2005 IEEE/PES Transmission and Distribution

Conference & Exhibition: Asia and Pacific

Dalian, China

An Appropriate Distributed Generation Sizing

Considering Recloser-Fuse Coordination
S. Chaitusaney, Student Member, IEEE, and A. Yokoyama, Member, IEEE

on system reliability is the coordination of protective devices

Abstract--Among various applications, this paper has applied [4]-[6]. The presence of DG tends to affect the protection
Distributed Generation (DG) as backup generation when main coordination. Evidently, the short circuit current would be
generation supply is cut due to system equipment failure and altered due to the contribution of DG, especially the aggregate
protection operation. As backup generation, DG can certainly contributions of several DG sources. The unacceptable
increase the system reliability, especially in radial distribution operation of protective devices might occur and finally lead to
system, if the related concerns are deliberately taken into the decrease in system reliability. For example, the recloser
account. The reliability improvement can be obtained in term of
the reduction of outage duration. Regarding the influential issues, fast operation should discriminate a temporary fault, occurring
protection coordination between recloser and fuses has been mostly in distribution system, and operate faster than a fuse.
taken into account. This is a key factor to determine the However, fuse may operate faster than recloser and cause
appropriate DG size. With this consideration, the existing electricity interruption when the total fault current is changed
protection scheme of recloser and fuse can be maintained while by the contribution from DG fault current. With fuse
DG has been installed. In addition, forced outage rate (FOR) of operation, the fault will turn to be permanent and considered
DG is included in the study. The appropriate size of DG is unacceptable for system reliability. In this paper, interesting
calculated from Optimal Power Flow (OPF) that treats DG as cases of such problem are discussed together with the
another electric source in addition to utility substation. In this solutions. This conflict against system reliability is what the
study, the cost function is the total electricity cost from both
utility substation and DG including the outage cost from the proposed algorithm concentrates on when determining the size
energy not supplied (ENS). The proposed algorithm has been of DG.
applied to RBTS-Bus 2, a reliability test system for electric The appropriate size of DG can be achieved via the Optimal
distribution study. Simulation results confirm that the proposed Power Flow (OPF) that treats DG as another electric source in
algorithm provides an appropriate DG size that cope with the addition to the substation. Consequently, the size of DG can
aforementioned concern of DG - protection coordination. be obtained from the dispatched result that is subject to the
Index Terms--Backup generation, Distributed generation, appropriate constraints. In addition to traditional constraints,
Outage cost, Probability, Protection coordination. this paper has taken into account the protection coordination
criteria. This is because the protection coordination will be
I. INTRODUCTION lost if the fault current flowing through any protective device
is critically changed. The size of DG that implies the degree of
DISTRIBUTED Generation (DG) is currently attracting fault current must be limited.
both distribution utilities and electricity users. DG can The study simulation has generated the outage events
provide meaningful advantages for not only its owner, but including those resulting from DG and utility generation as
also the utility to which it is connected. The advantages of DG well as other system components. Based on the probability
are of both engineering and economic view points. The approach, OPF is then applied to these events. Besides, the
advantageous applications of DG can be summarized as proposed algorithm not only considers DG as backup
follows: backup generation, loss reduction, power quality generation, but also indirectly reflects the loss reduction of
improvement, grid expansion postponement, environmental DG. In this framework, the cost function is the total energy
concerns, peak load service, rural and remote application, cost of system. The total energy cost in the study means the
combined heat and power generation, and financial and cost of electricity supplied from both utility substation and DG
trading purposes [1]-[3]. In this paper, we, however, as well as the outage cost from the energy not supplied (ENS).
concentrate only on backup generation application. In this This is to integrate the benefit of DG when it operates as
framework, DG is considered to operate as both normal and backup generation and supplies load in the isolated area. By
backup generation. The purpose of DG backup generation is this means, system loss tends to automatically reduce in the
to supply the isolated load area instead of utility substation optimization, since total energy cost depends on system loss.
when an interruption occurs. As backup generation, DG can To begin with, the review of DG as backup generation is
certainly increase the system reliability if the relevant issues mentioned in Section II. In Section III, the concept of
are deliberately considered. The mostly cited influential issue protection coordination is then discussed with the applicable
solutions. The method for DG sizing is presented in Section
The authors are with the department of electrical engineering, The IV, and numerical examples are shown in Section V. Lastly,
University of Tokyo, Tokyo, Japan (e-mail: surachai_work@yahoo.com, the important contents are briefly concluded in Section VI.
yokoyama(syl.t.u-tokyo.ac.jp).

