Alvarez vs.

CFI of Tayabas Case Digest

● The provisions of the constitution require that there be not only probable cause before the
issuance of a search warrant but that the search warrant must be based upon an application
supported by oath of the applicant and the witnesses he may produce.
● It is not mandatory to present affidavits of witnesses to corroborate the applicant or a
complainant in cases where the latter has personal knowledge of the facts.
● A detailed description of the person and place to be searched and the articles to be seized is
necessary, but where, by the nature of the articles to be seized, their description must be rather
general, it is not required that a technical description be given, as this would mean that no warrant
could issue.

Facts:

Mariano Almeda, the chief of the secret service of the Anti-Usury Board, applied for a search warrant
and presented to Judge David of the Court of First Instance of Tayabas an affidavit alleging that
according to reliable information, petitioner Alvarez kept in his house in Infanta, Tayabas, books,
documents, receipts, lists, chits and other papers used by him in connection with his activities as a
money-lender charging usurious rates of interest in violation of the law. In his oath at the end of the
affidavit, Almeda stated that his answers to the questions were correct to the best of his knowledge and
belief. He did not swear to the truth of his statements upon his own knowledge of the facts but upon the
information received by him from a reliable person. On the basis of such affidavit, Judge David issued a
warrant ordering the search of the petitioner’s house at any time of the day or night, the seizure of the
books and documents above-mentioned and the immediate delivery thereof to him to be disposed of in
accordance with the law.

With said warrant, several agents of the Anti-Usury Board entered the petitioner’s store and residence at
7:00 pm and seized articles such as internal revenue license, ledger, journals, cash bonds, check stubs,
memorandums, blackboards, contracts, inventories, bill of lading, credit receipts, correspondence,
receipt books, promissory notes and checks.

Alvarez filed a petition praying that the search warrant be declared illegal and that all the articles in
question be returned to him. He claimed that the search warrant was illegal for the following reasons: (a)
it was based solely upon the affidavit of the petitioner who had no personal knowledge of the facts of
probable cause; (b) it was not supported by other affidavits aside from that made by the applicant; (c) it
authorized its execution at night; (d) lack of an adequate description of the books and documents to be
seized; and (e) it was issued for the sole purpose of seizing evidence which would later be used in the
criminal proceedings that might be instituted against him for violation of the Anti-Usury Law.
The Anti-Usury Board insinuates in its answer that the petitioner cannot now question the validity of the
search warrant or the proceedings had subsequent to the issuance thereof, because he has waived his
constitutional rights in proposing a compromise whereby he agreed to pay a fine of P200 for the purpose
of evading the criminal proceeding or proceedings.

The CFI ruled against the Alvarez and upheld the validity of the search warrant.

Issues:

1. Is the search warrant illegal when the affidavit is based on hearsay?

2. Is there a need for affidavit of another witnesses to support the application for search warrant?
3. Can the search warrant be executed at night?
4. Did the search warrant satisfy the particularity of description as required by the law?
5. Is fishing evidence is valid?
6. Did Alvarez waived his constitutional right to question the validity of the search warrant or the
proceedings when he offered a compromise or settlement of the case?

Held:

1. Yes. The provisions of the constitution require that there be not only probable cause before the
issuance of a search warrant but that the search warrant must be based upon an application supported by
oath of the applicant and the witnesses he may produce. The oath required must refer to the truth of the
facts within the personal knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses, because the purpose thereof is to
convince the committing magistrate, not the individual making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of
the warrant, of the existence of probable cause. The true test of sufficiency of an affidavit to warrant
issuance of a search warrant is whether it has been drawn in such a manner that perjury could be charged
thereon and affiant be held liable for damages caused.

It appears that the affidavit, which served as the exclusive basis of the search warrant, is insufficient and
fatally defective by reason of the manner in which the oath was made, and therefore, it is hereby held that
the search warrant in question and the subsequent seizure of the books, documents and other papers are
illegal and do not in any way warrant the deprivation to which the petitioner was subjected.

