it to
assailed RTC Orders were issued pursuant to its proceed against the supersedeas bond the respondent
posted, representing rentals for the leased properties
from May 2001 to October 2001, and to withdraw the
lease payments deposited by respondent from
_______________
(g) To amend and control its process and orders so
as to make them conformable to law and justice;
(h) To authorize a copy of a lost or destroyed
pleading or other paper to be filed and used instead of
the original, and to restore, and supply deficiencies in
its records and proceedings.
16 6 Section. Means to carry jurisdiction into
effect.—When by law jurisdiction is conferred on a
court or judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, processes
and other means necessary to carry it into effect may
be employed by such court or officer; and if the
procedure to be followed in the exercise of such
jurisdiction is not specifically pointed out by law or by
these rules, any suitable process or mode of
proceeding may be adopted which appears
comfortable to the spirit of the said law or rules.
17 Rollo, p. 145.
18 Id., at p. 146.
614
614 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Regulus Development, Inc. vs. Dela Cruz
November 2001 until August 2003.19 The RTC
granted the motion.20
The RTC issued an Alias Writ of Execution21 dated
April 26, 2007, allowing the withdrawal of the rental
deposits and the value of the supersedeas bond.
The petitioner claimed that the withdrawn
deposits, supersedeas bond, and payments directly
made by the respondent to the petitioner, were
insufficient to cover rentals due for the period of May
2001 to May 2004. Hence, the petitioner filed a
manifestation and motion22 dated October 23, 2007,
praying that the RTC levy upon the respondent’s
property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
No. 136829 to satisfy the judgment credit.
The RTC granted the petitioner’s motion in
an order dated June 30, 2008.23 The respondent
filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by
the RTC in an order dated August 26, 2008.24
C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 105290:
Assailed the levy of the re-
spondent’s property
On October 3, 2008, the respondent filed with the
CA a Petition for Certiorari25 with application for
issuance of a temporary restraining order. The
petition sought to nullify and set aside the orders of
the RTC directing the levy of the respondent’s real
property. The CA dismissed the petition. Thereaf-
_______________
19 Id., at pp. 147-151.
20 Id., at p. 161.
21 Id., at p. 162.
22 Id., at pp. 165-167.
23 Id., at pp. 192-193.
24 Id., at pp. 194-195.
25 Id., at pp. 202-221.
615
VOL. 781, JANUARY 25, 2016 615
Regulus Development, Inc. vs. Dela Cruz
ter, the respondent filed a motion for
reconsideration26dated November 3, 2008.
Pursuant to the order dated June 30, 2008, a
public auction for the respondent’s property covered
by TCT No. 136829 was held on November 4,
2008,27 where the petitioner was declared highest
bidder. Subsequently, the Certificate of Sale 28 in favor
of the petitioner was registered.
Meanwhile, on January 7, 2010, the respondent
redeemed the property with the RTC Clerk of Court,
paying the equivalent of the petitioner’s bid price with
legal interest. The petitioner filed a motion to release
funds29 for the release of the redemption price paid.
The RTC granted30 the motion.
On February 12, 2010, the respondent filed a
manifestation and motion31 before the CA to withdraw
the petition for the reason that the redemption of the
property and release of the price paid rendered the
petition moot and academic.
Thereafter, the petitioner received the CA decision
dated November 23, 2010, which reversed and set
aside the orders of the RTC directing the levy of the
respondent’s property. The CA held that while the
approval of the petitioner’s motion to withdraw the
consigned rentals and the posted supersedeas bond
was within the RTC’s jurisdiction, the RTC had no
jurisdiction to levy on the respondent’s real property.
The CA explained that the approval of the levy on
the respondent’s real property could not be considered
as a case pending appeal, because the decision of the
MTC had already become final and executory. As
such, the matter of execution of the judgment lies
with the MTC where the complaint for ejectment was
originally filed and presented.
_______________
26 Id., at pp. 222-225.
27 Id., at p. 226.
28 Id., at pp. 227-228.
29 Id., at pp. 272-274.
30 Id., at p. 275.
31 Id., at pp. 276-278.
 seal on the Verification and Certi-
616 fication against Forum Shopping
616 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED is not fatal to the petition.
Regulus Development, Inc. vs. Dela Cruz
The petitioner alleged that the assailed CA
The CA ordered the RTC to remand the case to the
petition should have been dismissed since the notary
MTC for execution. The petitioner filed its motion for
public failed to affix his seal on the attached
reconsideration which was denied32 by the CA.
Verification and Certification against Forum
Shopping.
The Petition
We cannot uphold the petitioner’s argument.
The lack of notarial seal in the notarial
The petitioner filed the present petition for review
certificate34 is a defect in a document that is required
on certiorari to challenge the CA ruling in C.A.-G.R.
to be executed under oath.
S.P. No. 105290 which held that the RTC had no
Nevertheless, a defect in the verification does not
jurisdiction to levy on the respondent’s real property.
necessarily render the pleading fatally defective. The
The petitioner argues: first, that the RTC’s release
court may order its submission or correction, or act on
of the consigned rentals and levy were ordered in the
the pleading if the attending circumstances are such
exercise of its equity jurisdiction; second, that the
that strict compliance with the Rule may be dispensed
respondent’s petition in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 105290
with in order that the ends of justice may be served.35
was already moot and academic with the conduct of
Noncompliance or a defect in a certification
the auction sale and redemption of the respondent’s
against forum shopping, unlike in the case of a
real property; third, that the petition in C.A.-G.R. S.P.
verification, is generally not curable by its subsequent
No. 105290 should have been dismissed outright for
submission or correction, unless the covering Rule is
lack of signature under oath on the Verification and
relaxed on the ground of “substantial compliance” or
Certification against Forum Shopping.
based on the presence of “special circumstances or
The respondent duly filed its comment33 and
_______________
refuted the petitioner’s arguments. On
the first argument, respondent merely reiterated the
34 “Notarial Certificate” refers to the part of, or
CA’s conclusion that the RTC had no jurisdiction to
attachment to, a notarized instrument or document
order the levy on respondent’s real property as it no
that is completed by the notary public, bears the
longer falls under the allowed execution pending
notary’s signature and seal, and states the facts
appeal. On the second argument, the respondent
attested to by the notary public in a particular
contended that the levy on execution and sale at
notarization as provided for by these Rules. (Section
public auction were null and void, hence the CA
8, A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC, 2004 Rules on Notarial
decision is not moot and academic. On
Practice)
the third argument, the respondent simply argued
35 Altres v. Empleo, G.R. No. 180986, December
that it was too late to raise the alleged formal defect
10, 2008, 573 SCRA 583, 596.
as an issue.

The Issue 618

618 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
The petitioner poses the core issue of whether the
RTC had jurisdiction to levy on the respondent’s real Regulus Development, Inc. vs. Dela Cruz
property. compelling reasons.”36 Although the submission of
_______________ a certificate against forum shopping is deemed
obligatory, it is not however jurisdictional.37
32 Id., at pp. 39-40. In the present case, the Verification and
33 Id., at pp. 300-310. Certification against Forum Shopping were in fact
submitted. An examination of these documents shows
that the notary public’s signature and stamp were
duly affixed. Except for the notarial seal, all the
617 requirements for the verification and certification
VOL. 781, JANUARY 25, 2016 617 documents were complied with.
Regulus Development, Inc. vs. Dela Cruz The rule is that courts should not be unduly strict
on procedural lapses that do not really impair the
Our Ruling
proper administration of justice. The higher objective
of procedural rules is to ensure that the substantive
We grant the petition.
rights of the parties are protected. Litigations should,
as much as possible, be decided on the merits and not
Procedural issue: Lack of notarial
on technicalities. Every party-litigant must be
afforded ample opportunity for the proper and just
determination of his case, free from the unacceptable
plea of technicalities.38
The CA correctly refused to dismiss and instead
gave due course to the petition as it substantially
complied with the requirements on the Verification
and Certification against Forum Shopping.
An issue on jurisdiction prevents
the petition from becoming “moot
and academic.”
The petitioner claims that the assailed CA petition
should have been dismissed because the subsequent
redemption of the property by the respondent and the
release of the price paid to the petitioner rendered the
case moot and academic.
_______________
36 Id.
37 In-N-Out Burger, Inc. v. Sehwani,
Incorporated, G.R. No. 179127, December 24, 2008,
575 SCRA 535, 536.
38 Heirs of Amada A. Zaulda v. Zaulda, G.R. No.
201234, March 17, 2014, 719 SCRA 308, 310.
619
VOL. 781, JANUARY 25, 2016 619
Regulus Development, Inc. vs. Dela Cruz
A case or issue is considered moot and academic
when it ceases to present a justiciable controversy
because of supervening events, rendering the
adjudication of the case or the resolution of the issue
without any practical use or value.39 Courts generally
decline jurisdiction over such case or dismiss it on the
ground of mootness except when, among others, the
case is capable of repetition yet evades judicial
review.40
The CA found that there is an issue on whether
the RTC had jurisdiction to issue the orders directing
the levy of the respondent’s property. The issue on
jurisdiction is a justiciable controversy that prevented
the assailed CA petition from becoming moot and
academic.
It is well-settled in jurisprudence that jurisdiction
is vested by law and cannot be conferred or waived by
the parties. “Even on appeal and even if the reviewing
parties did not raise the issue of jurisdiction, the
reviewing court is not precluded from ruling that the
lower court had no jurisdiction over the case.”41
Even assuming that the case has been rendered
moot due to the respondent’s redemption of the
property, the CA may still entertain the jurisdictional
issue since it poses a situation capable of repetition
yet evading judicial review.
Under this perspective, the CA correctly exercised
its jurisdiction over the petition.
Equity jurisdiction versus
appellate jurisdiction of the
RTC.
_______________
39 Peñafrancia Sugar Mill, Inc. v. Sugar
Regulatory Administration, G.R. No. 208660, March 5,
2014, 718 SCRA 212.
40 Carpio v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 183102,
February 27, 2013, 692 SCRA 162, 163.
41 Garcia v. Ferro Chemicals, Inc., G.R. No.
172505, October 1, 2014, 737 SCRA 252, 266.
620
620 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Regulus Development, Inc. vs. Dela Cruz
The appellate jurisdiction of courts is conferred by
law. The appellate court acquires jurisdiction over the
subject matter and parties when an appeal is
perfected.42
On the other hand, equity jurisdiction aims to
provide complete justice in cases where a court of law
is unable to adapt its judgments to the special
circumstances of a case because of a resulting legal
inflexibility when the law is applied to a given
situation. The purpose of the exercise of equity
jurisdiction, among others, is to prevent unjust
enrichment and to ensure restitution.43
The RTC orders which allowed the withdrawal of
the deposited funds for the use and occupation of the
subject units were issued pursuant to the RTC’s
equity jurisdiction, as the CA held in the petition
docketed as C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 81277.
The RTC’s equity jurisdiction is separate and
distinct from its appellate jurisdiction on the
ejectment case. The RTC could not have issued its
orders in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction since
there was nothing more to execute on the dismissed
ejectment case. As the RTC orders explained, the
dismissal of the ejectment case effectively and
completely blotted out and cancelled the complaint.
Hence, the RTC orders were clearly issued in the
exercise of the RTC’s equity jurisdiction, not on the
basis of its appellate jurisdiction.
This Court takes judicial notice44 that the validity
of the RTC Orders has been upheld in a separate
petition before this
_______________
42 Trans International v. Court of Appeals, 348
Phil. 830, 831; 285 SCRA 49, 54 (1998).
43 Reyes v. Lim, 456 Phil. 1; 408 SCRA 560
(2003).
 44 Rule 129, 1 Section. Judicial notice, when
mandatory.—A court shall take judicial notice,
without the introduction of evidence, of the existence
and territorial extent of states, their political history,
forms of government and symbols of nationality, the
law of nations, the admiralty and maritime courts of
the world and their seals, the political constitution
and history of the Philippines, the official acts of
legislative, executive and judicial departments
621
VOL. 781, JANUARY 25, 2016 621
Regulus Development, Inc. vs. Dela Cruz
Court, under G.R. S.P. No. 171429 entitled Antonio
Dela Cruz v. Regulus Development, Inc.
The levy of real property was
ordered by the RTC in the
exercise of its equity juris-
diction.
The levy of the respondent’s property was made
pursuant to the RTC orders issued in the exercise of
its equity jurisdiction, independent of the ejectment
case originally filed with the MTC.
An examination of the RTC order dated June 30,
2008, directing the levy of the respondent’s real
property shows that it was based on the RTC order
dated July 25, 2003. The levy of the respondent’s
property was issued to satisfy the amounts due under
the lease contracts, and not as a result of the decision
in the ejectment case.
The CA erred when it concluded that the RTC
exercised its appellate jurisdiction in the ejectment
case when it directed the levy of the respondent’s
property.
Furthermore, the order to levy on the respondent’s
real property was consistent with the first writ of
execution issued by the RTC on December 18, 2003, to
implement the RTC orders. The writ of execution
states that:
x x x In case of [sic] sufficient personal
property of the defendant cannot be found
whereof to satisfy the amount of the said
judgment, you are directed to levy [on] the
real property of said defendant and to sell
the same or so much thereof in the manner
provided by law for the satisfaction of the
said judgment and to make return of your
proceedings together with this
_______________
of the Philippines, the laws of nature, the
measure of time, and the geographical divisions.
622
622 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Regulus Development, Inc. vs. Dela Cruz
Writ within sixty (60) days from receipt
hereof. (emphasis supplied)
The subsequent order of the RTC to levy on the
respondent’s property was merely a reiteration and an
enforcement of the original writ of execution issued.
Since the order of levy is clearly rooted on the RTC
Orders, the only question that needs to be resolved is
which court has jurisdiction to order the execution of
the RTC orders.
The RTC, as the court of origin,
has jurisdiction to order the
levy of the respondent’s real
property.
Execution shall be applied for in the court of
origin, in accordance with Section 1,45 Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court.
The court of origin with respect to the assailed
RTC orders is the court which issued these orders.
The RTC is the court with jurisdiction to order the
execution of the issued RTC orders.
_______________
45 Section 1 .Execution upon judgments or
final orders.—Execution shall issue as a matter of
right, or motion, upon a judgment or order that
disposes of the action or proceeding upon the
expiration of the period to appeal therefrom if no
appeal has been duly perfected. (1a)
If the appeal has been duly perfected and finally
resolved, the execution may forthwith be applied for
in the court of origin, on motion of the judgment
obligee, submitting therewith certified true copies of
the judgment or judgments or final order or orders
sought to be enforced and of the entry thereof, with
notice to the adverse party.
The appellate court may, on motion in the same
case, when the interest of justice so requires, direct
the court of origin to issue the writ of execution. (n)
623
VOL. 781, JANUARY 25, 2016 623
Regulus Development, Inc. vs. Dela Cruz
Hence, the petitioner correctly moved for the
issuance of the writ of execution and levy of the
respondent’s real property before the RTC as the court
of origin.
WHEREFORE, we hereby GRANT the petition
for review on certiorari. The decision dated November
23, 2010, and the resolution dated August 10, 2011, of
the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 105290 are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The orders
dated June 30, 2008, and August 26, 2008, of Branch
108 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, are
hereby REINSTATED.Costs against respondent
Antonio dela Cruz.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio (Chairperson), Del Castillo,
Mendoza and Leonen, JJ., concur.
Petition granted, judgment and resolution reversed
and set aside.
Notes.—Rule 42, Section 2 in relation to Rule 45,
Section 4 of the Rules of Court mandates petitioner to
submit a Certification Against Forum Shopping and
promptly inform this court about the pendency of any
similar action or proceeding before other courts or
tribunals. (Stronghold Insurance Company, Inc. vs.
Stroem, 746 SCRA 598 [2015])
Any flaw in the verification, being only a formal,
not a jurisdictional requirement, is not a fatal defect.
(Waterfront Cebu City Casino Hotel, Inc. vs. Ledesma,
754 SCRA 400 [2015])
——o0o——
II. Rules 1-5
August 3, 2010. G.R. No. 187104.*
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY, INC.,
petitioner, vs.EVANGELINE C. COBARRUBIAS, respondent.
Appeals; Docket Fees; Pleadings and
Practice; Appeal is not a natural right but a mere
statutory privilege, thus, appeal must be made
strictly in accordance with the provision set by
law; Payment in full of docket fees within the
prescribed period is not only mandatory, but also
jurisdictional.—Appeal is not a natural right but
a mere statutory privilege, thus, appeal must be
made strictly in accordance with the provision
set by law. Rule 43 of the Rules of Court provides
that appeals from the judgment of the VA shall
be taken to the CA, by filing a petition for review
within fifteen (15) days from the receipt of the
notice of judgment. Furthermore, upon the filing
of the petition, the petitioner shall pay to the CA
clerk of court the docketing and other lawful fees;
non-compliance with the procedural
requirements shall be a sufficient ground for the
petition’s dismissal. Thus, payment in full of
docket fees within the prescribed period is not
only mandatory, but also jurisdictional. It is an
essential requirement, without which, the
decision appealed from would become final and
executory as if no appeal has been filed.
Procedural Rules and Technicalities;
Procedural rules are not to be belittled or
dismissed simply because their non-observance
may have prejudiced a party’s substantive rights;
like all rules, they are required to be followed;
Exceptions.—Procedural rules do not exist for the
convenience of the litigants; the rules were
established primarily to provide order to and
enhance the efficiency of our judicial system.
While procedural rules are liberally construed,
the provisions on reglementary periods are
strictly applied, indispensable as they are to the
prevention of needless delays, and are necessary
to the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial
business. Viewed in this light, procedural rules
are not to be belittled or dismissed simply
because their non-observance may have
prejudiced a party’s substantive rights; like all
rules, they are required to be followed. However,
there are recognized exceptions to their strict
observance, such as: (1) most persuasive and
weighty reasons; (2) to relieve a litigant from an
_______________
* THIRD DIVISION.
650
6 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
50 ANNOTATED
Saint Luis University, Inc. vs.
Cobbarubias
injustice not commensurate with his failure
to comply with the prescribed procedure; (3) good
faith of the defaulting party by immediately
paying within a reasonable time from the time of
the default; (4) the existence of special or
compelling circumstances; (5) the merits of the
case; (6) a cause not entirely attributable to the
fault or negligence of the party favored by the
suspension of the rules; (7) a lack of any showing
that the review sought is merely frivolous and
dilatory; (8) the other party will not be unjustly
prejudiced thereby; (9) fraud, accident, mistake
or excusable negligence without the appellant's
fault; (10) peculiar, legal and equitable
circumstances attendant to each case; (11) in the
name of substantial justice and fair play; (12)
importance of the issues involved; and (13)
exercise of sound discretion by the judge, guided
by all the attendant circumstances. Thus, there
should be an effort, on the part of the party
invoking liberality, to advance a reasonable or
meritorious explanation for his/her failure to
comply with the rules.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and
resolution of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Ceasar G. Oracion and Jason R. Barlis for petitioner.
Emmanuel T. Costales for respondent.
BRION,J.:
We resolve the present petition for review on certiorari1filed
by petitioner Saint Louis University, Inc. (SLU), to challenge
the decision2 and the resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. SP No. 101708.4
_______________
1 Filed under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of
Court; Rollo, pp. 13-42.
2 Dated November 5, 2008, penned by Associate
Justice Celia C. Librea-Leagogo, and concurred in by
Associate Justices Mario L. Guariña III and Arturo G.
Tayag; id., at pp. 144-158.
3 Dated February 24, 2009; id., at pp. 167-168.
4 Entitled “Evangeline C. Cobarrubias v. Saint Louis
University, represented by Fr. Jessie M. Hechanova.”
651
VOL. 626, AUGUST 3, 2010 651
Saint Luis University, Inc. vs. Cobbarubias
The Factual Background
The facts of the case, gathered from the records, are briefly
summarized below.
Respondent Evangeline C. Cobarrubias is an associate
professor of the petitioner’s College of Human Sciences. She is
an active member of the Union of Faculty and Employees of
Saint Louis University (UFESLU).
The 2001-20065 and 2006-20116 Collective Bargaining
Agreements (CBAs) between SLU and UFESLU contain the
following common provision on forced leave:
For teaching employees in college who fail
the yearly evaluation, the following
provisions shall apply: 7.7. “Section
(a) Teaching employees who are retained
for three (3) cumulative years in five (5)
years shall be on forced leave for one (1)
regular semester during which period all
benefits due them shall be suspended.”7
SLU placed Cobarrubias on forced leave for the first
semester of School Year (SY) 2007-2008 when she failed the
evaluation for SY 2002-2003, SY 2005-2006, and SY 2006-2007,
with the rating of 85, 77, and 72.9 points, respectively, below
the required rating of 87 points.
To reverse the imposed forced leave, Cobarrubias sought
recourse from the CBA’s grievance machinery. Despite the
conferences held, the parties still failed to settle their dispute,
prompting Cobarrubias to file a case for illegal forced leave or
illegal suspension with the National Conciliation and Mediation
Board of the Department of Labor and Employment, Cordillera
Administrative Region, Baguio City. When circulation and
mediation again failed, the parties submitted the
_______________
5 Rollo, pp. 62-64.
6 Id., at pp. 65-67.
7 Id., at p. 63 and p. 66.
652
652 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Saint Luis University, Inc. vs. Cobbarubias
issues between them for voluntary arbitration before Voluntary
Arbitrator (VA) Daniel T. Fariñas.
Cobarrubias argued that the CA already resolved the forced
leave issue in a prior case between the parties, CA-G.R. SP No.
90596,8 ruling that the forced leave for teachers who fail their
evaluation for three (3) times within a five-year period should
be coterminous with the CBA in force during the same five-year
period.9
SLU, for its part, countered that the CA decision in CA-G.R.
SP No. 90596 cannot be considered in deciding the present case
since it is presently on appeal with this Court (G.R. No.
176717)10 and, thus, is not yet final. It argued that the forced
leave provision applies irrespective of which CBA is applicable,
provided the employee fails her evaluation three (3) times in
five (5) years.11
The Voluntary Arbitrator Decision
On October 26, 2007, VA Daniel T. Fariñas dismissed the
case.12 He found that the CA decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 90596
is not yet final because of the pending appeal with this Court.
He noted that the CBA clearly authorized SLU to place its
teaching employees on forced leave when they fail in the
evaluation for three (3) years within a five-year period, without
a distinction on whether the three years fall within one or two
CBA periods. Cobarrubias received the VA’s decision on
November 20, 2007.13
_______________
8 Decision of May 23, 2006, entitled “Saint Louis
University, Inc. v. Evangeline C. Cobarrubias.”
9 Entitled “Evangeline C. Cobarrubias v. Saint Louis
University, Inc.”
