barrel controversy, the picture gains a different context; nevertheless, he insisted that he has untainted A.M. No.
. No. SB-14-21-J September 23, 2014
service in the judiciary, and further denied he was the one advising Mrs. Napoles on legal strategies in
connection with the Kevlar helmet cases where she was acquitted by a Division of the Sandiganbayan of
which respondent is the Chairman and the then Acting Presiding Justice.
On September 12, 2013, Sula executed a "Karagdagang Sinumpaang Salaysay " wherein she gave details
regarding those persons named in her sworn statement, alleged to have visited their office or attended
their events, thus:
63) T: Ayon sa paragraph Nos. 32 at 33 ng iyong sinumpaang salaysay na may petsang 29 Agosto 2013,
nabanggit mo ang mga personalidad na nakikita mong bumibisita sa inyong opisina o di kaya naman sa
tuwing may party o special occacions si JANET NAPOLES ay may mga special guests kayo na
kinabibilangan ng mga malalaking pulitiko at ang iba naman ay may mga katungkulan sa gobyerno. Maari
mo bang ilahad ang mga pangyayari sa mga bawat pagkakataon na nakita mo sila sa iyong pagkaka-alala?
S : Opo, iisa-isahin ko po ang mga pangyayari sa mga pagkakataon na nakita ko po ang mga taong
nabanggit ko:
xxxx
w) Justice GREGORY ONG - Isang beses ko po siyang nakitang nagpunta sa office sa 2501 Discovery
Centre, Ortigas at nakita ko po silang magkausap ni Madam JANET NAPOLES sa conference room.
xxxx
In her testimony before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee on September 26, 2013, Sula was asked to
confirm her statement regarding Justice Ong, thus:
THE CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Grace.
Isang tanong lang kay Ms. Sula.
Sinabi niyo kanina may tinawagan si Ms. Napoles at sinabi niya, "Malapit na lumabas yung TRO galing sa
korte." May kilala pa ba si Janet Lim Napoles sa ltuwes sa korte sa Sandiganbayan? MS. SULA. Hindi ko po
alam.
THE CHAIRMAN. Your attention is called sa page –
MS. SULA. Sandiganbayan po, sorry. Mayroon po siyang binanggit na ano po –
THE CHAIRMAN. Nandito sa page 20.
MS. SULA. Si Mr. Ong, po, Justice Ong po.
THE CHAIRMAN. Gregory Ong.
MS. SULA Opo.
THE CHAIRMAN. Sa Sandiganbayan?
MS. SULA. Opo.
x x x (Emphasis supplied.)
In a letter dated September 26, 2013 addressed to Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno, respondent
meticulously explained the controversial photograph which raised questions on his integrity as a
magistrate, particularly in connection with the decision rendered by the Sandiganbayan' s Fourth Division
in the Kevlar helmet cases, which convicted some of the accused but acquitted Mrs. Napoles.
Respondent surmised that the photograph was taken during the birthday of Senator Estrada in February,
either in the year 2012 or 2013, but definitely not in 2010 or earlier. He explained that he could vaguely
remember the circumstances but it would have been rude for him to prevent any guest from posing with
him and Senator Estrada during the party. On the nature of his association with Mrs. Napoles, respondent
asserted:
(4) I can categorically state, on the other hand, that I have never attended any party or social event hosted
by Mrs. Napoles or her family, either before she had a case with our court, or while she already had a
pending case with our court, or at any time afterwards. I have never, to use the term of Mr. Rufo in his
article, "partied" with the Napoleses. (Emphasis supplied.)
As to the Kevlar helmet cases, respondent said it was impossible for him to have been advising Mrs.
Napoles, as claimed by Mr. Rufo, as even the article itself noted that Mrs. Napoles' own brother, Reynald L.
Lim, ( a.k.a. Reynaldo L. Francisco), a co-accused in the case, was convicted by the Sandiganbayan. He
stressed that these cases were decided on the merits by the Sandiganbayan, acting as a collegial body and
he was not even the ponente of the decision. Respondent thus submitted himself to the discretion of the
Chief Justice such that even without being required to submit an explanation, he voluntarily did so "to
[Formerly A.M. No. 13-10-06-SB]
RE: ALLEGATIONS MADE UNDER OATH AT THE SENATE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE HEARING HELD
ON SEPTEMBER 26, 2013 AGAINST ASSOCIATE JUSTICE GREGORY S. ONG, SANDIGANBAYAN
The character of every act depends upon the circumstances in which it is done.
- Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes
This administrative complaint was filed by the Court En Banc after investigation into certain allegations
that surfaced during the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee Hearing indicated prima facie violations of the
Code of Judicial Conduct by an Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan. The investigation was conducted
motu proprio pursuant to the Court's power of administrative supervision over members of the Judiciary.
Factual Antecedents
In the middle of 2013, the local media ran an expose involving billions of government funds channeled
through bogus foundations. Dubbed as the "pork barrel scam," as the money was sourced from the
Priority Development Assistance Fund allotted to members of the House of Representatives and Senate,
the controversy spawned massive protest actions all over the country. In the course of the investigation
conducted by the Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations (Blue Ribbon
Committee), the names of certain government officials and other individuals were mentioned by "whistle-
blowers" who are former employees of the alleged mastermind, Janet Lim-Napoles (Mrs. Napoles), wife of
an ex-military officer. These personalities identified by the whistle-blowers allegedly transacted with or
attended Mrs. Napoles' parties and events, among whom is incumbent Sandiganbayan Associate Justice
Gregory S. Ong, herein respondent.
Benhur Luy (Luy), a cousin of Mrs. Napoles who had worked for several years with the Napoleses, filed
illegal detention charges against Mrs. Napoles who accused him of double-dealing. When Luy went public
with his story about Mrs. Napoles' anomalous transactions and before the warrant of arrest was issued by
the court, she reportedly tried to reach out to the other whistle-blowers for them not to testify against her
but instead point to Luy as the one receiving and distributing the money.
Marina Sula (Sula) executed a Sworn Statement before the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) on
August 29, 2013, part of which reads:
32. In the sixteen (16) years that I worked with Ms. Napoles, I witnessed several personalities visit our
offices and join us as our special guests during our parties and other special occasions. 33. These
personalities who would either visit our office or join our events and affairs are: Senator Franklin Drilon,
Senator Jinggoy Estrada and family, Senator Bong Revilla, Lani Mercado-Revilla, Bryan Revilla, Secretary
Rene Villa, Congressman Pichay and Wife, Congressman Plaza, Congressman Ducut, DAR Director
Theresita Panlilio, Catherine Mae Canlas Santos, Pauline Labayen, Jen Corpuz (Staff of Senator Sotto),
Mayor Rene Maglanque, Atty. Dequina, Justice Gregory Ong, x x x.
34. Before the warrant of arrest was issued against Ms. Napoles, she told us that that case could take four
to five years to clear. She said, "Antayin niyo munang ma-clear pangalan ko para makakilos ako at
matulungan ko kayo". Sinabi niya na meron na siyang kausap sa Ombudsman at sa Sandiganbayan.
35. On 28 August 2013 while me and my companions were at the NBI, Janet Lim Napoles called me. She
was crying and asking me not to turn my back on her, that we should stay together. She said "kahit
maubos lahat ng pera ko, susuportahan ko kayo. Hintay[i]n nyo kasi lalabas na ang TRO ko."
xxxx
38. Attorney Tan instructed us to implicate Benhur in case we were asked by the NBI. He said "wala
naman ipinakita sa inyong masama si Madam (Janet Lim Napoles). Siguro wala naman kayong sama ng
loob kay madam, kaya nga idiin ninyo si Benhur na siya ang nag-utos at saka sa kanya ninyo ibinibigay ang
pera." (Emphasis supplied.)
The following day, the social news network Rappler published an article by Aries Rufo entitled "Exclusive:
Napoles Parties with Anti-Graft Court Justice" showing a photograph of Senator Jinggoy Estrada (Senator
Estrada), one of the main public figures involved in the pork barrel scam, together with Mrs. Napoles and
respondent. The reporter had interviewed respondent who quickly denied knowing Mrs. Napoles and
recalled that the photograph was probably taken in one of the parties frequently hosted by Senator
Estrada who is his longtime friend. Respondent also supposedly admitted that given the ongoing pork
Because of such favor, respondent out of courtesy went to see Mrs. Napoles and personally thank her.
Respondent stressed that that was the single occasion Sula was talking about in her supplemental
affidavit when she said she saw respondent talking with Mrs. Napoles at the conference room of their
office in Discovery Suites.
Respondent maintains that there was nothing improper or irregular for him to have personally seen Mrs.
Napoles at the time in order to thank her, considering that she no longer had any pending case with his
court, and to his knowledge, with any other division of the Sandiganbayan at the time and even until the
date of the preparation of his Comment. He thus prays that this Court duly note his Comment and accept
the same as sufficient compliance with the Court's Resolution dated October 17, 2013.
This Court upon evaluation of the factual circumstances found possible transgressions of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct committed by respondent. Accordingly, a Resolution was issued on January 21, 2014
stating that:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby resolves to have the instant administrative matter RE-DOCKETED as A.M.
No. SB-14-21-J (Re: Allegations Made Under Oath at tlze Senate Blue Ribbon Committee Hearing held on
September 26, 2013 against Associate Justice Gregory S. Ong, Sandiganbayan), and ASSIGNS the same to
retired Supreme Court Justice Angelina Sandoval-Gutierrez for investigation, report and recommendation
within a period of sixty (60) days from notice hereof.