2. No. It is not mandatory to present affidavits of witnesses to corroborate the applicant or a complainant
in cases where the latter has personal knowledge of the facts. However, when the applicant's or
complainant's knowledge of the facts is merely hearsay, it is the duty of the judge to require affidavits of
other witnesses so that he may determine whether probable cause exists.
3. Yes. The search be made at night when it is positively asserted in the affidavits that the property is on
the person or in the place ordered to be searched. In this case, it does not appear positively in the affidavit
that the articles were in the possession of the petitioner and in the place indicated; hence, the search and
seizure could not be made at night.

4. Yes. A detailed description of the person and place to be searched and the articles to be seized is
necessary, but where, by the nature of the articles to be seized, their description must be rather general, it
is not required that a technical description be given, as this would mean that no warrant could issue. The
only description of the articles given in the affidavit presented to the judge was as follows: "that there are
being kept in said premises books, documents, receipts, lists, chits and other papers used by him in
connection with his activities as money-lender, charging a usurious rate of interest, in violation of the
law." Taking into consideration the nature of the article so described, it is clear that no other more
adequate and detailed description could have been given, particularly because it is difficult to give a
particular description of the contents thereof. The description so made substantially complies with the
legal provisions because the officer of the law who executed the warrant was thereby placed in a position
enabling him to identify the articles, which he did.

5. At the hearing of the incidents of the case raised before the court it clearly appeared that the books and
documents had really been seized to enable the Anti-Usury Board to conduct an investigation and later
use all or some of the articles in question as evidence against the petitioner in the criminal cases that may
be filed against him. The seizure of books and documents by means of a search warrant, for the purpose
of using them as evidence in a criminal case against the person in whose possession they were found, is
unconstitutional because it makes the warrant unreasonable, and it is equivalent to a violation of the
constitutional provision prohibiting the compulsion of an accused to testify against himself. Therefore, it
appearing that at least nineteen of the documents in question were seized for the purpose of using them as
evidence against the petitioner in the criminal proceeding or proceedings for violation against him, we
hold that the search warrant issued is illegal and that the documents should be returned to him.

6. No. The petitioner did not waive his constitutional rights because the offer of compromise or
settlement attributed to him, does not mean, if so made, that he voluntarily tolerated the search and
seizure. The waiver would have been a good defense for the respondents had the petitioner voluntarily
consented to the search and seizure of the articles in question, but such was not the case because the
petitioner protested from the beginning and stated his protest in writing in the insufficient inventory
furnished him by the agents.
Jose Burgos vs. Chief of Staff G.R. No L-64261December 26 1!

Respondent Judge Ernani Cruz-Pano issued 2 search warrants to search the premises of of the
“Metropolitan Mail” and “We orum”! "arious e#uipment$ paraphernalia and written documents were
searched! Written literature alleged to %e in the possession and control of petitioner Jose &urgos$ Jr!$
pu%lisher-editor of “We orum” newspaper were seized! 'he (alidit) of these warrants were #uestioned
through a petition for certiorari and so thatthe articles and e#uipment ma) %e returned to the petitioners!

%ssue$
Whether or not the warrant of arrest is (alid to *ustif) the seizure of the items!

Su&reme Court Ru'i(g$

'he law pro(ides that “+no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue e,cept upon pro%a%le cause
to %e determined %) the *udge$ or such other responsi%le officer as ma) %eauthorized %) law$ after
e,amination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and thewitnesses he ma) produce$ and
particularl) descri%ing the place to %e searched and the persons or things to %e seized!” Pro%a%le
cause for a search is defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasona%l) discreet and
prudent man to %elie(e that an offense has %een committed and that the o%*ects sought in connection
with the offense are in the place sought to %e searched! n the case$ the reason for the seizure must %e
well stated$ as well as the specifications and the particularities of the alleged su%(ersi(e material that the
petitioner has pu%lished or is intending to pu%lish! Mere generalization will not suffice! 'hus$ the
%road statement in Col! .%adilla/s application is a mere conclusion of law and does not satisf) the
re#uirements of pro%a%le cause! 'he warrant is constitutionall) o%*ectiona%le %ecause the) are in the
nature of general warrants!'he search warrants were declared null and (oid!
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. PRISCILLA DEL NORTE, appellant.