10 Id., at pp. 68-77.
11 Id., at pp. 45-61.
12 Id., at pp. 78-85.
13 Id., at p. 86.
653
VOL. 626, AUGUST 3, 2010 653
Saint Luis University, Inc. vs. Cobbarubias
On December 5, 2007, Cobarrubias filed with the CA a
petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, but
failed to pay the required filing fees and to attach to the
petition copies of the material portions of the record. 14
Thus, on January 14, 2008, the CA dismissed the petition
outright for Cobarrubias’ procedural lapses. 15Cobarrubias
received the CA resolution, dismissing her petition, on January
31, 2008.16
On February 15, 2008, Cobarrubias filed her motion for
reconsideration, arguing that the ground cited is technical. She,
nonetheless, attached to her motion copies of the material
portions of the record and the postal money orders for
P4,230.00. She maintained that the ends of justice and fair play
are better served if the case is decided on its merits. 17
On July 30, 2008, the CA reinstated the petition. It found
that Cobarrubias substantially complied with the rules by
paying the appeal fee in full and attaching the proper
documents in her motion for reconsideration.18
SLU insisted that the VA decision had already attained
finality for Cobarrubias’ failure to pay the docket fees on time.
The CA Decision
The CA brushed aside SLU’s insistence on the finality of
the VA decision and annulled it, declaring that the “three (3)
cumulative years in five (5) years” phrase in Section 7.7(a) of
the 2006-2011 CBA means within the five-year effectivity of the
CBA. Thus, the CA ordered SLU to pay all the benefits
_______________
14 Id., at pp. 86-95.
15 Id., at pp. 97-98.
16 Id., at p. 99.
17 Id., at pp. 99-105.
18 Id., at pp. 112-115.
654
654 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Saint Luis University, Inc. vs. Cobbarubias
due Cobarrubias for the first semester of SY 2007-2008, when
she was placed on forced leave.19
When the CA denied20 the motion for reconsideration that
followed,21 SLU filed the present petition for review
on certiorari.22
The Petition
SLU argues that the CA should not have reinstated the
appeal since Cobarrubias failed to pay the docket fees within
the prescribed period, and rendered the VA decision final and
executory. Even if Cobarrubias’ procedural lapse is disregarded,
SLU submits that Section 7.7(a) of the 2006-2011 CBA should
apply irrespective of the five-year effectivity of each CBA.23
The Case for Cobarrubias
Cobarrubias insists that the CA settled the appeal fee issue,
in its July 30, 2008 resolution, when it found that she had
substantially complied with the rules by subsequently paying
the docket fees in full. She submits that the CA’s interpretation
of Section 7.7(a) of the 2006-2011 CBA is more in accord with
law and jurisprudence.24
The Issues
The core issues boil down to whether the CA erred in
reinstating Cobarrubias’ petition despite her failure to pay the
appeal fee within the reglementary period, and in reversing the
VA decision. To state the obvious, the appeal fee is a
_______________
19 Decision of November 5, 2008; supra note 2.
20 Resolution of February 24, 2009; supra note 3.
21 Id., at pp. 160-165.
22 Id., at pp. 13-44.
23 Ibid.
24 Id., at pp. 219-228.
655
VOL. 626, AUGUST 3, 2010 655
Saint Luis University, Inc. vs. Cobbarubias
threshold issue that renders all other issues unnecessary if
SLU’s position on this issue is correct.
The Court’s Ruling
We find the petition meritorious.
Payment of Appellate Court Docket Fees
Appeal is not a natural right but a mere statutory privilege,
thus, appeal must be made strictly in accordance with the
provision set by law.25 Rule 43 of the Rules of Court provides
that appeals from the judgment of the VA shall be taken to the
CA, by filing a petition for review within fifteen (15) days from
the receipt of the notice of judgment.26 Furthermore, upon the
filing of the petition, the petitioner shall pay to the CA clerk of
court the docketing and other lawful fees;27
_______________
25 Espejo v. Ito, G.R. No. 176511, August 4, 2009, 595
SCRA 192, 204.
26 4. SEC.Period of appeal.—The appeal shall be
taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of the award,
judgment, final order or resolution, or from the date of
its last publication, if publication is required by law for
its effectivity, or of the denial of petitioner’s motion for
new trial or reconsideration duly filed in accordance with
the governing law of the court or agency a quo. Only one
(1) motion for reconsideration shall be allowed. Upon
proper motion and the payment of the full amount of the
docket fee before the expiration of the reglementary
period, the Court of Appeals may grant an additional
period of fifteen (15) days only within which to file the
petition for review. No further extension shall be granted
except for the most compelling reason and in no case to
exceed fifteen (15) days. (Rule 43, Revised Rules of
Court.)
27 5. SEC.How appeal taken.—Appeal shall be
taken by filing a verified petition for review in seven (7)
legible copies with the Court of Appeals, with proof of
service of a copy thereof on the adverse party and on the
court or agency a quo. The original copy of the petition
intended for the Court of Appeals shall be indicated as
such by the petitioner.
656
656 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Saint Luis University, Inc. vs. Cobbarubias
non-compliance with the procedural requirements shall be a
sufficient ground for the petition’s dismissal.28 Thus, payment in
full of docket fees within the prescribed period is not only
mandatory, but also jurisdictional.29 It is an essential
requirement, without which, the decision appealed from would
become final and executory as if no appeal has been filed. 30
As early as the 1932 case of Lazaro v. Endencia and
Andres,31 we stressed that the payment of the full amount of the
docket fee is an indispensable step for the perfection of an
appeal. In Lee v. Republic,32 we decided that even though half of
the appellate court docket fee was deposited, no appeal was
deemed perfected where the other half was tendered after the
period within which payment should have been made.
In Aranas v. Endona,33 we reiterated that the appeal is not per-
_______________
Upon the filing of the petition, the petitioner shall
pay to the clerk of court of the Court of Appeals the
docketing and other lawful fees and deposit the sum of
P500.00 for costs. Exemption from payment of docketing
and other lawful fees and the deposit for costs may be
granted by the Court of Appeals upon a verified motion
setting forth valid grounds therefor. If the Court of
Appeals denies the motion, the petitioner shall pay the
docketing and other lawful fees and deposit for costs
within fifteen (15) days from notice of the denial. (Rule
43, Revised Rules of Court.)
28 7. SEC.Effect of failure to comply with
requirements.—The failure of the petitioner to comply
with any of the foregoing requirements regarding the
payment of the docket and other lawful fees, the deposit
for costs, proof of service of the petition, and the contents
of and the documents which should accompany the
petition shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal
thereof. (Rule 43, Revised Rules of Court.)
29 Ruby Shelter Builders and Realty Development
Corporation v. Formaran III, G.R. No. 175914, February
10, 2009, 578 SCRA 283, 297.
30 Ruiz v. Delos Santos, G.R. No. 166386, January
27, 2009, 577 SCRA 29, 43.
31 57 Phil. 552, 553 (1932).
32 No. L-15027, January 31, 1964, 10 SCRA 65, 67.
33 203 Phil. 120, 127; 117 SCRA 753, 759 (1982).
657
VOL. 626, AUGUST 3, 2010 657
Saint Luis University, Inc. vs. Cobbarubias
fected if only a part of the docket fee is deposited within the
reglementary period and the remainder is tendered after the
expiration of the period.
The rulings in these cases have been consistently reiterated
in subsequent cases: Guevarra v. Court of Appeals,34 Pedrosa v.
Spouses Hill,35 Gegare v. Court of Appeals,36 Lazaro v. Court of
Appeals,37 Sps. Manalili v. Sps. de Leon,38 La Salette College v.
Pilotin,39 Saint Louis University v. Spouses Cordero,40 M.A.
Santander Construction, Inc. v. Villanueva,41 Far Corporation v.
Magdaluyo,42 Meatmasters Int’l. Corp. v. Lelis Integrated Dev’t.
Corp.,43 Tamayo v. Tamayo, Jr.,44 Enriquez v. Enriquez,45 KLT
Fruits, Inc. v. WSR Fruits, Inc.,46
_______________
34 241 Phil. 40, 44-45; 157 SCRA 32, 36-37 (1988);
docket fees paid forty-one (41) days late.
35 327 Phil. 153, 158; 257 SCRA 373, 378 (1996);
docket fees paid four (4) months late.
36 358 Phil. 228, 232; 297 SCRA 587, 591 (1998);
nonpayment of docket fees despite CA notice to pay.
37 386 Phil. 412, 417; 330 SCRA 208, 212 (2000);
docket fees paid six (6) months late.
38 422 Phil. 214, 221; 370 SCRA 625, 631 (2001);
docket fees paid almost ten (10) months late.
39 463 Phil. 785, 793; 418 SCRA 380, 387 (2003);
docket fees paid one (1) year and eleven (11) months late.
40 478 Phil. 739, 750; 434 SCRA 575, 586 (2004);
docket fees paid almost a month late.
41 484 Phil. 500, 504; 441 SCRA 525, 529 (2004);
docket fees paid seven (7) months and twenty-five (25)
days late.
42 485 Phil. 599, 610; 443 SCRA 218, 229 (2004);
docket fees paid 132 days late.
43 492 Phil. 698, 701; 452 SCRA 626, 630 (2005);
docket fees paid one (1) month late.
44 G.R. No. 148482, August 12, 2005, 466 SCRA 618,
622-623; docket fees paid only upon the filing of the
motion for reconsideration.
45 G.R. No. 139303, August 25, 2005, 468 SCRA 77,
86; docket fees paid four (4) months late.
46 G.R. No. 174219, November 23, 2007, 538 SCRA
713, 730; docket fees paid more than thirty (30) days
late.
658
658 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Saint Luis University, Inc. vs. Cobbarubias
Tan v. Link,47 Ilusorio v. Ilusorio-Yap,48 and most recently
in Tabigue v. International Copra Export Corporation
(INTERCO),49 and continues to be the controlling doctrine.
In the present case, Cobarrubias filed her petition for
review on December 5, 2007, fifteen (15) days from receipt of
the VA decision on November 20, 2007, but paid her docket fees
in full only after seventy-two (72) days, when she filed her
motion for reconsideration on February 15, 2008 and attached
the postal money orders for P4,230.00. Undeniably, the docket
fees were paid late, and without payment of the full docket fees,
Cobarrubias’ appeal was not perfected within the reglementary
period.
Exceptions to the Rule on Payment of Appellate
Court Docket Fees not applicable
Procedural rules do not exist for the convenience of the
litigants; the rules were established primarily to provide order
to and enhance the efficiency of our judicial system.50While
procedural rules are liberally construed, the provisions on
reglementary periods are strictly applied, indispensable as they
are to the prevention of needless delays, and are necessary to
the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial business.51
_______________
47 G.R. No. 172849, December 10, 2008, 573 SCRA
479, 492; docket fees paid two (2) days late.
48 G.R. No. 171659, March 17, 2009, 581 SCRA 643,
646; docket fees paid more than three (3) months late.
49 G.R. No. 183335, December 23, 2009, 609 SCRA
223; deficiency in docket fees paid only upon the filing of
the motion for reconsideration.
50 Mejillano v. Lucillo, G.R. No. 154717, June 19,
2009, 590 SCRA 1, 9; Ko v. Philippine National Bank,
G.R. Nos. 169131-32, January 20, 2006, 479 SCRA 298,
303.
51 Villa v. Heirs of Enrique Altavas, G.R. No. 162028,
July 14, 2008, 558 SCRA 157, 166; Moneytrend Lending
Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No 165580,
February 20, 2006, 482 SCRA 705, 714.
659
VOL. 626, AUGUST 3, 2010 659
Saint Luis University, Inc. vs. Cobbarubias
Viewed in this light, procedural rules are not to be belittled
or dismissed simply because their non-observance may have
prejudiced a party’s substantive rights; like all rules, they are
required to be followed. However, there are recognized
exceptions to their strict observance, such as: (1) most
persuasive and weighty reasons; (2) to relieve a litigant from an
injustice not commensurate with his failure to comply with the
prescribed procedure; (3) good faith of the defaulting party by
immediately paying within a reasonable time from the time of
the default; (4) the existence of special or compelling
circumstances; (5) the merits of the case; (6) a cause not
entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party
favored by the suspension of the rules; (7) a lack of any showing
that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory; (8) the
other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby; (9) fraud,
accident, mistake or excusable negligence without the
appellant's fault; (10) peculiar, legal and equitable
circumstances attendant to each case; (11) in the name of
substantial justice and fair play; (12) importance of the issues
involved; and (13) exercise of sound discretion by the judge,
guided by all the attendant circumstances. 52 Thus, there should
be an effort, on the part of the party invoking liberality, to
advance a reasonable or meritorious explanation for his/her
failure to comply with the rules.
In Cobarrubias’ case, no such explanation has been
advanced. Other than insisting that the ends of justice and
fair play are better served if the case is decided on its merits,
Cobarrubias offered no excuse for her failure to pay the docket
fees in full when she filed her petition for review. To us,
Cobarrubias’ omission is fatal to her cause.
We, thus, find that the CA erred in reinstating Cobarrubias’
petition for review despite the nonpayment of the
_______________
52 Lim v. Delos Santos, G.R. No. 172574, July 31,
2009, 594 SCRA 607, 616-617; Villena v. Rupisan, G.R.
No. 167620, April 3, 2007, 520 SCRA 346, 358-359.
660
660 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Saint Luis University, Inc. vs. Cobbarubias
requisite docket fees within the reglementary period. The VA
decision had lapsed to finality when the docket fees were paid;
hence, the CA had no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal except
to order its dismissal.
WHEREFORE, the present petition is GRANTED. The
assailed decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 101708 are hereby DECLARED VOID and are
consequently SET ASIDE. The decision of the voluntary
arbitrator, that the voided Court of Appeals decision and
resolution nullified, stands. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio-Morales (J., Chairperson), Bersamin,
Abad** and Villarama, Jr., JJ., concur.
Petition granted, judgment and resolution declared void and
set aside.
Note.—While a court may refuse to entertain a suit for
non-payment of docket fees, such failure does not preclude it,
however, from taking cognizance of the case as circumstances
may so warrant or when the ends of justice would be best
served if the case were to be given due course—the failure to
pay the appeal docketing fee confers a discretionary authority,
not mandatory charge, on the part to dismiss an appeal. (Public
Estates Authority vs. Yujuico, 351 SCRA 280 [2001])
——o0o——
_______________
June 18, 2014. G.R. No. 177425.*
ALONZO GIPA, IMELDA MAROLLANO, JUANITO
LUDOVICE, VIRGILIO GOJIT, DEMAR BITANGCOR,
FELIPE MONTALBAN and DAISY M.
PLACER,1petitioners, vs. SOUTHERN LUZON INSTITUTE as
represented by its Vice President for Operations and Corporate
Secretary, RUBEN G. ASUNCION, respondent.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Pleadings
and Practice; Docket Fees; Payment of the full
amount of docket fees within the prescribed
period is not a mere technicality of law or
procedure but a jurisdictional requirement.—
Petitioners concede that payment of the full
amount of docket fees within the prescribed
period is not a mere technicality of law or
procedure but a jurisdictional requirement.
Nevertheless, they want this Court to relax the
application of the rule on the payment of the
appeal fee in the name of substantial justice and
equity.
Same; Same; Same; The rule in pleadings
and practice is that no new issue in a case can be
raised in a pleading which by due diligence could
have been raised in previous pleadings.—“The
purpose of a reply is to deny or allege facts in
denial of new matters alleged by way of defense
in the answer,” or in this case, in the comment to
the petition. “It is not the office or function of a
reply to set up or introduce a new [issue] or to
amend or amplify the [Petition].” The issue of
whether Section 6 of RA 9406 should be given
retroactive application in order to exempt
petitioners from payment of docket fees was
therefore improperly introduced in petitioners’
Reply. Moreover, “[t]he rule in pleadings and
practice is that no new issue in a case can be
raised in a pleading which by due diligence could
have been raised in previous pleadings.” Here,
petitioners at the outset could have very well
raised the said issue in the Petition since at the
time of its filing on June 7, 2007, RA 9406 was
already in effect. However, they failed to do so.
Besides, for this Court to take cognizance of the
_______________
* SECOND DIVISION.
1 Impleaded but not considered as petitioner in
accordance with the disquisition made in this Decision.
560
5 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
60 ANNOTATED
Gipa vs. Southern Luzon Institute
same is to offend the basic rules of fair play,
justice and due process since SLI had no chance
to propound its argument in connection thereto.
This is because even if it wanted to, SLI could
not anymore do so in its Memorandum as no new
issues or arguments may be raised in the said
pleading, it being only the summation of the
parties’ previous pleadings. For these reasons,
the Court sees no need to belabor the issue of the
retroactive application of Section 6 of RA 9406.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the resolutions of the
Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Juan Sanchez Dealca for respondent.
DEL CASTILLO,J.:
Suffice it to say that “[c]oncomitant to the liberal
interpretation of the rules of procedure should be an effort on
the part of the party invoking liberality to adequately explain
his failure to abide by the rules.”2 Those who seek exemption
from the application of the rule have the burden of proving the
existence of exceptionally meritorious reasons warranting such
departure.3
Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari is the
December 20, 2006 Resolution4 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
C.A.-G.R. CV No. 85215 which dismissed for non-perfection
herein petitioners’ appeal from the January 5, 2005 Decision5 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 65, Sorsogon City in
Civil Case No. 547-37. Likewise questioned is the CA Reso-
_______________
2 Enriquez v. Enriquez, 505 Phil. 193, 201; 468 SCRA
77, 86 (2005).
3 Id.
4 CA Rollo, pp. 108-111; penned by Associate Justice
Ramon R. Garcia and concurred in by Associate Justices
Rebecca De Guia-Salvador and Magdangal M. De Leon.
5 Records, pp. 289-308; penned by Judge Adolfo G.
Fajardo.
561
VOL. 726, JUNE 18, 2014 561
Gipa vs. Southern Luzon Institute
lution6 dated March 30, 2007 which denied the Motion for
Reconsideration thereto.
Factual Antecedents
On February 26, 1996, respondent Southern Luzon
Institute (SLI), an educational institution in Bulan, Sorsogon,
filed a Complaint7 for Recovery of Ownership and Possession
with Damages against petitioners Alonzo Gipa, Imelda
Marollano, Juanito Ludovice, Demar Bitangcor, Virgilio Gojit,
Felipe Montalban and four others namely, Arturo Rogacion,
Virgilio Gracela, Rosemarie Alvarez and Rosita Montalban
(Rosita). During trial, defendant Rosita executed a Special
Power of Attorney8 in favor of her sister Daisy M. Placer
(Placer) authorizing the latter to represent her in the case and
to sign any and all papers in relation thereto.
SLI alleged that it is the absolute owner of a 7,516-square
meter parcel of land situated in Brgy. Poblacion, Bulan,
Sorsogon covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-
28928. However, petitioners and their co-defendants who had
been informally occupying a portion of the said property refused
to vacate the same despite demand. Hence, SLI sought that
they be ordered to immediately vacate the premises, turn over
the same to SLI, and pay compensatory damages, attorney’s
fees and cost of suit.
In their Answer with Counterclaim,9 petitioners and their
co-defendants asserted that they did not heed SLI’s demand to
vacate as they believed that they have the right to stay on the
said property. They relied on their occupation thereof and
_______________
6 CA Rollo, pp. 119-122.
7 Records, pp. 1-3; see also Amended Complaint
where SLI additionally alleged that the assessed value of
the portion of the property occupied by petitioners and
their co-defendants is more than P20,000.00, id., at pp.
63-65.
8 Id., at p. 143.
9 Id., at pp. 26-30.
562
562 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Gipa vs. Southern Luzon Institute
that of their predecessors-in-interest which, according to them,
dates back to as early as 1950. Impugning SLI’s claims,
petitioners and their co-defendants averred that SLI had not
even for a single moment taken possession of the subject
property and was merely able to procure a title over the same
thru fraud, bad faith and misrepresentation. By way of
counterclaim, they prayed that they be declared the lawful
possessors of the property; that OCT No. P-28928 be declared
null and void; and, that SLI be ordered to pay them moral
damages and litigation expenses.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
Finding SLI to have proven its ownership of the property by
preponderance of evidence, the RTC rendered a Decision10 in its
favor on January 5, 2005. The said court gave weight to SLI’s
documentary evidence showing the grant of its Miscellaneous
Sales Application (MSA) over the subject property which
became the basis for the issuance of title under its name, and
the testimony of the Supervising Draftsman of the National
Housing Authority (NHA) who categorically stated that the
houses occupied by petitioners and their co-defendants were
within the property of SLI per NHA’s survey. It rejected, on the
other hand, petitioners and their co-defendants’ claim of title to
the property. For one, the fact that SLI had an existing MSA
over the property as far back as 1969 could not have been
unknown to them. This is because several of the petitioners and
their co-defendants filed Revocable Permit Applications over
the same property which were denied on March 4, 1964,
precisely because the areas applied for were already included in
SLI’s MSA. For another, the documentary evidence submitted
by them consisted mostly of tax declarations and other
documents which were self-serving and could not be considered
as conclusive evidence of ownership. Hence, the RTC ruled:
_______________
10 Id., at pp. 289-308.
563
VOL. 726, JUNE 18, 2014 563
Gipa vs. Southern Luzon Institute
WHEREFORE, premises considered,
judgment is hereby rendered —
a) Declaring plaintiff-SLI as absolute owner of
that portion of Lot 4705 containing an area of
SEVEN THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED
SIXTEEN (7,516) SQUARE METERS covered by
“Katibayan ng Orihinal na Titulo Blg. P-28928.”
b) Ordering herein defendants to vacate and
relinquish the portions of Lot 4705 belonging to
the SLI that they are presently occupying
illegally and to demolish the residential houses
existing thereon at their own expense.
c) To pay attorney’s fee in the amount of
Php10,000.00 jointly.
d) And to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.11
Petitioners and their co-defendants filed a Notice of
Appeal12 which was granted by the RTC in its Order13 of
January 27, 2005.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA, however, dismissed the appeal in its Resolution14 of
August 26, 2005 since it was not shown that the appellate court
docket fees and other lawful fees were paid. 15 Petitioners
_______________
11 Id., at p. 308.
12 Id., at p. 309.
13 Id., at p. 310.
14 CA Rollo, p. 82; penned by Associate Justice
Godardo A. Jacinto and concurred in by Associate
Justices Bienvenido L. Reyes (now a member of this
Court) and Rosalinda Asuncion-Vicente.
15 Pursuant to Sec. 4, Rule 41 and Sec. 1(c), Rule 50
of the Rules of Court which provide as follows:
4. SEC.Appellate court docket and other lawful
fees.—Within the period for taking an appeal, the
appellant shall pay
564
564 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Gipa vs. Southern Luzon Institute
and their co-defendants promptly filed a Motion for
Reconsideration16 to which they attached a Certification17from
the RTC that they paid the appeal fee in the amount of
P3,000.00 under Official Receipt No. 18091130 dated January
25, 2005. In view of this, the CA granted the said motion and
consequently reinstated the appeal through a Resolution18 dated
November 2, 2005.
Subsequently, however, the CA further required petitioners
and their co-defendants, through a Minute Resolution19 dated
March 1, 2006, to remit within ten days from notice the amount
of P30.00 for legal research fund, which apparently was not
included in the P3,000.00 appeal fee previously paid by them.