The Court further resolves to NOTE the letter dated January 7, 2014 of Atty. Joffre Gil C. Zapata, Executive
Clerk of Court III, Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division, in compliance with the resolution of the Court En Banc
dated December 3, 2013, transmitting the original records of Criminal Case Nos. 26768 and 26769. Atty.
Zapata is INFORMED that there is no more need to transmit to this Court the post-sentence investigation
reports and other reports on the supervisory history of the accused-probationers in Criminal Case Nos.
26768 and 26769.
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Justice
Justice Angelina Sandoval-Gutierrez, a retired Member of this Court, submitted her report with the
following findings and conclusions:
FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS
1. THE KEVLAR CASE
Two criminal cases were filed with the Sandiganbayan sometime in 2001 - Criminal Case No. 26768 for
Falsification of Public Documents and Criminal Case No. 26769 for Violation of Section 3(e) of the Anti-
Graft Law. Charged were several members of Philippine Marine Corps and civilian employees including
Ms. Janet L. Napoles (Napoles), her mother Magdalena Francisco (now deceased), her brother Reynaldo
Francisco and wife Anna Marie Dulguime, and her (Napoles') three employees.
These cases are referred to as the Kevlar case because the issue involved is the same - the questionable
purchase of 500 Kevlar helmets by the Philippine Marine Corps in the amount of P3,865,310.00 from five
suppliers or companies owned by Napoles.
The prosecution alleged inter alia that the accused, acting in conspiracy, released the payment although
there was yet no delivery of the Kevlar helmets; that the suppliers are mere dummies of Napoles; and that
the helmets were made in Taiwan, not in the U.S.A.
Napoles' husband, Major Jaime Napoles, was dropped from the two Informations in an Order issued by
the Ombudsman on March 18, 2002.
Napoles' mother, brother, and sister-in-law were among those convicted for the lesser crime of
Falsification of Public Documents and sentenced to suffer the penalty of 4 years and 2 months of prision
correccional to 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor and each to pay PS,000.00. They all underwent
probation.
Napoles and six members of the Philippine Marine Corps were acquitted in both cases.
The court ruled that Napoles "was not one of the dealer-payees in the transaction in question. Even if she
owns the bank account where the 14 checks were later deposited, this does not in itself translate to her
conspiracy in the crimes charged x x x."
xxxx
THE INVESTIGATION
xxxx
defend [his] reputation as a judge and protect the Sandiganbayan as an institution from unfair and
malicious innuendos."
On October 7, 2013, Chief Justice Sereno wrote the Members of this Court, citing the testimonies of Luy
and Sula before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee "[t]hat the malversation case involving Mrs. Janet Lim-
Napoles, Major Jaime G. Napoles, Jenny Lim Napoles, Reynaldo L. Francisco and other perpetrators was
'fixed' (inayos) through the intervention of Justice Gregory S. Ong of the Sandiganbayan", to wit:
SEN. ANGARA. Sa inyo, hindi niyo a/am kung inayos iyong kaso na iyon? Kasi napakaraming koneksiyon,
'di ba?
xxxx Sige, huwag kang matakot, Benhur.
MR. LUY. Alam ko, inayos ni Ms. Napoles iyon dahil may connect nga siya sa Sandiganbayan
SEN. ANGARA. Okay.
xxxx
THE CHAIRMAN. xxx Sinabi niyo kanina na may tinawagan si Ms. Napoles at sinabi niya "Malapit na
lumabas yung TRO galing sa korte." May kilala pa ba si Janet Lim Napoles sa huwes sa korte sa
Sandiganbayan?
xxxx
MS. SULA. Si Mr. Ong po, Justice Ong po.
THE CHAIRMAN. Gregory Ong.
MS. SULA. Opo.
THE CHAIRMAN. Sa Sandiganbayan?
MS. SULA. Opo.
Xxxx
Chief Justice Sereno then requested the Court En Banc to conduct an investigation motu proprio under
this Court's power of administrative supervision over members of the judiciary and members of the legal
profession (referring to notaries public who were alleged to have purposely left their specimen
signatures, dry seals and notarial books with Mrs. Napoles to facilitate the incorporation of non-
governmental organizations [NGOs] involved in the scam).
Under our Resolution dated October 17, 2013, the Court En Banc required respondent to submit his
comment and directed the NBI to furnish the Court with certified copies of the affidavit of Luy. On
November 21, 2013, the Court received respondent's Comment. Respondent categorically denied any
irregularity in the Kevlar helmet cases and explained the visit he had made to Mrs. Napoles as testified by
Sula.
On Sula's statement, respondent points out that Sula never really had personal knowledge whether
respondent is indeed the alleged "contact" of Mrs. Napoles at the Sandiganbayan; what she supposedly
"knows" was what Mrs. Napoles merely told her. Hence, Sula's testimony on the matter is based purely on
hearsay. Assuming that Mrs. Napoles actually made the statement, respondent believes it was given in the
context of massive media coverage of the pork barrel scam exploding at the time. With the consciousness
of a looming criminal prosecution before the Office of the Ombudsman and later before the
Sandiganbayan, it was only natural for Mrs. Napoles to assure Sula and others involved in their business
operation that she would not leave or abandon them and that she would do all that she can to help them
just so they would not turn their backs on her and become whistle-blowers. Thus, even if Mrs. Napoles
made misrepresentations to Sula regarding respondent as her "connection", she only had to do so in order
to convince Sula and her co-employees that the cases to be filed against them would be "fixed."
As to Sula's statement that she personally witnessed respondent at one time visiting Mrs. Napoles at her
office and having a meeting with her at the conference room, respondent said that at the birthday party of
Senator Estrada where the controversial photograph was taken, Mrs. Napoles engaged him in a casual
conversation during which the miraculous healing power of the robe or clothing of the Black Nazarene of
Quiapo was mentioned. When Mrs. Napoles told respondent that she is a close friend of the Quiapo
Church's parish priest, he requested her help to gain access to the Black Nazarene icon. Eventually,
respondent, who is himself a Black Nazarene devotee and was undergoing treatment for his prostate
cancer, was given special permission and was able to drape the Black Nazarene's robe or clothing for a
brief moment over his body and also receive a fragrant ball of cotton taken or exposed to the holy image,
which article he keeps to this day and uses to wipe any ailing part of his body in order to receive healing.
A Kasi po ma' am meron kaming ledger ng Sandiganbayan case sa lahat ng nagastos ni Ms. Janet Napoles,
nilista ko po yon lahat. Kasi naririnig ko po kay Janet Napoles, parang pinsan ko po si Janet Napoles,
"Paano nagkaroon ng kaso ang ate ko? So nadiscover ko na Jang po na yun pala yung Kevlar. So, mahigit
one hundred million na nagastos po ni Ms. Napoles kasi di Jang naman po si sir Justice Gregory Ong ...
xxx
Q Did you come to know to whom she gave all the money?
A Wala po siyang ... basta ang sabi niya inayos na niya si ... binaggit niya po si ... kasi si madam hindi kasi
nagki-keep kasi ako pinsan niya po kasi ako, nabanggit niya po si Justice Gregory Ong. Sinabi niya
nagbigay daw po siya ng pera kay Justice Ong pero she never mentioned kung magkano yung amount.
xxx
Q Nagbigay ng pera kay Justice Gregory Ong?
A Opo, yung ang sabi niya (referring to Ms. Napoles).
Q To you?
A Yes, madam.
Q Do you remember when she made that kind of statement?
A Bago po ano madam, bago po lumabas yung decision kaya kampante na po si Ms. Napoles bago lumabas
yung decision na acquitted siya. Alam na niya. Sa Kevlar case.
xxx
Justice Gutierrez
Continue counsel.
Witness Luy
Kasi naikwento po madam ni Ms. Napoles na almost PlOO million na ang nagastos niya. Tapos ang sabi ko
nga po sa kanya: "Madam, P 100 million na sa halagang P3.8 lang na PO (purchase order) sa Kevlar
helmet, tapos P 100 million na ang nagastos mo?"
Q Did she tell you or explain to you to whom this P 100 million was paid? How was it spent?
A Basta ang natatandaan ko ... di ko na po matandaan ang mga dates kasi parang staggered. May P5
million sa ibang tao ang kausap niya. Tapos ito naman tutulong ng ganito. lba-iba kasi madam, eh.
Q But there was no showing the money was given to Justice Ong?
A Wala po pero nabanggit lang po niya (Ms. Napoles) sa akin na nagbigay po siya kay Justice Ong, but she
never mentioned the amount.
Continuing with his testimony, Benhur declared that in 2012, respondent went twice to Napoles' office at
the Discovery Suites Center, 25 ADB Avenue, Ortigas, Pasig City. On the first visit, Napoles introduced
Justice Ong to Benhur and her other employees.
Benhur narrated what transpired during that visit. According to him, Napoles has so much money being
placed at the Armed Forces of the Philippines and Police Savings and Loan Association, Inc. (AFPSLAI)
which offered 13% interest annually. Napoles called Benhur telling him that respondent would like to
avail of such interest for his BDO check of P25.5 million. To arrange this, Napoles informed Benhur that
she would just deposit respondent's P25.5 million in her personal account with Metro bank. Then she
would issue to respondent in advance eleven (11) checks, each amounting to P282,000.00 as monthly
interest, or a total of P3,102,000.00 equivalent to 13% interest. Upon Justice Ong's suggestion, the checks
should be paid to cash. So, Benhur prepared the corresponding eleven (11) checks, thus:
Q With respect to the Kevlar case, what participation did you have, if there was any?