DECISION

PUNO, J.:

Before us is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 28,
finding appellant Priscilla del Norte guilty of the crime of illegal possession of drugs, viz:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, this Court finds the accused Pricilla (sic) Del Norte (g)uilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime for (sic) Violation of Sec. 8, Art. II, R.A. 6425, and hereby
sentences her to suffer imprisonment of Reclusion (P)erpetua and a fine of P1,000,000.00, without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
The marijuana subject matter of this case is confiscated and forfeited in favor of the Government. The
Branch Clerk of Court is directed to turn-over the subject marijuana to the Dangerous Drugs Board for
proper disposal/destruction.
The City Jail Warden of Caloocan City is hereby ordered to transfer the accused Priscilla del Norte to the
Correccion (sic) Institution for Women, Mandaluyong City for the service of her sentence.
SO ORDERED.[1]

A search warrant was served on a certain Ising Gutierrez Diwa, on August 1, 1997, by SPO1 Angel
Lumabas, SPO3 Celso de Leon, Maj. Dionisio Borromeo, Capt. Jose, SPO3 Malapitan, PO2 Buddy
Perez and PO2 Eugene Perida.
As a result of the search, an information against appellant Priscilla del Norte was filed with the trial
court, viz:

INFORMATION
The undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor accuses PRISCILLA DEL NORTE Y DIWA AND JANE
DOE, true name, real identity and present whereabouts of the last accused still unknown(,) of the crime
of VIOLATION OF SEC. 8, ART. II, R.A. (No.) 6425, committed as follows:
That on or about the 1st day of August 1997(,) in Caloocan City, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring together and mutually helping with (sic)
one another, without authority of law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in
their possession, custody and control(,) MARIJUANA weighing 6748.37 gms. knowing the same to be a
prohibited drug under the provisions of the above-entitled law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[2]

