SPECIFIC CASES Authorized causes under Art.

283 (Closure of establishment and

reduction of personnel)
Serrano v. NLRC
Installation of Separation pay at the rate of at
labor-saving least one-month pay or one-month
SERRANO V. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS devices pay for every year of service
COMMISSION AND ISETANN DEPARTMENT STORE Redundancy (whichever is higher)
27 January 2000 | Mendoza | Special civil action in the SC,
Certiorari Retrenchment to Separation pay at the rate of at
FACTS prevent losses least one-month pay or half-month
Ruben Serrano was hired by Isetann Dept. Store as a security Closing or pay for every year of service
checker cessation of (whichever is higher)
1984 – Contractual; 1985 – Regular; 1988 – Head of Security operations
Checkers
Absent proof that management acted in a malicious or arbitrary
manner, the Court will not interfere with the employer’s
In 1991, as a cost-cutting measure, Isetann decided to phase out
exercise of judgment.
the entire security sectionand engage the services of an
That the phase-out constituted a legitimate business decision is
independent security agency.
a factual finding of NLRC.
History of policies
Isetann sent a memoto Serrano on 11 Oct 1991, reiterating their
When there is just cause but no due process (requirements of
verbal notice of termination effective on the same day.
notice and opportunity to be heard)
Before: Dismissal is illegal
Serrano filed a complainton 3 Dec 1991 for illegal dismissal,
The shift took place in Wenphil Corp. v. NLRC
illegal layoff, unfair labor practice, underpayment of wages,
 Highly prejudicial to the employer’s interests to reinstate an
nonpayment of salary and overtime pay
employee who has been shown to be guilty of the charges
Labor Arbiter held that Serrano was illegally dismissed that warranted his dismissal
 Dismissal must be for just or authorized cause and after due
 Failed to establish that the cause of retrenchment is to process
minimize losses Now: Dismissal shall be upheld but the employer must be
sanctioned for non-compliance with the requirements of, or for
 Did not accord due process to Serrano
failure to observe, due process (Sebuguero v. NLRC)
 Did not use reasonable standards in selecting employees to
be terminated
 Fines imposed range from P1,000 to P10,000
 Did not show employees’ inefficiency so as to justify their
ReexaminingWenphil doctrine
replacement
 The day after Serrano’s dismissal, Isetann hired another
 J. Panganiban – Monetary sanctions are too insignificant,
person as a safety and security supervisor
niggardly, late
 Isetann ordered to pay backwages, reinstatement, unpaid  J. Puno – “Dismiss now, pay later” policy convenient for
wages, 13th month pay, attorney’s fees
moneyed employers
NLRC reversed Labor Arbiter’s decision upon Isetann’s appeal
o In their opinion, such dismissal is void and employee
should be reinstated and paid backwages
 Phase-out of security section, hiring of agency is a legitimate Remedy – pay full backwages from dismissal until
business decision determination that dismissal was for a just cause BUT STILL,
 Labor Arbiter’s distinction between retrenchment and dismissal must be upheld
employment of cost-saving devices insignificant
 Reasonable criteria does not apply because the entire Why violation of the notice requirement cannot be considered
Security Section was abolished a denial of due process resulting in the nullity of dismissal
 No bad faith in appointing a supervisor because it was Due process clause is a limitation on governmental powers and
separate from Serrano’s position as Security Checkers head DOES NOT APPLY to the exercise of private power
 Isetann ordered to give separation pay, unpaid salary, 13th a. Only the state has authority to take life, liberty, property
month pay b. Purpose of clause is to ensure that the exercise of this power
 Serrano’s MfR denied is consistent with civilized methods
ISSUE AND HOLDING
WON the abolition of the Security Checkers section and the Notice and hearing are required under the due process clause
employment of an independent security agency falls under any before the power of the organized society is brought to bear
of the authorized causes for dismissal under Article 283 of the upon the individual
Labor Code – YES, authorized cause is redundancy; Serrano a. This is NOT the case of termination of employee – no
should be given separation pay at the rate of one-month pay for adversary system here (there is no charge against the employee)
every year of service (Art. 283) b. Purpose of 30-day written notice is to give employee time to
DISCUSSION prepare for the eventual job loss, and for DOLE to determine
Art. 283 provides that one month before intended date, written WON economic causes exist to justify his termination
notice must be served on the workers and DOLE c. Even in cases of dismissal under Article 282[1], purpose of
 notice and hearing is NOT to comply with the due process  Full backwages from termination until this decision becomes
clause in the Constitution; Compliance with notice requirement final
does not foreclose right of employee to question the legality of Case remanded to Labor Arbiter to determine computation of
his dismissal monetary awards to Serrano.
d. History of related laws OPINIONS [2]
1. Art. 302 of Spanish Code of Commerce – Separate Opinion – Bellosillo
employee/employer can terminate relationship by giving  Prefers to call indemnity or penalty as disturbance
one month notice; in lieu of notice, mesada (one month compensation
pay) could be given to employee  Proposes that amount of the award be uniform and rational
2. NCC 2270 – repealed Art. 302 of Spanish Code of and not arbitrary
Commerce Dissenting Opinion – Puno
3. RA 1052 (Termination Pay Law) – revived mesada  Wenphil did not change ruling that violation of the pre-
4. RA 1787 – amended RA 1052 by providing for giving of dismissal notice requirement is an infringement of due
advance notice or payment of compensation (1/2 month process
per year of service)  Submits a return to the pre-Wenphil rule where a reasonless
5. Rules implementing BP 130, RA 6715 (amending NCC violation of the notice requirement makes the dismissal
277(b) – notice required even when the dismissal was for illegal and results in the employee’s reinstatement
cause  One undesirable effect of Wenphil is to compel employees
Employer CANNOT be expected to be an impartial judge of his to seek relief against illegal dismissals with DOLE (whereas
own cause before, a remedy can be sought before the employer) and
oftentimes, they do not know why they were dismissed in the
Also the case for termination for a just cause under Article 282 first place
J. Puno disputes this as he says that many cases have been won
 Dilution of the rule has been abused by employers who
by employees before grievance committees manned by
followed the “dismiss now, pay later” strategy
impartial judges of the company
 An employee under Article 283 has a stronger claim to the
Grievance machinery is DIFFERENT – established by
right to a pre-dismissal notice and hearing (rather than post
agreement of employer, employees and is composed of
facto dismissal hearing)
representatives from both sides
If the violation of the notice requirement is not a denial of due  Disagrees with majority opinion that due process
process, what is it? requirement does not apply to the exercise of private power;
Mere failure to observe a procedure for the termination of private due process is a settled norm in administrative law
employment, which makes the termination merely ineffectual Separate Opinion – Vitug
What makes a dismissal of an employee illegal?  A just or authorized cause and a written notice are required
Only the absence of a just cause for termination as provided in concurrently but not equipollent in their consequence in
Article 279 terminating an employer-employee relationship
 Where there is no just or authorized cause, reinstatement and
Autho No payment of backwages would be proper. Damages might
rized tic Rein Kind of also be awarded if dismissal is attended by bad faith of
Basis cause e state pay employer. Separation pay can substitute for reinstatement if
such reinstatement is not feasible.
Separation
 Employer must be made to pay corresponding damages for
Art. pay,
failure to comply with notice requirement
283 P Î Î backwages
Separate Opinion – Panganiban
Art. Backwage
283 Î Î P s  Notice requirement finds basis not only in the Labor Code
but also in the due process clause of the Constitution
Backwage  When the employee is dismissed without due process, he is
s from illegally dismissed. He is entitled to backwages and
terminatio reinstatement.
n until it is  The Labor Code grants the dismissed employee the right to
determined be notified as well as the right to be heard.
that there
Art. is just
282 P Î Î cause [1] Causes under Article 282 are (1) serious misconduct or
willful disobedience, (2) gross and habitual neglect of duties,
DISPOSITIVE PORTION (3) fraud or breach of trust, (4) commission of crime against
Petition granted. NLRC resolution modified. Isetann is ordered employer or immediate family member or authorized
to: representatives, and (5) other analogous causes.
 Pay separation pay equivalent to one month pay per year of
service [2] For this part, I will only take note of discussions different
 Unpaid salary from what has been presented in the majority opinion.
 Proportionate 13thmonth pay

De Leon vs. NLRC (100 SCRA 691)
Post under case digests, labor law at Saturday, March 10,
2012 Posted by Schizophrenic Mind
Facts: The petitioner started working with said corporation as a
messenger way back in 1949. He held various positions therein,
such as bookkeeper, accountant, general office supervisor
andAssistant-Manager. He then rose to the position
as Assistant Vice President-Manager (Makati Office) in 1913
and held it continuously up to 1977. Prior to his dismissal, he
was in the service for more than 28 years.
In October 1976, the petitioner was sent to Korea on
an officialbusiness for the respondent corporation. Before that,
the respondentAlfredo Benedicto, president and general
manager of the corporation, verbally intimated to petitioner that
the latter would soon be appointed as Assistant Vice President
for Finance, preparatory to his assuming the position of Vice
President for Finance upon the resignation of the then
incumbent. In early November 1976, petitioner was instructed
to attend the staff meeting at Bacolod every second and fourth
Tuesdays of every month starting January 1977.
The petitioner alleged that he had not at any time or in any
mannerapplied for retirement and that the requirement of due
process was not observed, thus making his dismissal illegal and
unjustified. Also, he stated that the respondents did not explain
to him any cause or reason for his dismissal, that no specific
charges were made against him and no formal investigation was
conducted to afford him opportunity to acquit himself of any
charges. Finally, the money offered by the corporation does not
constitute estoppel or waiver on his part, considering that his
acceptance was without prejudice to all his rights resulting from
his illegal dismissal.
Issue: Whether or not the acceptance of separation pay is a bar
to contesting the legality of dismissal.
Held: No. The contention of respondents that petitioner is
barred from contesting the illegality of his dismissal since he
has already received his separation pay cannot be sustained.
Since he was forced to retire, he suddenly found himself jobless
with a family of eight (8) children to support. He had no
alternative but to accept what was offered to him; he needed
money to support his family. He had to grab whatever was
offered as he accepted less than what was offered to show his
non-acquiescence to what amounted to dismissal.
Employees who received their separation pay are not barred
from contesting the legality of their dismissal. The acceptance
of those benefits would not amount to estoppels. Having been
illegally dismissed, the petitioner is entitled to reinstatement
with back wages corresponding to a period of three (3) years
without qualification minus the amount of P26, 492. 63 he was
forced to receive as retirement gratuity pay.
De Leon et al. v. NLRC
Posted: May 1, 2015 in case digests, labor relations
Tags: case digests, De Leon et al. v. NLRC, LABOR
RELATIONS
0
De Leon et al. v. NLRC
2001 May 30
Facts: Petitioners are security guards assigned in the premises
of Fortune Tobacco Services, Inc. (FTC) pursuant to a contract
for security services with Fortune Integrated Services Inc.
(FISI). Sometime after, FISI stockholders executed a “Deed of
Sale of Shares of Stock” in favor of a group of new
stockholders, it also amended its Articles of Incorporation
changing its name to Magnum Integrated Services, Inc.
(MISI). FTC terminated the contract with FISI which resulted
in the displacement of some 582 security guards assigned to
FTC, including petitioners herein.
FTC Labor Union which is an affiliate of NAFLU, sent a
Notice of Strike which resulted in the picketing of the
premises of FTC, however, RTC of Pasig, issued a writ of
injunction to enjoin the picket. Petitioners then filed the
instant case to the Arbitration branch of the NLRC.
Petitioners that they were regular employees of FTC which
was also using the corporate names FISI and MISI, averring
that they work under the control and supervision of FTC’s
security supervisors, and that, they were dismissed without
just cause and due process. They also claimed that their
dismissal was the design of their employer to bust their newly
organized union. Respondent FTC, on the other hand,
maintained that there was no EE-ER relationship, that
petitioners were employee of MISI a separate and distinct
corporation from FTC.
LA ruled for respondents. NLRC reversed.
Issue: WON respondents are guilty of ULP.
Held: Yes, respondents are guilty of ULP.
Ratio: Respondents were guilty of interfering with the ri
ght of petitioners to self-
organization which constitutes unfair labor practice under
Article 248 of the Labor Code. Petitioners have been
employed with FISI since the 1980s and have since been
posted at the premises of FTC (main factory plant, tobacco re-
drying plant and warehouse). FISI, while having its own
corporate identity, was
a mere instrumentality of FTC, tasked to provide
protection and security in the company premises. The 2
corporations had identical stockholders and the same business
address. FISI also had no other clients except FTC and other
companies belonging to the Lucio Tan group of
companies. Moreover, the early payslips of petitioners show
that their salaries were initially paid by FTC. To enforce their
rightful benefits under the laws on Labor Standards,
petitioners formed a union which was
later certified as bargaining agent of all the security guar
ds. On February 1, 1991, the
stockholders of FISI sold all their participations in the co
rporation to a new set of stockholders which renamed the
corporation Magnum Integrated Services, Inc. On October 15,
1991, FTC, without any reason, pre-terminated its contract of
security services with MISI and contracted 2 other agencies to
provide security services for its premises. This resulted in the
displacement of
petitioners. As MISI had no other clients, it failed to giv
e new assignments to petitioners. Petitioners have remained
unemployed since then. All these facts indicate a concerted
effort on the part of respondents to remove petitioners from
the
company and thus abate the growth of the union and blo
ck its actions to enforce their demands in accordance with
the Labor Standards laws.
The test of whether an employer has interfered with and
coerced employees
within the meaning of section (a) (1) is whether the emp
loyer has engaged in conduct
which it may reasonably be said tends to interfere with t
he free exercise of employees’ rights under section 3 of the
Act, and it is not necessary that there be direct evidence that
any employee was in fact intimidated or coerced by statements
of threats of the employer if
there is a reasonable inference that anti-
union conduct of the employer does have an adverse
effect on self-organization and collective bargaining.”
A corporation is an entity separate and
distinct from its stockholders and from other corporations
to which it is connected. However, when the concept of
separate legal entity is used to defeat public convenience,
justify wrong, protect fraud or defend crime, the law will
regard the corporation as an association of persons, or in case
of two corporations, merge them into
one. The separate juridical personality of a corporation m
ay also be
disregarded when such corporation is a mere alter ego or
business conduit of another person. FISI was a mere adjunct
of FTC. FISI, by virtue of a contract for security services,
provided FTC with security guards to safeguard its premises.
However, records show that
FISI and FTC have the same owners and business addres
s, and FISI provided security services only to FTC and other
companies belonging to the Lucio Tan group of companies.
The purported sale of the shares of the former stockholders
to a new set of stockholders who changed the name of the
corporation to Magnum Integrated Services, Inc. appears to
be part of a scheme to terminate the services of FISI’s s
ecurity guards posted at the premises of FTC and bust their
newly-organized union which was then beginning to become
active in demanding the company’s compliance with Labo
r Standards laws. Under these
circumstances, the Court cannot allow FTC to use its sep
arate corporate personality to shield itself from liability for
illegal acts committed against its employees.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, petition is GRANTED. The assailed
resolutions of the NLRC are SET ASIDE. Respondents are
hereby ordered to pay petitioners their full backwages, and to
reinstate them to their former position without loss of seniority
rights and privileges, or to award them separation pay in case
reinstatement is no longer possible.
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-58610 September 30, 1982
BABELO BERINA, MARILOU ELAGDON, ERNESTO
ROBERTO and JESUS SORIAO, petitioners,
vs.
PHILIPPINE MARITIME INSTITUTE, TOMAS CLOMA
and JAIME CLOMA, respondents.
ABAD SANTOS, J.:
Babelo Beriña, Marilou Elagdon, Ernesto Roberto and Jesus
Soriao are students of the Philippine Maritime Institute, PMI
for short. In their petition which is styled FOR
EXTRAORDINARY AND EQUITABLE REMEDY WITH
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION, they claim that PMI, five
weeks after school had started, posted sometime in August,
1981, a notice that there would be a 15% increase in tuition
fees retroactive to the start of the current semester; that the
students met and took positive steps in respect of the problem;
that their representatives held dialogues with the school
administration; "that, in reaction to these legitimate student
activities and without compliance with due process
respondents commencing on October 15, 1981 issued
expulsion orders against Jesus Soriao, Ernesto Roberto, and
Babelo Berina and an indefinite suspension against Marilou
Elagdon;" that the penalties were imposed without due process
and had the effect of negating the petitioners' right to free
speech, peaceful assembly and petition for redress of
grievances. The petitioners pray that the expulsion and
suspension orders be annulled and that while the case is
pending resolution they be restored to their status as students
of the PMI,
On November 10, 1981, We required PMI and its officers who
were included as respondents to comment on the petition. We
also issued a temporary restraining order commanding the
respondents to refrain from carrying out the expulsion and
suspension orders.
PMI filed its comment as required where it said that the 15%
increase in tuition fee had been authorized by the Ministry of
Education and Culture; and denied that the action taken
against the petitioners was in response to their activities in
connection with the tuition fee increase. The comment also
advances the arguments that this Court lacks jurisdiction to
entertain the petition because it involves "matters that are well
within the competence and jurisdiction of the lower courts to
pass upon, as even more serious matters and cases of greater
consequences are normally brought before them at the first
instance prior to any appeal to the Supreme Court, and there
are no valid and impelling excuses to warrant a direct recourse
to the Highest Tribunal in the judicial hierarchy."
We are not called upon to determine the validity or propriety
of the tuition fee increase of 15% five weeks after the classes
for the current semester had started. The issue in this case is
limited to the question as to whether or not the petitioners
were denied by the respondents their constitutional rights to
due process, free speech, peaceful assembly and petition to
redress of grievances. Treating the petition as having been
filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court as the petitioners
assert, We have no doubt that there is no absence of
jurisdiction.
Typical of the expulsion orders is that which was issued to
petitioner Jesus Soriao on October 15, 1981, which has been
marked as Annex A of the petition and which reads as follows:
For conduct unbecoming as a Cadet, you are
hereby dropped from the roll of students of
the School.
That your actuations and behavior as
reported and seen leave no other recourse
hence this action.
That on September 9th, you with another
student was (sic) caught inside the STC
Building, distributing leaflets, enticing and
coercing other students to join the slated
demonstration.
In the subsequent days, you were caught
again by the undersigned campaigning and
distributing leaflets, enjoining other students
to join the boycott.
That all these actions are contrary to MEC
regulations and directives that appropriate
action had to be taken.
For your guidance.
The suspension order which was issued for Marilou Elagdon
on October 20, 1981, which has been marked Annex C of the
petition reads:
Please be informed that C/miss ELAGDON,
Marilou is hereby suspended from her
classes for conduct unbecoming of a
Cadetee as against the rules and regulation
of the School.
Let the above-named student see the
undersigned and in the meantime she
remained suspended until clearance is given
by this office.
For your guidance.
The comment does not positively assert that in imposing the
expulsion and suspension orders there was observance of due
process which simply means that the petitioners should have
been given an opportunity to defend themselves. It was only
after the petitioners had said in their reply that the respondents
failed to traverse the denial of due process that the latter
invoked the legal presumption "that the ordinary course of
business has been followed" (Sec. 5(q), Rule 131, Rules of
Court)."
It is obvious from the expulsion and suspension orders that the
petitioners were denied due process, res ipsa loquitur. For the
orders are bereft of the sides of the petitioners. Hence the legal
presumption of regularity cannot be availed in the instant case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted; the expulsion and
suspension orders are hereby set aside but without prejudice to
the power of the respondents to formally charge the petitioners
for violation(s) of reasonable school rules and regulations and
after due notice to hear and decide the charge. No special
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Diosdado Guzman vs National University
142 SCRA 699 – Political Law – Bill of Rights – Due Process
– Due Process in Educational Institutions
In 1984, Diosdado Guzman and two others complained that the
National University (NU) barred them from enrolling in the said
university. NU argued that their failure to enroll was due to the
students’ fault. It was alleged that Guzman et al spearheaded
illegal mass actions within the university premises; that such
mass actions were violative of school policies; that due to their
mass actions, Guzman et al incurred bad grades; that Guzman
et al hated NU anyway so why should they be allowed to enroll;
that it is in the best interest of both parties for the students not
to be enrolled.
ISSUE: Whether or not National University may not admit the
Diosdado Guzman et al in the case at bar.
HELD: No. Guzman et al were deprived of due process. In the
first place, NU never showed which school policies or duly
published rules did Guzman et al violate upon which they may
be expelled from. NU failed to show that it conducted any sort
of proceedings (not necessarily a trial type one) to determine
Guzman et al’s liability or alleged participation in the said mass
actions.
Under the Education Act of 1982, Guzman et al, as students,
have the right among others “to freely choose their field of
study subject to existing curricula and to continue their course
therein up to graduation, except in case of academic deficiency,
or violation of disciplinary regulations.” Guzman et al were
being denied this right, or being disciplined, without due
process, in violation of the Manual of Regulations for Private
Schools which provides that “no penalty shall be imposed upon
any student except for cause as defined in the Manual and/or in
the school rules and regulations as duly promulgated and only
after due investigation shall have been conducted.”
Therefore, in effect, NU, by barring the enrollment of Guzman
et al imposed sanction upon the students without due
investigation – such act is illegal.
The Supreme Court also emphasized the minimum standards
which must be met to satisfy the demands of procedural due
process; and these are:
1. That the students must be informed in writing of the nature
and cause of any accusation against them;
2. That they shall have the right to answer the charges against
them, with the assistance of counsel, if desired;
3. That they shall be informed of the evidence against them;
4. That they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own
behalf; and
5. That the evidence must be duly considered by the
investigating committee or official designated by the school
authorities to hear and decide the case.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-68288 July 11, 1986
DIOSDADO GUZMAN, ULYSSES URBIZTONDO, and
ARIEL RAMACULA, petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL UNIVERSITY and DOMINGO L. JHOCSON in
his capacity as President of National University, respondents.
Efren H. Mercado and Haydee Yorac for petitioners.
Samson S. Alcantara for respondents.
DECISION
NARVASA, J.:
Petitioners Diosdado Guzman, Ulysses Urbiztondo and Ariel
Ramacula, students of respondent National University, have
come to this Court to seek relief from what they describe as
their school’s “continued and persistent refusal to allow them
to enroll.” In their petition “for extraordinary legal and
equitable remedies with prayer for preliminary mandatory
injunction” dated August 7, 1984, they allege:
1) that respondent University’s avowed reason for its refusal to
re-enroll them in their respective courses is “the latter’s
participation in peaceful mass actions within the premises of the
University”;
2) that this “attitude of the (University) is simply a continuation
of its cavalier if not hostile attitude to the student’s exercise of
their basic constitutional and human rights already recorded
in Rockie C. San Juan vs. National University, S.C. G.R. No.
65443 (1983) and its utter contempt for the principle of due
process of law to the prejudice of petitioners;” and
3) that “in effect petitioners are subjected to the extreme penalty
of expulsion without cause or if there be any, without being
informed of such cause and without being afforded the
opportunity to defend themselves. Berina v. Philippine
Maritime Institute (117 SCRA 581 [1983]).
In the comment filed on September 24, 1986 for respondent
University and its President pursuant to this Court’s
requirement therefor, 1 respondents make the claim:
1) that “petitioners’ failure to enroll for the first semester of the
school year 1984-1985 is due to their own fault and not because
of their alleged exercise of their constitutional and human
rights;”
2) that petitioner Urbiztondo, sought to re-enroll only on July 5,
1986 “when the enrollment period was already closed;”
3) that as regards petitioner Guzman, his “academic showing”
was “poor”, “due to his activities in leading boycotts of
classes”; that when his father was notified of this development
sometime in August, 1982, the latter had demanded that his son
“reform or else we will recall him to the province”; that
Guzman was one of the petitioners in G.R. No. 65443
entitled “Rockie San Juan, et al. vs. National University, et
al.,” at the hearing of which on November 23, 1983 this Court
had admonished “the students involved (to) take advantage and
make the most of the opportunity given to them to study;” that
Guzman “however continued to lead or actively participate in
activities within the university premises, conducted without
prior permit from school authorities, that disturbed or disrupted
classes therein;” that moreover, Guzman “is facing criminal
charges for malicious mischief before the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Manila (Crim. Case No. 066446) in connection with
the destruction of properties of respondent University on
September 12, 1983 “, and “is also one of the defendants in
Civil Case No. 8320483 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila
entitled ‘National University, Inc. vs. Rockie San Juan et
al.’ for damages arising from destruction of university
properties
4) that as regards petitioner Ramacula, like Guzman “he
continued to lead or actively participate, contrary to the spirit of
the Resolution dated November 23, 1983 of this … Court (in
G.R. No. 65443 in which he was also one of the petitioners) and
to university rules and regulations, within university premises
but without permit from university officials in activities that
disturbed or disrupted classes;” and
5) that petitioners have “failures in their records, (and) are not
of good scholastic standing. “
Respondents close their comment with the following assertions,
to wit:
1) By their actuations, petitioners must be deemed to have
forfeited their privilege, if any, to seek enrollment in respondent
university. The rights of respondent university, as an institution
of higher learning, must also be respected. It is also beyond
comprehension why petitioners, who continually despise and
vilify respondent university and its officials and faculty
members, should persist in seeking enrollment in an institution
that they hate.
2) Under the circumstances, and without regard to legal
technicalities, it is not to the best interest of all concerned that
petitioners be allowed to enroll in respondent university.
3) In any event, petitioners’ enrollment being on the semestral
basis, respondents cannot be compelled to enroll them after the
end of the semester.
On October 2, 1984 this Court issued a resolution reading as
follows:
… Acting on the Comment submitted by respondent, the Court
Resolved to NOTE the same and to require a REPLY to such
Comment. The Court further Resolved to ISSUE a
MANDATORY INJUNCTION, enjoining respondent to allow
the enrolment of petitioners for the coming semester without
prejudice to any disciplinary proceeding to which any or all of
them may be subjected with their right to lawful defense
recognized and respected. As regards petitioner Diosdado
Guzman, even if it be a fact that there is a pending criminal
charge against him for malicious mischief, the Court
nonetheless is of the opinion that, as above-noted, without
prejudice to the continuation of any disciplinary proceeding
against him, that he be allowed to resume his studies in the
meanwhile. As shown in Annex 2 of the petition itself, Mr. Juan
P. Guzman, father of said petitioner, is extending full
cooperation with petitioners to assure that whatever protest or
grievance petitioner Guzman may have would be ventilated in
a lawful and peaceful manner.
Petitioners’ REPLY inter alia—
1) denied that Urbiztondo attempted to enroll only on July 5,
1984 (when enrollment was already closed), it being alleged
that “while he did try to enroll that day, he also attempted to do
so several times before that date, all to no avail, because
respondents … persistently refused to allow him to do so”
respondents’ ostensible reason being that Urbiztondo (had)
participated in mass actions … within the school premises,”
although there were no existing disciplinary charge against
petitioner Urbiztondo” at the time;
2) asserted that “neither the text nor the context of the
resolution2 justifies the conclusion that “petitioners’ right to
exercise their constitutional freedoms” had thereby been
restricted or limited; and
3) alleged that “the holding of activities (mass action) in the
school premises without the permission of the school … can be
explained by the fact that the respondents persistently refused
to issue such permit repeatedly sought by the students. “
On November 23, 1984, this Court promulgated another
resolution, this time reading as follows:
… The Court, after considering the pleadings filed and
deliberating on the issues raised in the petition for extraordinary
legal and equitable remedies with prayer for preliminary
mandatory injunction as well as the respondents’ comment on
the petition and the reply of counsel for petitioners to the
respondents’ comment, Resolved to (a) give DUE COURSE to
the petition; (b) consider the respondents’ comment as
ANSWER to the petition; and (c) require the parties to file their
respective MEMORANDA within twenty (20) days from
notice. … .
Immediately apparent from a reading of respondents’ comment
and memorandum is the fact that they had never conducted
proceedings of any sort to determine whether or not petitioners-
students had indeed led or participated “in activities within the
university premises, conducted without prior permit from
school authorities, that disturbed or disrupted classes
therein” 3 or perpetrated acts of “vandalism, coercion and
intimidation, slander, noise barrage and other acts showing
disdain for and defiance of University
authority.” 4 Parenthetically, the pendency of a civil case for
damages and a criminal case for malicious mischief against
petitioner Guzman, cannot, without more, furnish sufficient
warrant for his expulsion or debarment from re-enrollment.
Also apparent is the omission of respondents to cite this Court
to any duly published rule of theirs by which students may be
expelled or refused re-enrollment for poor scholastic standing.
Under the Education Act of 1982,5 the petitioners, as students,
have the right among others “to freely choose their field of
study subject to existing curricula and to continue their course
therein up to graduation, except in case of academic deficiency,
or violation of disciplinary regulations.”6 Petitioners were being
denied this right, or being disciplined, without due process, in
violation of the admonition in the Manual of Regulations for
Private Schools7 that “(n)o penalty shall be imposed upon any
student except for cause as defined in … (the) Manual and/or in
the school rules and regulations as duly promulgated and only
after due investigation shall have been conducted.” 8 This
Court is therefore constrained, as in Berina v. Philippine
Maritime Institute, 9 to declare illegal this act of respondents of
imposing sanctions on students without due investigation.
Educational institutions of course have the power to “adopt and
enforce such rules as may be deemed expedient for … (its)
government, … (this being)” incident to the very object of
incorporation, and indispensable to the successful management
of the college.” 10 The rules may include those governing
student discipline. Indeed, the maintenance of “good school
discipline” is a duty specifically enjoined on “every private
school” by the Manual of Regulations for Private
Schools; 11 and in this connection, the Manual further provides
that-
… The school rules governing discipline and the corresponding
sanctions therefor must be clearly specified and defined in
writing and made known to the students and/or their parents or
guardians. Schools shall have the authority and prerogative to
promulgate such rules and regulations as they may deem
necessary from time to time effective as of the date of their
promulgation unless otherwise specified. 12
But, to repeat, the imposition of disciplinary sanctions requires
observance of procedural due process. And it bears stressing
that due process in disciplinary cases involving students does
not entail proceedings and hearings similar to those prescribed
for actions and proceedings in courts of justice. The
proceedings in student discipline cases may be summary; and
cross-examination is not, ‘contrary to petitioners’ view, an
essential part thereof. There are withal minimum standards
which must be met to satisfy the demands of procedural due
process; and these are, that (1) the students must be informed in
writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against them;
(2) they shall have the right to answer the charges against them,
with the assistance of counsel, if desired; (3) they shall be
informed of the evidence against them; (4) they shall have the
right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and (5) the
evidence must be duly considered by the investigating
committee or official designated by the school authorities to
hear and decide the case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the respondents
are directed to allow the petitioners to re-enroll or otherwise
continue with their respective courses, without prejudice to any
disciplinary proceedings to which any or all of them may be
subjected in accordance with the standards herein set forth.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-67784 February 28, 1986
MABUHAY TEXTILE MILLS CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
MINISTER ROBERTO V. ONGPIN, ALFREDO PIO DE
RODA, JR., EDGARDO L. TORDESILLAS, RAMON J.
FAROLAN, GARMENTS AND TEXTILE EXPORT
BOARD AND THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE
COURT, respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This petition for certiorari seeks to annul the decision of the
Intermediate Appellate Court dated January 6, 1984 which
upheld the cancellation of petitioner's export quota allocations
and the suspension of its officers even as it set aside the basis
of such cancellation and suspension on the ground of violation
of due process.
Petitioner Mabuhay Textile Mills Corporation (Mabuhay) is a
corporation engaged in the garments and textile import
business for the last twenty-seven years. Among the
government requirements for engaging in this type of business
are the export quota allocations issued by the respondent
Garments and Textile Export Board.
Sometime in 1982, the Board granted export quota allocations
for 1983 to the petitioner. These export quotas have been
granted annually to the petitioner since 1976. They are
automatically renewed every year provided the grantee has
utilized its quotas during the previous years.
On March 2, 1983, the petitioner received a letter from the
Board informing it that its 1983 export quota allocations were
revoked effective February, 1983. Furthermore, its major
stockholders and officers were also distinguished from
engaging in business activities involving garment and textile
exports. The decision of the Board was based on the following
initial findings of the Bureau of Customs, to wit:
1. Two 40-footer containers declared to
consist of 210 bales of acrylic staple fiber
weighing 48.211 kgs. with a value
(including taxes and duties) of
P1,240,857.00 arrived from Kobe, Japan on
12 February 1983 on board the S/S
Breadeverette.
2. Examination of the shipment reveals the
following —
a. About 100 bales of
acrylic staple fibers were
found in the first half of
the containers; and
b. Assorted textile piece
goods for blouses, shirts
and dresses were found
midway through the
containers.
3. The estimated value of the actual contents
of the 2 containers is P2.5 Million.
The Bureau of Customs conducted an investigation pursuant
to the above initial findings. On July 25, 1983, it rendered a
decision absolving the petitioner from any irregularity relative
to the subject shipment in the initial findings. It ruled:
xxx xxx xxx
During the hearing, it was shown that Mr.
James Dy, Executive Vice-President of
Mabuhay contacted the shipper in Japan,
Daiwa Trading Co., Ltd. demanding
explanation for the textile contents of the
shipment and the shipper answered that
those (sic) was an interchange in the loading
of the materials destined for Manila and
another shipment destined for Indonesia
(Exh. "O" and Stipulation No. 9).
Subsequently, Mr. Dy wrote another letter to
the Chief, CIID (Exh. "P") enclosing
therewith two letters from Daiwa Trading
Co., Ltd. dated February 21, 1983 and
February 25, 1983 explaining the supposed
interchanging of the materials destined for
Manila and that destined for Indonesia
(Exhs. "P-1" and "P-2"); a copy of a Bill of
Lading of Samudera Indonesia Shipping
Line for the S/S 'OCEAN PRIMA'
purportedly covering 150 crate piece goods
consigned to 'P.T. GADING AJU DJAZA
JL 'of Jakarta (Exhs. "P.3" & "J-A"); a photo
of an invoice addressed to 'P.T. GADING
AJU DJAZA JL' containing a detailed
description of assorted design/color of the
fabrics and their corresponding values (Exh,
" P-4 " and " 5-B ") and a photocopy of a
Packing List (Exh. "P-5" also "5-C")
containing the description and yardage of
the fabrics mentioned in the aforementioned
invoice. The aforementioned photocopies of
the shipping documents were sent by
DAIWA TRADING CO., LTD., to
Mabuhay for purposes of explaining the
alleged interchanging of the materials in the
two shipments and which Mabuhay, through
its Executive Vice-Presidents, submitted to
the CIID.
Thereafter, through a series of
communications with customs authorities in
Jakarta and a personal inspection in Jakarta
by the Commissioner of Customs, while he
was there, it was discovered that no such
containers with Nos. ICSU-4868538 and
ICSU-5219207 containing 110 bales of
acrylic staple fiber was on board the
'OCEAN PRIMA' and that Bill of Lading
No. CJ-4 covers a shipment of steel sheets
(Exh. "O-4 "; Exhs. "R" to "R-2") thus
debunking the claim of interchanged
shipments by DAIWA TRADING CO.,
LTD.
The claimant, on the other hand, showed
during the hearing that it opened a letter of
credit for the importation of 42,000 kilos of
Acryhc Staple Fiber C8 3D V64 at US$1.6
per kilo (Exh. "1") based on a Pro Forma
Invoice of Daiwa Trading Co., Ltd. (Exh. "l-
A"). Upon receipt of the shipping
documents, i.e., the Invoice (Exh. "D"); the
Packing List (Exh. "C") and the Bill of
Lading (Exh. "B" also Exh. "1") wherein it
is indicated that the shipment was Shipper's
Load & Count' (Exh. "1-A"), the same were
given to its broker in line with its used
business practice, for the purpose of filing
the import entry.
When the claimant received information that
the shipment contained fabrics which it did
not import, an explanation was required
from the shipper, DAIWA TRADING
CORPORATION, LTD. The latter, in two
letters addressed to the claimant (Exhs. "P1"
and "P-2" also Exhs. "4" & "5") alleged that
there was an inter change of materials in the
shipment to the claimant and another
shipment consigned to a customer in
Indonesia. Also sent to the claimant by
Daiwa were photocopies of a Bill of Lading
(Exh. "P-3"); and Invoice (Exh. "P-4") and a
packing list (Exh. "P-5") supposedly
covering a shipment of piece goods
consigned to 'P.T. GADING AJU DJAZA
JL' which the claimant forthwith submitted
to the CIID. Later, in the letter dated March
14, 1983, addressed to the Claimant, the
shipper admitted its culpability in claimant
interchanging the shipments (Exh. "8").
Thereafter, the Claimant filed a suit against
the shipper for the damages caused to it by
the latter's action and petitioned for the
issuance of a Writ of Preliminary
Attachment (Exh. "7" to "7-6").
A careful scrutiny of the facts and the
circumstances attendant to the case show
that the Mabuhay Textile Mills have no
participation in the irregularity relative to
the subject shipment. The same was
exported to the Philippines under a
'Shipper's Load and Count Bill of Lading
(Exh. " l-A") which means that it was the
shipper who was responsible for putting the
contents inside the container. The spurious
documents (Exhs. "P-3", "P-4" and "P-5")
came from the shipper, Daiwa Trading Co.,
Ltd. and were forwarded by Mabuhay to the
Bureau of Customs for checking and
evaluation. Lastly, and most important,
Daiwa Trading Co., Ltd., in a letter to
Mabuhay dated March 14, 1983 (Exh. "l")
admitted that its staff was responsible for the
story about the supposed mix-up with the
alleged shipment to Indonesia.
However, good faith should not be isolated
alone on the part of importer/consignee, but
it should be proven also on the part of the
supplier/exporter. It should be reckoned that
in matter of importation there are two
primary personalities involved, the supplier
and the importer. The supplier in order to
maintain his credibility to his
client/importer, should exercise an utmost
 care and extreme caution in shipping orders
of his importer otherwise there is always the
risk of losing huge amount of investment
capital by his importers which ultimately
produce tremendous damages on the part of
the importer similar to the instant case. He
must maintain his honest relationship to his
importers. Within the contemplation of the
Customs Code, the defense of the importer
of good faith must be mutually tie up with
the supplier. A good faith of the importer
does not in anyway offset the damage
committed by the supplier/exporter for it is
crystal clear on the provision of Section
2530 (1) 3, 4 of the Tariff and Customs
Code, the liability of the exporter is explicit,
thus:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) On the strength of a false documents or
affidavit executed by the owner,
importer, exporter or consignee concerning
the importation of such articles;
(4) On the strength of a false invoice or
other documents executed by the owner,
importer, exporter or consignee concerning
the importation or exportation of such
articles;
If Mabuhay is prejudiced by such actions, its
recourse is against the exporter by way of
damages and other remedies provided by
law, as in fact, Mabuhay have so done by
filling of the corresponding complaint
against the exporter and petitioning for the
issuance of the necessary Writ of
Attachment.
xxx xxx xxx
On the basis of such decision, the petitioner, on August 10,
1983, moved to reconsider the revocation of its export quota
allocations and the disqualification of its officers from the
export business. As the Board failed to reply to such a request,
two similar letters were sent by the petitioner on September
13, and 23, 1983 respectively. Again, the Board did not reply.
Finally on September 26 and 29, 1983, two letters were
respectively sent by the Board to the petitioner informing the
latter that it had referred petitioner's letters to the
Commissioner of Customs for comment.
On October 14, 1983, the Commissioner of Customs
responded through a letter-comment addressed to the Board
stating the following:
xxx xxx xxx
Kindly be informed that seizure proceedings
are proceedings instituted against the articles
or goods. Whenever a decision is rendered
in a seizure proceeding, it is final and
conclusive as to the goods but not as to the
persons involved therein where another
proceeding is necessary. Hence, any
findings made in a seizure proceeding, with
respect to the culpability or non-culpability
of the persons involved, cannot be
considered binding as to affect the judgment
that may be rendered in another. Seizure
proceedings cannot make a final and
conclusive pronouncement as to the guilt or
innocence of persons.
On October 19, 1983, petitioner filed an action for prohibition
and injunction with preliminary injunction and restraining
order against the Board. On October 24, 1983, the trial court
issued a restraining order directing the Board and its officials
to desist and to stop from implementing the decision revoking
the petitioner's export quota allocations and from disqualifying
its principal stockholder and officers from engaging in the
textile and garment export business.
The Board moved to reconsider but the same was denied. On
November 14, 1983, the lower court issued a writ of
preliminary injunction. This, notwithstanding, the next day,
the Board denied petitioner's request for reinstatement "on the
basis of the above letter (the letter of the Commissioner of
Customs dated October 14, 1983) and for the reason that no
new issues had been presented to warrant the reinstatement. "
After hearing, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of the
petitioner, and among others directed the Board to issue to the
petitioner within two days from service of the writ, Textile
Export Clearances Nos. 23292, 22583 and 14321, and to issue
the pertinent clearances with respect to the textile export
shipments of the petitioner after filing of the required papers
and documents. In its decision, the trial court stated:
The summary revocation of the export
quotas and export authorizations issued in
favor of the petitioner without hearing
violates not only the above-mentioned
provisions of the Rules and Regulations of
the respondent board but also the 'due
process of law' clause of the Constitution of
the Philippines to the effect that 'no person
shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law, nor shall any
person be denied equal protection of the
laws.' (Article IV, Sec. 1, New
Constitution). According to Daniel Webster
in the Dartmouth College case, due process
is the equivalent of the law; a law which
hears before it condemns, which proceeds
upon inquiry and renders judgment only
after trial. The meaning is that every citizen
shall hold his life, liberty, property, and
immunities under the protection of the
 general rules which govern society. (cited in
Philippine Constitutional Law, p. 168 by
Neptali Gonzales, 1975 ed.)
Administrative due process requires that
there be an impartial tribunal constituted to
determine the right involved; that due notice
and opportunity to be heard be given; that
the procedure at the hearing be consistent
with the essentials of a fair trial; and that the
proceedings be conducted in such a way that
there will be opportunity for a court to
determine whether the applicable rules of
law and procedure were observed. (42 Am.
Jur. p. 451, cited by Neptali Gonzales, p.
183, Philippine Constitutional Law).
The Board appealed the decision to the Intermediate Appellate
Court.
On January 4, 1984, the appellate court modified the trial
court's decision. It affirmed all the findings of fact of the court
and held that the petitioner was denied due process by the
Board when it cancelled the export quota allocations. It set
aside the letters of the Board dated March 2, 1983 and
November 14, 1983. However, the appellate court ordered the
Board to give the petitioner and its officers due hearing to
determine whether or not any of its rules and regulations had
been violated as to warrant the imposition of any penalty
against them. Until such hearings were held, the petitioner's
export quota allocations were to remain cancelled and its
officers suspended. This modification is now the subject of
this petition.
The petitioner contends that the appellate court committed
grave abuse of discretion when it ordered a new hearing to be
conducted unnecessarily since even without controverting
evidence, the evidence on record relied upon by the Board
failed miserably to measure up to the requisite of "substantial
evidence. "
This contention has no merit.
Executive Order No. 823 provides, among others:
The GTEB shall have the following powers
and functions:
h. In case of violations of its rules and
regulations, cancel or suspend quota
allocations, export authorizations and
licences for the operation of bonded garment
manufacturing warehouses. (Sec. 2[h] Exec.
Order No. 823 amended Sec. 3[h] of Exec.
Order No. 537).
Likewise, under its Rules and Regulations, said Executive
Order provides:
Rules and Regulations:
Section III. Penalties.- Any act or
misrepresentation or violation of these Rules
and Regulations shall, after due hearing,
constitute sufficient ground for the
imposition of a fine of not more than ten per
cent (10%) of the gross FOB value of the
goods exported or for a total or partial
forfeiture of the offender's Export Quota,
Export Authorization and Export License
and permit or temporary disqualification
from enjoying the privilege to export under
all Agreements on textiles, without prejudice
to any liabilities under other applicable laws.
(Sec. III, Part 111, Rules and Regulations).
It is clear from the above provisions that the respondent Board
is the body charged with the function of granting export quota
allocations, issuing licenses to operate bonded warehouses and
revoking or cancelling the same. Correspondingly, it is also
authorized to conduct hearings to determine whether or not
violations have been committed by the grantee .The Board
acted arbitrarily when, after acting solely upon the initial
findings of the Bureau of Customs, it issued the questioned
order but once the basis for its action proved non-existent, it
refused to lift its erroneous and unfounded order.
However, since the Board has reason to believe that the
petitioner might have violated its rules and regulations in
connection with the importation of materials for the
petitioner's garment industry then it has the discretion to
conduct a proper hearing to determine the petitioner's
culpability or non-culpability. It does not have to rely on the
findings of other agencies to discharge this function.
In its second assignment of error, the petitioner maintains that
the appellate court erred in allowing the implementation of the
orders of the respondent Board when such orders were set
aside for having been issued without a hearing.
There is merit in this contention.
The appellate court should have reversed and set aside the
cancellation of petitioner's export quota allocations and the
suspension of its officers since the very bases of these
measures were set aside because of lack of due process. As the
trial court correctly pointed out:
It is worthwhile to note that the basis of the
revocation of the export quotas and export
authorizations issued in favor of the
petitioner was based on the initial findings
of the Bureau of Customs regarding certain
shipments but subsequently the acting
collector of customs of the port of Manila,
Mr. Bienvenido P. Alano, Jr., cleared the
petitioner of any wrongdoing and declared
that it had no participation in the
irregularities relative to the subject
shipments. (Decision dated July 25, 1983,
Exhibit "A"). The decision of the acting
collector of customs of the port of Manila
 became final on August 18, 1983. The basis
of the revocation has, therefore, become
ineffective and unenforceable so that the
revocation has no more leg to stand on.
The petitioner has shown by its evidence
and the allegations of its verified petition
that it is entitled to the reliefs demanded and
the whole or part of such reliefs consists in
restraining the commission or continuance
of the acts complained of and that great or
irreparable injury would result to the
petitioner before the trial or termination of
this case. It has been shown by the evidence
presented during the hearing for the issuance
of the writs of preliminary injunction prayed
for by the petitioner that foreign companies
with whom the petitioner have entered into
contracts regarding its export business like
Itoman (U.S.A.) Inc., New York, N.Y., and
the C. ITOH and Co., Ltd. Tokyo, Japan,
have threatened to cancel their contracts
with the petitioner and to sue the latter for
damages if it cannot comply with its
commitments to them (Exhs. "I" and "J"),
thereby showing that the petitioner would
suffer great and irreparable injury if the
injunctions prayed for will not be granted.
Aside from this, the 700 employees and
workers of the petitioner will be practically
jobless and they and their families will
suffer greatly for the duration of this case if
the injuctions will not be granted.
To hold that there was a violation of petitioner's right to due
process but at the same time sustain the end results of such
violation would be tantamount to denying the right to due
process just the same. Indeed, the importance of this right
which is guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be stressed
strongly enough. In the case of Bacus v. Ople, (132 SCRA
690, 704), we ruled:
The principle of due process furnishes a
standard to which governmental action
should conform in order to impress it with
the stamp of validity. Fidelity to such
standard must of necessity be the overriding
concern of government agencies exercising
quasi-judicial functions. Although a speedy
administration of action implies a speedy
trial, speed is not the chief objective of a
trial. Respect for the rights of all parties and
the requirements of procedural due process
equally apply in proceedings before
administrative agencies with quasi-judicial
perspective in administrative decision
making and for maintaining the vision which
led to the creation of the administrative
office. (Citing Amberto V. Court of
Appeals, 89 SCRA 240 and Baguio Country
Club Corporation v. National Labor
Relations Commission, 118 SCRA 557).
Equally important are the requisites of due process in
administrative proceedings reiterated in the case of Halili v.
Court of Industrial Relations, (136 SCRA 112, 131):
xxx xxx xxx
. . . It is a settled rule that in administrative
proceedings, or cases coming before
administrative tribunals exercising quasi-
judicial powers, due process requires not
only notice and hearing, but also the
consideration by the administrative tribunal
of the evidence presented; the existence of
evidence to support the decision; its
substantiality; a decision based thereon or at
least contained in the record and disclosed to
the parties, such decision by the
administrative tribunal resting on its own
independent consideration of the law and
facts of the controversy; and such decision
acquainting the parties with the various
issues involved and the reasons therefor
(Ang Tibay v. Court, 69 Phil. 635, cited on
p. 84, Philippine Constitutional Law,
Fernando, 1984 ed.)
In the case at bar, the petitioner was never given the chance to
present its side before its export quota allocations were
revoked and its officers suspended. While it is true that such
allocations as alleged by the Board are mere privileges which
it can revoke and cancel as it may deem fit, these privileges
have been accorded to petitioner for so long that they have
become impressed with property rights especially since not
only do these privileges determine the continued existence of
the petitioner with assets of over P80,000,000.00 but also the
livelihood of some 700 workers who are employed by the
petitioner and their families. As the appellate court correctly
pointed out:
xxx xxx xxx
. . . This reliance on the 'right privilege'
dichotomy has long been denigrated by
leading lights in administrative law as 'too
crude for consistent application' by courts.
Indeed, considering the total topography of
this case, the resort to the right-privilege
distinction is too feeble a refutation of the
fact that there has been a disregard of the
due process requirement of the Constitution
by the petitioner Board. For the irrefutable
fact is that the private respondent has long
been granted its export allocations on their
basis, valuable contracts calling for textile
export shipments have been concluded
between the private respondent and foreign
corporation. Stated otherwise, these export
allocations can not anymore be categorized
 as mere 'privilege' but are already impressed more sharpens the need for a real hearing
with property rights of the private where the private respondent and its officers
respondent, They cannot be arbitrarily should be given a fair opportunity to
revoked without causing a collision with the establish their innocence-a factual issue that
constitutional call that there must be due cannot be resolved by mere resolution of its
process before anybody can be denied his requests for reinstatement on the basis of in.
right to property. formation known to the Board but unknown
to the private respondent such as the
Neither can the petitioner's request for reinstatement be exchange of communications between
considered as substantial compliance with the due process petitioner Farolan and the Director General
requirement so much so that any defect in the initial of Customs of Indonesia. Indeed even in
cancellation of the export quota allocations by the Board is judicial proceedings, the irreducible rule is
deemed to have been cured by petitioner's request for that the dismissal of an action upon a motion
reinstatement; an action which is alleged by the Board as to dismiss constitutes a denial of due process
being tantamount to a motion for reconsideration. of law if from a consideration of the
pleadings it appears that there are issues of
fact which cannot be decided without a trial
It should be noted that no reply was given by the Board when
of the case on the merits. In quasi-judicial
petitioner requested for reinstatement of its allocations until an
proceedings, the counterpart rule is that
action for injunction was filed by petitioner. Only then did the
Board deny petitioner's request on the basis of the letter of the where an adjudicative fact is at issue, a trial-
Commissioner of Customs that his findings were not type hearing ought to be held. (Londoner v.
Denver, 210 US 373, 386, 28 S. Ct. 708,
conclusive as to the persons involved therein and on the
714, 52 L. ed. 1103 119081).
ground that no new issues were presented by herein petitioner.

