FEBRUARY 2018

ISSUE NO. 228

The Rising Role of Buddhism in

India’s Soft Power Strategy
SHANTANU KISHWAR

ABSTRACT The Modi-led government is placing a strong accent on the use of soft
power in India's foreign policy. One of the more novel manifestations of these initiatives
has been engagement in Buddhist diplomacy. The Buddhist faith, due to its emphasis on
peaceful co-existence and its wide pan-Asian presence, lends itself well to soft-power
diplomacy. This brief will examine India’s attempts at leveraging its historical and
present-day associations with the faith, alongside similar attempts by the Chinese state.

INTRODUCTION

Since the time ‘soft power’ was conceptualised factor in determining the degree to which a
by Joseph Nye in the 1990s, the idea has nation commanded power in the international
gained more traction in foreign-policy system.1
discussions across the world. In recognition of
the changing nature of international relations Post-independence, India has always been
and a turn (at least in rhetoric) towards cognizant of the need to not make military
peaceful global interaction, Nye posited that power the basis of the country’s foreign policy.
conventional hard-power tactics predicated on From the time of Jawaharlal Nehru’s
military might would no longer be the sole Panchsheel principles, India has been guided

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 The Rising Role of Buddhism in India’s Soft Power Strategy
by the ideals of peaceful co-existence. Though
India’s position in the international system
has evolved significantly since—and today the
rhetoric of India’s great-power aspirations is
increasingly heard—ideas that advocate for
non-coercive power projection are still
important to foreign-policy formulations.
This brief studies one particular facet of
Indian soft power projection: the leveraging of
India’s historical associations with the
Buddhist faith in diplomacy and foreign
policy. First, the brief locates this form of soft
power projection within theoretical models of
soft power. It then seeks to understand why
Buddhism in particular lends itself to this
form of soft power projection, and explains
why India is in a favourable position to exploit
this. Initiatives undertaken by India within
the realm of Buddhist diplomacy shall then be
examined in the context of competition with
China’s own efforts at Buddhist diplomacy.
The brief concludes with a qualitative review
of these efforts and offers recommendations
for future action.
This brief rests upon the assumption that
soft power is a useful tool that can be
employed in the fulfilment of foreign-policy
objectives. The reason this must be stated is
because there is a debate as to the potency of
soft power; while this is a fruitful conversation
that deserves to be engaged with, it is not the
aim of this brief.
BACKGROUND TO INDIA’S SOFT POWER
In his book, Communicating India’s Soft Power:
Buddha to Bollywood, Daya Kishan Thussu
noted that the ‘Indic civilisation’, as he and
others have termed it, has given birth to a
2 ORF ISSUE BRIEF No. 228
number of major religions in the world and
over time has assimilated into its social fabric
numerous others. Sciences, spirituality, art
and faith that developed over millennia in the
subcontinent found their way across other
regions, earning India a considerable amount
of ‘soft power’ long before the term itself was
2
coined. Owing to this, present-day India is
well poised to draw upon religious and faith-
based associations with countries across the
globe.
The present BJP government adopted the
Panchamrit principles to guide its foreign
policy, in actively promoting India’s image as a
rising global power. The fifth of these five
principles is sanskriti evam sabhyata (cultural
and civilisational links), which expresses the
government’s desire to leverage India’s rich
historical cultural links with other countries as
3
a part of its non-coercive soft power strategy.
This form of soft power projection is an
aberration with respect to Nye’s conception of
soft power, which was predicated on the
possession of something that could be
exported to other countries. When one looks
at the experience of the US, for example, it is
understandable that Nye would come to this
conclusion, for the US’ soft power was based
on its export of not only commercial products
such as MTV, Coca Cola and McDonalds, but
also ‘values’ including democracy. Certain
aspects of Indian soft power, such as
Bollywood and Yoga, follow a similar model.
The particular aspect of soft power discussed
in this brief, however, relies not on the export
of a cultural product, but on promoting certain
shared religious and cultural associations,
thereby creating a mutually erected platform
upon which further relations are based.
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 The Rising Role of Buddhism in India’s Soft Power Strategy
Although such efforts are popularly studied
under the ambit of soft power, it would do well
to question whether it would be better to
simply call them “attempts at cultural
diplomacy”.
Examples of religious associations being
used to augment foreign policy are not
restricted to Buddhism. For instance, around
the time of Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s
historic visit to Israel in July 2017, observers
made constant references to India’s history
