G.R. No.

130866 September 16, 1998 On June 13, 1997, the NLRC rendered a resolution setting aside the questioned decision and
remanding the case to the labor arbiter for immediate appropriate proceedings.5 Petitioner
ST. MARTIN FUNERAL HOME, petitioner, then filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the NLRC in its resolution dated
vs. August 18, 1997 for lack of merit,6 hence the present petition alleging that the NLRC
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and BIENVENIDO ARICAYOS, committed grave abuse of discretion.7
respondents.
Before proceeding further into the merits of the case at bar, the Court feels that it is now
exigent and opportune to reexamine the functional validity and systemic practicability of the
mode of judicial review it has long adopted and still follows with respect to decisions of the
NLRC. The increasing number of labor disputes that find their way to this Court and the
REGALADO, J.:
legislative changes introduced over the years into the provisions of Presidential Decree (P.D.)
No. 442 (The Labor Code of the Philippines and Batas Pambansa Blg. (B.P. No.) 129 (The
The present petition for certiorari stemmed from a complaint for illegal dismissal filed by Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980) now stridently call for and warrant a reassessment of
herein private respondent before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), Regional that procedural aspect.
Arbitration Branch No. III, in San Fernando, Pampanga. Private respondent alleges that he
started working as Operations Manager of petitioner St. Martin Funeral Home on February 6,
We prefatorily delve into the legal history of the NLRC. It was first established in the
1995. However, there was no contract of employment executed between him and petitioner
Department of Labor by P.D. No. 21 on October 14, 1972, and its decisions were expressly
nor was his name included in the semi-monthly payroll. On January 22, 1996, he was
declared to be appealable to the Secretary of Labor and, ultimately, to the President of the
dismissed from his employment for allegedly misappropriating P38,000.00 which was
Philippines.
intended for payment by petitioner of its value added tax (VAT) to the Bureau of Internal
Revenue (BIR). 1
On May 1, 1974, P.D. No. 442 enacted the Labor Code of the Philippines, the same to take
effect six months after its promulgation. 8 Created and regulated therein is the present NLRC
Petitioner on the other hand claims that private respondent was not its employee but only the
which was attached to the Department of Labor and Employment for program and policy
uncle of Amelita Malabed, the owner of petitioner St. Martin's Funeral Home. Sometime in
coordination only.9 Initially, Article 302 (now, Article 223) thereof also granted an aggrieved
1995, private respondent, who was formerly working as an overseas contract worker, asked
party the remedy of appeal from the decision of the NLRC to the Secretary of Labor, but P.D.
for financial assistance from the mother of Amelita. Since then, as an indication of gratitude,
No. 1391 subsequently amended said provision and abolished such appeals. No appellate
private respondent voluntarily helped the mother of Amelita in overseeing the business.
review has since then been provided for.
In January 1996, the mother of Amelita passed away, so the latter then took over the
Thus, to repeat, under the present state of the law, there is no provision for appeals from the
management of the business. She then discovered that there were arrears in the payment of
decision of the NLRC. 10 The present Section 223, as last amended by Section 12 of R.A.
taxes and other government fees, although the records purported to show that the same were
No. 6715, instead merely provides that the Commission shall decide all cases within twenty
already paid. Amelita then made some changes in the business operation and private
days from receipt of the answer of the appellee, and that such decision shall be final and
respondent and his wife were no longer allowed to participate in the management thereof. As
executory after ten calendar days from receipt thereof by the parties.
a consequence, the latter filed a complaint charging that petitioner had illegally terminated his
employment.2
When the issue was raised in an early case on the argument that this Court has no
jurisdiction to review the decisions of the NLRC, and formerly of the Secretary of Labor, since
Based on the position papers of the parties, the labor arbiter rendered a decision in favor of
there is no legal provision for appellate review thereof, the Court nevertheless rejected that
petitioner on October 25, 1996 declaring that no employer-employee relationship existed
thesis. It held that there is an underlying power of the courts to scrutinize the acts of such
between the parties and, therefore, his office had no jurisdiction over the case. 3
agencies on questions of law and jurisdiction even though no right of review is given by
statute; that the purpose of judicial review is to keep the administrative agency within its
Not satisfied with the said decision, private respondent appealed to the NLRC contending that jurisdiction and protect the substantial rights of the parties; and that it is that part of the
the labor arbiter erred (1) in not giving credence to the evidence submitted by him; (2) in checks and balances which restricts the separation of powers and forestalls arbitrary and
holding that he worked as a "volunteer" and not as an employee of St. Martin Funeral Home unjust adjudications. 11
from February 6, 1995 to January 23, 1996, or a period of about one year; and (3) in ruling
that there was no employer-employee relationship between him and petitioner.4
Pursuant to such ruling, and as sanctioned by subsequent decisions of this Court, the remedy
of the aggrieved party is to timely file a motion for reconsideration as a precondition for any
further or subsequent remedy, 12 and then seasonably avail of the special civil action of
certiorari under Rule 65, 13 for which said Rule has now fixed the reglementary period of
sixty days from notice of the decision. Curiously, although the 10-day period for finality of the
decision of the NLRC may already have lapsed as contemplated in Section 223 of the Labor
Code, it has been held that this Court may still take cognizance of the petition for certiorari on
jurisdictional and due process considerations if filed within the reglementary period under
Rule 65. 14
Turning now to the matter of judicial review of NLRC decisions, B.P. No. 129 originally
provided as follows:
Sec. 9. Jurisdiction. — The Intermediate Appellate Court shall exercise:
(1) Original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari,
habeas corpus, and quo warranto, and auxiliary writs or processes, whether
or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction;
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for annulment of judgments of
Regional Trial Courts; and
(3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions,
resolutions, orders, or awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial
agencies, instrumentalities, boards, or commissions, except those falling
within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the
Constitution, the provisions of this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the third
paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the
Judiciary Act of 1948.
The Intermediate Appellate Court shall have the power to try cases and
conduct hearings, receive evidence and perform any and all acts necessary
to resolve factual issues raised in cases falling within its original and
appellate jurisdiction, including the power to grant and conduct new trials or
further proceedings.
These provisions shall not apply to decisions and interlocutory orders issued
under the Labor Code of the Philippines and by the Central Board of
Assessment Appeals. 15
Subsequently, and as it presently reads, this provision was amended by R.A. No. 7902
effective March 18, 1995, to wit:
Sec. 9. Jurisdiction. — The Court of Appeals shall exercise:
(1) Original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari,
habeas corpus, and quo warranto, and auxiliary writs or processes, whether
or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction;
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for annulment of judgments of
Regional Trial Courts; and
(3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions,
resolutions, orders or awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial
agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions, including the Securities
and Exchange Commission, the Social Security Commission, the Employees
Compensation Commission and the Civil Service Commission, except those
falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance
with the Constitution, the Labor Code of the Philippines under Presidential
Decree No. 442, as amended, the provisions of this Act, and of subparagraph
(1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of
Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.
The Court of Appeals shall have the power to try cases and conduct
hearings, receive evidence and perform any and all acts necessary to
resolve factual issues raised in cases falling within its original and appellate
jurisdiction, including the power to grant and conduct new trials or further
proceedings. Trials or hearings in the Court of Appeals must be continuous
and must be completed within, three (3) months, unless extended by the
Chief Justice.
It will readily be observed that, aside from the change in the name of the lower appellate
court, 16 the following amendments of the original provisions of Section 9 of B.P. No. 129
were effected by R.A. No. 7902, viz.:
1. The last paragraph which excluded its application to the Labor Code of the Philippines and
the Central Board of Assessment Appeals was deleted and replaced by a new paragraph
granting the Court of Appeals limited powers to conduct trials and hearings in cases within its
jurisdiction.
2. The reference to the Labor Code in that last paragraph was transposed to paragraph (3) of
the section, such that the original exclusionary clause therein now provides "except those
falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the
Constitution, the Labor Code of the Philippines under Presidential Decree No. 442, as
amended, the provisions of this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and
subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948."
(Emphasis supplied).
3. Contrarily, however, specifically added to and included among the quasi-judicial agencies
over which the Court of Appeals shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction are the Securities
and Exchange Commission, the Social Security Commission, the Employees Compensation
Commission and the Civil Service Commission.
This, then, brings us to a somewhat perplexing impassè, both in point of purpose and
terminology. As earlier explained, our mode of judicial review over decisions of the NLRC has
for some time now been understood to be by a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court. This is, of course, a special original action limited to the resolution of
jurisdictional issues, that is, lack or excess of jurisdiction and, in almost all cases that have
been brought to us, grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
It will, however, be noted that paragraph (3), Section 9 of B.P. No. 129 now grants exclusive
appellate jurisdiction to the Court of Appeals over all final adjudications of the Regional Trial
Courts and the quasi-judicial agencies generally or specifically referred to therein except,
among others, "those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in
accordance with . . . the Labor Code of the Philippines under Presidential Decree No. 442, as
amended, . . . ." This would necessarily contradict what has been ruled and said all along that
appeal does not lie from decisions of the NLRC. 17 Yet, under such excepting clause literally
construed, the appeal from the NLRC cannot be brought to the Court of Appeals, but to this
Court by necessary implication.
The same exceptive clause further confuses the situation by declaring that the Court of
Appeals has no appellate jurisdiction over decisions falling within the appellate jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the provisions of B.P. No. 129, and
those specified cases in Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948. These cases can, of course,
be properly excluded from the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals.
However, because of the aforementioned amendment by transposition, also supposedly
excluded are cases falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in
accordance with the Labor Code. This is illogical and impracticable, and Congress could not
have intended that procedural gaffe, since there are no cases in the Labor Code the
decisions, resolutions, orders or awards wherein are within the appellate jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court or of any other court for that matter.
A review of the legislative records on the antecedents of R.A. No. 7902 persuades us that
there may have been an oversight in the course of the deliberations on the said Act or an
imprecision in the terminology used therein. In fine, Congress did intend to provide for judicial
review of the adjudications of the NLRC in labor cases by the Supreme Court, but there was
an inaccuracy in the term used for the intended mode of review. This conclusion which we
have reluctantly but prudently arrived at has been drawn from the considerations extant in the
records of Congress, more particularly on Senate Bill No. 1495 and the Reference Committee
Report on S. No. 1495/H. No. 10452. 18
In sponsoring Senate Bill No. 1495, Senator Raul S. Roco delivered his sponsorship speech
19 from which we reproduce the following excerpts:
The Judiciary Reorganization Act, Mr. President, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129,
reorganized the Court of Appeals and at the same time expanded its
jurisdiction and powers. Among others, its appellate jurisdiction was
expanded to cover not only final judgment of Regional Trial Courts, but also
all final judgment(s), decisions, resolutions, orders or awards of quasi-judicial
agencies, instrumentalities, boards and commissions, except those falling
within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the
Constitution, the provisions of BP Blg. 129 and of subparagraph 1 of the third
paragraph and subparagraph 4 of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.
Mr. President, the purpose of the law is to ease the workload of the Supreme
Court by the transfer of some of its burden of review of factual issues to the
Court of Appeals. However, whatever benefits that can be derived from the
expansion of the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals was cut short
by the last paragraph of Section 9 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 which
excludes from its coverage the "decisions and interlocutory orders issued
under the Labor Code of the Philippines and by the Central Board of
Assessment Appeals.
Among the highest number of cases that are brought up to the Supreme
Court are labor cases. Hence, Senate Bill No. 1495 seeks to eliminate the
exceptions enumerated in Section 9 and, additionally, extends the coverage
of appellate review of the Court of Appeals in the decision(s) of the Securities
and Exchange Commission, the Social Security Commission, and the
Employees Compensation Commission to reduce the number of cases
elevated to the Supreme Court. (Emphases and corrections ours)
xxx xxx xxx
Senate Bill No. 1495 authored by our distinguished Colleague from Laguna
provides the ideal situation of drastically reducing the workload of the
Supreme Court without depriving the litigants of the privilege of review by an
appellate tribunal.
In closing, allow me to quote the observations of former Chief Justice
Teehankee in 1986 in the Annual Report of the Supreme Court:
. . . Amendatory legislation is suggested so as to relieve the
Supreme Court of the burden of reviewing these cases
which present no important issues involved beyond the
particular fact and the parties involved, so that the Supreme
Court may wholly devote its time to cases of public interest
in the discharge of its mandated task as the guardian of the
Constitution and the guarantor of the people's basic rights
and additional task expressly vested on it now "to determine
 whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.
We used to have 500,000 cases pending all over the land, Mr. President. It
has been cut down to 300,000 cases some five years ago. I understand we
are now back to 400,000 cases. Unless we distribute the work of the
appellate courts, we shall continue to mount and add to the number of cases
pending.
In view of the foregoing, Mr. President, and by virtue of all the reasons we
have submitted, the Committee on Justice and Human Rights requests the
support and collegial approval of our Chamber.
xxx xxx xxx
Surprisingly, however, in a subsequent session, the following Committee Amendment was
introduced by the said sponsor and the following proceedings transpired: 20
Senator Roco. On page 2, line 5, after the line "Supreme Court in
accordance with the Constitution," add the phrase "THE LABOR CODE OF
THE PHILIPPINES UNDER P.D. 442, AS AMENDED." So that it becomes
clear, Mr. President, that issues arising from the Labor Code will still be
appealable to the Supreme Court.
The President. Is there any objection? (Silence) Hearing none, the
amendment is approved.
Senator Roco. On the same page, we move that lines 25 to 30 be deleted.
This was also discussed with our Colleagues in the House of
Representatives and as we understand it, as approved in the House, this
was also deleted, Mr. President.
The President. Is there any objection? (Silence) Hearing none, the
amendment is approved.
Senator Roco. There are no further Committee amendments, Mr. President.
Senator Romulo. Mr. President, I move that we close the period of
Committee amendments.
The President. Is there any objection? (Silence) Hearing none, the
amendment is approved. (Emphasis supplied).
xxx xxx xxx
Thereafter, since there were no individual amendments, Senate Bill No. 1495 was passed on
second reading and being a certified bill, its unanimous approval on third reading followed. 21
The Conference Committee Report on Senate Bill No. 1495 and House Bill No. 10452,
having theretofore been approved by the House of Representatives, the same was likewise
approved by the Senate on February 20, 1995, 22 inclusive of the dubious formulation on
appeals to the Supreme Court earlier discussed.
The Court is, therefore, of the considered opinion that ever since appeals from the NLRC to
the Supreme Court were eliminated, the legislative intendment was that the special civil
action of certiorari was and still is the proper vehicle for judicial review of decisions of the
NLRC. The use of the word "appeal" in relation thereto and in the instances we have noted
could have been a lapsus plumae because appeals by certiorari and the original action for
certiorari are both modes of judicial review addressed to the appellate courts. The important
distinction between them, however, and with which the Court is particularly concerned here is
that the special civil action of certiorari is within the concurrent original jurisdiction of this
Court and the Court of Appeals; 23 whereas to indulge in the assumption that appeals by
certiorari to the Supreme Court are allowed would not subserve, but would subvert, the
intention of Congress as expressed in the sponsorship speech on Senate Bill No. 1495.
Incidentally, it was noted by the sponsor therein that some quarters were of the opinion that
recourse from the NLRC to the Court of Appeals as an initial step in the process of judicial
review would be circuitous and would prolong the proceedings. On the contrary, as he
commendably and realistically emphasized, that procedure would be advantageous to the
aggrieved party on this reasoning:
On the other hand, Mr. President, to allow these cases to be appealed to the
Court of Appeals would give litigants the advantage to have all the evidence
on record be reexamined and reweighed after which the findings of facts and
conclusions of said bodies are correspondingly affirmed, modified or
reversed.
Under such guarantee, the Supreme Court can then apply strictly the axiom
that factual findings of the Court of Appeals are final and may not be
reversed on appeal to the Supreme Court. A perusal of the records will reveal
appeals which are factual in nature and may, therefore, be dismissed outright
by minute resolutions. 24
While we do not wish to intrude into the Congressional sphere on the matter of the wisdom of
a law, on this score we add the further observations that there is a growing number of labor
cases being elevated to this Court which, not being a trier of fact, has at times been
constrained to remand the case to the NLRC for resolution of unclear or ambiguous factual
findings; that the Court of Appeals is procedurally equipped for that purpose, aside from the
increased number of its component divisions; and that there is undeniably an imperative need
for expeditious action on labor cases as a major aspect of constitutional protection to labor.