Copy of the said resolution was received on March 13, 2006 by
petitioners’ counsel, Atty. Jose G. Gojar of the Public Attorney’s
Office.20
Despite the lapse of nine months from their counsel’s
receipt of the said resolution, petitioners and their co-
defendants, however, failed to comply with the CA’s directive.
to the clerk of court which rendered the judgment or final
order appealed from, the full amount of the appellate court
docket and other lawful fees. Proof of payment of said fess shall
be transmitted to the appellate court together with the original
record or the record on appeal.
_______________
1. SEC.Grounds for dismissal of appeal.—An
appeal may be dismissed by the Court of Appeals, on its
motion or on that of the appellee, on the following
grounds:
xxxx
Failure of the appellant to pay the docket and other
lawful fees as provided in Section 5 of Rule 40 and
Section 4 of Rule 44. (c)
16 CA Rollo, pp. 83-84.
17 Id., at p. 85.
18 Id., at p. 102; penned by Associate Justice
Godardo A. Jacinto and concurred in by Associate
Justices Bienvenido L. Reyes (now a member of this
Court) and Mario L. Guariña III.
19 Id., at p. 103.
20 See Return Card, id., at p. 103, dorsal portion.
565
VOL. 726, JUNE 18, 2014 565
Gipa vs. Southern Luzon Institute
Hence, the said court dismissed the appeal through its
Resolution21 of December 20, 2006 in this wise:
Jurisprudence is replete that the nonpayment
of the docket and other lawful fees within the
reglementary period as provided under Section 4
of Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of [C]ourt is a
ground for the dismissal of an appeal, as
provided for under Section 1(c)[,] Rule 50 of the
same Rule. We quote:
1. SECTIONGrounds for dismissal of
appeal.—An appeal may be dismissed by the
Court of Appeals, on its own motion or on
that of the appellee, on the following grounds:
xxx xxx xxx
c.Failure of the appellant to pay the
docket and other lawful fees as provided in
Section 4 of Rule 41; x x x
xxxx
In the instant case, appellants were given
sufficient time to complete the payment of the
appeal fees. Unfortunately, appellants still failed
to comply with the said directive [despite the
fact] that the amount of P30.00 involved is very
little. Hence, appellants failed to perfect their
appeal for failure to fully pay the appeal fees.
They are deemed to have lost interest over the
instant appeal.
xxxx
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
instant Appeal is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.22
Petitioners and their co-defendants filed a Motion for
Reconsideration23 invoking the principle of liberality in the ap-
_______________
21 Id., at pp. 108-111.
22 Id., at pp. 109-111; emphases in the original.
23 Id., at pp. 112-114.
566
566 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Gipa vs. Southern Luzon Institute
plication of technical rules considering that they have paid the
substantial amount of P3,000.00 for docket and other legal fees
and fell short only by the meager amount of P30.00. As
compliance, they attached to the said motion a postal money
order in the sum of P30.00 payable to the Clerk of Court of the
CA.24
The CA, however, was not swayed, hence, the denial of the
Motion for Reconsideration in its Resolution25 of March 30,
2007.
Issue
Petitioners and Placer now file this Petition for Review
on Certiorari raising the lone issue of:
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS
GRAVELY ERRED IN DISMISSING THE
APPEAL FILED BY THE PETITIONERS FOR
FAILURE TO REMIT THE MEAGER AMOUNT
OF THIRTY PESOS (P30.00) AFTER HAVING
ADVANCED A SUBSTANTIAL PORTION OF
THE DOCKET FEES.26
It must, however, be noted at the outset that the caption of
the present Petition includes Placer as one of the petitioners. In
fact, the other petitioners even authorized her to sign the
verification and certification of nonforum shopping in their
behalf.27 A review of the records, however, shows that she was
not one of the defendants before the RTC. Her only
participation therein was that she represented her sister Rosita
as one of the defendants by virtue of a Special Power of
Attorney which the latter executed in her favor.28 Notably in the
pre-
_______________
24 Postal Money Order No. 0007804; attached to p.
112 of the CA Rollo.
25 Id., at pp. 119-122.
26 Rollo, p. 19.
27 Id., at pp. 27-28.
28 Supra note 8.
567
VOL. 726, JUNE 18, 2014 567
Gipa vs. Southern Luzon Institute
sent Petition, Placer appears to have been impleaded in her
personal capacity and not as Rosita’s representative. This
cannot be done. It bears emphasizing that an appeal
on certiorari, as in this case, is a continuation of the original
suit.29 Hence, the parties in the original suit must also be the
parties in such an appeal.30 Placer, therefore, not being a party
in the complaint before the RTC has no personality to continue
the same on appeal and cannot be considered as a petitioner. At
the most, her only role in this Petition was to sign the
verification and certification of nonforum shopping for and in
behalf of petitioners.
The Parties’ Arguments
Initially, petitioners invoke the liberal application of
technical rules31 and contend that the fact that only the amount
of P30.00 was not paid justifies relaxation of the same. Later in
their Reply,32 however, petitioners concede that the payment of
docket fees is not a mere technicality. Nevertheless, they point
out that while full payment of docket fees is indispensable in
the perfection of an appeal, the same admits of
exceptions.33 Their case falls under one of the exceptions, that
is, in
_______________
29 Madrigal Transport, Inc. v. Lapanday Holdings
Corporation, 479 Phil. 768, 780-781; 436 SCRA 123, 134-
135 (2004).
30 Id., at p. 781; p. 135.
31 See Petition for Review on Certiorari, Rollo, pp.
13-23.
32 Id., at pp. 100-104.
33 The following are the exceptions to the strict
application of the rules on payment of docket fees: “(1)
most persuasive and weighty reasons; (2) to relieve a
litigant from an injustice not commensurate with his
failure to comply with the prescribed procedure; (3) good
faith of the defaulting party by immediately paying
within a reasonable time from the time of the default; (4)
the existence of special or compelling circumstances; (5)
the merits of the case; (6) a cause not entirely
attributable to the fault or negligence of the party
favored by the suspension of the rules; (7) a lack of any
showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and
dilatory; (8) the other
568
568 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Gipa vs. Southern Luzon Institute
the name of substantial justice and fair play. According to
petitioners, the dismissal of their appeal for failure to pay
P30.00 runs counter to substantial justice and fair play as the
same would deprive them of their right to justice and render
ineffective the amount of P3,000.00, which despite being
indigents, they undertook to pay. To support their case,
petitioners cited Andrea Camposagrado v. Pablo
Camposagrado34 and Spouses Gutierrez v. Spouses
Valiente35 wherein the Court excused the insufficient payment
of docket fees.
_______________
Moreover, petitioners raise in the said Reply, albeit for
the first time, the argument that while Republic Act (RA)
No. 940636 was still inexistent at the time their appeal
was filed before the CA, Section 637 thereof which
exempts PAO clients
party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby; (9)
fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence without
appellant’s fault; (10) peculiar legal and equitable
circumstances attendant to each case; (11) in the name of
substantial justice and fair play; (12) importance of the
issues involved; and (13) exercise of sound discretion by
the judge guided by all the attendant circumstances.”
Villena v. Rupisan, 549 Phil. 146, 166-167; 520 SCRA
346, 363 (2007).
34 506 Phil. 583; 469 SCRA 602 (2005).
35 579 Phil. 486; 557 SCRA 211 (2008).
36 An Act Reorganizing and Strengthening the
Public Attorney’s Office (PAO), Amending for the
Purpose Pertinent Provisions of Executive Order No.
292, Otherwise Known as the “Administrative Code of
1987,” As Amended, Granting Special Allowance to PAO
Officials and Lawyers, and Providing Funds Therefor.
37 Relevant portion of said section provides:
New sections are hereby inserted in Chapter 5, Title
III, Book IV of Executive Order No. 292 to read as
follows: 6. SEC.
xxxx
Exemption from Fees and Costs of the Suit.—The
clients of the PAO shall be exempt from payment of
docket and other fees incidental to instituting an action
in court and other quasi-judicial bodies, as an original
proceeding or on appeal. 16-D. SEC.
569
VOL. 726, JUNE 18, 2014 569
Gipa vs. Southern Luzon Institute
like themselves from the payment of docket and other fees
should be given retroactive application.
For its part, SLI argues that since petitioners’ appeal was
not perfected due to insufficient payment of docket and other
legal fees, the January 5, 2005 Decision of the RTC had already
become final and executory. Further, the CA correctly
dismissed petitioners’ appeal because aside from the fact that
petitioners failed to comply with the CA’s directive to pay the
lacking amount of P30.00 for a period of more than nine months
from their counsel’s receipt of notice, no plausible explanation
was tendered by them for such failure.
Our Ruling
The Petition fails.
Payment of the full amount of appel-
late court docket and lawful fees
mandatory and jurisdictional; Relaxa-
tion of the rule on payment of appeal
fee is unwarranted in this case.
Section 4, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides:
4. Sec.Appellate court docket and other
lawful fees.—Within the period for taking an
appeal, the appellant shall pay to the clerk of
court which rendered the judgment or final order
appealed from, the full amount of the
appellate court docket and other lawful
fees. Proof of payment of said fees shall be
transmitted to the appellate court together with
the original record or the record on appeal.
(Emphases supplied)
In Gonzales v. Pe, the Court’s explanation anent the
38
requirement of full payment of docket and other lawful fees
under the abovequoted provision was iterated, viz.:
_______________
38 G.R. No. 167398, August 8, 2011, 655 SCRA 176.
570
570 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Gipa vs. Southern Luzon Institute
In Far Corporation v. Magdaluyo, as with
other subsequent cases of the same ruling, the
Court explained that the procedural requirement
under Section 4 of Rule 41 is not merely
directory, as the payment of the docket and other
legal fees within the prescribed period is both
mandatory and jurisdictional. It bears stressing
that an appeal is not a right, but a mere
statutory privilege. An ordinary appeal from a
decision or final order of the RTC to the CA must
be made within 15 days from notice. And within
this period, the full amount of the appellate court
docket and other lawful fees must be paid to the
clerk of the court which rendered the judgment
or final order appealed from. The requirement of
paying the full amount of the appellate docket
fees within the prescribed period is not a mere
technicality of law or procedure. The payment of
docket fees within the prescribed period is
mandatory for the perfection of an appeal.
Without such payment, the appeal is not
perfected. The appellate court does not acquire
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action
and the Decision sought to be appealed from
becomes final and executory. Further, under
Section 1(c), Rule 50, an appeal may be
dismissed by the CA, on its own motion or on
that of the appellee, on the ground of the
nonpayment of the docket and other lawful fees
within the reglementary period as provided
is under Section 4 of Rule 41. The payment of the
full amount of the docket fee is an indispensable
step for the perfection of an appeal. In both
original and appellate cases, the court acquires
jurisdiction over the case only upon the payment
of the prescribed docket fees.39
Here, petitioners concede that payment of the full amount
of docket fees within the prescribed period is not a mere
technicality of law or procedure but a jurisdictional
requirement. Nevertheless, they want this Court to relax the
application of the rule on the payment of the appeal fee in the
name of substantial justice and equity.
_______________
39 Id., at pp. 186-187; citations omitted.
571
VOL. 726, JUNE 18, 2014 571
Gipa vs. Southern Luzon Institute
The Court is not persuaded.
The liberality which petitioners pray for has already been
granted to them by the CA at the outset. It may be recalled that
while petitioners paid a substantial part of the docket fees, they
still failed to pay the full amount thereof since their payment
was short of P30.00. Based on the premise that the questioned
Decision of the RTC has already become final and executory
due to non-perfection, the CA could have dismissed the appeal
outright. But owing to the fact that only the meager amount of
P30.00 was lacking and considering that the CA may opt not to
proceed with the case until the docket fees are paid, 40 it still
required petitioners, even if it was already beyond the
reglementary period, to complete their payment of the appeal
fee within 10 days from notice. Clearly, the CA acted
conformably with the pronouncement made in Camposagrado, a
case cited by petitioners, that “[a] party’s failure to pay the
appellate docket fee within the reglementary period confers
only a discretionary and not a mandatory power to dismiss the
proposed appeal. Such discretionary power should be used in
the exercise of the court’s sound judgment in accordance with
the tenets of justice and fair play with great deal of
circumspection, considering all attendant circumstances and
must be exercised wisely and prudently, never capriciously,
with a view to substantial justice.”41
The CA’s leniency over petitioners’ cause did not end there.
Although they were given only 10 days to remit the P30.00
deficiency, the said court allowed an even longer period of nine
months to lapse, apparently in the hope that petitioners’
compliance would be on its way. But as no payment was
remitted, it was constrained to finally dismiss the
_______________
40 Under Sec. 5, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, if
fees are not paid, the court may refuse to proceed with
the action until they are paid and may dismiss the
appeal or the action or proceeding.
41 Supra note 34 at p. 589; p. 608.
572
572 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Gipa vs. Southern Luzon Institute
appeal for non-perfection. Surprisingly, petitioners were again
heard of when they filed a Motion for Reconsideration to which
they attached a postal money order of P30.00. Nevertheless,
they did not offer any plausible explanation either as to why
they, at the start, failed to pay the correct docket fees or why
they failed to comply with the CA’s directive for them to remit
the P30.00 deficiency. Instead, they focused on begging the CA
for leniency, arguing that the meager amount of the deficiency
involved justifies relaxation of the rules. What is worse is that
even if the CA already took note of the lack of such explanation
in its Resolution denying petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration, petitioners, up to now, have not attempted to
tender one in this Petition and instead continue to capitalize on
substantial justice, fair play and equity to secure a reversal of
the dismissal of their appeal. The Court cannot, therefore, help
but conclude that there is really no plausible reason behind the
said omission.
Suffice it to say that “[c]oncomitant to the liberal
interpretation of the rules of procedure should be an effort on
the part of the party invoking liberality to adequately explain
his failure to abide by the rules.”42 Those who seek exemption
from the application of the rule have the burden of proving the
existence of exceptionally meritorious reason warranting such
departure.43 Petitioners’ failure to advance any explanation as
to why they failed to pay the correct docket fees or to complete
payment of the same within the period allowed by the CA is
thus fatal to their cause. Hence, a departure from the rule on
the payment of the appeal fee is unwarranted.
Neither do the cases cited by petitioners help because they
are not in point. Unlike in this case, the CA
in Camposagrado no longer required the petitioners therein to
complete the payment of the appeal fee by remitting the P5.00
deficiency but just dismissed the appeal outright. Moreover, a
justifiable
_______________
42 Supra note 2.
43 Id.
573
VOL. 726, JUNE 18, 2014 573
Gipa vs. Southern Luzon Institute
reason for the insufficient payment was tendered by petitioners
in the said case, i.e., that they relied on the assessment made
by the collection officer of the court and honestly believed that
the amount collected from them was that which is mandated by
the Rules.
The same thing goes true with Gutierrez. In fact, the
pronouncement made in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v.
Asuncion,44 as cited in Gutierrez, even militates against
petitioners. It was reiterated therein that the rule that “a court
acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon payment of the
prescribed docket fees does not apply where the party does not
deliberately intend to defraud the court in payment of docket
fees, and manifests its willingness to abide by the rules by
paying additional docket fees when required by the
court.”45 As may be recalled, petitioners in this case did not
immediately remit the deficient amount of P30.00 when
required by the CA and only did so after the lapse of more than
nine months when their appeal was already dismissed.
The Court need not belabor the
issue of the retroactive application
of Section 6 of RA 9406.
“The purpose of a reply is to deny or allege facts in denial of
new matters alleged by way of defense in the answer,”46 or in
this case, in the comment to the petition. “It is not the office or
function of a reply to set up or introduce a new [issue] or to
amend or amplify the [Petition].”47 The issue of whether Section
6 of RA 9406 should be given retroactive application in order to
exempt petitioners from payment of docket fees was therefore
improperly introduced in petitioners’ Reply. More-
_______________
44 252 Phil. 280; 170 SCRA 274 (1989).
45 Supra note 35 at p. 498; p. 223. Emphases
supplied.
46 Magnolia Corporation v. National Labor Relations
Commission, 320 Phil. 408, 420; 250 SCRA 332, 341
(1995).
47 Id.
574
574 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Gipa vs. Southern Luzon Institute
over, “[t]he rule in pleadings and practice is that no new issue
in a case can be raised in a pleading which by due diligence
could have been raised in previous pleadings.” 48Here,
petitioners at the outset could have very well raised the said
issue in the Petition since at the time of its filing on June 7,
2007, RA 9406 was already in effect.49 However, they failed to
do so. Besides, for this Court to take cognizance of the same is
to offend the basic rules of fair play, justice and due process
since SLI had no chance to propound its argument in
connection thereto. This is because even if it wanted to, SLI
could not anymore do so in its Memorandum as no new issues
or arguments may be raised in the said pleading, it being only
the summation of the parties’ previous pleadings.50 For these
reasons, the Court sees no need to belabor the issue of the
retroactive application of Section 6 of RA 9406.
All told, the Court finds the CA’s dismissal of the appeal
interposed by petitioners in order.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari
is DENIED. The assailed Resolutions dated December 20, 2006
and March 30, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CV No.
85215 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Brion**(Acting Chairperson), Perez, Mendoza*** and Perlas-
Bernabe, JJ., concur.
Petition denied, resolutions affirmed.
_______________
48 Pineda v. Court of Appeals (Former Ninth
Division), G.R. No. 181643, November 17, 2010, 635
SCRA 274, 283.
49 Approved on March 23, 2007.
50 A.M. No. 99-2-04-SC dated November 21, 2000.
** Per Special Order No. 1699 dated June 13, 2014.
***Per Special Order No. 1696 dated June 13, 2014.
575
 VOL. 726, JUNE 18, 2014 575
Gipa vs. Southern Luzon Institute
Notes.—While it is, consequently, true that jurisdiction,
once required, cannot be easily ousted, it is equally settled that
a court acquires jurisdiction over a case only upon the payment
of the prescribed filing and docket fees. (Home Guaranty
Corporation vs. R-II Builders, Inc., 652 SCRA 649 [2011])
Payment of docket fees within the prescribed period is not
merely a technicality but a condition sine qua non for the
perfection of an appeal. (Philippine National Bank vs. Roque,
665 SCRA 57 [2012])
——o0o——
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of
Appeals.
The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.
Lim, Vigilia, Alcala, Dumlao and Orencia for petitioner.
The Law Firm of Antonio A. Navarro III & Associatesfor
private respondent M. Oliver.
RESOLUTION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for review seeks the reversal of the decision dated
1

June 1, 1998, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 43836,

VOL. 390, OCTOBER 3, 2002 263
China Banking Corporation vs. Oliver
G.R. No. 135796. October 3, 2002.
dismissing China Banking Corporation’s petition for certiorari
to annul the two orders of the Regional Trial Court of
Muntinlupa City, Branch 276, which earlier denied petitioner’s
motion to dismiss and then declared the bank in default in Civil
*

Case No. 96-219. The appellate court also denied petitioner’s

CHINA BANKING CORPORATION,
petitioner, vs.MERCEDES M. OLIVER, respondent.
Parties; Indispensable Party; An indispensable party is a party in
interest, without whom no final determination can be had of an action.—
An indispensable party is a party in interest, without whom no final
determination can be had of an action. It is true that mortgagor Oliver
One is a party in interest, for she will be affected by the outcome of the
case. She stands to be benefited in case the mortgage is declared valid,
or injured in case her title is declared fake. However, mortgagor Oliver
One’s absence from the case does not hamper the trial court in resolving
the dispute between respondent Oliver Two and petitioner.
Same; Same; A party is not indispensable to the suit if his interest
in the controversy or subject matter is distinct and divisible from the
interest of the other parties.—In Noceda vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 313
SCRA 504 (1999), we held that a party is not indispensable to the suit if
his interest in the controversy or subject matter is distinct and divisible
from the interest of the other parties and will not necessarily be
prejudiced by a judgment which does complete justice to the parties in
court. In this case, Chinabank has interest in the loan which, however,
is distinct and divisible from the mortgagor’s interest, which involves
the land used as collateral for the loan. Further, a declaration of the
mortgage’s nullity in this case will not necessarily prejudice mortgagor
Oliver One. The bank still needs to initiate proceedings to go after the
mortgagor, who in turn can raise other defenses pertinent to the two of
them. A party is also not indispensable if his presence would merely
permit complete relief between him and those already parties to the
action, or will simply avoid multiple litigation, as in the case of
Chinabank and mortgagor Oliver One. The latter’s participation in this
case will simply enable petitioner Chinabank to make its claim against
her in this case, and hence, avoid the institution of another action. Thus,
it was the bank who should have filed a third-party complaint or other
action versus the mortgagor Oliver One.
Same; Same; Non-joinder of Parties; Non-joinder of parties is not
a ground for dismissal of an action.—As to the second issue, since
mortgagor Oliver One is not an indispensable party, Section 7, Rule 3 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires compulsory joinder of
indispensa-
_______________
*SECOND DIVISION.
264
2SUPREME COURT REPORTS
64 ANNOTATED
motion for reconsideration in a resolution dated September 30,
1998.
The facts of this case are culled from the records.
In August 1995, Pangan Lim, Jr. and a certain Mercedes M.
Oliver opened a joint account in China Banking Corporation
(hereinafter Chinabank) at EDSA Balintawak Branch. Lim
introduced Oliver to the bank’s branch manager as his partner
in the rice and palay trading business. Thereafter, Lim and
Oliver ap-
_______________
1 Rollo, pp. 10-47.
265
VOL. 390, OCTOBER 3, 2002 265
China Banking Corporation vs. Oliver
plied for a P17 million loan, offering as collateral a 7,782 square
meter lot located in Tunasan, Muntinlupa and covered by TCT
No. S-50195 in the name of Oliver. The bank approved the
application. On November 17, 1995, Lim and Oliver executed in
favor of Chinabank a promissory note for P16,650,000, as well
as a Real Estate Mortgage on the property. The mortgage was
duly registered and annotated on the original title under the
custody of the Registry of Deeds of Makati and on the owner’s
duplicate copy in the bank’s possession. The mortgage
document showed Mercedes Oliver’s address to be No. 95
Malakas Street, Diliman, Quezon City. For brevity, she is
hereafter referred to as “Oliver One.”
On November 18, 1996, respondent claiming that she is
Mercedes M. Oliver with postal office address at No. 40 J.P.
