CEBU COUNTRY CLUB, INC.

(CCCI) VS ELIZAGAQUE GR 160273 1/182008TORTS/II-

INTENTIONAL TORTS/HUMAN RELATIONS/CATCH ALL PROVISIONS/ABUSE OFRIGHTS –
ART. 19
FACTS :
– CCCI is a domestic corporation operating as a non-profit and non-stock
private membership club. (In 1987, San Miguel Corp., a special company proprietary member
designated (for short), its senior vice president and operations manager for Visayas and
Mindanao, as special non-proprietary member.) In 1996, E filed with CCCI an
application for proprietary membership, endorsed by 2 members of CCCI. Since it was
required for a member to have proprietary share the price of which was P 5M, the president
of CCCI offered respondent a share of only P 3.5M. E however, purchased the share of a
certain Dr. Butalid for P 3M. However, his application was deferred. Subsequently, his
application was disapproved. Three letters for reconsideration were sent to the BoD,
however, no reply was sent by the latter. Hence, E filed with the RTC a complaint for
damages. RTC ruled in favor of E. CA affirmed the RTC ruling. Hence, this petition. (It should
be mentioned that the By-Laws of the Corporation provided that his eligibility as member
required a unanimous vote from the Board of Directors. This provision, however, was
not included in the application form. It was further revealed that among the
members of the BoD, only one voted his disapproval of the application. This, however, was
not made known to
ISSUE
- Should CCCI be held liable for damages despite the fact that it has the right to choose its
members?
HELD –
Obviously, the CCCI Board of Directors, under its Articles of Incorporation, has the right to
approve or disapprove an application for proprietary membership. But such right should not
be exercised arbitrarily. Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code on the Chapter on Human
Relations provide restrictions, thus: Article 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his
rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and
observe honesty and good faith. Article 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to
another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage. In GF Equity, Inc. v. Valenzona,5 we expounded
Article 19 and correlated it with Article 21, thus: This article, known to contain what is
commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, sets certain standards which must
be observed not only in the exercise of one's rights but also in the performance of one's
duties. These standards are the following: to act with justice; to give everyone his due; and
to observe honesty and good faith. The law, therefore, recognizes a primordial limitation
on all rights; that in their exercise, the norms of human conduct set forth in Article 19 must
be observed. A right, though by itself legal because recognized or granted by law as such,
may nevertheless become the source of some illegality. When a right is exercised in a
manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage
to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held
responsible . But while Article 19 lays down a rule of conduct for the government of human
relations and for the maintenance of social order, it does not provide a remedy for its
violation. Generally, an action for damages under either Article 20 or Article 21 would be
proper.
[S. F. No. 16951. In Bank. July 5, 1944.]
GLADYS ESCOLA, Respondent, v. COCA COLA BOTTLING COMPANY OF FRESNO (a Corporation

Facts:

Plaintiff, a waitress in a restaurant, was injured when a bottle of Coca Cola broke in her
hand. She alleged that defendant company, which had bottled and delivered the alleged
defective bottle to her employer, was negligent in selling "bottles containing said beverage
which on account of excessive pressure of gas or by reason of some defect in the bottle was
dangerous ... and likely to explode."

Plaintiff then rested her case, having announced to the court that being unable to show any
specific acts of negligence she relied completely on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.

Defendant contends that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur does not apply in this case, and
that the evidence is insufficient to support the judgment.

Issue:

Whether or not, res ipswa loquitur is applicable in this case.

[1] Res ipsa loquitur does not apply unless (1) defendant had exclusive control of the thing
causing the injury and (2) the accident is of such a nature that it ordinarily [24 Cal. 2d
458] would not occur in the absence of negligence by the defendant.

[2] Many authorities state that the happening of the accident does not speak for itself where
it took place some time after defendant had relinquished control of the instrumentality
causing the injury. Under the more logical view, however, the doctrine may be applied upon
the theory that defendant had control at the time of the alleged negligent act, although not
at the time of the accident, provided plaintiff first proves that the condition of the
instrumentality had not been changed after it left the defendant's possession.