0-7803-9114-4/05/$20.00 ©2005 IEEE. I

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II. DISTRIBUTED GENERATION As BACKUP GENERATION breaker. Nevertheless, the circuit breaker of the healthy feeder
In this paper, backup generation from DG means the may operate and cause unreasonable electricity interruption on
generation supply from DG to the isolated area. The concepts this healthy feeder. Both cases of fuse blowing and false
of system isolation and protection mechanism are not new for tripping are unacceptable in both engineering and economic
power engineering [2], [7], [8]. When a fault or an viewpoints.
interruption has occurred, electric utilities normally take time Substation
to repair the failed component and then reinstall it into their
systems. This time has been known as Repair Time. Prior to
,Z+
the repair, electric utilities must disconnect and isolate the
failed component from their systems. This isolation process
takes time as Switching Time that is definitely less than
Repair Time. During Switching Time, generation supply will
be cut out by the protective device in charge, causing (a) Fuse Blowing
electricity outage to customers. However, after the failed F,S~~

component is completely removed and the isolation has been Breaker Fault Recloser
Substation
achieved, the substation source can normally operate and
serve the loads located at the connected part. Hence, these IF DG
Breaker Recloser
loads can obtain electric energy without waiting until Repair
Time is due.
This seems to be less useful for the radial distribution
system since the electric power flows uni-directionally from
the substation downstream to the end of distribution feeder. (b) False Tripping
Fig. 1. Fuse blowing and false tripping.
During the isolation, substation source can only serve the
loads located at the area connected to the substation itself. Basically, most distribution utilities have a regulation that
However, the isolation is much beneficial when DG is present, DG must be immediately disconnected whenever a fault has
especially when DG with enough supplying capacity is occurred or the DG itself operates abnormally [2], [10], [11].
located at the end of feeder. This is because DG can upstream If it is applied and absolutely effective, such problems can be
supply loads whose locations are behind the failed and neglected. However, the regulation alone cannot yield the
disconnected component. desirable operation in practice. Although the risk of DG
continuing to operate during fault is low, it is not zero.
III. PROTECTION COORDINATION Furthermore, it cannot be guaranteed that DG will be
The introduction of DG into distribution system will no disconnected faster than fuse blowing and false tripping. The
longer maintain the radial characteristic of distribution feeders. connecting DG can still result in erroneous protective
Instead, the distribution system will be changed to be mesh operation.
characteristic. Since the conventional protection in As a reinforcement, false tripping on healthy feeders may
distribution system is based on overcurrent protection, it probably solved by using directional overcurrent relay for the
means that the traditional settings of protective coordination circuit breaker [4], [12]. This method is possible and does not
cannot be held and protective devices may operate undesirably. require a great investment. In addition, it seems less severe in
Finally, this could lead to both the decrease in system the case that both faulted and healthy feeders have same or
reliability and large damage from fault in distribution system. similar circuit breakers. This is because the operating time of
The impact of fault current from DG depends on type, size both circuit breakers will be different. The current seen by the
and location of DG, as well as its operation mode. According circuit breaker in healthy feeder is only from DG, whereas the
to the literature [4]-[6], [9], a number of troublesome cases are current seen by the circuit breaker in the faulted feeder is from
caused from DG fault current. However, only fuse blowing both utility substation and DG. As a result, the operating time
and false tripping (sympathetic tripping) that are cited mostly of the circuit breaker in faulted feeder will be faster and the
will be investigated here. The examples of these two cases can operating sequence of both circuit breakers can be
be shown in Fig. 1. discriminated.
Fuse blowing and false tripping can affect the system For fuse blowing, other solutions have been necessarily
reliability. First, the effect of fuse blowing will be addressed. proposed to cope with the problem. For example, utilities can
As conventional protection, a temporary fault, occurring replace the protective devices and/or have new settings of
mostly, at lateral feeder should be discriminated by the fast reclosers and fuses to correspond with fault current from DG
operation of recloser. However, this conventional scheme may [4]. This seems reasonable and proper to protection
not be held when DG is connected at the end of the feeder. It engineering. However, the cost of replacement and setting are
is possible that this temporary fault will be discriminated by not negligible. Compared with the benefits of DG, the whole
the lateral fuse. This certainly decreases the system reliability. investment is somewhat difficult to be determined worthy.
Similarly, false tripping brings about reliability problem. Another solution is to limit DG fault current that impacts on
When a fault occurs at another feeder, the operating device the existing protection coordination [5], [13]. The principle is
should be the devices located in that faulted feeder, e.g. circuit that there is a margin of the fault current from DG for the loss
of protection coordination.