with Judaism and its reputation for being a
safe haven for Jews at a time of their
prosecution in their native lands.4 Meanwhile,
with respect to Islam, India has sought
membership to the Organisation of Islamic
Cooperation (OIC) on the grounds that it has
the second largest Muslim population in the
5
world. This brief elects to devote attention to
Buddhism as it possesses the greatest
potential for soft power usage, for reasons
that will be discussed in the following section.
WHY BUDDHISM?
Buddhism’s potential utility in foreign policy
is derived to a large extent from the manner in
which the faith was revived in the aftermath of
the Second World War. The revival of the faith
had a decidedly internationalist outlook to it,
and focused on transgressing extant sectarian
and geographical boundaries. This was
facilitated by the foundation of a number of
organisations and the convening of numerous
councils and conferences in the decades after
the war that emphasised on transnational
cooperation amongst various sects of
Buddhism. This began with a conference
organised in newly independent Sri Lanka,
where the World Fellowship of Buddhists was
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6
founded. In 1952, under the prime
ministership of Jawaharlal Nehru, India
hosted the International Buddhist Conference
in Sanchi that was attended by over 3,000
Buddhist nuns, monks, and historians. At that
time, this was one of the largest gatherings of
Buddhist preachers and followers in the
7
world. In 1954, the Sixth Buddhist Council
was convened in Burma.8 In the decades since,
the tradition of holding conferences and
c o nv e n i n g c o u n c i l s h a s c o n t i n u e d ,
strengthening the global network of
Buddhism.
In East Asia, Japan and South Korea began
embracing their Buddhist heritage as they
recovered in the decades following the end of
the Second World War, as did a number of
former members of the Soviet Union after the
9
Cold War. Today, 97 percent of the world’s
Buddhist population lives in the Asian
continent, and a number of countries such as
Bhutan, Myanmar, Thailand, and Sri Lanka
conceive of Buddhism as intrinsic to their
10
national values and identity.
It is within this context that one can
understand the efforts of the Indian
government at incorporating Buddhist
heritage in order to form a basis for further
diplomatic, economic, cultural, and strategic
associations within its foreign policy. The
established transnational network for
Buddhism, and the important role played by
the faith in the lives of millions across the
world, is what allows it to possess potential for
Indian foreign policy. The pan-Asian presence
of the religion and its importance for national
identities in the region, coupled with its image
as a peaceful religion makes it ideal for soft
3
 The Rising Role of Buddhism in India’s Soft Power Strategy
power diplomacy, with its focus on non-
coercive power.
WHY INDIA?
Despite the fact that it is host to a relatively
small population of Buddhists in terms of
proportion, India is in a position to claim
legitimacy in its promotion of Buddhist
diplomacy for a number of reasons. First, the
Buddhist faith originated in India, therefore
granting it singular historical legitimacy.
Second, India has numerous sites of
importance to the Buddhist faith, such as
Bodh Gaya, Sarnath, and Nalanda. Third, India
has nurtured an image of being a protector of
the persecuted because of the presence of the
Dalai Lama and the Tibetan parliament-in-
exile in the city of Dharamshala following their
failed insurrection against China.11 In addition
to ties with Tibetan Buddhism, historical links
to Theravada Buddhism means that India is in
a good position to further relations with other
Buddhist countries and create conversation
between multiple streams of this faith.
Successfully leveraging these associations
with other Buddhist countries could have an
impact beyond the realm of cultural
diplomacy, and aid in other areas of foreign
policy as well. Interestingly, the relationship
between Buddhism and state diplomacy is not
a new one, and dates back to the days of
Emperor Ashoka, who following his adoption
of the religion began the practice of
dharmavijaya or conquest through Dharma.12
Deepening ties with Asian nations on the basis
of Buddhism could potentially feed into larger
policy objectives of the government, namely,
the ‘Neighbourhood First’ policy, and the ‘Act
East’ policy.
4 ORF ISSUE BRIEF No. 228
AVENUES OF DEPLOYMENT OF
BUDDHIST HERITAGE
Symbolic Gestures
At the most basic level, Prime Minister Modi
has made it a point to make Buddhism a
regular feature of his diplomatic visits. In
speeches made on official international visits
such as to Sri Lanka and China, among others,
Modi has made a conscious effort to
emphasise shared Buddhist heritage.
Additionally, on trips to foreign countries, the
prime minister reserves one day for visits to
Buddhist temples wherever possible. Modi has
often spoken at a number of occasions
domestically, where he has hailed the
importance of the Buddhist faith for the
development of both India and the world.
13
The Dalai Lama and Competition with China
As in most other areas of political significance,
India has found competition from China in the
realm of Buddhist diplomacy. Even though
China may be the strongest country in Asia in