Therefore, all references in the amended Section 9 of B.P. No. 129 to supposed appeals from
the NLRC to the Supreme Court are interpreted and hereby declared to mean and refer to
petitions for certiorari under Rule 65. Consequently, all such petitions should hence forth be
initially filed in the Court of Appeals in strict observance of the doctrine on the hierarchy of
courts as the appropriate forum for the relief desired.

Apropos to this directive that resort to the higher courts should be made in accordance with
their hierarchical order, this pronouncement in Santiago vs. Vasquez, et al. 25 should be
taken into account:

One final observation. We discern in the proceedings in this case a

propensity on the part of petitioner, and, for that matter, the same may be
said of a number of litigants who initiate recourses before us, to disregard the
hierarchy of courts in our judicial system by seeking relief directly from this
Court despite the fact that the same is available in the lower courts in the
exercise of their original or concurrent jurisdiction, or is even mandated by
law to be sought therein. This practice must be stopped, not only because of
the imposition upon the precious time of this Court but also because of the
inevitable and resultant delay, intended or otherwise, in the adjudication of
the case which often has to be remanded or referred to the lower court as the
proper forum under the rules of procedure, or as better equipped to resolve
the issues since this Court is not a trier of facts. We, therefore, reiterate the
judicial policy that this Court will not entertain direct resort to it unless the
redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts or where
exceptional and compelling circumstances justify availment of a remedy
within and calling for the exercise of our primary jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, under the foregoing premises, the instant petition for certiorari is hereby
REMANDED, and all pertinent records thereof ordered to be FORWARDED, to the Court of
Appeals for appropriate action and disposition consistent with the views and ruling herein set
forth, without pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. 153714-20. August 15, 2003
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. MARIO K. ESPINOSA, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
A waiver of the constitutional right against double jeopardy must be clear, categorical,
knowing and intelligent. Corollary to this rule, the alleged conditions attached to an
arraignment must be unmistakable, express, informed and enlightened. Otherwise, the plea
should be deemed to be simple and unconditional.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Certiorari 1[1] under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking to nullify
the April 10, 2002 Resolution2[2] of the Sandiganbayan (SBN) in Criminal Case Nos. 26422-
26428. The anti-graft court dismissed the criminal cases against Respondent Mario K.
Espinosa on the ground of double jeopardy as follows:
That being the case, the Court is constrained to concur with the accused that jeopardy has
set in and that he is now at peril of punishment twice for the same offense in violation of the
protection afforded by Sec. 21, Art. III of the Constitution.
WHEREFORE, these cases are DISMISSED as against accused Mario K. Espinosa alone. 3
[3]
The Antecedents
On February 4, 1998, separate cases of estafa and attempted corruption of public officers
were filed before the SBN by the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB) against (1) Respondent
Espinosa, then provincial administrator of Masbate; (2) Emma Vasquez; and (3) Romeo
Sanano. The cases were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 24438 and 24439.
1 4
2 5
3 6
Prior to his arraignment, Espinosa filed a Motion for Reinvestigation of the cases. The SBN
Fourth Division granted the Motion in an Order4[4] dated March 23, 1988, and directed the
Office of the Special Prosecutor to evaluate the evidence against the accused.
While the cases were being reevaluated, Espinosa filed with the SBN a Motion for Leave to
Travel Abroad for the period May 2-13, 1999.
On the date set for the hearing of the Motion, the SBN (Fourth Division) issued an Order
resetting the hearing to April 22, 1999. It required private respondent to be conditionally
arraigned on that date5[5] before it would act on his Motion to Travel.
As ordered, private respondent was arraigned, and thereafter granted his Motion to Travel.
The Order of Arraignment dated April 22, 2000, stated that upon being duly arraigned, [he]
entered a plea of Not Guilty to both Informations in Crim. Case Nos. 24438 and 24439. 6[6]
The Court also ordered the deferment of the pretrial of the cases, pending the reinvestigation
then being conducted by the Ombudsman.
On December 28, 2000, the OMB -- through the Office of the Special Prosecutor -- moved to
withdraw ex parte the two cases against private respondent. The SBN granted the Motion in a
Resolution dated January 9, 2001.
Thereafter, the OMB filed in the same court seven Informations for Malversation of Public
Funds against Espinosa and several others. These Informations were docketed as Criminal
Case Nos. 24622 to 24628 and raffled to the SBN First Division.
On January 22, 2001, Espinosa filed a Motion to Quash the Informations. He argued that
double jeopardy had already attached, because (1) he had been arraigned in the previous
estafa cases; and (2) the Motion to Withdraw the two earlier ones had been granted without
his express consent.
Petitioner countered that the arraignment for the two previous cases was conditional,
because it was made solely for the purpose of accommodating private respondents request
to travel abroad while the matters were pending reinvestigation.
Ruling of the Sandiganbayan
In its assailed Resolution, the SBN First Division ruled that jeopardy had attached in the first
instance when Criminal Case Nos. 24438-24439 were dismissed upon the prosecutions ex
parte motion to withdraw the information. It noted that the dismissal had been sought and
obtained without respondents knowledge, much less express consent.
It likewise held private respondents actual arraignment to be straightforward and unqualified.
The records did not disclose any circumstance showing that the accused knew that his
arraignment was subject to certain conditions.
Hence this recourse.7[7]
Issue
Petitioner submits the following issue for the Courts consideration:
Whether or not [the SBN] acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or x x x
excess of jurisdiction in dismissing Criminal Cases Nos. 34622 to 24628 as against
Respondent Espinosa.8[8]
The Courts Ruling
The Petition is unmeritorious.
Preliminary Issue:
Procedural Lapses
Before tackling the main issue raised by petitioner, the Court will point out some procedural
lapses.
First, prior to submitting the instant Petition to this Court, petitioner should have filed a motion
for reconsideration before the SBN. The extraordinary remedy of certiorari will lie only if there
is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. 9
[9]
Here, the plain, speedy and adequate remedy expressly provided by law 10[10] is a motion for
reconsideration to be filed within fifteen (15) days from promulgation or notice of the final
order or judgment.11[11] The purpose of the motion 12[12] is x x x to afford public respondent
7 11
8 12
9 13
10
an opportunity to correct any actual or fancied error attributed to it by way of a re-examination
of the legal and factual aspects of the case.
Explaining further, the Court said:
x x x. Petitioner's inaction or negligence under the circumstances is tantamount to a
deprivation of the right and opportunity of the respondent commission to cleanse itself of an
error unwittingly committed or to vindicate itself of an act unfairly imputed. An improvident
resort to certiorari cannot be used as a tool to circumvent the right of public respondent to
review and purge its decision of an oversight, if any. x x x. 13[13] (Italics supplied)
Second, the proper remedy is appeal under Rule 45, not certiorari under Rule 65. Section 7
of Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended by Republic Act No. 8249, provides that
[d]ecisions and final orders of the Sandiganbayan shall be appealable to the Supreme Court
by [a] petition for review on certiorari raising pure questions of law in accordance with Rule 45
of the Rules of Court. Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, likewise provides that a
judgment or final order or resolution of the Sandiganbayan may be appealed to the Supreme
Court via a verified petition for review on certiorari.
Clearly then, the remedy of appeal was available to petitioner. For unexplained reasons, it
chose not to pursue this recourse. Neither has it cited grounds to exempt the Petition from the
stringent rule forbidding a substitution of remedies. Verily, its cavalier disregard of procedural
requirements, especially its erroneous choice of remedy, is indeed enough reason to throw
out this Petition summarily.
Main Issue:
Attachment of Legal Jeopardy
Even if we are to gloss over these procedural infirmities, the Petition should nonetheless be
dismissed for its lack of substantive merit.
Petitioner argues that the dismissal of the later Informations against private respondent on
the ground of double jeopardy had no factual or legal basis, 14[14] because his arraignment in
the earlier cases was only conditional.
We are unconvinced.
14
Previous cases15[15] have mentioned the SBNs practice of conditionally arraigning the
accused pending the Ombudsmans reinvestigation of the case. 16[16] This practice is not
mentioned or provided for in the regular rules of procedure.
Section 9 of PD 1606, as amended by RA 7975,17[17] provides:
Sec. 9. Rules of Procedure. - The Rules of Court promulgated by the Supreme Court shall
apply to all cases and proceedings filed with the Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan shall
have no power to promulgate its own rules of procedure, except to adopt internal rules
governing the allotment of cases among the divisions, the rotation of justices among them,
and other matters relating to the internal operations of the court which shall be enforced until
repealed or modified by the Supreme Court."
The Revised Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan, 18[18] promulgated by this Court, do not
mention any conditional arraignment. Neither do the regular Rules of Court.
Arraignment is an indispensable requirement of due process. It consists of the judges or the
clerk of courts reading of the criminal complaint or information to the defendant. At this stage,
the accused is granted, for the first time, the opportunity to be officially informed of the nature
and the cause of the accusation. 19[19] Thus, arraignment cannot be regarded lightly or
brushed aside peremptorily.
Espinosa pleaded simply and unconditionally on April 22, 1999. No unusual ceremony
punctuated his arraignment. The SBN itself found this simple process inconsistent with its
studied manner of conditionally arraigning the accused pending reinvestigation in other
cases. We quote from its assailed Resolution as follows:
Since it is the accused who wishes to travel even while his case is pending review, and in
order that the Court might not lose jurisdiction over him while he is abroad, the accused and
counsel are advised as part of the arraignment process, that the arraignment is conditional,
i.e., that arraignment is without prejudice to the results of the reinvestigation or review; that if
the prosecution should recommend the filing of new charges, in lieu of the present charge,
which would necessarily include or be included in the present accusation, the accused would
now be understood as having waived his right against double jeopardy; and that if the
prosecution sought to withdraw the information, the arraignment would be deemed to have
15
16
17
18
19
been of no effect. If the accused accepts these conditions for arraignment, then he is
arraigned and allowed to travel. In other words, in this instance, the accused is clearly aware
of what is going on; at the time of his arraignment, there is an explicit waiver against the
protection against double jeopardy as a condition for his travel.20[20] (Italics supplied)
Under Section 11(c) of Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, the arraignment shall be suspended
for a period not exceeding 60 days when a reinvestigation or review is being conducted at
either the Department of Justice or the Office of the President. However, we should stress