Witness Luy
A Noon 2012 po kasi si Justice Gregory Ong po nasa unit 2501, yung office (of Ms. Napoles), so kami ni
Janet Napoles, nandito sa 2502 kasi yun po talaga ang office namin. Si Ms. Napoles po sinabi niya sa akin,
Ben, kasi si Ms. Napoles, may pera siyang madarni na pine-place niya po sa AFPSLAI at yung AFPSLAI po
ay nagbibigay po sa kanya o nagooffer ng 13% interest annually po. So, ang nangyari po <loon, sabi ni
Janet Napoles, si Justice Ong ho raw, gustong magkaroon din ng interest parang ganoon. So tutulungan
niya. So ang ginawa po namin x x x. Q Meaning to say, Justice Ong would like to deposit money?
A Opo.
Q So he could get 13% interest?
A Opo, kasi tapos madam ang nangyari po pumunta na po si Ms. Napoles sa kanyang opisina. Tinawag po
niya ako kasi pinasulat na niya sa akin ang checke. So, ang ginawa po ni Ms. Napoles, yung checke ni .. BDO
I. During the investigation, Benhur testified that he and Napoles are second cousins. After passing the
Medical Technology Licensure Examination in 2002, he was employed in the JLN (Janet Lim Napoles)
Corporation as Napoles' personal assistant. As such, he was in charge of disbursements of her personal
funds and those of her office. He was also in charge of government transactions of the corporation and
kept records of its daily business activities.
In the course of Benhur's employment at the JLN Corporation, Napoles mentioned to him the Kevlar case,
then pending in the Sandiganbayan, saying she has a "connect" in that court who would help her.
When asked about his testimony before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee concerning the Kevlar case,
Benhur declared that Napoles' "connect" with the Sandiganbayan is respondent, thus:
Q The question was, Mr. Witness, this is coming from Senator Angara, and I quote, "Kailan ho lumabas
yung decision ng Court sa Kevlar?" And just to refresh your memory, Mr. Witness, then Ms. Sula answered,
"I think 2010. Yun po yung lumabas po." And then going forward, Senator Angara referred to both of you
this question: "Sa inyo, hindi ninyo alam kung inayos yung kaso na iyon kasi napakaraming koneksyon, di
ba? Baka alam ng ibang whistleblowers kung nagka-ayusan sa kaso na iyon. Sige, huwag kang matakot,
Benhur." Do you remember that question being asked from you?
xxxx
A Yes po.
Q And now Mr. Witness, about this statement of yours at the Blue Ribbon Committee that Ms. Napoles has
a certain connect sa Sandiganbayan, who was this connect you were talking about, if you remember?
Witness Luy
A Si Justice Gregory Ong po.
Q How do you know that Justice Gregory Ong was the connect of Ms. Napoles at the Sandiganbayan?
A Ang sinabi po ... Si Ms. Napoles, pinsan ko po kasi we are second cousins. So kinuwento talaga sa akin ni
Madam kung ano ang mga developments sa mga cases, kung ano ang mga nangyayari. Tapos po, sinabi
niya sa akin mismo na nakakausap niya si Justice Gregory Ong at ang nagpakilala raw sa kanya po ay si
Senator Jinggoy Estrada.
Benhur further testified that even before the decision in the Kevlar case was promulgated, Napoles and
respondent were already communicating with each other (nag-uusap na po si!a). Therefore, she was sure
the decision would be in her favor:
Q Do you remember the date when the decision (in Kevlar case) was promulgated?
A Ano po, the year 2010 po ma' am.
Q And you met him (Justice Ong) in 2012?
A 2012 po, pero prior to that decision, madam, naririnig ko na po kay madam (Ms. Napoles) kasi
kinukwento na po ni madam sa akin na nag-uusap na po sila ni Justice Gregory Ong.
Q That was after the decision was promulgated?
A Bago po nailabas yung decision, ikinwento po m Ms. Napoles sa akin na nag-uusap na po sila ni Justice
Gregory Ong. Kaya kampante po si Ms. Napoles. Noong lumabas po yung decision, alam niya na po. Yung
ang sabi sa akin ni Ms. Napoles.
Going back to the hearing before the Blue Ribbon Committee, Benhur told Senator Angara that Napoles
fixed the Kevlar case because she has a "connect" in the Sandiganbayan:
"Baka alam ng ibang whistle blowers kung nagkaka-ayusan sa kaso na iyon (Kevlar case). Sige huwag
kang matakot Benhur."
Benhur Luy: "Alam ko inayos ni Ms. Napoles iyon dahil may connect nga siya sa Sandiganbayan."
On how Napoles "inayos" or fixed the Kevlar case, Benhur said that he kept a ledger of the Sandiganbayan
case wherein he listed all her expenses in the sum of P 100 million pesos. He was surprised why she
would spend such amount considering that what was involved in the Kevlar case was only P3.8 million.
She explained that she gave various amounts to different people during the pendency of the case which
lasted up to ten years. And before the decision in the Kevlar case was released, she also gave money to
respondent but she did not mention the amount. Thus, she knew she would be acquitted.
Q You answered Senator Angara this way which we already quoted a while ago, "Alam ko inayos ni Ms.
Napoles iyon dahil may connect nga siya sa Sandiganbayan." You stated that the connect is Justice Ong.
Can you explain before us what you mean, "Alam ko inayos ni Ms. Napoles iyon." What do you mean by
that "inayos"?
Sula explained that the TRO mentioned by Napoles refers to the TRO to be issued by the Sandiganbayan in
the event the case involving the PIO billion PDAF scam against her is filed with that court; and that
Napoles told Sula and the other employees not to worry because she has contact with the Sandiganbayan
- respondent Justice Ong, thus:
Q Not the illegal detention case?
Witness Sula
A Hindi po, pag nakasuhan na po kami sa Sandiganbayan.
Q Okay, again?
A Sa pagkakaintindi po namin, ang sabi po ni Madam na it takes 4 to 5 years, so hihintayin niya na
maacquit, sabi niyang ganoon, ang pangalan niya para maluwag na tulungan kami. Ito po ang
pagkakaintindi namin na sa Sandiganbayan.
Q Yung PDAF?
A Opo, yung PDAF sa Sandiganbayan.
Q Pagdating ng kaso sa Sandiganbayan?
A Opo, kasi po ina-ano po niya, siya po tinitira na ni Benhur - si Madam tungkol sa PlO billion scam. So,
pinag-uusapan namin sa bahay niya sa South Garden Unit na, Madam, paano po yan, pag lahat ng kaso na
iyan dadaan sa lawmakers, dadaan yon sa Ombudsman at saka sa Sandiganbayan? Sabi niya, "Huwag
kayong mag-alala. Meron naman akong mga contact doon." Sabi niyang ganoon sa Ombudsman at sa
Sandiganbayan.
Q Is that in your affidavit?
A Wala po. Pero sinabi ko po doon sa part na yon (her testimony before the Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee) na meron na siyang kilala sa Ombudsman, pero hindi niya nabanggit ang pangalan. Pero sa
Sandiganbayan, ang alam namin kilala niya si Justice Ong.
Q Yun ang sagot niya kay Chairman Guingona. Di ba I read it a while ago?
A Opo, doon sa Sandiganbayan.
Sula also testified that every time Napoles talked to her and the other employees, she would say that
Justice Ong will help her in the Kevlar case. Sula's testimony is as follows:
Q x x x you told me that somebody will help in the Kevlar case?
A Opo. Sinabi po niya sa amin every time po pag nagkukwento siya, sinasabi niya na si Justice Ong ang
tumulong sa kanya para ma-clear po yung Kevlar case niya.
Sula likewise testified that Napoles told her and the other employees that she will fix (aayusin) the "PDAF
case" in the Sandiganbayan. Then they replied in jest that her acquaintance in that court is respondent.
Napoles retorted, "Ay huag na iyon kasi masyadong mataas ang talent fee."
xxxx
III. Aries Rufo, a Reporter of Rappler, testified that he cannot reveal who gave him the photograph [of
respondent beside Napoles and Senator Jinggoy Estrada] because he is shielded by law and he has to
protect his source.
When asked about his comment upon seeing the picture, Rufo said:
Initially, when I saw the picture, since I knew that Justice Ong was one of the members of the division that
handled the Kevlar case, it aroused my curiosity why he was in that picture. Second, because in
journalism, we also get to practice ethical standards, I immediately sensed though that a Justice or a
lawyer, that he should not be seen or be going to a party or be in an event where respondent (Ms.
Napoles) was in a case under his Division. He should not be in a situation that would compromise the
integrity of his office.
Rufo further testified that on August 27, 2013, he faxed a letter to respondent to "get his side about the
photo." The next day, he went to respondent's office and showed it to him. Respondent was shocked. He
explained that it must have been taken during one of the parties hosted by his friend Senator Jinggoy
Estrada; that he did not know that the woman in the picture is Napoles because she did not appear during
the hearing of the Kevlar case; and that such picture must have been taken in one of those instances when
a guest would like to pose with celebrities or public figures.
xxxx
Respondent, in his defense, vehemently denied the imputations hurled against him.
check po kasi yun. Ang sabi sa akin ni Ms. Napoles, checke daw po yun ni Justice Gregory Ong. Sa, BDO. So,
di ko naman din po nakita Madam yung nakalagay sa ...
Q So it is the check of Justice Ong, not the check of Ms. Napoles?
A Opo, ang amount po ng check madam ay P25.5 million ang amount noong BDO check na inissue ...
Q That belongs to Justice Ong?