terms of economy and military, the projection
of its Buddhist heritage feeds into its desire of
furthering its influence over cultural life in
Asia. This can also be seen in how China is
using the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to
further its politico-economic reach in the
continent.
China’s attempts at popularisation and
projection of Buddhism are somewhat at odds
with the avowedly godless nature of the
Communist Party and the Chinese state. It is
also anathema to China’s persecution of
Buddhists during the Cultural Revolution.
However, in recognition of the
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 The Rising Role of Buddhism in India’s Soft Power Strategy
aforementioned potential that the religion
holds in the area of diplomacy, it has made it a
crucial part of its soft power strategy for the
continent. The Chinese state promotes the
religion on the grounds of its historical
association, and the fact that it also possesses
the largest Buddhist population of any
country in the world.
The most prominent manifestation of
India and China’s rivalry in the sphere of
Buddhist diplomacy relates to the issue of the
Dalai Lama. The presence of the Dalai Lama
and the Tibetan government-in-exile in
Dharamshala in North India has bolstered
India’s image in the global Buddhist
community. However, given that the Chinese
state regards the Dalai Lama and his followers
to be of an “anti-China splittist nature” that
threatens Chinese sovereignty, this has been a
source of contention between the two
14
countries. In 2011 for example, India hosted
the Global Buddhist Congregation to mark the
2,600 t h anniversar y of the Buddha’s
enlightenment. The event was the first major
Buddhist conference held by India in over 50
years, and therefore of crucial importance for
India’s Buddhist diplomacy efforts. The Dalai
Lama’s participation in the event was objected
to strongly by the Chinese, who cancelled
border talks with India that were scheduled for
the same month.
15
Two similar incidents occurred early in
2017 as well. In March, the Dalai Lama was
invited to inaugurate a seminar on ‘Buddhism
in the 21st Century’ in Rajgir, Bihar. This act
was condemned by the Chinese state who
urged India to “respect China’s core concerns
and avoid China-India relations from being
further disrupted and undermined”.16 In April,
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when the Dalai Lama visited Tawang, an
important site for Buddhists as it was where
the sixth Dalai Lama was born,17 his visit
became a cause for concern for the Chinese, as
many saw it affecting the issue of the Dalai
L a m a ’s re i n c a r n at i o n . T h e C h i n e s e
government, as per their 2007 State
Administration for Religious Affairs
regulations, has granted to itself the power of
approving the next Dalai Lama (in a similar
manner to what they had done to the Panchen
Lama), thereby ignoring the choice of the
present Dalai Lama and further strengthening
their control over Tibetan Buddhism.
18
Religious Tourism
The popular practice of religious tourism has
been identified as an avenue of expansion that
holds great promise. Though India is currently
home to seven of the eight most significant
Buddhist sites in the world, it receives less
than one percent of global Buddhist tourism.
South East Asian nations such as Thailand and
Indonesia were the prime recipients of such
19
tourism.
To remedy this and further project the
importance of India in the Buddhist world, the
Ministry of Tourism is promoting a number of
tourist circuits that transgress national
borders. A press release from the Ministry of
C u l t u r e i n M a rc h 2 0 1 5 n o t e d t h e
identification of a Buddhist tourist circuit that
would involve visits to various sites in Nepal,
such as Lumbini and Kapilavastu.20 On a larger
and more ambitious scale, the joint statement
released following the BIMSTEC Leaders’
Retreat in 2016 contained within it provisions
for the organisation of a Buddhist circuit
within the region.21
5
 The Rising Role of Buddhism in India’s Soft Power Strategy
Academic Initiatives
As mentioned earlier, the revival of Buddhism
was buoyed by the international conferences
organised and councils convened that
facilitated interaction between members
across sectarian and national boundaries. To
capitalise on this trend, a number of
conferences that draw global audiences are
organised, such as the previously mentioned
‘Buddhism in the 21st Century’ conference
that took place at Rajgir in 2017. In October
2016, the ‘5th International Buddhist
Conclave’ was organised in Varanasi by the
Ministry of Tourism, which was attended by
22
over 240 delegates from 39 countries. The
agenda for the conclave included business
meetings between tour international and
domestic tour operators, giving further
23
impetus to the proposed tourist circuits. In
2015, the ‘Hindu-Buddhist Initiative on
Conflict Avoidance’ was organised by the
Vivekananda International Foundation and
the Tokyo Foundation in Bodh Gaya, and
inaugurated by Prime Minister Modi
24
himself. This conference was of particular
importance because of the emphasis laid on
the relationship shared by Hinduism and
Buddhism, which was projected as one of
mutual benefit and growth instead of one of
antagonism.
The most important project in the domain