that the court does not lose control of the proceedings by reason of such review. Once it had
assumed jurisdiction, it is not handcuffed by any resolution of the reviewing prosecuting
authority.21[21] Neither is it deprived of its jurisdiction by such resolution. 22[22] The principles
established in Crespo v. Mogul23[23] still stands, as follows:
"Whether the accused had been arraigned or not and whether it was due to a reinvestigation
by the fiscal or a review by the Secretary of Justice whereby a motion to dismiss was
submitted to the Court, the Court in the exercise of its discretion may grant the motion or
deny it and require that the trial on the merits proceed for the proper determination of the
case.
xxx xxx xxx
"The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed in Court
any disposition of the case as to its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused
rests in the sound discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal retains the direction and control
of the prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is already in Court he cannot impose
his opinion on the trial court. The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case
before it. The determination of the case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A
motion to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal should be addressed to the Court which has the
option to grant or deny the same. It does not matter if this is done before or after the
arraignment of the accused or that the motion was filed after a reinvestigation or upon
instructions of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records of the investigation." 24[24]
(Italics supplied)
In any event, petitioner insists that private respondent has waived his right to invoke double
jeopardy in the light of his allegedly conditional arraignment.
20
21
22
23
24
Again, the Court is not persuaded.
The right against double jeopardy is enshrined in Section 21 of Article III of the Constitution,
which reads:
No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is
punished by a law and an ordinance conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar
to another prosecution for the same act.
This constitutionally mandated right is procedurally buttressed by Section 17 of Rule 117 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. 25[25] To substantiate a claim for double jeopardy,
the following must be demonstrated:
x x x (1) [A] first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must
have been validly terminated; (3) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense, or the
second offense includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the first
information, or is an attempt to commit the same or is a frustration thereof.
And legal jeopardy attaches only: (a) upon a valid indictment; (b) before a competent court;
(c) after arraignment; (d) [when] a valid plea [has] been entered; and (e) the case was
dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused. 26[26]
It has been the unwavering position of this Court that substantial rights cannot be trifled with
or cast aside on the basis of mere suppositions and conjectures. The relinquishment of a
constitutional right has to be laid out convincingly. Such waiver must be clear, categorical,
knowing and intelligent.27[27]
As can be gleaned from the Memorandum of petitioner, the alleged waiver falls short of the
above requirement:
Unfortunately, the records reveal that a lawyer for respondent Espinosa was present when
the April 19,1999 Order of the Fourth Division was issued in open court. Thus, said lawyer
must have heard that the hearing of the motion to travel was reset to April 22, 1999 so that
the movant could be conditionally arraigned.28[28]
xxx xxx xxx
25
26
27
28
x x x. As stressed in the petition, the arraignment was conditional for if it was not so,
respondent Espinosa would have been deemed to have abandoned his recourse for the
reevaluation of his cases before the Office of the Ombudsman. 29[29] (Italics supplied)
As correctly pointed out in the challenged Resolution, the dismissal of the estafa and the
corruption cases was made upon petitioners ex parte Motion for the withdrawal of the
Informations. Petitioner does not dispute the fact that private respondent was not notified of
this Motion. Neither was a hearing held thereon.
On the other hand, private respondent has amply shown that he learned of the Motion only
after the cases had been dismissed. It is clear that the dismissal, having been secured by
petitioner without the express consent of the accused, does not amount to a waiver of the
right against double jeopardy. But it does unequivocally show the fourth requisite for the
proper invocation of such right.
In a nutshell, the alleged conditions attached to an arraignment must be unmistakable,
express, informed and enlightened. They must be expressly stated in the Order disposing of
the arraignment. Otherwise, the plea should be deemed to be simple and unconditional.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DISMISSED.SO ORDERED.i
[G.R. No. 129742. September 16, 1998]
TERESITA G. FABIAN petitioner, vs. HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO, in his capacity as
ombudsman; HON. JESUS F. GUERRERO, in his capacity as Deputy
Ombudsman for Luzon; and NESTOR V. AGUSTIN respondents.
DECISION
REGALADO, J:
Petitioner has appealed to us by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court from the
"Joint Order" issued by public respondents on June 18, 1997 in OMB-Adm. Case No. 0-95-
0411 which granted the motion for reconsideration of and absolved private respondents from
29
administrative charges for inter alia grave misconduct committed by him as then Assistant
Regional Director, Region IV-A, Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH).
I directive or decision or denial of the motion for reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of
It appears from the statement and counter-statement of facts of the parties that petitioner
Teresita G. Fabian was the major stockholder and president of PROMAT Construction
Development Corporation (PROMAT) which was engaged in the construction
business. Private respondents Nestor V. Agustin was the incumbent District Engineering
District (FMED) when he allegedly committed the offenses for which he was administratively
charged in the Office in the office of the Ombudsman.
Promat participated in the bidding for government construction project including those
under the FMED, and private respondent, reportedly taking advantage of his official position,
inveigled petitioner into an amorous relationship. Their affair lasted for some time, in the
course of which private respondents gifted PROMAT with public works contracts and
interceded for it in problems concerning the same in his office.
Later, misunderstanding and unpleasant incidents developed between the parties and
when petitioner tried to terminate their relationship, private respondent refused and resisted
her attempts to do so to the extent of employing acts of harassment, intimidation and
threats. She eventually filed the aforementioned administrative case against him in a letter-
complaint dated July 24, 1995.
The said complaint sought the dismissal of private respondent for violation of Section 19,
Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989) and Section 36 of Presidential Decree No.
807 (Civil Service Decree), with an ancillary prayer for his preventive suspension. For
purposes of this case, the charges referred to may be subsumed under the category of
oppression, misconduct, and disgraceful or immoral conduct.
On January 31, 1996, Graft Investigator Eduardo R. Benitez issued a resolution finding
private respondents guilty of grave misconduct and ordering his dismissal from the service
with forfeiture of all benefits under the law. His resolution bore the approval of Director
Napoleon Baldrias and Assistant Ombudsman Abelardo Aportadera of their office.
Herein respondent Ombudsman, in an Order dated February 26, 1996, approved the
aforesaid resolution with modifications, by finding private respondent guilty of misconduct and
meting out the penalty of suspension without pay for one year. After private respondent
moved for reconsideration, respondent Ombudsman discovered that the former's new
counsel had been his "classmate and close associate" hence he inhibited himself. The case
was transferred to respondent Deputy Ombudsman Jesus F. Guerrero who, in the now
challenged Joint Order of June 18, 1997, set aside the February 26, 1997 Order of
respondent Ombudsman and exonerated private respondents from the administrative
charges.
II
In the present appeal, petitioner argues that Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770
(Ombudsman Act of 1989)[1] pertinently provides that -
In all administrative diciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the
Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a
petition for certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt of the written notice of the order,
the Rules of Court. (Emphasis supplied)
However, she points out that under Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07
(Rules of Procedure of the office of the Ombudsman), [2] when a respondent is absolved of the
charges in an administrative proceeding decision of the ombudsman is final and
unappealable. She accordingly submits that the office of the ombudsman has no authority
under the law to restrict, in the manner provided in its aforesaid Rules, the right of appeal
allowed by Republic Act No. 6770, nor to limit the power of review of this Court. Because of
the aforecited provision in those Rules of Procedure, she claims that she found it "necessary
to take an alternative recourse under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, because of the doubt it
creates on the availability of appeals under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Respondents filed their respective comments and rejoined that the Office of the
Ombudsman is empowered by the Constitution and the law to promulgate its own rules of
procedure. Section 13(8), Article XI of the 1987 Constitution provides, among others, that the
Office of the Ombudsman can "(p)romulgate its rules of procedure and exercise such other
powers or perform such functions or duties as may be provided by law."
Republic Act No. 6770 duly implements the Constitutional mandate with these relevant
provisions:
Sec. 14. Restrictions. - x x x No court shall hear any appeal or application for remedy against
the decision or findings of the Ombudsman except the Supreme Court on pure question on
law.
xxx
Sec. 18. Rules of Procedure. - (1) The Office of the Ombudsman shall promulgate its own
rules of procedure for the effective exercise or performance of its powers, functions, and
duties.
xxx
Sec. 23. Formal Investigation. - (1) Administrative investigations by the Office of the
Ombudsman shall be in accordance with its rules of procedure and consistent with the due
process. x x x
xxx
Sec. 27. Effectivity and Finality of Decisions. - All provisionary orders at the Office of the
Ombudsman are immediately effective and executory.
A motion for reconsideration of any order, directive or decision of the Office of the
Ombudsman must be filed within five (5) days after receipt of written notice shall be
entertained only on any of the following grounds:
xxx
Findings of fact by the Office of the Ombudsman when supported by substantial evidence are
conclusive. Any order, directive or decision imposing the penalty of public censure or
reprimand, suspension of not more than one month salary shall be final and unappealable.
In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the
Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for certiorari within
ten (10) days from receipt of the written notice of the order, directive or decision or denial of
the motion for reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
The above rules may be amended or modified by the Office of the Ombudsman as the
interest of justice may require.
Respondents consequently contend that, on the foregoing constitutional and statutory
authority, petitioner cannot assail the validity of the rules of procedure formulated by the
Office of the Ombudsman governing the conduct of proceeding before it, including those with
respect to the availabity or non-avalability of appeal in administrative cases. Such as Section
7, Rule III of Administrative Order No.07.
Respondents also question the propriety of petitioner's proposition that, although she
