POLITICAL VIOLENCE & TERRORISM Dated: 15-07-2008

Counter-Insurgency in
Balochistan: Pakistan’s Strategy,
Outcome and Future Implications

Khuram Iqbal

Dated: 15-07-2008

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POLITICAL VIOLENCE & TERRORISM Dated: 15-07-2008
Since January 2005, Pakistan’s resource-rich and strategically important province, Balochistan, is undergoing
another spat of violence that has posed a real security threat to Pakistan. Ongoing militancy in Balochistan is
also creating hurdles to undertake several mega development projects, like Gwadar Port. In order to address the
security issues in the province, Pakistani government initiated counter-insurgency operations in February 2005.
So far, counter-insurgency strategy adopted by the government has proved to be modestly successful since the
much awaited Gwadar port has become operational despite all the hurdles created by the anti-development
elements. Moreover the intensity/frequency of the attacks has been declined in Balochistan. But still, there is a
long road ahead to achieve durable peace and security in Balochistan, especially when Baloch people and
nationalist leaders don’t have trust in federal government and its development projects.

1. Baloch Insurgency
Balochistan, which forms 42 percent of the entire territory of Pakistan, is the largest but also the least
developed province in the country. Insurgency and security are two major problems of Balochistan at
present. At the same time, Balochistan is not under insurgency for the last few years but history of
Baloch insurgency and resistance is very old. Four post-partition insurgencies were witnessed in the
province during 1948, 1954, 1961 and 1977. At present, it is undergoing fifth insurgency which was
ignited in middle of 2004. Since then it has claimed more than 800 lives till June this year. The
ongoing unrest in Balochistan is not only posing a significant security threat to overall security
situation in Pakistan but also proving to be a main hindrance to undertake mega development
projects.

A recent report prepared by the federal interior ministry of Pakistan has termed Balochistan the most
volatile area. According to the report, out of 832 bomb blasts that took place in Pakistan from January
1, 2004 to May 15, 2008, 435 were recorded in Balochistan. Media reports have also disclosed that at
the start of 5th insurgency in Balochistan, 54 Ferrari camps (training camps of Baloch militants)
existed across Balochistan. Number of militant outfits also increased dramatically. According to
government sources, presently there are 5 militant outfits operating in Balochistan. Baloch Liberation
Army (BLA) is the most prominent amongst them that seeks separation of Balochistan from Pakistan.
Besides BLA, four other militant organizations including Balochistan Liberation Front (BLF),
Balochistan Republican Army (BRA), Lashkar-e-Balochistan and Jhalawan Baloch Tigers have
emerged to challenge the writ of the government. These outfits have been vocal to claim the
responsibility of various sporadic attacks on gas pipelines, power transmission lines, power pylons,
security check posts, FC forts, security forces, railway tracks, oil tankers, government offices, pro-
government tribesmen, official residences and civilians etc. Baloch Republican Army is the most
prominent among the newly emerged Baloch militant groups. The group came into the limelight on 21
August 2007, when a purported spokesman of BRA, Sarbaz Baloch, issued a statement condemning
the killings of Baloch PARRARI - (Guerilla wing of BLA) - activists by security forces on 8 August
2007.

Ongoing insurgency has also badly damaged the economy, development projects and infrastructure of
the province. Meanwhile insecurity remains the largest contributing factor to the decline in tourism in
the province. Provincial capital Quetta, once a vibrant tourist resort, the past six years of insurgency
have meant Quetta today finds its tourism industry collapsing. Not only has the number of foreigners
visiting ‘Little London’, as the provincial capital was once billed, declined dramatically, but even
domestic tourists, keen to witness Quetta and Ziarat’s ‘white Christmas’, are now a rare sight here.

2. Government’s Counter-Insurgency Strategy

Pakistan’s counter-insurgency strategy in Balochistan involves economic development, and the use of
force. Government invested heavily in term of economic activities and job creation while clamping
down on all forms of dissent.
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Many mega projects, like Gwadar deep-sea port, Coastal Highway, Mirani Dam, Subakzai Dam, Pat
Feeder Canal, Kachhi Canal, road networks, potable water projects for Quetta and other cities had
been initiated in Balochistan during the last few years. These development projects have generated
economic activity, and brought prosperity and employment opportunities in the province. After the
completion of Gwadar port, Pakistan has announced to construct another port at Sonmyani that is
likely to create another economic hub in Balochistan and would create economic opportunities for the
previously neglected province of Pakistan. The enhanced economic activities helped to win the public
support for the government vis-a-vis militant groups.

Along with the economic uplift of the province, Pakistan has adopted an “iron-hand” policy to deal
with the Baloch miscreants that has achieved considerable results.