A Opo. Tapos madam, so ang ginawa po namin ni Ms. Napoles, dahil po 13% interest ang ino-offer ng
AFPSLAI, sabi ni Madam ganito na lang, Ben, ipasok na lang muna natin yung check niya sa personal
account ko. Ako na lang muna for the meantime, mag-iissue ng check sa kanya para maavail ni Justice Ong
yung interest. So, ang ginawa nan1in madam, P25.5 million times 13% interest, tapos divided by 12,
lumalabas P282,000.00 or P283,000.00 or P281,000.00 po madam kasi naground off kami sa
P282,000.00. So, ang ginawa ni Madam, baga monthly. So eleven (11) checks ang prinepare namin. Kung
hindi po ako nagkakamali po, JLN Corporation check ang ... Ako pa nga po ang nagsulat at saka bago po
namin isinulat yung payee, inalam pa po namin. x x x So, pumunta na naman si madam sa 2501 kasi
nandoon si Justice Gregory Ong. Noong bumalik siya, pay to cash na lang daw. So, makikita po sa records
namin ni Ms. Napoles na pumasok ang P25.5 million na amount sa kanyang account at the same time nag-
issue siya ng checke na P282,000.00 na eleven checks. Nagstart kami madam 2012, siguro sometime July
or August or mga ganoong buwan po. Basta 11 checks, hindi nalalayo doon. So, siguro tapos na.
Q But what actually turned out was that the money of Justice Ong was deposited at the bank but the
interest was paid in advance by Ms. Napoles, and actually the bank will pay Ms. Napoles the advanced
interest she paid to Justice Ong, is that clear? Is that the arrangement? Do you understand me?
A Kasi ang nangyari po ma'am ganito e: yung P25.5 million ipinasok sa personal account ni Ms. Napoles
dito sa Metrobank. Metrobank kasi po yun e.
On the second visit of respondent to Napoles' office, they just engaged in conversation. She ordered
Chinese food for him which, according to Benhur, is his (respondent's) favorite.
On cross-examination, Benhur claimed that in his affidavits executed in the NBI, he did not mention
respondent's name. However, in his reply-affidavit filed with the Sandiganbayan, he alleged that Napoles
issued P282,000.00 (the amount stated in each of the 11 checks) but he did not mention the name of the
payee upon instruction of his lawyer, Atty. Baligod. Nonetheless, he knew that the checks were issued to
respondent.
II. Sula, also a whistle blower, testified that she was an employee of JLN Corporation. Her duties included
the formation of corporations by making use of the forms, applying for business licenses, transfer of
properties, purchase of cars, and others.
Sula corroborated Benhur's testimony that respondent visited the office of Napoles twice sometime in
2012.
Sula was asked to explain her testimony before the Blue Ribbon Committee during the hearing on
September 26, 2013, quoted as follows:
The Chairman (Senator Teofisto Guingona III)
Sinabi ninyo na may tinawagan si Mrs. Napoles at sinabi niya, Malapit nang lumabas yung TRO galing sa
korte. May kilala pa ba si Janet Lim Napoles sa huwes sa korte sa Sandiganbayan?
xxx
Ms. Sula
Si Mr. Ong po. Justice Ong po.
The Chairman
Gregory Ong?
Ms. Sula
Opo.
The Chairman
Sa Sandiganbayan?
Ms. Sula
Opo.
The Chairman
Okay. With that, I will just have a closing statement before we leave the hearing.
xxxx
It bears stressing that before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, Benhur initially testified that Napoles
fixed or "inayos" the Kevlar case because she has a contact at the Sandiganbayan, referring to respondent.
Sula corroborated Benhur's testimony.
Testifying before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee is certainly an ordeal. The witnesses and everything
they say are open to the public. They are subjected to difficult questions propounded by the Senators,
supposedly intelligent and knowledgeable of the subject and issues under inquiry. And they can easily
detect whether a person under investigation is telling the truth or not. Considering this challenging and
difficult setting, it is indubitably improbable that the two whistle blowers would testify false! y against
respondent.
Moreover, during the investigation of this case, Benhur and Sula testified in a candid, straightforward, and
categorical manner. Their testimonies were instantaneous, clear, unequivocal, and carried with it the ring
of truth.
In fact, their answers to the undersigned's probing questions were consistent with their testimonies
before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee. During cross-examination, they did not waver or falter. The
undersigned found the two whistle blowers as credible witnesses and their story untainted with bias and
contradiction, reflective of honest and trustworthy witnesses.
The undersigned therefore finds unmeritorious respondent's claim that Benhur and Sula were lying.
. . . respondent insisted he could not have intervened in the disposition of the Kevlar case considering that
Napoles' mother, brother and sister-in-law were convicted.
Respondent must have forgotten that Napoles' natural instinct was self-preservation. Hence, she would
avail of every possible means to be exonerated. Besides, respondent's belief that the two members of his
Division are independent-minded Jurists remains to be a mere allegation.
xxxx
With the undersigned's finding that there is credence in the testimonies of Benhur and Sula, there is no
need to stretch one's imagination to arrive at the inevitable conclusion that in "fixing" Kevlar case, money
could be the consideration ... Benhur testified he kept a ledger (already shredded) of expenses amounting
to P 100 million incurred by Napoles for the Sandiganbayan during the pendency of the Kevlar case which
extended up to ten years; and that Napoles told him she gave respondent an undetermined sum of money.
Respondent maintains that the testimonies of Benhur and Sula are pure hearsay, inadmissible in
evidence:
Justice Ong
Your honor, since these are all accusations against me by Luy and Sula, and according to Luy and Sula,
these were only told to them by Napoles, always their statements were ... they do not have personal
knowledge, it was only told to them by Napoles, is it possible that we subpoena Napoles so that the truth
will come out? If. ..
xxxx
Justice Gutierrez
That is your prerogative.
Justice Ong
I am willing to take the risk although I know I am not an acquaintance of Napoles. Just to clear my name
whether I should be hung or I should not be hung.
xxxx
Atty. Geronilla
I don't think it would be necessary, your honor.
Justice Gutierrez (to Atty. Geronilla)
Discuss this matter with your client, file a motion, then we will see.
However, respondent and his counsel did not take any action on the undersigned's suggestion. They did
not present Napoles to rebut the testimonies of Benhur and Sula. Significantly, respondent failed to
consider that his testimony is likewise hearsay. He should have presented Msgr. Ramirez and Napoles as
witnesses to support his claim regarding their role which enabled him to wear the robe of the Holy Black
Nazarene.
x x xx
1. He asserted that he could not be the contact or "connect" of Napoles at the Sandiganbayan for he never
met or came to know her during the pendency of the Kevlar case;
2. Challenging Benhur's testimony that he fixed or "inayos" the Kevlar case, respondent claimed that it
was decided based on the merits by the Sandiganbayan Fourth Division as a collegial body. The two other
members of the court, Justice Jose R. Hernandez (ponente) and Justice Maria Cristina J. Cornejo, are
independent-minded jurists who could not be pressured or influenced by anybody, not even by their
peers;
3. On Benhur's allegation that respondent received an amount of money from Napoles prior to the
promulgation of the decision in the Kevlar case, respondent deplored the fact that Benhur was attempting
to tarnish his reputation without any proof. And that it is unthinkable for him to have received money
from Napoles considering that her mother, brother, and sister-in-law were convicted;
4. Respondent admitted he went to Napoles' office twice, sometime in March 2012, after the decision in
the Kevlar case was promulgated in 2010 and narrated what prompted him to do so, thus:
At the birthday party of Senator Jinggoy Estrada on February 17, 2012, Napoles approached him and
introduced herself. She engaged him in a casual conversation and thanked him for her acquittal in the
Kevlar case. Respondent replied she should thank her "evidence" instead, adding that had the court found
enough evidence against her, she would have been convicted. She talked about her charity works like
supporting Chinese priests, building churches and chapels in China, and sponsoring Chinese Catholic
priests. He was not interested though in what she was saying until she mentioned the name of Msgr.
Ramirez, former Parish Priest of Quiapo Church.
Respondent became interested because he has been a devotee of the Holy Black Nazarene since he was a
little boy. Napoles told him that Msgr. Ramirez has with him the robe of the Holy Black Nazarene which
has a healing power if one wears it. Then respondent asked if he can have access to the robe so he can be
cured of his ailment (prostate cancer) which he keeps only to himself and to the immediate members of
his family. Napoles made arrangement with Msgr. Ramirez until respondent was able to drape the robe
over his body for about one or two minutes in Quiapo Church. He also received a fragrant ball of cotton
which he keeps until now to heal any ailing part of his body. That was a great deal for him. So out of
courtesy, he visited Napoles in her office and thanked her. That was his first visit.
Thereafter, Napoles kept on calling respondent, inviting him to her office, but he kept on declining. Then
finally after two weeks, he acceded for she might think he is "walang kwentang tao." They just engaged in
a small talk for about 30 minutes and had coffee.
5. Concerning Benhur's testimony that Napoles paid respondent an advanced interest consisting of eleven
(11) checks in the amount of P282,000.00 each and that he issued to her his BDO check of P25.5 million
which she deposited in her account, he claimed that "he never issued that check as he did not intend to
invest in AFPSLAI. In fact, he does not have any money deposited there. Inasmuch as he did not issue any
BDO check, it follows that Napoles could not have given him those eleven (11) checks representing
advanced interest. He further explained that he found from the internet that in AFPSLAI, an investor can
only make an initial deposit of P30,000.00 every quarter or Pl20,000.00 per year. The limit or ceiling is P3
million with an interest of 15% or 16% per annum.
6. The whistle blower's testimony are conflicting and therefore lack credibility. While Sula testified that
Napoles told her that she did not want to approach respondent (should a case involving the pork barrel
scam be filed with the Sandiganbayan) because his talent fee is too high, however, both whistle blowers
claimed that he is Napoles' contact in the Sandiganbayan.