How can petitioner present any "new issues" when it was While there is no controlling and precise definition of due
process, the guidelines laid down in the Ang Tibay v.
never given the chance by the Board? Furthermore, the only
Court case, supra, and all subsequent cases reiterating the
reason the petitioner knew why its export quota allocations
same furnish an unavoidable standard to which government
had been cancelled was the initial findings of the Bureau of
action must conform in order that any deprivation of life,
Customs which were made the sole basis by the Board for
such cancellation. It is only but logical that petitioner would liberty, and property, in each appropriate case, may be valid.
only touch on this issue and nothing else. Thus, such request (See Eastern Broadcasting Corporation v. Dans, Jr., 137
SCRA 628).
for reinstatement and the subsequent denial by the Board can
hardly be considered a motion for reconsideration that "cured"
the non-observance of due process. Again, as pointed out by WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the
the appellate court: petition is GRANTED and the decision of the appellate court
dated January 6, 1984 and its order of June 6, 1984 are SET
ASIDE. The respondent Board is hereby ordered to conduct a
Nor are We persuaded by the proposition
hearing where the petitioner is accorded due process to
that the subsequent requests for restoration
determine whether or not the petitioner has violated any of its
of its export allocations made by the private
rules and regulations. Pending such hearing, and to maintain
respondent cured the due process deficiency
on the part of the Board. The requests for the status quo ante of the parties, the Board is directed to issue
restoration rest on the allegation of the Textile Export Clearances in favor of the petitioner without
prejudice to the revocation of the same if the petitioner is
private respondent and its principal officers
found to be guilty of any such violation. No costs.
that they had no hand in the illicit
importation of the apprehended shipment.
The allegation is buttressed by the decision SO ORDERED.
itself of the Acting Collector of Customs of
the Port of Manila holding that '. . . a careful
scrutiny of the facts and the circumstance
attendant to the case show that the Mabuhay
Textile Mills have no participation in the
irregularity relative to the subject shipment.'
It may be technically true that this statement
does not settle the criminal culpability of the G.R. No. 105752 September 2, 1993
private respondent and its officers for as
pointed out by petitioner Brig. Gen. Ramon INOCENCIO GONZALES, petitioner,
Farolan, Acting Commissioner of Customs, vs.
a decision in a seizure proceedings is'. . final HONORABLE CIVIL SERVICE
and conclusive as to the goods but not as to COMMISSION, respondent.
the persons involved therein where another
proceeding is necessary.' But this all the German A. Gineta for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondent.
PUNO, J.:
At stake is the 36 year career service of the petitioner in
government. For losing his job without proper notice,
petitioner seeks the protection of due process, the guaranty
against acts of arbitrariness of government. 1 His plea is not
without merit.
It took petitioner Inocencio Gonzales thirty six (36) years to
ascend to his position of Administrative Officer III of the
Agricultural Training Institute (ATI), an agency of the
Department of Agriculture. On his 25th year of service, he
received a merit award recognizing his continuous, dedicated,
and faithful service in the government. On his 30th year, he
repeated the feat. His record of service is without any wart of
malfeasance or misfeasance in office.
Early in 1990, certain problems beset his two (2)children in
the United States. He had to fly to the United States to attend
to his children. He applied for and was granted leaves with
pay from February 2, to July 16, 1990. After six (6) months,
however, the family problem had not gone away and he
decided to spend more time with his children.
On June 25, 1990, petitioner wrote to the Director of ATI
requesting approval of a leave without pay starting from the
second week of July to December 31,1991. He cited as
additional reason his desire to take advantage of ". . . a
physical check-up free of charge due to my childrens' medical
plan benefits". The letter was personally delivered by
petitioner's wife. It carried his address in the United States at
149 Declaration Way, San Jose, California, 95116.
For unknown reason, the Director of ATI did not act on the
letter-request. It was neither approved nor disapproved. Three
(3) months later, ATI started acting adversely on petitioner's
request. On September 5, 1990, Atty. Ildefonso del Rosario,
ATI's Assistant Director and OIC, wrote to petitioner
declaring him absent without official leave for more than
thirty (30) days and warning him that should he not report
within five (5) days from receipt of the letter, he would be
dropped from the rolls. The letter was addressed at 30 Ventura
St., BF Homes, Quezon City, petitioner's house. The letter,
however, was returned to sender (ATI) on September 27,
1990. 2
What ATI did was to publish a notice of similar import in the
October 4, 11 and 18, 1990 issues of the Philippine Journal, a
newspaper, of general circulation. On October 24, 1990, ATI
dropped petitioner from its rolls. He was not furnished a copy
of the order. When he came back from the United States and
reported for work on November 19, 1990, he found out that
Mercedes Puruganan had been appointed to his position. By
himself, he protested to the Civil Service Commission on
December 14, 1990. His letter-protest was endorsed to the
Merit Systems Protection Board (MPSB) for appropriate
action. On April 30, 1991, the Board ruled that petitioner was
duly notified before he was dropped from the roll. His appeal
was dismissed. His motion for reconsideration was rejected.
Petitioner appealed to the Civil Service Commission. Again,
petitioner lost. In its Resolution No. 92-640, dated May 7,
1992, the Commission held:
(1) that the requirement of notice was "substantially" complied
with by the ATI, and (2) that the failure of ATI to act on his
request for leave without pay was of "no moment".
Undaunted by his legal setbacks, petitioner filed this petition
for certiorari. He raises the following arguments:
I. GRAVE INJUSTICE WAS
COMMITTED BY SUPPOSEDLY BEING
ABSENT WITHOUT LEAVE (AWOL),
WHEN HE HAD ACCRUED VACATION
AND SICK LEAVES AND WAS,
THEREFORE, STILL SERVING ON
OFFICIAL TIME.
II. GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
WAS COMMITTED WHEN
PETITIONER, AN OFFICER WITH THE
RIGHT OF SECURITY OF TENURE,
WAS DROPPED FROM THE ROLLS
WHICH IS TANTAMOUNT TO
REMOVING HIM WITHOUT CAUSE.
III. GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
WAS LIKEWISE COMMITTED WHEN
PETITIONER WAS SUMMARILY,
HASTILY AND INORDINATELY
DROPPED FROM THE ROLLS AND HIS
REPLACEMENT HURRIEDLY
APPOINTED WITHOUT THE
OBSERVANCE OF THE REQUISITE
DUE PROCESS.
We ordered the Solicitor General to file the Comment in
defense of the respondent Civil Service Commission. In his
Comment dated September 14, 1992, Solicitor General Raul
Goco 3 conceded that petitioner was denied due process and
hence, illegally dismissed. The Civil Service Commission,
thru its Legal Department, then defended itself. In its own
Comment dated December 14, 1992 it contended that
petitioner had "constructive notice" of the letter ordering him
to return to work and which he failed to heed.
We find for the petitioner.
We need not be unduly detained by the first two contentions of
petitioner which are manifestly devoid of merit. Anent the first
argument, WE note that in all the proceedings below,
petitioner never took the position that he still had vacation and
sick leaves, hence he could not be declared AWOL. His new
posture is also diametrically opposed to his letter of June 25,
1990 where he requested leave without pay precisely because
he had no more vacation and sick leaves. In any event, it is too
late and forbidden for petitioner to alter his theory especially
when the new theory rests on allegations not borne by the
records of the case. Just as untenable is petitioner's defense of
security of tenure espoused in his second argument. It ought to
be self-evident that security of tenure can not be a shield
against absences without proper approval by the authorities.
Leaves are matters of private convenience and cannot
prejudice public service. Their approval is discretionary as it
depends on the higher needs of public service.
Be that as it may, petitioner's third argument where he invokes
the protection of the due process clause of the Constitution
should be sustained. CSC Memorandum Circular No. 2, Series
of 1985 is the governing rule on notice before an employee
can be dropped from the rolls due to absence without
leave, viz:
4. The agency should notify in writing the
employee, who is absent without leave
(AWOL) for thirty (30) days, to report
within five (5) days from receipt of notice,
otherwise, he shall be dropped from the
rolls.
The Circular does not specifically state where the notice shall
be sent. In the case at bar, petitioner's residence is at 30
Ventura St., BF Homes, Quezon City. Nonetheless in 1990,
petitioner left for the United States to attend personally to the
problems of his children. When petitioner filed his leave of
absence without pay, ATI knew that petitioner was staying at
149 Declaration Way, San Jose, California in 1992. The letter
of June 25, 1990 of the petitioner requesting this leave clearly
carried his address in the United States. The records do not
show that the officials of ATI denied knowledge of petitioner's
correct address. Despite this knowledge, however, the letter of
September 5, 1990 written by Atty. Ildefonso del Rosario,
ATI's Asst. Director and OIC, directing petitioner to return to
work within five (5) days, otherwise, he would be dropped
from the rolls was inexplicably mailed to his house at 30
Ventura St., BF Homes, Quezon City. The letter was not
received by petitioner. Per certification of Mr. Jesse Santos,
Postmaster of the Bureau of Post of Quezon City, this letter ".
. . was returned to sender, the Agricultural Training Institute
on September 27, 1990 and received by one Victoria Lim,
authorized, representative."
It is the ruling of the respondent Civil Service Commission
that the sending of the said notice to the residence of petitioner
constitutes "substantial" compliance with the demands of due
process. The ruling would have some allure if the address of
petitioner in the United States was not known to the officials
of ATI and if his Philippine address was his last known
address. But as stressed above, they knew of petitioner's exact
address in the United States and there appears no impediment
for them to send the notice in this correct address. Petitioner,
be it noted, was not moving from one residence to another, to
avoid service of legal notices. They are aware that petitioner
was not momentarily staying in his address in Quezon City
where he could receive said notice. Under the circumstances,
it is grave abuse of discretion for the respondent Commission
to hold that there was "substantial" compliance with the notice
requirement of due process. The disputed ruling cuts too
deeply on petitioner's right to continue his employment in the
government and unduly dilutes the protection of due process.
To be sure, the cavalier attitude of respondent Commission is
deplorable considering that on line is the thirty six (36) long
years of faithful and dedicated, service to the government of
the petitioner. Nothing less than strict compliance with the
demands of due process should have been demanded by the
respondent Commission from the officials of ATI in light of
the equities of the case. Nor can we give our concurrence to
the further ruling of the respondent Commission that the
denial of due process to the petitioner was cured by the
publication of said notice in three (3) issues of the Philippine
Journal. Notice by publication might have been proper if the
address of petitioner were unknown. Since the officials of ATI
knew the whereabouts of petitioner, they have no legal
warrant to notify him thru the newspapers.
There are other acts, both covert and overt, which show that
ATI officials did not accord fair treatment to the petitioner.
Petitioner filed his request for leave without pay on June 25,
1990 while still in the United States. Though petitioner has no
right to presume that his request would be granted,
nonetheless it was no less a duty on the part of officials ATI to
act immediately on the request, if only because petitioner was
abroad and needed reasonable time and resources to return to
the Philippine on a five (5) day call. For reasons not divulged
in the records, they sat on the request. Only on September 5,
1990, did they declare that petitioner had been absent without
official leave. In the said letter too, Atty. del Rosario ordered
petitioner to return to work within five (5) days allegedly due
to the "exigencies of the service." Nonetheless, Atty. del
Rosario did not explain why all of a sudden the "exigencies of
the service" required the immediate return of the petitioner. If
the "exigencies of the service" were real, the Court wonders
why he did not deny forthwith the request of petitioner for
leave without pay made as far back as June 1992. Worse still,
the order dropping petitioner from the rolls was never sent to
him. Petitioner did not also know he had been replaced till he
returned to the Philippines on November 16, 1990. In a setting
of scarcities, it is bad enough to lose a job; it is worse, if it is
taken away by government itself without due process of law.
Our Constitution abhors such arbitrariness.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition for certiorari is granted
and Resolution No. 92-640 dated May 7, 1992 of the
respondent Civil Service Commission is reversed and set
aside. The Director of the Agricultural Training Institute is
ordered to reinstate petitioner to his position as Administrative
Officer III or its equivalent without loss of any right or
privilege.
SO ORDERED.
Necessity of Actual Hearing
[G.R. No. 143173. March 28, 2001]
SPS. PEDRO ONG AND VERONICA ONG, petitioners, vs.
SOCORRO PAREL AND HON. COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.
DECISION
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
The instant petition for review on certiorari seeks the
annulment of the decision of the respondent Court of
Appeals[1] dated December 14, 1999 affirming the decision of
the Regional Trial Court which reversed and set aside the
judgment of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch 15,
for forcible entry, as well as the resolution dated May 4, 2000
denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.[2]
Spouses Pedro and Veronica Ong are the registered
owners of Lot No.18, Block 2 of the subdivision plan II of Rizal
Park subdivision, situated in Sta Cruz, Manila covered by TCT
No. 218597, having purchased the property from the spouses
Emilio Magbag and Norma B. Pascual in 1994. Adjacent to Lot
No. 18 is Lot No.17 consisting of about 109 sq. meters covered
by TCT No. 125063 registered under the name of Visitacion
Beltran, grandmother of respondent Socorro Parel.
On May 25, 1995, the Ong spouses filed an action for
forcible entry against defendant Parel before the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Manila, Branch 15, docketed as Civil Case No.
148332, alleging among other things that defendant Parel
through strategy and stealth constructed an overhang and
hollow block wall along the common boundary of the parties
adjoining lot, i.e., beyond Lot No. 17 owned by Parel and inside
Lot No.18 owned by plaintiffs spouses Ong, thereby illegally
depriving plaintiffs of possession of the said portion of their lot;
that plaintiffs discovered respondents illegal possession of their
lot on August 23, 1994 when they had the boundaries of their
lot resurveyed; that plaintiffs made various demands from the
defendants to remove the constructions they introduced in the
said lot of the plaintiffs and vacate the same, the last of which
demands having been made on December 19, 1994.
Defendant Parel denied the material allegations of the
complaint and alleged that the overhang and hollow block wall
had already been in existence since 1956 and that these
structures are within the boundary of lot 17 owned by him.
The parties moved for an ocular inspection of the subject
lot which was granted by the trial court. The trial
court designated the Branch Clerk of Court as Commissioner
while defendant Parel employed the services of Geodetic Engr.
Mariano V. Flotildes who made the relocation survey on
November 28, 1995 in the presence of both parties. Thereafter,
the Commissioner reported that defendants wall protrudes 1
meters into plaintiffs property and a window sill overhangs by
about meter deep into plaintiffs premises and the eaves of the
main residential building extends into the plaintiffs
premises. The Geodetic Engineers Report, confirmed that the
house of the defendant encroached plaintiffs property by an area
of 2.7 sq. m., and the adobe and hollow block wall by an area
of 1.59 sq. m., respectively, resulting to a total encroachment of
4.29 sq. m., more or less into the plaintiffs property.
On April 12, 1996, the Metropolitan Trial Court rendered
judgment in favor of the plaintiffs spouses Ong; the dispositive
portion reads:[3]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby
rendered in favor of plaintiffs and against the defendants
ordering: (a) the defendants and all persons claiming rights
under her to remove the overhang constructions measuring
2.70 sq. m. and the adobe block wall measuring 1.59 sq.m.
respectively on lot 18 of the plaintiffs and to peacefully
surrender its possession to the plaintiffs; (b) ordering the
defendants to pay the plaintiffs the sum of Ten Thousand
Pesos (P10,000.00) as and by way of attorneys fees; plus the
costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
Respondent Parel filed an appeal with the Regional Trial
Court, docketed as Civil Case No. 96-78666. On October 3,
1996, the regional trial court[4] dismissed the case for failure of
the Ong spouses to prove prior physical possession of the
subject lot, the dispositive portion reads:[5]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision appealed
from is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. This case is
hereby DISMISSED, without prejudice to the filing of the
appropriate actions, without costs.
SO ORDERED.
Spouses Ong moved for a reconsideration which was also
denied in a resolution dated August 1, 1997.[6]
Aggrieved by the above decision, petitioners spouses Ong
elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals by way of a petition
for review. The respondent Court of Appeals in a decision dated
December 14, 1999 denied the petition. The appellate court
adopted the lower courts findings that the alleged
encroachments were made by the late Visitacion Beltran at a
time when she still owned both lots or when she had all the right
and the power to introduce the improvements; thus the
introduction of the said construction could not be equated with
strategy and stealth giving rise to forcible entry. It added that
what is involved in a forcible entry case is merely the issue of
material possession or possession de facto which the petitioner
miserably proved in their favor. It further pointed out that it was
admitted by the petitioners in their petition that this case
involves a boundary dispute and not lot 18 in its entirety,
and the encroachment was discovered only upon a relocation
survey of the property; such controversy could not be threshed
out in an ejectment suit in view of the summary nature of the
action, and the MTC, accordingly, is without jurisdiction to
entertain the same. Petitioners moved for a reconsideration
which was also denied in a resolution dated May 4,
2000. Hence, this petition.
Petitioners assign the following issues for consideration:[7]
1. WHETHER OR NOT GAINING ENTRY WITHOUT THE
KNOWLEDGE OR CONSENT OF THE OWNER OR
REMAINING RESIDENT OF ANOTHER WITHOUT
PERMISSION IS DISPOSSESSION BY STEALTH;
2. WHETHER OR NOT ENTRY SECURED BY
STRATEGY OR STEALTH BECOMES UNLAWFUL AND
DE FACTO POSSESSION COMMENCES ONLY UPON
DEMAND;
3. WHETHER OR NOT THERE IS A DISTINCTION
BETWEEN FORCIBLE ENTRY BY MEANS OF STEALTH
AND FORCIBLE ENTRY BY MEANS OF FORCE,
INTIMIDATION OR THREAT;
4. WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER CAN INVOKE
SUPREME COURT RULINGS IN UNLAWFUL
DETAINER CASES;
5. WHETHER OR NOT THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT IS
THE AUTHORIZED PARTY IN THE CASE OF CO-
OWNERSHIP AS OBTAINED IN THIS CASE;
6. WHETHER OR NOT THE CHARACTER OF THE
POSSESSION ACQUIRED IN BAD FAITH WAS
INHERITED BY THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT AND DID
NOT CHANGE;
7. WHETHER OR NOT THE DECISION OF THE
RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS IS BASED ON
SPECULATION SURMISE OR CONJECTURE OR
MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS.
Petitioners essentially allege that the act of entering and
trespassing upon a parcel of land, or of constructing
improvements upon a parcel of land without the knowledge or
permission of the person who owns or administers it is an act of
dispossession and usurpation of real property by means of
strategy or stealth; that private respondent is a usurper or
encroacher who constructed a portion of her house and adobe
and hollow block wall on the land of the petitioners with no
bona fide claim and without the consent of the owner.
The petition has no merit.
Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court requires that in
actions for forcible entry the plaintiff is allegedly deprived of
the possession of any land or building by force, intimidation,
threat, strategy, or stealth and that the action is filed any time
within one year from the time of such unlawful deprivation of
possession. This requirement implies that in such cases, the
possession of the land by the defendant is unlawful from the
beginning as he acquires possession thereof by unlawful
means. The plaintiff must allege and prove that he was in prior
physical possession of the property in litigation until he was
deprived thereof by the defendant. The one year period within
which to bring an action for forcible entry is generally counted
from the date of actual entry on the land,[8] except that when
entry was made through stealth, the one year period is counted
from the time the plaintiff learned thereof.[9] If the alleged
dispossession did not occur by any of the means stated in
section 1, Rule 70, the proper recourse is to file a plenary action
to recover possession with the regional trial court.[10]
In their complaint, petitioners Ong spouses aver that
through stealth and strategy respondent constructed the
controversial overhang and hollow block wall along the
common boundary of the parties adjoining lots
which encroached on petitioners Lot No. 18. Stealth is defined
as any secret, sly, or clandestine act to avoid discovery and to
gain entrance into or remain within residence of another without
permission.[11] However, petitioners failed to establish that
respondents encroached upon their property through stealth as
it was not shown when and how the alleged entry was made on
the portion of their lot.
On the other hand, respondents claim that the said
structures were already existing on the lot at the time petitioners
brought the same from the Magbag spouses in 1994, was
sustained by the lower court since petitioners admitted in their
petition that they discovered such encroachment only after a
relocation survey on their lot on August 23, 1994. We find no
reason to disturb the respondent courts factual conclusion that
the alleged encroachments were made by the late Visitacion
Beltran at a time when she still owned both lots nos. 17 and 18
or when she had all the right and power to do so. Private
respondent in her affidavit submitted before the court had
affirmed that her grandmother, Visitacion Beltran, was the
registered owner of the parcel of land covered by TCT No.
125163 (Lot No. 17) with improvements which include the
window sill overhang and the old adobe wall which were
constructed as early as 1956 and these improvements are
adjacent to the private alley from Elias Street which has to be
opened and maintained as long as there exists building thereon;
that the maintenance of such alley was made as an encumbrance
in petitioners title (TCT No. 218597) when they bought the
adjacent Lot no. 18. Petitioners failed to present evidence to the
contrary.
It becomes clear that this is not a proper case for forcible
entry wherein one party unlawfully deprives another of
possession of the property subject of the litigation; it is a
boundary dispute wherein the adobe wall, overhang and
window grill on the respondents side of the property encroach
a total of 4.29 meters, more or less, upon the petitioners side of
the property. We affirm with approval of the observations of the
Regional Trial Court, in this wise:
Let it be emphasized that the matter subject of the present
action is that portion only of Lot No. 18 allegedly encroached
by the defendant-appellant and not Lot 18 in its entirety.
While there was a finding of encroachment on Lot No. 18 as
per the Commissioners Report and Engineers Report dated
December 27, 1995 and December 29, 1995, respectively,
plaintiff-appellees failed to recount the circumstances as to
how and when defendant-appellant allegedly forcibly entered
Lot No. 18. Neither was there any evidence ever proffered by
them to prove that defendant-appellant made or at least
ordered the introduction of the said improvements or
construction. According to them, the Magbag spouses gave
them the right to administer, occupy and to have physical
possession in the concept of an owner, Lot No. 18 on June 17,
1994 until the title to the said lot was transferred to their
names on October 28, 1994 and they have just discovered the
encroachment on Lot No. 18 only on August 23, 1994 when
they had the boundaries of Lots Nos. 17 and 18
resurveyed. Defendant-appellant, on the other hand, averred
that the questioned improvements and constructions
encroaching on Lot No. 18 were already there since 1956, and
this averment was not controverted by the plaintiff-appellees
at all. Thus, the truth is that, when defendant-appellant
acquired Lot No. 18, the adobe wall, overhang and window
grill were already there encroaching on Lot No. 18 as it was
the late Salvacion (sic)[12] Beltran who built the same. In fact,
even up to the present, defendant-appellant is still in
possession of the herein questioned premises which means
that plaintiff-appellees were never in possession of the
same. The latter, therefore, cannot be said to be in prior
physical possession. The demand made on the defendant-
appellant is here of no moment as it is a well-entrenched
jurisprudence that demand to vacate is not necessary in
forcible entry cases (Menez vs. Militante, 41 Phil. 44).
Consequently, for failure of the plaintiff-appellees to
circumstantiate prior physical possession on the herein subject
premises and the fact of entry on the same by the defendant-
appellant by force, intimidation, violence or stealth, the
present action for forcible entry must exigently fail. Moreover,
this Court notes that at the time the improvements were made,
the late Salvacion (sic) Beltran was still the registered owner
of both Lots Nos. 17 and 18. Thus while it may be true that
defendant-appellant is now the administrator of Lot No. 17,
defendant-appellant cannot be made to answer for the
encroachments on Lot No. 18 for the same were done by the
late Salvacion (sic) Beltran who had all the right and power to
introduce the improvements as she was then the registered
owner of both Lots Nos. 17 and 18 at the time the same were
made. While plaintiff-appellees can recover possession of the
herein questioned premises, they cannot do so in the guise of
an action for forcible entry. For where the complaint fails to
specifically aver facts constitutive of forcible entry or
unlawful detainer, as where it does not state how entry was
effected or how and when dispossession started, the action
should either be ACCION PUBLICIANA or ACCION
REINVINDICATORIA for which the lower court has no
jurisdiction (See Sarona, et al. vs. Villegas, et al., March 27,
1968, Banayos vs. Susana Realty, Inc. L-30336, June 30,
1976).
In view of the failure of the petitioners to allege, much less
prove, with specificity that the respondents unlawfully entered
their portion of the lot either by force, intimidation, threat,
strategy, or stealth this action for forcible entry must necessarily
fall. We declared in the case of Sarmiento vs. Court of
Appeals:[13]
The jurisdictional facts must appear on the face of the
complaint. When the complaint fails to aver facts constitutive
of forcible entry or unlawful detainer, as where it does not
state how entry was effected or how and when dispossession
started, as in the case at bar, the remedy should either be
an accion publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria in the proper
regional trial court.
If private respondent is indeed the owner of the premises
subject of this suit and she was unlawfully deprived of the real
right of possession or the ownership thereof, she should
present her claim before the regional trial court in an accion
publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria, and not before the
municipal trial court in a summary proceeding of unlawful
detainer or forcible entry. For even if one is the owner of the
property, the possession thereof cannot be wrested from
another who had been in the physical or material possession of
the same for more than one year by resorting to a summary
action for ejectment.This is especially true where his
possession thereof was not obtained through the means or held
under the circumstances contemplated by the rules on
summary ejectment.
We have held that in giving recognition to the action for
forcible entry and unlawful detainer, the purpose of the law is
to protect the person who in fact has actual possession, and in
case of a controverted proprietary right, the law requires the
parties to preserve the status quo until one or the other sees fit
to invoke the decision of a court of competent jurisdiction
upon the question of ownership."
Petitioners contention that although they denominated
their complaint as one for forcible entry based on the ground of
stealth, the allegations in the body of the complaint sufficiently
established a cause of action for unlawful detainer, does not
persuade us. In unlawful detainer, one unlawfully withholds
possession thereof after the expiration or termination of his
right to hold possession under any contract, express or
implied. In the instant case, the complaint does not allege that
the possession of respondent ever changed from illegal to legal
anytime from their alleged illegal entry before plaintiffs made
the demand to vacate. There was no averment in the complaint
which recites as a fact any overt act on the part of the petitioners
which showed that they permitted or tolerated respondent to
occupy a portion of their property.
After a finding that the petitioners failed to make a case
for ejectment, we find it unnecessary to dwell on the other
assignments of error.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the assailed
decision of respondent Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
 WHEREFORE, premises considered,
judgment is hereby rendered ordering as
follows:

G.R. No. 81805 May 31, 1988 1. Dismiss of the instant

case with a reprimand and
VAR-ORIENT SHIPPING CO., INC. and COMNINOS warning respondents
BROS., petitioners, Vedasto Navarro, Eugenio
vs. Capalad, Raul Tumasis,
TOMAS D. ACHACOSO, in his capacity as Administrator of Antonio Tanioan,
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA), Celestino Cason, Danilo
EDGAR T. BUNYOG, VEDASTO NAVARRO, EUGENIO Manela and Roberto
CAPALAD, RAUL T IS, ANTONIO TANIOAN, Genesis, against the
CELESTINO CASON, DANILO MANELA & ROBERTO commission of the same or
GENESIS, respondents. similar offense otherwise
it shall be dealt with more
severe penalty;
Viray, Aseron & Associates for petitioners.