Rizal St., San Pedro, Laguna, filed an action for annulment of
mortgage and cancellation of title with damages against
Chinabank, Register of Deeds Atty. Mila G. Flores, and Deputy
Register of Deeds Atty. Ferdinand P. Ignacio. Respondent,
whom we shall call as “Oliver Two,” claimed that she was the
registered and lawful owner of the land subject of the real
estate mortgage; that the owner’s duplicate copy of the title had
always been in her possession; and that she did not apply for a
loan or surrender her title to Chinabank. She prayed that: (1)
2

China Banking Corporation vs. Oliver
ble parties in a case, does not apply. Instead, it is Section 11,
Rule 3, that applies. Non-joinder of parties is not a ground for dismissal
of an action. Parties may be added by order of the court, either on its
the owner’s duplicate copy surrendered to Chinabank as well as
the original title with the Registry of Deeds be cancelled; (2) the
mortgage be declared null and void; and (3) the Registry of
Deeds be ordered to issue a new and clean title in her name. 3

own initiative or on motion of the parties. Hence, the Court of Appeals

committed no error when it found no abuse of discretion on the part of
the trial court for denying Chinabank’s motion to dismiss and, instead,
suggested that petitioner file an appropriate action against mortgagor
Oliver One. A person who is not a party to an action may be impleaded
by the defendant either on the basis of liability to himself or on the
ground of direct liability to the plaintiff.
On January 31, 1997, Chinabank moved to dismiss the case
for lack of cause of action and non-joinder of an indispensable
party, the mortgagor.
On March 13, 1997, Judge Norma C. Perello issued an
order denying the motion to dismiss, stating that:
A reading of the COMPLAINT which of course is
hypothetically admitted, will show that a valid
judgment can be rendered against defendant.
Plaintiff having sufficiently averred that
defendants negligently
_______________
2 CA Rollo, pp. 159, 292.
3 Rollo, pp. 18-19.
266
266 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATED
China Banking Corporation vs. Oliver
failed to ascertain the genuineness or not (sic) of
the title of the land mortgaged to it upon the
claim of ownership by the mortgagors.
Furthermore, the matters alleged in the
MOTION TO DISMISS are all evidentiary which
Defendants may substantiate at the appointed
hours. 4
On April 7, 1997, Chinabank filed with the Court of Appeals a
petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction and/or restraining order to enjoin
enforcement of the March 13, 1997 order and further action on
the case. The Court of Appeals directed respondent Oliver Two
to file her comment and deferred action on the prayer for the
issuance of the preliminary injunction pending submission of
the comment.
On June 30, 1997, respondent Oliver Two moved to declare
petitioner Chinabank in default. She pointed out that since
petitioner received the order denying the motion to dismiss on
March 21, 1997, it had only until April 7, 1997 to file its answer
to the complaint. However, until the filing of the motion for
default, no answer had been filed yet. The trial court granted
the motion and declared petitioner in default in its order dated
July 17, 1997, thus:
Acting on the Motion To Declare Defendant Bank
in Default, and finding the same to be legally
tenable is granted. Accordingly, the Defendant
Bank is declared in default as summons
was served on It as early as December 16,
1996, but until date they have not filed an
Answer nor any responsive pleading and instead,
It filed a Motion to Dismiss, which was denied by
this Court on March 13, 1997.
The filing of a CERTIORARI to question the
Orders by this Court did not toll the period for
Defendants to answer the complaint.
Therefore, the reglementary period for the
filing of responsive pleading has long expired.
Let the case be submitted for Decision based
on the complaint.
It is SO ORDERED. 5
Consequently, petitioner Chinabank filed a supplemental
petition on August 11, 1997, seeking annulment of the July 17,
1997 order. It argued that the special civil action for certiorari
filed in
_______________
4 Id., at 20.
5 Id., at 22-23.
267
VOL. 390, OCTOBER 3, 2002 267
China Banking Corporation vs. Oliver
the Court of Appeals interrupted the proceedings before the
trial court, thereby staying the period for filing the answer.
On June 1, 1998, the Court of Appeals promulgated the
assailed decision, finding no grave abuse of discretion
committed by the trial judge in ruling that the Rules of Court
provided the manner of impleading parties to a case and in
suggesting that petitioner file an appropriate action to bring
the mortgagor within the court’s jurisdiction. The appellate
court said that Rule 6, Section 11 of the Rules of Court allows
petitioner to file a third-party complaint against the mortgagor.
As to the judgment by default, the Court of Appeals said that
an order denying the motion to dismiss is inter-locutory and
may not be questioned through a special civil action for
certiorari. The defendant must proceed with the case and raise
the issues in his motion to dismiss when he appeals to a higher
court. In this case, petitioner Chinabank should have filed its
answer when it received the March 13, 1997 order denying the
motion to dismiss. The special civil action for certiorari with the
Court of Appeals did not interrupt the period to file an answer,
there being no temporary restraining order or writ of
preliminary injunction issued.
The Court of Appeals denied petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration. Hence, this petition anchored on the following
grounds:
I
SEC. 11, RULE 3, OF THE 1997 RULES OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE DOES NOT APPLY
WHERE THE PARTY WHO WAS NOT
IMPLEADED IS AN INDISPENSABLE PARTY;
INSTEAD, SECTION 7, RULE 3 THEREOF,
APPLIES.
II
THE MORTGAGOR MERCEDES M. OLIVER
IS AN INDISPENSABLE PARTY UNDER
SECTION 7, RULE 3, OF THE 1997 RULES OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE, AND MUST THEREFORE
INDISPENSABLY BE JOINED AS A PARTY-
DEFENDANT.
III
RESPONDENT’S CAUSE OF ACTION IS
ANCHORED ON HER CLAIM AS THE
REGISTERED AND LAWFUL OWNER OF THE
PROPERTY IN QUESTION AND THAT HER
OWNER’S DUPLICATE COPY OF THE
268
268 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATED
 China Banking Corporation vs. Oliver
TITLE (ANNEX “A”) IS THE TRUE AND
GENUINE TITLE. THUS, THE ACTION
BEFORE THE HONORABLE COURT-A-
QUO IS A LAND DISPUTE BETWEEN TWO (2)
PERSONS CLAIMING OWNERSHIP.
IV
THE ANNULMENT OF THE MORTGAGE
AND THE CANCELLATION OF ANNEXES “B”
AND “C” AS PRAYED FOR IN THE
COMPLAINT IN CIVIL CASE NO. 96-219 ARE
INEXTRICABLY INTERTWINED WITH THE
ISSUE OF OWNERSHIP. HENCE, THE
LATTER MUST FIRST BE RESOLVED TO
DETERMINE THE FORMER.
V
THE OWNER’S DUPLICATE COPY OF THE
TITLE OF MORTGAGOR MERCEDES M.
OLIVER OWNER’S DUPLICATE COPY
CANNOT, IN HER ABSENCE, BE DECLARED
NULL AND VOID. CONSEQUENTLY,
INASMUCH AS THE MORTGAGE IN FAVOR
OF PETITIONER IS DEPENDENT UPON THE
OWNER’S DUPLICATE COPY OF THE
MORTGAGOR, THE COMPLAINT IN CIVIL
CASE NO. 96-219 CAN NOT RESOLVE THE
CONTROVERSY WITH FINALITY.
VI
THE CASE OF CHURCH OF CHRIST VS.
VALLESPIN, G.R. NO. 53726, AUGUST 15,
1988, DOES NOT APPLY INASMUCH AS THE
USE OF TERM “INDISPENSABLE PARTY” IN
SAID CASE WAS LOOSELY USED AND IN
TRUTH WAS INTENDED TO MEAN
“PARTIES-IN-INTEREST” AS
CONTEMPLATED BY SECTION 2, RULE 3 OF
THE RULES OF COURT.
VII
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT SANCTIONED
THE TRIAL COURT’S ERROR IN DECLARING
DEFENDANT CBC IN DEFAULT FOR
FAILURE TO FILE AN ANSWER,
NOTWITHSTANDING THE SETTLED
DOCTRINE THAT WHERE AN
INDISPENSABLE PARTY IS NOT IN COURT,
THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD NOT PROCEED
BUT INSTEAD SHOULD DISMISS THE CASE.
VIII
THE DISMISSAL/WITHDRAWAL OF THE
COMPLAINT AGAINST DEFENDANTS
REGISTER AND DEPUTY REGISTER OF
DEEDS NECESSARILY GIVE RISE TO, AND
BOLSTERS, THE CONCLUSION
269
VOL. 390, OCTOBER 3, 2002 269
China Banking Corporation vs. Oliver
THAT THE OWNER’S DUPLICATE COPY
OF TCT NO. S-50195 OF MORTGAGOR
MERCEDES M. OLIVER IS THE GENUINE
AND AUTHENTIC COPY. 6
For a clearer discussion of the issues in this controversy, we
may state them as follows:
1. 1.Is the mortgagor who goes by the name of Mercedes
M. Oliver, herein called Oliver One, an indispensable
party in Civil Case No. 96219?
2. 2.Should Section 7 Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure apply in this case?
7
3. 3.Did the Court of Appeals err when it sustained the
trial court’s declaration that petitioner was in
default?
4. 4.Were the withdrawal and consequent dismissal of
the complaint against the Registry of Deeds’ officials
indicative of the authenticity of mortgagor Oliver
One’s copy of TCT No. S-50195?
Petitioner Chinabank alleges that there are two owner’s
duplicate copies of TCT No. S-50195 involved in this case and
two persons claiming to be the real “MERCEDES MARAVILLA
OLIVER.” One is the mortgagor, Oliver One. The other is the
respondent, Oliver Two. Respondent’s complaint before the trial
court was one for cancellation of the transfer certificate of title
in petitioner’s possession (Annex “B”). According to petitioner,
the issue below is the genuineness of the titles, which is
intertwined with the issue of ownership. This being the case,
said the petitioner, the mortgagor Oliver One must necessarily
be impleaded for she is the registered owner under Annex “B.”
Petitioner argues that mortgagor Oliver One is in a better
position to defend her title. She stands to suffer if it is declared
fake. Further, petitioner claims that the validity and
enforceability of the mortgage entirely depends on the validity
and authenticity of Annex “B.” The mortgage cannot be
declared a nullity without the trial court declaring Annex “B” a
nullity. Hence, mortgagor Oliver One’s participation in the suit
is indis-
_______________
6Id., at 26-28.
7SEC. 7, Rule 3, 1997 Revised Rules of
Court: Compulsory joinder of indispensable parties.—
Parties in interest without whom no final determination
can be had of an action shall be joined either as plaintiffs
or defendants.
270
270 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
 ANNOTATED
China Banking Corporation vs. Oliver
pensable, according to petitioner. In brief, what petitioner
Chinabank is saying is that it was indispensable for respondent
Oliver Two to implead mortgagor Oliver One in the case before
the trial court. Failing to do that, the complaint of herein
respondent Oliver Two should have been dismissed.
Petitioner’s contention is far from tenable. An indispensable
party is a party in interest, without whom no final
determination can be had of an action. It is true that mortgagor
8 impleaded by the defendant either on the basis of liability to
Oliver One is a party in interest, for she will be affected by the
outcome of the case. She stands to be benefited in case the
mortgage is declared valid, or injured in case her title is
declared fake. However, mortgagor Oliver One’s absence from
9
the case does not hamper the trial court in resolving the dispute
between respondent Oliver Two and petitioner. A perusal of
Oliver Two’s allegations in the complaint below shows that it
was for annulment of mortgage due to petitioner’s negligence in
not determining the actual ownership of the property, resulting
in the mortgage’s annotation on TCT No. S-50195 in the
Registry of Deeds’ custody. To support said allegations,
respondent Oliver Two had to prove (1) that she is the real
Mercedes M. Oliver referred to in the TCT, and (2) that she is
not the same person using that name who entered into a deed of
mortgage with the petitioner. This, respondent Oliver Two can
do in her complaint without necessarily impleading the
mortgagor Oliver One. Hence, Oliver One is not an
indispensable party in the case filed by Oliver Two.
In Noceda vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 313 SCRA 504(1999),
we held that a party is not indispensable to the suit if his
interest in the controversy or subject matter is distinct and
divisible from the interest of the other parties and will not
necessarily be prejudiced by a judgment which does complete
justice to the parties in court. In this case, Chinabank has
interest in the loan which, however, is
_______________
8 Nufable, et al. vs. Nufable, et al., 309 SCRA 692, 703
(1999).
9 SEC. 2, Rule 3, Rules of Court: Parties in interest.—
A real party in interest is the party who stands to be
benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the
party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise
authorized by law or these Rules, every action must be
prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in
interest.
271
VOL. 390, OCTOBER 3, 2002 271
China Banking Corporation vs. Oliver
distinct and divisible from the mortgagor’s interest, which
involves the land used as collateral for the loan.
Further, a declaration of the mortgage’s nullity in this case
will not necessarily prejudice mortgagor Oliver One. The bank
still needs to initiate proceedings to go after the mortgagor, who
in turn can raise other defenses pertinent to the two of them. A
party is also not indispensable if his presence would merely
permit complete relief between him and those already parties to
the action, or will simply avoid multiple litigation, as in the
case of Chinabank and mortgagor Oliver One. The latter’s
10
participation in this case will simply enable petitioner
Chinabank to make its claim against her in this case, and
hence, avoid the institution of another action. Thus, it was the
bank who should have filed a third-party complaint or other
action versus the mortgagor Oliver One.
As to the second issue, since mortgagor Oliver One is not an
indispensable party, Section 7, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, which requires compulsory joinder of indispensable
parties in a case, does not apply. Instead, it is Section 11, Rule
3, that applies. Non-joinder of parties is not a ground for
11
dismissal of an action. Parties may be added by order of the
court, either on its own initiative or on motion of the
parties. Hence, the Court of Appeals committed no error when
12
it found no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court for
denying Chinabank’s motion to dismiss and, instead, suggested
that petitioner file an appropriate action against mortgagor
Oliver One. A person who is not a party to an action may be
himself or on the ground of direct liability to the plaintiff. 13
_______________
10 Imson vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 239 SCRA 58, 65
(1994).
11 SEC. 11, Rule 3, 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure: Misjoinder and non-joinder of parties.—
Neither misjoinder nor non-joinder of parties is ground
for dismissal of an action. Parties may be dropped or
added by order of the court on motion of any party or on
its own initiative at any stage of the action and on such
terms as are just. Any claim against a misjoined party
may be severed and proceeded with separately.
12 Heirs of Joaquin Asuncion, et al. vs. Hon. Gervacio,
Jr., et al., 304 SCRA 322, 327 (1999).
13 Almendras vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 293 SCRA
540, 543 (1998).
272
272 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATED
China Banking Corporation vs. Oliver
Now, the third issue, did the Court of Appeals err when it
sustained the trial court’s ruling that petitioner Chinabank was
in default? As found by the Court of Appeals, petitioner did not
file its answer, although it received the March 13, 1997 order
denying the motion to dismiss. Instead, petitioner filed a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Said
petition, however, does not interrupt the course of the principal
case unless a temporary restraining order or writ of
preliminary injunction is issued. No such order or writ was
14
issued in this case. Hence, Chinabank as defendant below was
properly declared in default by the trial court, after the 15-day
period to file its answer or other responsive pleading lapsed.
Lastly, were the withdrawal and consequent dismissal of
the complaint against officials of the Registry of Deeds
conclusive of the authenticity of mortgagor Oliver One’s copy of
TCT No. S-50195? This is a question of fact, which is not a
proper subject for review in this petition. Here, we are limited
only to questions of law, as a general rule. Petitioner failed to
15
show that this case falls under any of the exceptions to this
rule. We need not tarry on this issue now.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
The assailed decision dated June 1, 1998 and the resolution
dated Sep-tember 30, 1998 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 43836 are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo (Actg. C.J., Chairman), Austria-
Martinezand Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.
_______________
14
SEC. 7, Rule 65, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure: Expediting
proceedings; injunctive relief.—The court in which the petition is filed may
issue orders expediting the proceedings, and it may also grant a temporary
restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction for the preservation of
the rights of the parties pending such proceedings. The petition shall not
interrupt the course of the principal case unless a temporary restraining
order or a writ of preliminary injunction has been issued against the public
respondent from further proceeding in the case.
15
Far East Bank & Trust Company vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 256
SCRA 15, 18 (1996).
273
VOL. 390, OCTOBER 3, 2002 2 submitted which the parties failed to raise
73
People vs. Lopez
Mendoza, J., On official leave.
Petition denied, judgment affirmed.
Note.—A real party-in-interest is defined as “the party who
stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment or the party
entitled to the avails of the suit,” and “interest” within the
meaning of the rule means material interest, an interest in
issue and to be affected by the decree, as distinguished from
mere interest. (Ortigas & Co. Ltd. vs. Court of Appeals, 346
SCRA 748 [2000])
——o0o——
February 25, 2015. G.R. No. 176973.*
DAVID M. DAVID, petitioner, vs. FEDERICO M. PARAGAS,
JR., respondent.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; In
countless cases, the Supreme Court (SC) has
allowed the consideration of other grounds or
matters not raised or assigned as errors.—In
countless cases, the Court has allowed the
consideration of other grounds or matters not
raised or assigned as errors. In the case
of Cordero v. F.S. Management & Development
Corporation, 506 SCRA 451 (2006), the Court
wrote: While a party is required to indicate in his
brief an assignment of errors and only those
assigned shall be considered by the appellate
court in deciding the case, appellate courts have
ample
_______________
* SECOND DIVISION.
649
VOL. 751, FEBRUARY 25, 2015 649
David vs. Paragas, Jr.
authority to rule on matters not assigned as
errors in an appeal if these are indispensable or
necessary to the just resolution of the pleaded
issues. Thus this Court has allowed the
consideration of other grounds or matters not
raised or assigned as errors, to wit: 1)
grounds affecting jurisdiction over the subject
matter; 2) matters which are evidently plain or
clerical errors within the contemplation of the
law; 3) matters the consideration of which is
necessary in arriving at a just decision and
complete resolution of the case or to serve
the interest of justice or to avoid dispensing
piecemeal justice; 4) matters of record
which were raised in the trial court and
which have some bearing on the issue
or which the lower court ignored; 5) matters
closely related to an error assigned; and
6) matters upon which the determination of
a question properly assigned is dependent.
Civil Law; Compromise Agreements; Words
and Phrases; A compromise agreement is a
contract whereby the parties make reciprocal
concessions in order to resolve their differences
and, thus, avoid or put an end to a lawsuit.—A
compromise agreement is a contract whereby the
parties make reciprocal concessions in order to
resolve their differences and, thus, avoid or put
an end to a lawsuit. They adjust their difficulties
in the manner they have agreed upon,
disregarding the possible gain in litigation and
keeping in mind that such gain is balanced by
the danger of losing. It must not be contrary to
law, morals, good customs and public policy, and
must have been freely and intelligently executed
by and between the parties. A compromise
agreement may be executed in and out of court.
Once a compromise agreement is given judicial
approval, however, it becomes more than a
contract binding upon the parties. Having been
sanctioned by the court, it is entered as a
determination of a controversy and has the force
and effect of a judgment.
Same; Same; A judicially approved
compromise agreement, in order to be binding
upon the litigants with the force and effect of a
judgment, must have been executed by them.—
Verily, a judicially approved compromise
agreement, in order to be binding upon the
litigants with the force and effect of a judgment,
must have been executed by them. In this case,
the compromise agreement was signed by David
in his capacity as the complainant in the civil
case, and Olympia, through Lobrin as its agent.
The agreement made
650
650 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATED
David vs. Paragas, Jr.
plain that the terms and conditions the
“parties” were to follow were agreed upon by
David and Olympia. Datoy and Paragas never
appeared to have agreed to such terms for it was
Olympia, despite not being a party to the civil
case, which was a party to the agreement.
Despite this, David claims that the concessions
were made by Olympia on behalf of the non-
signatory parties and such should be binding on
them.
Corporations; Separate Legal Personality;
Elementary is the rule that under Philippine
corporate and partnership laws, a corporation or
a partnership possesses a personality separate
from that of its incorporators or partners.—David
must note that Olympia is a separate being, or at
least should be treated as one distinct from the
personalities of its owners, partners or even
directors. Under the doctrine of processual
presumption, this Court has to presume that
Hong Kong laws is the same as that of the
Philippines particularly with respect to the legal
characterization of Olympia’s legal status as an
artificial person. Elementary is the rule that
under Philippine corporate and partnership laws,
a corporation or a partnership possesses a
personality separate from that of its
incorporators or partners. Olympia should, thus,
be accorded the status of an artificial being at
least for the purpose of this controversy.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Parties;
Joinder of Parties; The joinder of indispensable
parties is mandatory. The presence of
indispensable parties is necessary to vest the
court with jurisdiction, which is “the authority to
hear and determine a cause, the right to act in a
case.”—In Lotte Phil. Co., Inc. v. Dela Cruz, 464
SCRA 591 (2005), the Court reiterated that an
indispensable party is a party-in-interest without
whom no final determination can be had of an
action, and who shall be joined either as
plaintiffs or defendants. The joinder of
indispensable parties is mandatory. The
presence of indispensable parties is necessary to
vest the court with jurisdiction, which is “the
authority to hear and determine a cause, the
right to act in a case.” Considering that David
was asking for judicial determination of his
rights in Olympia, it is without a doubt, an
indispensable party as it stands to be injured or
benefited by the outcome of the main proceeding.
It has such an interest in the controversy that a
final decree would necessarily affect its rights.
Not having been impleaded, Olympia cannot be
prejudiced by any judgment where its interests
and properties are adjudicated in favor of
another even if
651
VOL. 751, FEBRUARY 25, 2015 651
David vs. Paragas, Jr.
the latter is a beneficial owner. It cannot be
said either to have consented to the judicial
approval of the compromise, much less waived
substantial rights, because it was never a party
in the proceedings.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Time and again,
the Supreme Court (SC) has held that the absence
of an indispensable party renders all subsequent
actions of the court null and void for want of
authority to act, not only as to the absent parties
but even to those present.—Time and again, the
Court has held that the absence of an
indispensable party renders all subsequent
actions of the court null and void for want of
authority to act, not only as to the absent parties
but even to those present. The failure to implead
an indispensable party is not a mere procedural
matter. Rather, it brings to fore the right of a
disregarded party to its constitutional rights to
due process. Having Olympia’s interest being
subjected to a judicially-approved agreement,
absent any participation in the proceeding
leading to the same, is procedurally flawed. It is
unfair for being violative of its right to due
process. In fine, a holding that is based on a
compromise agreement that springs from a void
proceeding for want of jurisdiction over the
person of an indispensable party can never
become binding, final nor executory and it may
be “ignored wherever and whenever it exhibits
its head.”
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and
resolution of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Abbas, Alejandro-Abbas, Francisco & Associates for
petitioner.
Arellano Law Firm for respondent.
MENDOZA,J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
seeking to annul and set aside the July 31, 2006 Decision1and
_______________
1 Rollo, pp. 40-55. Penned by Justice Eliezer R. De
los Santos, with Justices Fernanda Lampas-Peralta and
Myrna Dimaranan-Vidal, concurring.
652
652 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATED
David vs. Paragas, Jr.
the February 23, 2007 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 80942. The said issuances modified
the July 21, 2003 Order3 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
200, Las Piñas City (RTC) in Civil Case No. LP-02-0165, a case
for Declaratory Relief and Sum of Money with Damages filed by
petitioner David M. David (David) against Philam Plans, Inc.
(PPI), Severo Henry G. Lobrin (Lobrin), respondent Federico M.