With respect to the Rappler Report, according to respondent, Rufo was insinuating four things: 1. That
there was irregularity in the manner the Kevlar case was decided;
2. That respondent was close to Napoles even during the pendency of the Kevlar case;
3. That respondent was attending parties of the Napoleses; and
4. That respondent was advising Napoles about legal strategies relative to the Kevlar case. Respondent
"dismissed all the above insinuations as false and without factual basis." As to the last insinuation that he
advised Napoles about legal strategies to be pursued in the Kevlar case, respondent stressed that the case
was decided by a collegial body and that he never interceded on her behalf.
EVALUATION
Ong, Jose R. Hernandez and Rodolfo A. Ponferrada, Sandiganbayan,'' the Supreme Court found respondent
Justice Ong guilty of violation of PD 1606 and The Revised Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan for
nonobservance of collegiality in hearing criminal cases in the Hall of Justice, Davao City. Instead of siting
as a collegial body, the members of the Sandiganbayan Fourth Division adopted a different procedure. The
Division was divided into two. As then Chairperson of the Division, respondent was ordered to pay a fine
of P15,000.00 with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar offense shall be dealt with
more severely.
xxxx
...the undersigned cannot hold back her skepticism regarding the acquittal of Napoles. The Sandiganbayan
Fourth Division, of which respondent was the Chairman, held that Napoles did not conspire with the
suppliers in the questionable purchase of the Kevlar helmets as she was not one of the "dealer-payees" in
the transaction in question and that there was no proof of an overt act on her part. How could the Fourth
Division arrive at such conclusion? The Decision itself indicates clearly that ( 1) Napoles was following up
the processing of the documents; (2) that she was in charge of the delivery of the helmets; and (3) the
checks amounting to P3,864,310.00 as payment for the helmets were deposited and cleared in only one
bank account, Security Bank Account No. 512-000-2200, in the name of Napoles.
Considering this glaring irregularity, it is safe to conclude that indeed respondent has a hand in the
acquittal of Napoles. All along, the whistle blowers were telling the truth.
xxxx
RECOMMENDATION
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, It is respectfully recommended, for consideration of the Honorable Court,
that respondent Justice Gregory S. Ong be found GUILTY of gross misconduct, dishonesty, and
impropriety, all in violations of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary and be
meted the penalty of DISMISSAL from the service WITH FORFEITURE of all retirement benefits, excluding
accrued leave credits, and WITH PREJUDICE to reemployment to any government, including government-
owned or controlled corporations.
xxxx
The Court's Ruling
This Court adopts the findings, conclusions and recommendations of the Investigating Justice which are
well-supported by the evidence on record.
Based on the testimonies of Luy, Sula and Rufo, the Investigating Justice formulated the charges against
the respondent, as follows:
1. Respondent acted as contact of Napoles in connection with the Kevlar case while it was pending in the
Sandiganbayan Fourth Division wherein he is the Chairman;
2. Respondent, being Napoles' contact in the Sandiganbayan, fixed the Kevlar case resulting in her
acquittal;
3. Respondent received an undetermined amount of money from Napoles prior to the promulgation of the
decision in the Kevlar case thus, she was sure ("kampante") of her acquittal; 4. Respondent visited
Napoles in her office where she handed to him eleven (ll) checks, each amounting to P282,000.00 or a
total of P3,102,000.00, as advanced interest for his P25.5 million BDO check she deposited in her personal
account; and
5. Respondent attended Napoles' parties and was photographed with Senator Estrada and Napoles.
Respondent thus stands accused of gross misconduct, partiality and corruption or bribery during the
pendency of the Kevlar case, and impropriety on account of his dealing and socializing with Napoles after
her acquittal in the said case. Additionally, respondent failed to disclose in his September 26, 2013 letter
to Chief Justice Sereno that he had actually visited Napoles at her office in 2012, as he vehemently denied
having partied with or attended any social event hosted by her.
Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a
dereliction of duty, unlawful behavior, willful in character, improper or wrong behavior; while ·"gross" has
been defined as "out of all measure beyond allowance; flagrant; shameful; such conduct as is not to be
excused." We agree with Justice Sandoval-Gutierrez that respondent's association with Napoles during the
pendency and after the promulgation of the decision in the Kevlar case resulting in her acquittal,
Respondent's acts of allowing himself to be Napoles' contact in the Sandiganbayan, resulting in the fixing
of the Kevlar case, and of accepting money from her, constitute gross misconduct, a violation of the New
Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary.
xxxx
That Benhur personally prepared the eleven (11) checks which Napoles handed to respondent led the
undersigned to conclude without hesitation that this charge is true. It is highly inconceivable that Benhur
could devise or concoct his story. He gave a detailed and lucid narration of the events, concluding that
actually Napoles gave respondent P3, 102,000.00 as advanced interest.
According to respondent, the purpose of his first visit was to thank Napoles for making it possible for him
to wear the Holy Black Nazarene's robe. Even assuming it is true, nonetheless it is equally true that during
that visit, respondent could have transacted business with Napoles. Why should Napoles pay respondent
an advanced interest of P3,102,000.0 with her own money if it were not a consideration for a favor?
Respondent's transgression pertains to his personal life and no direct relation to his judicial function. It is
not misconduct but plain dishonesty. His act is unquestionably disgraceful and renders him morally unfit
as a member of the Judiciary and unworthy of the privileges the law confers on him. Furthermore,
respondent's conduct supports Benhur's assertion that he received money from Napoles.
Dishonesty likewise violates Canon 2 (1 and 2) on Integrity of the same Code providing in part that judges
must ensure that their conduct is above reproach and must reaffirm the people's faith in the integrity of
the Judiciary.
Indeed, respondent should not stay in his position even for a moment.
xxxx
...From respondent's end, there was nothing wrong when he visited Napoles twice in her office
considering that the visits took place long after the promulgation of the decision in the Kevlar case.
Contrary to respondent's submission, such acts also constitute gross misconduct in violation of Canon 4
on Propriety of the same Code. Section 1 provides that judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance
of impropriety in all of their activities .
. . . respondent's reason for his first visit was to thank Napoles for her help in making it possible for him to
wear the robe of the Holy Black Nazarene. Instead of visiting her, respondent could have extended his
gratitude by simply calling her by phone. Worse, he visited her again because she may think he is an
unworthy person. This is an extremely frail reason. He was seen by the whistle blowers and their co-
workers who, without doubt, readily confirmed that he was Napoles' contact at the Sandiganbayan and
that he "fixed" the decision in the Kevlar case.
Respondent cannot be excused for his unconcern for the position he holds. Being aptly perceived as the
visible personification of law and justice, his personal behavior, not only while in the performance of
official duties but also outside the court, must be beyond reproach. A judicial office circumscribes a
personal conduct and imposes a number of inhibitions, whose faithful observance is the price one has to
pay for holding an exalted position.
xxxx
On the photograph showing respondent
with Senator Jinggoy Estrada and Napoles.
xxxx
This incident manifests respondent's disregard of the dictum that propriety and the appearance of
propriety are essential to the performance of all the activities of a judge. This exacting standard of
decorum is demanded from judges to promote public confidence in the integrity of the Judiciary.
In joining Senator Estrada and Napoles in a picture taking, respondent gave a ground for reproach by
reason of impropriety. It bears reiterating Canon 4 (1) on Propriety of the same Code which provides that
judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities.
Respondent maintained that he did not know Napoles at that time because she was not present before the
Sandiganbayan during the hearing of the Kevlar case for she must have waived her appearance.
Respondent's explanation lacks merit. That court could not have acquired jurisdiction over her if she did
not appear personally for arraignment.
Of utmost significance is the fact that this is not the first time that respondent has been charged
administratively. In "Assistant Special Prosecutor Ill Rohermina J Jamsani-Rodriguez v. Justices Gregory S.
The hearsay testimonies of Luy and Sula generated intense public interest because of their close
relationship to Napoles and their crucial participation in her transactions with government officials,
dubbed by media as the "Pork Barrel Queen." But as aptly observed by Justice SandovalGutierrez, the
"challenging and difficult setting" of the Senate hearings where they first testified, made it highly
improbable that these whistle blowers would testify against the respondent. During the investigation of
this case, Justice Sandoval-Gutierrez described their manner of testifying as "candid, straightforward and
categorical." She likewise found their testimonies as "instantaneous, clear, unequivocal, and carried with
it the ring of truth," and more important, these are consistent with their previous testimonies before the
Senate; they never wavered or faltered even during cross-examination.
It is a settled rule that the findings of investigating magistrates are generally given great weight by the
Court by reason of their unmatched opportunity to see the deportment of the witnesses as they testified.
The rule which concedes due respect, and even finality, to the assessment of credibility of witnesses by
trial judges in civil and criminal cases applies a fortiori to administrative cases. 18 In particular, we concur
with Justice Sandoval-Gutierrez's assessment on the credibility of Luy and Sula, and disagree with
respondent's claim that these witnesses are simply telling lies about his association with Napoles.
Contrary to respondent's submission, Sula in her testimony said that whenever Napoles talked about her
contacts in the Ombudsman and Sandiganbayan, they knew that insofar as the Sandiganbayan was
concerned, it was understood that she was referring to respondent even as she may have initially
contacted some persons to get to respondent, and also because they have seen him meeting with Napoles
at her office. It appears that Napoles made statements regarding the Kevlar case not just to Luy but also to
the other employees of JLN Corporation. The following are excerpts from Sula's testimony on direct
examination, where she even hinted at their expected outcome of the Kevlar case:
Atty. Benipayo
Q So, Ms. Sula, what were the statements being made by Ms. Janet Lim Napoles regarding her involvement
in the Kevlar case, or how she was trying to address the problem with the Kevlar case pending before the
Sandiganbayan?