On 12 April 2006, government put a ban on BLA to help suppress the on-going violence in
Balochistan. It was the first solid strategic initiative against the Baloch miscreants that caused a great
damage to organizational structure of BLA. In the following days, federal government directed the
four provincial governments and the chief commissioner of Islamabad Capital Territory to freeze the
bank accounts of 42 suspected members of the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA). The security forces
also inflicted massive damage to insurgent groups by targeting its leadership. In August 2006, Nawab
Akbar Khan Bugti, the chief tribal elder of the Bugti tribe and an alleged prominent leader of the
Baloch insurgents, was killed in a military operation. The November-2007 killing of the purported
head of Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA), Mir Balach Marri, was a significant blow to the
insurgency. The government considered Balach as one of the biggest anti-state element. Islamabad
had to seek the support of Interpol to get him extradited to Pakistan. He was the most popular figure
among the extremist segment of Baloch society, which believed in the separation of Balochistan from
Pakistan.

All these developments weakened the organizational structure of BLA, the leading insurgent group in
the province. For a short span of time, the operational capability of the BLA remained constrained.
Subsequently, the intensity of the Baloch insurgency declined in 2007 as key leaders of the insurgent
movement were eliminated during military operations, fled the country or switched loyalties to the
Pakistani side in return for amnesty. Moreover, an increasing number of civilian casualties resulting
from the terrorist attacks by BLA have negatively affected the popularity of the insurgent groups
among the common people of Balochistan. On 30 May 2008, the BLA claimed to kill six young
cricketers on the charges of spying for the government. The incident triggered a series of protests in
the provincial capital Quetta and the protestors openly chanted slogans against the militant outfit.

2.1. The Outcome

Government’s counter strategy in Balochistan resulted in a temporary success. A fragile peace
descended upon the province as the intensity and frequency of the militancy related incidents
declined dramatically in the year 2007.

In the year 2006, province experienced more than 641 terrorist/counter-terrorist attacks. While, the
total numbers militancy-related incidents declined to 316 in the year 2007. Similarly, due to enhanced
security measures, the Baloch outfits were not allowed to carry out any significant attack in the
strategically and commercially significant Gwadar district.
Only 5 minor rocket attacks took place in Gwadar without causing any significant damage. It merits
mentioning here that 4 out of 5 attacks happened in Gwadar in the first six months while only one
rocket attack has been recorded during last six months of year 2007.
However, at the start of year 2008, militant activities regained momentum. The BLA, BLF, BRA
resurfaced through random attacks against the infrastructure, security forces and the government
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officials. At present Balochistan is once again reeling under an insurgency. Though the human
casualties are low, however, the government offices, check posts, railway tracks, electricity pylons and
gas pipelines are being attacked daily Increasing number of terrorist incidents in Balochistan suggest
that insurgent group have recovered from their recent setbacks resulting from the loss of key
leadership during government’s counter insurgency campaign and have reorganized themselves to
fight against the Pakistani security forces.
It remains to be seen that how the militant outfits in Balochistan reorganized themselves even after
losing the key leadership? Why government is still unable to achieve a durable peace in the province
despite having popular support on its side? Some important factors need to be explored in order to
answer these critical questions.

2.2. Fault Line

During the eight years of president Musharraf’s rule, economic development and use of forces were
the most emphasized elements of government’s strategy in Balochistan. However, the absence of
political process that is necessary to deal with the insurgencies resulted in the alienation of moderate
Baloch nationalist from the federation of Pakistan. One cannot dispute the government’s need to
counter violence by using force. Acts of terrorism, sabotage and attacks on various installations,
highways and communication networks have been on the rise. They have to be dealt with firmly, no
doubt. But that does not mean that the door should be shut on the negotiating process.
In the recent past, not just the ruling parties but the opposition has also ignored the Balochistan issue.
For instance, in May 2007, the leading opposition parties organized an “All Parties Conference” to
plan a collective line of action to deal with the different problems faced by Pakistan. Surprisingly, the
issue of deteriorating security situation in Balochistan was not on the agenda.

However, after the February 2008 elections in Pakistan, the newly elected provincial and federal
governments have come together to fill the political vacuum in order to obtain sustained peace in
Balochistan province. Some significant confidence building measures have been taken up by the
government such as the announcement of halting military operations in Balochistan and withdrawal
of cases against former Chief Minister of Balochistan Sardar Akhtar Jan Mengal. Also, the Pakistan
People’s Party (PPP) that surfaced victorious in elections tendered an apology to Balochistan on
behalf of the people of Pakistan. The leadership of mainstream political parties also signaled to talk
even to people “who have gone to mountains” i.e. Baloch militant groups to end the insurgency. All
the major Baloch nationalist parties responded positively and demonstrated their willingness for a
peaceful resolution of the Balochistan’s multifaceted problem by welcoming the apology. But the issue
got a new twist on 9 April 2008 when BLA rejected the government’s offer for talks, saying it was not
ready even to consider it.

3. The Road Ahead

Though, after tendering apology to Balochistan, current government has not chalked out any strategy
for peace in Balochistan but still there are many issues need to be addressed in order to formulate a
comprehensive and flawless strategy for a stable peace in the province. For instance many believe that
the dialogue process in Balochistan is likely to succeed if the government is able to reinforce
insurgent’s trust into political process for a durable solution of Balochistan’s problems. However it
seems highly unlikely that the BLA would be agreed to negotiate on anything less than “independent
Socialist Balochistan”. The BLA in its foundations is a separatist organization. Formed in 1974 by a
Marxist Sardar, Khair Bakhsh Marri, the outfit vows to undertake an armed struggle for a separate
state of Balochistan with a socialist system.