definitely prefaced her petition by categorizing the same as "an appeal by certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court," she makes the aforequoted ambivalent statement which in
effect asks that, should the remedy under Rule 45 be unavailable, her petition be treated in
the alternative as an original action for certiorariunder Rule 65. The parties thereafter engage
in a discussion of the differences between a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
and a special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65.
Ultimately, they also attempt to review and rationalize the decision of this Court
applying Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 vis--vis Section 7, Rule III of Administrative
Order No. 07. As correctly pointed out by public respondents, Ocampo IV vs. Ombudsman, et
al.[3] and Young vs. Office of the Ombudsman, et al. [4] were original actions for certiorari under
Rule 65. Yabut vs. Office of the Ombudsman, et al. [5] was commenced by a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45. Then came Cruz, Jr. vs. People, et al., [6] Olivas vs. Office of the
Ombudsman, et al., [7] Olivarez vs. Sandiganbayan, et al., [8] and Jao, et al. vs. Vasquez,
[9]
which were for certiorari, prohibition and/or mandamus under Rule 65. Alba vs. Nitorreda,
et al.[10] was initiated by a pleading unlikely denominated as an "Appeal/Petition
for Certiorari and/or Prohibition," with a prayer for ancillary remedies, and ultimately followed
by Constantino vs. Hon. Ombudsman Aniano Desierto, et al. [11] which was a special civil
action for certiorari.
Considering, however the view that this Court now takes of the case at bar and the
issues therein which will shortly be explained, it refrains from preemptively resolving the
controverted points raised by the parties on the nature and propriety of application of the writ
of certiorari when used as a mode of appeal or as the basis of a special original action, and
whether or not they may be resorted to concurrently or alternatively, obvious though the
answers thereto appear to be. Besides, some seemingly obiter statements in Yabuts and Alba
could bear reexamination and clarification. Hence, we will merely observe and lay down the
rule at this juncture that Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 is involved only whenever an
appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 is taken from a decision in an administrative diciplinary
action. It cannot be taken into account where an original action for certiorari under Rule 65 is
resorted to as a remedy for judicial review, such as from an incident in a criminal action.
III
After respondents' separate comments had been filed, the Court was intrigued by the
fact, which does appear to have been seriously considered before, that the
administrative liability of a public official could fall under the jurisdiction of both the Civil
Service Commission and the Office of the Ombudsman. Thus, the offenses imputed to herein
private respondent were based on both Section 19 of Republic Act. No. 6770 and Section 36
of Presidential Decree No. 807. Yet, pursuant to the amendment of section 9, Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129 by Republic Act No. 7902, all adjudications by Civil Service Commission
in administrative disciplinary cases were made appealable to the Court of Appeals effective
March 18, 1995, while those of the Office of the Ombudsman are appealable to this Court.
It could thus be possible that in the same administrative case involving two respondents,
the proceedings against one could eventually have been elevated to the Court of Appeals,
while the other may have found its way to the Ombudsman from which it is sought to be
brought to this Court. Yet systematic and efficient case management would dictate the
consolidation of those cases in the Court of Appeals, both for expediency and to avoid
possible conflicting decisions.
Then there is the consideration that Section 30, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
provides that "(n)o law shall be passed increasing the appellate indiction of the Supreme
Court as provided in this Constitution without its advice and consent," and that Republic Act
No. 6770, with its challenged Section 27, took effect on November 17, 1989, obviously in
spite of that constitutional grounds must be raised by a party to the case, neither of whom did
so in this case, but that is not an inflexible rule, as we shall explain.
Since the constitution is intended fort the observance of the judiciary and other
departments of the government and the judges are sworn to support its provisions, the courts
are not at liberty to overlook or disregard its commands or countenance evasions
thereof. When it is clear that a statute trangresses the authority vested in a legislative body, it
is the duty of the courts to declare that the constitution, and not the statute, governs in a case
before them for judgement.[12]
Thus, while courts will not ordinarily pass upon constitutional questions which are not
raised in the pleadings,[13] the rule has been recognized to admit of certain exceptions. It does
not preclude a court from inquiring into its own jurisdiction or compel it to enter a judgement
that it lacks jurisdiction to enter. If a statute on which a court's jurisdiction in a proceeding
depends is unconstitutional, the court has no jurisdiction in the proceeding, and since it may
determine whether or not it has jurisdiction, it necessarily follows that it may inquire into the
constitutionality of the statute.[14]
Constitutional question, not raised in the regular and orderly procedure in the trial are
ordinarily rejected unless the jurisdiction of the court below or that of the appellate court is
involved in which case it may be raised at any time or on the court's own motion. [15] The
Court ex mero motu may take cognizance of lack of jurisdiction at any point in the case where
the fact is developed.[16] The court has a clearly recognized right to determine its own
jurisdiction in any proceeding.[17]
The foregoing authorities notwithstanding, the Court believed that the parties hereto
should be further heard on this constitutional question. Correspondingly, the following
resolution was issued on May 14, 1998, the material parts stating as follows:
The Court observes that the present petition, from the very allegations thereof, is "an appeal
by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court from the 'Joint Order (Re: Motion for
Reconsideration)' issued in OMB-Adm. Case No. 0-95-0411, entitled 'Teresita G. Fabian vs.
Engr. Nestor V. Agustin, Asst. Regional Director, Region IV-A, EDSA, Quezon City,' which
absolved the latter from the administrative charges for grave misconduct, among other."
It is further averred therein that the present appeal to this Court is allowed under Section 27
of the Ombudsman Act of 1987 (R.A. No. 6770) and, pursuant thereto, the Office of the
Ombudsman issued its Rules of Procedure, Section 7 whereof is assailed by petitioner in this
proceeding. It will be recalled that R.A. No. 6770 was enacted on November 17, 1989, with
Section 27 thereof pertinently providing that all administrative diciplinary cases, orders,
directives or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to this Court in
accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
The Court notes, however, that neither the petition nor the two comments thereon took into
account or discussed the validity of the aforestated Section 27 of R.A. No. 8770 in light of the
provisions of Section 30, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution that "(n)o law shall be passed
increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided in this Constitution
without its advise and consent."
The Court also invites the attention of the parties to its relevant ruling in First Lepanto
Ceramics, Inc. vs. The Court of Appeals , et al. (G.R. No. 110571, October 7, 1994, 237
SCRA 519) and the provisions of its former Circular No. 1-95,as now substantially reproduced
in Rule 43 of the 1997 revision of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
In view of the fact that the appellate jurisdiction of the Court is invoked and involved and in
this case, and the foregoing legal consideration appear to impugn the constitutionality and
validity of the grant of said appellate jurisdiction to it, the Court deems it necessary that the
parties be heard thereon and the issue be first resolved before conducting further
proceedings in this appellate review.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to require the parties to Submit their position and
arguments on the matter subject of this resolution by filing their corresponding pleadings
within ten (10) days from notice hereof.
IV
The records do not show that the Office of the Solicitor General has complied with such
requirement, hence the Court dispenses with any submission it should have presented. On
the other hand, petitioner espouses the theory that the provision in Section 27 of Republic Act
No. 6770 which authorizes an appeal by certiorari to this Court of the aforementioned
adjudications of the Ombudsman is not violative of Section 30, Article VI of the
Constitution. She claims that what is proscribed is the passage of law "increasing" the
appellate jurisdiction of this Court "as provided in this Constitution," and such appellate
jurisdiction includes "all cases in which only an error or question of law is involved." Since
Section 5(2)(e), Article VIII of the Constitution authorizes this Court to review, revise, reverse,
modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari the aforesaid final judgement or orders "as the law or
the Rules of Court may provide," said Section 27 does not increase this Court may provide,"
said section 27 does not increase this Court's appellate jurisdiction since, by providing that
the mode of appeal shall be by petition for certiorari under Rule 45, then what may be raised
therein are only questions of law of which this Court already has of which this Court already
has jurisdiction.
We are not impressed by this discourse. It overlooks the fact that by jurisprudential
developments over the years, this Court has allowed appeals by certiorari under Rule 45 in a
substantial number of cases and instances even if questions of fact are directly involved and
have to be resolved by the appellate court.[18] Also, the very provision cited by petitioner
specifies that the appellate jurisdiction of this Court contemplated therein is to be exercised
over "final judgements and orders of lower courts," that is, the courts composing the
integrated judicial system. It does not include the quasi-judicial bodies or agencies, hence
whenever the legislature intends that the decisions or resolutions of the quasi-judicial agency
shall be reviewable by the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals, a specific provision to that
effect is included in the law creating that quasi-judicial agency and, for that matter, any
special statutory court. No such provision on appellate procedure is required for the regular
courts of the integrated judicial system because they are what are referred to and already
provided for in Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution.
Apropos to the foregoing, and as correctly observed by private respondent, the revised
Rules of Civil Procedure[19] preclude appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the Supreme
Court via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. In the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, Section 1 Rule 45, on "Appeal by Certiorari to the Supreme Court," explicitly
states:
SECTION 1 . Filing of petition with Supreme Court. - A person desiring to appeal
by certiorari from a judgement or final order or Resolution of the Court of Appeals, the
Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court or other court whenever authorized by law, may file
with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition shall raise only
question of law which must be distinctly set forth. (Italics ours).
 This differs from the former Rule 45 of the 1964 Rules of Court which made mention only
of the Court of Appeals, and had to be adopted in statutes creating and providing for appeals
from certain administrative or quasi-judicial agencies, whenever the purpose was to restrict
the scope of the appeal to questions of law. That intended limitation on appellate review, as
we have just discussed, was not fully subserved by recourse to the former Rule 45 but, then,
at that time there was no uniform rule on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies.