In the present case no instructions were requested or given on this phase of the case,
although general instructions upon res ipsa loquitur were given. Defendant, however, has
made no claim of error with reference thereto on this appeal. [5] Upon an examination of
the record, the evidence appears sufficient to support a reasonable inference that the bottle
here involved was not damaged by any extraneous force after delivery to the restaurant by
defendant. It follows, therefore, that the bottle was in some manner defective at the time
defendant relinquished control, because sound and properly prepared bottles of carbonated
liquids do not ordinarily explode when carefully handled.

COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILIPPINES, INC. vs. CA and MS. LYDIA GERONIMO

G.R. No. 110295 October 18, 1993
Petition for review on certiorari (under Rule45) the decision of the CA
DAVIDE, JR., J.:

FACTS: Private respondent was the proprietress of Kindergarten Wonderland Canteen in

Dagupan City. In August 1989, some parents of the students complained to her that the Coke
 and Sprite soft drinks sold by her contained fiber-like matter and other foreign substances.
She brought the said bottles for examination to DOH and it was found out that the soft drinks
“are adulterated.” As a result, her per day sales of soft drinks severely plummeted that she
had to close her shop on 12 December 1989 for losses. She demanded damages from
petitioner before the RTC which dismissed the same on motion by petitioner based on the
ground of Prescription. On appeal, the CA annulled the orders of the RTC.

ISSUE: WON the action for damages by the proprietress against the soft drinks manufacturer
should be treated as one for breach of implied warranty under article 1561 of the CC which
prescribes after six months from delivery of the thing sold.

RULING: Petition Denied.

The SC agrees with the CA’s conclusion that the cause of action in the case at bar is found
on quasi-delict under Article 1146 of the CC which prescribes in four years and not on breach
of warranty under article 1562 of the same code. This is supported by the allegations in the
complaint which makes reference to the reckless and negligent manufacture of "adulterated
food items intended to be sold for public consumption."

NUTRIMIX FEEDS CORP V. CA 441 SCRA 357 (2004)

FACTS: In 1993, private respondent spouses Evangelista procured various animal feeds
from petitioner Nutrimix Feeds Corp. the petitioner gave the respondents a credit
period of 30-45 days to postdate checks to be issued as payment for the feeds. The
accommodation was made apparently because the company’s president was a close
friend of Evangelista. The various animal feeds were paid and covered by checks with due
dates from July 1993-September 1993. Consequently, the respondents incurred an aggregate
unsettled account with Nutrimix amounting to P766,151. When the checks were deposited
by the petitioner, the same were dishonored (closed account). Despite several demands
from the petitioner, the spouses refused to pay the remaining balance Thereafter, Nutrimix
filed a complaint against Evangelista for collection of money with damages. The
respondents admitted their unpaid obligation but impugned their liability. The
respondents also lodged a complaint for damages against the petitioner, for the untimely
and unforeseen death of their animals supposedly effected by the adulterated animal feeds
the petitioner sold to them. Nutrimix alleged that the death of the respondents’ animals
was due to the widespread pestilence in their farm.
`
The trial court held in favor of petitioner on the ground that it cannot be held liable under
Articles 1561 and 1566 of the Civil Code governing “hidden defects” of commodities sold. CA
modified the decision of the trial court, citing that respondents were not obligated to
pay their outstanding obligation to the petitioner in view of its breach of warranty
against hidden defects.

ISSUE: WON Nutrimix is guilty of breach of warranty due to hidden defects

HELD: NO.
The provisions on warranty against hidden defects are found in Articles 1561 and 1566 of
the New Civil Code of the Philippines. A hidden defect is one which is unknown or could not
have been known to the vendee. Under the law, the requisites to recover on account of
hidden defects are as follows:
a) the defect must be hidden;
b) the defect must exist at the time the sale was made;
c) the defect must ordinarily have been excluded from the contract;
d) the defect, must be important (renders thing UNFIT or considerably decreases FITNESS);
e) the action must be instituted within the statute of limitations

In the sale of animal feeds, there is an implied warranty that it is reasonably fit and
suitable to be used for the purpose which both parties contemplated. To be able to
prove liability on the basis of breach of implied warranty, three things must be
established by the respondents. The first is that they sustained injury because of the
product; the second is that the injury occurred because the product was defective or
unreasonably unsafe; and finally, the defect existed when the product left the hands of
the petitioner. A manufacturer or seller of a product cannot be held liable for any
damage allegedly caused by the product in the absence of any proof that the product in
question was defective. The defect must be present upon the delivery or manufacture
of the product; or when the product left the seller’s or manufacturer’s control; or when
the product was sold to the purchaser; or the product must have reached the user or
consumer without substantial change in the condition it was sold. Tracing the defect to
the petitioner requires some evidence that there was no tampering with, or changing of the
animal feeds. The nature of the animal feeds makes it necessarily difficult for the
respondents to prove that the defect was existing when the product left the premises of the
petitioner.