of academia to have been undertaken is that of
the Nalanda University, begun by the previous
UPA government and continued by the
incumbent. The launch of the university was a
pan-Asian initiative that was funded by
numerous countries and envisioned, in the
words of Ambassador P. Stobdan, as “the
6 ORF ISSUE BRIEF No. 228
centre-piece of Asian civilization, to focus on
the process of Asian renaissance, for
reconnecting Asian people and societies, and
for reconstructing Asian values and ethos for
the long-term benefit of Asia, and indeed the
25
world.” The establishment of a successful,
world-class research institution would go a
long way in placing India at the helm of the
world Buddhist order, and improving India’s
stature in the Buddhist academic community.
However, with domestic politics and
inefficiency hobbling the project, this does
not seem likely to be opened any time soon.
Despite construction of the 455-acre campus
having been slated to begin in 2012, as late as
2016, not even a foundation stone had been
26
laid. Further, the academic programmes that
are being conducted out of a temporary
campus have been plagued by political
pressures on professors who were offering
27
courses that were deemed ‘problematic’. One
of the most glaring shortcomings in the
university establishment is the lack of
involvement of the Dalai Lama, whose
presence in such a project would have been
assumed to be certain.
Evidently, though this is a much discussed
project with a significant amount of
international investment, the lack of full-time
faculty and proper infrastructure has plagued
any hope of successful revival of the ancient
centre of learning. China, meanwhile, saw an
opportunity for itself and launched its own
Nalanda University, also known as the Nanhai
Buddhist College, in its Hainan Province.
Academic sessions here began in 2017, with
220 students set to enrol, and with
partnerships with Buddhist centres in Sri
Lanka, Nepal, Thailand and Cambodia.28
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 The Rising Role of Buddhism in India’s Soft Power Strategy
CONCLUSION
Theoretically speaking, the variety of India’s
soft power diplomacy has expanded the scope
of soft power rhetoric, by allowing for shared
cultural development instead of the export of
cultural products. However, in the realm of
practical outputs the Indian government is
found wanting when it comes to Buddhist
diplomacy. Ambassador P. Stobdan said in an
interview that “Buddhism was India’s ancient
geopolitical tool that could still be employed to
meet the challenges of the new millennium.”29
W hile there has been a definite
acknowledgement of this fact in government
rhetoric, the effort has not been put in to truly
capitalise on this.
One aspect in which the Indian
government has been decisive is in standing
its ground against China's demands in 2017
regarding the Dalai Lama. This however, is
perhaps the easiest of areas for decisive action
to be taken for it is short-term in nature and
requires little sustained effort on the part of
the government. The most important move to
be made with respect to the Dalai Lama would
be to involve him closely with the
development of the Nalanda University,
though there is no indication that this will
happen. What will be crucial in the coming
years is India’s response to the Chinese
appointment of the next Dalai Lama, given
that a great deal of authority is derived from
the presence of the current Dalai Lama.
The Modi government must move beyond
mere tokenism – visiting temples and
Buddhist shrines on official tours can take one
only so far. What India has in its favour at the
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moment is an abundance of resources by way
of pilgrimage sites, the presence of the Dalai
Lama, and international goodwill, as well as
the right intentions. In terms of initiatives on
the international level, the government must
also ensure that it does not direct its efforts
solely at Tibetan Buddhism, and make
directed attempts at promoting connections
with other Buddhist schools of thought.
Effective revitalisation of the Nalanda
University project and encouragement of
Buddhist studies in well-established
universities across the country must take
place, to ensure that a diverse variety of
thought that goes beyond just Tibetan
Buddhism is brought in and that it is not only
the duty on the Nalanda project to produce
Buddhist scholarship. The study of ancient
languages like Pali in which a number of
Buddhist texts have been written would also
be necessary for the holistic development of
Buddhist academia. Entire schools of
Buddhist thought, such as Nagarjuna
Buddhism, remain largely unexplored in
academic study, further expanding the scope
for research to be encouraged and funded.
The promotion of Buddhist tourism
reminiscent of the ‘Incredible India’ campaign
is required to popularise India’s association
with the faith internationally. In addition to
advertisement, proper management of tourist
sites is a must. Inspiration for this can be taken
from the effective management of the Kumbh
Mela, which due to its successful organisation
became the subject of a Harvard Business
30
Review case study in 2013.
Having displayed adequate intent to
bolster India’s position in the Buddhist world,
7
 The Rising Role of Buddhism in India’s Soft Power Strategy