The Solicitor General for public respondent. 2. Exclusion of Ricardo

Llanes from this case;

3. Reprimanding
complainant Var-Orient
GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.: Shipping Co. for failure to
comply with its
Imputing grave abuse of discretion to the public respondent, obligations pursuant to
the petitioners ask that the public respondent's decision dated POEA rules and
September 9,1987 in POEA CASE No. (M) 86-11-1080 regulations and warning
entitled "VAR-ORIENT SHIPPING CO., INC. and against committing the
COMNINOS BROS. vs. EDUARDO H. ARSOLON, ET AL.," same or a similar offense
be annulled for having been rendered without due process of otherwise it shall be dealt
law, and that the writ of execution issued by the POEA with more severely;
Administrator be set aside for being premature because the
decision is not yet final and executory as no copy of it had 4. That the case insofar as
been received by petitioner's counsel. A temporary restraining respondents Eduardo H.
order was issued by this Court to enjoin the execution of the ArsoIon, Apolinario dela
decision complained of pending the determination of the Cruz, Levy Montero and
merits of the petition. Danilo N. de la Cruz are
concerned, be archived,
The petitioners filed a complaint with the Workers' Assistance while their names shall be
and Adjudication Office, Philippine Overseas Employment included in the POEA
Administration (POEA) against the private respondents Edgar watchlist until they shall
T. Bunyog, Vedasto Navarro, Eugenio Capalad, Raul have voluntarily submitted
Tumasis, Antonio Tanioan, Celestino Cason, Danilo Manela themselves to the
and Roberto Genesis, crew members of the MPV "Silver jurisdiction of this office;
Reefer," for having allegedly violated their Contracts of
Employment with the petitioners which supposedly resulted in 5. Payment by the
damages arising from the interdiction of the vessel by the complainants jointly and
International Transport Workers' Federation (ITF) at Kiel severally, unto Vedasto
Canal, Germany, in March 1986. Navarro, Eugenio
Capalad, Raul Tumasis,
After joinder of the issues, the case was heard on March 4, Antonio Tanioan,
1987 where the parties agreed to submit their respective Celestino Cason, Danilo
position papers and thereafter the case would be submitted for Manela and Roberto
decision. Only the private respondents submitted a position Genesis the amount of
paper. Pl,550.59 each,
representing deductions
On the basis of the pleadings and memoranda (Annexes A, B, from allotments, plus
Code. D, E & F) the public respondent rendered a decision on Pl,000.00 as and for
September 9,1987 (Annex G), the dispositive part of which attorney's fees; and
reads as follows:
 6. Payment by the
complainants jointly and
severally unto respondent
Edgar T. Bunyog the
amount of US$4,680.00 or
its peso equivalent at the
time of payment
representing his salaries
for the unserved portion of
his employment contract
plus P4,000.00 as and for
attorney's fees.
to be tendered thru this Office, ten (10) days
from receipt of this decision.
A copy of the decision was sent by registered mail and
delivered by the postman to the petitioners' counsel, then
Attorney Francisco B. Figura, at his address on the 4th Floor,
TRC Building, Sen. Gil Puyat Avenue, Makati, Metro Manila,
through the receptionist, Marlyn Aquino, on the groundfloor
of said building on September 21, 1987. According to
Attorney Figura, he did not receive the envelope containing
the decision (p. 66, Rollo).<äre||anº•1àw>
Petitioners allegedly learned about the decision only when the
writ of execution was served on them on November 20,1987
by NLRC Deputy Sheriff Rene Masilungan and Attorney
Wilfredo Ong. On November 23,1987, petitioners, through
new counsel, Atty. Quentin Aseron, Jr., filed an 'urgent
Motion to Recall Writ of Execution' on the ground that the
decision had not been received by the petitioners, hence, it
was not yet final and executory.
On January 19, 1988, the public respondent denied the motion.
In due time, this petition was filed wherein the petitioners
allege that:
(1) they were denied due process of law because the
respondent Administrator resolved the case without any
formal hearing;
(2) the respondent Administrator gravely abused his discretion
in denying petition petitioners' right to appeal, and
(3) in awarding to the private respondent's damages which are
not only excessive building unfounded.
The petition is not meritorious.
The petitioners' allegation that the issuance of the writ of
execution was premature because the decision had not been
received by their counsel is unconvincing, Atty. Figura's
affidavit on the matter is self-serving. Petitioners failed to
submit an affidavit of the receptionist Marlyn Aquino
explaining what she did with the decision which she received
for Atty. Figura. Under the circumstances, the respondent
Administrator's ruling that the decision had been properly
served on petitioners' counsel and that it is now final and
unappealable, should be sustained.
Equally unmeritorious is the petitioners 'allegation that they
were denied due process because the decision was rendered
without a formal hearing. The essence of due process is simply
an opportunity to be heard (Bermejo vs. Banjos, 31 SCRA
764), or, as applied to administrative proceedings, an
opportunity to explain one's side (Tajonera vs. Lamaroza, 110
SCRA 438; Gas Corporation of the Phil. vs. Hon. Inciong, 93
SCRA 653; Cebu Institute of Technology vs. Minister of
Labor, 113 SCRA 257), or an opportunity to seek a
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of
(Dormitorio vs. Fernandez, 72 SCRA 388).
The fact is that at the hearing of the case on March 4,1987, it
was agreed by the parties that they would file their respective
memoranda and thereafter consider the case submitted for
decision (Annex 7 of Bunyog's Comment). This procedure is
authorized by law to expedite the settlement of labor disputes.
However, only the private respondents submitted memoranda.
The petitioners did not. On June 10, 1987, the respondents
filed a motion to resolve (Annex 7, Bunyog's Comment). The
petitioners' counsel did not oppose either the "Motion to
Resolve" or the respondents "Motion for Execution of
Decision" dated October 19, 1987 (Annex 10), both of which
were furnished them through counsel. If it were true, as they
now contend, that they had been denied due process in the
form of a formal hearing, they should have opposed both
motions.
Furthermore, the petition for review does not allege that the
petitioners are in possession of evidence, other than those
which they had attached to their pleadings, which if produced
would have altered the outcome of the case.
The Administrator did not abuse his discretion in ordering the
petitioners to pay respondent Edgar Bunyog's salaries for the
unserved portion of his contract plus attorney's fees, in view of
the Administrator's finding that Bunyog did not sign the letter
of the other defendants to ITF, hence, 'he is deemed not to
have committed any offense or act to warrant his dismissal."
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is denied for lack of
merit. The temporary restraining order which We issued is
hereby set aside.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 76752 January 12, 1990
ST. MARY'S COLLEGE (TAGUM, DAVAO), SR.
JACINTA DE BELEN, R.V.M., SR. MILAGROS
SEALONGO, R.V.M. and JOSEFINA LLEDO,
R.V.M., petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION,
ASSOCIATED LABOR UNION (TUCP), MIGUELITA
LUBIANO, ELENA ODILAO, ROSALINDA
FRANCISQUETE, LOUELLA DE BORJA, DELIA DE LA
CRUZ and AIDA PERALTA, respondents.
Padilla Law Office for petitioners.
Carmelita Yadao-Guno for private respondents.
PARAS, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari seeking to annul the decision of
the respondent National Labor Relations Commission in
NLRC Case No. 362-ULP- XI-82 (Annex E), which affirmed
(except as to the award of damages) the decision of Labor
Arbiter Potenciano Canizares (Annex C) finding the
petitioners guilty of unfair labor practice and ordering private
respondents' reinstatement with backwages.
The facts of the case are as follows:
Petitioners Sister Jacinta de Belen, Sister Milagros Sealongo
and Sister Josefina Lledo are the directress, principal and
cashier of the petitioner-school respectively while private
respondents Miguelita Lubiano, Elena Odilao, Rosalinda
Francisquete, Louella de Borja, Delia de la Cruz and Aida
Peralta are faculty members of the said school.
On or about April 12, 1982, when applications for the next
school year were being received, private respondents
circulated a six-page "Manifesto" in petitioner-school,
accusing the individual petitioners, among others, of forcing
teachers to sign affidavits waiving the benefits of P.D. No.
1713, blacklisting ten (10) teachers whose names were listed
in the Manifesto, terminating teachers without proper
evaluation, and aborting the organization of a teachers' union
by creating fear and insecurity among the teachers. Thus, the
Manifesto demanded the replacement of the petitioners for
making the school "a prison without walls where there is no
freedom, justice and peace. . ."(Annex H)
Upon investigation, private respondents admitted authorship
of the Manifesto. Thus, Sister Ma. Jacinta de Belen terminated
the services of private respondents Lubiano, Francisquete and
de la Cruz for gross insubordination and serious disrespect and
did not renew the probationary contracts of de Borja, Odilao
and Peralta.
On June 29, 1982, private respondents, together with
respondent Associated Labor Union (ALU), filed a complaint
with the respondent Commission charging the petitioners with
illegal dismissal, unfair labor practice, violation of P.D. No.
1713 and P.D. No. 851 and other acts giving rise to a claim for
damages. More specifically, private respondents alleged that
together with a number of their co-teachers, they tried to
organize a local faculty union which would be affiliated with
respondent ALU but the petitioners discouraged union
membership which culminated in the dismissal of private
respondents. (p. 26, Rollo)
On July 21, 1982, the parties appeared before Labor Arbiter
Jose O. Libron for initial conference. When they failed to
arrive at an amicable settlement, they were required to submit
their position papers.
Petitioners attached to their position paper a letter dated May
27, 1982 of seventy-seven (77) faculty members of petitioner-
school, addressed to the Superior General of the Congregation,
disclaiming that they ever authorized the five or six authors of
the Manifesto to speak for the faculty. (Exh. 3) In said letter,
six of the ten teachers alleged by private respondents to have
been "blacklisted" by the school authorities also denied that
they were ever "blacklisted", thus, leaving only the four
private respondents with their self-serving allegations.
Petitioners also attached to their position paper a certification
dated June 7, 1982 of sixty eight (68) teachers, stating: that
they have never been refused or denied their right to form
and/or organize themselves into a union; that the decision to
form or not to form a union was discussed openly in a general
assembly of the faculty in the month of February 1982; and
that the overwhelming number of teachers decided to organize
a "Faculty Association" instead of a "Faculty Union" without
any intervention from the school administration. (Exh. 9)
On the other hand, private respondents attached to their
position paper certificates of good character issued by former
school directresses. (p. 187, Rollo)
A few days after the submission of the parties' position papers,
another Labor Arbiter, Potenciano Canizares, Jr. rendered a
decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby
rendered:
1. Declaring respondents guilty of unfair
labor practice as charged;
2. Ordering respondents to cease and desist
from committing the unfair labor practice
acts complained of;
3. Ordering respondents to reinstate
complainants in their former positions
without loss of seniority right and other
privileges, and to pay them full backwages
from the time they were dismissed until their
actual reinstatement; and
4. Ordering respondents to pay complainants
moral damages in the sum of ONE
HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS
(Pl00,000.00).
The claims for emergency cost of living
allowance, 13th month pay, unpaid salaries
 and vacation leave are hereby dismissed for
lack of sufficient evidence. (p. 10, Rollo)
Said decision was affirmed on appeal, except for the award of
moral damages which was deleted, having been found to have
no sufficient basis. (p. 15, Rollo)
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied.
In this petition, petitioners claim that they were deprived of
due process because they were denied the opportunity to
cross-examine private respondents and to rebut their
documentary evidence.
At the inception of the case, the parties were heard or at least
given an opportunity to be heard. Failing to arrive at an
amicable settlement, they agreed to submit their respective
position papers for resolution. Thus, the requirements of due
process have been satisfied and a decision based on the
position papers which were found to the sufficient meets the
requirements of a fair and open hearing. (Gonzales v. Hon.
Sec. of Labor, 116 SCRA 575)
While as a general rule, the findings of respondent
Commission are binding upon the Court, the finding of unfair
labor practice on the part of the petitioners cannot be upheld
for it clearly appears to have no reasonable support in
evidence. There is no substantial evidence of record upon
which the said finding of fact may be based. To be substantial,
the evidence must first of all be credible.
Here, out of the more than eighty (80) faculty members of the
petitioner school, sixty eight (68) teachers denied the charge
that petitioners interfered with their right to self-organization
(Exh. 9). Similarly, seventy seven (77) teachers, including six
(6) of the ten (10) alleged by private respondents to have been
blacklisted categorically denied the charge of blacklisting
(Exh. 3).
Not having the support of a substantial number of their
colleagues, We find it hard to believe that private respondents
were in the process of organizing a faculty union when they
were dismissed by the petitioners. A cursory glance at the
number of teachers disowning the charges of private
respondents against the petitioners shows that they cannot
even comply with the thirty percent (30%) subscription
requirement for a certification election. With this kind of
support from the faculty members, there is no reason for the
petitioners to commit acts of unfair labor practice against
private respondents.
On the other hand, private respondents admitted authorship of
the widely circulated Manifesto, which ridiculed the
petitioners and demanded their removal and which disrupted
the good order and decorum in the school. This constitutes
gross misconduct which is a just cause for the termination of
their employment.
WHEREFORE, the questioned decisions are hereby
REVERSED and the complaint against petitioners,
DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
UP BOARD OF REGENTS VS TELAN
FACTS: THE UP Board of Regents imposed on Nadal the
penalties of suspension for one year, non-issuance of any
certificate of good moral character during the suspension and/or
as long as Nadal has not reimbursed the STFAP benefits he had
received with 12% interest per annum and non issuance of his
transcript of records until he has settled his financial obligations
with the university. The disciplinary action is meted after
finally rendering a guilty verdict on Nadal’s alleged willfull
withholding of the following information in his application for
scholarship tantamount to acts of dishonesty, viz: (1) that he has
and maintains a car and (2) the income of his mother in the USA
in support of the studies of his brothers. Nadal complained that
he was not afforded due process when, after the Board Meeting
on his case on March 28, 1993 that resulted in a decision of
“NOT GUILTY” in his favor, the Chairman of the UP Board of
Regents, without notice to the petitioner, called another meeting
the following day to deliberate on the Chairman’s Motion for
Reconsideration, which this time resulted in a decision of
“GUILTY.” Upon petition, Nadal was granted his action for
mandamus with preliminary injunction.
ISSUE: WON Nadal was denied due process.
HELD: No. It is gross error to equate due process in the instant
case with the sending of notice of the March 29, 1993 BOR
meeting. University rules do not require the attendance in BOR
meetings of individuals whose cases are included as items on
the agenda of the Board. At no time did respondent complain of
lack of notice given to him to attend any of the regular and
special BOR meetings where his case was up for deliberation.
Let it not be forgotten that respondent aspires to join the ranks
of professionals who would uphold truth at all costs so that
justice may prevail. Nadal has sufficiently proven to have
violated his undertaking to divulge all information needed when
he applied for the benefits of the STFAP. Unlike in criminal
cases which require proof beyond reasonable doubt as basis for
a judgment, in administrative or quasi-judiciall proceedings,
only substantial evidence is required, that which means a
reasonable mind might accept a relevant evidence as adequate
to support a conclusion.