Under the present Rule 45, appeals may be brought through a petition for review on
certiorari but only from judgments and final orders of the courts enumerated in Section 1
thereof. Appeals from judgments and final orders of quasi-judicial agencies [20] are now
required to be brought to the Court of Appeals on a verified petition for review, under the
requirements and conditions in Rule 43 which was precisely formulated and adopted to
provide for a uniform rule of appellate procedure for quasi-judicial agencies . [21]
It is suggested, however, that the provisions of Rule 43 should apply only to "ordinary"
quasi-judicial agencies, but not to the Office of the Ombudsman which is a "high constitutional
body." We see no reason for this distinction for, if hierarchical rank should be a criterion, that
proposition thereby disregards the fact that Rule 43 even includes the Office of the President
and the Civil Service Commission, although the latter is even an independent constitutional
commission, unlike the Office of the Ombudsman which is a constitutionally-mandated but
statutorily created body.
Regarding the misgiving that the review of the decision of the Office of the Ombudsman
by the Court of Appeals would cover questions of law, of fact or of both, we do not perceive
that as an objectionable feature. After all, factual controversies are usually involved in
administrative disciplinary actions, just like those coming from the Civil Service, Commission,
and the Court of Appeals as a trier of fact is better prepared than this Court to resolve the
same. On the other hand, we cannot have this situation covered by Rule 45 since it now
applies only to appeals from the regular courts. Neither can we place it under Rule 65 since
the review therein is limited to jurisdictional questions. *
The submission that because this Court has taken cognizance of cases involving
Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770, that fact may be viewed as "acquiescence" or
"acceptance" by it of the appellate jurisdiction contemplated in said Section 27, is
unfortunately too tenuous. The jurisdiction of a court is not of acquiescence as a matter of
fact but an issue of conferment as a matter of law. Besides, we have already discussed the
cases referred to, including the inaccuracies of some statements therein, and we have
pointed out the instances when Rule 45 is involved, hence covered by Section 27 of Republic
Act No. 6770 now under discussion, and when that provision would not apply if it is a judicial
review under Rule 65.
Private respondent invokes the rule that courts generally avoid having to decide a
constitutional question, especially when the case can be decided on other grounds. As a
general proposition that is correct. Here, however, there is an actual case susceptible of
judicial determination. Also, the constitutional question, at the instance of this Court, was
raised by the proper parties, although there was even no need for that because the Court can
rule on the matter sua sponte when its appellate jurisdiction is involved. The constitutional
question was timely raised, although it could even be raised any time likewise by reason of
the jurisdictional issue confronting the Court. Finally, the resolution of the constitutional issue
here is obviously necessary for the resolution of the present case. [22]
It is, however, suggested that this case could also be decided on other grounds, short of
passing upon; the constitutional question. We appreciate the ratiocination of private
respondent but regret that we must reject the same. That private respondent could be
absolved of the charge because the decision exonerating him is final and unappealable
assumes that Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07 is valid, but that is precisely
one of the issues here. The prevailing rule that the Court should not interfere with the
discretion of the Ombudsman in prosecuting or dismissing a complaint is not applicable in this
administrative case, as earlier explained. That two decisions rendered by this Court
supposedly imply the validity of the aforementioned Section 7 of Rule III is precisely under
review here because of some statements therein somewhat at odds with settled rules and the
decisions of this Court on the same issues, hence to invoke the same would be to beg the
question.
V
Taking all the foregoing circumstances in their true legal roles and effects, therefore,
Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 cannot validly authorize an appeal to this Court from
decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases. It
consequently violates the proscription in Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution against a
law which increases the Appellate jurisdiction of this Court. No countervailing argument has
been cogently presented to justify such disregard of the constitutional prohibition which, as
correctly explained in First Leparto Ceramics, Inc. vs. The Court of Appeals, el al. [23] was
intended to give this Court a measure of control over cases placed under its appellate
Jurisdiction. Otherwise, the indiscriminate enactment of legislation enlarging its appellate
jurisdiction would unnecessarily burden the Court [24]
We perforce have to likewise reject the supposed inconsistency of the ruling in First
Lepanto Ceramics and some statements in Yabut and Alba, not only because of the
difference in the factual settings, but also because those isolated cryptic statements in Yabut
and Alba should best be clarified in the adjudication on the merits of this case. By way of
anticipation, that will have to be undertaken by the proper court of competent jurisdiction.
Furthermore in addition to our preceding discussion on whether Section 27 of Republic
Act No. 6770 expanded the jurisdiction of this Court without its advice and consent, private
respondent's position paper correctly yields the legislative background of Republic Act No.
6770. On September 26, 1989, the Conference Committee Report on S.B. No. 453 and H.B.
No. 13646, setting forth the new version of what would later be Republic Act No. 6770, was
approved on second reading by the House of Representatives. [25] The Senate was informed
of the approval of the final version of the Act on October 2, 1989 [26] and the same was
thereafter enacted into law by President Aquino on November 17, 1989.
Submitted with said position paper is an excerpt showing that the Senate, in the
deliberations on the procedure for appeal from the Office of the Ombudsman to this Court,
was aware of the provisions of Section 30, Article III of the Constitution. It also reveals that
Senator Edgardo Angara, as a co-author and the principal sponsor of S.B. No. 543 admitted
that the said provision will expand this Court's jurisdiction, and that the Committee on Justice matter; but if it operates as a means o implementing an existing right then the rule deals
and Human Rights had not consulted this Court on the matter, thus: merely with procedure.[32]
In the situation under consideration, a transfer by the Supreme Court, in the exercise of
INTERPELLATION OF SENATOR SHAHANI its rule-making power, of pending cases involving a review of decisions of the Office of the
Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary actions to the Court of Appeals which shall now be
xxx vested with exclusive appellate jurisdiction thereover, relates to procedure only. [33] This is so
because it is not the right to appeal of an aggrieved party which is affected by the law. That
Thereafter, with reference to Section 22(4) which provides that the decisions of the Office of
right has been preserved. Only the procedure by which the appeal is to be made or decided
the Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court, in reply to Senator Shahani's query
has been changed. The rationale for this is that litigant has a vested right in a particular
whether the Supreme Court would agree to such provision in the light of Section 30, Article VI
remedy, which may be changed by substitution without impairing vested rights, hence he can
of the Constitution which requires its advice and concurrence in laws increasing its appellate
have none in rules of procedure which relate to the remedy. [34]
jurisdiction, Senator Angara informed that the Committee has not yet consulted the Supreme
Court regarding the matter. He agreed that the provision will expand the Supreme Court's Furthermore, it cannot be said that transfer of appellate jurisdiction to the Court of
jurisdiction by allowing appeals through petitions for review, adding that they should be Appeals in this case is an act of creating a new right of appeal because such power of the
appeals on certiorari.[27] There is no showing that even up to its enactment, Republic Act No. Supreme Court to transfer appeals to subordinate appellate courts is purely a procedural and
6770 was ever referred to this Court for its advice and consent . [28] not a substantive power. Neither can we consider such transfer as impairing a vested right
because the parties have still a remedy and still a competent tribunal to administer that
VI
remedy.[35]
As a consequence of our ratiocination that Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 should
Thus, it has been generally held that rules or statutes involving a transfer of cases from
be struck down as unconstitutional, and in line with the regulatory philosophy adopted in
one court to another, are procedural and remedial merely and that, as such, they are
appeals from quasi-judicial agencies in the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, appeals
applicable to actions pending at the time the statute went into effect [36] or, in the case at bar,
from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases should be
when its invalidity was declared. Accordingly, even from the standpoint of jurisdiction ex
taken to the Court of Appeals under the provisions of Rule 43.
hypothesi the validity of the transfer of appeals in said cases to the Court of Appeals can be
There is an intimation in the pleadings, however, that said Section 27 refers to appellate sustained.
jurisdiction which, being substantive in nature, cannot be disregarded by this Court under its
WHEREFORE, Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989), together
rule-making power, especially if it results in a diminution, increase or modification of
with Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07 (Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
substantive rights. Obviously, however, where the law is procedural in essence and purpose,
Ombudsman), and any other provision of law or issuance implementing the aforesaid Act and
the foregoing consideration would not pose a proscriptive issue against the exercise of the
insofar as they provide for appeals in administrative disciplinary cases from the Office of the
rule-making power of this Court. This brings to fore the question of whether Section 27 of
Ombudsman to the Supreme Court, are hereby declared INVALID and of no further force and
Republic Act No. 6770 is substantive or procedural.
effect.
It will be noted that no definitive line can be drawn between those rules or statutes which
The instant petition is hereby referred and transferred to the Court of Appeals for final
are procedural, hence within the scope of this Court's rule-making power, and those which
disposition, with said petition to be considered by the Court of Appeals pro hac vice as a
are substantive. In fact, a particular rule may be procedural in one context and substantive in
petition for review under Rule 43, without prejudice to its requiring the parties to submit such
another.[29] It is admitted that what is procedural and what is substantive is frequently a
amended or supplemental pleadings and additional documents or records as it may deem
question of great difficulty.[30] It is not, however, an insurmountable problem if a rational and
necessary and proper.
pragmatic approach is taken within the context of our own procedural and jurisdictional
system. SO ORDERED.
In determining whether a rule prescribed by the Supreme Court, for the practice and
procedure of the lower courts, abridges, enlarges, or modifies any substantive right, the test
is whether the rule really regulates procedure, that is, the judicial process for enforcing rights
and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering remedy and redress for
a disregard or infraction of them. [31] If the rule takes away a vested right, it is not procedural. If
the rule creates a right such as the right to appeal, it may be classified as a substantive
G.R. No. 146731. January 13, 2004]