Moreover, the BLA has experienced radical shifts in its policies and objectives in the last few years.
During the course of time the outfit has evolved as a transnational entity that maintains strong
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relationships with foreign terrorist groups like People Resistance Movement of Iran (Previously
known as Jundullah-Iran). At present group’s wider strategy involves the creation of “Greater
Balochistan” comprising Afghan, Iranian and Pakistani parts of Balochistan. The BLA has also
influenced other armed groups in Balochistan to expend their strategy and gain “independence from
the forced occupation of Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran”. These other groups like Balochistan
Republican Army (BRA) and Balochistan Liberation Front (BLF) have also transformed into
separatists. Unlike nationalist parties’ active in Balochistan, their demands are no more limited to all
the “autonomy minus defense, currency, communications and foreign affairs” but province’s
alienation from the federation. Can government negotiate with BLA on the basis of a demand for a
separate Balochistan?

Needless to say, the government’s offer to initiate dialogue with Baloch nationalist parties, the true
representatives of Balochs, is likely to produce positive outcomes. However, the prospect of engaging
BLA into dialogue doesn’t seem practical. The outfit has never shown any political credentials that are
necessary to engage in talks. By rejecting government’s recent offer for talks, BLA has, once again,
closed all doors for the dialogue with the provincial and federal government.

4. Recommendation
In order to formulate a comprehensive and flawless strategy for a stable peace in Balochistan,
following steps can be considered;

1. On the side of Pakistani government, there is a dire need to raise the issue of Indian involvement in
Balochistan on international forums.

2. On political level, the newly elected government must differentiate between the true representatives
of the Baloch people (newly elected representatives in provincial and national assembly) and the
terrorist outfits supported by the foreign countries. Therefore talks must take place but just with
right-minded politicians.

3. Government must demonstrate political will to address the problems of insurgency in Balochistan
by releasing all political prisoners and accepting Supreme Court’s directives to end the
disappearances of political opponents.

4. Valid dissatisfactions of people living in Balochistan should be tackled by giving them a greater say
within their own province and drawing them into the mainstream of national life in Pakistan.

5. The long-held fear of the Baloch people that investors may take their resources away needs to be
addressed.

6. Prior to invite them for the talks, government must understand that BLA is no more a tribal militia
with a limited agenda but a transnational entity with broader objective of “Greater Balochistan”.
Henceforth, there is a need to neutralize the extremist/separatist segment of BLA’s leadership.

7. The BLA, if sincere with a peaceful resolution of the years old conflict, must understand the new
political realities in the province where the elected representatives are exploring ways to address the
valid grievances of the people living in Balochistan.

8. The local population needs to be provided with opportunities to take advantage of the benefits of
foreign investment in mega projects like Gwadar deep sea port.

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Considering the increasing numbers of anti-Pakistan elements, it is the need of the hour that a
comprehensive strategy by police, frontier corps and intelligence agencies may be evolved to eradicate
these terrorist groups. The situation in Balochistan also calls for immediate attention to solve the
problem of Baloch insurgency by showing a political commitment by the new leadership and a
comprehensive strategy to eradicate the militancy in the province.

(Khuram Iqbal is a Research Analyst at S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS),

Nanyang Technological University. He was previously a senior researcher at Pak Institute for Peace
Studies, Islamabad, Pakistan.)

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2. Balochistan: Outcome of Polls and Reconciliation Outlook
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4. Gwadar: Strategic Asset of Pakistan and Indian Concerns
5. Balochistan: Law and Order Situation Hindering Investment

1-“Gwadar Port becomes operational” The News, 15 March 2008

2-The figure is based on the database of militancy related incidents in Balochistan compiled by Pak
Institute for Peace Studies, Islamabad, Pakistan
3-“Most blasts took place in Balochistan” The Post, 6 June 2008
4-Ibid
5-“Nawa-i-Waqt” (Urdu Daily), Lahore, 20 December, 2005
6-According to official website of BLA, www.balochvoice.com, the outfit is waging armed struggle to
create “Greater Balochistan, comprising Pakistani, Iranian and Afghan parts of Balochistan
7-“Balochistan: Law and Order Situation Hindering Investment” South Asia Net, 2 April 2007
8-“BLA declared terrorist organization, banned” Dawn, 10 April 2006
9-“BLA kills six youths playing cricket in Quetta” Daily Times, 31 May 2008
10-“ Pakistan Security Report 2006” by Mubashir Bukhari, Mujtaba Rathore, Khuram Iqbal,
published by Pak Institute for Peace Studies, Islamabad, Pakistan
11-ICPVTR database
12-“The Balochistan crisis” Editorial The Post, 1 June 2007
13-Urdu Daily Jang, Lahore, 26 February 2008
14-Ibid
15-“BLA rejects govt’s offer for talks”, Dawn, Karachi, 10 April 2008