Joson v. Executive Secretary [G.R. No. 131255. May
20, 1998]
08AUG
FACTS
Petitioner Governor Joson was filed a complaint before the
Office of the President for barging violently into the session hall
of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan in the company of armed
men. The case was endorsed to the DILG. For failure to file an
answer after three (3) extensions, petitioner was declared in
default and ordered the petitioner 60-day preventive
suspension. Petitioner later “Motion to Conduct Formal
Investigation”. DILG denied the motion declaring that the
submission of position papers substantially complies with the
requirements of procedural due process in administrative
proceedings. Later, the Executive Secretary, by authority of the
President, adopted the findings and recommendation of the
DILG Secretary. The former imposed on petitioner the penalty
of suspension from office for six (6) months without pay.
ISSUES
Whether or not:
 (a) Preventive suspension is proper;
 (b) Procedural due process is violated;
 (c) The resolution of DILG Secretary is invalid on the
ground of undue delegation; that it is the President who is
the Disciplining Authority, not the Secretary of DILG;
RULING
“(a) Yes. Preventive suspension may be imposed by the
Disciplining Authority at any time (a) after the issues are
joined; (b) when the evidence of guilt is strong; and (c) given
the gravity of the offense, there is great probability that the
respondent, who continues to hold office, could influence the
witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the
records and other evidence. The act of respondent in allegedly
barging violently into the session hall of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan in the company of armed men constitutes grave
misconduct. The allegations of complainants are bolstered by
the joint-affidavit of two (2) employees of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan. Respondent who is the chief executive of the
province is in a position to influence the witnesses. Further, the
history of violent confrontational politics in the province
dictates that extreme precautionary measures be taken.
“(b) Yes. The rejection of petitioner’s right to a formal
investigation denied him procedural due process. Section 5 of
A. O. No. 23 provides that at the preliminary conference,
the Investigating Authority shall summon the parties to
consider whether they desire a formal investigation. This
provision does not give the Investigating Authority the
discretion to determine whether a formal investigation would
be conducted. The records show that petitioner filed a motion
for formal investigation. There is nothing in the Local
Government Code and its Implementing Rules and Regulations
nor in A.O. No. 23 that provide that administrative cases against
elective local officials can be decided on the basis of position
papers. A.O. No. 23 states that the Investigating Authority may
require the parties to submit their respective memoranda but
this is only after formal investigation and hearing.
“(c) No. The DILG resolution is valid. The President remains
the Disciplining Authority. What is delegated is the power to
investigate, not the power to discipline. The power to discipline
evidently includes the power to investigate. As the
Disciplining Authority, the President has the power derived
from the Constitution itself to investigate complaints against
local government officials. A. O. No. 23, however, delegates
the power to investigate to the DILG or a Special Investigating
Committee, as may be constituted by the Disciplining
Authority. This is not undue delegation, contrary to petitioner
Joson’s claim.
Under the doctrine of qualified political agency “…which
recognizes the establishment of a single executive, all executive
and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive
Department, the heads of the various executive departments are
assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in
cases where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution
or law to act in person or the exigencies of the situation demand
that he act personally, the multifarious executive and
administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed
by and through the executive departments, and the acts of the
Secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in
the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or
reprobated by the Chief Executive presumptively the acts of the
Chief Executive.”
This doctrine is corollary to the control power of the President
provided in the Constitution. Control is said to be the very heart
of the power of the presidency. As head of the Executive
Department, the President, however, may delegate some of his
powers to the Cabinet members except when he is required by
the Constitution to act in person or the exigencies of the
situation demand that he acts personally. The members of
Cabinet may act for and in behalf of the President in certain
matters because the President cannot be expected to exercise his
control (and supervisory) powers personally all the time. Each
head of a department is, and must be, the President’s alter
ego in the matters of that department where the President is
required by law to exercise authority.
G.R. No. 74841 December 20, 1991
ASSOCIATED LABOR UNIONS-VIMCONTU, THE CEBU
OIL EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, represented by its
Acting President, MIGUEL C. ALIVIADO, and THE MOBIL
DAVAO/ COTABATO CHAPTER-ALU, represented by its
President, DAVID C. ONDEVILLA, petitioners,
vs.
THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION
(NLRC), MOBIL OIL PHILIPPINES, INC., JEAN PIERRE
BAILLEUX, CALTEX PHILIPPINES, INC., and MOBIL
PHILIPPINES, INC., respondents.
G.R. No. 75667 December 20, 1991
ASSOCIATED LABOR UNIONS-VIMCONTU, THE CEBU
OIL EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-ALU LOCAL 15,
represented by its President, EMILIO S. SUAREZ, and THE
MOBIL DAVAO/COTABATO CHAPTER-ALU, represented
by its President, DAVID C. ONDEVILLA, petitioners,
vs.
MOBIL OIL PHILS., INC., JEAN PIERRE BAILLEUX,
CALTEX PHILIPPINES, INC., and MOBIL PHILIPPINES,
INC., respondents.
Edgemelo C. Rosales for petitioner ALU.
DAVIDE, JR., J:p
These consolidated petitions for certiorari, filed within four (4)
days from each other, seek to annul and set aside the
decision 1 dated 22 January 1986 of the National Labor
Relations Commissions (NLRC) affirming the dismissal by
Labor Arbiter Felipe T. Graduque II of the complaint filed in
NLRC Case No. RAB-VII-0762-83 entitled Associated Labor
Unions-VIMCONTU, et al. versus Mobil Oil Philippines, Inc.
et al., promulgated on 6 December 1984.
G.R. No. 74841 was filed by Atty. Felipe Tac-an on 25 July
1986, 2 with the local represented by its acting president,
Miguel Aliviado. G.R. No. 75667 was filed by Atty. Candido
C. Caballero on 28 July 1986. 3 He avers that he is counsel for
the petitioner Unions except for twenty (20) petitions stem
from the same facts and involve identical issues, a single
discussion will be devoted to both.
The antecedent facts are partly summarized by the public
respondent, as follows:
... A collective bargaining agreement was
entered into between the complainants and
the respondent Mobil Oil Philippines, Inc.
for a period of three years starting from
April 1, 1982 to March 31, 1985. On August
5, 1983, respondent J.P. Bailiux, President
of Mobil Oil Philippines, Inc. sent letters to
the employees, notifying of (sic) the
termination of their services effective
August 31, 1983 because of the sale of the
respondent firm. On September 13, 1983,
complainant employee accepted their checks
for separation pay and signed quit-claims
under protest and subject to the outcome of
this case.
Caltex Philippines, Inc. was impleaded as
additional respondent because of its
acquisition of the entire marketing and
distribution assets of Mobil Oil Philippines.
Mobil Philippines, Inc. was also made a
respondent in view of a metropolitan daily
newspaper announcement that Mobil Oil
Philippines, Inc. will continue to do business
under the corporate name of Mobil
Philippines, Inc. and that this newly formed
company will market chemicals and special
products such as solvents, process products,
waxes and industrial asphalt, fuels and
lubricants for the international marine and
aviation industries.
Complainants charge respondent Mobil Oil
Philippines, Inc. and J.P. Bailiux with unfair
labor practice for violating their collective
bargaining agreement which, among others,
states that "this Agreement shall be binding
upon the parties hereto and their successors
and assigns, and may be assigned by the
company without the previous approval of
the Union. However, the latter will be
notified of such assignment when it occurs."
In this case, the complainant unions were
not notified officially of such assignment to
Caltex Philippines and respondent Mobil Oil
Philippines made announcement in major
dailies that the company shall continue to
operate its business. 4
The pleadings of the parties further disclose the following:
What Caltex Phils. purchased was Mobil Petroleum's USA
(Mobil Pet) shareholdings in Mobil Oil Philippines, Inc.
(MOPI) for US$40,000,000.00. Upon consummation of the
sale, MOPI filed an amended articles of incorporation which
provided that its corporate term would cease on 31 December
1983. By 5 September 1983, MOPI actually closed and ceased
operations. 5
The complaint for unfair labor practice and breach of contract
against Jean Pierre Bailleux was filed on 8 September 1983 in
the NLRC, Ministry of Labor and Employment, Cebu City.
This was amended on 5 October 1983 to implead additional
respondents, namely: MOPI, Caltex Phils., Inc. and Mobil
Phils., Inc. and to demand payment for actual, moral and
exemplary damages in the amounts of P2,000,000.00,
P3,000,000.00, and P1,000,000.00, respectively, and for
attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and other measures of
reliefs and remedies consistent with law and equity. 6
In due course, Labor Arbiter Felipe T. Garduque II rendered a
decision dismissing the complaint on the basis of the
following findings and conclusions:
After a close evaluation of the arguments of
both contending parties, it is believed that
the alleged sale by Mobil Petroluem, USA to
Caltex, the former being a principal
stockholder of MOPI, was in fact made by
MOPI to Caltex, and whatever CBA entered
 into by MOPI binds its stockholders.
However, Section I of Article XX of the
CBA was not violated by respondent MOPI
as the record shows and from the admission
of complainants-union that the latter has
(sic) knowledge of the impending sales and
closure of the firm in a series of
negotiations/meetings.
Further, it would seem that as between
complainants and respondent MOPI, the
situation is one of closure and not
redundancy, and therefore, Sec. 3 of Article
XI is not applicable.
Furthermore, since this instant complaint of
unfair labor practice takes the nature of a
criminal case, the same must be established
by clear and convincing evidence which
complainants failed to do so.
On the issue of whether or not respondents
Caltex and MOPI bound (sic) by the
provisions of the CBA, the Commission
finds that although Caltex is bound by the
said agreement under Section I thereof, but
the rights and interests or benefits that may
have been earned during the remaining term
of the CBA have been satisfied by MOPI
when herein complainants accepted their
respective checks and executed quitclaim
from and in favor of the firm.
The office took note of the fact although
acceptance of payment was under protest,
there have been previous long
negotiations/meetings for settlement
between herein parties, and the benefits
granted by respondent MOPI, were far
above the benefits provided for by law.
As regards respondent MPI, in addition to
the above, there is no concrete evidence to
establish or porve complainant's allegation
that MOPI will continue its business. 7
Complainants (petition herein) appealed from the decision to
the NLRC. Finding the arguments raised on appeal to be a
repetition of the grounds presented before the labor arbiter,
and opining that no grave abuse of discretion was committed
by labor arbiter Garduque, the NLRC's first division dismissed
the appeal in its decision of January 22 1986. Their motion for
reconsideration filed on 20 March 1986 8 having been denied
for lack of merit on 11 April 1986, 9 these instant petitions
were filed on the dates earlier mentioned.
In G.R. No. 74841, petitioners assail the above decision and
contend that the NLRC committed serious errors of law and
grave abuse of discretion when it ruled to justify the
termination that : (a) petitioners had knowledge of the
impending sale to Caltex and closure of the company in a
series of negotiations/meetings by considering it as a sufficient
notice of termination; (b) the situation was one of closure and
not redundancy; (c) the rights and interests or benefits that
may have been earned during the remaining term of the CBA
have been satisfied by MOPI when complainants accepted
their respective checks and executed quitclaim from and in
favor of the firm; (d) the benefits granted by respondent MOPI
were far above the benefits provided by law; and (e) as regards
the liability of Mobil Philippines, Inc., there is no concrete
evidence to establish or prove complainants' allegation that
MOPI will continue its business. As to the issue of unfair
labor practice, they alleged that public respondent committed
serious errors of law and acted with grave abuse of discretion
when it ruled that since the complaint for unfair Labor practice
partakes of the nature of a criminal case, it must be established
by clear and convincing evidence. 10
In G.R. No. 75667, petitioners attribute to the public
respondent the commission of the following errors:
(A) ... grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack of or in excess of jurisdiction in
holding that respondents Mobil Oil
Philippines, Inc., Jean Pierre Bailleux,
Caltex Philippines, Inc. and Mobil
Philippines, Inc. did not commit an unfair
labor practice acts (sic) resulting from a
breach of contract thus giving out actual,
moral and exemplary damages as well as
attorney's fees and costs of litigation, ...
(B) ... in the findings and conclusions of law
when the respondent commission instantly
dismissed the complaint and appeal for lack
of merit, inspite of an utter disregard of the
valid and existing collective bargaining
agreement of the herein petitioners and
respondent Mobil Oil Philippines and Jean
Pierre Bailleux. 11
On 11 August 1986, We required the respondents in G.R. No.
74841 to comment on the petition, 12 which public respondent
NLRC did through the office of the Solicitor General on 5
March 1987 13 and private respondents on 25 September
1987. 14
On 7 October 1987, We ordered the consolidation of the two
(2) petitions, 15 considered the Solicitor General's comment in
G.R. No. 74841 as his comment in G.R. No. 75667, and
required petitioners to reply to the comment, which they
complied with on 1 June 1988. 16
Thereupon, on 23 November 1987, petitioners, thru their
representatives Miguel Aliviado and David Ondevilla, filed a
motion to disregard, expunge and/or dismiss the petition filed
without authority by Atty. Candido Caballero and consider
only the petition filed by Atty. Felipe Tac-an in G.R. No.
74841. 17 This was followed by a motion to withdrawal
appearance filed by Atty. Caballero on 14 December
1987. 18 Atty. Edgemelo Rosales replaced Caballero as
counsel for petitioners.
On 20 May 1988, this court resolved to give due course to
both petitions and require the parties to file simultaneous
memoranda. 19 On 1 July 1988, public respondent moved that
it be excused from filing a Memorandum and that its
Comment dated 2 March 1987 be considered as its joint
memorandum in the two (2) petitions 20 which this Court
granted on 3 August 1988. 21
Petitioners filed their Memorandum on 28 July 1988 22 while
private respondents filed theirs on 12 August 1988. 23
There is no merit in these consolidated petitions.
The issues presently raised have already been passed upon and
resolved by this Court in another almost identical case, Mobil
Employees Association, et al. vs. NLRC, et al., 24 a petition
which challenged the decision dated 6 April 1987 of the
NLRC Second Division, upholding a labor arbiter's finding
that MOPI was not guilty of unfair labor practice and illegal
dismissal and that the termination was accused by cessation of
MOPI's business operations in the country. Through Mr.
Justice Feliciano, this Court held in said case that:
xxx xxx xxx
Examination of the CBA provisions entitled
"Effectivity" shows that the written notice to
terminate that is required to be given by
either party to the other relates to notice to
terminate the CBA at the end of the original
three-year, period or any subsequent year
thereafter, in the absence of which written
notice, the duration of the CBA would be
automatically extended for one (1) year
periods. What is involved in instant Petition
is not, however, the termination of the CBA
itself, considering that the sale by Mobil Pet
of its wholly owned subsidiary MOPI to
Caltex Pet took place in 1983, in the middle
of original (sic) period of the CBA's. It
appears to the Court that the applicable
provision is Article II, Section 1, quoted
above. Under Article II, Section 1, in cases
of termination of services of employees, the
company is required to comply with the
provisions of the Labor Code and its
implementing Rules and Regulations and,
"time and circumtances permitting" and
"whenever possible," management should
enlist the support of the unions in actions
affecting the vital interest of the bargainable
(i.e., member) employees. It may be well to
add that, since actual notice was given to all
of MOPI's employees, including, of course,
the employees who were members of
petitioner unions, such notice may also be
regarded as effectively the notice to the
unions contemplated by the CBA provision
on "Effectivity."
Article 284 of the Labor Code as it existed
in 1983 provided as follows:
Art. 284. Closure of establishment and
reduction of personnel. — The employer
may also terminate the employment of any
employee due to the installation of labor-
saving devices, redundancy, retrenchment
top prevent losses or the closing or
cessation of operation of the establishment
or undertaking, unless the closing is for the
purpose of circumventing the provisions of
this title by serving a written notice on the
workers and the Ministry of Labor and
Employment at least one (1) month before
the intended date thereof. In case of
termination due to the installation of labor-
saving devices or redundany, the worker
affected thereby shall be entitled to a
separation pay equivalent to least his one (1)
month pay or to at least one (1) month pay
for every year of service, whichever is
higher. In case of retrenchment to prevent
losses and in cases of closure or cessation of
operations of establishment or undertaking
not due to serious business losses or
financial reverses, the separation pay shall
be equivalent to one (1) month pay or least
one-half (½) month pay for every year of
service, whichever is higher. A fraction of at
least six (6) months shall be considered one
(1) whole year.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Under Article 184 above, three (3)
requirements may be seen be established in
respect of cessation of business operations
of an employer company not due to business
reverses, namely:
(a) service of a written notice to the
employees and to the MOLE at least one (1)
month before the intended date thereof;
(b) the cessation of or withdrawal from
business operation must be bona fide in
character; and
(c) payment to the employees of termination
pay amounting to at least one-half (½)
month pay for each year of service, or one
(1) month pay, which is higher.
As noted earlier, MOPI's employee and the
MOLE were notified in writing on 5 August
1983 that the employees' service would
cease on 31 August 1983, but that
employees would nonetheless be paid their
salaries and other benefits until or as of 5
September 1983. We believe that is more
 than substantial compliance with the notice
requirements of the Labor Code. In respect
of requirement (c) above relating to payment
of termination pay to the package given by
MOPI to all its employees far exceeded the
minimum requirement of one-half (½)
month pay for every year of service laid
down in Article 184 of the Labor Code. The
very generosity of the termination pay
package thus given to the employees argues
strongly that the cessation of business
operations by MOPI was a bona fide one. It
is very difficult for this Court to believe that
MOPI would be dissolved and all its
employees separated with generous
separation pay benefits, for the sole purpose
of circumventing the requirements of
MOPI's CBA with petitioner unions. Indeed,
petitioners have not suggested any reason
why MOPI should have undertaken such a
fundamental and non-reversible business
reorganization merely to evade its
obligations under the CBA. The
establishment of MPI with the same
Directors who had served as such in MOPI
and the hiring of some former MOPI
employees for the purpose of settling and
winding up the affairs of MOPI, does not
detract from the bona fide character of
MOPI's dissolution and withdrawal from
business. MPI's residual business consisting
of the marketing of chemicals, aviation and
marine fuels as well as exports, all of which
constituted a fraction of the prior business of
MOPI, similarly does not argue against
the bona fide character of the corporate
reorganization which here took place. The
net effect of the reorganization was the
liquidation by Mobil Pet of the great bulk of
its former business in the Philippines, the
dissolution of the corporate entity of MOPI
and the transfer of its physical assets and
business to some other Philippine entity
owned and controlled by Caltex Pet,
presumably Caltex Philippines, without any
impact upon the foreign exchange reserves
of the Philippines.
xxx xxx xxx
We conclude that petitioners have failed to
show any grave abuse of discretion or any
act without or in excess of jurisdiction on
the part of the NLRC in rendering its
decision dated 6 April 1987.
xxx xxx xxx
The above decision forecloses any further attempt at reversing
the decision of the public respondnt challenged in these
petitions. The parallels in that case and in these cases are too
overwhelming for this Court to disregard: (a) both cases
sprung from the same sale negotiations between Mobil Pet and
Caltex Pet; (b) in both, MOPI's President, J.P. Bailleux,
informed all employees in a letter dated 5 August 1983 that on
31 August 1983, their employment would cease as a result of
MOPI's withdrawal from business; (c) all employees were
paid compensation up to or until 5 September 1983 and were
given separation pay equivalent to 2.25 months basic salary as
of 31 August 1983 for every year of service and their unused
vacation leave for the current year were paid in cash; and (d)
in both, complaints for ULP, based on similarly worded CBAs
(particularly on the notice requirements), were filed with
different, branches of NLRC which promulgated the two
decisions appealed from within six days from each other. The
only difference, albeit insignificant, between the two (2) cases
is that in the Mobil Employees Association case, the collective
bargaining agreements (CBA) are with MOPI-Luzon and
MOPI-Iloilo, while in the instant petitions, the CBAs are with
MOPI of Cebu, Cotabato and Davao.
Thus, with this Court's pronouncement in Mobil Employees
Association, et al. vs. NLRC, et al., supra., that what was
effected was cessation of business and that the requirement of
due notice was substantially complied with, the allegations
that both MOPI and Caltex merely intended to evade the
provisions of the CBA cannot be sustained. There was nothing
irregular in the closure by MOPI of its business operation.
Caltex may not be said to have stepped into the picture as an
assignee of the CBA because of the very fact of such closure.
In Sundowner Development Corp. vs. Drilon, 25 We stated the
rule that unless expressly assumed, labor contracts such as are
not enforceable against a transferee of an enterprise, labor
contracts being in personam, thus binding only between the
parties. 26 As a general rule, there is no law requiring a bona
fide purchaser of the assets of an on-going concern to absorb
in its employ the employees of the latter. 27 However,
although the purchaser of the assets or enterprise is not legally
bound to absorb in its employ the employees of the seller of
such assets or enterprise, the parties are reliable to the
employees if the transaction between the parties is colored or
clothed with bad faith. 28 The sale or disposition must be
motivated by good faith as an element of exemption from
liability. 29
This flows from the well-recognized principle that is within
the employer's legitimate sphere of management control of the
business to adopt economic policies or make some changes or
adjustments in their organization or operations that would
insure profit to itself or protect the investment of its
stockholders. As in the exercise of such management
prerogative, the employer may merge or consolidate its
business with another, or sell or dispose all or substantially all
of its assets and properties which may bring about the
dismissal or termination of its employees in the
process. 30 This disposes of the allegation that there was
termination due to redundancy; such could not be the case as
all the employees were terminated as a result of the closure.
Redundancy contemplates a situation where employees are
dismissed because of duplicitous functions.
The foregoing renders unnecessary further discussion on the
other issues raised by petitioners.
WHEREFORE, both Petitions for certiorari are DISMISSED
for lack of merit.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 85976. November 15, 1990.]
JOSE CESAR D. SIMPAO, Petitioner, v. CIVIL SERVICE
COMMISSION, BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE, and
RAUL DE OCERA, Respondents.
Nazareno, Azada, Sabado & Dizon for Petitioner.
SYLLABUS
1. POLITICAL LAW; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; RIGHT
TO DUE PROCESS; DEPRIVATION THEREOF, CURED
BY THE FILING OF A MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION. — The claim of Simpao that he was
deprived of his right to due process has been cured by his
filing of a Motion for Reconsideration subsequently upon
having learned of the questioned resolution of September 27,
1988. In the case of Sumadchat v. Court of Appeals, January
30, 1982, 111 SCRA 501, this Court held that "in the
application of the principle of due process, what is sought to
be safeguarded is not lack of previous notice but the denial of
opportunity to be heard . . ." (Bermejo v. Barrios, L-23614;
Camorin v. Barrios, L-23615, February 27, 1980, 31 SCRA
764, 775-776 cited in Corjeo v. Secretary of Justice, June 28,
1974, 57 SCRA 663). "Absence of previous notice is not itself
a substantial defect; what the law abhors is the lack of
opportunity to be heard . . ." (Manuel v. Villalena, Et Al., L-
28218, February 27, 1970, 37 SCRA 745, 751). The records
disclose that petitioner moved for reconsideration of the CSC
decision. In the case of Dominador L. Galura v. Civil Service
Commission, Et Al., G.R. No. 85812, June 1, 1989, En Banc,
Minute Resolution, this Court held that "a Motion for
Reconsideration constitutes sufficient opportunity for the party
who feels aggrieved to inform the tribunal concerned of his
side in the controversy (Maglasang v. Ople, 63 SCRA 508
[1975]; Dormitorio v. Fernandez, 72 SCRA 388 [1976];
Sumadchat v. Court of Appeals, 111 SCRA 488
[1982])."cralaw virtua1aw library
2. ID.; ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; ADMINISTRATIVE
AGENCY; CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION; CANNOT
SUBSTITUTE ITS WILL FOR THAT OF THE
APPOINTING AUTHORITY. — In the case at bar, there is
no question that Simpao possesses the qualifications required
for the contested position. The appointing authority had
exercised its discretion and had chosen its appointee fully
cognizant of the respective positions previously held by the
rival candidates. The comment of the Assistant Commissioner,
Section Operations Officer is strongly indicative of the
determination made by the appointing officer of the one most
suited for the position from among the competing candidates,
based on standards of competence and integrity and as
required by the interest of the service. The right of choice
having been exercised, it cannot now be faulted on the ground
that there is another better qualified. Respondent Commission
cannot substitute its will for that of the appointing authority. In
revoking the appointment thus made, it had encroached on the
discretion vested in the latter (Central Bank, Et. Al. v. CSC,
Et. Al. supra; Luego v. CSC, No. 69137, August 5, 1986, 143
SCRA 327).
DECISION
PARAS, J.:
This is a petition for Certiorari with Urgent Prayer for the
Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order to annul the
resolutions 1 of the respondent Civil Service Commission in
CSC Case No. 31, entitled "RE: DE OCERA, RAUL B.,
Appellant", the first dated September 27, 1988, and the second
dated November 24, 1988, for having been issued with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction and in
gross violation of the right of petitioner to due process.
The undisputed facts are as follows;
On November 1, 1987, petitioner Jose Cesar D. Simpao was
appointed Supervising Revenue Enforcement Officer of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), pursuant to the
reorganization of the BIR under Executive Order No. 127
dated January 20, 1987. The appointment was actually a
reappointment because prior to the reorganization Simpao was
holding the same position of Supervising Revenue
Enforcement Officer assigned to the Manufacturing Division I
by virtue of Revenue Travel Assignment Order No. 166-87
(Rollo, p. 73).chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
On April 28, 1988, private respondent Raul de Ocera filed his
protest contesting the appointment of petitioner Jose Cesar D.
Simpao as Supervising Revenue Enforcement Officer on the
ground that he has better qualifications and is more competent
than Simpao (Rollo, p. 53; Comment, p. 1).
Evaluating the protest, Assistant Commissioner of the BIR,
Fortunato Aguas, Section Operations Officer, made the
following comment on May 10, 1988:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"In connection with the subject protest, I would like to state
for the record that the Protestee meets the standard of
competence and integrity as will be shown by his performance
and his spotless records as a revenue man. A consistent
outstanding achiever in terms of assessment and collection for
the last two years, he is superior to Protestant, who has
alternately posted on a ‘satisfactory’ or ‘very satisfactory’
adjectival rating during the same period.
"Similarly, my evaluation on the parties as to the moral fitness
relevant to the contested position discloses that the Protestee
has an edge because he has not been linked to any anomaly,
irregularity, a fact which cannot be conceded to the Protestant.
"In sum it is my considered view that as between the herein
contending parties, it is the Protestee who can better give
substance and dignity to the position, hence, more deserving
than Protestant.
"Accordingly, it is respectfully recommended that the protest
be dismissed for lack of merit." (Rollo, p. 25; Petition; Annex
"C")
On May 24, 1988, the Bureau of Internal Revenue-
Reorganization Appeals Board (BIR-RAB) rendered its
decision against Ocera (Rollo, p. 54; Comment, p. 2).
On May 26, 1988, Ocera appealed to the Civil Service
Commission. Simpao was never notified by the former of the
appeal. Neither did the respondent Commission give any
notice thereof to Simpao (Rollo, p. 6; Petition). He came to
know of it only when the questioned resolution of September
27, 1988 was promulgated, the dispositive portion of which
reads as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"In view thereof, Mr. Simpao’s appointment as Supervising
Revenue Enforcement Officer is deemed revoked. Appellant
De Ocera should be appointed thereto instead and appellee
Simpao be considered to the Sr. Revenue Enforcement Officer
position vacated by appellant. The BIR Commissioner is
hereby directed to immediately issue to herein contestants
their respective appointments, in accordance with the new
staffing pattern of the Bureau." (Rollo, p. 20; Petition; Annex
"A", p. 3)
On October 17, 1988, Simpao filed with the respondent
Commission a Motion for Reconsideration with Urgent Prayer
to Stay Execution (Rollo, p. 26; Petition; Annex "D"). In its
resolution of November 24, 1988, the CSC found no cogent
reason to warrant reversal and denied reconsideration (Rollo,
p. 75).
Hence, this petition for certiorari based on the following
grounds:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
I v. Villalena, Et Al., L-28218, February 27, 1970, 37 SCRA
Having itself found that the petitioner is in possession of the
basic and minimum qualifications for the position (under the
reorganization plan) of Supervising Revenue Enforcement
Officer, the respondent Commission gravely abused its
discretion when it nullified petitioner’s appointment thereto in
palpable disregard of long established jurisprudence that in
such cases the discretionary choice of the appointing power
cannot be supplanted by that of the Civil Service Commission.
II
The grave abuse of discretion of the respondent Commission
is underscored by the fact that the petitioner, more than having
the minimum qualifications for the position, has been found
by the BIR Personnel Evaluator to be more competent, more
qualified and more deserving than private respondent De
Ocera, and yet the Commission without any justifiable reason
disregarded this finding and, instead, resorted to a distorted
application of the Rules on Government Reorganization to
come out with the baseless conclusion that respondent De
Ocera has a ‘preferential right of appointment.’
III
The respondent Commission denied petitioner’s right to due
process and compounding the violation of constitutional
rights, brushed aside without discussion the petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration wherein it precisely raised the issue
of violation of the due process clause. (Rollo, p. 7; Petition, p.
6)
On December 28, 1988, the Court En Banc issued a
Temporary Restraining Order enjoining the implementation
and execution of the questioned CSC Resolutions dated
September 27, 1988 and November 24, 1988 (Rollo, p. 50).
In the resolution of July 25, 1989, this Court considered the
comment as answer and required the parties to file their
respective memoranda (Rollo, p. 104). Petitioner and
respondent having adopted their respective pleadings as their
memoranda, this case was calendared for deliberation in the
resolution of April 24, 1990 (Rollo, p. 122).chanrobles law
library : red
The claim of Simpao that he was deprived of his right to due
process has been cured by his filing of a Motion for
Reconsideration subsequently upon having learned of the
questioned resolution of September 27, 1988. In the case of
Sumadchat v. Court of Appeals, January 30, 1982, 111 SCRA
501, this Court held that "in the application of the principle of
due process, what is sought to be safeguarded is not lack of
previous notice but the denial of opportunity to be heard . . ."
(Bermejo v. Barrios, L-23614; Camorin v. Barrios, L-23615,
February 27, 1980, 31 SCRA 764, 775-776 cited in Corjeo v.
Secretary of Justice, June 28, 1974, 57 SCRA 663). "Absence
of previous notice is not itself a substantial defect; what the
law abhors is the lack of opportunity to be heard . . ." (Manuel
745, 751)
The records disclose that petitioner moved for reconsideration
of the CSC decision. In the case of Dominador L. Galura v.
Civil Service Commission, Et Al., G.R. No. 85812, June 1,
1989, En Banc, Minute Resolution, this Court held that "a
Motion for Reconsideration constitutes sufficient opportunity
for the party who feels aggrieved to inform the tribunal
concerned of his side in the controversy (Maglasang v. Ople,
63 SCRA 508 [1975]; Dormitorio v. Fernandez, 72 SCRA 388
[1976]; Sumadchat v. Court of Appeals, 111 SCRA 488
[1982])."cralaw virtua1aw library
 competence and integrity and as required by the interest of the
However, there is merit in Simpao’s contention that the Civil service. The right of choice having been exercised, it cannot
Service Commission had committed grave abuse of discretion now be faulted on the ground that there is another better
in nullifying his appointment. On all fours with the case at bar, qualified. Respondent Commission cannot substitute its will
is the ruling of this Court in the case of Pintor v. Tan, G.R. for that of the appointing authority. In revoking the
No. 84022, March 9, 1989, which is as appointment thus made, it had encroached on the discretion
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph vested in the latter (Central Bank, Et. Al. v. CSC, Et. Al.
supra; Luego v. CSC, No. 69137, August 5, 1986, 143 SCRA
"Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must 327).
be exercised by the officer in which it is vested according to
his best lights, the fundamental requisite being that the PREMISES CONSIDERED, (1) the Resolutions of the Civil
appointee must possess the qualifications required by law. If Service Commission dated September 27, 1988 and November
he does, then the appointment cannot be faulted on the ground 24, 1988 are hereby SET ASIDE; (2) respondent Civil Service
that there is another better qualified who should have been Commission is hereby DIRECTED to attest the appointment
appointed instead. Whom to appoint among those who possess of petitioner Jose Cesar D. Simpao as Supervising Revenue
the required qualifications is a ‘political’ or administrative Enforcement Officer; and (3) the temporary restraining order
question involving considerations of wisdom and the interests issued on December 28, 1988 is hereby MADE permanent.
of the service which only the appointing authority can decide
(Zulueta v. Mamangun, et al, G.R. No. 85941, June 15, 1989; SO ORDERED.
Luego v. CSC, 143 SCRA 327 [1986]; Torres v. Borja, 56
SCRA 47 [1974]; Meralco Securities Corp. v. Savellano, 117
SCRA 804 [1982]). There is no question that both respondent
Santiago and petitioner Pintor possessed the qualifications
specified for the position involved. That being so, the head of
the office, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, must be
accorded ample leeway in choosing the person he regards as
most suited for the position and whose appointment is, in his
judgment, called for by the best interests of the service (Cited G.R. No. 78212 January 22, 1990
in Dominador L. Galura v. CSC, G.R. No. 85812, June 1,
1989) (Emphasis supplied)
T.H. VALDERAMA & SONS, INC. and/or ROBERTO
TINSAY, petitioners,
Again, in Central Bank of the Philippines, Et. Al. v. Civil vs.
Service Commission, Et Al., G.R. Nos. 80455-56, April 10,
HON. FRANKLIN DRILON, DANNY GONZAGA and 276
1989, this Court held:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
OTHER WORKERS, respondents.
". . . It is well-settled that when the appointee is qualified, as
in this case, and all the other legal requirements are satisfied, Macalalag Law Office & Associates for petitioners.
the Commission has no alternative but to attest to the
appointment in accordance with the Civil Service Laws Dalisay & Dalisay Law Office for private respondents.
(Luego v. CSC, 143 SCRA 327, 331 [1986]). The
Commission has no authority to revoke an appointment on the
ground that another person is more qualified for a particular
position. It also has no authority to direct the appointment of a GANCAYCO, J.:
substitute of its choice. To do so would be an encroachment
on the discretion vested upon the appointing authority. An
This petition concerns the orders issued by public respondent
appointment is essentially within the discretionary power of
Secretary of Labor and Employment Franklin M. Drilon
whomsoever it is vested, subject to the only condition that the
denying the appeal of petitioners and affirming the compliance
appointee should possess the qualifications required by law."
order of the Assistant Regional Director of the Department of
(Cited in Lourdes R. Zulueta v. Marina O. Mamangun, Et Al.,
Labor and Employment (DOLE), formerly the Ministry of
G.R. No. 85941, June 15, 1989 and Dominador L. Galura v.
Labor and Employment (MOLE). 1
CSC, Et Al., G.R. No. 85812, June 1, 1989, En Banc, Minute
Resolution)
The instant case originated from a complaint filed by Danny
In the case at bar, there is no question that Simpao possesses Gonzaga for and in behalf of 276 other employees against
the qualifications required for the contested position. The their employer T.H. Valderama & Sons, Inc. (hereinafter
appointing authority had exercised its discretion and had referred to as petitioner company) and/or Roberto Tinsay,
chosen its appointee fully cognizant of the respective positions dated January 7, 1985 before the Iligan City District Office of
previously held by the rival candidates. The comment of the the Ministry (now Department) of Labor and Employment
Assistant Commissioner, Section Operations Officer is through its Labor Standards Enforcement Unit.
strongly indicative of the determination made by the
appointing officer of the one most suited for the position from In their complaint, private respondents alleged failure of their
among the competing candidates, based on standards of employer, petitioner company, to pay their salaries, wages,
allowances and other benefits due them under the applicable
laws. Specifically, they are claiming their unpaid wages and
emergency cost of living allowance (ECOLA) covering the
period of November and December 1984; underpayment of
their wages and ECOLA for three years; and non-payment and
underpayment of their 13th month pay. 2
By reason of this complaint, on February 4, 1985, Labor
Standards Enforcement Unit officers Somirano Macud and
Cornelia Garay went to the premises of petitioner company to
conduct an investigation. There, they were met by Ireneo
Clarida, personnel aide of petitioner company, and were
informed that the manager was not around. The following day,
the said labor officers went back to petitioner company's
premises but, again, were told that the manager was out.
Thereupon, the labor officers conducted their investigation
and came out with a report 3 which was submitted to the
Regional Director of the MOLE, Region XII, Cotabato City.
In the said report, the following findings were made:
1. The respondents violated Sec. 11 Rule X,
Book III of the Rules Implementing PD 442,
as amended, requiring employers to keep
their employment records in their premises;
4. That complainants were underpaid of
their 13th month pay. 4
After computing the amount of private respondents' claim, the
Labor Standards Enforcement Unit set the amount of
petitioner company's liability at the aggregate sum of ONE
MILLION NINE HUNDRED TWENTY-EIGHT
THOUSAND & 92/100 (Pl,928,000.92).
On the basis of the aforesaid report, Assistant Regional
Director Martin E. Daiz of the MOLE issued a Compliance
Order 5 dated May 28, 1985 requiring petitioner company to
pay its liability as computed.
Thereafter, or on July 15, 1985, private respondents filed a
motion for execution of the compliance order. A day after, a
writ of execution was issued by the Regional Director.
In due time, petitioners filed an urgent motion to recall writ of
execution and/or reconsideration dated August 21, 1986
attaching and submitting therewith some pay slips and daily
time records showing that some of private respondents' claim
had already been paid or otherwise satisfied. Acting on the
said motion, the Regional Director reduced the amount of
petitioners' liability to ONE MILLION FOUR HUNDRED
NINETY-FIVE THOUSAND THREE & 70/100
(P1,495,003.70).
In the light of the foregoing development, the Regional
Director called for a summary investigation of the
controversy. Petitioners failed to appear therein, henceforth, a
writ of execution was issued to satisfy the claims of private
respondents.
This was appealed to the then Minister of Labor and
Employment Augusto Sanchez who, in an order dated
November 14, 1986, ruled against petitioner company. The
dispositive portion of the order reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
Compliance Order dated May 28, 1985 is
hereby affirmed subject to the modification
that the award therein be reduced to
Pl,495,003.70 as recomputed. Let the entire
records be remanded to the Regional Office
of origin for enforcement of the said order
which had become final and executory.
SO ORDERED. 6
A motion for reconsideration of the immediately preceding
order was filed but the same was denied by respondent
Secretary Franklin Drilon on March 12, 1987. 7 Hence, this
petition for certiorari.
The only issue posed in this instant petition is whether
petitioners were denied their right to procedural due process.
Petitioners posit the affirmative. However, We find their
contention bereft of merit.
There is no denying that in order for this Court to sustain the
findings of an administrative body exercising quasi-judicial
functions, such body must abide by the elementary rules of
due process. 8 However, procedural due process as understood
in administrative proceedings accepts of a more flexible
standard as long as the proceedings were undertaken in an
atmosphere of fairness and justice. 9
Contrary to petitioners' assertion, the record discloses that they
were not denied their right to due process. They had several
opportunities to present their side of the controversy but were
negligent in defending their cause.
As borne by the record, after the narrative report was
forwarded by the Labor Standards Enforcement Unit to the
Office of the Regional Director, a hearing was scheduled on
February 8, 1985 for petitioners to dispute the report thus
submitted. However, on the scheduled hearing, petitioners
failed to appear.
Likewise, in the summary investigation that was scheduled on
May 20, 1986 for the purpose of hearing the parties relative to
the amount of petitioner company's liability as recomputed,
petitioners, again, did not appear despite due notice. 10
Petitioners vehemently deny that notices of the aforestated
proceedings were ever sent to them. This failure of notice is in
fact the core of their argument in their petition. 11
At any rate, We need not discuss the truthfulness of this
assertion. As the record will reveal, petitioners were afforded
ample opportunity to present their side of the case. Petitioners
were able to submit pay slips and daily time records to the
appropriate agency of the DOLE which became the basis of
the recomputation conducted. Besides, they were able to
appeal the compliance order and writ of execution to the then
Minister of Labor Sanchez. There was also a motion for
reconsideration which they filed with Secretary Drilon.
As already ruled by this Court, denial of due process cannot be
successfully invoked where a party was given the chance to be
heard on his motion for reconsideration. 12 Petitioners' appeal
and their subsequent motion for reconsideration have the
effect of curing whatever irregularity was committed in the
proceedings below. 13
After a careful deliberation on the facts and issue thus posed,
this Court finds no reason to disturb the assailed order.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for
lack of merit, with costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED
Additional
G.R. No. 78385 August 31, 1987
PHILIPPINE CONSUMERS FOUNDATION,
INC., petitioner,
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND
SPORTS, respondent.
GANCAYCO, J.:
This is an original Petition for prohibition with a prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.
The record of the case discloses that the herein petitioner
Philippine Consumers Foundation, Inc. is a non-stock, non-
profit corporate entity duly organized and existing under the
laws of the Philippines. The herein respondent Secretary of
Education, Culture and Sports is a ranking cabinet member
who heads the Department of Education, Culture and Sports of
the Office of the President of the Philippines.
On February 21, 1987, the Task Force on Private Higher
Education created by the Department of Education, Culture
and Sports (hereinafter referred to as the DECS) submitted a
report entitled "Report and Recommendations on a Policy for
Tuition and Other School Fees." The report favorably
recommended to the DECS the following courses of action
with respect to the Government's policy on increases in school
fees for the schoolyear 1987 to 1988 —
(1) Private schools may be allowed to
increase its total school fees by not more
than 15 per cent to 20 per cent without the
need for the prior approval of the DECS.
Schools that wish to increase school fees
beyond the ceiling would be subject to the
discretion of the DECS;
(2) Any private school may increase its total
school fees in excess of the ceiling, provided
that the total schools fees will not exceed
P1,000.00 for the schoolyear in the
elementary and secondary levels, and
P50.00 per academic unit on a semestral
basis for the collegiate level. 1
The DECS took note of the report of the Task Force and on
the basis of the same, the DECS, through the respondent
Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports (hereinafter
referred to as the respondent Secretary), issued an Order
authorizing, inter alia, the 15% to 20% increase in school fees
as recommended by the Task Force. The petitioner sought a
reconsideration of the said Order, apparently on the ground
that the increases were too high. 2 Thereafter, the DECS issued
Department Order No. 37 dated April 10, 1987 modifying its
previous Order and reducing the increases to a lower ceiling of
10% to 15%, accordingly. 3 Despite this reduction, the
petitioner still opposed the increases. On April 23, 1987, the
petitioner, through counsel, sent a telegram to the President of
the Philippines urging the suspension of the implementation of
Department Order No. 37. 4 No response appears to have been
obtained from the Office of the President.
Thus, on May 20, 1987, the petitioner, allegedly on the basis
of the public interest, went to this Court and filed the instant
Petition for prohibition, seeking that judgment be rendered
declaring the questioned Department Order unconstitutional.
The thrust of the Petition is that the said Department Order
was issued without any legal basis. The petitioner also
maintains that the questioned Department Order was issued in
violation of the due process clause of the Constitution in
asmuch as the petitioner was not given due notice and hearing
before the said Department Order was issued.
In support of the first argument, the petitioner argues that
while the DECS is authorized by law to regulate school fees in
educational institutions, the power to regulate does not always
include the power to increase school fees. 5
Regarding the second argument, the petitioner maintains that
students and parents are interested parties that should be
afforded an opportunity for a hearing before school fees are
increased. In sum, the petitioner stresses that the questioned
Order constitutes a denial of substantive and procedural due
process of law.
Complying with the instructions of this Court, 6 the respondent
Secretary submitted a Comment on the Petition. 7 The
respondent Secretary maintains, inter alia, that the increase in
tuition and other school fees is urgent and necessary, and that
the assailed Department Order is not arbitrary in character. In
due time, the petitioner submitted a Reply to the
Comment. 8 Thereafter, We considered the case submitted for
resolution.
After a careful examination of the entire record of the case,
We find the instant Petition devoid of merit.
We are not convinced by the argument that the power to
regulate school fees "does not always include the power to
increase" such fees. Section 57 (3) of Batas Pambansa Blg.
232, otherwise known as The Education Act of 1982, vests the
DECS with the power to regulate the educational system in the
country, to wit:
SEC. 57. Educations and powers of the
Ministry. The Ministry shall:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) Promulgate rules and regulations
necessary for the administration, supervision
and regulation of the educational system in
accordance with declared policy.
xxx xxx xxx 9
Section 70 of the same Act grants the DECS the power to
issue rules which are likewise necessary to discharge its
functions and duties under the law, to wit:
SEC. 70. Rule-making Authority. — The
Minister of Education and Culture, charged
with the administration and enforcement of
this Act, shall promulgate the necessary
implementing rules and regulations.
In the absence of a statute stating otherwise, this power
includes the power to prescribe school fees. No other
government agency has been vested with the authority to fix
school fees and as such, the power should be considered
lodged with the DECS if it is to properly and effectively
discharge its functions and duties under the law.
We find the remaining argument of the petitioner untenable.
The petitioner invokes the due process clause of the
Constitution against the alleged arbitrariness of the assailed
Department Order. The petitioner maintains that the due
process clause requires that prior notice and hearing are
indispensable for the Department Order to be validly issued.
We disagree.
The function of prescribing rates by an administrative agency
may be either a legislative or an adjudicative function. If it
were a legislative function, the grant of prior notice and
hearing to the affected parties is not a requirement of due
process. As regards rates prescribed by an administrative
agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial function, prior
notice and hearing are essential to the validity of such rates.
When the rules and/or rates laid down by an administrative
agency are meant to apply to all enterprises of a given kind
throughout the country, they may partake of a legislative
character. Where the rules and the rates imposed apply
exclusively to a particular party, based upon a finding of fact,
then its function is quasi-judicial in character. 9a
Is Department Order No. 37 issued by the DECS in the
exercise of its legislative function? We believe so. The
assailed Department Order prescribes the maximum school
fees that may be charged by all private schools in the
country for schoolyear 1987 to 1988. This being so, prior
notice and hearing are not essential to the validity of its
issuance.
This observation notwithstanding, there is a failure on the part
of the petitioner to show clear and convincing evidence of
such arbitrariness. As the record of the case discloses, the
DECS is not without any justification for the issuance of the
questioned Department Order. It would be reasonable to
assume that the report of the Task Force created by the DECS,
on which it based its decision to allow an increase in school
fees, was made judiciously. Moreover, upon the instance of
the petitioner, as it so admits in its Petition, the DECS had
actually reduced the original rates of 15% to 20% down to
10% to 15%, accordingly. Under the circumstances peculiar to
this case, We cannot consider the assailed Department Order
arbitrary.
Under the Rules of Court, it is presumed that official duty has
been regularly performed. 10 In the absence of proof to the
contrary, that presumption prevails. This being so, the burden
of proof is on the party assailing the regularity of official
proceedings. In the case at bar, the petitioner has not
successfully disputed the presumption.
We commend the petitioner for taking the cudgels for the
public, especially the parents and the students of the country.
Its zeal in advocating the protection of the consumers in its
activities should be lauded rather than discouraged. But a
more convincing case should be made out by it if it is to seek
relief from the courts some time in the future. Petitioner must
establish that respondent acted without or in excess of her
jurisdiction; or with grave abuse of discretion, and there is no
appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law before the extraordinary writ of
prohibition may issue. 11
This Court, however, does not go to the extent of saying that it
gives its judicial imprimatur to future increases in school fees.
The increases must not be unreasonable and arbitrary so as to
amount to an outrageous exercise of government authority and
power. In such an eventuality, this Court will not hesitate to
exercise the power of judicial review in its capacity as the
ultimate guardian of the Constitution.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant Petition
for prohibition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. We
make no pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