Paragas, Jr. (Paragas), Rodelio S. Datoy (Datoy), Rizal
Commercial Banking Corporation, Parañaque Branch
(RCBC), and Gerald P.S. Agarra (Agarra).
The RTC Order resolved the Motion to Admit Supplemental
Complaint filed by David and the Joint Omnibus Motion4 filed
by David, Lobrin and Datoy. In the said Order, the RTC
admitted the attached supplemental complaint and approved
the compromise agreement.5 The questioned CA decision
nullified the approval by the RTC of the compromise
agreement.
The Antecedents
Sometime in 1995, David, Paragas and Lobrin agreed to
venture into a business in Hong Kong (HK). They created
Olympia International, Ltd. (Olympia) under HK laws.
Olympia had offices in HK and the Philippines. David handled
the marketing aspect of the business while Lobrin and Datoy
were in charge of operations. In late 1995, Olympia started with
“selling, through catalogs, consumer products such as
appliances, furniture and electronic equipment to the OFWs in
Hong Kong, to be delivered to their addresses in the
Philippines. They coined the name Kayang-Kaya for the
venture.”6
_______________
2 Id., at p. 38. Penned by Justice Fernanda Lampas-
Peralta, with Justices Aurora Santiago Lagman and
Myrna Dimaranan-Vidal, concurring.
3 Id., at pp. 127-130. Penned by Judge Leopoldo E.
Baraquia.
4 Id., at pp. 109-111.
5 Id., at pp. 112-115.
6 Id., at p. 41.
653
VOL. 751, FEBRUARY 25, 2015 653
David vs. Paragas, Jr.
In early 1998, Olympia became the exclusive general agent
in HK of PPI’s pre-need plans through the General Agency
Agreement. In late 2001, Olympia launched the Pares-
Pares program by which planholders would earn points with
cash equivalents for successfully enlisting new subscribers. The
cash equivalents, in turn, would be used for the payment of
monthly premiums of the planholders. PPI authorized Olympia
to accept the premium payments, including the cash equivalent
of the bonus points, and to remit the same, net of commissions,
to PPI in the Philippines. The money from HK was to be
remitted through Olympia’s account in RCBC. In turn, Olympia
was to pay the planholders’ bonuses as well as the share of
profits for the directors.7 David was tasked to personally remit
said amounts to PPI as he was the only signatory authorized to
transact on behalf of Olympia regarding the RCBC accounts.
As Paragas alleged, the amount remitted by Olympia to
RCBC from September 2001 to May 25, 2002 reached
P82,978,543.00, representing the total net earnings from the
pre-need plans, 30% of which comprised the bonus points
earned by the subscribers under the Pares-Pares program. The
rest was to be distributed among the four partners.
In 2002, the state of affairs among the partners went sour
upon Lobrin’s discovery that David failed to remit to PPI the
30% cash equivalent of the bonus points.
In a meeting held on June 1, 2002 in HK, David tried to
explain his side, but no settlement was reached.
Later, Lobrin discovered that only P19,302,902.13 remained
of the P82,978,543.00 remitted from HK to the RCBC account.
As the Chairperson of Olympia’s Board of Directors (BOD), he
demanded the return of the entire P82,978,543.00.
On June 17, 2002, the BOD stripped David of his position
as a director. It then informed RCBC of his removal. In an-
_______________
7 Id., at pp. 42-43.
654
654 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATED
David vs. Paragas, Jr.
other letter, it also instructed RCBC to prohibit any
transaction regarding the funds or their withdrawal therefrom
pending the determination of their rightful owner/s.
Meanwhile, a Watch-List Order was issued against David
pursuant to the letter sent by Paragas’ counsel to the Bureau of
Immigration. As a result, he was prevented from boarding a
flight to Singapore on June 29, 2002.
Constrained by these circumstances, David filed a
complaint for Declaratory Relief, Sum of Money and Damages
before the RTC. He insisted on his entitlement to the
commissions due under the regular and Pares-Pares programs
in his capacity as Principal Agent under the General Agency
Agreement with PPI; that he be allowed to hold the cash
deposits of P19,302,902.00 to the extent of P18,631,900.00 as a
trust fund for the benefit of the subscribers of the Pares-
Pares program; that RCBC be ordered to recognize no other
signatory relative to the said deposits except him; and that
Paragas, Lobrin and Datoy be held liable in an amount not less
than P20,000,000.00, representing the missing amount and/or
unauthorized disbursements from the funds of Olympia, plus
the payment of moral damages, exemplary damages and
attorney’s fees.
Paragas and Lobrin filed their answers with compulsory
counterclaims8 against David, to wit:
First Counterclaim — to mandate David to
render an accounting of the amounts mentioned;
Second Counterclaim — to require David to
turn over such books of accounts and other
documents owned by Olympia as well as all
records pertaining to Olympia’s business
transactions in the Philippines;
Third Counterclaim — to make David pay the
amount of P24,893,562.90 to Philam as cash
bonuses of the respective original subscribers;
_______________
8 Id., at pp. 73-108.
655
VOL. 751, FEBRUARY 25, 2015 655
David vs. Paragas, Jr.
Fourth Counterclaim — to make David pay
Lobrin and Paragas the amount of
P24,521,245.00 each, as and by way of actual
damages, representing (1) Lobrin and Paragas’
respective shares as co-owners in the net profit of
Olympia from the sale of the Pre-need plan
under the pares-pares program in the amount of
P14,521,245.00 and the amount of
P10,000,000.00 representing the cost of plane
fares, living allowances and unrealized profit;
Fifth Counterclaim — to hold David liable to
pay Lobrin and Paragas the amount of
P20,000,000.00 each, as and by way of moral
damages;
Sixth Counterclaim — to make David pay the
amount of P10,000,000.00 as and by way of
exemplary damages; and
Seventh Counterclaim — to hold David
personally liable to pay Lobrin and Paragas the
amount of P1,000,000.00 as attorney’s fees, plus
such amount as may be proved during the trial
as litigation expenses and cost of suit.9
On March 5, 2003, David filed the supplemental complaint,
with a manifestation that an amicable settlement was struck
with Lobrin and Datoy whereby they agreed to withdraw the
complaint and counterclaims against each other. On May 6,
2003, Lobrin and Olympia through their counsel, confirmed
that on March 26, 2003, they had arrived at a
compromise.10 The agreement clearly stated that Lobrin was
acting on Olympia’s behalf, on the basis of a resolution passed
during the board meeting held on March 21, 2003. The
settlement reads:
_______________
9 Id., at pp. 27-28.
10 Id., at pp. 44-45.
656
656 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATED
David vs. Paragas, Jr.
COMPROMISE AGREEMENT
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:
This Agreement, entered into by and between:
DAVID M. DAVID, of legal age, married,
Filipino and with address at 23 Pablo Roman
Street, BF Homes, Parañaque, hereinafter
referred to as DMD;
-and-
OLYMPIA INTERNATIONAL LIMITED, a
corporation organized and existing under the
laws of Hong Kong, with principal office at 13/F
Li Dong Building, 7-11 Li Yuen Street East,
Central, Hong Kong, and herein represented by
its Attorney-in-Fact, Henry G. Lobrin, and
herein after referred to as Olympia;
WITNESSETH: That —
WHEREAS, Olympia has passed a board
resolution during the meeting of its Board of
Directors held in Hong Kong on 21 March 2003
constituting and appointing as such its herein
Attorney-in-Fact for the purposes stated in said
resolution, a copy of which is hereto attached as
Annex “A”;
WHEREAS, there is a pending case before
Branch 200 of the Regional Trial Court of Las
Pi[ñ]as City docketed as Civil Case No. LP-02-
0165 (“the Case”) and among the defendants in
said Case are Henry G. Lobrin, Federico M.
Paragas, Jr. and Roberto S. Datoy who are
presently directors of Olympia;
WHEREAS, the causes of action in the
complaint in said Case against aforesaid Lobrin,
Paragas, Jr. and Datoy are in their capacity as
shareholders/directors of Olympia, and likewise
concern the relationship and rights between
DMD and Olympia International Ltd., including
the status of the latter’s operations and financial
position;
WHEREAS, another issue in said case is the
respective rights of herein parties DMD and
Olympia un-
657
VOL. 751, FEBRUARY 25, 2015 657
David vs. Paragas, Jr.
der and pursuant to the General Agency
Agreement (GAA) with Philam Plans, Inc.,
(“PPI”) dated 10 February 1998;
WHEREAS, corollary to the issue of the GAA
is the respective obligation of DMD and Olympia
to the planholders of PPI under the regular
and pares-pares program, specifically the binhing
yaman and pamilyaman benefits due to
approximately 12,000 planholders of Philam
Plans, Inc. (“PPI”) as per the list attached to the
complaint in said Case;
WHEREAS, both DMD and Olympia are
desirous of settling the Case amicably under
mutually acceptable terms and conditions:
NOW, THEREFORE, parties hereby agree as
follows:
1. Olympia hereby waives its rights and
interests to the trust fund presently in Account
Nos. 1-214-25224-0, 07214108903-003 and
0000005292 with the Rizal Commercial Banking
Corporation (“RCBC”) and Account No. 0301-
01334-5 with the Equitable PCI Bank pertaining
to the cash benefits of the approximately 12,000
planholders of Philam Plans, Inc., per the list
attached to the complaint in the Case;
2. Olympia further agrees that the same shall
be settled exclusively by DMD, subject to the
requirement that it shall be furnished a copy of
the Statement of Benefits pertaining to each
planholder;
3. Olympia likewise no longer interposes any
objection/opposition to the payment of the cash
benefits to the planholders from said trust funds,
and shall make of record in the Case the
withdrawal of its opposition;
4. DMD shall drop as party Defendants from
the Case Severo Henry G. Lobrin, Federico M.
Paragas, Jr. and Rodelio S. Datoy;
658
658 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATED
David vs. Paragas, Jr.
5. Olympia shall withdraw its First
Compulsory Counterclaim, Second Compulsory
Counterclaim and Third Compulsory
Counterclaim as stated in the “Answer with
Compulsory Counterclaims” dated 3 October
2002 filed in said Case, because the subject
matters of said compulsory counterclaims are
exclusively the concern of Olympia as a
corporation and are now the subject of this
Compromise Agreement;
6. Olympia shall likewise withdraw the
Fourth Compulsory Counterclaim, Fifth
Compulsory Counterclaim, Sixth Compulsory
Counterclaim and Seventh Compulsory
Counterclaim insofar as they refer to claims to
which the claimants will be entitled in their
capacity as shareholder and/or director of
Olympia;
7. The Fourth Compulsory Counterclaim,
Fifth Compulsory Counterclaim, Sixth
Compulsory Counterclaim and Compulsory
Counterclaim (sic) will also be withdrawn by
Henry G. Lobrin in his personal capacity;
8. For this purpose, the following motions
shall be filed pursuant to this Agreement;
a. A Joint Motion shall be filed in the case for
the dismissal of the complaint and compulsory
counterclaims as above stated;
b. A Motion to Withdraw Opposition to the
Motion to Release Benefits and Supplemental
Motion (to Release Benefits) be filed by Olympia
through its Attorney-in-Fact.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, parties hereto set
their hands this ____ day of __________ in
__________________.
DAVID M. DAVID OLYMPIA
I responsibility/accountability of Plaintiff, subject
NTERNATIONAL Ltd.
659
VOL. 751, FEBRUARY 25, 2015 659
David vs. Paragas, Jr.
By:
HENRY G. LOBRIN
Attorney-in-Fact
HENRY G. LOBRIN
In his personal capacity
[Emphases supplied]11
On May 15, 2003, David and Lobrin filed the Joint
Omnibus Motion to formally inform the RTC of the compromise
agreement. They asserted the following:
2. Said agreement was executed between
Plaintiff and Olympia, the latter being
represented by Defendant Lobrin as Olympia’s
Attorney-in-Fact, pursuant to a resolution passed
by a majority vote during the board meeting held
in Hong [Kong] on 21 March 2003 wherein
Defendants Lobrin, Paragas, Jr. and Datoy were
all present, authorizing said Attorney-in-Fact to
negotiate a compromise settlement regarding
instant case, the payment of the accrued benefits
due the planholders of Philam Plan, Inc. under
the regular and Pares-Pares program as well as
the disposition of the cash and other deposits
with Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation
(RCBC) and other accounts in other banks. Said
resolution is appended to the Agreement as its
Annex “A”;
3. By virtue of said Agreement, Olympia no
longer questions and hereby waives whatever
rights and interest it may have to the deposits
constituting the trust fund pertaining to the cash
benefits of the approximately 12,000 planholders
of Philam Plans Inc., per the list attached to the
complaint in instant case in Account Nos. 1-214-
25224-0, 07214108903-003 and 0000005292 with
RCBC and Account No. 0301-01334-5 with the
Equitable-PCI Bank;
_______________
11 Id., at pp. 112-114.
660
660 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATED
David vs. Paragas, Jr.
4. Olympia further withdraws its
objection/opposition to the payment of the cash
benefits to the planholders from said trust funds
which shall remain to be the sole
to the requirement that Olympia through its
authorized Attorney-in-Fact shall be furnished a
copy of the Statement of Benefits pertaining to
each planholder;
5. As a consequence of the above, Defendants
Severo Henry G. Lobrin, Federico M. Paragas, Jr.
and Rodelio S. Datoy shall be dropped as party
defendants in instant case, to which no objection
will be interposed by Plaintiff, and the motion to
declare Defendant Datoy in default for failure to
file his Answer is similarly withdrawn for having
been rendered moot and academic by the
Agreement;
6. Olympia hereby withdraw[s] its First,
Second and Third Compulsory Counterclaims
against herein Plaintiff considering that the legal
and factual bases thereof are matters which are
exclusively the concern of Olympia as a
corporation and have been the subject of the
Agreement;
7. Olympia likewise withdraws the Fourth,
Fifth, Sixth and Seventh Compulsory
Counterclaim insofar as they refer to the claims
pertaining to Defendants Paragas, Lobrin and
Datoy in their capacity as shareholders and/or
directors of Olympia;
8. Defendant Lobrin likewise withdraws the
Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and Seventh Compulsory
Counterclaim insofar as they refer to claims
pertaining to him in his personal capacity;
9. Plaintiff likewise withdraws his complaint
against Defendant Gera[l]d P.S. Algarra based
on the statements contained in the latter’s
Answer, and said Defendant likewise withdraws
his Counterclaims against plaintiff, however,
Plaintiff reserves his right to implead the proper
party Defendant; and
661
VOL. 751, FEBRUARY 25, 2015 661
David vs. Paragas, Jr.
10. This motion is without prejudice to the
right of Defendant Paragas to join and/or avail of
the benefits of the Agreement and instant Motion
hereinafter.12
On May 8, 2003, Paragas questioned the existence of the
cited BOD resolution granting Lobrin the authority to settle the
case, as well as the validity of the agreement through an
affidavit duly authenticated by the Philippine Consul, Domingo
Lucinario, Jr. He pointed to the fact that Olympia, as an entity,
was never a party in the controversy.
On July 21, 2003, the RTC granted David’s Motion to Admit
the Supplemental Complaint and approved the compromise
agreement, to wit:
Further, finding the agreement in the JOINT
OMNIBUS MOTION to be well-taken, not
contrary to law, public policy and morals, the
same is hereby APPROVED and the motion
GRANTED. The resolution is hereby rendered
based thereon, thus, the parties concerned are
enjoined to faithfully comply with all the terms
and conditions stated therein. As prayed for by
the parties concerned in the JOINT OMNIBUS
MOTION, let Henry G. Lobrin, Rodelio S. Datoy
and Gera[l]d PS Algarra BE DROPPED as party
defendants except defendant Federico Paragas,
Jr. who filed an Opposition thereto, and the
compulsory counterclaims between defendants
Lobrin, Datoy and Algarra and plaintiff David
against each other DISMISSED. The withdrawal
of the motion to declare defendant Datoy is
hereby noted.13
On August 15, 2003, Paragas moved for
reconsideration,14 claiming that although the parties had the
prerogative to settle their differences amicably, the intrinsic
and extrinsic validity of the compromise agreement, as well as
its basis, may be questioned if illicit and unlawful.
_______________
12 Id., at pp. 109-111.
13 Id., at p. 130.
14 Id., at pp. 131-137.
662
662 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATED
David vs. Paragas, Jr.
In its September 30, 2003 Order,15 the RTC denied the
motion of Paragas.
Unperturbed, Paragas elevated the issue to the CA via a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
In its July 31, 2006 Decision, the CA reversed the RTC’s
approval of the compromise agreement. It explained that the
agreement entered into by David, Lobrin and Datoy was invalid
for two reasons: First, the agreement was between David and
Olympia, which was not a party in the case;
and second, assuming that Olympia could be considered a
party, there was no showing that the signatory had the
authority from Olympia or from the other parties being sued to
enter into a compromise.
David moved for reconsideration. In its February 23, 2007
Resolution, the CA denied his motion.
Hence, this petition.
Grounds of the Petition
I. RESPONDENT COURT LACKED
AND/OR EXCEEDED ITS JURISDICTION
WHEN IT MODIFIED THE ORDER OF THE
TRIAL COURT DATED JULY 21, 2003,
DESPITE THE ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
BEING SPECIFICALLY LIMITED TO THE
ORDER OF THE TRIAL COURT DATED
SEPTEMBER 30, 2003 WHICH DENIED
THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
FILED BY HEREIN PRIVATE David vs. Paragas, Jr.
RESPONDENT. because Paragas did not assail the July 21, 2003 Order, the
II. OLYMPIA IS NOT A PARTY TO THE same should not have been modified by the CA.
He further insists that the CA should not have annulled the
CASE BELOW, HENCE, THE DISMISSAL compromise agreement because the July 21, 2003 RTC Order
OF THE COMPLAINT AND COMPULSORY did not refer to the approval of the compromise agreement, but
COUNTERCLAIMS ARE PERSONAL IN to the agreement of the parties to dismiss the claims and
counterclaims against each other. In support of this position,
NATURE TO THE PARTIES AND IS David takes refuge in the RTC statement that the parties had
WITHIN THE PURVIEW OF SECTION 2 OF the right to “amicably settle their issues even if subject
RULE 17. compromise agreement had not been entered into.” To him, it
was not the “Compromise Agreement” that was approved, but
_______________ the “underlying agreement between the parties to withdraw
their claims against each other which are personal to them in
nature.”
15 Id., at p. 138.
Lastly, David submits that he was denied due process of
663
law when the CA annulled the compromise agreement based on
unsubstantiated allegations of fact, that is, the allegation that
VOL. 751, FEBRUARY 25, 2015 663 the board meeting granting Lobrin the authority to enter into
David vs. Paragas, Jr. compromise with him on behalf of Olympia and on behalf of the
other parties did not take place. He believes that Paragas failed
III. THERE IS DENIAL OF DUE to prove his allegations and, therefore, the meeting, as
PROCESS OF LAW WHEN RESPONDENT supported by the minutes signed by one Flordeliza Sacapano,
COURT ANNULLED THE COMPROMISE must be respected as a matter of fact.
AGREEMENT BASED ON The Court’s Ruling
UNSUBSTANTIATED ALLEGATIONS OF
FACT CONTAINED IN THE PETITION.16 The Court denies the petition.

The CA did not exceed its jurisdiction in modifying the July 21,
In his reply,17 David limited his “discussion to the issue that 2003 RTC Order
still has a practical bearing on the case below,” 18 that is,
whether or not the nullification of the Compromise Agreement In his petition, David claims that the CA exceeded its
similarly nullified the dismissal of both the complaint as jurisdiction when it modified the July 21, 2003 Order of the
against the defendants x x x.19 RTC by admitting David’s supplemental complaint and
In the Resolution, dated February 16, 2011, the Court gave approving the earlier mentioned compromise agreement even
due course to the petition and directed the parties to file their though Paragas’ petition for certiorari before the CA only
respective memoranda.20 While Paragas was able to file his 665
memorandum on May 16, 2011, David’s memorandum was VOL. 751, FEBRUARY 25, 2015 665
dispensed with in a resolution, dated June 19, 2013, for his
failure to file one within the extended period granted by the
David vs. Paragas, Jr.
Court.21 questioned the September 30, 2003 Order of the RTC
denying his motion for reconsideration.22
Position of David This Court is unmoved by this position advocated by David.
In countless cases, the Court has allowed the consideration
David charges the CA with grave abuse of discretion in of other grounds or matters not raised or assigned as errors. In
dispensing a relief more than what Paragas prayed for. the case of Cordero v. F.S. Management & Development
According to David, the CA exceeded its jurisdiction when it Corporation,23 the Court wrote:
annulled the compromise agreement despite the fact that the While a party is required to indicate in his
assignment of error in the petition of Paragas before the CA brief an assignment of errors and only those
was limited only to the review of the correctness of the RTC’s
September 30, 2003 Order denying the motion for
assigned shall be considered by the appellate
reconsideration and not the July 21, 2003 Order approving the court in deciding the case, appellate courts have
compromise agreement. In other words, David is of the view ample authority to rule on matters not assigned
that
as errors in an appeal if these are indispensable
_______________
or necessary to the just resolution of the pleaded
16 Id., at p. 24. issues. Thus this Court has allowed the
17 Id., at pp. 227-232. consideration of other grounds or matters not
18 Id., at p. 228. raised or assigned as errors, to wit: 1)
19 Id. grounds affecting jurisdiction over the subject
20 Id., at p. 239. matter; 2) matters which are evidently plain or
21 Id., at p. 299.
clerical errors within the contemplation of the
664 law; 3) matters the consideration of which is
664 SUPREME COURT REPORTS necessary in arriving at a just decision and
ANNOTATED complete resolution of the case or to serve
the interest of justice or to avoid dispensing
piecemeal justice; 4) matters of record
which were raised in the trial court and
which have some bearing on the issue
submitted which the parties failed to raise
or which the lower court ignored; 5) matters
closely related to an error assigned; and
6) matters upon which the determination of
a question properly assigned is
dependent. [Emphases supplied] 24
In this case, while it is true that Paragas’ petition
for certiorari before the CA only assailed the subsequent order
of the RTC denying his August 15, 2003 Motion for
Reconsideration,
_______________
22 Id., at pp. 25-26.
23 536 Phil. 1151, 1159; 506 SCRA 451, 460-461
(2006).
24 Id.
666
666 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATED
David vs. Paragas, Jr.
he did pray in the said motion for reconsideration that it set
aside and reverse its approval of the Joint Omnibus Motion.
The prayer reads:
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of
this Honorable Court that the Order dated 21
July 2003 be MODIFIED to SET ASIDE and
REVERSE the approval of the Joint Omnibus
Motion dated 15 May 2003 and a new one be
issued DENYING said motion.25
Obviously, the resolution of his motion for reconsideration
necessarily involved the July 21, 2003 Order of the RTC as it
was indispensable and inextricably linked with the September
30, 2003 Order being assailed.
The CA did not err in annulling the compromise agreement.
At the outset, David asserts that the CA based the
annulment of the compromise agreement exclusively on the
unsubstantiated allegations of Paragas.