the present government faces the crucial strengthening its relations with Asian
challenge of effective execution. This would go countries, and helping it further down the path
a long way in countering the rise of China, of its regional and global power ambitions.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Shantanu Kishwar is a graduate of Literary and Cultural Studies and International Studies from FLAME
University, Pune. He interned at ORF between August and November 2017.

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ENDNOTES

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2. Daya Kishan Thussu. “The Historical Context of India's Soft Power.” Communicating India's
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3. “ Panch s he el G i ve s Way to Pa nch am r i t .” T h e Tele g ra ph , A pr i l 4 , 2015,

https://www.telegraphindia.com/1150404/jsp/nation/story_12587.jsp

4. Madhu Purnima Kishwar, “Modi Visit Signals Historic Shift in Indo-Israel Relations.” The
Jerusalem Post, July 3, 2017, http://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/Modis-Visit/Modi-visit-
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5. “In a First, Indian to Attend Organisation of Islamic Nations' Meet.” The Quint, September 28,
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6. Juyan Zhang, 'Revival of Buddhism after the WWII'. Buddhist Diplomacy: History and Status
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7. Suresh K. Sharma and Usha Sharma, “The Great Sanchi Congregation.”Cultural and Religious
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8. Juyan Zhang, 'Revival of Buddhism after the WWII'. Buddhist Diplomacy: History and Status
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9. Juyan Zhang,'Revival of Buddhism after the WWII'. Buddhist Diplomacy: History and Status
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10. P. Stobdan, “As China Pushes for a 'Buddhist' Globalisation, India Isn't Making the Most of Its
Legacy.” The Wire, May 15, 2017.https://thewire.in/133670/india-china-buddhist/

11. Rishika Chauhan, “Modi and Buddhism: Between Culture and Faith Based Diplomacy.” ORF
Occasional Papers, (November 2015): 4-5.