2
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With the above discussion, fuse blowing is considered

critical and will be merged into the energy dispatch problem IF,DG <Imargin (2)
described later. In addition, all DG sources are assumed to be
disconnected from the distribution system as it is a where IF,DG is the DG fault current.
conventional regulation of DG interconnection. The limit of
fault current from DG will be integrated into the study instead From the equation (1) and (2), the DG fault current can be
of new settings and replacement for protective devices. This is calculated as shown in (3). This relation will be used as a
to avoid the investment cost that can be considered large for constraint for sizing DG, described later in Section IV.
the whole system. Fig.2 shows a sample illustration how to
determine the DG limit or margin from a typical recloser and IF,DG <1 fuse,margin - F,S (3)
fuse coordination.
According to Fig. 1 (a), it is a general sample that DG is IV. DETERMINING THE SIZE OF DISTRIBUTED GENERATION
located at the end of feeder and a fault occurs at a lateral
feeder behind the recloser. In this case, the fault current Determining an appropriate size of DG, the principle is
flowing through the recloser is different from the fault current based on the conventional Optimal Power Flow (OPF) of
flowing through the fuse. It is obvious that the fault current distribution system. However, the concept of the coordination
seen by fuse is higher than the fault current seen by recloser. of recloser and fuses will be integrated so that the existing
This results from the contribution of the DG fault current. As protection setting can function properly.
the sample in Fig. 2, the philosophy here is that recloser F The detailed procedures can be categorized into 3
must disconnect the circuit before fuse MM. Hence, the subsections: probabilistic enumeration of events, cost function
margin for DG fault current can be calculated from the point for the optimization, and protection coordination constraint.
that fuse MM operates at the same time as the recloser F. A. Probabilistic Enumeration of Events
RAFOS¢ TC Ie-- r Fu X3 As stated in Section II, this paper proposes a method for
sizing DG with the integration of backup generation
......xa...... v... . application. To reflect the benefit of backup generation, the
decrease in outage duration must be calculated. Normally, two
typical methods are applied [8]. First, it can be calculated
from the time-varying status of load points that results from
U11"I
..................m.r.... Umr4E
the status of each system component, i.e. line, transformer,
breaker, as well as substation source and DG. The status can
be generally generated from Monte Carlo simulation and will
I Lfto"rf
be interpreted later in probability approach. For the second
method, the outage duration can be calculated directly from
analytical approach which employs probabilistic enumeration
Curren~t (Arno*) of events.
Fig. 2. Sample coordination between recloser and fuse. The latter method will be used in this study because the test
Note that the descriptions TC and MM of fuse mean total clearing and system used here is not much complicated. In addition, it can
minimum melting characteristics respectively, and the descriptions S and F of
recloser mean slow and fast operation modes respectively. evidently show all interesting events with the calculation.
Since the status of load points is derived from the status of
First, the fault current from substation can be predetermined, each system component, the dispatch result and the size of DG
and it will be the fault current seen by recloser. Then, the time will be calculated along with the events of system component.
at which recloser F and fuse MM operate simultaneously can B. Cost Function for the Optimization
be known. Since the current seen by fuse is the summation of
the fault currents flowing from substation and DG, the To apply an OPF for electric energy dispatch, the cost
maximum fault current from DG must be lower than the function should be clearly specified. As mentioned in Section
margin. From Fig. 2, the relation of the fault current from I, the study concentrates on monetary matter rather than solely
utility substation and the maximum or margin fault current fuel cost or energy loss. According to customers' response,
from DG can be written as follows. the outage cost is much higher than normal electricity cost and
should not be neglected. As a result, the cost function in the
fuse,margin =JIFS Imargi (1) study is the combination of electricity cost from both utility
where and DG and the outage cost from the energy not supplied.
To concentrate on the outage cost, the electricity costs from
IF,S fault current from utility substation; utility substation and DG are assumed to be equal. In addition,
Imargin margin for DG fault current; only the average cost per MW-hr will be used instead of
Ifuse,margin current seen by fuse with 'margin from DG. varying costs. Regarding the outage cost, it can be divided
into two portions. The first portion is due to the failure of
To ensure that the recloser F will operate before fuse MM, system equipment that definitely causes the electricity outage.
the fault current from DG must be lower than Imargin. Hence, For each load point, the outage duration is dependent upon the
the following equation can be expressed. locations of the failed component and the load point itself. For