Aowa vs. DTI

G.R. No. 189655, April 13, 2011

FACTS:

The DTI-NCR records show at least 273 administrative complaints against

Aowa Electronics Philippines, Inc. from the year 2001 to 2007. The facts narrated in the
consumer complaints consistently contain a common thread that a target costumer is
approached by Aowa’s representative usually in the mall and inform the former that he/she
has won a gift or a “give-away.” Aowa’s representatives then verbally reveal that the said
gift can only be claimed upon purchase of additional products. An initial gift is also offered
to target customer and upon acceptance, the customer is invited to Aowa’s store or outlet.
It is that point that the customer is informed that he/she is qualified for a raffle draw or
contest entitling him to additional gift. In the same manner, the additional gift can be
received only upon purchase of additional products. In the course of enticing the target
customer to purchase additional products, they are physically surrounded (a.k.a ganging
up) by Aowa’s representatives. The purchase of additional products is not disclosed during
the initial stage of the sales pitch. The revelation is done only when the customer is already
being surrounded by Aowa’s representatives.

As a result, DTI-NCR filed a Formal Charge against Aowa before the DTI-NCR
Adjudication Officer for violation Articles 50 and 52 of the Consumer Act of the Philippines
praying that a cease and desist order be issued and administrative fines be imposed.

The Adjudication Officer held that DTI-NCR had sufficiently established prima
facie evidence against Aowa for violation of the Consumer Act and its Implementing Rules
and Regulations. Furthermore, the Adjudication Officer highlighted that Aowa failed to
secure any Sales Promotion Permit. Thus, a Decision was made declaring Aowa liable
for Deceptive, Unfair and Unconscionable Sales act or Practices.
 Aowa appealed the Adjudication Officer’s Decision before the Appeals Committee
(OLA). On August 26, 2008, the Appeals Committee sustained the Decision and held that the
schemes and techniques employed by Aowa were fraudulent.

Feeling aggrieved, Aowa elevated the Decision of the Appeals Committee to the
Court of Appeals (CA) under Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. However, on June 23,
2009, the CA affirmed the findings of the Appeals Committee.

Still unsatisfied, Aowa finally elevated the case before the Supreme Court by filing
a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure seeking the
reversal of the CA Decision. Briefly stated, Aowa raised among others the following errors
before the high tribunal:
1. There is no sufficient basis in the Formal Charge against Aowa since the
charge is merely based on consumer complaints which have all been
amicably settled.
2. The CA erred when it affirmed the harsh and excessive Decision of DTI
notwithstanding the fact that the Formal Charge is not supported by any
concrete, sufficient and convincing evidence.
3. The complaints against Aowa pertain to cases in the NCR, hence, there
was no basis for DTI to presume that the allege offenses are likewise
practice in other places in the country.
4. Aowa also argued that like other companies, sales personnel employed
enthusiasm and overzealousness in sales talk to convince potential
customers which cannot and should not be considered as deceit.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA committed any reversible error in affirming the findings and ruling
of the Adjudication Officer and the DTI Appeals Committee.

HELD:

In sustaining the CA Decision, the Supreme Court held that “it is indubitable that
the DTI is tasked to protect the consumers against deceptive, unfair and unconscionable
sales, acts or practices as defined in Article 50 and 52 of the Consumer Act.” It cannot be
gainsaid that the DTI acted on the basis of about 273 consumer complaints against Aowa,
averring a common and viral scheme in carrying out its business to the prejudice of
comsumers. Complaints- filed by consumers not only within NCR but also in the provinces-
continued to be filed even after the formal charge and the issuance of PMO.