Witness Sula
A Ang alam ko po kasi marami po siyang kinaka-usap na mga lawyers na binabayaran niya para tulungan
siya kay Gregory Ong sa Kevlar case. Tapos, sa kalaunan po, nasabi na niya sa amin na mcron na po siyang
nakilala sa Sandiganbayan na nagngangalang Justice Gregory Ong. Tapos, sabi niya, siya po ang tutulong sa
amin para ma-clear kami. Pero hindi niya sinabi na meron din pong ma ... sasagot sa kaso. Hindi po lahat,
kasi po dalawa sa mga empleyado niya, bale apat, dalawang empleyado niya, isang kapatid niya at sister-
in-law ang mag-aano sa kaso pati yung mother niya na namatay na ay sasagot din sa kaso. Siya Jang at
saka yung asawa niya ang bale makli-clear sa kaso.
Q So, she told you that two (2) employees, one (1) sister-in-law and one brother will answer for the case
and Janet Lim Napoles and her husband will be acquitted, is that right?
A Yun po ang aking pagkaka-alam kasi po, nag-petition po kasi sila eh, yung mga officemates ko.
Nagkaroon ng probation. Noong lumabas ang hatol, meron silang probation period.
xxxx
Q Which you told me that somebody will help in the Kevlar case?
A Opo. Sinabi po niya sa amin everytime po pag nagkukwento siya, sinasabi niya na si Justice Ong ang
tutulong sa kanya para ma-clear po yung Kevlar case niya.
x x x x19 (Emphasis supplied.)
As it turned out, Napoles' husband was dropped from the two informations while her mother, brother and
sister-in-law were convicted in the lesser charge of falsification of public documents. Apparently, after her
acquittal, Napoles helped those convicted secure a probation. But as stated in our earlier resolution, the
Court will no longer delve into the merits of the Kevlar case as the investigation will focus on
respondent's administrative liability.
Respondent's act of voluntarily meeting with Napoles at her office on two occasions was grossly improper
and violated Section 1, Canon 4 (Propriety) of the New Code of Judicial Conduct, which took effect on June
1, 2004.
SECTION 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities.
constitutes gross misconduct notwithstanding the absence of direct evidence of corruption or bribery in
the rendition of the said judgment.
We cannot overemphasize that in administrative proceedings, only substantial evidence, i.e., that amount
of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, is required.
The standard of substantial evidence is satisfied when there is reasonable ground to believe that
respondent is responsible for the misconduct complained of, even if such evidence might not be
overwhelming or even preponderant.
The testimonies of Luy and Sula established that Napoles had been in contact with respondent ("nag-
uusap sila") during the pendency of the Kevlar case. As Napoles' trusted staff, they (especially Luy who is
a cousin) were privy to her daily business and personal activities. Napoles constantly updated them of
developments regarding the case. She revealed to them that she has a "connect" or "contact" in the
Sandiganbayan who will help "fix" the case involving her, her mother, brother and some employees.
Having closely observed and heard Napoles being confident that she will be acquitted even prior to the
promulgation of the decision in the Kevlar case, they were convinced she was indeed in contact with
respondent, whose identity was earlier divulged by Napoles to Luy. Luy categorically testified that
Napoles told him she gave money to respondent but did not disclose the amount. There was no reason for
them to doubt Napoles' statement as they even keep a ledger detailing her expenses for the
"Sandiganbayan," which reached Pl 00 million. Napoles' information about her association with
respondent was confirmed when she was eventually acquitted in 2010 and when they saw respondent
visit her office and given the eleven checks issued by Napoles in 2012.
Respondent maintains that the testimonies of Luy and Sula were hearsay as they have no personal
knowledge of the matters they were testifying, which were merely told to them by Napoles. Specifically,
he points to portions of Sula's testimony indicating that Napoles had not just one but "contact persons" in
Ombudsman and Sandiganbayan; hence, it could have been other individuals, not him, who could help
Napoles "fix" the Kevlar case, especially since Napoles never really disclosed to Sula who was her
(Napoles) contact at the Sandiganbayan and at one of their conversations Napoles even supposedly said
that respondent's "talent fee" was too high. Bribery is committed when a public officer agrees to perform
an act in connection with the performance of official duties in consideration of any offer, promise, gift or
present received. Ajudge who extorts money from a party-litigant who has a case before the court
commits a serious misconduct and this Court has condemned such act in the strongest possible terms.
Particularly because it has been committed by one charged with the responsibility of administering the
law and rendering justice, it quickly and surely corrodes respect for law and the courts.
An accusation of bribery is easy to concoct and difficult to disprove. The complainant must present a
panoply of evidence in support of such an accusation. Inasmuch as what is imputed against the
respondent judge connotes a grave misconduct, the quantum of proof required should be more than
substantial. Concededly, the evidence in this case is insufficient to sustain the bribery and corruption
charges against the respondent. Both Luy and Sula have not witnessed respondent actually receiving
money from Napoles in exchange for her acquittal in the Kevlar case. Napoles had confided to Luy her
alleged bribe to respondent.
Notwithstanding the absence of direct evidence of any corrupt act by the respondent, we find credible
evidence of his association with Napoles after the promulgation of the decision in the Kevlar case. The
totality of the circumstances of such association strongly indicates respondent's corrupt inclinations that
only heightened the public's perception of anomaly in the decision-making process. By his act of going to
respondent at her office on two occasions, respondent exposed himself to the suspicion that he was
partial to Napoles. That respondent was not the ponente of the decision which was rendered by a collegial
body did not forestall such suspicion of partiality, as evident from the public disgust generated by the
publication of a photograph of respondent together with Napoles and Senator Jinggoy Estrada. Indeed,
the context of the declarations under oath by Luy and Sula before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee,
taking place at the height of the "Pork Barrel" controversy, made all the difference as respondent himself
acknowledged. Thus, even in the present administrative proceeding, their declarations are taken in the
light of the public revelations of what they know of that government corruption controversy, and how it
has tainted the image of the Judiciary.
action as may raise suspicion on their partiality in resolving or deciding the case. Thus, he emphasized in
his Memorandum that he "never knew Napoles on a personal level while she was still on trial as an
accused in Kevlar helmet case." Respondent even quoted Sula's testimony expressing her opinion that she
finds nothing wrong with respondent going to Napoles' office because at that time, the Kevlar case had
already been terminated.
We do not share the view that the rule on propriety was intended to cover only pending and prospective
litigations.
Judges must, at all times, be beyond reproach and should avoid even the mere suggestion of partiality and
impropriety. Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct states that "[p ]ropriety and the appearance of
propriety are essential to the performance of all the activities of a judge." Section 2 further provides:
SEC. 2. As a subject of constant public scrutiny, judges must accept personal restrictions that might be
viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do so freely and willingly. In particular, judges
shall conduct themselves in a way that is consistent with the dignity of the judicial office.
As we held in Sibayan-Joaquin v. Javellana
... Judges, indeed, should be extra prudent in associating with litigants and counsel appearing before them
so as to avoid even a mere perception of possible bias or partiality. It is not expected, of course, that
judges should live in retirement or seclusion from any social intercourse. Indeed, it may be desirable, for
instance, that they continue, time and work commitments permitting, to relate to members of the bar in
worthwhile endeavors and in such fields of interest, in general, as are in keeping with the noble aims and
objectives of the legal profession. In pending or prospective litigations before them, however, judges
should be scrupulously careful to avoid anything that may tend to awaken the suspicion that their
personal, social or sundry relations could influence their objectivity, for not only must judges possess
proficiency in law but that also they must act and behave in such manner that would assure, with great
comfort, litigants and their counsel of the judges' competence, integrity and independence.
In this light, it does not matter that the case is no longer pending when improper acts were committed by
the judge. Because magistrates are under constant public scrutiny, the termination of a case will not deter
public criticisms for acts which may cast suspicion on its disposition or resolution. As what transpired in
this case, respondent's association with Napoles has unfortunately dragged the Judiciary into the "Pork
Barrel" controversy which initially involved only legislative and executive officials. Worse, Napoles' much-
flaunted "contact" in the judiciary is no less than a Justice of the Sandiganbayan, our special court tasked
with hearing graft cases. We cannot, by any stretch of indulgence and compassion, consider respondent's
transgression as a simple misconduct.
During his testimony, respondent acknowledged his violation of judicial ethics and its serious
repercussions, as shown by his answers to the questions from the Investigation Justice, viz: Justice
Gutierrez
What I am thinking Justice, as a Justice holding a very high position, could it not be possible for you to just
go to the Church of Quiapo and ask the priest there to help you or assist you, no longer through Ms.
Napoles?
Justice Ong
You cannot do that, your honor. Ever since when I was a small boy, I never got near the image of the Mahal
na Poon. Nobody can do that, your honor.
Justice Gutierrez
No, no. What I mean is that you can just go to the priest in Quiapo and make the proper request. Why did
you not do that?
Justice Ong
I don't know, your honor.
Justice Gutierrez
Because you have been suffering from that ailment, mass or whatever, and that you are a devotee of the
Black Nazarene. You could have gone to the Office of the priest there and had that request for you to wear
that robe of the Black Nazarene?
Justice Ong
Hindi ko po alam na may ganyan, your honor. I was only told by Napoles during that conversation. Had I
known that, siguro po pwede ko pong gawin. Had I known that there is such a robe, maybe I will do that.
A judge must not only be impartial but must also appear to be impartial and that fraternizing with
litigants tarnishes this appearance. Public confidence in the Judiciary is eroded by irresponsible or
improper conduct of judges. A judge must avoid all impropriety and the appearance thereof. Being the
subject of constant public scrutiny, a judge should freely and willingly accept restrictions on conduct that
might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen.