PADUA vs RANADA390 SCRA 663
Status and CharacteristicsConsequence of
Characteristics of Administrative Agencies
FACTS:
On November 9, 2001, the TRB issued Resolution
No. 2001-89 authorizing rovisional toll
ratead!ustments at the "etro "anila #$%&a%,
e'e(tive )anuar% 1, 2002. *or im lementation
starting )anuar% 1,2002 a+ter its ubli(ation
on(e a &ee$ +or three (onse(utive &ee$s
in a ne&s a er o+ general(ir(ulation and that
said /rovisional Toll Rate n(rease shall remain
in e'e(t until su(h time that the TRBBoard has
determined other&ise.On e(ember 1 , 23 and
1, 2001, the above Resolution a roving
rovisional toll rate ad!ustments &as ublished
in the ne&s a ers o+ general (ir(ulation.
Tra(ing ba($ the events that led to the issuan(e
o+ the said Resolution, it a ears that on
*ebruar% 2 ,2001 the 4itra "etro "anila
Toll&a%s 4or oration 4 TR5 6led &ith the
TRB an a li(ation +or an interimad!ustment
o+ the toll rates at the "etro "anila #$%&a%
/ro!e(t #tage 1. 4 TR5 moored its etition on
the rovisions o+ the #u lemental Toll
O eration 5greement #TO5 , authorizing it,
as the investor, to a l%+or and i+ &arranted,
to be granted an interim ad!ustment o+ toll rates
in the event o+ a signi6(ant
(urren(%devaluation.4laiming that the eso
e7(hange rate to a .#. dollar had devaluated
+rom /2 .1 1 in 199: to /38.00 in2000,
4 TR5 alleged that there &as a (om elling need
+or the in(rease o+ the toll rates to meet the
loanobligations o+ the /ro!e(t and the substantial
in(rease in debt-servi(e burden. ue to heav%
o osition, 4 TR5s etition remained
unresolved. This rom ted 4 TR5 to 6le on
O(tober 9,2001 an rgent "otion +or /rovisional
5 roval, this time, invo$ing #e(tion , Rule
10 o+ the Rules o+ /ra(ti(e and /ro(edure
;overning <earing Be+ore the Toll Regulator%
Board TRB Rules o+ /ro(edure .On O(tober
0, 2001, 4 TR5 moved to &ithdra& its rgent
"otion +or /rovisional 5 roval
&ithout re!udi(e to its right to see$ or be
granted rovisional relie+ under the above-
=uoted rovisions o+ the TRBRules o+
/ro(edure, obviousl%, re+erring to the o&er o+
the Board to a(t on its o&n initiative.On
November , 2001, 4 TR5 &rote a letter to
TRB e7 ressing its (on(ern over the undue
dela% in the ro(eeding, stressing that an%
+urther setba($ &ould bring the /ro!e(ts 6nan(ial
(ondition, as &ell as the/hili ine ban$ing
s%stem, to a total (olla se. 4 TR5 re(ounted
that out o+ the #> :3 million +unding
+rom(reditors, t&o-thirds 2? thereo+ (ame
+rom the /hili ine ban$s and 6nan(ial
institutions, su(h as the@andban$ o+ the
/hili ines and the ;overnment #ervi(e
nsuran(e #ervi(es. Thus, 4 TR5 re=uested
TRB to6nd a timel% solution to its
redi(ament.On November 9, 2001, TRB
granted 4 TR5s motion to &ithdra& the rgent
"otion +or /rovisional 5 rovaland, at the same
time, issued Resolution No. 2001-89, earlier
=uoted.<en(e, etitioners 4e+erino /adua and
Aduardo ial(ita assail be+ore this 4ourt the
validit% and legalit% o+ TRB Resolution No.
2001-89./etitioner 4e+erino /adua, as a toll
a%er, 6led an rgent "otion +or a Tem orar%
Restraining Order to #to 5rbitrar% Toll *ee
n(reases in a etition +or mandamus earlier
6led b% him. n his urgent motion,
etitioner/adua (laims that alone, TRB
A7e(utive ire(tor )aime #. umlao, )r., (ould
not authorize the rovisionaltoll rate
ad!ustments be(ause the TRB is a (ollegial
bod%. On )anuar% 3, 2002, etitioner /adua
6led a#u lemental rgent "otion +or a TRO
against Toll *ee n(reases, arguing +urther that
Resolution No. 2001-89 &as issued &ithout
basis (onsidering that &hile it &as signed b%
three o+ the 6ve members o+ the TRB,
none o+ them a(tuall% attended the
hearing./etitioner Aduardo ial(ita, as a
ta7 a%er and as 4ongressman o+ /arana=ue
4it%, 6led the resent etition+or rohibition
&ith ra%er +or a tem orar% restraining order
and?or &rit o+ reliminar% in!un(tion against
TRB and 4 TR5, im ugning the same
Resolution No. 2001-89. <e asserts that the
rovisional toll ratead!ustments are e7orbitant
and that the TRB violated its o&n 4harter,
/residential e(ree No. 1112, &henit
romulgated Resolution No. 2001-89 &ithout
the bene6t o+ an% ubli( hearing. <e also
maintains thatthe TRB violated the 4onstitution
&hen it did not e7 ress (learl% and distin(tl%
the +a(ts and the la& on&hi(h Resolution No.
2001-89 &as based. 5nd lastl%, he (laims that
#e(tion , Rule 10 o+ the TRB Rules o+
/ro(edure is not san(tioned b% /. . No. 1112.
ISSUE:
Chether or not Resolution No. 2001-89 issued b% the
Toll Regulator% Board TRB is valid
RULIN :
Des. The remed% o+ rohibition initiated b%
etitioner ial(ita su'ers several in6rmities.
nitiall%, it
violates the t&in do(trine o+ rimar% administrative
!urisdi(tion and non-e7haustion o+
administrativeremedies. /. . No. 1112
e7 li(itl% rovides that the de(isions o+ the
TRB on etitions +or the in(rease o+ tollrate
shall be a ealable to the OE(e o+ the /resident
&ithin ten 10 da%s +rom the romulgation
thereo+.Obviousl%, the la&s and the TRB Rules
o+ /ro(edure have rovided the remedies o+ an
interestedA7 ress&a%s user. The initial
 ro er re(ourse is to 6le a etition +or revie&
o+ the ad!usted toll rates &iththe TRB. The need
+or a rior resort to this bod% is &ith reason.
The TRB, as the agen(% assigned tosu ervise
the (olle(tion o+ toll +ees and the o eration o+
toll +a(ilities, has the ne(essar% e7 ertise,
trainingand s$ills to !udi(iousl% de(ide matters
o+ this $ind. 5s ma% be gleaned +rom the
etition, the main thrust o+ etitioner ial(itas
argument is that the rovisional toll rate
ad!ustments are e7orbitant, o ressive,onerous
and un(ons(ionable. This is obviousl% a
=uestion o+ +a(t re=uiring $no&ledge o+ the
+ormula usedand the +a(tors (onsidered in
determining the assailed rates. e6nitel%, this
tas$ is &ithin the rovin(e o+ the TRB.Ce ta$e
(ognizan(e o+ the &ealth o+ !uris ruden(e on
the do(trine o+ rimar% administrative
!urisdi(tionand e7haustion o+ administrative
remedies. n this era o+ (logged (ourt do($ets,
the need +or s e(ializedadministrative boards or
(ommissions &ith the s e(ial $no&ledge,
e7 erien(e and (a abilit% to hear anddetermine
rom tl% dis utes on te(hni(al matters or
intri(ate =uestions o+ +a(ts, sub!e(t to !udi(ial
revie&in (ase o+ grave abuse o+ dis(retion, is
indis ensable. Bet&een the o&er lodged in an
administrative bod%and a (ourt, the
unmista$able trend is to re+er it to the
+ormer.F + the (ase is su(h that its
determination re=uires the e7 ertise,
s e(ialized s$ills and $no&ledge o+ the ro er
administrative bodies be(ause te(hni(al matters or
intri(ate =uestions o+ +a(ts are involved,
thenrelie+ must 6rst be obtained in an
administrative ro(eeding be+ore a remed% &ill
be su lied b% the (ourtseven though the
matter is &ithin the ro er !urisdi(tion o+ a
(ourt.*or another, it is not true that it &as TRB
A7e(utive ire(tor umlao, )r. alone &ho issued
Resolution No.2001-89. The Resolution itsel+
(ontains the signature o+ the +our TRB
ire(tors, namel%, #imeon 5. atumanong,
Ammanuel /. Bonoan, Ruben #. Reinoso, )r. and
"ario G. As inosa. /etitioner /adua &ouldargue
that &hile these ire(tors signed the Resolution,
none o+ them ersonall% attended the hearing.
Thisargument is mis la(ed. nder our
!uris ruden(e, an administrative agen(% ma%
em lo% other ersons,su(h as a hearing oE(er,
e7aminer or investigator, to re(eive eviden(e,
(ondu(t hearing and ma$ere orts, on the basis
o+ &hi(h the agen(% shall render its de(ision.
#u(h a ro(edure is a ra(ti(alne(essit%.5t an%
rate, it (annot be gainsaid that the term
administrative bod% or agen(% in(ludes the
subordinateoE(ials u on &hose hand the bod%
or agen(% delegates a ortion o+ its authorit%.
n(luded therein are thehearing oE(ers through
&hose e%es and ears the administrative bod% or
agen(% observes the demeanor,(ondu(t and
attitude o+ the &itnesses and listens to their
testimonies. t must be em hasized that the
a ointment o+ (om etent oE(ers to hear and
re(eive eviden(e is(ommonl% resorted to b%
administrative bodies or agen(ies in the interest
o+ an orderl% and eE(ientdis osition o+
administrative (ases.4orollaril%, in a (atena o+
(ases, this 4ourt laid do&n the (ardinal
re=uirements o+ due ro(ess inadministrative
ro(eedings, one o+ &hi(h is that the tribunal or
bod% or an% o+ its !udges must a(t on its orhis
o&n inde endent (onsideration o+ the la& and
+a(ts o+ the (ontrovers%, and not sim l%
a((e t thevie&s o+ a subordinate. Thus, it is
logi(al to sa% that this mandate &as rendered
re(isel% to ensure that in(ases &here the
hearing or re(e tion o+ eviden(e is assigned to a
subordinate, the bod% or agen(% shallnot
merel% rel% on his re(ommendation but instead
shall ersonall% &eigh and assess the eviden(e
&hi(hthe said subordinate has gathered.Be that
as it ma%, &e must stress that the TRBHs
authorit% to grant rovisional toll rate
ad!ustments doesnot re=uire the (ondu(t o+ a
hearing. /ertinent la&s and !uris ruden(e
su ort this (on(lusion.
RATI!:
The very characteristics of administrative agencies necessitate
that delegation of function andauthority be a predominant
feature of their organization and procedure. At any rate, it
cannot be gainsaidthat the term administrative body or agency
includes the subordinate o cials (hearing o cers,examiners,
investigators) upon whose hand the body or agency delegates
a portion of its authority.
PHILCOMSAT VS. ALCUAZ
G.R. No. 84818 December 18, 1989 PHILIPPINE
COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE CORPORATION,
petitioner, vs. JOSE LUIS A. ALCUAZ, as NTC
Commissioner, and NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS
COMMISSION, respondents.
Facts: The petition before us seeks to annul and set aside an
Order 1 issued by respondent Commissioner Jose Luis Alcuaz
of the National Telecommunications Commission
Herein petitioner is engaged in providing for services
involving telecommunications. Charging rates for certain
specified lines that were reduced by order of herein respondent
Jose AlcuazCommissioner of the National
Telecommunications Commission. The rates were ordered to
be reduced by fifteen percent (15%) due to Executive Order
No. 546 which granted the NTC the power to fix rates. Said
order was issued without prior notice and hearing.
Under Section 5 of Republic Act No. 5514, petitioner was
exempt from the jurisdiction of the then Public Service
Commission, now respondent NTC. However, pursuant to
Executive Order No. 196 issued on June 17, 1987, petitioner
was placed under the jurisdiction, control and regulation of
respondent NTC
Issue: Whether or Not E.O. 546 is unconstitutional.
Held: In Vigan Electric Light Co., Inc. vs. Public Service
Commission the Supreme Court said that although the rule-
making power and even the power to fix rates- when such
rules and/or rates are meant to apply to all enterprises of a
given kind throughout the Philippines-may partake of a
legislative character. Respondent Alcuaz no doubt contains all
the attributes of a quasi-judicial adjudication. Foremost is the
fact that said order pertains exclusively to petitioner and to no
other
The respondent admits that the questioned order was issued
pursuant to its quasi-judicial functions. It, however, insists that
notice and hearing are not necessary since the assailed order is
merely incidental to the entire proceedings and, therefore,
temporary in nature but the supreme court said that While
respondents may fix a temporary rate pending final
determination of the application of petitioner, such rate-fixing
order, temporary though it may be, is not exempt from the
statutory procedural requirements of notice and hearing
The Supreme Court Said that it is clear that with regard to
rate-fixing, respondent has no authority to make such order
without first giving petitioner a hearing, whether the order be
temporary or permanent. In the Case at bar the NTC didn’t
scheduled hearing nor it did give any notice to the petitioner
PHILCOMSAT VS. ALCUAZ [180 SCRA 218; G.R.
NO.84818; 18 DEC 1989]
Sunday, February 01, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law
Facts: Herein petitioner is engaged in providing for services
involving telecommunications. Charging rates for certain
specified lines that were reduced by order of herein respondent
Jose Alcuaz Commissioner of the National
Telecommunications Commission. The rates were ordered to
be reduced by fifteen percent (15%) due to Executive Order No.
546 which granted the NTC the power to fix rates. Said order
was issued without prior notice and hearing.
Issue: Whether or Not E.O. 546 is unconstitutional.
Held: Yes. Respondents admitted that the application of a
policy like the fixing of rates as exercised
by administrative bodies is quasi-judicial rather than quasi-
legislative. But respondent’s contention that notice and hearing
are not required since the assailed order is merely incidental to
the entire proceedings and temporary in nature is erroneous.
Section 16(c) of the Public Service Act, providing for the
proceedings of the Commission, upon notice and hearing,
dictates that a Commission has power to fix rates, upon proper
notice and hearing, and, if not subject to the exceptions,
limitations or saving provisions.
It is thus clear that with regard to rate-fixing, respondent has no
authority to make such order without first giving petitioner a
hearing, whether the order be temporary or permanent, and it is
immaterial whether the same is made upon a complaint,
a summary investigation, or upon the commission's own
motion as in the present case.
WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for is GRANTED and the order
of respondents is hereby SET ASIDE.
Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation vs Jose Luis
Alcuaz
180 SCRA 218 – Political Law – Delegation of Power –
Administrative Bodies
By virtue of Republic Act No. 5514, the Philippine
Communications Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT) was
granted the authority to “construct and operate such ground
facilities as needed to deliver telecommunications services from
the communications satellite system and ground terminal or
terminals” in the Philippines. PHILCOMSAT provides satellite
services to companies like Globe Mackay (now Globe) and
PLDT.
Under Section 5 of the same law, PHILCOMSAT was exempt
from the jurisdiction, control and regulation of the Public
Service Commission later known as the National
Telecommunications Commission (NTC). However, Executive
Order No. 196 was later promulgated and the same has placed
PHILCOMSAT under the jurisdiction of the NTC.
Consequently, PHILCOMSAT has to acquire permit to operate
from the NTC in order to continue operating its existing
satellites. NTC gave the necessary permit but it however
directed PHILCOMSAT to reduce its current rates by 15%.
NTC based its power to fix the rates on EO 546.
PHILCOMSAT now sues NTC and its commissioner (Jose Luis
Alcuaz) assailed the said directive and holds that the enabling
act (EO 546) of the NTC, empowering it to fix rates for public
service communications, does not provide the necessary
standards which were constitutionally required, hence, there is
an undue delegation of legislative power, particularly the
adjudicatory powers of NTC. PHILCOMSAT asserts that
nowhere in the provisions of EO 546, providing for the creation
of NTC and granting its rate-fixing powers, nor of EO 196,
placing PHILCOMSAT under the jurisdiction of NTC, can it
be inferred that NTC is guided by any standard in the exercise
of its rate-fixing and adjudicatory powers.
PHILCOMSAT subsequently clarified its said submission to
mean that the order mandating a reduction of certain rates is
undue delegation not of legislative but of quasi-judicial power
to NTC, the exercise of which allegedly requires an express
conferment by the legislative body.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is an undue delegation of power.
HELD: No. There is no undue delegation. The power of the
NTC to fix rates is limited by the requirements of public safety,
public interest, reasonable feasibility and reasonable rates,
which conjointly more than satisfy the requirements of a valid
delegation of legislative power. Fundamental is the rule that
delegation of legislative power may be sustained only upon the
ground that some standard for its exercise is provided and that
the legislature in making the delegation has prescribed the
manner of the exercise of the delegated power.
Therefore, when the administrative agency concerned, NTC in
this case, establishes a rate, its act must both be non-
confiscatory and must have been established in the manner
prescribed by the legislature; otherwise, in the absence of a
fixed standard, the delegation of power becomes
unconstitutional. In case of a delegation of rate-fixing power,
the only standard which the legislature is required to prescribe
for the guidance of the administrative authority is that the rate
be reasonable and just. However, it has been held that even in
the absence of an express requirement as to reasonableness, this
standard may be implied.
However, in this case, it appears that the manner of fixing the
rates was done without due process since no hearing was made
in ascertaining the rate imposed upon PHILCOMSAT.
Zambales Chromite Mining et al vs Court of Appeals
Due Process – Administrative Due Process
ZCM filed an administrative case before the Director of Mines
Gozon to have them be declared the rightful and prior locators
and possessors of 69 mining claims in Sta. Cruz, Zambales.
They are asserting their claim against the group of Martinez and
Pabiloňa. Gozon decided in favor of Martinez et al. ZCM
appealed the case before the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources. During pendency, Gozon was assigned as
the Sec of Agri. And Natural Resources. He did not inhibit
himself from deciding on the appeal but he instead affirmed his
earlier decision when he was still the director of mines. ZCM
then appealed before the CFI of Zambales. The CFI affirmed
the decision of Gozon. It held that the disqualification of a judge
to review his own decision or ruling (Sec. 1, Rule 137, Rules of
Court) does not apply to administrative bodies; that there is no
provision in the Mining Law, disqualifying the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources from deciding an appeal
from a case which he had decided as Director of Mines; that
delicadeza is not a ground for disqualification; that the ZCM
did not seasonably seek to disqualify Gozon from deciding their
appeal, and that there was no evidence that Gozon acted
arbitrarily and with bias, prejudice, animosity or hostility to
ZCM. ZCM appealed the case to the CA. The CA reversed
Gozon’s finding and declared that ZCM had the rights earlier
attributed to Martinez et al by Gozon. Martinez et al appealed
averring that the factual basis found by Gozon as Director of
Mines be given due weight. The CA reconsidered after realizing
that Gozon cannot affirm his own decision and the CA
remanded the case to the Minister of Natural Resources. Now
both parties appealed urging their own contentions; ZCM wants
the CA’s earlier decision to be reaffirmed while Martinez et al
demanded that Gozon’s finding be reinstated. The CA denied
both petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not Gozon can validly affirm his earlier
decision w/o disturbing due process.
HELD: The SC annulled the decision of Gozon calling it as a
mockery of justice. Gozon had acted with grave abuse of
discretion. In order that the review of the decision of a
subordinate officer might not turn out to be a farce, the
reviewing officer must perforce be other than the officer whose
decision is under review; otherwise, there could be no different
view or there would be no real review of the case. The decision
of the reviewing officer would be a biased view; inevitably, it
would be the same view since being human, he would not admit
that he was mistaken in his first view of the case. The SC
affirmed the 2nd decision of the CA.
EN BANC
Adm. Case No. 2655 July 9, 1987
In re: Complaint against ATTY. PATRICIO A. ASOY,
LEONARD W. RICHARDS, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. PATRICIO A. ASOY, respondent.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
In a Complaint formalized by the Bar Confident on April 29,
1986, pursuant to the Resolution of this Court, dated February
10, 1986, Respondent Atty. Patricio A. Asoy as retained
counsel of Complainant, Leonard W. Richards, an Australian,
was charged with Malpractice for non-attendance at Court
hearings, negligence and lack of zeal in prosecuting a civil
case for damages, resulting in its dismissal for lack of interest
and/or failure to prosecute.
Prior to the aforesaid formal Complaint, Leonard W. Richards
had filed a letter-complaint on June 29, 1984 with the Chief
Legal Officer, Tourist Division, Department of Tourism
followed up with another letter dated July 13, 1984 to the
Chief Justice denouncing Respondent's actuations.
Required to comment in a Resolution, dated August 8, 1984,
Respondent failed to do so despite service of the Resolution
together with a copy of the letter-complaint. The Court (First
Division) required Respondent to show cause why he should
not be disciplinary dealt with or held in contempt for such
failure, but all efforts to serve copy of the show-cause
Resolution on Respondent at his six (6) available addresses as
well as through the national and the Tacloban Chapters of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines proved futile. Since,
unquestionably, respondent had gone into hiding and was
evading service of pleadings/orders/processes of this Court,
we suspended him from the practice of law in a Resolution
dated November 11, 1985. Copies of the Resolution were
circularized to all Courts nationwide with the directive that
should Respondent appear before any lower Court, the latter
shall serve upon him a copy of the show-cause Resolution and
require him to appear within five (5) days thereafter before the
Deputy Clerk of Court and Bar Confidant.
Flushed out, on December 2, 1985, Respondent filed a
Manifestation/Motion for Reconsideration "submitting himself
voluntarily to the jurisdiction of the Court," denying any
violation of his oath as an attorney, which would warrant his
suspension, and praying that in the interest of due process and
on broader grounds of substantial justice, the order of
suspension be lifted and that he be excused from appearing
before the Bar Confidant by reason of distance and financial
constraints. Respondent gave his address as "Room 302
Abalos Bldg., Aguinaldo St., Iligan City."
In a resolution dated February 10, 1986, the Court denied the
lifting of the order of suspension but excused Respondent
from appearing before the Deputy Clerk of Court and Bar
Confidant. In the same Resolution, and as stated initially, the
Bar Confidant was directed to formulate the administrative
complaint and respondent to answer the same within five (5)
days from receipt of notice.
The background facts disclose that on April 23, 1982,
Complainant retained Respondent as counsel in CC No. 0181-
P before the Regional Trial Court, Branch CX, Pasay City,
entitled "Spouses Anita M. Richards & Leonard Richards vs.
Danilo A. Felindario, et al." It was a suit for damages
allegedly due to faulty workmanship and non-compliance with
specifications in the construction of the RICHARDS house
and swimming pool at Johann Menzi St., Phase III, BF
Homes, Paranaque, Metro Manila.
Among the terms and conditions in their contract for legal
services were the payment by Complainant to Respondent of
an acceptance fee of Fifteen Thousand Pesos (P15,000.00)
payable upon the signing of the agreement, and a fee of
P300.00 for each Court appearance. The acceptance fee was
fully paid by Complainant on April 30, 1982, the initial
payment having been made on April 26, 1982. 1 On October
21, 1982,2 Complainant and his family left permanently for
Australia after selling their house to a third party.
On June 20, 1983, Civil Case No. 0181-P was dismissed by
the Trial Court without prejudice "for lack of interest on the
part of plaintiffs as shown by the absence of their counsel
despite due notice."3
On August 15, 1983, the case was reinstated after the
reconsideration sought by Respondent on July 13, 1983 was
granted by the Trial Court. According to Complainant,
reconsideration must have been sought by Respondent only
because in Complainant's letter, dated June 7, 1983, he had
already sought the assistance of Major Fred de Vera of the
Bureau of Tourism Services regarding his complaint against
Respondent.1avvphi1
In an Order dated October 20, 1983, the Trial Court again
dismissed the case for "lack of interest and/or failure to
prosecute," "it appearing that plaintiffs' counsel was duly
notified as indicated by his signature appearing on the record,
it appearing further that notwithstanding said notice, said
counsel for the plaintiffs is not in Court today." The Trial
Court further observed that "this is the second time that this
case was dismissed for failure of plaintiffs' counsel to appear
despite notice."4
In his Answer, Respondent states that he was delayed in filing
the same as he had to temporarily reside and hold office at
Tubod, Lanao del Norte, by reason of his temporary
appointment as Provincial Administrator of Lanao del Norte
effective March 11, 1986; that his inability to prosecute the
case was because Complainant left for Australia without
furnishing Respondent his address and that he was unable to
shoulder the burden of paving the fees required for the
services of expert witnesses besides the fact that his daughter
was stricken with cerebral palsy; that he had no intention to
delay Complainant for money, that the Administrative
Complaint does not comply with the requirements of Section
1, Rule 139 of the Rules of Court; and that he was deprived of
due process of law inasmuch as Section 30, Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court requires that an attorney be heard before he is
removed or suspended. Respondent then prayed that, pending
investigation, his suspension be lifted and that after due
hearing the Complaint be dismissed and Complainant held
liable for payment of all damages suffered by Respondent
during the investigation of this case.
In his letter-reply, dated February 13, 1987, addressed to the
First Division Clerk of Court, Complainant stated that he had
paid P15,000.00 to Respondent5 to handle the case for him
conditioned upon Respondent's prosecuting the case to
completion, attending all scheduled hearings and keeping
Complainant posted on the progress of the case; that at the
time he engaged Respondent's services, the latter was the
Manager of Personnel and Legal Affairs of Asia International
Builders Corporation in Makati, which had connections with
an Australian counterpart in Melbourne; that he had paid Civil
Engineer Mendoza P5,000.00 for the inspection of the house
and that the latter was to be the only expert witness so that
Respondent's excuse that he (Respondent) had no funds with
which to pay for expert witnesses is "entirely untrue"; that he
paid an additional P1,300.00 to Respondent for other expenses
like filing fee and other miscellaneous items6 and that his total
expenses relevant to the case aggregate P34,300.00; that he
had informed Respondent of his address in Australia in letters
dated November 26, 1982. February 1, 1983 and June 5, 1983;
that Respondent has the financial means to reimburse
Complainant considering his present and former position; and
that he is prepared to withdraw his complaint if reimbursed by
Respondent in the amount of P34,300.00.
The facts, as disclosed, require no further evidentiary hearing,
and speak for themselves. Res ipsa loquitur. The Orders of the
'Trial Court dismissing Civil Case No. 181-P are of record and
Respondent's excuse that he can no longer recall them is
feeble. Respondent's side has been fully heard in the pleadings
he has filed before this Court. A trial-type hearing is not de
riqueur. The requirement of due process has been duly
satisfied. What due process abhors is absolute lack of
opportunity to be heard.7
Contrary to Respondent's claim, the lack of verification in the
Complaint formulated by the Bar Confident, as required by
Sec. 1, Rule 139 of the Rules of Court, is not a fatal defect
since the original letter-complaint, which was forwarded to
this Court by the Chief Legal Officer, Ministry of Tourism,
had been sworn and subscribed to by Complainant before the
Bar Confidant.
Respondent is guilty of grave professional misconduct. He
received from Complainant, his client, compensation to handle
his case in the Trial Court, but the same was dismissed for
lack of interest and failure to prosecute. He had abandoned his
client in violation of his contract ignoring the most elementary
principles of professional ethics.8 That Respondent had
ignored the processes of this Court and it was only after he
was suspended from the practice of law that he surfaced, is
highly indicative of his disregard of an attorney's duties to the
Court. All the facts and circumstances taken into
consideration, Respondent has proven himself unworthy of the
trust reposed in him by law as an officer of the Court.
Consistent with the policy to maintain the high
traditions and standards of the legal profession,
insure the observance of legal ethics, protect the
interests of clients and help keep their faith in
attorney's-at-law, the Supreme Court is constrained to
disbar a member of the bar who violates his lawyer's
oath for failure to properly attend to a client's case
not only once, but on two occasions, with results
highly prejudicial to the interest of the latter.9
Furthermore, since Complainant's rights as Respondent's client
have been prejudiced by the latter's failure to take the steps
necessary for the prosecution of the case Complainant may
recover as a result of such gross negligence and grave
professional misconduct.10
If a judgment is obtained against a party upon a
complaint which is radically defective, and he desires
to appeal, and procedures bondsmen, but his attorney
neglects to do so until the time for appeal expires, the
attorney is guilty of gross negligence, and is liable for
the loss sustained by the client.11
ACCORDINGLY, for malpractice and violation of his oath as
a lawyer, 1) respondent Atty. Patricio A. Asoy is hereby
ordered DISBARRED; and 2) he is hereby ordered to
reimburse complainant, Leonard W. Richards, in the sum of
P16,300.00 (P15,000.00 + P1,300.00), the only sums
substantiated by the evidence on record,12 within thirty (30)
days from notice hereof.
Copies of this Resolution shall be circulated to all Courts of
the country and spread on the personal record of respondent
Atty. Patricio A. Asoy.
Copy of this Resolution shall likewise be furnished
Complainant Leonard W. Richards, via airmail, at his address
of record, 4/169 Avoca Street, Randwick NSW 2031,
Australia, with copy furnished the Department of Foreign
Affairs for onward transmittal to the Philippine Consulate
General, Sydney, Australia.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-83882 January 24, 1989
IN RE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF WILLIE
YU, petitioner,
vs.
MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, BIENVENIDO P.
ALANO, JR., MAJOR PABALAN, DELEO HERNANDEZ,
BLODDY HERNANDEZ, BENNY REYES and JUN
ESPIRITU SANTO, respondent.
Pelaez, Adriano and Gregorio and Bonifacio A. Alentajan for
petitioner.
Chavez, Hechanova & Lim Law Offices collaborating counsel
for petitioner.
Augusto Jose y. Arreza for respondents.
PADILLA, J.:
The present controversy originated with a petition for habeas
corpus filed with the Court on 4 July 1988 seeking the release
from detention of herein petitioner. 1 After manifestation and
motion of the Solicitor General of his decision to refrain from
filing a return of the writ on behalf of the CID, respondent
Commissioner thru counsel filed the return. 2Counsel for the
parties were heard in oral argument on 20 July 1988. The
parties were allowed to submit marked exhibits, and to file
memoranda. 3 An internal resolution of 7 November 1988
referred the case to the Court en banc. In its 10 November
1988 resolution, denying the petition for habeas corpus, the
Court disposed of the pending issues of (1) jurisdiction of the
CID over a naturalized Filipino citizen and (2) validity of
warrantless arrest and detention of the same person.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration with prayer for
restraining order dated 24 November 1988. 4 On 29 November
1988, the Court resolved to deny with finality the aforesaid
motion for reconsideration, and further resolved to deny the
urgent motion for issuance of a restraining order dated 28
November 1988. 5
Undaunted, petitioner filed a motion for clarification with
prayer for restraining order on 5 December 1988.
Acting on said motion, a temporary restraining order was
issued by the Court on 7 December 1988. 6 Respondent
Commissioner filed a motion to lift TRO on 13 December
1988, the basis of which is a summary judgment of
deportation against Yu issued by the CID Board of
Commissioners on 2 December 1988. 7 Petitioner also filed a
motion to set case for oral argument on 8 December 1988.
In the meantime, an urgent motion for release from arbitrary
detention 8 was filed by petitioner on 13 December 1988. A
memorandum in furtherance of said motion for release dated
14 December 1988 was filed on 15 December 1988 together
with a vigorous opposition to the lifting of the TRO.
The lifting of the Temporary Restraining Order issued by the
Court on 7 December 1988 is urgently sought by respondent
Commissioner who was ordered to cease and desist from
immediately deporting petitioner Yu pending the conclusion
of hearings before the Board of Special Inquiry, CID. To
finally dispose of the case, the Court will likewise rule on
petitioner's motion for clarification with prayer for restraining
order dated 5 December 1988, 9 urgent motion for release
from arbitrary detention dated 13 December 1988, 10 the
memorandum in furtherance of said motion for release dated
14 December 1988, 11 motion to set case for oral argument
dated 8 December 1988. 12
Acting on the motion to lift the temporary restraining order
(issued on 7 December 1988) dated 9 December 1988, 13 and
the vigorous opposition to lift restraining order dated 15
December 1988, 14 the Court resolved to give petitioner Yu a
non-extendible period of three (3) days from notice within
which to explain and prove why he should still be considered a
citizen of the Philippines despite his acquisition and use of a
Portuguese passport. 15
Petitioner filed his compliance with the resolution of 15
December 1988 on 20 December 1988 16 followed by an
earnest request for temporary release on 22 December 1988.
Respondent filed on 2 January 1989 her comment reiterating
her previous motion to lift temporary restraining order.
Petitioner filed a reply thereto on 6 January 1989.
Petitioner's own compliance reveals that he was originally
issued a Portuguese passport in 1971, 17 valid for five (5) years
and renewed for the same period upon presentment before the
proper Portuguese consular officer. Despite his naturalization
as a Philippine citizen on 10 February 1978, on 21 July 1981,
petitioner applied for and was issued Portuguese Passport No.
35/81 serial N. 1517410 by the Consular Section of the
Portuguese Embassy in Tokyo. Said Consular Office certifies
that his Portuguese passport expired on 20 July 1986. 18 While
still a citizen of the Philippines who had renounced, upon his
naturalization, "absolutely and forever all allegiance and
fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state or sovereignty"
and pledged to "maintain true faith and allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines," 19 he declared his nationality as
Portuguese in commercial documents he signed, specifically,
the Companies registry of Tai Shun Estate Ltd. 20 filed in
Hongkong sometime in April 1980.
To the mind of the Court, the foregoing acts considered
together constitute an express renunciation of petitioner's
Philippine citizenship acquired through naturalization.
In Board of Immigration Commissioners us, Go
Gallano, 21express renunciation was held to mean a
renunciation that is made known distinctly and explicitly and
not left to inference or implication. Petitioner, with full
knowledge, and legal capacity, after having renounced
Portuguese citizenship upon naturalization as a Philippine
citizen 22 resumed or reacquired his prior status as a
Portuguese citizen, applied for a renewal of his Portuguese
passport 23 and represented himself as such in official
documents even after he had become a naturalized Philippine
citizen. Such resumption or reacquisition of Portuguese
citizenship is grossly inconsistent with his maintenance of
Philippine citizenship.
This Court issued the aforementioned TRO pending hearings
with the Board of Special Inquiry, CID. However, pleadings
submitted before this Court after the issuance of said TRO
have unequivocally shown that petitioner has expressly
renounced his Philippine citizenship. The material facts are
not only established by the pleadings — they are not disputed
by petitioner. A rehearing on this point with the CID would be
unnecessary and superfluous. Denial, if any, of due process
was obviated when petitioner was given by the Court the
opportunity to show proof of continued Philippine citizenship,
but he has failed.
While normally the question of whether or not a person has
renounced his Philippine citizenship should be heard before a
trial court of law in adversary proceedings, this has become
unnecessary as this Court, no less, upon the insistence of
petitioner, had to look into the facts and satisfy itself on
whether or not petitioner's claim to continued Philippine
citizenship is meritorious.
Philippine citizenship, it must be stressed, is not a commodity
or were to be displayed when required and suppressed when
convenient. This then resolves adverse to the petitioner his
motion for clarification and other motions mentioned in the
second paragraph, page 3 of this Decision.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, petitioner's motion for
release from detention is DENIED. Respondent's motion to lift
the temporary restraining order is GRANTED. This Decision
is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-58058 January 30, 1982
SANTIAGO MENDOZA, CARMEN URBANO, MANUELA
URBANO, RENATO DE GUZMAN, RAQUEL DE
GUZMAN, ROSETTE DE GUZMAN, and ROMEO DE
GUZMAN, petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY and ANGELITO
LAZARO, respondents.
CONCEPCION JR., J.:
Petition for prohibition, with a prayer for the issuance of a writ
of preliminary injunction and/or restraining order, to restrain
the respondents from the threatened demolition of the
petitioners' houses situated in Barangay Tatalon, Quezon City;
and to declare Presidential Decree No. 1472 unconstitutional.
There is no dispute as to the material facts. The petitioners are
occupants of certain portions of the Tatalon Estate in Quezon
City. The petitioner Santiago Mendoza claims ownership over
a portion with an area of 8.5 hectares which he acquired from
the DEUDORS, as evidenced by an AGREEMENT entered
into by him and Hilario M. Andaya, Valente M. Andaya, and
Calixta M. Andaya on December 4, 1969, 1 while the
petitioners Carmen Urbano and Manuela Urbano claim title to
a portion with an area of 1,500 sq.m. by virtue of a contract,
dated May 4, 1951, and denominated DEED OF TRANSFER
OF RIGHTS TO, INTERESTS IN AND POSSESSION OF A
RESIDENTIAL LOT entered into by them and Tomasa F. de
Salanga 2 who, in turn, acquired the property from Pedro
Deudor on March 2, 1949. 3 The petitioners Renato, Raquel,
Rosette, and Romeo, all surnamed de Guzman, upon the other
hand, are claiming title over a portion with an area of 1,700
sq.m. which they inherited from their father Serafin de
Guzman, who also acquired it from Tomasa F. de Salanga on
September 6, 1957. 4 The lot is part of the land which Tomasa
F. de Salanga acquired from Pedro Deudor on March 2,
1949. 5
On August 3, 1959, Republic Act No. 2616, which authorized
"the expropriation of the Tatalon Estate jointly owned by the
J.M. Tuason and Company, Inc., Gregorio Araneta and
Company, Inc., and Florencio Deudor, et al.," for subdivision
into small lots and its resale al cost to the bona fide occupants
thereof, took effect without executive approval. Thereafter, the
Land Tenure Administration was directed to institute the
proceeding for the expropriation of the Tatalon Estate. But,
before the complaint for eminent domain could be filed, the
J.M. Tuason and Company, Inc., claiming to be the owner of
the Tatalon Estate which was sought to be condemned, filed
an action with the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon
City Branch, for prohibition with preliminary injunction
against the Land Tenure Administration, praying that Republic
Act No. 2616 be declared unconstitutional, seeking in the
meanwhile a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the
Land Tenure Administration from instituting such
expropriation proceeding, thereafter to be made permanent
after trial. After trial, the lower court promulgated its decision
holding that Republic Act No. 2616 is unconstitutional and
granting the writ of prohibition prayed for. Upon appeal,
however, this Court reversed the decision of the lower court
and denied the petition for prohibition. 6
On October 27, 1972, the President of the Philippines, by
Letter of Instruction No. 34, issued pursuant to Proclamation
No. 1081, directed the People's Homesite and Housing
Corporation "to take immediate steps towards the acquisition
of the Tatalon Estate located at Quezon City, in its entirety or
so much thereof as may be necessary for the purposes stated in
Republic Act No. 2616, by negotiation with the known and
registered owner or owners thereof or, should this be not
feasible, by expropriation pursuant to the aforesaid law." In
compliance therewith, the People's Homesite and Housing
Corporation, representing the Republic of the Philippines,
filed a complaint on January 23, 1973, with the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch, docketed therein as
Civil Case No. Q-17334, for the condemnation of the Tatalon
Estate covered by TCT No. 42774 and TCT No. 49235. 7
Upon a survey of the property to be condemned, it was
discovered that the J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. had disposed for a
substantial portion of the Tatalon Estate and only a portion,
with an area of about 25.26 hectares, out of the 109 hectares
originally comprising the Estate as appearing in the
certificates of title covering the land, TCT No. 42774 and TCT
No. 49235, remained unsold. It was also found that a portion
of the Estate with an area of about 8.1317 sq.m. was covered
by another certificate of title - TCT No. 142624. In view
thereof, the President of the Philippines issued Presidential
Decree No. 1261 on December 12, 1977, directing the
expropriation of a portion of the Tatalon Estate with an area of
25.26 hectares and designated the National Housing Authority,
which had been created not only to take over the functions of
the People's Homesite and Housing Corporation, but also to
develop and implement programs to provide housing for the
greatest number of the people, 8 as the administrator of the
Tatalon Estate Housing Project. The decree also provided
guidelines for the development of the Tatalon Estate, as well
as for the allocation of the lots to the bona fide occupants
thereof, as follows:
SECTION 3. Allocation of lots and/or
housing units in the project area shall be
made by the Authority according to the
following priority:
1. Present occupants who were listed in the
1958 Araneta Census List of Occupants;
development in some portion," so that, the
defendant is entitled only to a net total SUM
OF TWENTY SEVEN MILLION EIGHT
HUNDRED EIGHTY EIGHT THOUSAND
NINE HUNDRED FIFTY FIVE & 50/100
(P27,888,955.50) PESOS, as just
compensation.
2. That the total sum of TWENTY SEVEN
MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED EIGHTY
EIGHT THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED
FIFTY FIVE & 50/100 (P27,888,955.50)
PESOS shall be paid as follows:

2. Present occupants as determined by the a) The amount of FIVE

Authority in its 1976 Census Survey; and MILLION FIVE
HUNDRED SEVENTY
3. Squatter families in the Tatalon Estate SEVEN THOUSAND
after the 1976 Census Survey. SEVEN HUNDRED
NINETY ONE & 10/100
(5,577,791.10) PESOS
In the event that the number of homelots in shall be paid upon signing
the expropriated area is not sufficient to of the Compromise
accommodate all families falling under the Agreement.
foregoing categories, the Authority shall
accommodate such excess families in any of
b) The balance of
its sites and services projects. 9
'TWENTY 'TWO
MILLION THREE
On July 28, 1978, the Republic of the Philippines, now HUNDRED ELEVEN
represented by the National Housing Authority, and the J.M. THOUSAND ONE
Tuason and Co., Inc. submitted a Compromise Agreement to HUNDRED SIXTY
the trial court and prayed that judgment be rendered in FOUR & 40/100
accordance therewith; 10 and on September 15, 1978, the trial (P22,311,164.40) PESOS
court promulgated its decision, approving the compromise shag be paid in four yearly
agreement and enjoining the parties to strictly follow the terms equal installment of FIVE
and conditions thereof, as follows: MILLION FIVE
HUNDRED SEVENTY
Parties have submitted to this Court a joint SEVEN THOUSAND
Compromise Agreement the terms of which SEVEN HUNDRED
are quoted as follows: NINETY ONE & 10/100
(P5,577,791.10) PESOS,
1. That the plaintiff Republic of the without interest, as
Philippines, represented herein by the follows:
National Housing Authority and the
defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. have lst Installment on or before May 15, 1979;
agreed conformably with Sec. 7 of P.D.
1261 that the just compensation for the 2nd Installment on or before May 15, 1980;
expropriation of the 25.26 hectares portion
of the Tatalon Estate, subject matter of the
above entitled case is THIRTY NINE 3rd Installment on or before May 15, 1981;
MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FORTY
ONE THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED 4th Installment on or before May 15,1982.
SIXTY FIVE (P39,841,365.00) PESOS, the
owner's declared value as of 1973 pursuant 3. That the defendant warrants and
to P.D. No. 76, less the amount of ELEVEN guarantees its absolute titles to the aforesaid
MILLION NINE HUNDRED FIFTY TWO properties expropriated, free from all aliens
THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED NINE & and encumbrances; that for and in
50/100 (P11,952,409.50) PESOS, consideration of the foregoing payments, the
representing 30% of the aforesaid declared defendant has consented and agreed that
market value "to account for the prevalence titles to the parcels of land listed in Annex
of squatters in the area and for the lack of "A" of the Compromise Agreement totalling
 25.26 hectares which are covered by its TCT
Nos. 49235, 42774 and 142624 of the
Register of Deeds of Quezon City and
subject matter of this expropriation
proceedings, be vested in the National
Housing Authority;
4. That the defendant herein has accepted, as
it hereby accepts and/or has waived and
renounced, as it hereby waives and
renounces, any and all rights, if any, to
impugn or question the validity of P.D. No.
1261 promulgated on the 5th day of
December, 1977 "AMENDING REPUBLIC
ACT NO. 2616, PROVIDING
ADDITIONAL FUNDS FOR THE
ACQUISITION OF THE TATALON
ESTATE AND DESIGNATING THE
NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY AS
THE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE
TATALON ESTATE HOUSING
AUTHORITY."
5. That the expropriation or condemnation
of the 25.26 hectares portion of the Tatalon
Estate subject of this expropriation Civil
Case No. Q-17334 pending before this Court
as mandated by Sec. 1 of P.D. No. 1261 be
judicially declared and confirmed by this
Honorable Court subject to the preceding
paragraphs.
WHEREFORE, the Compromise
Agreement, being not contrary to law,
morals, good customs, public order or public
policy, is hereby approved, and judgment is
hereby rendered accordingly without costs.
declaring defendant's Tatalon Estate
comprising of the parcels of land listed in
Annex "A" of the Compromise Agreement
and covered by TCT Nos. 49435, 42774 and
142624 of the Register of Deeds of Quezon
City as expropriated and condemned as
mandated by P.D. No. 1261; and ordering
the cancellation from the aforesaid Transfer
Certificates of Titles the parcels of land
enumerated in Annex "A" and the issuance
of the corresponding Transfer Certificate of
Titles in the name of the National Housing
Authority.
The parties are enjoined to strictly follow
the terms and conditions of the said
agreement. 11
Meanwhile, on June 11, 1978, the President of the Philippines
issued Presidential Decree No. 1472, authorizing the National
Housing Authority to summarily eject any and all squatters
from government resettlement projects without the necessity
of a judicial order.
Sec. 2. The National Housing Authority
shall have the power to summarily eject,
without the necessity of judicial order, any
and all squatters from squatters' colonies of
government resettlement projects, as well as,
any illegal occupant in any homelot
apartment or dwelling unit owned or
administered by it. In the exercise of such
power, the National Housing Authority shall
have the right and authority to request the
help of the Barangay Chairman and any
peace officer in the locality. Illegal occupant
as used in this Decree shall mean to include
those awardees or lessees whose right to
occupy or lease the subject homelot
apartment or dwelling unit has already
ceased by reason of his violation of the
conditions of his award or lease agreement
executed in his favor by the National
Housing Authority or its predecessors-in-
interest. In all these cases, however, proper
notice of ejectment either by personal
service or by posting the same in the lot or
door of the apartment as the case may be
shall be given to the squatter or illegal
occupant concerned as the case may be at
least 10 days before his scheduled ejectment
from the premises. The Provisions of
Section 2 of Republic Act No. 6026 that no
awardee shall be ejected unless he is
transferred to another housing project or to
his hometown with the assistance of the
Department of Social Welfare is hereby
repealed. 12
Thereafter, on May 8, 1980, the President of the Philippines,
in line with the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1517,
which declared the entire Metropolitan Manila Area as an
Urban Land Reform Zone, issued Proclamation No. 1967,
proclaiming 244 sites in Metropolitan Manila, described in an
annex appended thereto as "Areas for Priority Development
and Urban Land Reform Zones. 13 One of the sites mentioned
is "An area within Tatalon Estates, Bounded by Kaliraya
Street on the North; Kabignayan, Manungal, Kitanlad and
Araneta Streets on the Southwest, and Botolan Transmission
lines on the Southeast. 14 It is indicated in the sketch as that
portion shaded in yellow. 15
On January 27, 1981, the National Housing Authority wrote
the petitioner Manuela Urbano, informing her that her request
for inclusion in the list of Tatalon Estate beneficiaries could
not be favorably considered, not even for lot allocation under
the third priority mentioned in Presidential Decree No. 1261,
for being an absentee structure owner, and demanding that she
demolish her structure built on Lot Nos. 16 and 18, Block 523
of the Tatalon Estate and vacate the premises within 15 days
from receipt thereof, otherwise, the National Housing
Authority would summarily demolish her structure after the
expiration of the period without further notice. 16 The said
petitioner sought a reconsideration of the order of demolition
and the National Housing Authority, in a letter to Carmen and
Manuela Urbano, dated June 2, 1981, informed them that
"after a careful re-evaluation of the records of (their) petition
as well as the records in the Project Office," they may now "be
considered for allocation under the third priority of the
squatter families in Tatalon Estate after the 1976 Census
Survey established in Section 3, Par. 3 of P.D. 1261." The
reconsideration, however, did not in any way alter the standing
order of demolition of their structures in the lots occupied by
them. 17
In a letter, dated June 5, 1981, the National Housing Authority
also informed the herein petitioners Romeo de Guzman and
Renato de Guzman "that after careful and judicious evaluation
of the records of (their) petition, as well as the records
available in the Project Office, (the) Authority finds no ground
to justify a reversal of its previous decision and that (their)
petition for lot allocation under P.D. 1261, is denied for lack
of merit." "The decision, therefore, declaring (them) as
absentee structure owners, denying (their) petition for
inclusion in the 1976 Census List of bona fide residents of
Tatalon Estate and ordering (them) to demolish (their)
structure on the subject lot stands as ordered without any
further notice. The National Housing Authority, however,
offered to buy the structure in Lot 18 of Block 523 at a price
to be determined by it in order to avoid economic waste, but
that if the owner was not willing to sell the structure, he
should demolish the same within 10 days from notice,
otherwise the National Housing Authority would summarily
demolish the same without further notice. 18
In a letter dated August 27, 1981, the National Housing
Authority also ordered the petitioner Santiago Mendoza, "to
demolish the illegal extension of (his) structure located at
Block 6, Lot 12, ERC-A, Tatalon Estate which encroaches to
the adjacent lot boundaries and pose obstruction/delay in the
allocation process", within 10 days from receipt thereof,
otherwise the National Housing Authority would summarily
demolish the illegal construction after the expiration of the
period without further notice. 19
In view of this treatened demolition of their houses, the
petitioners have filed the present recourse.
The petitioners contend that the enforcement of Presidential
Decree No. 1472 against them. is illegal and unconstitutional
as it would deprive them of their property without due process
of law.
The petition is devoid of merit. To begin with, it is based upon
the premise that the petitioners are owners of the lots occupied
by them for having acquired them from DEUDORS, which is
false, since the property occupied by them belong to the
Republic of the Philippines after the expropriation proceedings
made pursuant to Republic Act No. 2616, the administration
and control of which had been entrusted to respondent
National Housing Authority under Presidential Decree No.
1261, issued on December 12, 1977. As a matter of fact, the
petitioners Manuela Urbano, Carmen Urbano, Renato de
Guzman, and Romeo de Guzman had admitted the title of the
Government over said lots when they applied for inclusion in
the list of "Tatalon Estate beneficiaries. 20 Besides, the land is
registered in the name of the Government and its title thereto
had become indefeasible. The petitioners, having actual
knowledge of the expropriation of the Tatalon Estate, ,should
have vindicated their claim of ownership to the land claimed
by them in the expropriation proceedings, as intimated by the
Court in the case of J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Land Tenure
Administration. 21 The then Justice, now Chief Justice of the
Philippines Enrique M. Fernando, speaking for the Court, said:
xxx xxx xxx
7. The other points raised may be briefly
disposed of. Much is made of what the
lower court considered to be the inaccuracy
apparent on the face of the challenged
statute as to the ownership of the Tatalon
Estate. it could very wen be that Congress
ought to have taken greater pains to avoid
such imprecision. At any rate, the lower
court unduly would consider it a deprivation
of property without due process of law. Such
a fear is unwarranted. In the course of the
expropriation proceedings, there
undoubtedly would be a judicial
determination as to the party entitled to the
just compensation. As of now then, such a
question would appear at the very least to be
premature. Reference is likewise made as to
the effect of the authorized expropriation on
those purchasers of lots located in the
Tatalon Estate. Again, on the occasion of the
expropriation, whatever contractual rights
might, be possessed by vendors and vendees
could be asserted and accorded the
appropriate constitutional protection.
But petitioners failed to do so. They cannot therefore be said
to be deprived of property which is not legally theirs.
At any rate, Presidential Decree No. 1472 does not violate the
constitutional due process clause since it requires proper
notice of ejectment to the squatter or illegal occupant
concerned either by personal service or by posting the same in
the lot or door of the apartment as the case may be at least 10
days before his scheduled ejectment from the premises, which
has been amply complied with in the case of the petitioners.
Here, notices of ejectment were served upon the petitioners
after it had been determined that they are not "Tatalon Estate
beneficiaries" and, consequently, squatters on the land
occupied by them. 22 As squatters, they are a public nuisance
which can be abated even without judicial proceedings. 23
The claim of the petitioners that the National Housing
Authority has no jurisdiction over them since the lots occupied
by them "are outside the perimeter of the appropriate area of
the Tatalon Estate and are not also embraced under
Proclamation No. 1967", is utterly devoid of merit. The
complaint filed was for the expropriation of the Tatalon Estate
covered, among others, by TCT No. 42774. The said title
covers an area of about 757,946.30 square meters, more or
less, and more particularly described as follows:
 A parcel of land (boundary of plan Pcs-
3824, being the consolidation of Blocks
Nos. 235 to 241, Street Lots 4 to 9 and all of
plan Psd-36950 and Lot 4-B-3-C-2-B-2 of
plan Psd-18526, L.R.C. (G.L.R.). Record
No. 7681, situated in Quezon City. Bounded
on the NW, by Block 233 and Street Lot No.
10 of plan Psd-36950 and Lot 4-D-3-C-2C
of plan Psd -7576 (The Commonwealth of
the Philippines) on the NE. ' by the San Juan
River; on the E. by Lot 4-B-5 of plan Psd-
13540 (Manila Electric Co.); on the SE., by
Lot 4-B-5 of plan Psd-3640 (Manila Electric
Co.) and Blocks Nos. 232 and 231 and
Street Lot No. 13 of plan Psd-36950; on the
S. by Espana Extension and Block No. I of
plan Psd-12582 (Philippine Trust Co.) on
the SW. by Street Lot No. 2 of plan Psd-
18527 and Street Lot No. 10 of plan Psd-
26950; and on the W. by Block Nos. 229,
230, 231, 331, and 232 and Street Lots Nos.
1, 2, and 3 of plan Psd-36950, ... . 24
Street Lot No. 10 of plan Psd-36950 and Lot No. 4-D-3-C-2-C
of plan Psd-7576 (Commonwealth of the Philippines,
boundaries on the Northwest, are commonly called Banawe
Street and Quezon Boulevard Extension, respectively, while
Lot 4-B-5 of plan Psd-13540 (Manila Electric Co.) is known
as the Botolan Transmission Line. Referring to the plan, 25 the
parcel of land covered by TCT No. 42774 would, therefore, be
that circumscribed by Banawe Street, Quezon Boulevard
Extension, the San Francisco River (a branch of the San Juan
River), the Manila Electric Co. Transmission Line, and Espana
Extension. However, J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. had the property
subdivided under subdivision plan Psd-57920 and disposed of
a considerable portion thereof, such that of the original area of
the land of 757,946.30 sq.m., more or less, only a portion of
about 185,157.50 sq.m., more or less, was left unsold. These
unsold lots form part of the 25.26 hectares expropriated and
whose titles have been transferred to the Government pursuant
to the decision of the trial court of September 15,
1978. 26 Among these lots are Lot Nos. 16, 18, 20 of Block
523 and Block Nos. 527, 528, 529, 530, and 531. 27 Since the
petitioners admit that "the acquired residential lots of
petitioners DE GUZMAN and URBANO, are Identical to Lot
Nos. 16,18, and 20, Block 523 of the Tatalon Estate, while
that of SANTIAGO MENDOZA, is Identical to Blocks Nos.
527, 528, 529, 530, and 531 of the Tatalon Estate, it is beyond
question that the lots occupied or claimed by the petitioners
are among those expropriated by the Government. The fact
that the said lots are not included within the area proclaimed
for priority development under Proclamation No. 1967, dated
May 8, 1980, does not preclude the National Housing
Authority from exercising administrative control and
supervision over the disposition of said lots. The National
Housing Authority was created by virtue of Presidential
Decree No. 757, dated July 31, 1975, not only to take over the
functions of the People's Homesite and Housing Corporation,
but also to develop and implement housing programs, and was
expressly designated, under Presidential Decree No. 1261,
dated December 12, 1977, the Administrator for the national
government of the Tatalon Estate. Since the lots occupied or
claimed by the herein petitioners are, as previously stated.
within the Tatalon Estate, the National Housing Authority has
supervision and control over the disposition of the said lots.
WHEREFORE, the petition should be, as it is hereby,
DISMISSED. With costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Sumulong vs. Guerrero [No. L-48685,September 30, 1987]
Post under case digests, Political Law at Thursday, March 01,
2012 Posted by Schizophrenic Mind
Facts: On December 5, 1997 the National Housing Authority
(NHA) filed a complaint for expropriation of parcels of land for
the expansion of Bagong Nayon Hosing Project to provide
housing facilities to low-salaried government employees,
covering approximately twenty five (25) hectares in Antipolo,
Rizal. This included the lots of petitioners Lorenzo Sumulong
(6,667 sq.m.) and Emilia Vidanes-Balaoing (3,333 sq.m.). The
land sought to be expropriated were valued by the NHA at one
peso (P1.00) per square meter adopting the market value fixed
by the provincial assessor in accordance with presidential
decrees prescribing the valuation of property in expropriation
proceedings.
Together with the complaint was a motion for immediate
possession of the properties. The NHA deposited the amount of
P158,980.00 with the Phil. Nat’l Bank, representing the “total
market value” of the subject 25 ha. of land, pursuant to P.D. No.
1224 which defines “the policy on the expropriation of private
property for socialized housing upon payment of just
compensation.”
On January 17, 1978, respondent Judge Buenaventura S.
Guerrero issued a writ of possession pertaining to the subject
parcels of land. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration on
the ground that they had been deprived of the possession of their
property without due process of law. This was however, denied.
Hence, this petition challenging the orders of respondent Judge
and assailing the constitutionality of P.D. No. 1224,
as amended.
Petitioners contend that the taking of their property subsumed
under the topics of public use, just compensation, and due
process.
Issues:
(1) Whether “socialized housing” as defined in P.D. 1224,
asamended, for the purpose of condemnation proceedings is not
“public use” since it will benefit only “a handful of people,
bereft of public character,” hence it is not a valid exercise of the
State’s power of eminent domain.
(2) Whether NHA has the discretion to determine the size of the
property/properties to be expropriated.
(3) Whether P.D. 1224, as amended, allows unjust and unfair
valuations arbitrarily fixed by government assessors.
(4) Whether petitioners were denied due process because their
parcels of land were immediately possessed by the NHA by
virtue of the writ of possession ordered by the respondent
judge.
Held:
(1) P.D. 1224 defines “socialized housing” as,
“the construction of dwelling units for the middle and lower
class members of our society, including the construction of the
supporting infrastructure and other facilities.” The “public use”
requirement for a valid exercise of the power
of eminent domain is a flexible and evolving concept
influenced by changing conditions. The taking to be valid must
be for public use. As long as the purpose of the taking is public,
then the power of eminent domain comes into play. It is
accurate to state then that at present, whatever may be
beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the
requirement of public use. Ergo, “socialized housing” falls
within the confines of “public use.”
(2) The State acting through the NHA is vested with broad
discretion to designate the particular property/properties to be
taken for socialized housing purposes and how much thereof
may be expropriated. Absent a clear showing of fraud, bad faith,
or gross abuse of discretion, which petitioners failed to
demonstrate, theCourt will give due weight to and leave
undisturbed the NHA’s choice and the size of the site for the
project. The right to use, enjoyment and disposal of private
property is tempered by and has to yield to the demands of
the common good.
(3) Yes. The provisions on just compensation found in
Presidential Decrees No. 1224, 1259, and 1313 are the same
provisions found in P.D. No.’s 76, 464, 794, and 1533 which
were declaredunconstitutional for being encroachments on
judicial prerogative. Just compensation means the value of the
property at the time of the taking. It means a fair and full
equivalent for the loss sustained. Tax values can serve as guides
but cannot be absolute substitute for just compensation.
(4) Yes. The petitioners were denied of due process. P.D. 1224,
asamended, violates procedural due process as it allows
immediate taking of possession, control and disposition of
property without giving the owner his day in court. Respondent
Judge ordered the issuance of a writ of possession without
notice and without hearing.
Arsenio Lumiqued vs Apolonio Exevea
282 SCRA 125 (89 SCAD 151) – Political Law –
Constitutional Law – Due Process; Administrative Bodies –
Assistance by Counsel
Law on Public Officers – Right to Due Process – Public Office
is Not a Property
Arsenio Lumiqued was the Regional Director of DAR-CAR.
He was charged by Jeannette Zamudio, the Regional Cashier,
for dishonesty due to questionable gas expenses under his
office. It was alleged that he was falsifying gas receipts for
reimbursements and that he had an unliquidated cash advance
worth P116,000.00. Zamudio also complained that she was
unjustly removed by Lumiqued two weeks after she filed the
two complaints. The issue was referred to the DOJ. Committee
hearings on the complaints were conducted on July 3 and 10,
1992, but Lumiqued was not assisted by counsel. On the second
hearing date, he moved for its resetting to July 17, 1992, to
enable him to employ the services of counsel. The committee
granted the motion, but neither Lumiqued nor his counsel
appeared on the date he himself had chosen, so the committee
deemed the case submitted for resolution. The Investigating
Committee recommended the dismissal of Lumiqued. DOJ Sec
Drilon adopted the recommendation. Fidel Ramos issued AO
52 dismissing Lumiqued.
Lumiqued appealed averring that his right to due process was
violated as well as his right to security of tenure.
ISSUE: Does the due process clause encompass the right to be
assisted by counsel during an administrative inquiry?
HELD: No. The right to counsel, which cannot be waived
unless the waiver is in writing and in the presence of counsel, is
a right afforded a suspect or an accused during custodial
investigation. It is not an absolute right and may, thus, be
invoked or rejected in a criminal proceeding and, with more
reason, in an administrative inquiry. In the case at bar,
Lumiqued invoked the right of an accused in criminal
proceedings to have competent and independent counsel of his
own choice. Lumiqued, however, was not accused of any crime.
The investigation conducted by the committee was for the
purpose of determining if he could be held administratively
liable under the law for the complaints filed against him. The
right to counsel is not indispensable to due process unless
required by the Constitution or the law.
“. . . There is nothing in the Constitution that says that a party
in a non-criminal proceeding is entitled to be represented by
counsel and that, without such representation, he shall not be
bound by such proceedings. The assistance of lawyers, while
desirable, is not indispensable. The legal profession was not
engrafted in the due process clause such that without the
participation of its members, the safeguard is deemed ignored
or violated. The ordinary citizen is not that helpless that he
cannot validly act at all except only with a lawyer at his side.”
In administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is
simply the opportunity to explain one’s side. Whatever
irregularity attended the proceedings conducted by the
committee was cured by Lumiqued’s appeal and his subsequent
filing of motions for reconsideration.
The Supreme Court also emphasized that the constitutional
provision on due process safeguards life, liberty and property.
Public office is a public trust. It is not a property guaranteed of
due process. But when the dispute concerns one’s constitutional
right to security of tenure, however, public office is deemed
analogous to property in a limited sense; hence, the right to due
process could rightfully be invoked. Nonetheless, the right to
security of tenure is not absolute especially when it was proven,
as in this case, that the public officer (Lumiqued) did not live
up to the Constitutional precept i.e., that all public officers and
employees must serve with responsibility, integrity, loyalty and
efficiency.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 120223. March 13, 1996.]
DR. RAMON Y. ALBA, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE
DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN, CESAR Y.
NITORREDA, et al., respondents.
RESOLUTION
FRANCISCO, J.:
The instant motion for reconsideration has its origin in an
administrative case (OBM-MIN-ADM-94-059) filed with the
Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao by private respondents
Jesiela Antiporta and Aida Salmeo against petitioner Dr.
Ramon Y. Alba in his capacity as Director III of the Department
of Education Culture and Sports (DECS) accusing the latter of
violating certain provisions of the Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards For Public Official and Employees (R.A. 6713).
The facts are as follows:
Private respondents were among the twenty
five (25) graduating students of the Arriesgado Institute of
Medical Sciences Foundation, Inc. (AIMSFI) in Tagum, Davao
who sought the intervention of petitioner in settling a dispute
with the said school arising from the implementation of certain
school policies. Acting on the request for intervention,
petitioner scheduled a meeting with the students on March 20,
1994 at 8:30 in the morning. Thus, on the said date, private
respondents and the other complaining students travelled all the
way from Tagum, Davao to the DECS Office in Davao
City. Their presence in the said office was duly noted by DECS
Administrative Officer V, Aquilina Granada who advised them
that petitioner will forthwith meet with them. However, instead
of conferring with the aggrieved students, petitioner instead met
with the Arriesgado spouses-owners of AIMSFI - who
admittedly did not even have a previous appointment with
petitioner with the result that the students were left waiting at
the anteroom for several hours. In view of this apparent
discrimination, the students contacted respondent Deputy
Ombudsman for Mindanao, Cesar E. Nitorreda who was
impelled to proceed to the DECS Office to admonish petitioner
for not conferring with both parties at the same time in order to
hear both sides of the controversy. Thereafter, petitioner
presided over the conference between the Arriesgados and the
aggrieved students.
On March 29, 1994, petitioner submitted to the Office of
the Ombudsman for Mindanao (Office of the Ombudsman), a
report on the said conference wherein he claimed that he had
succeeded in facilitating an amicable settlement between the
parties. However, petitioners claim of having settled the dispute
between the Arriesgados and the complaining students is belied
by private respondents affidavit-complaint[1] attesting to the
fact that as a result of the said dispute, they were barred from
taking the final examinations and participating in the graduation
rites. In the same affidavit complaint, private respondents
pointed out petitioners evident bias and partiality in favor of the
Arriesgados in the conduct of the conference held on March 20,
1994. Petitioner denied the said charges in his counter-
affidavit[2] and justified his actuations by posturing that the
reason why he decided to talk to the school owner first was to
thresh out the complaints of the students in order to have a
complete view of the situation before talking jointly with the
student and the owner of the school.[3] Petitioner also theorized
that private respondents were not allowed to take the final
examinations and participate in the graduation rites due to their
failure to settle their obligations with the school and/or x x x
pass their academic subjects x x x.[4] However, in a rejoinder
filed by petitioner, he averred that after inquiry from AIMSFI,
he was informed that private respondents taking of the final
examinations and their graduation were conditioned upon their
withdrawal of the complaint filed against petitioner with the
Office of the Ombudsman.[5]
After both parties failed to attend the preliminary
conference scheduled by the Graft Investigating Officer
assigned to the case, a resolution dated April 28, 1995 was
rendered by the Office of the Ombudsman finding petitioner
guilty of violating Section 4(b), (c) and (e) of R.A.
6713[6] holding as follows:
There is no denying that respondent Director Alba was partial
to the AIMSFI school owners and acted against the interest of
the complainants. Complaints averments were confirmed by
the school itself, thru School Principal Ma. Clara Arriesgado,
that the complaining student were not allowed to take the final
examination until and unless they agree to the withdrawal of
the case they filed in this Office against herein respondent
Assistant Regional Director. Clearly, respondent and the
school jointly coerced the students to submit to such an illegal,
improper and immoral demand. Respondent did not comport
himself in accordance with justness, sincerity and
professionalism required by the Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards of Public Officers and Employees (R.A. 6713). [7]
For such gross misconduct, petitioner was meted a
suspension of thirty (30) days without pay and warned that any
other instance of non-observance of the Code of Conduct will
result in graver punishment.[8]
When petitioners motion for reconsideration of the
foregoing resolution was denied, he filed an Appeal/Petition for
Certiorari and/or Prohibition With Prayer for Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Prohibitory
Injunction (petition) with this Court. In a Resolution dated June
27, 1995, the said petition was dismissed on the ground that it
was moot and academic because the questioned suspension of
petitioner which was effective from May 26, 1995 to June 24,
1995 had already expired or became functus oficio on June 28,
1995 when the petition was filed. Alleging, first and foremost,
a misreading of the correct date of filing of the petition,
petitioner filed the instant motion for reconsideration of the
dismissal of the said petition. A closer scrutiny of the records
shows that the petition was indeed filed on June 2, 1995 and not
on June 28 as initially deciphered by this Court from the
misleading sequence of numbers on the stamp of receipt, that
is, JUN 2 8 28 PM 95. Thus, as correctly averred by petitioner,
at the time of the filing of the petition on June 2, 1995, there
were still a good twenty two (22) days left of the suspension
imposed on him. Consequently, we set aside our original
finding that the petition is moot and academic.
With that error rectified, it is now incumbent upon this
Court to resolve the following issues raised in the petition to the
end that the latter may be finally disposed of on its merits.
(A) Whether or not Section 27 of R.A. 6770 (otherwise
known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989) which states:
xxx xxx xxx.
Findings of fact by the Office of the Ombudsman when
supported by substantial evidence are conclusive. Any order,
directive or decision imposing the penalty of public censure or
reprimand, suspension of not more than one months salary
(sic) shall be final and unappealable.
and Section 7, Rule III, of Administrative Order No. 07, date
April 10, 1990 (otherwise known as the RULES OF
PROCEDURE OF THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN x
x x), which states:
Section 7. Finality of decision. - Where the respondent is
absolved of the charged (sic) and in case of conviction where
the penalty imposed is public censure or reprimand,
suspension of not more than one month, or a fine equivalent to
one month salary, the decision shall be final and
unappealable. In all other cases, the decision shall become
final after the expiration of ten (10) days from receipt thereof
by the respondent, unless a motion for reconsideration or
petition for certiorari shall have been filed by him as
prescribed in Section 27 of RA 6770.
are valid or constitutional, or constitute an undue curtailment
or deprivation of Petitioners right to DUE PROCESS and a
denial of his constitutional right to property.[9]
and
(b) Whether or not the thirty (30)-day suspension of Petitioner,
without pay and unappealable, imposed by herein respondent
DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN for MINDANAO, Cesar E.
Nitorreda, was in accordance with a valid or constitutional
law/legislation and/or in accordance with due process,
supported by substantial evidence and is not arbitrary,
whimsical and a grave abuse of discretion or authority on the
part of said Nitorreda.[10]
Petitioner assails the constitutionality of Section 27 of
R.A. 6770 and Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No.7
for their failure to provide for the right of appeal in certain cases
from the decision of the Ombudsman, maintaining that the same
is tantamount to a deprivation of property without due process
of law. As regards this threshold matter, suffice it to say that
this Court has consistently held that:
The right to appeal is not a natural right nor a part of due
process; it is merely a statutory privilege, and may be
exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the
provisions of the law.[11]
Apparently, therefore, the constitutional requirement of
due process may be satisfied notwithstanding the denial of the
right to appeal for the essence of due process is simply the
opportunity to be heard and to present evidence in support of
ones case.[12]
The Office of the Ombudsman is vested by law with the
power to promulgate its own rules of procedure, [13] and a
perusal of the said rules of procedure in administrative cases
manifest sufficient compliance with the requirements of due
process. Thus,
Sec. 5. Administrative Adjudication; How Conducted. -
a) If the complaint is not dismissed for any of the causes
enumerated in Section 20 of Republic Act No. 6770, the
respondent shall be furnished with copy of the affidavits and
other evidences submitted by the complainant, and shall be
ordered to file his counter-affidavits and other evidences in
support of his defense, within ten (10) days from receipt
thereof, together with proof of service of the same on the
complainant who may file reply affidavits within ten (10) days
from receipt of the counter affidavits of the respondent.
b) If, on the basis of the affidavits and other evidences
submitted by the parties, the investigating officer finds no
sufficient cause to warrant further proceedings, the complaint
may be dismissed. Otherwise, he shall summon the parties to a
preliminary conference to consider the following matters:
1) Whether the parties desire a formal investigation or are
willing to submit the case for resolution on the basis of the
evidence on record and such other evidences they will present
at such conference;
2) Should the parties desire a formal investigation to
determine the nature of the charge, stipulation of facts, a
definition of the issues, identification and marking of exhibits,
limitation of witness and such other matters as would expedite
the proceedings;
c) After the preliminary conference, the investigating officer
shall issue an order reciting the matters taken up during the
conference, including the facts stipulated, the evidence marked
and the issues involved. The contents of this order may not be
deviated from unless amended to prevent manifest injustice.
d) Should hearing be conducted, the parties shall be notified at
least five (5) days before the date thereof. Failure of any or
both of the parties to appear at the hearing is not necessarily a
cause for the dismissal of the complaint. A party who appears
may be allowed to present his evidence in the absence of the
adverse party who was duly notified of the hearing;
e) Only witness who have submitted affidavits served on the
adverse party at least five (5) days before the date of his being
presented as a witness may be allowed to testify at the
hearing. The affidavit of any witness shall constitute his direct
testimony, subject to cross-examination, re-direct examination
and re-cross-examination;
f) The parties shall be allowed the assistance of counsel and
the right to the production of evidence thru the compulsory
process of subpoena and subpoena duces tecum.
Petitioner further assails the failure of the Graft
Investigating Officer to call the parties to another preliminary
conference after their failure to appear at the first one. He
contends that the lack of any kind of hearing for evidence
presentation resulted in what may be termed, in the lingo of civil
procedure, a judgment on the pleading.[14] At the onset, it is
worth pointing out that petitioner was afforded ample
opportunity to present his side at the scheduled preliminary
conference. His non-appearance thereat is attributable to no one
else but himself and he cannot be allowed to now pass the buck
to the Graft Investigating Officer who had complied strictly
with the abovequoted procedure in the conduct of
administrative investigations. Furthermore, undisputed is the
fact that not only did the Office of the Ombudsman give due
course and consideration to petitioners counter-affidavit, but it
also entertained and resolved his motion for reconsideration
which is not ordinarily allowed in the adjudication of
administrative cases where the penalty imposed is suspension
of not more that one month. Thus, contrary to petitioners claim,
he was in fact given all opportunity to be heard, albeit through
pleadings.
In point is the case of Concerned Officials of the MWSS
vs. Hon. Ombudsman Conrado Vasquez,[15] where this Court
upheld the validity of an order issued by the Ombudsman
without prior hearing, in this wise:
The essence of due process is an opportunity to be heard. One
may be heard, not solely by verbal presentation but also, and
perhaps even many times more creditably and practicable than
oral argument, through pleadings. In administrative
proceedings, moreover, technical rules of procedure and
evidence are not strictly applied; administrative due process
cannot be fully equated to due process in its strict judicial
sense.[16]
Hence, a formal or trial type hearing is not, at all times,
necessary. So long as a partly is afforded fair and reasonable
opportunity to explain his side, the requirement of due process
is complied with.[17]
That the petitioner and all other public officials are
deprived of a legal recourse in the event that the Ombudsman
or his Deputy hastily, arbitrarily, if not oppressively and/or
inhumanly, acts to find him administratively liable for an
imagined violation of Sec. 4 of R.A. 6713 x x x[18] is belied by
the fact that the remedy of filing a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is always available to an
aggrieved public official in such a case. The Rules of Court
which apply suppletorily to the Rules of Procedure of the Office
of the Ombudsman[19] provides that in the absence of an appeal
or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law, a person aggrieved by any decision rendered in
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion by a
tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial functions, may file
a petition for certiorari with this Court.[20]
Petitioners asseveration that his suspension is not
substantiated by evidence is a mere desperate attempt to lure
this Court into reviewing the factual findings of the Office of
the Ombudsman. Squarely applicable to the findings of fact in
the administrative proceedings against petitioner is the settled
rule that:
x x x factual findings of administrative agencies are accorded
not only respect but finality, because of the special knowledge
and expertise gained by these quasi-judicial tribunals from
handling specific matters falling under their jurisdiction. Court
cannot take cognizance of such factual issues. In reviewing
administrative decisions, the reviewing court cannot re-
examine the sufficiency of the evidence x x x.[21]
Nonetheless, even a review of the evidence against the
petitioner does not warrant a reversal of the findings of fact of
the Office of the Ombudsman.
Finally and as a last ditch effort, petitioner secured a joint-
affidavit of desistance dated May 19, 1995 from private
respondents in the hope that the Office of the Ombudsman will
be persuaded into discontinuing the prosecution of the case
against him. The joint-affidavit of desistance was executed by
private respondents only after all evidence against petitioner
had been documented and evaluated by the Office of the
Ombudsman, and in fact, only after it had issued its resolution
finding petitioner guilty of the administrative charges against
him. The joint-affidavit of desistance is not binding on the
Office of the Ombudsman and cannot prevail over the provision
of law which categorically allows the Office of the Ombudsman
to investigate and prosecute on its own any act or omission of a
public officer or employee, office or agency which appears to
be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient.[22] Moreover, this
Court has consistently refrained from interfering with the
exercise by the Ombudsman of his constitutionally mandated
investigatory and prosecutory powers. Otherwise stated, it is
beyond the ambit of this Court to review the exercise of
discretion of the Ombudsman in prosecuting or dismissing a
complaint filed before it.[23] Such initiative and independence
are inherent in the Ombudsman who, beholden to no one, acts
as the champion of the people and preserver of the integrity of
the public service.
 WHEREFORE, in view of the aforegoing reasons, the
motion for reconsideration of the Resolution of this Court dated
June 27, 1995 is hereby denied.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 114944. May 29, 2002]
MANUEL C. ROXAS and AHMED S. NACPIL, petitioners,
vs. HON. CONRADO M. VASQUEZ, Ombudsman
and JOSE DE FERRER, Deputy Special Prosecutor,
and the HONORABLE
SANDIGANBAYAN, respondents.
RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Before us is the Motion for Reconsideration of petitioner
Manuel C. Roxas seeking to set aside our Decision dated June
19, 2001 which dismissed the instant petition, anchored on the
following arguments:
I
WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THE INSTANT
CASE DOES NOT ATTEMPT TO
UNNECESSARILY AND EXCESSIVELY
ENTANGLE THE HONORABLE COURT WITH
THE TASK OF UNDULY REVIEWING OR
INTERFERING WITH THE PROSECUTORIAL
PREROGATIVES OF THE OMBUDSMAN.
II
WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THERE EXIST
MORE THAN SUFFICIENT REASONS FOR
THE HONORABLE COURT TO FIND
VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS AND GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN THE INSTANT
CASE WHEN THE TOTALITY OF THE
CIRCUMSTANCES IS TESTED IN THE
CRUCIBLE OF FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS.
III
WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THE DECISION
HAS SERIOUS AND FAR-REACHING
IMPLICATIONS IN THE ADMINISTRATION
OF JUSTICE CONSIDERING THAT BECAUSE
OF IT, NO DECISION OF THE OMBUDSMAN
IN THE DETERMINATION OF PROBABLE
CAUSE WILL EVER ACHIEVE FINALITY.[1]
Respondents were required to file their respective
comments to the motion.[2] In its Comment,[3] the Office of the
Special Prosecutor argued that the issues presented in the
Motion for Reconsideration have already been raised, resolved
and passed upon by this Court. On the other hand, the Solicitor
General, in his Comment,[4] maintained that petitioner Roxas
was not denied due process since he was no stranger to the
proceedings; the reinvestigation was just a continuation of the
investigation of the case where petitioner was a party-
respondent.
In order to resolve the Motion for Reconsideration, it is
helpful to restate the salient antecedent facts.
Manuel C. Roxas was the Chairman, while Ahmed S.
Nacpil was a Member, of the Bids and Awards Committee of
the Philippine ConstabularyIntegrated National Police (PC-
INP). The PC-INP invited bids for the supply of sixty-five units
of fire trucks. After the public bidding, General Cesar P.
Nazareno created a Technical Evaluation Committee, headed
by General Mario Tanchanco, which was sent to Korea and
Japan to conduct ocular inspections of the plant facilities and
equipment of the five qualified proponents. Thereafter, the
Technical Evaluation Committee recommended for
procurement the Morita Isuzu and Nikki-Hino fire trucks.
Meanwhile, the Bids and Awards Committee voted to
recommend to Director General Cesar Nazareno the
procurement of Ssangyong fire trucks. Instead of acting on this
recommendation, Gen. Nazareno created a Review Committee
headed by Gen. Gerardo N. Flores, which found that there was
a failure to bid. Gen. Nazareno thus instructed the Bids and
Awards Committee to reconsider its earlier recommendation
and to conduct further evaluation of the proponents, but this
time limiting itself to the two Japanese brands recommended by
the Technical Evaluation Committee, namely, Morita Isuzu and
Nikki-Hino. The Bids and Awards Committee subsequently
voted to award the contract to the Tahei Co., Ltd., manufacturer
of Nikki-Hino.[5]
Accordingly, the contract of sale of sixty-five units of
Nikki-Hino fire trucks was executed between Gen. Nazareno,
on behalf of the PC-INP, and Tahei Company, Ltd. The
corresponding Purchase Order was prepared and signed by Col.
Nicasio Custodio, Chief of the PNP Logistics Support
Command; Major Obedio Espea, Acting Chief, PNP
Procurement Center; Gen. Cesar Nazareno; and DILG
Secretary Luis Santos.
Thereafter, Custodio, Espea and Nazareno, together with
the PNP Chief Accountant, Generosa Ramirez, prepared the
disbursement vouchers, authorizing the payment to Tahei Co.,
Ltd. of the sum of P167,335,177.24, as marginal deposit for the
sixty-five fire trucks.
The COA subsequently discovered that while the
disbursement voucher indicated the bid price of Tahei Co., Ltd.
to be only P2,292,784.00 per unit, the purchase order showed
the unit price as P2,585,562.00, resulting in a discrepancy of
P292,778.00 per unit of fire truck or a total of P19,030,570.00.
 On February 12, 1993, DILG Secretary Rafael Alunan III
filed a complaint with the Ombudsman for violation of Section
3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019 against the following:
1. Dir. Gen. Cesar Nazareno, PNP
2. Dep. Dir. Manuel Roxas, PNP
3. Fire Marshal Mario Tanchanco
4. Fire B/Gen. Diosdado Godoy (Ret.)
5. P/Sr. Supt. Ahmed Nacpil, PNP
6. P/Supt. Juhan Kairan, PNP
7. CInsp. Reynaldo Osea, PNP
8. Dep. Dir. Gen. Gerardo Flores, PNP
9. Dir. Nicasio Custodio, PNP
10. Supt. Obedio Espea, PNP
11. Former DILG Secretary Luis Santos
12. Ms. Generosa Ramirez
After preliminary investigation, the Deputy Ombudsman
for the Military recommended the indictment of all respondents,
except Generosa Ramirez.[6] On review, the Office of the
Special Prosecutor recommended the dismissal of the
complaints against Manuel Roxas, Ahmed Nacpil, Diosdado
Codoy, Juhan Kairan and Generosa Ramirez.[7] This was
approved by the Special Prosecutor and the Ombudsman in a
Memorandum dated April 15, 1993.
Hence, formal charges were filed with the Sandiganbayan
against Nazareno, Flores, Tanchanco, Custodio, Osia, Espea
and Santos, docketed as Criminal Case No. 18956.[8] Roxas,
Nacpil, Codoy, Kairan and Ramirez were not included in the
criminal information.
Flores and Tanchanco moved for a reinvestigation, which
was granted. Thereafter, on October 19, 1993, the Office of the
Special Prosecutor recommended the dismissal of the charges
against Flores and Tanchanco. In the same resolution, however,
the Special Prosecutor made a sudden turnabout as regards
Roxas, Nacpil and Kairan, and ordered their inclusion as
accused in Criminal Case No. 18956. Deputy Special
Prosecutor Jose de Ferrer voted for the approval of the
recommendation. Special Prosecutor Aniano A. Desierto
dissented. Ombudsman Conrado M. Vasquez approved the
recommendation.
Roxas, Nacpil and Kairan filed a Motion for
Reconsideration. The Review Committee of the Office of the
Special Prosecutor recommended that the Motion for
Reconsideration be granted and that the charge against the
movants be dismissed. However, Deputy Special Prosecutor de
Ferrer and Ombudsman Vasquez disapproved the
recommendation. Accordingly, the Office of the Ombudsman
filed an amended information with the Sandiganbayan
impleading Roxas, Nacpil and Kairan as co-accused.[9]
Thus, Roxas and Nacpil filed with this Court the instant
petition for certiorari and prohibition, seeking to annul the
orders of the Ombudsman directing their inclusion as accused
in Criminal Case No. 18956.
The petition was dismissed in our Decision dated June 19,
2001 on the ground that the Ombudsman did not lose
jurisdiction over petitioners after the charges against them were
dismissed, considering that the reinvestigation was merely a
repeat investigation. Likewise, petitioners were not denied due
process when the Ombudsman issued the assailed orders
because they were able to file their counter-affidavits during the
preliminary investigation.
After a careful and meticulous review of the case, we find
merit in the Motion for Reconsideration.
The records show that the participation of petitioner
Roxas in the transactions complained of is limited to the
following:
(1) He was the Chairman of the Bids and Awards Committee
of the PC-INP.
(2) He wrote a letter to Mrs. Carol de Jesus of Ssangyong
Corporation informing her that her company had been selected
as the supplier of fire trucks.
(3) Upon the directive of Gen. Nazareno, he conducted an
immediate review of the recommendation of the Bids and
Awards Committee which awarded the supply contract to
Ssangyong and, instead, adopted the findings and
recommendation of the Review Committee, again upon
specific orders of Nazareno.
(4) He submitted a memorandum to Gen. Nazareno that
Majority of the members of the Bids and Awards Committee
have chosen the Nikki-Hino brand over Morita Isuzu.
Based on these established facts, the Review Committee
of the Office of the Special Prosecutor, in a Memorandum dated
April 15, 1993, recommended the dismissal of the charges
against petitioner on the following considerations:
The action of [the Bids and Awards] Committee in choosing
Ssangyong over Kanglim does not appear to have caused any
damage to the Government or any party because it did not
materialize. This action was nullified on order of Gen.
Nazareno and upon recommendation of the Review
Committee. Therefore, this does not merit a lengthy
discussion. Suffice it to stay that the procedure followed by
the committee which resulted in the choices of Ssangyong
does not indicate any irregularity. Neither does it suggest an
unwarranted choice considering that Ssangyong was the next
lower bidder to V.G. Roxas-Kanglim.
What is of significance was the action of the INP BAC which
chose Nikki-Hino as the final winning bidder. It is this action
that resulted in the nullification of the previous action by the
INP BAC and the purchase of 56 units of fire trucks at a price
much higher than the prices for Kanglim or Ssangyong Fire
Trucks.
Records show that Gen. Nazareno issued the Order directing
this Committee to reconsider its previous actions. To this
Order was attached the recommendation of Chairman Mario
C. Tanchanco of the Technical Evaluation Committee for the
consideration of the Japanese fire trucks only namely: Nikki
Hino and Morita Isuzu. In other words, the authority of the
INP BAC this time to conduct the bidding was limited to only
Nikki Hino and Morita Isuzu by no less than the approving
authority and the highest ranking commander of the INP.
This Committees action, in the light of General Nazarenos
order, appeared to be regular and proper because it chose the
lowest bidder among the Japanese fire trucks supplied to them
by General Nazareno. It could not possibly consider
Ssangyong because its previous action choosing Ssangyong
was precisely ordered set aside. Neither could it choose
Kanglim because this was not recommended in the Tanchanco
report which was appended by General Nazareno in the
abovestated Order addressed to the INP BAC.
For the foregoing reasons, we find no reason to hold the
members of the INP BAC liable for violation of the Anti-Graft
Law. However, we make exception to respondent P/Supt.
Reynold Osia because he was implicated by Supt. Concordio
Apolonio in his sworn statement (page 73, Records) as the one
who acted as liaison of General Nazareno in discreetly sending
his messages to the members of the INP BAC to vote in favor
of Nikki Hino. It can be said that respondent Osia cooperated
with General Nazareno in the manipulative scheme to corner
the award in favor of Tahei Co., Ltd. We therefore hold
respondent Osia liable for violation of the Anti-Graft Law.[10]
The foregoing recommendation was unanimously
approved by Deputy Special Prosecutor Jose De Ferrer, Special
Prosecutor Aniano Desierto and Ombudsman Conrado M.
Vasquez.
During the reinvestigation, however, the Office of the
Special Prosecutor recommended the indictment of petitioners
on the assumption that: The said persons of the Bids and
Awards Committee who voted for the Nikki-Hino perfected and
awarded the contract to Nikki-Hino. Their cooperation was
indispensable for the consummation of the contract which was
irregular.[11]
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration. On
February 10, 1994, the team of Special Prosecution Officer III
Reynaldo L. Mendoza, Special Prosecution Officer II Luz L.
Quiones-Marcos and Special Prosecution Officer I Cornelio L.
Somido recommended that petitioners motion for
reconsideration be granted, saying:
It appears that the charge against respondents Roxas, Nacpil
and Kairan was previously dismissed by this Office by virtue
of the approved resolution dated April 15, 1993. For this
reason, as far as the said respondents are concerned, there
being no motion or reconsideration filed by
the complainant (underscoring supplied), the said respondents
ceased to be parties in this case. Consequently, the mere filing
of motions for reconsideration by those previously indicted,
without questioning the dismissal of the charge against the
said respondents, could not and should not be made the basis
for impleading them as accused in this case without violating
their right to due process.[12]
At first blush, it would appear that the findings of the
Special Prosecution Officers on April 15, 1993 and February
10, 1994 are well supported by the evidence presented during
the preliminary investigation. This notwithstanding, the Deputy
Special Prosecutor and the Ombudsman, in their marginal
notes, disapproved the recommendation on February 10, 1994.
Ordinarily, we will not interfere with the discretion of the
Ombudsman to determine whether there exists reasonable
ground to believe that a crime has been committed and that the
accused is probable guilty thereof and, thereafter, to file the
corresponding information with the appropriate
courts.[13] However, we find that the case at bar falls under one
of the recognized exceptions to this rule, more specifically, the
constitutional rights of the accused are impaired and the charges
are manifestly false.[14] In cases where the Ombudsman and the
Special Prosecutor were unable to agree on whether or not
probable cause exists, we may interfere with the findings and
conclusions.[15]
Be that as it may, we recognize that the power to
investigate offenses of this nature belongs to the Ombudsman
and the Special Prosecutor.[16] While the Ombudsman may have
erred in disregarding the recommendations of the Special
Prosecution Officers which appear to be substantiated by the
record, he should be allowed an opportunity to review his
decision and, where necessary, correct it.
Furthermore, it appears that petitioners were deprived of
due process when the Special Prosecutor reinstated the
complaint against them without their knowledge. Due process
of law requires that every litigant must be given an opportunity
to be heard. He has the right to be present and defend himself
in person at every stage of the proceedings.[17]
Under Rule II, Section 7 of Administrative Order No.
07, i.e., the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman, motions for reconsideration or reinvestigation of
an approved order or resolution of the Ombudsman or the
Deputy Ombudsman must be filed within fifteen (15) days from
notice thereof. It is significant to note in this case that no motion
for reconsideration was filed from the resolution of the
Ombudsman dismissing the charges against petitioners. Hence,
petitioners had a right to consider the complaint against them as
closed. Indeed, every litigation must come to an end; otherwise,
it would become even more intolerable than the wrong and
injustice it is designed to correct.[18]
For all intents and purposes, therefore, petitioners were no
longer parties in the criminal action. Evidently, the Office of the
Special Prosecutor thought so too. It did not give petitioners
notice of the reinvestigation, which would have enabled them
to participate in the proceedings. But when it later found
probable cause against petitioners, it should have first given
them notice and afforded them an opportunity to be heard
before ordering their inclusion in Criminal Case No. 18956.
The finding of probable cause against petitioners in
proceedings which they had neither knowledge of nor
participation in violated their right to procedural due
process. At the very least, they should have been notified that
the complaint against them has not yet been finally disposed of;
or that the fight was not yet over, so to speak. They should have
been apprised of their possible implication in the criminal case
to enable them to meet any new accusations against them head-
on, and to prepare for their defense.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision
dated April June 19, 2001 is RECONSIDERED and SET
ASIDE. This case is ordered REMANDED to the Office of the
Ombudsman for further proceedings for the determination of
probable cause against petitioners Manuel C. Roxas and Ahmed
S. Nacpil in OMB-AFP-CRIM-93-0016.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 127838. January 21, 1999]
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, petitioner, vs. JOSE J.
LUCAS, respondent.
DECISION
PARDO, J.:
The petition for review on certiorari before the Court
assails the decision of the Court of Appeals[1] which set aside
the resolution of the Civil Service Commission[2] and reinstated
that of the Board of Personnel Inquiry (BOPI for brevity),
Office of the Secretary, Department of
Agriculture,[3] suspending respondent for one month, for simple
misconduct.
To provide a factual backdrop of the case, a recital of the
facts is necessary.
On May 26, 1992, Raquel P. Linatok, an assistant
information officer at the Agricultural Information Division,
Department of Agriculture (DA for brevity), filed with the
office of the Secretary, DA, an affidavit-complaint against
respondent Jose J. Lucas, a photographer of the same agency,
for misconduct.
Raquel described the incident in the following manner:
While standing before a mirror, near the office door of Jose J.
Lucas, Raquel noticed a chair at her right side which Mr. Jose
Lucas, at that very instant used to sit upon. Thereafter, Mr.
Lucas bent to reach for his shoe. At that moment she felt Mr.
Lucas hand touching her thigh and running down his palm up
to her ankle. She was shocked and suddenly faced Mr. Lucas
and admonished him not to do it again or she will kick
him. But Lucas touched her again and so she hit Mr. Lucas.
Suddenly Mr. Lucas shouted at her saying lumabas ka na at
huwag na huwag ka nang papasok dito kahit kailan A verbal
exchange then ensued and
respondent Lucas grabbed Raquel by the arm and shoved her
towards the door causing her to stumble, her both hands
protected her face from smashing upon the door.
Mr. Lucas, bent on literally throwing the affiant out of the
office, grabbed her the second time while she
attempted to regain her posture after being pushed the first
time. x x x while doing all this, Mr. Lucas shouted at the
affiant, saying, labas, huwag ka nang papasok dito kahit
kailan.[4]
On June 8, 1992, the Board of Personnel Inquiry, DA,
issued a summons requiring respondent to answer the
complaint, not to file a motion to dismiss, within five (5) days
from receipt. On June 17, 1992, respondent Lucas submitted a
letter to Jose P. Nitullano, assistant head, BOPI, denying the
charges. According to Lucas, he did not touch the thigh of
complainant Linatok, that what transpired was that he
accidentally brushed Linatoks leg when he reached for his
shoes and that the same was merely accidental and he did not
intend nor was there malice when his hand got in contact with
Linatoks leg.
On May 31, 1993, after a formal investigation by the
BOPI, DA, the board issued a resolution finding respondent
guilty of simple misconduct[5] and recommending a penalty of
suspension for one (1) month and one (1) day. The Secretary of
Agriculture approved the recommendation.
In due time, respondent appealed the decision to the Civil
Service Commission (CSC). On July 7, 1994, the CSC issued a
resolution finding respondent guilty of grave misconduct and
imposing on him the penalty of dismissal from the
service.[6] Respondent moved for reconsideration but the CSC
denied the motion.
Then, respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals. On
October 29, 1996, the Court of Appeals promulgated its
decision setting aside the resolution of the CSC and reinstating
the resolution of the BOPI, DA, stating thus: It is true that the
Civil Service Act does not define grave
and simple misconduct. There is, however, no question that th
ese offenses fall under different categories. This is clear from a
perusal of memorandum circular No. 49-89 dated August 3,
1989 (also known as the guidelines in the application of
penalties in administrative cases) itself which classifies
administrative offenses into three: grave, less grave and light
offenses. The charge of grave misconduct falls under the
classification of grave offenses while simple misconduct is
classified as a less grave offense. The former is punishable by
dismissal while the latter is punishable either by suspension
(one month and one day to six months), if it is the first offense;
or by dismissal, if it is the second. Thus, they should be treated
as separate and distinct offenses.[7]
The Court of Appeals further ruled that a basic
requirement of due process on the other hand is that a person
must be duly informed of the charges against him (Felicito
Sajonas vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 183 SCRA
182). In the instant case however, Lucas came to know
of the modification of the charge against him only when he
received notice of the resolution dismissing him from the
service.[8]
Hence, this petition.
The issues are (a) whether respondent Lucas was denied
due process when the CSC found him guilty of grave
misconduct on a charge of simple misconduct, and (b) whether
the act complained of constitutes grave misconduct.
 Petitioner anchors its position on the view that the formal
charge against a respondent in an administrative case need not
be drafted with the precision of an information in a criminal
prosecution. It is sufficient that he is apprised of the substance
of the charge against him; what is controlling is the allegation
of the acts complained of, and not the designation of the
offense.[9]
We deny the petition.
As well stated by the Court of Appeals, there is an existing
guideline of the CSC distinguishing simple and grave
misconduct. In the case of Landrito vs. Civil Service
Commission, we held that in
gravemisconduct as distinguished from simple misconduct, the
elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law or flagrant
disregard of established rule, must be
manifest,[10] which is obviously lacking in respondents
case. Respondent maintains that as he was charged with simple
misconduct, the CSC deprived him of his right to due process
by convicting him of grave misconduct.
We sustain the ruling of the Court of Appeals[11] that: (a)
a basic requirement of due process is that a person must be duly
informed of the charges against him[12] and that (b) a person can
not be convicted of a crime with which he was not charged.[13]
Administrative proceedings are not exempt from basic and
fundamental procedural principles, such as the right to
due process in investigations and hearings.[14]
The right to substantive and procedural due process is
applicable in administrative proceedings.[15]
Of course, we do not in any way condone respondents
act. Even in jest, he had no right to touch complainants leg.
However, under the circumstances, such act is not constitutive
of grave misconduct, in the absence of proof that respondent
was maliciously motivated. We note that respondent has been
in the service for twenty (20) years and this is his first offense.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court hereby DENIES the
petition for review on certiorari and AFFIRMS the decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. SP No. 37137.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 127876. December 17, 1999]
ROXAS & CO., INC., petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS, DEPARTMENT OF
AGRARIAN REFORM, SECRETARY OF
AGRARIAN REFORM, DAR REGIONAL
DIRECTOR FOR REGION IV, MUNICIPAL
AGRARIAN REFORM OFFICER OF NASUGBU,
BATANGAS and DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN
REFORM ADJUDICATION BOARD, respondents.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
This case involves three (3) haciendas in Nasugbu,
Batangas owned by petitioner and the validity of the acquisition
of these haciendas by the government under Republic Act No.
6657, the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988.
Petitioner Roxas & Co. is a domestic corporation and is
the registered owner of three haciendas, namely, Haciendas
Palico, Banilad and Caylaway, all located in the Municipality
of Nasugbu, Batangas.Hacienda Palico is 1,024 hectares in area
and is registered under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
985. This land is covered by Tax Declaration Nos. 0465, 0466,
0468, 0470, 0234 and 0354. Hacienda Banilad is 1,050 hectares
in area, registered under TCT No. 924 and covered by Tax
Declaration Nos. 0236, 0237 and 0390. Hacienda Caylaway is
867.4571 hectares in area and is registered under TCT Nos. T-
44662, T-44663, T-44664 and T-44665.
The events of this case occurred during the incumbency of
then President Corazon C. Aquino. In February 1986, President
Aquino issued Proclamation No. 3 promulgating a Provisional
Constitution. As head of the provisional government, the
President exercised legislative power until a legislature is
elected and convened under a new Constitution.[1] In the
exercise of this legislative power, the President signed on July
22, 1987, Proclamation No. 131 instituting a Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program and Executive Order No. 229
providing the mechanisms necessary to initially implement the
program.
On July 27, 1987, the Congress of the Philippines formally
convened and took over legislative power from the
President.[2] This Congress passed Republic Act No. 6657, the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) of 1988. The
Act was signed by the President on June 10, 1988 and took
effect on June 15, 1988.
Before the laws effectivity, on May 6, 1988, petitioner
filed with respondent DAR a voluntary offer to sell Hacienda
Caylaway pursuant to the provisions of E.O. No. 229.
Haciendas Palico and Banilad were later placed under
compulsory acquisition by respondent DAR in accordance with
the CARL.
Hacienda Palico
On September 29, 1989, respondent DAR, through
respondent Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) of
Nasugbu, Batangas, sent a notice entitled Invitation to Parties
to petitioner. The Invitation was addressed to Jaime Pimentel,
Hda. Administrator, Hda. Palico.[3] Therein, the MARO invited
petitioner to a conference on October 6, 1989 at the DAR office
in Nasugbu to discuss the results of the DAR investigation of
Hacienda Palico, which was scheduled for compulsory
acquisition this year under the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program.[4]
On October 25, 1989, the MARO completed three (3)
Investigation Reports after investigation and ocular inspection
of the Hacienda. In the first Report, the MARO found that 270
hectares under Tax Declaration Nos. 465, 466, 468 and 470
were flat to undulating (0-8% slope) and actually occupied and
cultivated by 34 tillers of sugarcane.[5] In the second Report, the
MARO identified as flat to undulating approximately 339
hectares under Tax Declaration No. 0234 which also had
several actual occupants and tillers of sugarcane;[6] while in the
third Report, the MARO found approximately 75 hectares
under Tax Declaration No. 0354 as flat to undulating with 33
actual occupants and tillers also of sugarcane.[7]
On October 27, 1989, a Summary Investigation Report
was submitted and signed jointly by the MARO, representatives
of the Barangay Agrarian Reform Committee (BARC) and
Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP), and by the Provincial
Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO). The Report recommended
that 333.0800 hectares of Hacienda Palico be subject to
compulsory acquisition at a value of P6,807,622.20. [8] The
following day, October 28, 1989, two (2) more Summary
Investigation Reports were submitted by the same officers and
representatives. They recommended that 270.0876 hectares and
75.3800 hectares be placed under compulsory acquisition at a
compensation of P8,109,739.00 and P2,188,195.47,
respectively.[9]
On December 12, 1989, respondent DAR through then
Department Secretary Miriam D. Santiago sent a Notice of
Acquisition to petitioner. The Notice was addressed as follows:
Roxas y Cia, Limited
Soriano Bldg., Plaza Cervantes
Manila, Metro Manila.[10]
Petitioner was informed that 1,023.999 hectares of its land
in Hacienda Palico were subject to immediate acquisition and
distribution by the government under the CARL; that based on
the DARs valuation criteria, the government was offering
compensation of P3.4 million for 333.0800 hectares; that
whether this offer was to be accepted or rejected, petitioner was
to inform the Bureau of Land Acquisition and Distribution
(BLAD) of the DAR; that in case of petitioners rejection or
failure to reply within thirty days, respondent DAR shall
conduct summary administrative proceedings with notice to
petitioner to determine just compensation for the land; that if
petitioner accepts respondent DARs offer, or upon deposit of
the compensation with an accessible bank if it rejects the same,
the DAR shall take immediate possession of the land.[11]
Almost two years later, on September 26, 1991, the DAR
Regional Director sent to the LBP Land Valuation Manager
three (3) separate Memoranda entitled Request to Open Trust
Account. Each Memoranda requested that a trust account
representing the valuation of three portions of Hacienda Palico
be opened in favor of the petitioner in view of the latters
rejection of its offered value.[12]
Meanwhile in a letter dated May 4, 1993, petitioner
applied with the DAR for conversion of Haciendas Palico and
Banilad from agricultural to non-agricultural lands under the
provisions of the CARL.[13] On July 14, 1993, petitioner sent a
letter to the DAR Regional Director reiterating its request for
conversion of the two haciendas.[14]
Despite petitioners application for conversion, respondent
DAR proceeded with the acquisition of the two Haciendas. The
LBP trust accounts as compensation for Hacienda Palico were
replaced by respondent DAR with cash and LBP bonds. [15] On
October 22, 1993, from the mother title of TCT No. 985 of the
Hacienda, respondent DAR registered Certificate of Land
Ownership Award (CLOA) No. 6654. On October 30, 1993,
CLOAs were distributed to farmer beneficiaries.[16]
Hacienda Banilad
On August 23, 1989, respondent DAR, through
respondent MARO of Nasugbu, Batangas, sent a notice to
petitioner addressed as follows:
Mr. Jaime Pimentel
Hacienda Administrator
Hacienda Banilad
Nasugbu, Batangas[17]
The MARO informed Pimentel that Hacienda Banilad was
subject to compulsory acquisition under the CARL; that should
petitioner wish to avail of the other schemes such as Voluntary
Offer to Sell or Voluntary Land Transfer, respondent DAR was
willing to provide assistance thereto.[18]
On September 18, 1989, the MARO sent an Invitation to
Parties again to Pimentel inviting the latter to attend a
conference on September 21, 1989 at the MARO Office in
Nasugbu to discuss the results of the MAROs investigation over
Hacienda Banilad.[19]
On September 21, 1989, the same day the conference was
held, the MARO submitted two (2) Reports. In his first Report,
he found that approximately 709 hectares of land under Tax
Declaration Nos. 0237 and 0236 were flat to undulating (0-8%
slope). On this area were discovered 162 actual occupants and
tillers of sugarcane.[20] In the second Report, it was found that
approximately 235 hectares under Tax Declaration No. 0390
were flat to undulating, on which were 92 actual occupants and
tillers of sugarcane.[21]
The results of these Reports were discussed at the
conference. Present in the conference were representatives of
the prospective farmer beneficiaries, the BARC, the LBP, and
Jaime Pimentel on behalf of the landowner.[22] After the
meeting, on the same day, September 21, 1989, a Summary
Investigation Report was submitted jointly by the MARO,
representatives of the BARC, LBP, and the PARO. They
recommended that after ocular inspection of the property,
234.6498 hectares under Tax Declaration No. 0390 be subject
to compulsory acquisition and distribution by CLOA. [23] The
following day, September 22, 1989, a second Summary
Investigation was submitted by the same officers. They
recommended that 737.2590 hectares under Tax Declaration
Nos. 0236 and 0237 be likewise placed under compulsory
acquisition for distribution.[24]
On December 12, 1989, respondent DAR, through the
Department Secretary, sent to petitioner two (2) separate
Notices of Acquisition over Hacienda Banilad. These Notices
were sent on the same day as the Notice of Acquisition over
Hacienda Palico. Unlike the Notice over Hacienda Palico,
however, the Notices over Hacienda Banilad were addressed to:
Roxas y Cia. Limited
7th Floor, Cacho-Gonzales Bldg. 101 Aguirre St., Leg.
Makati, Metro Manila.[25]
Respondent DAR offered petitioner compensation
of P15,108,995.52 for 729.4190 hectares and P4,428,496.00 for
234.6498 hectares.[26]
On September 26, 1991, the DAR Regional Director sent
to the LBP Land Valuation Manager a Request to Open Trust
Account in petitioners name as compensation for 234.6493
hectares of Hacienda Banilad.[27] A second Request to Open
Trust Account was sent on November 18, 1991 over 723.4130
hectares of said Hacienda.[28]
On December 18, 1991, the LBP certified that the amounts
of P4,428,496.40 and P21,234,468.78 in cash and LBP bonds
had been earmarked as compensation for petitioners land in
Hacienda Banilad.[29]
On May 4, 1993, petitioner applied for conversion of both
Haciendas Palico and Banilad.
Hacienda Caylaway
Hacienda Caylaway was voluntarily offered for sale to the
government on May 6, 1988 before the effectivity of the CARL.
The Hacienda has a total area of 867.4571 hectares and is
covered by four (4) titlesTCT Nos. T-44662, T-44663, T-44664
and T-44665. On January 12, 1989, respondent DAR, through
the Regional Director for Region IV, sent to petitioner two (2)
separate Resolutions accepting petitioners voluntary offer to
sell Hacienda Caylaway, particularly TCT Nos. T-44664 and T-
44663.[30] The Resolutions were addressed to:
Roxas & Company, Inc.
7th Flr. Cacho- Gonzales Bldg.
Aguirre, Legaspi Village
Makati, M. M.[31]
On September 4, 1990, the DAR Regional Director issued
two separate Memoranda to the LBP Regional Manager
requesting for the valuation of the land under TCT Nos. T-
44664 and T-44663.[32] On the same day, respondent DAR,
through the Regional Director, sent to petitioner a Notice of
Acquisition over 241.6777 hectares under TCT No. T-44664
and 533.8180 hectares under TCT No. T-44663.[33]Like the
Resolutions of Acceptance, the Notice of Acquisition was
addressed to petitioner at its office in Makati, Metro Manila.
Nevertheless, on August 6, 1992, petitioner, through its
President, Eduardo J. Roxas, sent a letter to the Secretary of
respondent DAR withdrawing its VOS of Hacienda
Caylaway. The Sangguniang Bayan of Nasugbu, Batangas
allegedly authorized the reclassification of Hacienda Caylaway
from agricultural to non-agricultural. As a result, petitioner
informed respondent DAR that it was applying for conversion
of Hacienda Caylaway from agricultural to other uses. [34]
In a letter dated September 28, 1992, respondent DAR
Secretary informed petitioner that a reclassification of the land
would not exempt it from agrarian reform. Respondent
Secretary also denied petitioners withdrawal of the VOS on the
ground that withdrawal could only be based on specific grounds
such as unsuitability of the soil for agriculture, or if the slope of
the land is over 18 degrees and that the land is undeveloped.[35]
Despite the denial of the VOS withdrawal of Hacienda
Caylaway, on May 11, 1993, petitioner filed its application for
conversion of both Haciendas Palico and Banilad. [36] On July
14, 1993, petitioner, through its President, Eduardo Roxas,
reiterated its request to withdraw the VOS over Hacienda
Caylaway in light of the following:
1) Certification issued by Conrado I. Gonzales, Officer-in-
Charge, Department of Agriculture, Region 4, 4th Floor, ATI
(BA) Bldg., Diliman, Quezon City dated March 1, 1993
stating that the lands subject of referenced titles are not
feasible and economically sound for further agricultural
development.
2) Resolution No. 19 of the Sangguniang Bayan of Nasugbu,
Batangas approving the Zoning Ordinance reclassifying areas
covered by the referenced titles to non-agricultural which was
enacted after extensive consultation with government
agencies, including [the Department of Agrarian Reform], and
the requisite public hearings.
3) Resolution No. 106 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of
Batangas dated March 8, 1993 approving the Zoning
Ordinance enacted by the Municipality of Nasugbu.
4) Letter dated December 15, 1992 issued by Reynaldo U.
Garcia of the Municipal Planning & Development,
Coordinator and Deputized Zoning Administrator addressed to
Mrs. Alicia P. Logarta advising that the Municipality of
Nasugbu, Batangas has no objection to the conversion of the
lands subject of referenced titles to non-agricultural.[37]
On August 24, 1993, petitioner instituted Case No. N-
0017-96-46 (BA) with respondent DAR Adjudication Board
(DARAB) praying for the cancellation of the CLOAs issued by
respondent DAR in the name of several persons. Petitioner
alleged that the Municipality of Nasugbu, where the haciendas
are located, had been declared a tourist zone, that the land is not
suitable for agricultural production, and that the Sangguniang
Bayan of Nasugbu had reclassified the land to non-agricultural.
In a Resolution dated October 14, 1993, respondent
DARAB held that the case involved the prejudicial question of
whether the property was subject to agrarian reform, hence, this
question should be submitted to the Office of the Secretary of
Agrarian Reform for determination.[38]
On October 29, 1993, petitioner filed with the Court of
Appeals CA-G.R. SP No. 32484. It questioned the
expropriation of its properties under the CARL and the denial
of due process in the acquisition of its landholdings.
Meanwhile, the petition for conversion of the three
haciendas was denied by the MARO on November 8, 1993.
Petitioners petition was dismissed by the Court of Appeals
on April 28, 1994.[39] Petitioner moved for reconsideration but
the motion was denied on January 17, 1997 by respondent
court.[40]
Hence, this recourse. Petitioner assigns the following
errors:

A. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY
ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONERS CAUSE OF
ACTION IS PREMATURE FOR FAILURE TO EXHAUST
ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES IN VIEW OF THE
PATENT ILLEGALITY OF THE RESPONDENTS ACTS,
THE IRREPARABLE DAMAGE CAUSED BY SAID
ILLEGAL ACTS, AND THE ABSENCE OF A PLAIN,
SPEEDY AND ADEQUATE REMEDY IN THE
ORDINARY COURSE OF LAWALL OF WHICH ARE
EXCEPTIONS TO THE SAID DOCTRINE.
B. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY
ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONERS
LANDHOLDINGS ARE SUBJECT TO COVERAGE
UNDER THE COMPREHENSIVE AGRARIAN REFORM
LAW, IN VIEW OF THE UNDISPUTED FACT THAT
PETITIONERS LANDHOLDINGS HAVE BEEN
CONVERTED TO NON-AGRICULTURAL USES BY
PRESIDENTIAL PROCLAMATION NO. 1520 WHICH
DECLARED THE MUNICIPALITY OF NASUGBU,
BATANGAS AS A TOURIST ZONE, AND THE ZONING
ORDINANCE OF THE MUNICIPALITY OF NASUGBU
RE-CLASSIFYING CERTAIN PORTIONS OF
PETITIONERS LANDHOLDINGS AS NON-
AGRICULTURAL, BOTH OF WHICH PLACE SAID
LANDHOLDINGS OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF AGRARIAN
REFORM, OR AT THE VERY LEAST ENTITLE
PETITIONER TO APPLY FOR CONVERSION AS
CONCEDED BY RESPONDENT DAR.
C. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY
ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO DECLARE THE
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE RESPONDENT DAR VOID FOR
FAILURE TO OBSERVE DUE PROCESS, CONSIDERING
THAT RESPONDENTS BLATANTLY DISREGARDED
THE PROCEDURE FOR THE ACQUISITION OF
PRIVATE LANDS UNDER R.A. 6657, MORE
PARTICULARLY, IN FAILING TO GIVE DUE NOTICE
TO THE PETITIONER AND TO PROPERLY IDENTIFY
THE SPECIFIC AREAS SOUGHT TO BE ACQUIRED.
D. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY
ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO RECOGNIZE THAT
PETITIONER WAS BRAZENLY AND ILLEGALLY
DEPRIVED OF ITS PROPERTY WITHOUT JUST
COMPENSATION, CONSIDERING THAT
PETITIONER WAS NOT PAID JUST COMPENSATION
BEFORE IT WAS UNCEREMONIOUSLY STRIPPED OF
ITS LANDHOLDINGS THROUGH THE ISSUANCE OF
CLOAS TO ALLEGED FARMER BENEFICIARIES, IN
VIOLATION OF R.A. 6657.[41]
The assigned errors involve three (3) principal issues: (1)
whether this Court can take cognizance of this petition despite
petitioners failure to exhaust administrative remedies; (2)
whether the acquisition proceedings over the three haciendas
were valid and in accordance with law; and (3) assuming the
haciendas may be reclassified from agricultural to non-
agricultural, whether this court has the power to rule on this
issue.
I. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies.
In its first assigned error, petitioner claims that respondent
Court of Appeals gravely erred in finding that petitioner failed
to exhaust administrative remedies. As a general rule, before a
party may be allowed to invoke the jurisdiction of the courts of
justice, he is expected to have exhausted all means of
administrative redress. This is not absolute, however. There are
instances when judicial action may be resorted to
immediately. Among these exceptions are: (1) when the
question raised is purely legal; (2) when the administrative body
is in estoppel; (3) when the act complained of is patently illegal;
(4) when there is urgent need for judicial intervention; (5) when
the respondent acted in disregard of due process; (6) when the
respondent is a department secretary whose acts, as an alter ego
of the President, bear the implied or assumed approval of the
latter; (7) when irreparable damage will be suffered; (8) when
there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy; (9) when
strong public interest is involved; (10) when the subject of the
controversy is private land; and (11)
in quo warranto proceedings.[42]
Petitioner rightly sought immediate redress in the
courts. There was a violation of its rights and to require it to
exhaust administrative remedies before the DAR itself was not
a plain, speedy and adequate remedy.
Respondent DAR issued Certificates of Land Ownership
Award (CLOAs) to farmer beneficiaries over portions of
petitioners land without just compensation to petitioner. A
Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) is evidence
of ownership of land by a beneficiary under R.A. 6657, the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988. [43] Before this
may be awarded to a farmer beneficiary, the land must first be
acquired by the State from the landowner and ownership
transferred to the former. The transfer of possession and
ownership of the land to the government are conditioned upon
the receiptby the landowner of the corresponding payment or
deposit by the DAR of the compensation with an accessible
bank. Until then, title remains with the landowner.[44] There was
no receipt by petitioner of any compensation for any of the
lands acquired by the government.
The kind of compensation to be paid the landowner is also
specific. The law provides that the deposit must be made only
in cash or LBP bonds.[45] Respondent DARs opening of trust
account deposits in petitioners name with the Land Bank of the
Philippines does not constitute payment under the law. Trust
account deposits are not cash or LBP bonds. The replacement
of the trust account with cash or LBP bonds did not ipso
facto cure the lack of compensation; for essentially, the
determination of this compensation was marred by lack of due
process. In fact, in the entire acquisition proceedings,
respondent DAR disregarded the basic requirements of
administrative due process. Under these circumstances, the
issuance of the CLOAs to farmer beneficiaries necessitated
immediate judicial action on the part of the petitioner.
II. The Validity of the Acquisition Proceedings Over the Haciendas.
 Petititioners allegation of lack of due process goes into the
validity of the acquisition proceedings themselves. Before we
rule on this matter, however, there is need to lay down the
procedure in the acquisition of private lands under the
provisions of the law.
A. Modes of Acquisition of Land under R. A. 6657
Republic Act No. 6657, the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law of 1988 (CARL), provides for two (2) modes of
acquisition of private land: compulsory and voluntary. The
procedure for the compulsory acquisition of private lands is set
forth in Section 16 of R.A. 6657, viz:
Sec. 16. Procedure for Acquisition of Private Lands. --. For
purposes of acquisition of private lands, the following
procedures shall be followed:
a) After having identified the land, the landowners and the
beneficiaries, the DAR shall send its notice to acquire the land
to the owners thereof, by personal delivery or registered mail,
and post the same in a conspicuous place in the municipal
building and barangay hall of the place where the property is
located. Said notice shall contain the offer of the DAR to pay a
corresponding value in accordance with the valuation set forth
in Sections 17, 18, and other pertinent provisions hereof.
b) Within thirty (30) days from the date of receipt of written
notice by personal delivery or registered mail, the landowner,
his administrator or representative shall inform the DAR of his
acceptance or rejection of the offer.
c) If the landowner accepts the offer of the DAR, the LBP
shall pay the landowner the purchase price of the land within
thirty (30) days after he executes and delivers a deed of
transfer in favor of the Government and surrenders the
Certificate of Title and other muniments of title.
d) In case of rejection or failure to reply, the DAR shall
conduct summary administrative proceedings to determine the
compensation for the land requiring the landowner, the LBP
and other interested parties to submit evidence as to the just
compensation for the land, within fifteen (15) days from
receipt of the notice. After the expiration of the above period,
the matter is deemed submitted for decision. The DAR shall
decide the case within thirty (30) days after it is submitted for
decision.
e) Upon receipt by the landowner of the corresponding
payment, or, in case of rejection or no response from the
landowner, upon the deposit with an accessible bank
designated by the DAR of the compensation in cash or in LBP
bonds in accordance with this Act, the DAR shall take
immediate possession of the land and shall request the proper
Register of Deeds to issue a Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. The
DAR shall thereafter proceed with the redistribution of the
land to the qualified beneficiaries.
f) Any party who disagrees with the decision may bring the
matter to the court of proper jurisdiction for final
determination of just compensation.
In the compulsory acquisition of private lands, the
landholding, the landowners and the farmer beneficiaries must
first be identified. After identification, the DAR shall send a
Notice of Acquisition to the landowner, by personal delivery or
registered mail, and post it in a conspicuous place in the
municipal building and barangay hall of the place where the
property is located. Within thirty days from receipt of the
Notice of Acquisition, the landowner, his administrator or
representative shall inform the DAR of his acceptance or
rejection of the offer. If the landowner accepts, he executes and
delivers a deed of transfer in favor of the government and
surrenders the certificate of title. Within thirty days from the
execution of the deed of transfer, the Land Bank of the
Philippines (LBP) pays the owner the purchase price. If the
landowner rejects the DARs offer or fails to make a reply, the
DAR conducts summary administrative proceedings to
determine just compensation for the land. The landowner, the
LBP representative and other interested parties may submit
evidence on just compensation within fifteen days from
notice. Within thirty days from submission, the DAR shall
decide the case and inform the owner of its decision and the
amount of just compensation. Upon receipt by the owner of the
corresponding payment, or, in case of rejection or lack of
response from the latter, the DAR shall deposit the
compensation in cash or in LBP bonds with an accessible
bank. The DAR shall immediately take possession of the land
and cause the issuance of a transfer certificate of title in the
name of the Republic of the Philippines. The land shall then be
redistributed to the farmer beneficiaries. Any party may
question the decision of the DAR in the regular courts for final
determination of just compensation.
The DAR has made compulsory acquisition the priority
mode of land acquisition to hasten the implementation of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). [46] Under
Section 16 of the CARL, the first step in compulsory acquisition
is the identification of the land, the landowners and the
beneficiaries. However, the law is silent on how the
identification process must be made. To fill in this gap, the
DAR issued on July 26, 1989 Administrative Order No. 12,
Series of 1989, which set the operating procedure in the
identification of such lands. The procedure is as follows:
II. OPERATING PROCEDURE
A. The Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer, with the
assistance of the pertinent Barangay Agrarian Reform
Committee (BARC), shall:
1. Update the masterlist of all agricultural lands
covered under the CARP in his area of
responsibility. The masterlist shall include such
information as required under the attached
CARP Masterlist Form which shall include the
name of the landowner, landholding area,
TCT/OCT number, and tax declaration number.
 2. Prepare a Compulsory Acquisition Case Folder
(CACF) for each title (OCT/TCT) or landholding
covered under Phase I and II of the CARP except
those for which the landowners have already
filed applications to avail of other modes of land
acquisition. A case folder shall contain the
following duly accomplished forms:
a) CARP CA Form 1MARO Investigation
Report
b) CARP CA Form 2-- Summary Investigation
Report of Findings and Evaluation
c) CARP CA Form 3Applicants Information
Sheet
d) CARP CA Form 4Beneficiaries Undertaking
e) CARP CA Form 5Transmittal Report to the
PARO
The MARO/ BARC shall certify that all information contained
in the above-mentioned forms have been examined and
verified by him and that the same are true and correct.
3. Send a Notice of Coverage and a letter of
invitation to a conference/ meeting to the
landowner covered by the Compulsory Case
Acquisition Folder. Invitations to the said
conference/ meeting shall also be sent to the
prospective farmer-beneficiaries, the BARC
representative(s), the Land Bank of the
Philippines (LBP) representative, and other
interested parties to discuss the inputs to the
valuation of the property. He shall discuss the
MARO/ BARC investigation report and solicit
the views, objection, agreements or suggestions
of the participants thereon. The landowner shall
also be asked to indicate his retention area. The
minutes of the meeting shall be signed by all
participants in the conference and shall form an
integral part of the CACF.
4. Submit all completed case folders to the
Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO).
B. The PARO shall:
1. Ensure that the individual case folders are
forwarded to him by his MAROs.
2. Immediately upon receipt of a case folder,
compute the valuation of the land in accordance
with A.O. No. 6, Series of 1988.[47] The valuation
worksheet and the related CACF valuation forms
shall be duly certified correct by the PARO and
all the personnel who participated in the
accomplishment of these forms.
3. In all cases, the PARO may validate the report of
the MARO through ocular inspection and
verification of the property. This ocular
inspection and verification shall be mandatory
when the computed value exceeds 500,000 per
estate.
4. Upon determination of the valuation, forward the
case folder, together with the duly accomplished
valuation forms and his recommendations, to the
Central Office. The LBP representative and the
MARO concerned shall be furnished a copy each
of his report.
C. DAR Central Office, specifically through the
Bureau of Land Acquisition and Distribution
(BLAD), shall:
1. Within three days from receipt of the case folder
from the PARO, review, evaluate and determine
the final land valuation of the property covered
by the case folder. A summary review and
evaluation report shall be prepared and duly
certified by the BLAD Director and the
personnel directly participating in the review and
final valuation.
2. Prepare, for the signature of the Secretary or her
duly authorized representative, a Notice of
Acquisition (CARP CA Form 8) for the subject
property. Serve the Notice to the landowner
personally or through registered mail within
three days from its approval. The Notice shall
include, among others, the area subject of
compulsory acquisition, and the amount of just
compensation offered by DAR.
3. Should the landowner accept the DARs offered
value, the BLAD shall prepare and submit to the
Secretary for approval the Order of
Acquisition. However, in case of rejection or
non-reply, the DAR Adjudication Board
(DARAB) shall conduct a summary
administrative hearing to determine just
compensation, in accordance with the procedures
provided under Administrative Order No. 13,
Series of 1989.Immediately upon receipt of the
DARABs decision on just compensation, the
BLAD shall prepare and submit to the Secretary
for approval the required Order of Acquisition.
4. Upon the landowners receipt of payment, in case
of acceptance, or upon deposit of payment in the
designated bank, in case of rejection or non-
response, the Secretary shall immediately direct
the pertinent Register of Deeds to issue the
corresponding Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) in the name of the Republic of the
Philippines. Once the property is transferred, the
DAR, through the PARO, shall take possession
of the land for redistribution to qualified
beneficiaries.
Administrative Order No. 12, Series of 1989 requires that
the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) keep an
updated master list of all agricultural lands under the CARP in
his area of responsibility containing all the required
information. The MARO prepares a Compulsory Acquisition
Case Folder (CACF) for each title covered by CARP. The
MARO then sends the landowner a Notice of Coverage and a DAR A. O. No. 9, Series of 1990 entitled Revised Rules
letter of invitation to a conference/ meeting over the land Governing the Acquisition of Agricultural Lands Subject of
covered by the CACF. He also sends invitations to the Voluntary Offer to Sell and Compulsory Acquisition Pursuant
prospective farmer-beneficiaries, the representatives of the to R. A. 6657, requires that:
Barangay Agrarian Reform Committee (BARC), the Land
Bank of the Philippines (LBP) and other interested parties to B. MARO
discuss the inputs to the valuation of the property and solicit
views, suggestions, objections or agreements of the parties. At 1. Receives the duly accomplished CARP Form Nos.
the meeting, the landowner is asked to indicate his retention 1 & 1.1 including supporting documents.
area.
2. Gathers basic ownership documents listed under
The MARO shall make a report of the case to the
1.a or 1.b above and prepares corresponding
Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO) who shall
VOCF/ CACF by landowner/ landholding.
complete the valuation of the land. Ocular inspection and
verification of the property by the PARO shall be mandatory 3. Notifies/ invites the landowner and
when the computed value of the estate representatives of the LBP, DENR, BARC and
exceeds P500,000.00. Upon determination of the valuation, the prospective beneficiaries of the schedule of
PARO shall forward all papers together with his ocular inspection of the property at least one
recommendation to the Central Office of the DAR. The DAR week in advance.
Central Office, specifically, the Bureau of Land Acquisition
and Distribution (BLAD), shall review, evaluate and determine 4. MARO/ LAND BANK FIELD OFFICE/ BARC
the final land valuation of the property. The BLAD shall
prepare, on the signature of the Secretary or his duly authorized a) Identify the land and landowner, and
representative, a Notice of Acquisition for the subject determine the suitability for
property.[48] From this point, the provisions of Section 16 of agriculture and productivity of the
R.A. 6657 then apply.[49] land and jointly prepare Field
Investigation Report (CARP Form
For a valid implementation of the CAR Program, two No. 2), including the Land Use
notices are required: (1) the Notice of Coverage and letter of Map of the property.
invitation to a preliminary conference sent to the landowner, the
representatives of the BARC, LBP, farmer beneficiaries and
b) Interview applicants and assist them in the
other interested parties pursuant to DAR A. O. No. 12, Series
preparation of the Application For
of 1989; and (2) the Notice of Acquisition sent to the landowner
Potential CARP Beneficiary
under Section 16 of the CARL.
(CARP Form No. 3).
The importance of the first notice, i.e., the Notice of
Coverage and the letter of invitation to the conference, and its c) Screen prospective farmer-beneficiaries and
actual conduct cannot be understated. They are steps designed for those found qualified, cause the
to comply with the requirements of administrative due signing of the respective
process. The implementation of the CARL is an exercise of the Application to Purchase and
States police power and the power of eminent domain. To the Farmers Undertaking (CARP Form
extent that the CARL prescribes retention limits to the No. 4).
landowners, there is an exercise of police power for the
regulation of private property in accordance with the d) Complete the Field Investigation Report
Constitution.[50] But where, to carry out such regulation, the based on the result of the ocular
owners are deprived of lands they own in excess of the inspection/ investigation of the
maximum area allowed, there is also a taking under the power property and documents submitted.
of eminent domain. The taking contemplated is not a mere See to it that Field Investigation
limitation of the use of the land. What is required is the Report is duly accomplished and
surrender of the title to and physical possession of the said signed by all concerned.
excess and all beneficial rights accruing to the owner in favor
of the farmer beneficiary.[51] The Bill of Rights provides that
5. MARO
[n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without
due process of law.[52] The CARL was not intended to take
away property without due process of law. [53] The exercise of a) Assists the DENR Survey Party in the
the power of eminent domain requires that due process be conduct of a boundary/ subdivision
observed in the taking of private property. survey delineating areas covered by
OLT, retention, subject of VOS,
DAR A. O. No. 12, Series of 1989, from whence the CA (by phases, if possible),
Notice of Coverage first sprung, was amended in 1990 by DAR infrastructures, etc., whichever is
A.O. No. 9, Series of 1990 and in 1993 by DAR A.O. No. 1, applicable.
Series of 1993. The Notice of Coverage and letter of invitation
to the conference meeting were expanded and amplified in said
amendments.
 b) Sends Notice of Coverage (CARP Form
No. 5) to landowner concerned or
his duly authorized representative
inviting him for a conference.
c) Sends Invitation Letter (CARP Form No. 6)
for a conference/ public hearing to
prospective farmer-beneficiaries,
landowner, representatives of
BARC, LBP, DENR, DA, NGOs,
farmers organizations and other
interested parties to discuss the
following matters:
Result of Field Investigation
Inputs to valuation
Issues raised
Comments/ recommendations by all parties
concerned.
d) Prepares Summary of Minutes of the
conference/ public hearing to be
guided by CARP Form No. 7.
e) Forwards the completed VOCF/CACF to
the Provincial Agrarian Reform
Office (PARO) using CARP Form
No. 8 (Transmittal Memo to
PARO).
x x x.
DAR A. O. No. 9, Series of 1990 lays down the rules on
both Voluntary Offer to Sell (VOS) and Compulsory
Acquisition (CA) transactions involving lands enumerated
under Section 7 of the CARL.[54]In both VOS and CA
transactions, the MARO prepares the Voluntary Offer to Sell
Case Folder (VOCF) and the Compulsory Acquisition Case
Folder (CACF), as the case may be, over a particular
landholding. The MARO notifies the landowner as well as
representatives of the LBP, BARC and prospective
beneficiaries of the date of the ocular inspection of the property
at least one week before the scheduled date and invites them to
attend the same. The MARO, LBP or BARC conducts the
ocular inspection and investigation by identifying the land and
landowner, determining the suitability of the land for
agriculture and productivity, interviewing and screening
prospective farmer beneficiaries. Based on its investigation, the
MARO, LBP or BARC prepares the Field Investigation Report
which shall be signed by all parties concerned. In addition to
the field investigation, a boundary or subdivision survey of the
land may also be conducted by a Survey Party of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) to
be assisted by the MARO.[55] This survey shall delineate the
areas covered by Operation Land Transfer (OLT), areas
retained by the landowner, areas with infrastructure, and the
areas subject to VOS and CA. After the survey and field
investigation, the MARO sends a Notice of Coverage to the
landowner or his duly authorized representative inviting him to
a conference or public hearing with the farmer beneficiaries,
representatives of the BARC, LBP, DENR, Department of
Agriculture (DA), non-government organizations, farmers
organizations and other interested parties. At the public
hearing, the parties shall discuss the results of the field
investigation, issues that may be raised in relation thereto,
inputs to the valuation of the subject landholding, and other
comments and recommendations by all parties concerned. The
Minutes of the conference/ public hearing shall form part of the
VOCF or CACF which files shall be forwarded by the MARO
to the PARO. The PARO reviews, evaluates and validates the
Field Investigation Report and other documents in the VOCF/
CACF. He then forwards the records to the RARO for another
review.
DAR A. O. No. 9, Series of 1990 was amended by DAR
A. O. No. 1, Series of 1993. DAR A. O. No. 1, Series of 1993
provided, among others, that:
IV. OPERATING PROCEDURES:
"Steps Responsible Activity Forms/
Agency/Unit Document
(Requirements)
A. Identification and
Documentation
xxx
5 DARMO Issues Notice of Coverage to LO CARP
by personal delivery with proof of Form No.2
service, or by registered mail with
return card, informing him that his
property is now under CARP cover-
age and for LO to select his retention
area, if he desires to avail of his right
of retention; and at the same time in-
vites him to join the field investigation
to be conducted on his property which
should be scheduled at least two weeks
in advance of said notice.
A copy of said Notice CARP
shall be posted for at least Form No.17
one week on the bulletin
board of the municipal and barangay
halls where the property is located.
LGU office concerned notifies DAR
about compliance with posting requirement
thru return indorsement on CARP Form
No. 17.
6 DARMO Sends notice to the LBP, CARP
BARC, DENR Form No.3
representatives and
prospective ARBs of the schedule of
the field investigation to be conducted
on the subject property.
7 DARMO With the participation of CARP
BARC the LO, representatives of Form No.4
LBP the LBP, BARC, DENR Land Use
DENR and prospective ARBs, Map
Local Office conducts the investigation
on subject property to identify the landholding,
determines its suitability and productivity;
and jointly prepares the Field Investigation
Report (FIR) and Land Use Map. However,
the field investigation shall proceed even if the
LO, the representatives of the DENR and
prospective ARBs are not available provided,
they were given due notice of the time and date
of the investigation to be conducted. Similarly,
if the LBP representative is not available or could
not come on the scheduled date, the field
investigation shall also be conducted, after which
the duly accomplished Part I of CARP Form No. 4
shall be forwarded to the LBP representative for
validation. If he agrees to the ocular inspection report
of DAR, he signs the FIR (Part I) and accomplishes
Part II thereof.
In the event that there is a difference or variance
between the findings of the DAR and the LBP as
to the propriety of covering the land under CARP,
whether in whole or in part, on the issue of suitability
to agriculture, degree of development or slope, and
on issues affecting idle lands, the conflict shall be
resolved by a composite team of DAR, LBP, DENR
and DA which shall jointly conduct further investigation
thereon. The team shall submit its report of findings
which shall be binding to both DAR and LBP, pursuant
to Joint Memorandum Circular of the DAR, LBP, DENR
and DA dated 27 January 1992.
8 DARMO Screens prospective ARBS CARP
BARC and causes the signing of Form No. 5
the Application of
Purchase and Farmers' Undertaking (APFU).
9 DARMO Furnishes a copy of the CARP
duly accomplished FIR to Form No.
the landowner by personal 4
delivery with proof of service or registered
mail with return card and posts a copy thereof
for at least one week on the bulletin board of the
municipal and barangay halls where the property
is located.
LGU office concerned CARP
Notifies DAR about Form No.
compliance with posting 17
requirement thru return endorsement on
CARP Form No. 17.
B. Land Survey
10 DARMO Conducts perimeter or Perimeter
And/or segregation survey or
DENR delineating areas covered Segregation
Local Office by OLT, "uncarpable Survey Plan
areas such as 18% slope and above,
unproductive/ unsuitable to agriculture,
retention, infrastructure. In case of
segregation or subdivision survey, the
plan shall be approved by DENR-LMS.
C. Review and Completion of Documents.
11 DARMO Forwards VOCF/CACF CARP
to DARPO. Form No.
6 B. The Compulsory Acquisition of Haciendas Palico and Banilad
x x x."
DAR A. O. No. 1, Series of 1993, modified the
identification process and increased the number of government
agencies involved in the identification and delineation of the
land subject to acquisition.[56]This time, the Notice of Coverage
is sent to the landowner before the conduct of the field
investigation and the sending must comply with specific
requirements. Representatives of the DAR Municipal Office
(DARMO) must send the Notice of Coverage to the landowner
by personal delivery with proof of service, or by registered mail
with return card, informing him that his property is under CARP
coverage and that if he desires to avail of his right of retention,
he may choose which area he shall retain. The Notice of
Coverage shall also invite the landowner to attend the field
investigation to be scheduled at least two weeks from
notice. The field investigation is for the purpose of identifying
the landholding and determining its suitability for agriculture
and its productivity. A copy of the Notice of Coverage shall be
posted for at least one week on the bulletin board of the
municipal and barangay halls where the property is located. The
date of the field investigation shall also be sent by the DAR
Municipal Office to representatives of the LBP, BARC, DENR
and prospective farmer beneficiaries. The field investigation
shall be conducted on the date set with the participation of the
landowner and the various representatives. If the landowner
and other representatives are absent, the field investigation shall
proceed, provided they were duly notified thereof. Should there
be a variance between the findings of the DAR and the LBP as
to whether the land be placed under agrarian reform, the lands
suitability to agriculture, the degree or development of the
slope, etc., the conflict shall be resolved by a composite team
of the DAR, LBP, DENR and DA which shall jointly conduct
further investigation.The teams findings shall be binding on
both DAR and LBP. After the field investigation, the DAR
Municipal Office shall prepare the Field Investigation Report
and Land Use Map, a copy of which shall be furnished the
landowner by personal delivery with proof of service or
registered mail with return card. Another copy of the Report and
Map shall likewise be posted for at least one week in the
municipal or barangay halls where the property is located.
Clearly then, the notice requirements under the CARL are
not confined to the Notice of Acquisition set forth in Section 16
of the law. They also include the Notice of Coverage first laid
down in DAR A. O. No. 12, Series of 1989 and subsequently
amended in DAR A. O. No. 9, Series of 1990 and DAR A. O.
No. 1, Series of 1993. This Notice of Coverage does not merely
notify the landowner that his property shall be placed under
CARP and that he is entitled to exercise his retention right; it
also notifies him, pursuant to DAR A. O. No. 9, Series of 1990,
that a public hearing shall be conducted where he and
representatives of the concerned sectors of society may attend
to discuss the results of the field investigation, the land
valuation and other pertinent matters. Under DAR A. O. No. 1,
Series of 1993, the Notice of Coverage also informs the
landowner that a field investigation of his landholding shall be
conducted where he and the other representatives may be
present.
In the case at bar, respondent DAR claims that it, through
MARO Leopoldo C. Lejano, sent a letter of invitation entitled
Invitation to Parties dated September 29, 1989 to petitioner
corporation, through Jaime Pimentel, the administrator of
Hacienda Palico.[57] The invitation was received on the same
day it was sent as indicated by a signature and the date received
at the bottom left corner of said invitation.With regard to
Hacienda Banilad, respondent DAR claims that Jaime Pimentel,
administrator also of Hacienda Banilad, was notified and sent
an invitation to the conference. Pimentel actually attended the
conference on September 21, 1989 and signed the Minutes of
the meeting on behalf of petitioner corporation.[58] The Minutes
was also signed by the representatives of the BARC, the LBP
and farmer beneficiaries.[59] No letter of invitation was sent or
conference meeting held with respect to Hacienda Caylaway
because it was subject to a Voluntary Offer to Sell to respondent
DAR.[60]
When respondent DAR, through the Municipal Agrarian
Reform Officer (MARO), sent to the various parties the Notice
of Coverage and invitation to the conference, DAR A. O. No.
12, Series of 1989 was already in effect more than a month
earlier. The Operating Procedure in DAR Administrative Order
No. 12 does not specify how notices or letters of invitation shall
be sent to the landowner, the representatives of the BARC, the
LBP, the farmer beneficiaries and other interested parties. The
procedure in the sending of these notices is important to comply
with the requisites of due process especially when the owner, as
in this case, is a juridical entity. Petitioner is a domestic
corporation,[61] and therefore, has a personality separate and
distinct from its shareholders, officers and employees.
The Notice of Acquisition in Section 16 of the CARL is
required to be sent to the landowner by personal delivery or
registered mail. Whether the landowner be a natural or juridical
person to whose address the Notice may be sent by personal
delivery or registered mail, the law does not distinguish. The
DAR Administrative Orders also do not distinguish. In the
proceedings before the DAR, the distinction between natural
and juridical persons in the sending of notices may be found in
the Revised Rules of Procedure of the DAR Adjudication Board
(DARAB). Service of pleadings before the DARAB is
governed by Section 6, Rule V of the DARAB Revised Rules
of Procedure. Notices and pleadings are served on private
domestic corporations or partnerships in the following manner:
Sec. 6. Service upon Private Domestic Corporation or
Partnership.-- If the defendant is a corporation organized
under the laws of the Philippines or a partnership duly
registered, service may be made on the president, manager,
secretary, cashier, agent, or any of its directors or partners.
Similarly, the Revised Rules of Court of the Philippines,
in Section 13, Rule 14 provides:
Sec. 13. Service upon private domestic corporation or
partnership.If the defendant is a corporation organized under
the laws of the Philippines or a partnership duly
registered, service may be made on the president, manager,
secretary, cashier, agent, or any of its directors.
Summonses, pleadings and notices in cases against a
private domestic corporation before the DARAB and the
regular courts are served on the president, manager, secretary,
cashier, agent or any of its directors. These persons are those
through whom the private domestic corporation or partnership
is capable of action.[62]
Jaime Pimentel is not the president, manager, secretary,
cashier or director of petitioner corporation. Is he, as
administrator of the two Haciendas, considered an agent of the
corporation?
The purpose of all rules for service of process on a
corporation is to make it reasonably certain that the corporation
will receive prompt and proper notice in an action against
it.[63] Service must be made on a representative so integrated
with the corporation as to make it a priori supposable that he
will realize his responsibilities and know what he should do
with any legal papers served on him,[64] and bring home to the
corporation notice of the filing of the action.[65] Petitioners
evidence does not show the official duties of Jaime Pimentel as
administrator of petitioners haciendas. The evidence does not
indicate whether Pimentels duties is so integrated with the
corporation that he would immediately realize his
responsibilities and know what he should do with any legal
papers served on him. At the time the notices were sent and the
preliminary conference conducted, petitioners principal place
of business was listed in respondent DARs records as Soriano
Bldg., Plaza Cervantes, Manila,[66] and 7th Flr. Cacho-Gonzales
Bldg., 101 Aguirre St., Makati, Metro Manila. [67] Pimentel did
not hold office at the principal place of business of petitioner.
Neither did he exercise his functions in Plaza Cervantes, Manila
nor in Cacho-Gonzales Bldg., Makati, Metro Manila. He
performed his official functions and actually resided in the
haciendas in Nasugbu, Batangas, a place over two hundred
kilometers away from Metro Manila.
Curiously, respondent DAR had information of the
address of petitioners principal place of business. The Notices
of Acquisition over Haciendas Palico and Banilad were
addressed to petitioner at its offices in Manila and
Makati. These Notices were sent barely three to four months
after Pimentel was notified of the preliminary
conference. [68] Why respondent DAR chose to notify Pimentel
instead of the officers of the corporation was not explained by
the said respondent.
Nevertheless, assuming that Pimentel was an agent of
petitioner corporation, and the notices and letters of invitation
were validly served on petitioner through him, there is no
showing that Pimentel himself was duly authorized to attend the
conference meeting with the MARO, BARC and LBP
representatives and farmer beneficiaries for purposes of
compulsory acquisition of petitioners landholdings.Even
respondent DARs evidence does not indicate this authority. On
the contrary, petitioner claims that it had no knowledge of the
letter-invitation, hence, could not have given Pimentel the
authority to bind it to whatever matters were discussed or
agreed upon by the parties at the preliminary conference or
public hearing. Notably, one year after Pimentel was informed
of the preliminary conference, DAR A.O. No. 9, Series of 1990
was issued and this required that the Notice of Coverage must
be sent to the landowner concerned or his duly authorized
representative.[69]
Assuming further that petitioner was duly notified of the
CARP coverage of its haciendas, the areas found actually
subject to CARP were not properly identified before they were