In giving due respect to factual findings of DTI, the Supreme Court held: “By reason of the
special knowledge and expertise of DTI over matters falling under its jurisdiction, it is in
better position to pass judgment on the issues, and its findings of fact in that regard,
especially when confirmed by the CA, are generally accorded with respect, if not finality,
by this Court. Furthermore, Aowa failed to refute DTI’s finding that it did not secure any
permit for its alleged promotional sale.”

“In these trying times when fly-by-night establishments and syndicates proliferate all over
the country, lurking and waiting to prey on innocent consumers , and ganging up on them
like a pack of wolves with their sugar-coated sales talk false fellester.blogspot.com
representations disguised as “overzealous marketing strategies,” it is the mandated duty
of the government, through its various agencies like the DTI, to be wary and ready to
protect each and every consumer. To allow or to even tolerate the marketing schemes such
as these, under the pretext of promotional sales in contravention of the law and its existing
rules and regulations, would result in consumers being robbed in broad daylight of their
hard earned money. This Court shall not countenance theses pernicious acts at the expense
of the consumers”. (Case Digest by Atty. Fel Lester Brillantes)

G.R. No. L-41941 January 9, 1936

BENGZON vs.
THE PROVINCE OF PANGASINAN

In this case the motion for reconsideration of the decision promulgated on October 26, 1935,
was granted and the case set for re-argument on December 17, 1935. The court having had
the benefit of the oral argument of counsel on the issue of their present value of the
premises of the plaintiff-appellant involved in this suit, its decision of October 26, 1935, is
amended to read as follows:

This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan in

action for damages for maintaining a nuisance continuously injurious to the plaintiff
and his family by reason of the maintenance and operation of a stand pipe, pumping
station and open reservoir for the storage of water upon the premises immediately
adjacent to the plaintiff's residence.

It appears from the stipulation of facts that the plaintiff owns a house constructed
of wood and covered with nipa on Avenida Rizal, municipality of Lingayen, Province
of Pangasinan; that he had and his family have resided there for twenty-seven years,
his family being composed of eight members. Their house is two stories constructed
upon a lot which contains 720 square meter. Upon the adjacent lot the defendant,
during the years 1924 and 1925, constructed a reinforced concrete stand pipe 28
meters high and nine meters in diameter. Within the base of this cylindrical tank
there are three machines: One electrical, one gasoline and one crude oil. On the
side of the tank nearest the plaintiff's residence and at a distance of 3.4 meters is a
chimney which rises to about the height of the gable of the house. The tank itself is
3.8 meters from the house of the plaintiff.

In March, 1927, the plaintiff protested to the governor of the province for the manner
in which the plant was being operated and asked that he be indemnified for the
value of his house and lot so that he might move his family and his effects to another
residence. In this protest he stated:

"Expide humo y olor desagradable que penetran en el interior de mi casa, aun

cerradas sus ventanas, molestos y perjudiciales a nuestra salud. La chimenea de la
maquina, que esta en en el lado del tanque, contiguo al alero de mi casa, aunque
esta envuela en la cabeza como una red de acero chispea en ocasiones en que detro
de la red se ha acumulado por el humo bastante suciedad inflamable, y si algumas
tiguo de mi casa, techada de nipa, ella naturalmente nada de su contenido.

"El tangue nos asusta y ponne en en peligro de ser aplastadoos por el, siempre que
ocurre un tembor como ya ha ocurrido varias veces desde su levantamiento, por sus
porciones y condiciones mencionadas, y la circunstancia de estar plantado sobre
terreno blado, bajo y anegadizo. No es improbable, ni menos increible, que este
tanque volcara o se tumbra, si ocurriera en Lingayen un temblor tan fuerte como el
ocurrido el año 63 u 80 en Manila, o el occurrido en Japon en 1923, o en la fecha 7
de estee mes, que derrumbo muchas casas, matando a millares de personas. Ninguna
personans, por sabia que sea, puede dar certidumre y seguridad de que no se
tumbaria, por cualquier terremoto fuerte que occuriera aqui en Lingayen, maxime,
estado cargada de CIEN MIL galones de agua en su parte superior. Y si en ocasion en
que yo mi familia estuvieramos dormidos, ocurrienran el temblor y el volacamiento
del TANQUE hacia mi casa ay de nosotros!"