In Caneda v. Alaan, we held that:
Judges are required not only to be impartial but also to appear to be so, for appearance is an essential
manifestation of reality. Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct enjoins judges to avoid not just
impropriety in their conduct but even the mere appearance of impropriety.
They must conduct themselves in such a manner that they give no ground for reproach. [Respondent's]
acts have been less than circumspect. He should have kept himself free from any appearance of
impropriety and endeavored to distance himself from any act liable to create an impression of indecorum.
xxxx
Indeed, respondent must always bear in mind that:
"A judicial office traces a line around his official as well as personal conduct, a price one has to pay for o
ccupying an exalted position in the judiciary, beyond which he may not freely venture. Canon 2 of the
Code of Judicial Conduct enjoins a judge to avoid not just impropriety in the performance of judicial
duties but in all his activities whether in his public or private life. He must conduct himself in a manner
that gives no ground for reproach." (Emphasis supplied.)
On this score, our previous pronouncements have enjoined judges to avoid association or socializing with
persons who have pending cases before their court. Respondent cites the case of Abundo v. Mania, Jr.
where this Court did not find fault with a judge who was charged with fraternizing with his lawyer-friend.
In that case, we said:
Respondent admits that he and Atty. Pajarillo became close friends in 1989 when they were both RTC
judges stationed in Naga City. Since they both resided in Camarines Norte, Atty. Pajarillo hitched rides
with respondent to Daet, Camarines Norte in the latter's car.
In his Comment, respondent claims that he leaves the door to his chambers open to lawyers or parties
with official court business, whose requests and complaints regarding their cases he listens to in full view
of his staff, who are witnesses to his transparency and honesty in conducting such dialogues. He also
admits that Atty. Pajarillo has been to his house on several occasions, but only to make emergency long-
distance calls to his children in Metro Manila. He, however, denies that he and Atty. Pajarillo were
frequently seen eating and drinking together in public places.
We agree with Justice Buzon's finding that the evidence against respondent on this point was insufficient,
viz.:
"On the other hand, the admission of respondent that he attended two public functions where Atty.
Pajarillo was also present; that Atty. Pajarillo had been in his house twice or thrice and used his
telephone; and that he receives lawyers, including Atty. Pajarillo, and litigants inside his chambers, the
door to which is always open so that [the] staff could see that no under the table transactions are taking
place, is not proof that he is fraternizing with Atty. Pajarillo. A judge need not ignore a former colleague
and friend whenever they meet each other or when the latter makes requests which are not in any
manner connected with cases pending in his court. Thus, Canon 30 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics
provides:
It is not necessary to the proper performance of judicial duty that judges should live in retirement or
seclusion; it is desirable that, so far as the reasonable attention to the completion of their work will
permit, they continue to mingle in social intercourse, and that they should not discontinue their interests
in or appearance at meetings of members at the bar. A judge should, however, in pending or prospective
litigation before him be scrupulously careful to avoid such action as may reasonably tend to waken the
suspicion that his social or business relations or friendships constitute an element in determining his
judicial course.'"
The factual setting in Abundo v. Mania, Jr. is not similar to the present case because Napoles was not a
colleague or lawyer-friend but an accused in a former case before the Sandiganbayan's Fourth Division
chaired by respondent and which acquitted her from malversation charge. What respondent perhaps
want to underscore is the caveat for judges, in pending or prospective litigation before them, to avoid such
The Court finds that respondent, in not being truthful on crucial matters even before the administrative
complaint was filed against him motu proprio, is guilty of Dishonesty, a violation of Canon 3 (Integrity) of
the New Code of Judicial Conduct.
Dishonesty is a "disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of
honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack of fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to defraud,
deceive or betray." Dishonesty, being a grave offense, carries the extreme penalty of dismissal from the
service with forfeiture of retirement benefits except accrued leave credits, and with perpetual
disqualification from reemployment in government service. Indeed, dishonesty is a malevolent act that
has no place in the Judiciary.
Under Section 11(A), Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, a respondent found guilty of a serious charge may be
penalized as follows:
SEC. 11. Sanctions. - A. If the respondent is guilty of a serious charge, any of the following sanctions may
be imposed:
1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may determine, and
disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including governmentowned or
-controlled corporations. Provided, however, that the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include
accrued leave credits;
2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3) but not exceeding six
(6) months; or
3. A fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00. Considering that respondent is not a first
time offender and the charges of gross misconduct and dishonesty are both grave offenses showing his
unfitness to remain as a magistrate of the special graft court, we deem it proper to impose the supreme
penalty of dismissal.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Sandiganbayan Associate Justice Gregory S. Ong GUILTY of
GROSS MISCONDUCT, DISHONESTY and IMPROPRIETY, all in violations of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, for which he is hereby DISMISSED from the service, with forfeiture of
all retirement benefits, except accrued leave credits, if any, and with prejudice to reemployment in any
branch, agency or instrumentality of the government including government-owned or -controlled
corporations.
This Decision is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.
SO ORDERE
A.M. No. RTJ-14-2388 June 10, 2014
[Formerly OCA IPI No. 10-3554-RTJ]
EMILIE SISON-BARIAS, Complainant, vs. JUDGE MARINO E. RUBIA, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT [RTC],
BRANCH 24, BIÑAN, LAGUNA and EILEEN A. PECAÑA, DATA ENCODER II, RTC, OFFICE OF THE CLERK
OF COURT, BIÑAN, LAGUNA, Respondents.
Public trust requires that we exact strict integrity from judges and court employees. This case emphasizes
the need for members of the judiciary and those within its employ to exhibit the impartiality, prudence,
and propriety that the New Code of Judicial Conduct and the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel require
when dealing with parties in pending cases.
Complainant Emilie Sison-Barias is involved in three cases pending before the sala of respondent Judge
Marino Rubia.
The first case is an intestate proceeding. Complainant filed a petition for letters of administration over the
intestate estate of her late husband, Ramon A. Barias. This was opposed by her mother-in-law, Romelias
Almeda-Barias.
The second case is a guardianship proceeding over Romelias Almeda-Barias. Evelyn Tanael, the guardian
appointed by the court, submitted a property inventory report that included not only the properties of
Romelias Almeda-Barias but also properties forming part of the estate of complainant’s late husband.
The third case is a civil action for annulment of contracts and reconveyance of real properties filed by
Romelias Almeda-Barias, represented by Evelyn Tanael, against complainant, among others.
In all these cases, a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-510712 and part of the
estate of complainant’s husband was involved.
Justice Gutierrez
Okay. It happened already. But just to thank Ms. Napoles, I think Justice you should have been very, very
careful about your actuations. You should not have been seen in public, you know, with a woman like her
who was an accused before. You could have thanked her simply by calling her. You could have relayed to
her your true feelings that you are so grateful because of her assistance. Were it not for her, you could not
have worn that Holy Robe of the Black Nazarene. You could have simply called her instead of going to her
office; instead of, you know, going to the Church of Santuario de San Antonio in Forbes Park. And you
should have been more careful not to be seen by the public with her considering that she was a former
accused in that case.
Justice Ong
I will heed to that advice, your honor.
Justice Gutierrez
Q And you admitted a while ago, during the interview conducted by Mr. Aries Rufo that. "That is a lesson
for me; that I should not have associated, you know, with a former respondent or accused in a case before
me." You admitted that? You said you learned you lesson. Was that the first time you learned that kind of
lesson, Mr. Justice? Or even before you took your oath as a member of the Judiciary, you already knew that
lesson, isn't it or was that the first time? That is why you associated yourself with Senator Jinggoy Estrada
who was accused before of plunder?
Justice Ong
Your honor, talking about ....
Justice Gutierrez
Q Do you admit you committed a lapse along that line?
Justice Ong
A Yes, your honor. You have to forgive me for that. (Emphasis supplied.)
In her report, Justice Sandoval-Gutierrez noted that respondent's purported reason for visiting Napoles in
her office remains uncorroborated, as Napoles and the Quiapo parish priest were not presented as
witnesses despite her suggestion to respondent and his counsel. On the other hand, Luy's testimony on
what transpired in one of respondent's meeting with Napoles at her office appears to be the more
plausible and truthful version. Expectedly, respondent denied having issued a BDO check for P25 .5
million as claimed by Luy, and asserted he (respondent) did not deposit any money to AFPSLAI.
Unfortunately, Luy is unable to present documentary evidence saying that, as previously testified by him
before the Senate, most of the documents in their office were shredded upon orders of Napoles when the
"Pork Barrel Scam" controversy came out.
Justice Sandoval-Gutierrez stated that the eleven checks of P282,000.00 supposed advance interest for
respondent's check deposit to AFPSLAI were given to respondent as consideration for the favorable ruling
in the Kevlar case. Such finding is consistent with Luy's testimony that Napoles spent a staggering PlOO
million just to "fix" the said case. Under the circumstances, it is difficult to believe that respondent went to
Napoles office the second time just to have coffee. Respondent's act of again visiting Napoles at her office,
after he had supposedly merely thanked her during the first visit, tends to support Luy's claim that
respondent had a financial deal with Napoles regarding advance interest for AFPSLAI deposit. The
question inevitably arises as to why would Napoles extend such an accommodation to respondent if not
as consideration for her acquittal in the Kevlar case? Respondent's controversial photograph alone had
raised adverse public opinion, with the media speculating on pay-offs taking place in the courts.