The Court disagrees. A careful reading of the assailed CA
decision reveals that it did not merely rely on the claims of
Paragas. What the CA did was to analyze and appreciate the
circumstances behind the compromise agreement. In revisiting
and delving deep into the records, the Court indeed agrees with
the CA that the RTC gravely abused its discretion in approving
the agreement for the following reasons:
First, the subject compromise agreement could not be the
basis of the withdrawal of the respective complaint and
counterclaims of the parties for it was entered into by David
with a nonparty in the proceedings. Even if the Court interprets
that the RTC approved the underlying agreement to with-
_______________
25 Rollo, p. 135.
667
VOL. 751, FEBRUARY 25, 2015 667
David vs. Paragas, Jr.
draw the claims and counterclaims between the parties, the
terms and conditions of the subject compromise agreement
cannot cover the interests of Olympia, being a nonparty to the
suit.
Second, the RTC had no authority to approve the said
compromise agreement because Olympia was not impleaded as
a party, although its participation was indispensable to the
resolution of the entire controversy.
A compromise agreement could not be the basis of
dismissal/withdrawal of a complaint and counterclaims if it
was entered into with a nonparty to the suit.
A compromise agreement is a contract whereby the parties
make reciprocal concessions in order to resolve their differences
and, thus, avoid or put an end to a lawsuit. They adjust their
difficulties in the manner they have agreed upon, disregarding
the possible gain in litigation and keeping in mind that such
gain is balanced by the danger of losing. It must not be contrary
to law, morals, good customs and public policy, and must have
been freely and intelligently executed by and between the
parties.26 A compromise agreement may be executed in and out
of court. Once a compromise agreement is given judicial
approval, however, it becomes more than a contract binding
upon the parties. Having been sanctioned by the court, it is
entered as a determination of a controversy and has the force
and effect of a judgment.27
Verily, a judicially approved compromise agreement, in
order to be binding upon the litigants with the force and effect
_______________
26 Magbanua v. Uy, 497 Phil. 511, 518; 458 SCRA
184, 190 (2005).
27 Armed Forces of the Philippines Benefit
Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 370 Phil. 150, 163;
311 SCRA 143, 154-155 (1999).
668
668 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
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David vs. Paragas, Jr.
of a judgment, must have been executed by them. In this
case, the compromise agreement was signed by David in his
capacity as the complainant in the civil case, and Olympia,
through Lobrin as its agent. The agreement made plain that
the terms and conditions the “parties” were to follow were
agreed upon by David and Olympia. Datoy and Paragas never
appeared to have agreed to such terms for it was Olympia,
despite not being a party to the civil case, which was a party to
the agreement. Despite this, David claims that the concessions
were made by Olympia on behalf of the non-signatory parties
and such should be binding on them.
David must note that Olympia is a separate being, or at
least should be treated as one distinct from the personalities of
its owners, partners or even directors. Under the doctrine of
processual presumption, this Court has to presume that Hong
Kong laws is the same as that of the Philippines particularly
with respect to the legal characterization of Olympia’s legal
status as an artificial person. Elementary is the rule that under
Philippine corporate and partnership laws, a corporation or a
partnership possesses a personality separate from that of its
incorporators or partners. Olympia should, thus, be accorded
the status of an artificial being at least for the purpose of this
controversy.
 On that basis, Olympia’s interest should be detached from
those of directors Paragas, Lobrin, Datoy, and even David.
Their (individual directors) interest are merely indirect,
contingent and inchoate. Because Olympia’s involvement in the
compromise was not the same as that of the other parties who
were, in the first place, never part of it, the compromise
agreement could not have the force and effect of a judgment
binding upon the litigants, specifically Datoy and Paragas.
Conversely, the judicially approved withdrawal of the claims on
the basis of that compromise could not be given effect for such
agreement did not concern the parties in the civil case.
David, nevertheless, points out that the validity of the
dismissal of the claims and counterclaims must remain on the
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David vs. Paragas, Jr.
argument that the compromise agreement was made in
their personal capacities inasmuch as he filed the complaint
against Paragas, Lobrin and Datoy also in their personal
capacities. He draws support from the Answer with Compulsory
Counterclaims28 filed by Paragas and Lobrin. The counterclaims
against him did not involve Olympia, save for the demand to
render an accounting as well as to turn over the books of
account and records pertaining to the latter. David, thus,
stated:
It is very clear from the order of July 21, 2003
that the agreement being referred to as having
been approved is not the Compromise Agreement
but the agreement of the parties to dismiss the
claims and counterclaims against each other.
This is obvious when the order stated that it is
within the right of the parties to amicably settle
the issues even if subject Compromise
Agreement had not been entered into. Clearly, it
was not the Compromise Agreement that was
approved, because precisely it involved Olympia,
but the underlying agreement between the
parties to withdraw their claims against each
other which are personal to them in nature. As
noted by the trial court, even without the
Compromise Agreement, parties could still settle
the case amicably and withdraw the claims
against one another which is precisely what the
parties did.29
His contention is devoid of merit.
While David repeatedly claims that his complaint against
Paragas, Lobrin and Datoy was personal in character, a review
of the causes of action raised by him in his complaint shows
that it primarily involved Olympia. As defined, a cause of action
is an act or omission by which a party violates a right of
another. It requires the existence of a legal right on the part of
the plaintiff, a correlative obligation of the defen-
_______________
28 Rollo, pp. 73-108.
29 Id., at p. 29.
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670 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
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David vs. Paragas, Jr.
dant to respect such right and an act or omission of such
defendant in violation of the plaintffs’s rights.30
In his complaint, David raised three causes of action.
The first one dealt with the alleged omission on the part of the
other venture partners to respect his right, being Olympia’s
beneficial owner and PPI’s principal agent under the GAA, over
the income generated from the sale PPI’s pre-need plans.
The second dealt with his right over all amounts that the
venture partners disbursed in excess of those authorized by
him, under the premise that he remained Olympia’s beneficial
owner. The third dealt with the acts of the venture partners in
causing undue humiliation and shame when he was prevented
from boarding his Singapore-bound plane pursuant to the
Watch-List Order issued by the Bureau of Immigration at the
behest of a letter sent by the counsel of Paragas. Accordingly,
David prayed that the RTC:
a. Declare him as the one entitled to the commission due
under the regular and Pares-Pares programs net of the agents’
commission in his capacity as Principal Agent under the
General Agency Agreement with Philam Plans, Inc.;
b. Hold the cash deposits of P19,302,902.00 to the extent of
P18,631,900.00 as a trust fund for the benefit of the subscribers
of the Pares-Pares Program and validly held in trust by [him];
c. Order Defendant RCBC to recognize no other signatory to
said deposits except [him].
x x x x 31
_______________
30 Noynay v. Citihomes Builder and Development,
Inc., G.R. No. 204160, September 22, 2014, 735 SCRA
708.
31 Rollo, p. 70.
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David vs. Paragas, Jr.
Essentially, David was asking for judicial determination of
his rights over Olympia’s revenues, funds in the RCBC bank
accounts and the amounts used and expended by Olympia
through the acts of its directors/defendants. Nothing therein
can be said to be “personal” claims against Paragas, Lobrin and
Datoy, except for his claim for damages resulting from the
humiliation he suffered when he was prevented from boarding
his Singapore-bound plane. Obviously, the argument that they
executed the compromise agreement in their personal
capacities does not hold water.
For even if the Court looks closer at the concessions made,
many provisions deal with Olympia’s interests instead of the
personal claims they have against one another. A review of the
Joint Omnibus Motion would also show that the compromise
agreement dealt more with David and Olympia. Given this,
Olympia did not have the standing in court to enter into a
compromise agreement unless impleaded as a party. The RTC
did not have the authority either to determine Olympia’s rights
and obligations. Furthermore, to allow the compromise
agreement to stand is to deprive Olympia of its properties and
interest for it was never shown that the person who signed the
agreement on its behalf had any authority to do so.
More importantly, Lobrin, who signed the compromise
agreement, failed to satisfactorily prove his authority to bind
Olympia. The CA observed, and this Court agrees, that the
“board resolution” allegedly granting authority to Lobrin to
enter into a compromise agreement on behalf of Olympia was
more of a part of the “minutes” of a board meeting containing a
proposal to settle the case with David or to negotiate a
settlement. It should be noted that the said document was not
prepared or issued by the Corporate Secretary of Olympia but
by a “Secretary to the Meeting.” Moreover, the said resolution
was neither acknowledged before a notarial officer in Hong
Kong nor authenticated before the Philippine Consul in Hong
672
672 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
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David vs. Paragas, Jr.
Kong.32 Considering these facts, the RTC should have
denied the Joint Omnibus Motion and disapproved the
compromise agreement. In fine, Olympia was not shown to have
properly consented to the agreement, for the rule is, a
corporation can only act through its Board of Directors or
anyone with the authority of the latter. To allow the
compromise agreement to stand is to deprive Olympia of its
properties and interest for it was never shown that Lobrin had
the necessary authority to sign the agreement on Olympia’s
behalf.
Olympia is an indispensable Party
In Lotte Phil. Co., Inc. v. Dela Cruz,33 the Court reiterated
that an indispensable party is a party-in-interest without whom
no final determination can be had of an action, and who shall be
joined either as plaintiffs or defendants. The joinder of
indispensable parties is mandatory. The presence of
indispensable parties is necessary to vest the court with
jurisdiction, which is “the authority to hear and determine a
cause, the right to act in a case.”34
Considering that David was asking for judicial
determination of his rights in Olympia, it is without a doubt, an
indispensable party as it stands to be injured or benefited by
the outcome of the main proceeding. It has such an interest in
the controversy that a final decree would necessarily affect its
rights. Not having been impleaded, Olympia cannot be
prejudiced by any judgment where its interests and properties
are adjudicated in favor of another even if the latter is a
beneficial owner. It cannot be said either to have consented to
the judicial approval of the compromise, much less waived
substantial rights, because it was never a party in the
proceedings.
_______________
32 Id., at pp. 53-54.
33 502 Phil. 816; 464 SCRA 591 (2005).
34 Insular Savings Bank v. Far East Bank and Trust
Company, 525 Phil. 238, 250; 492 SCRA 145, 157 (2006).
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David vs. Paragas, Jr.
Moreover, Olympia’s absence did not confer upon the RTC
the jurisdiction or authority to hear and resolve the whole
controversy. This lack of authority on the part of the RTC which
flows from the absence of Olympia, being an indispensable
party, necessarily negates any binding effect of the subject
judicially-approved compromise agreement.
Time and again, the Court has held that the absence of an
indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court
null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the
absent parties but even to those present. The failure to implead
an indispensable party is not a mere procedural matter. Rather,
it brings to fore the right of a disregarded party to its
constitutional rights to due process. Having Olympia’s interest
being subjected to a judicially-approved agreement, absent any
participation in the proceeding leading to the same, is
procedurally flawed. It is unfair for being violative of its right to
due process. In fine, a holding that is based on a compromise
agreement that springs from a void proceeding for want of
jurisdiction over the person of an indispensable party can never
become binding, final nor executory and it may be “ignored
wherever and whenever it exhibits its head.”35
Lest it be misunderstood, after the remand of this case to
the RTC, the parties can still enter into a compromise
agreement on matters which are personal to them. That is their
absolute right. They can dismiss their claims and counterclaims
against each other, but the dismissal should not be dependent
or contingent on a compromise agreement, one signatory to
which is not a party. It should not also involve or affect the
rights of Olympia, the nonparty, unless it is properly impleaded
as one. Needless to state, a judicial determina-
_______________
35 Crisologo v. JEWM, G.R. No. 196894, March 3,
2014, 717 SCRA 644, citing Buena v. Sapnay, 116 Phil.
1023; 6 SCRA 706 (1962), citing Banco Español-
Filipino v. Palanca, 37 Phil. 921 (1918); Lipana v. Court
of First Instance of Cavite, 74 Phil. 18 (1942).
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674 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
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David vs. Paragas, Jr.
tion of the rights of Olympia, when it is not a party, would
necessarily affect the rights of its shareholders or partners, like
Paragas, without due process of law.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The July 31,
2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals and its February 23, 2007
Resolution in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 80942 are
hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio (Chairperson), Velasco, Jr.,** Del
Castillo andLeonen, JJ., concur.
Petition denied, judgment and resolution affirmed.
Notes.—If a party fails or refuses to abide by a compromise
agreement, the other party may either enforce the compromise
or regard it as rescinded and insist upon his original demand.
(Diamond Builders Conglomeration vs. Country Bankers
Insurance Corporation, 540 SCRA 194 [2007])
A corporation, upon coming into existence, is invested by law
with a personality separate and distinct from those of the
persons composing it as well as from any other legal entity to
which it may be related. (Commissioner of Customs vs. Oilink
International Corporation, 728 SCRA469 [2014])
——o0o——
April 17, 2013. G.R. No. 191667.*
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES,
petitioner, vs.EDUARDO M. CACAYURAN, respondent.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Taxpayer’s
Suits; For a taxpayer’s suit to prosper, two
requisites must be met namely, (1) public funds
derived from taxation are disbursed by a political
subdivision or instrumentality and in doing so, a
law is violated or some irregularity is committed;
and (2) the petitioner is directly affected by the
alleged act.—It is hornbook principle that a
taxpayer is allowed to sue where there is a claim
that public funds are illegally disbursed, or that
public money is being deflected to any improper
purpose, or that there is wastage of public funds
through the enforcement of an invalid or
unconstitutional law. A person suing as a
taxpayer, however, must show that the act
complained of directly involves the illegal
disbursement of public funds derived from
taxation. In other words, for a taxpayer’s suit to
prosper, two requisites must be met namely, (1)
public funds derived from taxation are disbursed
by a political subdivision or instrumentality and
in doing so, a law is violated or some irregularity
is committed; and (2) the petitioner is directly
affected by the alleged act.
Local Government Units; Internal Revenue
Allotments (IRA); The Municipality’s Internal
Revenue Allotment, which serves as the local
government unit’s just share in the national
taxes, is in the nature of public funds derived
from taxation.—Although the con-
_______________
* SECOND DIVISION.
862
8 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
62 ANNOTATED
Land Bank of the Philippines vs.
Cacayuran
struction of the APC would be primarily
sourced from the proceeds of the Subject Loans,
which Land Bank insists are not taxpayer’s
money, there is no denying that public funds
derived from taxation are bound to be expended
as the Municipality assigned a portion of its IRA
as a security for the foregoing loans. Needless to
state, the Municipality’s IRA, which serves as
the local government unit’s just share in the
national taxes, is in the nature of public funds
derived from taxation. The Court believes,
however, that although these funds may be
posted as a security, its collateralization should
only be deemed effective during the incumbency
of the public officers who approved the same, else
those who succeed them be effectively deprived of
its use. In any event, it is observed that the
proceeds from the Subject Loans had already
been converted into public funds by the
Municipality’s receipt thereof. Funds coming
from private sources become impressed with the
characteristics of public funds when they are
under official custody.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Taxpayer’s
Suits; A taxpayer need not be a party to the
contract to challenge its validity; as long as taxes
are involved, people have a right to question
contracts entered into by the government.—As a
resident-taxpayer of the Municipality, Cacayuran
is directly affected by the conversion of the Agoo
Plaza which was funded by the proceeds of the
Subject Loans. It is well-settled that public
plazas are properties for public use and
therefore, belongs to the public dominion. As
such, it can be used by anybody and no one can
exercise over it the rights of a private owner. In
this light, Cacayuran had a direct interest in
ensuring that the Agoo Plaza would not be
exploited for commercial purposes through the
APC’s construction. Moreover, Cacayuran need
not be privy to the Subject Loans in order to
proffer his objections thereto. In Mamba v. Lara,
608 SCRA 149 (2009), it has been held that a
taxpayer need not be a party to the contract to
challenge its validity; as long as taxes are
involved, people have a right to question
contracts entered into by the government.
Local Government Units; Ultra Vires Acts;
An act which is outside of the municipality’s
jurisdiction is considered as a void ultra vires
act, while an act attended only by an irregularity
but remains within the municipality’s power is
considered as an ultra vires act subject to
ratification and/or validation.—Generally, an
ultra vires act is one committed outside the
object for which a corporation is
863
VOL. 696, APRIL 17, 2013 8
63
Land Bank of the Philippines vs.
Cacayuran
created as defined by the law of its
organization and therefore beyond the powers
conferred upon it by law. There are two (2) types
of ultra vires acts. As held in Middletown
Policemen’s Benevolent Association v. Township
of Middletown, 162 N.J. 361, 368 (2000): There is
a distinction between an act utterly beyond
the jurisdiction of a municipal
corporation and the irregular exercise of a
basic power under the legislative grant in
matters not in themselves jurisdictional.
The former are ultra vires in the primary sense
and void; the latter, ultra vires only in a
secondary sense which does not preclude
ratification or the application of the
doctrine of estoppel in the interest of
equity and essential justice. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied) In other words, an act
which is outside of the municipality’s jurisdiction
is considered as a void ultra viresact, while an
act attended only by an irregularity but remains
within the municipality’s power is considered as
an ultra vires act subject to ratification and/or
validation. To the former belongs municipal
contracts which (a) are entered into beyond the
express, implied or inherent powers of the local
government unit; and (b) do not comply with the
substantive requirements of law e.g., when
expenditure of public funds is to be made, there
must be an actual appropriation and certificate
of availability of funds; while to the latter
belongs those which (a) are entered into by the
improper department, board, officer of agent; and
(b) do not comply with the formal requirements
of a written contract e.g., the Statute of Frauds.
Civil Law; Contracts; Article 1409(1) of the
Civil Code provides that purpose is contrary to
law, morals, good customs, public order or public
policy is considered void and as such, creates no
rights or obligations or any juridical relations.—
Article 1409(1) of the Civil Code provides that a
contract whose purpose is contrary to law,
morals, good customs, public order or public
policy is considered void and as such, creates no
rights or obligations or any juridical relations.
Consequently, given the unlawful purpose
behind the Subject Loans which is to fund the
commercialization of the Agoo Plaza pursuant to
the Redevelopment Plan, they are considered
as ultra vires in the primary sense thus,
rendering them void and in effect, non-binding
on the Municipality. At this juncture, it is
equally observed that the land on which the Agoo
Plaza is situated cannot be converted into
patrimonial property―as the SB tried to when
it passed Municipal Ordinance No. 02-
2007―absent any express grant by the
national government. As public land used for
public
864
8 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
64 ANNOTATED
Land Bank of the Philippines vs.
Cacayuran
use, the foregoing lot rightfully belongs to
and is subject to the administration and control
of the Republic of the Philippines. Hence,
without the said grant, the Municipality has no
right to claim it as patrimonial property.
Local Government Units; Ultra Vires Acts;
Case law states that public officials can be held
personally accountable for acts claimed to have
been performed in connection with official duties
where they have acted ultra vires.—Nevertheless,
while the Subject Loans cannot bind the
Municipality for being ultra vires, the officers
who authorized the passage of the Subject
Resolutions are personally liable. Case law states
that public officials can be held personally
accountable for acts claimed to have been
performed in connection with official duties
where they have acted ultra vires, as in this case.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of
Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
LBP Legal Services Group for petitioner.
Pablo M. Olarte for respondent.
PERLAS-BERNABE,J.:
Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari1 is the
March 26, 2010 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. CV. No. 89732 which affirmed with modification the April
10, 2007 Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Agoo, La
Union, Branch 31, declaring inter aliathe nullity of the loan
agreements entered into by petitioner Land Bank of
_______________
1 Rollo, pp. 10-37.
2 Id., at pp. 42-73. Penned by Associate Justice Celia
C. Librea-Leagogo, with Associate Justices Ramon R.
Garcia and Stephen C. Cruz, concurring.
3 Id., at pp. 74-203. Penned by Executive Judge
Clifton U. Ganay.
865
VOL. 696, APRIL 17, 2013 865
Land Bank of the Philippines vs.
Cacayuran
the Philippines (Land Bank) and the Municipality of Agoo, La
Union (Municipality).
The Facts
From 2005 to 2006, the Municipality’s Sangguniang
Bayan (SB) passed certain resolutions to implement a multi-
phased plan (Redevelopment Plan) to redevelop the Agoo Public
Plaza (Agoo Plaza) where the Imelda Garden and Jose Rizal
Monument were situated.
To finance phase 1 of the said plan, the SB initially passed
Resolution No. 68-20054 on April 19, 2005, authorizing then
Mayor Eufranio Eriguel (Mayor Eriguel) to obtain a loan from
Land Bank and incidental thereto, mortgage a 2,323.75 square
meter lot situated at the southeastern portion of the Agoo Plaza
(Plaza Lot) as collateral. To serve as additional security, it
further authorized the assignment of a portion of its internal
revenue allotment (IRA) and the monthly income from the
proposed project in favor of Land Bank.5 The foregoing terms
were confirmed, approved and ratified on October 4, 2005
through Resolution No. 139-2005.6 Consequently, on November
21, 2005, Land Bank extended a P4,000,000.00 loan in favor of
the Municipality (First Loan),7 the proceeds of which were used
to construct ten (10) kiosks at the northern and southern
portions of the Imelda Garden. After completion, these kiosks
were rented out.8
On March 7, 2006, the SB passed Resolution No. 58-
2006,9 approving the construction of a commercial center on the
_______________
4 Id., at pp. 79-83.
5 Id., at p. 63.
6 Id., at pp. 120-125.
7 Id., at p. 64.
8 Id., at pp. 87-88.
9 Id., at pp. 115-120. Records reveal that there are
two (2) versions of Resolution No. 58-2006. While in both
versions the SB approved the construction of the said
commercial center, the second
866
866 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Land Bank of the Philippines vs.
Cacayuran
Plaza Lot as part of phase II of the Redevelopment Plan. To
finance the project, Mayor Eriguel was again authorized to
obtain a loan from Land Bank, posting as well the same
securities as that of the First Loan. All previous
representations and warranties of Mayor Eriguel related to the
negotiation and obtention of the new loan10 were ratified on
September 5, 2006 through Resolution No. 128-2006.11 In
consequence, Land Bank granted a second loan in favor of the
Municipality on October 20, 2006 in the principal amount of
P28,000,000.00 (Second Loan).12
Unlike phase 1 of the Redevelopment Plan, the construction
of the commercial center at the Agoo Plaza was vehemently
objected to by some residents of the Municipality. Led by
respondent Eduardo Cacayuran (Cacayuran), these residents
claimed that the conversion of the Agoo Plaza into a commercial
center, as funded by the proceeds from the First and Second
Loans (Subject Loans), were “highly irregular, violative of the
law, and detrimental to public interests, and will result to
wanton desecration of the said historical and public park.” 13 The
foregoing was embodied in a Manifesto,14 launched through a
signature campaign conducted by the residents and Cacayuran.