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13. Rishika Chauhan, “Modi and Buddhism: Between Culture and Faith Based Diplomacy.” ORF
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14. “China Warns India over Invite to Dalai Lama to Buddhist Meet.” The Economic Times, March 20,
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Occasional Papers, November 2015, pp. 10.

16. “China Warns India over Invite to Dalai Lama to Buddhist Meet.” The Economic Times, March20,

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17. G. Parthasarathy, “When the Dalai Lama Visited Tawang.” The Hindu Business Line, April 19,
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dalai-lama-visited-tawang/article9650537.ece

18. Tshering Chonzom Bhutia, “The Politics of Reincarnation: India, China, and the Dalai Lama.”
The Diplomat, April 20, 2017, https://thediplomat.com/2017/04/the-politics-of-
reincarnation-india-china-and-tibet/

19. Divya A., “On the Anvil, Trans-National Buddhist Circuit from India to Nepal.” The Indian
Express, May 31, 2016, http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-news-india/ministry-of-
tourism-buddhist-circuit-trans-national-tourist-circuit-nepal-sri-lanka-2826631/

20. “3 Buddhist Circuits Identified by the Ministry of Tourism.” Press Information Bureau,
Government of India, March 4, 2015, http://pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?
relid=116398

21. “BIMSTEC Leaders' Retreat 2016 Outcome Document.” Press Information Bureau, Government
of India, October 17, 2016, http://pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=151717

22. “International Buddhist Conclave Open Session in Sarnath.” The Times of India, October 5, 2016,
https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/varanasi/International-Buddhist-conclave-open-
session-in-Sarnath/articleshow/54685864.cms

23. “M/o Tourism Organizes '5th International Buddhist Conclave' in Varanasi-Sarnath from 2nd
to 6th October 2016.” Press Information Bureau, Government of India, October 1, 2016.
http://pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=151333

24. “PM Stresses Need to Shift from Ideology to Philosophy.” The Hindu, September 3, 2015,
http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/intolerant-nonstate-actors-unleashing-barbaric-
violence-on-innocent-people-modi/article7611348.ece

25. P. Stobdan, “Asia's Buddhist Connectivity and India's Role.” Institute for Defence Studies and
Analysis, February19, 2016. https://idsa.in/issuebrief/asias-buddhist-connectivity-and-
indias-role_pstobdan_190216

26. Devirupa Mitra, “Nalanda University Campus Construction Likely to Be Delayed as MEA Claims
'Anomalies' in Tender.” The Wire, May 23, 2016, https://thewire.in/37927/nalanda-university-
campus-construction-likely-to-be-delayed-as-mea-claims-anomalies-in-tender/

27. Shreya Roy Chowdhury, “'It Is a Closed Place': Why Students Are Quitting Nalanda University.”
Scroll.in, October 28, 2017, https://scroll.in/article/854841/it-is-a-closed-place-why-students-
are-leaving-nalanda-university

28. Yatish Yadav, “Soft Power: China Gets Its Own Nalanda University, Shames India.” The New
Indian Express, June 5 2017, http://www.newindianexpress.com/thesundaystandard/2017/
jun/04/china-gets-its-own-nalanda-shames-india-1612588.html

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29. “In Conversation with Ambassador P. Stobdan”. Research Ladakh. July 16 2017,
http://www.reachladakh.com/in-conversation-with-ambassador-p-stobdan/1763.html

30. Tarun Khanna, “Studying India's Maha Kumbh Mela Festival.” Harvard Business Review, Harvard
University, January 25, 2013.

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