AGUSTINA M. ENEMECIO, petitioner, vs. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN (VISAYAS) and

SERVANDO BERNANTE, respondents.

DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari[1] assailing the Resolution[2] dated 31 May
2000 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 58875. The Court of Appeals dismissed for
being an inappropriate remedy the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner Agustina M.
Enemecio against respondents Office of the Ombudsman and Servando Bernante. The
present petition also assails the Court of Appeals Resolution dated 7 December 2000 denying
petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The Antecedents
Petitioner Agustina M. Enemecio (Enemecio) is a utility worker at the Cebu State College
of Science and Technology, College of Fisheries Technology (CSCST-CFT), Carmen,
Cebu.Private respondent Servando Bernante (Bernante) is an Assistant Professor IV of
CSCST-CFT.
On 30 March 1998, Enemecio filed an administrative complaint for gross misconduct,
falsification of public documents, malversation, dishonesty and defamation against Bernante
before the Office of the Executive Dean of CSCST-CFT. [3] Dr. Severino R. Romano, CSCST-
CFT Executive Dean, indorsed the complaint to the Office of the Ombudsman for the Visayas
(Ombudsman).
Enemecio also filed with the Ombudsman a criminal complaint against Bernante for
falsification of public document.[4] The Ombudsman ordered Enemecio to submit her affidavit
and the affidavits of her witnesses. After Enemecio submitted the required affidavits, the
Ombudsman ordered Bernante to submit his counter-affidavit. The administrative complaint
was docketed as OMB-VIS-ADM-98-0201, while the criminal complaint was docketed as
OMB-VIS-CRIM-98-0286. The Ombudsman jointly tried the two cases.
Enemecio alleged that Bernante had caused the spray-painting of obscene and
unprintable words against her on the walls of the CSCST Carmen Campus. Enemecio
claimed that Bernante also shouted defamatory words against her while she was inside the
school premises. Enemecio further asserted that Bernante made it appear in his leave
application that he was on forced leave from 15 May 1996 to 21 May 1996 and on vacation
leave from 22 May 1996 to 31 May 1996. In truth, Bernante was serving a 20-day prison
term, from 14 May 1996 to 2 June 1996, because of his conviction of the crime of slight
physical injuries in Criminal Case No. NR-1678-CR. Bernante was able to receive his salary
during his incarceration since then CSCST-CFT Superintendent Andres T. Melencion
approved Bernantes application for leave. Enemecio contended that Bernante was not
entitled to receive salary for that period because of his falsified leave applications. [5]
For his part, Bernante did not deny that he was in prison from 15 May 1996 to 31 May
1996. He maintained that he received his salary for that period because of his duly approved
leave applications. Bernante also alleged that Enemecio filed the criminal and administrative
complaints against him in retaliation for the case he filed against Enemecios friends, Dean
Severino Romano and Bernadette Mante. Bernante denied he was behind the spray-painting
of obscenities against Enemecio on the walls of the school campus. [6]
On 13 January 2000, the Ombudsman rendered a decision dismissing
the administrative complaint against Bernante in OMB-VIS-ADM-98-0201. The Ombudsman
explained:
On the issue of the alleged falsification of respondents application for leave by making it
appear that he was on vacation when in truth and in fact he was serving a sentence for a
criminal conviction, we have determined that there is no regulation restricting the purpose or
use of an employees earned leave credits. Considering that the application for leave filed by
the respondent was duly approved by the appropriate official concerned, it matters not how
he utilizes his leave for it is not a requirement that the specifics or reasons for going on leave
be spelled out in such application.
On the issue of the spray painting of obscenities on the walls of the school, the evidence is
insufficient to prove that respondent was the person responsible for such as there were no
eye witnesses to such activity. The testimony of Bernadette Mante merely identifies the
respondent as allegedly having a drinking session with security guard Estanislao Lavaria at
around 11:00 on the night of March 29, 1998.Furthermore, witness Mante states that there
are about ten (10) to twelve (12) families living inside the dormitory facing the school walls
where the grafitti appeared. Despite this number, not one single person appeared to have
witnessed respondent spray painting the questioned grafitti on the walls of the campus (TSN,
April 19, 1999). While it may be probable that the only person or persons who could have had
the opportunity to spray paint the said grafitti on the night of March 29, 1998 or in the early
morning hours of March 30, 1998 were the respondent and security guard Lavaria, this is not
sufficient justification to directly blame them for such event.
Regarding the complainants allegation that on March 10 and 25, 1998, the respondent
defamed the former by uttering slanderous words, it appears that only the incident occurring
on March 10, 1998 was corroborated by the testimony of witness Delfin Buot (TSN, April 7,
1998). Witness Buot testified that he was about (3) meters from the respondent when the
latter shouted the words buricat (whore) putang ina and maot (snob) to the
complainant. However, the circumstances of the utterance, particularly the time and the
relation of the protagonists involved, leads us to conclude that the same is removed from the
official functions of the respondent as a professor of the school. Stated otherwise, the act of
the respondent was not in relation to his official functions. In the case of Palma vs. Fortich, et
al., 147 SCRA 397, the Supreme Court ruled that:
In administrative actions against municipal officers, the Supreme Court in Festijo v. Crisologo,
et al. (17 SCRA 868, 869 [1966]), classified the grounds for suspension under two categories,
namely: (1) those related to the discharge of the functions of the officer concerned (neglect of
duty, oppression, corruption or other forms of maladministration of office and (2) those not so
connected with said functions. Under the second category, when the crime involving moral
turpitude is not linked with the performance of official duties, conviction by final judgment is
required as a condition precedent to administrative action.
Therefore, inasmuch as the oral defamation charge is now pending before the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court in Catmon, Cebu under Criminal Case No. 30006-CR, the matter of
respondents administrative culpability is still premature to be determined herein. [7]
On the same date, the Ombudsman dismissed the criminal complaint against Bernante
in OMB-VIS-CRIM-98-0286[8] finding no probable cause to indict Bernante for falsification of
public document. The Ombudsman explained thus:
It is well established by documentary evidence that the applications for leave filed by the
respondent for the period from May 15 to 31, 1996 were duly approved by the head of office,
which in this case is Mr. Andres T. Melencion, Vocational School Superintendent. All these
leaves were with pay indicating that the respondent availed of his leave credits which are
undeniably due to him by law. It matters not how the respondent utilizes the days where he is
on leave, be they enjoyed as a vacation or, in this case, incarceration for a crime. There
appears to be no regulation or law against the utilization of leave credits for purposes other
than recreation. As such, there could be no falsification where nothing is being
misrepresented in the official leave forms which the respondent prepared and submitted. [9]
The Ombudsman denied Enemecios motion to reconsider the dismissal of
the criminal complaint in its Order of 28 February 2000. In denying the motion, the
Ombudsman stated:
We find the complainants arguments untenable. There is no dispute that the leave forms are
public documents. What is in dispute is whether or not the failure of the respondent to
indicate therein the reasons for his leave amounts to a crime of falsification. It is submitted
that it does not, for the simple reason that the form itself does not require stating the reasons
for going on leave. An employee simply indicates through check marks the nature of the
leave he is availing of, which in the case at bar, respondent chose to avail of his forced and
vacation leave credits. Nevertheless, the omission does not affect the validity of its
approval. What is indicated in the leave forms is only the need to specify the whereabouts of
the employee who goes on leave. However, it is not a requirement that specifics must be
provided. In any case the omission to state the location of a vacationing employee is not a
condition sine-qua-non for its approval.
To sum it up, there is no falsification of leave forms where there is no requirement for the
indication of reasons for going on leave. Regardless of such a requirement, the need to
indicate the whereabouts of a vacationing employee is not a necessity for its approval. [10]
Enemecio filed a special civil action for certiorari before the Court of Appeals, assailing
the resolutions which dismissed the criminal complaint and denied the motion for
reconsideration in OMB-VIS-CRIM-98-0286. Applying the ruling in Fabian v. Desierto,[11] the
appellate court dismissed Enemecios petition for having been filed out of time. The appellate
court also stated that the proper remedy available to Enemecio was a petition for review
under Rule 43 and not a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
In her motion for reconsideration, Enemecio argued that the appellate court should not
have relied on Fabian. Enemecio contended that Fabian declared void only Section 27 of
Republic Act No. 6770 (RA 6770) and Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07 (AO
No. 07) insofar as they provide for appeals in administrative disciplinary cases from the
Ombudsman to the Supreme Court. Enemecio asserted that the other provisions of Section