In addition, Cacayuran wrote a letter15 dated December 8,
2006 addressed to Mayor Eriguel, Vice Mayor Antonio Eslao
(Vice Mayor Eslao), and the members of the SB namely, Violeta
Laroya-Balbin, Jaime Boado, Jr., Rogelio De Vera, James
_______________
version further authorized Mayor Eriguel to
negotiate and enter into a loan with Land Bank for the
aforesaid purpose, as well as mortgage, assign, or
execute any other collateral agreement to secure the
payment of such loan.
10 Id., at p. 65.
11 Id., at pp. 125-127.
12 Id., at p. 65.
13 Id., at pp. 213-215.
14 Id.
15 Id., at pp. 216-218.
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Land Bank of the Philippines vs.
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Dy, Crisogono Colubong, Ricardo Fronda, Josephus Komiya,
Erwina Eriguel, Felizardo Villanueva, and Gerard Mamuyac
(Implicated Officers), expressing the growing public clamor
against the conversion of the Agoo Plaza into a commercial
center. He then requested the foregoing officers to furnish him
certified copies of various documents related to the
aforementioned conversion including, among others, the
resolutions approving the Redevelopment Plan as well as the
loan agreements for the sake of public information and
transparency.
Unable to get any response, Cacayuran, invoking his right
as a taxpayer, filed a Complaint16 against the Implicated
Officers and Land Bank, assailing, among others, the validity of
the Subject Loans on the ground that the Plaza Lot used as
collateral thereof is property of public dominion and therefore,
beyond the commerce of man.17
Upon denial of the Motion to Dismiss dated December 27,
2006,18 the Implicated Officers and Land Bank filed their
respective Answers.
For its part, Land Bank claimed that it is not privy to the
Implicated Officers’ acts of destroying the Agoo Plaza. It further
asserted that Cacayuran did not have a cause of action against
it since he was not privy to any of the Subject Loans.19
During the pendency of the proceedings, the construction of
the commercial center was completed and the said structure
later became known as the Agoo’s People Center (APC).
On May 8, 2007, the SB passed Municipal Ordinance No.
02-2007,20 declaring the area where the APC stood as
patrimonial property of the Municipality.
_______________
16 Id., at pp. 205-212.
17 Id., at p. 208.
18 Id., at p. 49.
19 Id., at p. 53.
20 Id., at pp. 219-220.
868
868 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
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Land Bank of the Philippines vs.
Cacayuran
The Ruling of the RTC
In its Decision dated April 10, 2007,21 the RTC ruled in
favor of Cacayuran, declaring the nullity of the Subject
Loans.22 It found that the resolutions approving the said loans
were passed in a highly irregular manner and thus, ultra vires;
as such, the Municipality is not bound by the same.23 Moreover,
it found that the Plaza Lot is proscribed from collateralization
given its nature as property for public use.24
Aggrieved, Land Bank filed its Notice of Appeal on April 23,
2007.25 On the other hand, the Implicated Officers’ appeal was
deemed abandoned and dismissed for their failure to file an
appellants’ brief despite due notice.26 In this regard, only Land
Bank’s appeal was given due course by the CA.
Ruling of the CA
In its Decision dated March 26, 2010,27 the CA affirmed
with modification the RTC’s ruling, excluding Vice Mayor Eslao
from any personal liability arising from the Subject Loans.28
It held, among others, that: (1) Cacayuran had locus
standi to file his complaint, considering that (a) he was born,
raised and a bona fide resident of the Municipality; and (b) the
issue at hand involved public interest of transcendental
importance;29 (2) Resolution Nos. 68-2005, 139-2005, 58-2006,
128-2006 and all other related resolutions (Subject Resolutions)
_______________
21 Id., at pp. 74-203.
22 Id., at p. 199.
23 Id., at pp. 148-149.
24 Id., at pp. 145-147.
 25 Id., at p. 56.
26 Id., at p. 45.
27 Id., at pp. 42-73.
28 Id., at p. 69.
29 Id., at pp. 62-63.
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were invalidly passed due to the SB’s non-compliance with
certain sections of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as
the “Local Government Code of 1991” (LGC); (3) the Plaza Lot,
which served as collateral for the Subject Loans, is property of
public dominion and thus, cannot be appropriated either by the
State or by private persons;30and (4) the Subject Loans are ultra
vires because they were transacted without proper authority
and their collateralization constituted improper disbursement
of public funds.
Dissatisfied, Land Bank filed the instant petition.
Issues Before the Court
The following issues have been raised for the Court’s
resolution: (1) whether Cacayuran has standing to sue; (2)
whether the Subject Resolutions were validly passed; and (3)
whether the Subject Loans are ultra vires.
The Court’s Ruling
The petition lacks merit.
Cacayuran’s standing to sue A.
Land Bank claims that Cacayuran did not have any
standing to contest the construction of the APC as it was
funded through the proceeds coming from the Subject Loans
and not from public funds. Besides, Cacayuran was not even a
party to any of the Subject Loans and is thus, precluded from
questioning the same.
The argument is untenable.
It is hornbook principle that a taxpayer is allowed to sue
where there is a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed,
or that public money is being deflected to any im-
_______________
30 Id., at p. 67.
870
870 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
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proper purpose, or that there is wastage of public funds through
the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law. A person
suing as a taxpayer, however, must show that the act
complained of directly involves the illegal disbursement of
public funds derived from taxation. In other words, for a
taxpayer’s suit to prosper, two requisites must be met namely,
(1) public funds derived from taxation are disbursed by a
political subdivision or instrumentality and in doing so, a law is
violated or some irregularity is committed; and (2) the
petitioner is directly affected by the alleged act. 31
Records reveal that the foregoing requisites are present in
the instant case.
First, although the construction of the APC would be
primarily sourced from the proceeds of the Subject Loans,
which Land Bank insists are not taxpayer’s money, there is no
denying that public funds derived from taxation are bound to be
expended as the Municipality assigned a portion of its IRA as a
security for the foregoing loans. Needless to state, the
Municipality’s IRA, which serves as the local government unit’s
just share in the national taxes,32 is in the nature of public
funds derived from taxation. The Court believes, however, that
although these funds may be posted as a security, its
collateralization should only be deemed effective during the
incumbency of the public officers who approved the same, else
those who succeed them be effectively deprived of its use.
In any event, it is observed that the proceeds from the
Subject Loans had already been converted into public funds by
_______________
31 Mamba v. Lara, G.R. No. 165109, December 14,
2009, 608 SCRA 149, 162, citing Bagatsing v. San Juan,
329 Phil. 8, 13; 260 SCRA 250, 253 (1996).
32 Sec. 284 of the LGC provides as follows:
284. Sec.Allotment of Internal Revenue
Taxes.―Local government units shall have a share
in the national internal revenue taxes based on the
collection of the third fiscal year preceding the
current fiscal year as follows: x x x x
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the Municipality’s receipt thereof. Funds coming from private
sources become impressed with the characteristics of public
funds when they are under official custody.33
Accordingly, the first requisite has been clearly met.
Second, as a resident-taxpayer of the Municipality,
Cacayuran is directly affected by the conversion of the Agoo
Plaza which was funded by the proceeds of the Subject Loans. It
is well-settled that public plazas are properties for public
use34 and therefore, belongs to the public dominion.35 As such, it
can be used by anybody and no one can exercise over it the
rights of a private owner.36 In this light, Cacayuran had a direct
interest in ensuring that the Agoo Plaza would not be exploited
for commercial purposes through the APC’s construction.
Moreover, Cacayuran need not be privy to the Subject Loans in
order to proffer his objections thereto. In Mamba v. Lara, it has
been held that a taxpayer need not be a party to the contract to
challenge its validity; as long as taxes are involved, people have
a right to question contracts entered into by the government. 37
_______________
33 See People v. Aquino, G.R. No. L-6063, April 26,
1954.
34 Province of Camarines Sur v. CA, G.R. No.
175064, September 18, 2009, 600 SCRA 569, 588-589.
35 Art. 420 of the Civil Code provides:
The following things are 420. Art. property
of public dominion:
(1)Those intended for public use, such as
roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges
constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads,
and others of similar character; x x x x (Emphasis
supplied)
36 Province of Camarines Sur v. CA, supra note 34,
at p. 587, citing In the Matter of Reversion/Recall of
Reconstituted Act No. 0-116 Decree No. 388, Heirs of
Palaganas v. Registry of Deeds, Tarlac City, G.R. No.
171304, October 10, 2007, 535 SCRA 476, 484.
37 Mamba v. Lara, supra note 31, at p. 162,
citing Abaya v. Ebdane, Jr., G.R. No. 167919, February
14, 2007, 515 SCRA 720, 758.
872
872 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
 ANNOTATED
Land Bank of the Philippines vs.
Cacayuran
Therefore, as the above-stated requisites obtain in this case,
Cacayuran has standing to file the instant suit.
Validity of the Subject Resolutions B.
Land Bank avers that the Subject Resolutions provided
ample authority for Mayor Eriguel to contract the Subject
Loans. It posits that Section 444(b)(1)(vi) of the LGC merely
requires that the municipal mayor be authorized by the SB
concerned and that such authorization need not be embodied in
an ordinance.38
A careful perusal of Section 444(b)(1)(vi) of the LGC shows
that while the authorization of the municipal mayor need not
be in the form of an ordinance, the obligation which the said
local executive is authorized to enter into must be made
pursuant to a law or ordinance, viz.:
444. Sec.The Chief Executive: Powers, Duties,
Functions and Compensation.―
xxxx
For efficient, effective and economical
governance the purpose of which is the general
welfare of the municipality and its inhabitants
pursuant to Section 16 of this Code, the
municipal mayor shall: (b)
xxxx
Upon authorization by the (vi) sangguniang
bayan, represent the municipality in all its
business transactions and sign on its behalf all
bonds, contracts, and obligations, and such
other documents made pursuant to law or
ordinance; (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
In the present case, while Mayor Eriguel’s authorization to
contract the Subject Loans was not contained―as it need not be
contained―in the form of an ordinance, the said loans and
_______________
38 Rollo, p. 26.
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even the Redevelopment Plan itself were not approved
pursuant to any law or ordinance but through mere resolutions.
The distinction between ordinances and resolutions is
wellperceived. While ordinances are laws and possess a general
and permanent character, resolutions are merely declarations
of the sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking body on a specific
matter and are temporary in nature.39 As opposed to ordinances,
“no rights can be conferred by and be inferred from a
resolution.”40 In this accord, it cannot be denied that the SB
violated Section 444(b)(1)(vi) of the LGC altogether.
Noticeably, the passage of the Subject Resolutions was also
tainted with other irregularities, such as (1) the SB’s failure to
submit the Subject Resolutions to the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of La Union for its review contrary to Section 56
of the LGC;41 and (2) the lack of publication and posting in con-
_______________
39 Municipality of Parañaque v. V.M. Realty
Corporation, 354 Phil. 684, 691-695; 292 SCRA 678, 689
(1998).
40 Spouses Yusay v. CA, G.R. No. 156684, April 6,
2011, 647 SCRA 269, 278.
41Review of Component City and Municipal
Ordinances or Resolutions by the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan.― 56. Sec.
Within three (3) days after approval, the secretary to
the (a) sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang
bayan shall forward to the sangguniang
panlalawigan for review, copies of approved ordinances
and the resolutions approving the local development
plans and public investment programs formulated by the
local development councils.
Within thirty (30) days after receipt of copies of such
ordinances and resolutions, the (b) sangguniang
panlalawigan shall examine the documents or transmit
them to the provincial attorney, or if there be none, to
the provincial prosecutor for prompt examination. The
provincial attorney or provincial prosecutor shall, within
a period of ten (10) days from receipt of the documents,
inform the sangguniang panlalawigan in writing of his
comments or recommendations, which may be considered
by the sangguniang panlalawigan in making its decision.
874
874 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Land Bank of the Philippines vs.
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travention of Section 59 of the LGC.42
_______________
If the (c) sangguniang panlalawigan finds that such
an ordinance or resolution is beyond the power conferred
upon the sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang
bayan concerned, it shall declare such ordinance or
resolution invalid in whole or in part. The sangguniang
panlalawigan shall enter its action in the minutes and
shall advise the corresponding city or municipal
authorities of the action it has taken.
If no action has been taken by the (d) sangguniang
panlalawiganwithin thirty (30) days after submission of
such an ordinance or resolution, the same shall be
presumed consistent with law and therefore valid.
42 59. Sec.Effectivity of Ordinances or
Resolutions.―
Unless otherwise stated in the ordinance or the
resolution approving the local development plan and
public investment program, the same shall take effect
after ten (10) days from the date a copy thereof is posted
in a bulletin board at the entrance of the provincial
capitol or city, municipal, or barangay hall, as the case
may be, and in at least two (2) other conspicuous places
in the local government unit concerned. (a)
The secretary to the (b) sanggunian concerned
shall cause the posting of an ordinance or resolution in
the bulletin board at the entrance of the provincial
capitol and the city, municipal, or barangay hall in at
least two (2) conspicuous places in the local government
unit concerned not later than five (5) days after approval
thereof.
 The text of the ordinance or resolution shall be
disseminated and posted in Filipino or English and in
the language or dialect understood by the majority of the
people in the local government unit concerned, and the
secretary to the sanggunian shall record such fact in a
book kept for the purpose, stating the dates of approval
and posting.
The gist of all ordinances with penal sanctions shall
be published in a newspaper of general circulation
within the province where the local legislative body
concerned belongs. In the absence of any newspaper of
general circulation within the province, posting of such
ordinances shall be made in all mu- (c)
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In fine, Land Bank cannot rely on the Subject Resolutions
as basis to validate the Subject Loans.
Ultra vires nature of the Subject Loans C.
Neither can Land Bank claim that the Subject Loans do not
constitute ultra vires acts of the officers who approved the
same.
Generally, an ultra vires act is one committed outside the
object for which a corporation is created as defined by the law of
its organization and therefore beyond the powers conferred
upon it by law.43 There are two (2) types of ultra vires acts. As
held in Middletown Policemen’s Benevolent Association v.
Township of Middletown:44
There is a distinction between an act utterly
beyond the jurisdiction of a municipal
corporation and the irregular exercise of a
basic power under the legislative grant in
matters not in themselves jurisdictional.
The former are ultra vires in the primary sense
and void; the latter, ultra viresonly in a
secondary sense which does not preclude
ratification or the application of the
doctrine of estoppel in the interest of
equity and essential justice. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
_______________
nicipalities and cities of the province where
the sanggunian of origin is situated.
In the case of highly urbanized and independent
component cities, the main features of the ordinance
or resolution duly enacted or adopted shall, in
addition to being posted, be published once in a local
newspaper of general circulation within the city:
Provided, That in the absence thereof the ordinance
or resolution shall be published in any newspaper of
general circulation. (d)
43 Republic v. Acoje Mining Company, Inc., G.R. No.
L-18062, February 28, 1963, 7 SCRA 361, citing 19
C.J.S., Sec. 965, p. 419.
44 162 N.J. 361, 368 (2000), citing Skulski v. Nolan,
68 N.J. 179, 198 (1975).
876
876 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
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In other words, an act which is outside of the municipality’s
jurisdiction is considered as a void ultra vires act, while an act
attended only by an irregularity but remains within the
municipality’s power is considered as an ultra vires act subject
to ratification and/or validation. To the former belongs
municipal contracts which (a) are entered into beyond the
express, implied or inherent powers of the local government
unit; and (b) do not comply with the substantive requirements
of law e.g., when expenditure of public funds is to be made,
there must be an actual appropriation and certificate of
availability of funds; while to the latter belongs those which (a)
are entered into by the improper department, board, officer of
agent; and (b) do not comply with the formal requirements of a
written contract e.g., the Statute of Frauds.45
Applying these principles to the case at bar, it is clear that
the Subject Loans belong to the first class of ultra vires acts
deemed as void.
Records disclose that the said loans were executed by the
Municipality for the purpose of funding the conversion of the
Agoo Plaza into a commercial center pursuant to the
Redevelopment Plan. However, the conversion of the said plaza
is beyond the Municipality’s jurisdiction considering the
property’s nature as one for public use and thereby, forming
part of the public dominion. Accordingly, it cannot be the object
of appropriation either by the State or by private persons.46 Nor
can it be the subject of lease or any other contractual
undertaking.47 In Villanueva v. Castañeda, Jr.,48 citing Espiritu
v. Municipal Council of Pozorrubio,49 the Court pronounced
that:
_______________
45 See ANTONIO E.B. NACHURA, Outline Reviewer
in Political Law (2009), p. 602.
46 Id., at p. 607.
47 238 Phil. 136, 142; 154 SCRA 142, 148 (1987).
48 Id., at p. 144; p. 149.
49 102 Phil. 866, 869-870 (1958).
877
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x x x Town plazas are properties of public
dominion, to be devoted to public use and to be
made available to the public in general. They are
outside the commerce of man and cannot be
disposed of or even leased by the municipality to
private parties.
In this relation, Article 1409(1) of the Civil Code provides
that a contract whose purpose is contrary to law, morals, good
customs, public order or public policy is considered void50 and as
such, creates no rights or obligations or any juridical
relations.51 Consequently, given the unlawful purpose behind
the Subject Loans which is to fund the commercialization of the
Agoo Plaza pursuant to the Redevelopment Plan, they are
considered as ultra viresin the primary sense thus, rendering
them void and in effect, non-binding on the Municipality.
At this juncture, it is equally observed that the land on
which the Agoo Plaza is situated cannot be converted into
patrimonial property―as the SB tried to when it passed
Municipal Ordinance No. 02-200752―absent any express
grant by the national government.53 As public land used for
public use, the foregoing lot rightfully belongs to and is subject
to the administration and control of the Republic of
_______________
50The following contracts are inexistent and void
from the beginning: 1409. Art.
Those whose cause, object or purpose is contrary to
law, morals, good customs, (1)
xxxx
These contracts cannot be ratified. Neither can the
right to set up the defense of illegality be waived.
51 See Nunga, Jr. v. Nunga III, G.R. No. 178306,
December 18, 2008, 574 SCRA 760, 780.
52 Rollo, pp. 219-220.
53 Province of Camarines Sur v. CA, supra note 34,
at p. 588, citing Municipality of San Carlos, Pangasinan
v. Morfe, 115 Phil. 608; 5 SCRA 625 (1962).
878
878 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Land Bank of the Philippines vs.
Cacayuran
the Philippines.54 Hence, without the said grant, the
Municipality has no right to claim it as patrimonial property.
Nevertheless, while the Subject Loans cannot bind the
Municipality for being ultra vires, the officers who authorized
the passage of the Subject Resolutions are personally liable.
Case law states that public officials can be held personally
accountable for acts claimed to have been performed in
connection with official duties where they have acted ultra
vires,55 as in this case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Accordingly, the
March 26, 2010 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV.
No. 89732 is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio (Chairperson), Brion, Del Castillo and Perez, JJ.,
concur.
Petition denied, judgment affirmed.
Notes.―A taxpayer is deemed to have the standing to raise
a constitutional issue when it is established that public funds
from taxation have been disbursed in alleged contravention of
the law or the Constitution. (Dela Llana vs. The Chairperson,
Commission on Audit, 665 SCRA 176 [2012])
Taxpayer’s suit is based on the theory that expenditure of
public funds for the purpose of executing an unconstitutional
act is a misapplication of such funds. (Pambansang Koalisyon
ng mga Samahang Magsasaka at Manggagawa sa Niyugan
[PKSMMN] vs. Executive Secretary, 669 SCRA 49 [2012])
――o0o――
April 4, 2011. G.R. No. 190823.*
DOMINGO CARABEO, petitioner, vs. SPOUSES NORBERTO
and SUSAN DINGCO, respondents.
Civil Law; Property; Sales; The requirement
that a sale must have for its object a determinate
thing is satisfied as long as, at the time the
contract is entered into, the object of the sale is
capable of being made determinate without the
necessity of a new or further agreement between
the parties.—That the kasunduan did not specify
the technical boundaries of the property did not
render the sale a nullity. The requirement that a
sale must have for its object a determinate thing
is satisfied as long as, at the time the contract is
entered into, the object of the sale is capable of
being made determinate without the necessity of
a new or further agreement between the parties.
As the above-quoted portion of
the kasunduan shows, there is no doubt that the
object of the sale is determinate.
Remedial Law; Actions; Death of a Party;
The question as to whether an action survives or
not depends on the nature of the action and the
damage sued for.—Respecting the argument that
petitioner’s death rendered respondents’
complaint against him dismissible, Bonilla v.
Barcena, 71 SCRA 491 (1976), enlightens: The
question as to whether an action survives or not
depends on the nature of the action and the
damage sued for. In the causes of action
which survive, the wrong complained [of]
affects primarily and principally property and
property rights, the injuries to the person being
merely incidental, while in the causes of action
which do not survive, the injury complained of
is to the person, the property and rights of
property affected being incidental.
Same; Same; Same; Since the trial court was
not informed of petitioner’s death, it may not be
faulted for proceeding to render judgment without
ordering his substitution.—It bears noting that
trial on the merits was already
concluded before petitioner died. Since the trial
court was not informed of petitioner’s death, it
may not be faulted for proceeding to render
judgment without ordering his substitution. Its
judgment is thus valid and binding upon peti-
_______________
* THIRD DIVISION.
201
VOL. 647, APRIL 4, 2011 2
01
Carabeo vs. Dingco
tioner’s legal representatives or successors-
in-interest, insofar as his interest in the property
subject of the action is concerned.
Same; Same; Same; The death of a client
immediately divests the counsel of authority.—In
another vein, the death of a client immediately
divests the counsel of authority. Thus, in filing a
Notice of Appeal, petitioner’s counsel of record
had no personality to act on behalf of the already
deceased client who, it bears reiteration, had not
been substituted as a party after his death. The
trial court’s decision had thereby become final
and executory, no appeal having been perfected.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of
Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Bernaldo, Mirador Law Offices for petitioner.
Ortiguera, Zuniga, Pomer, Salaria, Sison-Panganibanfor
respondents.
CARPIO-MORALES,J.:
On July 10, 1990, Domingo Carabeo (petitioner) entered
into a contract denominated as “Kasunduan sa Bilihan ng
Karapatan sa Lupa”1 (kasunduan) with Spouses Norberto and
Susan Dingco (respondents) whereby petitioner agreed to sell
his rights over a 648 square meter parcel of unregistered land
situated in Purok III, Tugatog, Orani, Bataan to respondents
for P38,000.
Respondents tendered their initial payment of P10,000
upon signing of the contract, the remaining balance to be paid
on September 1990.
Respondents were later to claim that when they were about
to hand in the balance of the purchase price, petitioner re-
_______________
1 Records, p. 6.
202
202 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Carabeo vs. Dingco
quested them to keep it first as he was yet to settle an on-going
“squabble” over the land.
Nevertheless, respondents gave petitioner small sums of
money from time to time which totaled P9,100, on petitioner’s
request according to them; due to respondents’ inability to pay
the amount of the remaining balance in full, according to
petitioner.
By respondents’ claim, despite the alleged problem over the
land, they insisted on petitioner’s acceptance of the remaining
balance of P18,900 but petitioner remained firm in his refusal,
proffering as reason therefor that he would register the land
first.