After making an ocular inspection of the plant and hearing the testimony of the
witnesses, the trial court came to the conclusion that although the operation of the
pumps and the tank creates some annoyance and discomfort to the plaintiff, these
are but ordinary and incidental to the reasonable conduct of the defendant's water
system. The court further held that inasmuch as the plaintiff did not protest till after
the plan was constructed, his action is barred for laches.

For this later conclusion of law the trial court cites no authority and we are not
aware of any. It is to be noted that this is not a suit for equitable relief but an action
for damages. The doctrine that one who consents to permits or acquiesces in the
erection of structure with knowledge of the purpose for which it is to be put and the
consequences of its uses are productive of a nuisance, is not applicable here, for the
plaintiff neither consented to, permitted or acquiesced in the erection of the
structure; nor could it fairly be said that he had knowledge in advance of all the
consequences of the erection and the manner of operation of the plant here in
question. The amended complaint in this case was filed on January 4, 1930, from
which we infer that the suit was instituted some time before that date. But there is
nothing in the record which warrants the inference of an estoppel by acquiescence.

The learned trial judge, in his decision of January 27, 1934, made a careful and
exhaustive analysis both of the law and the evidence in this case. But after a careful
examination of the entire record, we cannot accept his conclusion that the evidence
a case of actionable nuisance.

In locating its pumping station within 3.8 meters from the house of the plaintiff, the
defendant should reasonably have foreseen that the noise, vibrations, smoke, odor
and sparks coming from the plant during its operation, not only during the day but
during the night as well, would cause a constant annoyance, discomfort and danger
both to the property of the plaintiff and the health and comport of himself and his
family. The chimney which is just opposite the plaintiff's house at a distance of only
3.4 meters emits smoke, gases of crude oil and gasoline and occasionally sparks well.
The plaintiff testified that at times the smoke blinds him and his family affecting
their lungs and their eyes and that the noise and vibrations affect their sleep. As
against the testimony of the plaintiff, who is exposed day in and day out to these
conditions, and of his neighbors who corroborate him, the brief ocular inspection
made by the court on one day, although conducted with eminent fairness, seems to
us to be entitled to less weight. The witnesses for the defendant, its employees,
naturally minimize the harmful effects to the plaintiff of the operation of the
machines in the pumping plant. But the evidence as a whole leaves us with clear
conviction that the construction and operation of this pumping plant in such close
proximity to the plaintiff's residence has rendered the same practically uninhabitable
without exposing to risk the comfort, health and, in case of fire, even the live of the
plaintiff and his family.

We find from the preponderance of the evidence that the fair present value of the
appellant's premises involved in this suit is P3,000; and as, under the circumstances,
the maintenance of the nuisance is practically tantamount to an expropriation, we
have concluded that the defendant-appellee should be and it is hereby required and
 adjudged to pay by him to it of a valid conveyance of the premises, free of liens and
incumbrances, reserving to the plaintiff-appellant the right to remove his
improvements therefrom within three months from the date of payment of the said
P3,000.

The judgment appealed from is reserved and the cause is remanded for further
proceedings in accordance with this decision. No special pronouncement as to costs
in this instance.

Libi vs IAC
Libi vs. IAC

FACTS:

Julie Ann Gotiong and Wendell Libi were a sweetheart until the former broke up with the
latter after she found out the Wendell was irresponsible and sadistic. Wendell wanted
reconciliation but was not granted by Julie so it prompted him to resort to threats. One
day, there were found dead from a single gunshot wound each coming from the same
gun. The parents of Julie herein private respondents filed a civil case against the parents
of Wendell to recover damages. Trial court dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of
evidence but was set aside by CA.

ISSUE: WON the parents should be held liable for such damages.

HELD:

The subsidiary liability of parents for damages caused by their minor children imposed under
Art 2180 of the Civil Code and Art. 101 of Revised Penal Code covered obligations arising
from both quasi-delicts and criminal offenses. The court held that the civil liability of the
parents for quasi-delict of their minor children is primary and not subsidiary and that
responsibility shall cease when the persons can prove that they observe all the diligence of
a good father of a family to prevent damage. However, Wendell’s mother testified that her
husband owns a gun which he kept in a safety deposit box inside a drawer in their
bedroom. Each of the spouses had their own key. She likewise admitted that during the
incident, the gun was no longer in the safety deposit box. Wendell could not have gotten
hold of the gun unless the key was left negligently lying around and that he has free access
of the mother’s bag where the key was kept. The spouses failed to observe and exercise
the required diligence of a good father to prevent such damage.