27 of RA 6770 and Section 7 of AO No. 07, including the final and unappealable character of
orders, resolutions or decisions exonerating a respondent from any criminal liability, still
stand. Enemecio stated that she filed the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the Court of
Appeals because she considered Bernantes absolution from the administrative complaint in
OMB-VIS-ADM-98-0201 as already final and unappealable. As there was no adequate
remedy of appeal, Enemecio claimed that her only recourse was a petition for certiorari
before the appellate court under Rule 65.[12]
The Court of Appeals denied Enemecios motion for reconsideration in its Order of 7
December 2000.
Hence, this petition for review.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In dismissing the petition, the Court of Appeals stated that in Fabian, the Supreme Court
held that appeals in administrative disciplinary cases from the Ombudsman to the Court of
Appeals must be brought by petition for review under Rule 43. The appellate court stated that
a petition for review must be filed within 15 days from notice of the assailed final order or
resolution. Since Enemecio received on 22 March 2000 a copy of the Ombudsmans Order
denying her motion for reconsideration, the appellate court ruled that Enemecio had only until
6 April 2000 to file a petition for review. Enemecio filed her petition only on 8 May 2000. The
appellate court further stated that Enemecios allegation in the petition that there is no appeal
or other plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law is false. The proper
remedy available to Enemecio is a petition for review. [13]
In denying Enemecios motion for reconsideration, the Court of Appeals clarified
that Fabian does not apply to Enemecios petition assailing the dismissal of
the criminal complaint against Bernante. The appellate court stated that
what Fabian declared void was Section 27 of RA 6770, which authorized appeals to the
Supreme Court from decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases. Under
the Fabian ruling, the appellant should take such appeal in administrative disciplinary cases
to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43. The Court of Appeals added that it follows that the
power to review decisions of the Ombudsman in criminal cases is retained by the Supreme
Court under Section 14 of RA 6770. Thus, the appellate court dismissed the petition for lack
of jurisdiction.[14]
The Issues
 Enemecio contends that:
1. The Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in refusing to assume
jurisdiction over the petition.
2. The Court of Appeals gravely erred in failing to appreciate that a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 was the appropriate course of action considering the
circumstances obtaining.
3. The Court of Appeals gravely erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 filed by petitioner by misinterpreting the ruling of the Supreme Court
in Fabian vs. Desierto.[15]
The issues boil down to whether a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 filed before the
Court of Appeals is the proper remedy to question the dismissal of a criminal complaint filed
with the Ombudsman.
The Courts Ruling
We resolve to dismiss this petition.
Enemecio filed before the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari under Rule
65[16] questioning the Ombudsmans Resolution dated 13 January 2000 and Order dated 28
February 2000 dismissing the criminal case against Bernante.[17] Thus, the Prefatory
statement of Enemecios Petition in the Court of Appeals states:
This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking to nullify the
Resolution dated 13 January 2000 and the Order dated 28 February 2000 both issued by the
Public Respondent in the Ombudsman Case docketed as OMB-VIS-CRIM-98-0201 and
entitled, Agustina Enemecio vs. Servando Bernante, Asst. Professor IV, CSCST- College of
Fisheries Technology, Carmen, Cebu, for being a manifest and grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess of jurisdiction. The Resolution dated 13 January 2000 dismissed
the criminal complaint for malversation and falsification of public documents filed against
herein Private Respondent while the Order dated 28 February 2000 denied herein Petitioners
Motion for Reconsideration. Certified machine copies of the aforesaid Resolution and Order
are hereto appended as Annexes A and B respectively. (Emphasis supplied)
The appellate court dismissed Enemecios petition and denied her motion for
reconsideration. Enemecio now comes to this Court via this petition for review, claiming
that what was involved in the petition before the appellate court was the administrative,
not the criminal case.[18] Enemecio thus stresses that there is no reason for the Court of
Appeals to say that the petition concerned the criminal case. [19]
We cannot countenance the sudden and complete turnabout of Enemecio and her
counsel, Atty. Terence L. Fernandez. Atty. Fernandezs conduct has fallen far too short of the
honesty required of every member of the Bar.
It is clear from the records that Atty. Fernandez filed with the Court of Appeals
a certiorari petition assailing the Ombudsmans Resolution and Order dismissing
the criminal case, not the administrative case against Bernante. For this reason, the
appellate court in its 7 December 2000 Resolution rectified itself and stated that Fabian does
not apply to Enemecios petition as the Fabian ruling applies only to administrative
disciplinary actions. Atty. Fernandezs attempt to mislead this Court in a last ditch effort to
secure a decision favorable to his clients cause does not escape our attention. As an officer
of the court, Atty. Fernandez is duty bound to uphold the dignity and authority of the court to
which he owes fidelity according to the oath he has taken as attorney, and not to promote
distrust in the administration of justice. He must always bear in mind that good faith and
honorable dealings with judicial tribunals are primary obligations of an attorney. He must
always remember to deal with courts with truthfulness and not to trifle with court proceedings.
[20]
For this, Atty. Fernandez should be admonished not to commit similar acts again.
Even if we consider Enemecios petition before the Court of Appeals as questioning the
dismissal of the administrative case against Bernante, the action must also fail. Appeals from
decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary actions should be brought to the
Court of Appeals under Rule 43.[21] The only provision affected by the Fabian ruling is the
designation of the Court of Appeals as the proper forum and of Rule 43 as the proper mode of
appeal. All other matters in Section 27 of RA 6770, including the finality or non-finality of
decisions of the Ombudsman, remain valid.[22]
In any event, jurisprudence now holds that where the findings of the Ombudsman on the
existence of probable cause in criminal cases is tainted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the aggrieved party may file a petition
for certiorari with the Supreme Court under Rule 65. [23] Since Enemecio filed
a certiorari petition before the Court of Appeals, instead of the Supreme Court, she availed of
a wrong remedy in the wrong forum. Hence, the instant petition should be dismissed outright.
Even if we consider the substance of the case, we find no grave abuse of discretion in
the Ombudsmans determination of whether there exists a prima facie case against Bernante.
Enemecio assails the dismissal of the criminal charges against Bernante for two
reasons: (1) that she was able to prove before the Ombudsman the charge for malversation
against Bernante; and (2) that Bernante himself admitted that he signed and filed the subject
leave applications.
Enemecio asserts that she was able to present before the Ombudsman the payroll of the
CSCST-CFT employees covering the period from 16 May 1996 to 31 May 1996 signed by
Bernante. Enemecio asserts that this document proved that Bernante actually received and
was paid the amount of P3,185.08 as a result of his falsified letter-requests and leave
applications. According to Enemecio, these constituted acts of malversation.
Enemecios contentions do not deserve serious consideration.
 Under Article 171, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code, the elements of falsification
of public documents through an untruthful narration of facts are: (a) the offender makes in a
document untruthful statements in a narration of facts; (b) the offender has a legal obligation
to disclose the truth of the facts narrated; (c) the facts narrated by the offender are absolutely
false; and (d) the perversion of truth in the narration of facts was made with the wrongful
intent to injure a third person.[24]
As the Ombudsman correctly pointed out, Enemecio failed to point to any law imposing
upon Bernante the legal obligation to disclose where he was going to spend his leave of
absence. Legal obligation means that there is a law requiring the disclosure of the truth of the
facts narrated.[25] Bernante may not be convicted of the crime of falsification of public
document by making false statements in a narration of facts absent any legal obligation to
disclose where he would spend his vacation leave and forced leave.
In PCGG v. Desierto,[26] the Court ruled that the Ombudsman has the discretion to
determine whether a criminal case, given the facts and circumstances, should be filed or
not. The Ombudsman may dismiss the complaint forthwith if he finds it insufficient in form or
substance. On the other hand, he may continue with the inquiry if he finds otherwise. If, in the
Ombudsmans view, the complaint is sufficient in form and substance, he may proceed with
the investigation. In fact, the Ombudsman has the power to dismiss a complaint outright
without going through a preliminary investigation.[27]
Our evaluation of the records leads us to the conclusion that the Ombudsman has
carefully studied the merits of the criminal complaint. Where the Ombudsman has thoroughly
examined the merits of the complaint, it would not be right to subject the private respondent
to an unnecessary and prolonged anguish.[28]
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. Nos. 187896-97, June 10, 2013