Sometime in 1994, respondents learned that the alleged
problem over the land had been settled and that petitioner had
caused its registration in his name on December 21, 1993 under
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 161806. They thereupon offered
to pay the balance but petitioner declined, drawing them to file
a complaint before the Katarungan Pambarangay. No
settlement was reached, however, hence, respondent filed a
complaint for specific performance before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Balanga, Bataan.
Petitioner countered in his Answer to the Complaint that
the sale was void for lack of object certain, the kasunduan not
having specified the metes and bounds of the land. In any
event, petitioner alleged that if the validity of the kasunduan is
upheld, respondents’ failure to comply with their reciprocal
obligation to pay the balance of the purchase price would render
the action premature. For, contrary to respondents’ claim,
petitioner maintained that they failed to pay the balance of
P28,000 on September 1990 to thus constrain him to accept
installment payments totaling P9,100.
After the case was submitted for decision or on January 31,
2001,2 petitioner passed away. The records do not show that
_______________
2 Petitioner’s Death Certificate is appended as Annex
“M” to the petition for review, Rollo, p. 105.
203
VOL. 647, APRIL 4, 2011 203
Carabeo vs. Dingco
petitioner’s counsel informed Branch 1 of the Bataan RTC,
where the complaint was lodged, of his death and that proper
substitution was effected in accordance with Section 16, Rule 3,
Rules of Court.3
By Decision of February 25, 2001,4 the trial court ruled in
favor of respondents, disposing as follows:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered,
judgment is hereby rendered ordering:
The defendant to sell his right over 648
square meters of land pursuant to the
contract dated July 10, 1990 by executing
a Deed of Sale thereof after the payment
of P18,900 by the plaintiffs; 1.
The defendant to pay the costs of the suit.”
2.
_______________
3 16. Section Death of party; duty of counsel.—Whenever a party to a
pending action dies, and the claim is not thereby extinguished, it shall be the
duty of his counsel to inform the court within thirty (30) days after such
death of the fact thereof, and to give the name and address of his legal
representative or representatives. Failure of counsel to comply with his duty
shall be a ground for disciplinary action.
The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the
deceased, without requiring the appointment of an executor or administrator
and the court may appoint a guardian ad litem for the minor heirs.
The court shall forthwith order said legal representative or
representatives to appear and be substituted within a period of thirty (30)
days from notice.
If no legal representative is named by the counsel for the deceased party,
or if the one so named shall fail to appear within the specified period, the
court may order the opposing party, within a specified time to procure the
appointment of an executor or administrator for the estate of the deceased
and the latter shall immediately appear for and on behalf of the deceased.
The court charges in procuring such appointment, if defrayed by the opposing
party, may be recovered as costs. (16a, 17a)
4 Rollo, pp. 71-79.
204
204 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Carabeo vs. Dingco
SO ORDERED.”5
Petitioner’s counsel filed a Notice of Appeal on March 20,
2001.
By the herein challenged Decision dated July 20, 2009, 6the
Court of Appeals affirmed that of the trial court.Petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration having been denied by Resolution of
January 8, 2010, the present petition for review was filed by
Antonio Carabeo, petitioner’s son,7 faulting the appellate court:
(A)
… in holding that the element of a
contract, i.e., an object certain is present in this
case.
(B)
 … in considering it unfair to expect
respondents who are not lawyers to make judicial
consignation after herein petitioner allegedly
refused to accept payment of the balance of the
purchase price.
(C)
… in upholding the validity of the contract,
“Kasunduan sa Bilihan ng Karapatan sa Lupa,”
despite the lack of spousal consent, (underscoring
supplied)
and proffering that
(D)
[t]he death of herein petitioner causes the
dismissal of the action filed by
respondents; respondents’ cause of action being
an action in personam. (underscoring supplied)
_______________
5 Id., at pp. 78-79.
6 Penned by Associate Justice Jose C. Reyes, with the
concurrence of Associate Justices Martin S. Villarama,
Jr. (now Supreme Court Associate Justice) and
Normandie B. Pizzaro, id., at pp. 28-36.
7 Rosita’s Death Certificate appended to the petition
for review as Annex “M-1”, id., at p. 106.
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VOL. 647, APRIL 4, 2011 205
Carabeo vs. Dingco
The petition fails.
The pertinent portion of the kasunduan reads:8
“x x x x
Na ako ay may isang partial na lupa
na matatagpuan sa Purok 111, Tugatog, Orani
Bataan, na may sukat na 27 x 24 metro
kuwadrado, ang nasabing lupa ay may sakop na
dalawang punong santol at isang punong
mangga, kaya’t ako ay nakipagkasundo sa mag-
asawang Norby Dingco at Susan Dingco na
ipagbili sa kanila ang karapatan ng nasabing
lupa sa halagang P38,000.00.
x x x x” (underscoring supplied)
That the kasunduan did not specify the technical
boundaries of the property did not render the sale a nullity. The
requirement that a sale must have for its object a determinate
thing is satisfied as long as, at the time the contract is entered
into, the object of the sale is capable of being made determinate
without the necessity of a new or further agreement between
the parties.9 As the above-quoted portion of
the kasunduan shows, there is no doubt that the object of the
sale is determinate.
Clutching at straws, petitioner proffers lack of spousal
consent. This was raised only on appeal, hence, will not be
considered, in the present case, in the interest of fair play,
justice and due process.10
Respecting the argument that petitioner’s death rendered
respondents’ complaint against him dismissible, Bonilla v.
Barcena11 enlightens:
_______________
8 Heirs of Romana Ingjug-Tiro, et al. v. Spouses
Casals, et al., G.R. No. 134718, August 20, 2001, 363
SCRA 435.
9 Civil Code, Article 1460.
10 Philippine Commercial and International Bank v.
Custodio, G.R. No. 173207, February 14, 2008, 545 SCRA
367.
11 G.R. No. L-41715, June 18, 1976, 71 SCRA 491.
206
206 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Carabeo vs. Dingco
“The question as to whether an action
survives or not depends on the nature of the
action and the damage sued for. In the causes of
action which survive, the wrong complained
[of] affects primarily and principally property
and property rights, the injuries to the person
being merely incidental, while in the causes of
action which do not survive, the injury
complained of is to the person, the property and
rights of property affected being incidental.”
(emphasis and underscoring supplied)
In the present case, respondents are pursuing a property
right arising from the kasunduan, whereas petitioner is
invoking nullity of the kasunduan to protect his proprietary
interest. Assuming arguendo, however, that the kasunduan is
deemed void, there is a corollary obligation of petitioner to
return the money paid by respondents, and since the action
involves property rights,12 it survives.
It bears noting that trial on the merits was already
concluded before petitioner died. Since the trial court was not
informed of petitioner’s death, it may not be faulted for
proceeding to render judgment without ordering his
substitution. Its judgment is thus valid and binding upon
petitioner’s legal representatives or successors-in-interest,
insofar as his interest in the property subject of the action is
concerned.13
In another vein, the death of a client immediately divests
the counsel of authority.14 Thus, in filing a Notice of Appeal,
petitioner’s counsel of record had no personality to act on behalf
of the already deceased client who, it bears reiteration, had not
been substituted as a party after his death. The trial court’s
decision had thereby become final and executory, no appeal
having been perfected.
_______________
12 Sumaljag v. Spouses Literato, et al., G.R. No.
149787, June 18, 2008, 555 SCRA 53.
13 Saligumba et al. v. Palanog, G.R. No. 143365,
December 4, 2008, 573 SCRA 8.
14 Active Realty and Development Corporation v.
Fernandez, G.R. No. 157186, October 19, 2007, 537
SCRA 116.
207
 VOL. 647, APRIL 4, 2011 207
Carabeo vs. Dingco
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio,** Brion, Bersamin and Sereno, JJ., concur.
Petition denied.
Note.—Failure of the counsel to comply with his duty to
inform the court of the death of his client, such that no
substitution is effected, will not invalidate the proceedings and
the judgment rendered thereon if the action survives the death
of such party. (Napere vs. Barbarona, 543 SCRA 376 [2008])
——o0o——
July 22, 2015. G.R. No. 175796.*
BPI FAMILY SAVINGS BANK, INC., petitioner, vs. SPOUSES
BENEDICTO & TERESITA YUJUICO, respondents.
Actions; Real Actions; According to Section
1, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, a real action is
one that affects title to or possession of real
property, or an interest therein.—It is basic that
the venue of an action depends on whether it is a
real or a personal action. The determinants of
whether an action is of a real or a personal
nature have been fixed by the Rules of Court and
relevant jurisprudence. According to Section 1,
Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, a real action is one
that affects title to or possession of real property,
or an interest therein. Thus, an action for
partition or condemnation of, or foreclosure of
mortgage on, real property is a real action. The
real action is to be commenced and tried in the
proper court having jurisdiction over the area
wherein the real property involved, or a portion
thereof, is situated, which explains why the
action is also referred to as a local action. In
contrast, the Rules of Court declares all other
actions as personal actions. Such actions may
include those brought for the recovery of personal
property, or for the enforcement of some contract
or recovery of damages for its breach, or for the
recovery of damages for the commission of an
injury to the person or property. The venue of a
personal action is the place where the plaintiff or
any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where
the defendant or any of the principal defendants
resides, or in the case of a nonresident defendant
where he may be found, at the election of the
plaintiff, for which reason the action is
considered a transitory one.
_______________
* FIRST DIVISION.
487
VOL. 763, JULY 22, 2015 487
BPI Family Savings Bank, Inc. vs. Yujuico
Same; Personal Actions; An action to recover
the deficiency after the extrajudicial foreclosure of
the real property mortgage is a personal action,
for it does not affect title to or possession of real
property, or any interest therein.—Based on the
distinctions between real and personal actions,
an action to recover the deficiency after the
extrajudicial foreclosure of the real property
mortgage is a personal action, for it does not
affect title to or possession of real property, or
any interest therein.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Venue;
Personal Actions; In civil proceedings, venue is
procedural, not jurisdictional, and may be
waived by the defendant if not seasonably raised
either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer.—
We underscore that in civil proceedings, venue is
procedural, not jurisdictional, and may be waived
by the defendant if not seasonably raised either
in a motion to dismiss or in the answer. Section
1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court thus expressly
stipulates that defenses and objections not
pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the
answer are deemed waived. As it relates to the
place of trial, indeed, venue is meant to provide
convenience to the parties, rather than to restrict
their access to the courts. In other words, unless
the defendant seasonably objects, any action may
be tried by a court despite its being the improper
venue.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of
Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Benedicto, Versosa, Felipe and Burkley Law Office for
petitioner.
Tan, Venturanza, Valdez for respondents.
BERSAMIN,** J.:
An action to recover the deficiency after extrajudicial
foreclosure of a real property mortgage is a personal action
because it does not affect title to or possession of real property,
or any interest therein.
_______________
** Designated Acting Chairperson per Special Order
No. 2102.
488
488 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATED
BPI Family Savings Bank, Inc. vs. Yujuico On November 4, 2003, the respondents moved for
reconsideration, reiterating their grounds earlier made in their
The Case
motion to dismiss.9
In turn, the petitioner adopted its comment/opposition to
This appeal is taken by the petitioner to overturn the
the motion to dismiss.10
decision promulgated on March 31, 2006,1 whereby the Court of
The respondents then filed their reply,11 in which they
Appeals (CA) set aside the orders issued by the Regional Trial
raised for the first time their objection on the ground of
Court, Branch 60, in Makati City (Makati RTC) on October 17,
improper venue. They contended that the action for the
20032 and February 1, 20053dismissing their action against the
recovery of the deficiency, being a supplementary action of the
respondents to recover the deficiency after the extrajudicial
extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings, was a real action that
foreclosure of their mortgage (Civil Case No. 03-450) on the
should
ground of improper venue.
_______________
Antecedents
6 Id., at p. 12.
On August 22, 1996, the City of Manila filed a complaint 7 Id.
against the respondents for the expropriation of five parcels of 8 Id., at pp. 87-88.
land located in Tondo, Manila and registered in the name of 9 Id., at pp. 132-136.
respondent Teresita Yujuico. Two of the parcels of land, covered 10 Id., at pp. 137-138.
by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 261331 and TCT No.
11 Id., at pp. 139-143.
261332, were previously mortgaged to Citytrust Banking
Corporation, the petitioner’s predecessor-in-interest, under a
First Real Estate Mortgage Contract.4 On June 30, 2000, the
Regional Trial Court in Manila (Manila RTC) rendered its 490
judgment declaring the five parcels of land expropriated for
public use. The judgment became final and executory on 490 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
January 28, 2001 and was entered in the book of entries of ANNOTATED
judgment on March 23, 2001.5 The petitioner subsequently filed
a Motion to Intervene in Execution with Partial Opposition to BPI Family Savings Bank, Inc. vs. Yujuico
Defendant’s Request to Release, but the RTC denied the motion have been brought in the Manila RTC because Manila was
for having been “filed out of time.” Hence, the peti- the place where the properties were located.12
_______________ On February 1, 2005, the Makati RTC denied the
respondents’ motion for reconsideration for its lack of merit;
and held on the issue of improper venue that:
1 Rollo, pp. 9-27; penned by Associate Justices
Vicente S.E. Veloso (retired) with concurrence of
It would be improper for this Court to dismiss
Associate Justice Portia Aliño-Hormachuelos (retired) the plaintiff’s complaint on the ground of
and Amelita G. Tolentino (retired). improper venue, assuming that the venue is
2 Id., at pp. 87-88. indeed improperly laid, since the said ground
3 Id., at pp. 89-94. was not raised in the defendant’s Motion to
4 Id., at pp. 10-11. Dismiss. On this point, it was held in the case
5 Id., at p. 11.
of Malig, et al. v. Bush, L-22761, May 31,
1969,that an action cannot be dismissed on a
ground not alleged in the motion therefore even
489
if said ground, e.g., prescription, is provided in
VOL. 763, JULY 22, 2015 489 Rule 16.13
BPI Family Savings Bank, Inc. vs. Yujuico
tioner decided to extrajudicially foreclose the mortgage
constituted on the two parcels of land subject of the Decision of the CA
respondents’ loan. After holding the public auction, the sheriff
awarded the two lots to the petitioner as the highest bidder at Not satisfied, the respondents assailed the orders dated
P10,000,000.00.6 October 17, 2003 and February 1, 2005 by petition
Claiming a deficiency amounting to P18,522,155.42, the for certiorari.14 They submitted for consideration by the CA the
petitioner sued the respondents to recover such deficiency in following issues, namely:
the Makati RTC (Civil Case No. 03-450). The respondents x x x (WHETHER OR NOT) RESPONDENT
moved to dismiss the complaint on several grounds, namely:
that the suit was barred by res judicata; that the complaint
TRIAL COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE
stated no cause of action; and that the plaintiff’s claim had been OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR
waived, abandoned, or extinguished.7 EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT
In its order issued on October 17, 2003, the Makati RTC ISSUED ITS ASSAILED ORDERS
denied the respondents’ motion to dismiss, ruling that there
was no res judicata; that the complaint stated a sufficient cause CONSIDERING THAT:
of action to recover the deficiency; and that there was nothing THE COMPLAINT A. A QUO IS BARRED
to support the claim that the obligation had been abandoned or BY RES JUDICATA.
extinguished apart from the respondents’ contention that the
properties had been subjected to expropriation by the City of
THE COMPLAINT STATED NO CAUSE OF
Manila.8 ACTION. B.
_______________ ANNOTATED
12 Id., at pp. 140-141.
BPI Family Savings Bank, Inc. vs. Yujuico
The CA denied the respondents’ Motion for Partial
13 Id., at p. 94.
Reconsideration and the petitioner’s Partial Motion for
14 Id., at p. 9. Reconsideration on December 7, 2006.17

Issues
491
Hence, this appeal by the petitioner, to assail the CA’s
VOL. 763, JULY 22, 2015 491 dismissal of Civil Case No. 03-450 on the ground of improper
BPI Family Savings Bank, Inc. vs. Yujuico venue upon the following grounds,18 namely:

PRIVATE RESPONDENT’S CLAIM HAS I.

BEEN WAIVED, ABANDONED OR WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE
OTHERWISE EXTINGUISHED. C. COURT OF APPEALS’ DENIAL OF THE
VENUE WAS IMPROPERLY LAID. D.15 PETITIONER’S PARTIAL MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION ON THE GROUND OF
IMPROPER VENUE AS A RESULT
On March 31, 2006, the CA granted the petition DISMISSED THE COMPLAINT FOR SUM OF
for certiorari of the respondents on the basis of the fourth issue,
opining: MONEY IS CONTRARY TO LAW.
xxxx II.
Thus, a suit for recovery of the deficiency WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE
after the foreclosure of a mortgage is in the COURT OF APPEALS[’] ACT OF
nature of a mortgage action because its APPRECIATING THE ADDITIONAL GROUND
purpose is precisely to enforce the OF IMPROPER VENUE, ONLY RAISED IN
mortgage contract; it is upon a written THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
contract and upon an obligation of the FILED IN THE LOWER COURT AFTER IT
mortgage-debtor to pay the deficiency DENIED RESPONDENTS’ MOTION TO
which is created by law. As such, the venue of DISMISS, IS CONTRARY TO LAW AND
an action for recovery of deficiency must JURISPRUDENCE.19
necessarily be the same venue as that of the Ruling of the Court
extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage.
xxxx We grant the petition for review on certiorari.
In this regard, We take note that the parcels It is basic that the venue of an action depends on whether it
is a real or a personal action. The determinants of whether an
of land subject of the mortgage contract are action is of a real or a personal nature have been fixed by
located in Tondo, Manila, under Transfer the Rules of Court and relevant jurisprudence. According to
Certificates of Title Nos. 216331 and 216332. On _______________
the other hand, the extrajudicial foreclosure of
17 Id., at p. 30.
the real estate mortgage took place at the RTC of
18 Id., at pp. 36-45.
Manila on January 28, 2003. Thus, the suit for 19 Id., at p. 41.
judgment on the deficiency filed by
respondent BPI against petitioners Yujuico,
493
being an action emanating from the
foreclosure of the real estate mortgage
VOL. 763, JULY 22, 2015 493
contract between them, must necessarily be BPI Family Savings Bank, Inc. vs. Yujuico
Section 1, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, a real action is one
filed also at the RTC of Manila, not at the
that affects title to or possession of real property, or an interest
RTC of Makati. therein. Thus, an action for partition or condemnation of, or
x x x x 16 foreclosure of mortgage on, real property is a real action. 20 The
real action is to be commenced and tried in the proper court
_______________ having jurisdiction over the area wherein the real property
involved, or a portion thereof, is situated, which explains why
the action is also referred to as a local action. In contrast,
15 Id., at p. 17.
the Rules of Court declares all other actions as personal
16 Id., at pp. 23-25. actions.21 Such actions may include those brought for the
recovery of personal property, or for the enforcement of some
contract or recovery of damages for its breach, or for the
recovery of damages for the commission of an injury to the
492
person or property.22 The venue of a personal action is the place
492 SUPREME COURT REPORTS where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or
where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, 25 Marcos-Araneta v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
or in the case of a nonresident defendant where he may be 154096, August 22, 2008, 563 SCRA 41, 61-62.
found, at the election of the plaintiff,23 for which reason the 26 Rudolf Lietz Holdings, Inc. v. Registry of Deeds of
action is considered a transitory one.
Parañaque City, G.R. No. 133240, November 15, 2000,
Based on the distinctions between real and personal
actions, an action to recover the deficiency after the
344 SCRA 680, 685.
extrajudicial foreclosure of the real property mortgage is a
personal action, for it does not affect title to or possession of
real property, or any interest therein.
495
It is true that the Court has said in Caltex Philippines, Inc.
v. Intermediate Appellate Court24 that “a suit for the recovery of VOL. 763, JULY 22, 2015 495
the deficiency after the foreclosure of a mortgage is in the BPI Family Savings Bank, Inc. vs. Yujuico
nature of a mortgage action because its purpose is precisely to
defendant seasonably objects, any action may be tried by a
_______________ court despite its being the improper venue.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition for review
20 Chua v. Total Office Products and Services on certiorari; REVERSE and SET ASIDE the decision
(Topros), Inc., G.R. No. 152808, September 30, 2005, 471 promulgated by the Court of Appeals on March 31,
SCRA 500, 507. 2006; REINSTATE the orders dated October 17, 2003 and
21 Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court. February 1, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 60, in
Makati City; and ORDER the respondents to pay the costs of
22 Hernandez v. Development Bank of the
suit.
Philippines, No. SO ORDERED.
L-31095, June 18, 1976, 71 SCRA 290, 292-293. Peralta,*** Perez, Perlas-Bernabe and Leonen,**** JJ.,
23 Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court; see concur.
also Orbeta v. Orbeta,G.R. No. 166837, November 27,
2006, 508 SCRA 265, 268. Petition granted, judgment reversed and set aside.
24 G.R. No. 74730, August 25, 1989, 176 SCRA 741,
754. Notes.—The venue of real actions affecting properties
found in different provinces is determined by the singularity or
plurality of the transactions involving said parcels of land.
(United Overseas Bank Phils. vs. Rosemoore Mining &
494 Development Corp., 518 SCRA 123 [2007])
Under Section 1, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, a real action
494 SUPREME COURT REPORTS is an action affecting title to or possession of real property, or
ANNOTATED interest therein. These include partition or condemnation of, or
foreclosure of mortgage on, real property. (Cabrera vs.
BPI Family Savings Bank, Inc. vs. Yujuico Francisco, 704 SCRA 103 [2013])
enforce the mortgage contract.” However, the CA erred in
holding, upon the authority of Caltex Philippines, Inc., that the ——o0o——
venue of Civil Case No. 03-450 must necessarily be Manila, the
same venue as that of the extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage.
An examination of Caltex Philippines, Inc. reveals that the
Court was thereby only interpreting the prescriptive period
within which to bring the suit for the recovery of the deficiency
after the foreclosure of the mortgage, and was not at all ruling
therein on the venue of such suit or on the nature of such suit
being either a real or a personal action.
Given the foregoing, the petitioner correctly brought Civil
Case No. 03-450 in the Makati RTC because Makati was the
place where the main office of the petitioner was located.
Moreover, the Makati RTC observed, and the observation is
correct in our view, that it would be improper to dismiss Civil
Case No. 03-450 on the ground of improper venue, assuming
that the venue had been improperly laid, considering that the
respondents had not raised such ground in their Motion to
Dismiss. As earlier indicated, they came to raise the objection of
improper venue for the first time only in their reply to the
petitioner’s comment on their Motion for Reconsideration. They
did so belatedly.
We underscore that in civil proceedings, venue is
procedural, not jurisdictional, and may be waived by the
defendant if not seasonably raised either in a motion to dismiss
or in the answer.25 Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court thus
expressly stipulates that defenses and objections not pleaded
either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed
waived. As it relates to the place of trial, indeed, venue is
meant to provide convenience to the parties, rather than to
restrict their access to the courts.26In other words, unless the
_______________