Chan, Jr.,v. Iglesia NiCristo,Inc.,G.R. No.160283, October 14,2005

Facts:

Chan owns Aringay Shell Gasoline Station in La Union. It is bounded on the south by a chapel
of the INC. The gas station supposedly needed additional sewerage andseptic tanks for
itswashrooms, so the services of retired army general Ely Yoro was procured by Chan as the
former was allegedly a construction contractor in the locality. Chan and Yoro entered a
MOA, pertinent portions of which are as follows: Any damage within or outside the property
of the CHAN incurred during thedigging shall be borne by the YORO In the event that valuable
objects are found outside the property line during the said digging, the same shall be divided
among the parties (35% for Chan, 65% for Yoro) Diggings thereafter commenced. Chan was
informed by the members of the INC that the digging traversed and penetrated a portion of
the land belonging to the latter. The foundation of the chapel was affected as a tunnel was
dug directly under it tothe damage and prejudice ofthe INC.A complaint against Chan and a
certain Teofilo Oller (engineer) was filedby the INC in RTC La Union. Chan and Oller filed an
Answer and impleaded Yoro as third party defendant. The trial court absolved Oller and
adjudged Chan and Yoro solidarily liable holding that the diggings were not intended for the
construction of sewerage and septic tanks but were made to construct tunnels to find hidden
treasure. Chan and Yoro appealed separately. The trial court disallowed Yoro‘s appeal for
failure to paythe docket and otherlawful fees. Chan appeal was given due course but was
denied by the CA. Then, Chan instituted this case. He argues that the MOA executed
between him and Yoro is the law between them and must be given weight by the courts.
Since nothing in the MOA goes against the law, morals, good customs and public policy, it
must govern to absolve him from any liability.

Issue:

Whether or not the MOA entered into by the Chan and Yoro has the effect of making the
latter solely responsible for damages to the respondent.

Held:

NO. The findings of the trial court and the CA on this point are in complete unison. Chan
and Yoro were in quest for hidden treasure and, undoubtedly, they were partners in this
endeavor. Based on Art. 2176 the requisites of quasi-delict are the following: (1) There must
be an act or omission; (2) Such act or omission causes damage to another; (3) Such act or
commission is caused by fault or negligence; and (4) There is nopre-existing contractual
relation between the parties.All the requisites are attendant in the instant case. The
tortious act was the excavation which caused damage to
INCbecauseitwasdonesurreptitiouslywithinitspremisesanditmayhaveaffectedthefoundationo
fthechapel.Theexcavation on INC‘s premises was caused by fault. Finally, there was no pre-
existing contractual relation between theChan and Yoro on the one hand, and the INC on
the other. For the damage caused to INC, Chan and Yoro are jointly liable as they are joint
tort feasors. Verily, the responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a quasi-
delict is solidary. Chan and Yoro cooperated incommitting the tort. They even had provisions
in their MOA as to how they would divide the treasure if any isfound within or outside
Chan‘spropertyline.Thus,theMOA,insteadofexculpatingChanfromliability,istheverynoosetha
tinsuresthathebesodeclared as liable.While it is settled that a party who did not appeal from
the decision cannot seek any relief other than what is provided in the judgment appealed
from, nevertheless, when the rights and liability of the defendants are so

interwoven and dependent as to be inseparable, in which case, the modification of the

appealed judgment in favor of appellant operates as a modification to Yoro who did not
appeal. In this case, the liabilities of Yoro and Chan being solidary, the above exception
applies.*Torts-related but not underthe topicassigned:Exemplary or corrective damages are
imposed by way of example or correction for the public good. In quasi-delicts, exemplary
damages may be granted if the defendant acted with gross negligence. Bygross negligence
is meant such entire want of care as to raise a presumption that the person in fault is
conscious of the probable consequences of carelessness, and is indifferent, or worse, to the
danger of injury to person orpropertyofothers.Surreptitiouslydigging under the respondent‘s
chapel which may weaken the foundation thereof,thereby endangering the lives and limbs
of the people in worship, unquestionably amounts to gross negligence. Not to mention the
damage that may be caused to the structure itself. The exemplary damages must
correspondingly be increased to P100,000.00.