AMANDO P. CORTES, Petitioner, v. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN (VISAYAS), VICTORY
M. FERNANDEZ, JULIO E. SUCGANG AND NILO IGTANLOC, Respondents.

RESOLUTION

PEREZ, J.:

The subject of this petition for review is the dismissal of the criminal and administrative
complaints filed by petitioner Amando P. Cortes with the Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas)
against respondents Victory M. Fernandez (Fernandez), Julio E. Sucgang (Sucgang) and Nilo
Igtanloc (Igtanloc), who were sued in their capacity as Provincial Engineer, Barangay Captain
of Barangay Soncolan and Grader Operator, respectively, of the Province of Aklan.

In his Complaint-Affidavit filed on 28 November 2006, petitioner charged respondents with

violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
and Misconduct. Petitioner alleged that during the period of 29 March 2006 to 1 April 2006,
respondents utilized a heavy equipment grader owned by the Province of Aklan in levelling a
portion of his land. Petitioner claimed that the portion of the land destroyed has an area of
1,125 square meters and that several fruit trees were destroyed. Petitioner impleaded
Fernandez for the latter’s failure to ascertain from the BarangayCaptain whether the roads
sought to be levelled were barangay roads, and for issuing a driver’s trip ticket to the Grader
Operator.1
In a Consolidated Evaluation Report dated 14 December 2006, the Office of the Ombudsman
(Visayas) recommended the dismissal of the cases due to the fact that two (2) other cases
involving the same parties and issues had already been filed by petitioner.
Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the Consolidated Evaluation Report. On 7
February 2008, the Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas) denied the motion for
reconsideration.
Petitioner takes the appeal directly to this Court, via a petition for review on certiorari,
pursuant to Section 27 of the Ombudsman Act, assailing the denial of his motion for
reconsideration by the Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas).
Petitioner cites the following errors as grounds for the allowance of
the petition:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
(1) Respondent Ombudsman Office gravely erred when it dismissed the complaint-affidavit
of herein petitioner on the ground that two cases involving the same issues as in the
complaint-affidavit were previously filed by petitioner, as complainant therein.
(2) Respondent Ombudsman Office gravely erred in finding that a mere Inventory of
Barangay Roads and Bridges as of 1999 could prevail over an Original Certificate of Title
registered on 28 May 1985.
(3) Respondent Ombudsman Office gravely erred in allowing respondents Fernandez,
Igtanloc and Sucgang, to grossly violate the constitutional mandate provided for in the
Bill of Rights, 1987 Constitution of the Philippines.
(4) Respondent Ombudsman Office gravely erred in not expressing clearly and distinctly in
its Order dated February 7, 2008 and Consolidated Evaluation Report dated December
14, 2006, the law on which it is based in careless disregard of a constitutional mandate. 2
Petitioner refutes the finding of the Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas) that he had filed a
similar administrative and criminal complaint against respondents. Petitioner claims that the
complaints adverted to were filed by one Hernando Cortes and they pertained to another
parcel of land that was also graded and levelled by respondents. Petitioner maintains that
the affected portion of his land is covered by an original certificate of title and that a document
such as the inventory of barangay roads upon which the authority to scrape and
level barangay roads is based should have been first annotated as lien to petitioner’s
certificate of title. Petitioner stresses that respondents’ actions violated his constitutional right
to due process and that his property was taken without just compensation. Finally, petitioner
assails the Consolidated Evaluation Report and Order of the Office of the Ombudsman
(Visayas) for having been issued in violation of the constitutional requirement that decisions
must state the factual and legal basis thereof.
In their Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General seeks the dismissal of the petition
because petitioner availed of the wrong remedy. Moreover, the Office of the Solicitor General
supports the dismissal of petitioner’s complaint due to identity of issues and respondents in
the previous and the present complaint.
Respondents also filed their respective Comments. Igtanloc denied levelling and grading a
portion of petitioner’s land. According to Igtanloc, he only followed the contours of the
existing barangay road and did not widen or create a new one. Fernandez asserts that he
was merely acting in his official capacity and exercising his duty in issuing a driver’s trip ticket
to Igtanloc. Sucgang characterizes the complaint as a case of the "second brother (Amando
P. Cortes)" filing cases against the same respondents, raising the same issue that was
previously disposed of by the same office, in the cases filed by his brother (Hernando P.
Cortes).3
Petitioner, in filing this petition for review, committed a procedural misstep which warrants an
outright dismissal.
Petitioner misconstrued Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 or the Ombudsman Act of 1989
and disregarded prevailing jurisprudence. Section 27 provides, in part,
that:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives, or decisions of the Office of the
Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for certiorari within
ten (10) days from receipt of the written notice of the order, directive or decision or denial of
the motion for reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
This provision, insofar as it provided for appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 from the decisions
or orders of the Ombudsman in administrative cases, had been declared unconstitutional by
this Court as early as in the case of Fabian v. Desierto.4 We ruled in Fabian that appeals
from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases should be
taken to the Court of Appeals under the provisions of Rule 43, in line with the regulatory
philosophy adopted in appeals from quasi-judicial agencies in the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure.5
Jurisprudence accords a different treatment with respect to an appeal in a criminal case filed
with the Office of the Ombudsman. We made the pronouncement in Acuña v. Deputy
Ombudsman for Luzon6that the remedy of an aggrieved party in criminal complaints before
the Ombudsman is to file with this Court a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
Considering that the case at bar was a consolidation of an administrative and a criminal
complaint, petitioner had the option to either file a petition for review under Rule 43 with the
Court of Appeals or directly file a certiorari petition under Rule 65 before this Court. Neither
of these two remedies was resorted to by petitioner. findings. Neither should it deviate or come out with a different view with what was already
ruled upon by allowing the filing of another complaint. 10
By availing of a wrong remedy, this petition merits an outright dismissal.
For failing to overcome the procedural hurdle and for lack of merit, the petition must be
A review of the substantial merit of this petition would likewise yield to the same conclusion. denied.

It appears that prior to the filing of the instant complaint, Atty. Hernando P. Cortes (Hernando) FOR THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the petition is DENIED. The Order of the
had filed both criminal and administrative complaints against respondents Igtanloc and Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas) dated 7 February 2008 in OMB-V-C-06-0577-K and
Sucgang, who were the Provincial Engineer and Barangay Captain, respectively. These OMB-V-A-06-0639-K is AFFIRMED.
complaints involved the alleged grading and levelling of a portion of Hernando’s property. On SO ORDERED.
15 August 2006, the Office of the Ombudsman issued a Decision on the administrative case
docketed as OMB-V-A-06-0344-F and a Resolution on the criminal case docketed as OMB-V-
C-06-0315-F, dismissing both complaints for lack of merit. Three months later, petitioner filed
an administrative and criminal complaint bearing the same facts and issues. The cases,
docketed as OMB-V-C-06-0577-K and OMB-V-A-06-0639-K, were consolidated by the Office
of the Ombudsman. Petitioner additionally impleaded Fernandez as respondent. The Office
of the Ombudsman (Visayas) dismissed the case on the ground that a similar complaint
involving the same facts and issues had already been filed against the same respondents.
The Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas) was referring to the Hernando complaint.

Records disclosed that Hernando and petitioner are not only brothers but are also registered
as owners of the property allegedly levelled and graded by Igtanloc. In his complaints,
Hernando alleged that he, together with Amando P. Cortes, is the registered owner of a land
denominated as Lot 427, Psc 35, of Batan Cadastre, which is covered by Transfer Certificate
of Title (TCT) No. T-34885. 7 However, TCT No. T-34885 8 could be traced back to the mother
title, Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-15197, 9registered under the name of petitioner.
The same OCT was attached to the complaints filed by petitioner, wherein he also asserted
ownership over the subject property.

The facts point to the result that the previous and the present complaints, bearing
complainants who are owners of the same affected property, same respondents, same issues
and same arguments, in reality are one and the same. The Office of the Ombudsman
(Visayas) explained:cralavvonlinelawlibrary

To reiterate, the issues are identical and were in fact already resolved and decided upon by
the assigned investigator handling the complaints which were filed earlier. To allow a similar
complaint to proceed before the same forum using the same arguments and counter-
arguments already raised and discussed in a previous complaint would cause endless
litigations which is frowned upon by the courts. It is observed that there is identity of the
rights asserted and reliefs prayed for which are being founded on the same facts. It also
bears stressing that there is also identity with respect to the two preceding particulars in the
two cases, such that any findings that may be rendered in the pending case, regardless of
which party is successful, would amount to be a rehash of the other.

This Office cannot allow the simple changing of complainants just to side step its earlier
i