3

the second portion, the outage is due to the capacity limit of
DG either from the DG capacity or from the protection
coordination constraint. This outage takes place when DG is
supposed to be a single supplying generation in the isolated
area with higher load demand. In this case, the generation
from DG is less than the total load consumption. Load
shedding is necessarily applied to ensure the normal operating
conditions, e.g. frequency and voltage profile. In summary,
the cost function can be written as the following equation.
Energy Cost = Electricity CostSubstation + ElectricityCOStDG (4)
+ Outage COStequipnent failure + Outage COStDG limit
Energy Cost = (Cs x QS)+ (CDG X QDG)+ (CO X QO1 )+ (CO XQO,2) (5)
where
Cs electricity cost of utility substation ($/MWh);
QS dispatched energy from utility substation (MW);
CDG electricity cost of DG ($/MWh);
QDG dispatched energy from DG (MW);
CO cost of electricity outage ($/MWh);
Qo, energy not supplied from equipment failure (MW);
Qo,2 energy not supplied from DG limit (MW).
C. Protection Coordination Constraint
The constraints for traditional OPF are set of power flow
equations, real and reactive power limits, and voltage
magnitude and voltage angle limits. In addition to these
conventional constraints, the constraint of protection
coordination should be simultaneously integrated in the
calculation. Regarding Section III, the margin for the fault
current from DG can be determined from the recloser-fuse
coordination. Based on (3), since the fault current from
substation can be known firstly from the fault calculation, the
next calculation is for Ifuse,margin. To calculate this current value,
the time at which recloser characteristic has the values of IFs
is used. This is to ensure that fuse will not operate faster than
recloser. This time will be noted as tmargin-
To determine Ifusenmargin mathematically, the fuse
characteristic should be approximated with an explicit
function. From the fuse characteristic on the log-log curve, it
is better to approximate by a second order polynomial
function. However, the interested range of the curve
approaches a straight line. Moreover, a linear equation can be
simply applied to reduce the calculation task. The general
equation describing the fuse characteristic curve can be
expressed as follows.
log (t) = a * log(I) + b (6)
where t and I are the associated time and current, and the
coefficients a and b can be known from the curve fitting.
By substituting tmargin into (6), the equation can be rewritten
and express Ifuse,margin as follows.
fuse,margin (7)
4
4
From (3) and (7), the limit of DG fault current can be
expressed. Whenever the DG fault current is less than this
limit, the protection coordination between recloser and fuse is
considered to be maintained.
IF,DG <10((109(tina,j,)-b)1a) IFS (8)
To integrate the current limit into the optimization problem,
the limit of DG fault current should be transformed to the
power limit or the size of DG. In this paper, Short-circuit
Capacity (MVA) is assumed to determine the maximum
capacity of DG.
Short- circuit MVA 3x Ix F,DG
= (9)
By substituting (8) into (9), the maximum capacity of DG, SDG,
can be derived.
SDG < V/s x VDG X (Z 0((Iog(t.,,g,, )-b)/a) - ) (10)
Next, it is assumed that DG normally operates at a constant
power factor, PF. Hence, the real power limit can be obtained.
PDG x PF x VDG X (10((l F(tS. )-b)/a) IF) (11)
To cope with the all coordination of the recloser and lateral
fuses, the value of PDG must be the smallest among all
coordination constraints.
PDG <min { x PF x VDG X (i0((10(tmaginb)la) - IFS (12)
where i ranges for the total cases of coordination constraints
of recloser and lateral fuses.
V. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES
The modified test system RBTS Bus 2 has been used in the
simulation. The system comprises 4 main feeders and 22 load
points. In the simulation, a DG is connected into the end of
each main feeder to be used as backup generation when a
section of main feeder has a failure. The reliability statistics
and load data are given as the data of RBTS Bus 2 [14].
In the simulation, the substation has enough installed
capacity for the whole system, whereas DG has enough
capacity for only the connecting feeder. This is aimed at
exposing the impact of protection coordination on the DG
maximum size. With protection coordination constraint, the
generation size of DG is forced to be limited. The average
power factor of DG is assumed to be 0.875. Regarding
electricity price, it is assumed to be 100 $/MWh and is equal
for both from substation and DG. Lastly, the outage cost is
assumed to be one hundred times higher than the normal
electricity price. Fig. 3 shows the single line diagram for the
test system RBTS Bus 2.
The numerical simulation has initially focused only on the
first feeder. This is to investigate and have an insight of the
protection coordination impact on DG sizing. Then, the full
system result is presented.
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LP16 LP17 LP18 LP19 LP20 LP21 LP22

From the table, the expected values can be derived by
27 28 30 3 33 35 36 multiplying the results with the corresponding probability, and
26 29 32 34 then summing up the values. Table II shows that the expected
generation from utility substation is 3.750 MW. The total
16 18 21 24
energy cost is 390.858 $/h which is calculated from the
17 19 20 22 23 25 summation of the electricity cost and the outage cost,
accordingly to (5).
LP1O LP11 LP12 LP13 LP14 LP15
C TABLE II
Substation 12
13
14
15 EXPECTED RESULTS WITHOUT DG
LP8 LP9
Substation DG Electricity cost Outage cost
4 7 10 (MW) (MW) ($/h) ($/h)
2 3 5 6 8 9 11 3.750 0.000 374.962 15.896