taken over by respondent DAR. Respondents insist that the
lands were identified because they are all registered property
and the technical description in their respective titles specifies
their metes and bounds. Respondents admit at the same time,
however, that not all areas in the haciendas were placed under
the comprehensive agrarian reform program invariably by
reason of elevation or character or use of the land. [70] The
acquisition of the landholdings did not cover the entire expanse
of the two haciendas, but only portions thereof. Hacienda Palico
has an area of 1,024 hectares and only 688.7576 hectares were
targetted for acquisition. Hacienda Banilad has an area of 1,050
hectares but only 964.0688 hectares were subject to CARP. The
haciendas are not entirely agricultural lands. In fact, the various
tax declarations over the haciendas describe the landholdings as
sugarland, and forest, sugarland, pasture land, horticulture and
woodland.[71]
Under Section 16 of the CARL, the sending of the Notice
of Acquisition specifically requires that the land subject to land
reform be first identified. The two haciendas in the instant case
cover vast tracts of land. Before Notices of Acquisition were
sent to petitioner, however, the exact areas of the landholdings
were not properly segregated and delineated. Upon receipt of
this notice, therefore, petitioner corporation had no idea which
portions of its estate were subject to compulsory acquisition,
which portions it could rightfully retain, whether these retained
portions were compact or contiguous, and which portions were
excluded from CARP coverage. Even respondent DARs
evidence does not show that petitioner, through its duly
authorized representative, was notified of any ocular inspection
and investigation that was to be conducted by respondent
DAR. Neither is there proof that petitioner was given the
opportunity to at least choose and identify its retention area in
those portions to be acquired compulsorily. The right of
retention and how this right is exercised, is guaranteed in
Section 6 of the CARL, viz:
Section 6. Retention Limits.x x x.
The right to choose the area to be retained, which shall be
compact or contiguous, shall pertain to the landowner;
Provided, however, That in case the area selected for retention
by the landowner is tenanted, the tenant shall have the option
to choose whether to remain therein or be a beneficiary in the
same or another agricultural land with similar or comparable
features. In case the tenant chooses to remain in the retained
area, he shall be considered a leaseholder and shall lose his
right to be a beneficiary under this Act. In case the tenant
chooses to be a beneficiary in another agricultural land, he
loses his right as a leaseholder to the land retained by the
landowner. The tenant must exercise this option within a
period of one (1) year from the time the landowner manifests
his choice of the area for retention.
Under the law, a landowner may retain not more than five
hectares out of the total area of his agricultural land subject to
CARP. The right to choose the area to be retained, which shall
be compact or contiguous, pertains to the landowner. If the area
chosen for retention is tenanted, the tenant shall have the option
to choose whether to remain on the portion or be a beneficiary
in the same or another agricultural land with similar or
comparable features.
C. The Voluntary Acquisition of Hacienda Caylaway
Petitioner was also left in the dark with respect to
Hacienda Caylaway, which was the subject of a Voluntary
Offer to Sell (VOS). The VOS in the instant case was made on
May 6, 1988,[72] before the effectivity of R.A. 6657 on June 15,
1988. VOS transactions were first governed by DAR
Administrative Order No. 19, series of 1989, [73] and under this
order, all VOS filed before June 15, 1988 shall be heard and
processed in accordance with the procedure provided for in
Executive Order No. 229, thus:
III. All VOS transactions which are now pending before the
DAR and for which no payment has been made shall be
subject to the notice and hearing requirements provided in
Administrative Order No. 12, Series of 1989, dated 26 July
1989, Section II, Subsection A, paragraph 3.
All VOS filed before 15 June 1988, the date of effectivity of
the CARL, shall be heard and processed in accordance with
the procedure provided for in Executive Order No. 229.
"x x x."
Section 9 of E.O. 229 provides:
Sec. 9. Voluntary Offer to Sell. The government shall purchase
all agricultural lands it deems productive and suitable to
farmer cultivation voluntarily offered for sale to it at a
valuation determined in accordance with Section 6. Such
transaction shall be exempt from the payment of capital gains
tax and other taxes and fees.
Executive Order 229 does not contain the procedure for
the identification of private land as set forth in DAR A. O. No.
12, Series of 1989. Section 5 of E.O. 229 merely reiterates the
procedure of acquisition in Section 16, R.A. 6657. In other
words, the E.O. is silent as to the procedure for the identification
of the land, the notice of coverage and the preliminary
conference with the landowner, representatives of the BARC,
the LBP and farmer beneficiaries. Does this mean that these
requirements may be dispensed with regard to VOS filed before
June 15, 1988? The answer is no.
First of all, the same E.O. 229, like Section 16 of the
CARL, requires that the land, landowner and beneficiaries of
the land subject to agrarian reform be identified before the
notice of acquisition should be issued.[74] Hacienda Caylaway
was voluntarily offered for sale in 1989. The Hacienda has a
total area of 867.4571 hectares and is covered by four (4)
titles. In two separate Resolutions both dated January 12, 1989,
respondent DAR, through the Regional Director, formally
accepted the VOS over two of these four titles.[75] The land
covered by the two titles has an area of 855.5257 hectares, but
only 648.8544 hectares thereof fell within the coverage of R.A.
6657.[76] Petitioner claims it does not know where these
portions are located.
Respondent DAR, on the other hand, avers that surveys on
the land covered by the four titles were conducted in 1989, and
that petitioner, as landowner, was not denied participation
therein. The results of the survey and the land valuation
summary report, however, do not indicate whether notices to
attend the same were actually sent to and received by petitioner
or its duly authorized representative.[77] To reiterate, Executive
Order No. 229 does not lay down the operating procedure,
much less the notice requirements, before the VOS is accepted
by respondent DAR. Notice to the landowner, however, cannot
be dispensed with. It is part of administrative due process and
is an essential requisite to enable the landowner himself to
exercise, at the very least, his right of retention guaranteed
under the CARL.
III. The Conversion of the three Haciendas.
It is petitioners claim that the three haciendas are not
subject to agrarian reform because they have been declared for
tourism, not agricultural purposes.[78] In 1975, then President
Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1520 declaring the
municipality of Nasugbu, Batangas a tourist zone. Lands in
Nasugbu, including the subject haciendas, were allegedly
reclassified as non-agricultural 13 years before the effectivity
of R. A. No. 6657.[79] In 1993, the Regional Director for Region
IV of the Department of Agriculture certified that the haciendas
are not feasible and sound for agricultural development. [80] On
March 20, 1992, pursuant to Proclamation No. 1520, the
Sangguniang Bayan of Nasugbu, Batangas adopted Resolution
No. 19 reclassifying certain areas of Nasugbu as non-
agricultural.[81] This Resolution approved Municipal Ordinance
No. 19, Series of 1992, the Revised Zoning Ordinance of
Nasugbu[82] which zoning ordinance was based on a Land Use
Plan for Planning Areas for New Development allegedly
prepared by the University of the Philippines.[83] Resolution No.
19 of the Sangguniang Bayan was approved by the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Batangas on March 8, 1993. [84]
Petitioner claims that Proclamation No. 1520 was also
upheld by respondent DAR in 1991 when it approved
conversion of 1,827 hectares in Nasugbu into a tourist area
known as the Batulao Resort Complex, and 13.52 hectares in
Barangay Caylaway as within the potential tourist
belt. [85] Petitioner presents evidence before us that these areas
are adjacent to the haciendas subject of this petition, hence, the
haciendas should likewise be converted. Petitioner urges this
Court to take cognizance of the conversion proceedings and rule
accordingly.[86]
We do not agree. Respondent DARs failure to observe due
process in the acquisition of petitioners landholdings does
not ipso facto give this Court the power to adjudicate over
petitioners application for conversion of its haciendas from
agricultural to non-agricultural. The agency charged with the
mandate of approving or disapproving applications for
conversion is the DAR.
At the time petitioner filed its application for conversion,
the Rules of Procedure governing the processing and approval
of applications for land use conversion was the DAR A. O. No.
2, Series of 1990.Under this A. O., the application for
conversion is filed with the MARO where the property is
located. The MARO reviews the application and its supporting
documents and conducts field investigation and ocular
inspection of the property. The findings of the MARO are
subject to review and evaluation by the Provincial Agrarian
Reform Officer (PARO). The PARO may conduct further field
investigation and submit a supplemental report together with
his recommendation to the Regional Agrarian Reform Officer
(RARO) who shall review the same. For lands less than five
hectares, the RARO shall approve or disapprove applications
for conversion. For lands exceeding five hectares, the RARO
shall evaluate the PARO Report and forward the records and
his report to the Undersecretary for Legal Affairs.Applications
over areas exceeding fifty hectares are approved or disapproved
by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform.
The DARs mandate over applications for conversion was
first laid down in Section 4 (j) and Section 5 (1) of Executive
Order No. 129-A, Series of 1987 and reiterated in the CARL
and Memorandum Circular No. 54, Series of 1993 of the Office
of the President. The DARs jurisdiction over applications for
conversion is provided as follows:
"A. The Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) is
mandated to approve or disapprove applications
for conversion, restructuring or readjustment of
agricultural lands into non-agricultural uses,
pursuant to Section 4 (j) of Executive Order No.
129-A, Series of 1987.
"B. Section 5 (1) of E.O. 129-A, Series of 1987,
vests in the DAR, exclusive authority to approve
or disapprove applications for conversion of
agricultural lands for residential, commercial,
industrial and other land uses.
"C Section 65 of R. A. No. 6657, otherwise known
as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of
1988, likewise empowers the DAR to authorize
under certain conditions, the conversion of
agricultural lands.
"D. Section 4 of Memorandum Circular No. 54,
Series of 1993 of the Office of the President,
provides that action on applications for land use
conversion on individual landholdings shall
remain as the responsibility of the DAR, which
shall utilize as its primary reference, documents
on the comprehensive land use plans and
accompanying ordinances passed upon and
approved by the local government units
concerned, together with the National Land Use
Policy, pursuant to R. A. No. 6657 and E. O. No.
129-A.[87]
Applications for conversion were initially governed by
DAR A. O. No. 1, Series of 1990 entitled Revised Rules and
Regulations Governing Conversion of Private Agricultural
Lands and Non-Agricultural Uses, and DAR A. O. No. 2, Series
of 1990 entitled Rules of Procedure Governing the Processing
and Approval of Applications for Land Use Conversion. These
A.O.s and other implementing guidelines, including
Presidential issuances and national policies related to land use
conversion have been consolidated in DAR A. O. No. 07, Series
of 1997. Under this recent issuance, the guiding principle in
land use conversion is:
to preserve prime agricultural lands for food production while,
at the same time, recognizing the need of the other sectors of
society (housing, industry and commerce) for land, when
coinciding with the objectives of the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law to promote social justice, industrialization and
the optimum use of land as a national resource for public
welfare.[88]
Land Use refers to the manner of utilization of land,
including its allocation, development and management. Land
Use Conversion refers to the act or process of changing the
current use of a piece of agricultural land into some other use
as approved by the DAR.[89] The conversion of agricultural land
to uses other than agricultural requires field investigation and
conferences with the occupants of the land. They involve
factual findings and highly technical matters within the special
training and expertise of the DAR. DAR A. O. No. 7, Series of
1997 lays down with specificity how the DAR must go about
its task. This time, the field investigation is not conducted by
the MARO but by a special task force, known as the Center for
Land Use Policy Planning and Implementation (CLUPPI- DAR
Central Office). The procedure is that once an application for
conversion is filed, the CLUPPI prepares the Notice of
Posting. The MARO only posts the notice and thereafter issues
a certificate to the fact of posting. The CLUPPI conducts the
field investigation and dialogues with the applicants and the
farmer beneficiaries to ascertain the information necessary for
the processing of the application. The Chairman of the CLUPPI
deliberates on the merits of the investigation report and
recommends the appropriate action. This recommendation is
transmitted to the Regional Director, thru the Undersecretary,
or Secretary of Agrarian Reform. Applications involving more
than fifty hectares are approved or disapproved by the
Secretary. The procedure does not end with the Secretary,
however. The Order provides that the decision of the Secretary
may be appealed to the Office of the President or the Court of
Appeals, as the case may be, viz:
Appeal from the decision of the Undersecretary shall be made
to the Secretary, and from the Secretary to the Office of the
President or the Court of Appeals as the case may be. The
mode of appeal/ motion for reconsideration, and the appeal
fee, from Undersecretary to the Office of the Secretary shall
be the same as that of the Regional Director to the Office of
the Secretary.[90]
Indeed, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not
warrant a court to arrogate unto itself authority to resolve a
controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with
an administrative body of special competence.[91] Respondent
DAR is in a better position to resolve petitioners application for
conversion, being primarily the agency possessing the
necessary expertise on the matter. The power to determine
whether Haciendas Palico, Banilad and Caylaway are non-
agricultural, hence, exempt from the coverage of the CARL lies
with the DAR, not with this Court.
Finally, we stress that the failure of respondent DAR to
comply with the requisites of due process in the acquisition
proceedings does not give this Court the power to nullify the
CLOAs already issued to the farmer beneficiaries. To assume
the power is to short-circuit the administrative process, which
has yet to run its regular course. Respondent DAR must be
given the chance to correct its procedural lapses in the
acquisition proceedings. In Hacienda Palico alone, CLOA's
were issued to 177 farmer beneficiaries in 1993. [92] Since then
until the present, these farmers have been cultivating their
lands.[93] It goes against the basic precepts of justice, fairness
and equity to deprive these people, through no fault of their
own, of the land they till. Anyhow, the farmer beneficiaries
hold the property in trust for the rightful owner of the land.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is granted in part and
the acquisition proceedings over the three haciendas are
nullified for respondent DAR's failure to observe due process
therein. In accordance with the guidelines set forth in this
decision and the applicable administrative procedure, the case
is hereby remanded to respondent DAR for proper acquisition
proceedings and determination of petitioner's application for
conversion.
SO ORDERED.
Government of USA vs Purganan
APRIL 9, 2014
Government of USA vs Purganan
G.R. No. 148571. September 24, 2002
Facts:This Petition is really a sequel to GR No. 139465
entitled Secretary of Justice v. Ralph C. Lantion where the
court held that Jimenez was bereft of the right to notice and
hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process.
Finding no more legal obstacle, the Government of the United
States of America, represented by the Philippine DOJ, filed
with the RTC on 18 May 2001, the appropriate Petition for
Extradition which was docketed as Extradition Case 01192061.
The Petition alleged, inter alia, that Jimenez was the subject of
an arrest warrant issued by the United States District Court for
the Southern District of Florida on 15 April 1999.
Before the RTC could act on the Petition, Jimenez filed before
it an “Urgent Manifestation/Ex-Parte Motion,” which prayed
that Jimenez’s application for an arrest warrant be set for
hearing. In its 23 May 2001 Order, the RTC granted the Motion
of Jimenez and set the case for hearing on 5 June 2001. In that
hearing, Jimenez manifested its reservations on the procedure
adopted by the trial court allowing the accused in an extradition
case to be heard prior to the issuance of a warrant of arrest.
After the hearing, the court a quo required the parties to submit
their respective memoranda. In his Memorandum, Jimenez
sought an alternative prayer: that in case a warrant should issue,
he be allowed to post bail in the amount of P100,000.
The alternative prayer of Jimenez was also set for hearing on 15
June 2001. Thereafter, the court below issued its 3 July 2001
Order, directing the issuance of warrant for his arrest and fixing
bail for his temporary liberty at P1 million in cash. After he had Respondent Jimenez cites the foreign case Parettiin arguing
surrendered his passport and posted the required cash bond, that, constitutionally, “[n]o one shall be deprived of x x x
Jimenez was granted provisional liberty via the challenged liberty x x x without due process of law.”
Order dated 4 July 2001. Hence, this petition. Contrary to his contention, his detention prior to the conclusion
of the extradition proceedings does not amount to a violation of
his right to due process. We iterate the familiar doctrine that the
Issues: 1.Whether Jimenez is entitled to notice and hearing
essence of due process is the opportunity to be heard but, at the
before a warrant for his arrest can be issued
same time, point out that the doctrine does not always call for
2. Whether he is entitled to bail and to provisional liberty
a prior opportunity to be heard. Where the circumstances —
while the extradition proceedings are pending such as those present in an extradition case — call for it,
Held: a subsequent opportunity to be heard is enough. In the present
1. No.
case, respondent will be given full opportunity to be heard
To determine probable cause for the issuance of arrest warrants,
subsequently, when the extradition court hears the Petition for
the Constitution itself requires only the examination — under
Extradition. Hence, there is no violation of his right to due
oath or affirmation — of complainants and the witnesses they
process and fundamental fairness.
may produce. There is no requirement to notify and hear
the accused before the issuance of warrants of arrest.
At most, in cases of clear insufficiency of evidence on record,
judges merely further
examine complainants and their witnesses. In the present case,
validating the act of respondent judge and instituting the
practice of hearing the accused and his witnesses at this early
stage would be discordant with the rationale for the entire
system. If the accused were allowed to be heard and
necessarily to present evidence during the prima
facie determination for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, what
would stop him from presenting his entire plethora of defenses
at this stage — if he so desires — in his effort to negate a prima
facie finding? Such a procedure could convert the
determination of a prima facie case into a full-blown trial of the
entire proceedings and possibly make trial of the main case
superfluous. This scenario is also anathema to the summary
nature of extraditions.
***Upon receipt of a petition for extradition and its supporting
documents, the judge must study them and make, as soon as
possible, a prima facie finding whether (a) they are sufficient in
form and substance, (b) they show compliance with the
Extradition Treaty and Law, and (c) the person sought is
extraditable. At his discretion, the judge may require the
submission of further documentation or may personally
examine the affiants and witnesses of the petitioner. If, in spite
of this study and examination, no prima facie finding is
possible, the petition may be dismissed at the discretion of the
judge.
On the other hand, if the presence of a prima facie case is
determined, then the magistrate must immediately issue a
warrant for the arrest of the extraditee, who is at the same time
summoned to answer the petition and to appear at scheduled
summary hearings. Prior to the issuance of the warrant, the
judge must not inform or notify the potential extraditee of the
pendency of the petition, lest the latter be given the opportunity
to escape and frustrate the proceedings. In our opinion, the
foregoing procedure will “best serve the ends of justice” in
extradition cases.***
2. No.
Extradition cases are different from ordinary criminal
proceedings. The constitutional right to bail “flows from the
presumption of innocence in favor of every accused who should
not be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would
be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond
reasonable doubt.”It follows that the constitutional provision on
bail will not apply to a case like extradition, where the
presumption of innocence is not at issue.