SPO1 Lumabas testified that on August 1, 1997, their group was tasked to serve a search
warrant[3] against a certain Ising Gutierrez Diwa residing at No. 275 North Service Road corner Cruzada
St., Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City, for alleged violation of Republic Act No. 6425. They were ordered to
forthwith seize and take possession of an undetermined quantity of shabu and marijuana leaves. They
coordinated with the barangay officials and proceeded to the house pointed out to them by the local
officials. Upon reaching the house, its door was opened by a woman. SPO3 De Leon introduced
themselves as policemen to the woman who opened the door, whom they later identified in court as the
appellant.[4] They informed her they had a search warrant, but appellant suddenly closed and locked the
door. It was only after some prodding by the barangay officials that she reopened the door. The
authorities then conducted the search. They found a bundle of marijuana wrapped in Manila paper under
the bed and inside the room.[5] They asked appellant who owned the marijuana. She cried and said she
had no means of livelihood.[6] Appellant was brought to the police headquarters for further
investigation. Both SPO1 Lumabas and SPO3 De Leon identified the confiscated five (5) bundles of
marijuana[7] in court.
Mrs. Grace Eustaquio, a forensic chemist testified that pursuant to a letter request[8] from the Chief
of the Caloocan City Police, she conducted an examination on a specimen consisting of five bundles of
suspected marijuana. She found that each of the bundles was positive for marijuana. This finding was
reduced to a Laboratory Report.[9] The report also contained a finding on the supposed weight of each
bundle in grams, i.e., (A) 973.45, (B) 1,840.31, (C) 472.99, (D) 1,678.8, and (E) 1,782.82. [10]
SPO2 Florencio Ramirez, a police officer in the Intelligence Branch of the Caloocan Police Station,
testified that on August 1, 1997, the appellant was brought before him by SPO3 De Leon and SPO1
Lumabas. They also submitted two weighing scales, five bricks of marijuana leaves, and two bunches of
marijuana leaves wrapped in an old newspaper.[11] He apprised appellant of her constitutional rights
before investigating her. After the laboratory test showed that the evidence yielded was marijuana, he
sent a referral slip[12] to Prosecutor Zaldy Quimpo for inquest.
Appellant assailed the validity of the search warrant against her. She contended that she lived at 376
Dama de Noche, Barangay Baesa, Caloocan City,[13] and that on August 1, 1997, she was merely visiting
a friend, Marlyn, who lived at 275 North Service Road corner Cruzada St., Bagong Barrio, Caloocan
City. She went to Marlyns house to borrow money. Marlyn was out and she waited. While appellant was
seated near the door, several people introduced themselves as policemen, made her sign a white paper
and entered the house. She heard them say we already got Ising, and was surprised why they suddenly
arrested her. She saw Ising, her sister, at a house two steps away from the house where she was
arrested. Despite her claim that she was not Ising, the policemen brought her to the police station. [14]
Appellants daughter, Christine also took the witness stand. She testified that she is one of the eight
children of the appellant. Since June 1997, she recalled that they had lived at 376 Dama de Noche St.,
Caloocan City, as proved by the address stated in her school identification card, [15] and a receipt
evidencing payment for the rental of their house at Dama de Noche St. from July 18 to August 18,
1997.[16]
The trial court convicted appellant. In this appeal, she raises the lone error that the lower court erred
in convicting the accused-appellant of the crime charged, when her guilt has not been proved beyond
reasonable doubt.[17]
 Appellant contends that the prosecution failed to establish who owned the house where the search
was conducted, and avers that her mere presence therein did not automatically make her the owner of the
marijuana found therein. She likewise argues that the search warrant specified the name of Ising
Gutierrez as the owner of the house to be searched, and that since she is not Ising Gutierrez, the lower
court erred in admitting the confiscated drugs as evidence against her. [18]
The Solicitor General contends that the totality of the evidence demonstrates appellants guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.[19] He cites the case of United States vs. Gan Lian Po,[20] that when illegal
drugs are found in the premises occupied by a certain person, such person is presumed to be in possession
of the prohibited articles. It then becomes the accuseds burden to prove the absence of animus
possidendi.[21]
We reverse the trial courts decision. The prosecution failed to establish the guilt of appellant
beyond reasonable doubt.
In a prosecution for illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the following facts must be proven with
moral certainty: (1) that the accused is in possession of the object identified as a prohibited or regulated
drug; (2) that such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) that the accused freely and consciously
possessed the said drug.[22]
We first rule on the validity of the search warrant. Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution provides:

SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by
the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized. (emphases supplied)

Appellant argues that the marijuana seized as a result of the search is inadmissible due to the
irregularity of the search warrant which contained the name Ising Gutierrez Diwa and not Priscilla del
Norte. She alleges that Ising is her sister. During her arrest, she claimed she saw Ising nearby and pointed
her to the authorities, but her efforts were futile the authorities arrested her.
The Constitution requires search warrants to particularly describe not only the place to be searched,
but also the persons to be arrested. We have ruled in rare instances that mistakes in the name of the
person subject of the search warrant do not invalidate the warrant, provided the place to be searched is
properly described. In People v. Tiu Won Chua,[23] we upheld the validity of the search warrant despite
the mistake in the name of the persons to be searched. In the cited case, the authorities conducted
surveillance and a test-buy operation before obtaining the search warrant and subsequently implementing
it. They had personal knowledge of the identity of the persons and the place to be searched although they
did not specifically know the names of the accused.
 The case at bar is different. We cannot countenance the irregularity of the search warrant. The
authorities did not have personal knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the search. They did not
conduct surveillance before obtaining the warrant. It was only when they implemented the warrant that
they coordinated with the barangay officials. One of the barangay officials informed SPO3 De Leon that
Ising Gutierrez Diwa and Priscilla Del Norte are one and the same person, but said barangay official was
not presented in court. The authorities based their knowledge on pure hearsay.
On the merits, we believe the prosecution failed to discharge its burden of proving appellants guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecutions witnesses failed to establish appellants ownership of the
house where the prohibited drugs were discovered. Except for their bare testimonies, no other proof was
presented.
This is in contrast to appellants proof of her residence. The prosecution did not contest the punong
barangays certification,[24] Christinas school ID[25] and the rental receipt,[26] all of which show that
appellant and her family live at 376 Dama de Noche St. There being no substantial contrary evidence
offered, we conclude that appellant does not own the house subject of the search.
The prosecution likewise failed to prove that appellant was in actual possession of the prohibited
articles at the time of her arrest. This is shown by the testimony of the prosecutions witness:

Fiscal Lomadilla to Witness

Q: What did you find in that house at No. 275?
A: We found marijuana.
Q: What is the quantity of the marijuana you found?
A: Five bunch (sic) or bricks of marijuana and two weighing scale(s), sir.
Q: Mr. Lumabas, you mentioned a search warrant issued by Judge Rivera. What was the result
of the execution of that search warrant?
A: We were able to find marijuana inside the house of Priscilla del Norte.
Q: What is the quantity?
A: More or less six kilos.
Q: Was it arranged? How was it placed?
A: It was wrapped inside the plastic tape and it looks (sic) like in bricks form.[27]

xxxxxxxxx

Q: What part of the house did you discover these five bricks of marijuana?
A: Inside the room, sir, under the bed.
Q: You said you found the accused Priscilla del Norte, where was she when you found her?
A: Inside the sala, sir.[28]

In fact, it seems that the authorities had difficulty looking for the drugs which were not in plain
view, viz:

Atty. Yap to witness

 Q: You made mention about the bricks found?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And you said further that it was inside the room?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Now, when you entered the room, was it locked?
A: No, sir.
Q: As a matter of fact, there was no padlock of that room, is it correct?
A: I did not notice, sir, but it was open.
Q: And this alleged marijuana was protruding under the bed?
A: No, sir but it was under the bed, dulong-dulo.
Q: Was it also the same plastic bag?
A: No, sir.
Q: Was it also already wrapped in newspaper?
A: No, sir, only plastic tape. We were not able to notice that it was marijuana because it is (sic)
wrapped in a plastic tape.
Q: How long did you search?
A: Half an hour, sir.[29]

The prosecutions weak evidence likewise shows from the following testimony:

Atty. Yap to witness

Q: Were you able to search the personal effects?
A: Yung iba.
Q: Did you find any I.D. (of the persons) who occupy this room?
A: No, sir.
Q: In other words, your assumption is because Priscilla del Norte was around so (sic) it
follows that she was the possessor of that illegal drugs?
A: Yes, sir because it is their house.
Q: Was there a picture or photograph taken inside the room of that particular person?
A: None, sir.
Q: So a family lived thereat?
A: None, sir.
Q: Was there a separate picture of Ising Gutierrez?
A: I did not see any.
Q: There was no incriminating evidence except this (sic) drugs taken by Police Officer
de Leon and the barangay tanod, no other incriminating evidence?
A: None, sir. (emphases supplied)

In all criminal cases, it is appellants constitutional right to be presumed innocent until the contrary
is proved beyond reasonable doubt.[30] In the case at bar, we hold that the prosecutions evidence treads on
shaky ground. We detest drug addiction in our society. However, we have the duty to protect appellant
where the evidence presented show insufficient factual nexus of her participation in the commission of
the offense charged.[31] In People vs. Laxa,[32] we held:

The governments drive against illegal drugs deserves everybodys support. But it cannot be pursued by
ignoble means which are violative of constitutional rights. It is precisely when the governments purposes
are beneficent that we should be most on our guard to protect these rights. As Justice Brandeis warned
long ago, the greatest dangers to liberty lurk in the insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well meaning
without understanding.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision of Branch 28 of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City is
reversed. Appellant is acquitted based on reasonable doubt.

SO ORDERED.

Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Tinga, JJ., concur.