LP1 LP2 LP3 LP4 LP5 LP6 LP7 Regarding the case with DG, the outage can be divided
X Circuit breaker
*
into two portions, i.e. the outage from equipment failure and
Recloser
* Fuse the outage from DG limit. The outage costs from both
-/_ Disconnecting device equipment failure and DG limit are shown separately in the
Fig. 3. RBTS Bus 2 with the installation of DG result.
From Table III, DG size is limited at 1.790 MW to maintain
A. Impact of Protection Coordination the all cases of protection coordination between recloser and
The algorithm presented in Section IV is first applied to the fuses. Table IV shows that the expected generations supplied
first feeder of RBTS Bus 2. The result of the case without by utility substation and DG are 1.932 MW and 1.754 MW
DG is initially presented. Then, the result of which DG is respectively.
installed at the end of feeder is presented. This is to compare TABLE III
the detailed difference, including the total cost of system. GENERATION AND OUTAGE RESULTS WITH DG
TABLE I
GENERATION AND OUTAGE RESULTS WITHOUT DG Outage Proba- Sub DG Electri- Outage Outage
case bility (MW) (MW) city COSt, CoSt2
cost
Outage Probability Sub DG Electricity Outage ($/h) ($/h) ($/h)
case (MW) (MW) cost cost None 0.9773600 1.897 1.790 368.7 0 0
($/h) ($/h) Sub* 0.0000000 0.000 0.000 0.0 36450 0
None 0.9973068 3.751 0.000 375.1 0.0 Sub** 0.0000005 0.000 1.790 179.0 0 18729
Substation 0.0000005 0.000 0.000 0.0 36450.0 DG 0.0199460 3.751 0.000 375.1 0 0
Breaker 0.0000027 0.000 0.000 0.0 36450.0 Breaker* 0.0000007 0.000 0.000 0.0 36450 0
Line 1 0.0000278 0.000 0.000 0.0 36450.0 Breaker** 0.0000020 0.000 1.790 179.0 0 18729
Line 4* 0.0000056 0.000 0.000 0.0 36450.0 Line 1* 0.0000054 0.000 0.000 0.0 36450 0
Line 4** 0.0000222 1.079 0.000 107.9 25750.0 Line 1** 0.0000054 0.000 1.787 178.7 10700 8029
Line 7 0.0000278 2.205 0.000 220.5 14740.0 Line 4* 0.0000054 0.000 0.000 0.0 36450 0
Line 10* 0.0000044 2.205 0.000 220.5 14740.0 Line 4** 0.0000218 1.079 1.785 286.4 11010 0
Line 10** 0.0000178 3.270 0.000 327.0 4540.0 Line 7* 0.0000054 2.205 0.000 220.5 14740 0
Line 2 0.0000222 3.197 0.000 319.7 5350.0 Line 7** 0.0000218 2.205 0.455 266.0 10200 0
Trans.2 0.0003415 3.197 0.000 319.7 5350.0 Line 10* 0.0000044 2.205 0.000 220.5 14740 0
Line 3 0.0000296 3.197 0.000 319.7 5350.0 Line 10** 0.0000174 3.269 0.000 326.9 4540 0
Trans. 3 0.0003415 3.197 0.000 319.7 5350.0 Line 2 0.0000218 1.351 1.790 314.1 5350 0
Line 5 0.0000296 3.186 0.000 318.6 5350.0 Trans. 2 0.0003347 1.351 1.790 314.1 5350 0
Trans. 5 0.0003415 3.186 0.000 318.6 5350.0 Line 3 0.0000290 1.351 1.790 314.1 5350 0
Line 6 0.0000222 3.154 0.000 315.4 5660.0 Trans. 3 0.0003347 1.351 1.790 314.1 5350 0
Trans. 6 0.0003415 3.154 0.000 315.4 5660.0 Line 5 0.0000290 1.354 1.784 313.8 5350 0
Line 8 0.0000296 3.149 0.000 314.9 5660.0 Trans. 5 0.0003347 1.354 1.784 313.8 5350 0
Trans. 8 0.0003415 3.149 0.000 314.9 5660.0 Line 6 0.0000218 1.338 1.768 310.6 5660 0
Line 9 0.0000278 3.268 0.000 326.8 4540.0 Trans. 6 0.0003347 1.338 1.768 310.6 5660 0
Trans. 9 0.0003415 3.268 0.000 326.8 4540.0 Line 8 0.0000290 1.483 1.626 311.0 5660 0
Line 11 0.0000296 3.270 0.000 327.0 4540.0 Trans. 8 0.0003347 1.483 1.626 311.0 5660 0
Trans. 11 0.0003415 3.270 0.000 327.0 4540.0 Line 9 0.0000272 1.512 1.712 322.4 4540 0
Note that the asterisks * and ** for the outage cases mean the durations in and Trans.9 0.0003347 1.512 1.712 322.4 4540 0
out of switching time respectively. Line 11 0.0000290 1.628 1.603 323.1 4540 0
Trans. 11 0.0003347 1.628 1.603 323.1 4540 0
Without DG, Table I shows the event probability and the Note that the superscript and 2 for the outage cost mean the outages resulting
corresponding dispatch results. Since the FOR of equipment is from equipment failure and DG limit respectively.
rather small, the probability of outage cases of more than two
components is less than 1 0-7. Therefore, these trivial cases is TABLE IV
EXPECTED RESULTS WITH DG
truncated. Only the cases of no any outage and single outage
are taken into account. The result shows the generations from Substation DG Electricity Cost Outage cost' Outage CoSt2
(MW) (MW) ($/h) ($/h) ($/h)
both substation and DG, and the electricity and outage costs. 1.932 1.754 368.640 14.334 0.090
Notice that the outage cost here is only from the equipment
failure.

5

From Table IV, the expected generation from DG is 1.754
MW while the maximum generation or DG size is 1.790 MW.
The reason is that DG supplies at the limited size only in some
cases. This generation will help substation supply the system
load. Comparing Table II and IV, the generation supplied by
substation is compensated by the DG, and total generation is
reduced to 3.686 MW (1.932 and 1.754 MW). This follows
the optimization process to reduce system loss that affect
directly to the electricity cost. As a result, electricity cost
decreases to 368.640 $/h. This reflects the advantage of DG in
loss reduction. Furthermore, the outage cost from equipment
failure is reduced from 15.896 $/h to 14.334 $/h, resulting
from the backup generation from DG. To maintain protection
coordination, some load is shed, resulting in the outage cost of
0.090 $/h. However, the total outage cost is 14.424 $/h
(14.334 and 0.090 $/h) considered less than 15.896 $/h when
there is no DG installed into the feeder.
B. Resultfor Whole System
In addition to feeder 1, the proposed method is applied to
the whole system. As mentioned above, DG is assumed to be
installed at the end of each feeder. Table V shows the obtained
results. The expected generation from DG is 5.925 MW. Due
to the limited space, the explanation can be concluded as in
subsection A. According to the result, the proposed method
also works effectively with the whole system.
TABLE V
EXPECTED RESULT FOR THE WHOLE SYSTEM
Substation DG Electricity Cost Outage cost' Outage cost2
(MW) (MW) ($/h) ($/h) ($/h)
6.485 5.925 1241.042 48.315 0.294
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper has proposed an appropriate determination for
the size of DG. The objective is to optimize the advantage of
DG while distribution system does not lose its protection
coordination. The advantage of DG is evaluated in term of the
reduction in outage duration that affects the energy not
supplied and the outage cost. Numerical examples show that
DG can reduce not only the total outage costs, but also the
total energy costs. In addition, the results imply that system
loss has been reduced by the contribution of DG.
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VIII. BIOGRAPHIES
Surachai Chaitusaney (S'02) received the B.Eng.
and M.Eng. in Electrical Engineering,
Chulalongkorn University, Thailand, in 2000 and
2002 respectively. From 2002 to 2004, he worked
at Energy Research Institute and Center of
Excellence in Power Technology, Chulalongkorn
University. He is currently pursuing the Ph.D.
degree at the University of Tokyo, Japan, with
JICA scholarship. His interests include distributed
generation, reliability, and system deregulation.
Akihiko Yokoyama (Member) was born in Osaka,
Japan, on October 9, 1956. He received B.S., M.S.
and Dr. Eng from The University of Tokyo, Tokyo,
Japan in 1979, 1981 and 1984, respectively. He
has been with Department of Electrical
Engineering, The University of Tokyo since 1984
and currently a professor in charge of Power
System Engineering. He is a member of IEEJ,