Regrettably, the conduct of respondent gave cause for the public in general to doubt the honesty and
fairness of his participation in the Kevlar case and the integrity of our courts of justice. Before this Court,
even prior to the commencement of administrative investigation, respondent was less than candid. In his
letter to the Chief Justice where he vehemently denied having attended parties or social events hosted by
Napoles, he failed to mention that he had in fact visited Napoles at her office. Far from being a plain
omission, we find that respondent deliberately did not disclose his social calls to Napoles. It was only
when Luy and Sula testified before the Senate and named him as the "contact" of Napoles in the
Sandiganbayan, that respondent mentioned of only one instance he visited Napoles ("This is the single
occasion that Sula was talking about in her supplemental affidavit x x x.").
these cases were special proceedings, they could not be consolidated with an ordinary civil action.
Respondent Judge Rubia insisted on discussing the totality of the different issues involved in the three
distinct cases under one court proceeding. As such, complainant alleged that the main issues of the special
proceedings were consolidated with matters that were properly the subject of a separate civil action.
Complainant alleged that respondent Judge Rubia refused to issue Orders that would have allowed her to
comply with her duties as the special administrator of her late husband’s estate. This included the order
to conduct an inventory of the properties, rights, and credits of the deceased, subject to the authority of
the administrator.
In addition, complainant alleged that respondent Judge Rubia refused to grant her request for subpoena
duces tecum and ad testificandum that she had prayed for to compel Evelyn Tanael to produce the
documents showing the accrued rentals of the parcel of land belonging toher late husband. As such,
complainant raised that respondent Judge Rubia’s refusal emboldened Evelyn Tanael and oppositor
Romelias Almeda-Barias to interfere in the management of the estate of complainant’s late husband.
Because of this refusal, she asserted that respondent Judge Rubia failed to adhere to the duty of the court
to ensure a proper inventory of the estate.
Complainant enumerated occasions that alleged manifest partiality on the part of respondent Judge
Rubia. She alleged that respondent Judge Rubia failed to require a timely filing of the pre-trial brief on the
part of Evelyn Tanael and Romelias Almeda-Barias, and despite their noncompliance on four (4) separate
pre-trials that were postponed, Tanael and Almeda-Barias were not declared in default. 44 She also alleged
that respondent Judge Rubia stated that the burden to prove ownership of the property was on
complainant, when in fact it was the oppositor, or Tanael and Almeda-Barias, who had the burden of proof
to show that the land was fraudulently transferred to her late husband.
Complainant admitted that she did not inform her counsel of the dinner meeting she had with
respondents. It was Enrique who allegedly told complainant’s lawyers about it when he went to the
lawyer’s office to pay some bills. Complainant said that her lawyer immediately admonished her for
agreeing to meet with respondent Judge Rubia. Complainant then texted respondent Pecanñ a on August 8,
2010 on her lawyer’s reaction concerning the March 3, 2010 meeting. The following exchanges took place
via text message:
COMPLAINANT:
Hi Aileen! Sorry jz feeling bad. . my lawyer jz called me at galit n galit. My brother went to hm today to pay
som bills. Sa kakadaldal na mention s lawyr my meeting wid u n judge rubia. My lawyr ws mad dat m nt
suppose to do dat w/out hs knowledge. I cnt understand anymore wat he ws sayng kanina kse nga galit.
He wil file yata somtng abt dat n I dnt knwwat? Pls. Help me. (August 8, 2010, 2:31 p.m.)
AILEEN PECANÑ A [sic]:
Ha? Anong ififile? Bkt xa galit? Bka lalo tayo mapahamak? (August 8, 2010, 3:48 p.m.)
COMPLAINANT
M nt very sure bt he mentioned abt administrative or administratn something. I hav to talk to hm n
person para mas claro. Hirap kse by fon tlaga. He ws mad bcoz f our meetng nga, dats wat struck hm.
Sorry, daldal kse ni kuya. M going to col kuya tomorrow na. Its 1am na hr, I have to buy foncard pa.
(August 8, 2010, 4:18 p.m.)
AILEEN PECANÑ A [sic]
Admin? Nku d mapapahamak nga kaming 2 ni juj. Pati ikaw mapapahamak pa dn. (August 8, 2010, 4:28
p.m.)
AILEEN PECANÑ A [sic]
Bkt xa galit kng mkpg kta ka smin widout his knowledge. I cnt fathom y wil it end up filing an admin case.
(August 8, 2010, 4:29 p.m.)
AILEEN PECANÑ A [sic]
Pls Emily do something 2 pacify ur lawyer, juj rubia will definitely get mad wid us. (August 8, 2010, 4:30
p.m.) (Emphasis supplied)
On September 15, 2010, complainant moved for respondent Judge Rubia’s inhibition. This was denied on
October 6, 2010. Complainant then filed a motion for reconsideration denied in an order dated November
15, 2010.
Complainant alleged that there was delay in the publication of the notice in the petition for issuance of
letters of administration filed. She was then informed by her brother, Enrique "Ike" Sison, that respondent
Eileen Pecanñ a, the daughter of his good friend, was a data encoder in the Office of the Clerk of Court of the
Regional Trial Court of Binñ an, Laguna.
Complainant, together with her two brothers, Enrique and Perlito "Jun" Sison, Jr., met with respondent
Pecanñ a on February 20, 2010. During this meeting, complainant informed respondent Pecanñ a of the delay
in the publication of the notice in the petition for issuance of letters of administration. She then asked
respondent Pecanñ a to check the status of the publication of the notice. Respondent Pecanñ a asked for
complainant’s number so that she could inform her as soon as any development takes place in the case.
Enrique and Perlito executed affidavits to corroborate these allegations.
Respondent Pecanñ a asked complainant to meet her again at her house in Binñ an, Laguna. Complainant
went there with Enrique. Respondent Pecanñ a then informed complainant that she could no longer assist
her since respondent Judge Rubia had already given administration of the properties to Evelyn Tanael.
Complainant stated that she was not interested in the grant of administration to Tanael because these
concerned the properties of her mother-in-law, Romelias Almeda-Barias. She was only concerned with
the administration of the properties of her late husband, to which respondent Pecanñ a replied, "Ah ganun
ba? Iba pala ung kaso mo."
Complainant alleged that respondent Pecanñ a sent her a text message on March 2, 2010 asking
complainant to call her. Complainant called respondent Pecanñ a who informed her that respondent Judge
Rubia wanted to talk to her. Complainant agreed to meet with respondent Judge Rubia over dinner, on the
condition that respondent Pecanñ a would be present as well.
On March 3, 2010 at around 7:00 p.m, complainant picked up respondent Pecanñ a at 6750 Ayala Avenuein
Makati City. They proceeded to Cafeé Juanita in The Fort, Bonifacio Global City. Respondent Pecanñ a said
that respondent Judge Rubia would arrive late as he would be coming from a Rotary Club meeting held at
the Mandarin Hotel.
Respondent Judge Rubia arrived at Cafeé Juanita around 8:30 p.m. During the dinner meeting, respondents
allegedly asked complainant inappropriate questions. Respondent Judge Rubia allegedly asked whether
she was still connected with Philippine Airlines, which she still was at that time. Complainant was then
informed that respondent Judge Rubia knew of this fact through Atty. Noe Zarate, counsel of Romelias
Almeda-Barias. This disclosure surprised complainant, as she was under the impression that opposing
counsel and respondent JudgeRubia had no business discussing matters that were not relevant to their
pending cases.
Respondent Judge Rubia also allegedly asked her questions about her supposed involvement with
another man and other accusations made by Romelias Almeda-Barias. She was asked about the hospital
where she brought her husband at the time of his cardiac arrest.
These details, according to complainant, were never discussed in the pleadings or in the course of the
trial. Thus, she inferred that respondent Judge Rubia had been talking to the opposing counsel regarding
these matters outside of the court proceedings. The impression of complainant was that respondent
Judge Rubia was actively taking a position in favor of Atty. Zarate.
To confirm her suspicion, respondents then allegedly "told complainant to just talk to Atty. Zarate, counsel
for the oppositor, claiming that he is a nice person. Complainant was appalled by such suggestion and
replied[,] ‘Why will I talk to him? Judge di ko yata kaya gawin un.’"
After dinner, complainant stayed behind to settle the bill. Even before he left, she alleged that respondent
Judge Rubia had made insinuations that she was awaiting the company of another man.
From then on, complainant and respondents did not communicate and/or meet outside the courtroom
until August 8, 2010.
In the meantime, complainant alleged that respondent Judge Rubia acted in a manner that showed
manifest partiality in favor of the opposing parties, namely, Romelias Almeda-Barias and Evelyn Tanael, as
represented by their counsel, Atty. Noe Zarate.
On June 15, 2010, counsel for complainant was personally handed a copy of a motion for consolidation
filed by the oppositor, Romelias Almeda-Barias, despite the date of the hearing on such motion being set
on June 18, 2010. Complainant alleged that respondent Judge Rubia did not even consider the
comment/opposition to the motion for consolidation filed by her counsel, which stated that since two of
On September 12, 2011, this court issued a resolution referring the administrative complaint to a Justice
of the Court of Appeals for investigation, report, and recommendation. The complaint was assigned to
Court of Appeals Associate Justice Samuel H. Gaerlan.
On December 5, 2011, Atty. Noe Zarate filed a motion for Intervention allegedly due to the implication of
his name in the administrative complaint.
Atty. Zarate argued that the complaint should be dismissed on the ground of forum shopping because the
orders issued by respondent Judge Rubia and mentioned in the complaint were assailed in a petition for
certiorari.
Further, Atty. Zarate alleged that he did not know respondents personally, and he was not closely
associated with them. He asserted that the records were replete with incidents where he and respondent
Judge Rubia engaged in heated discussions on legal matters. He maintained that he did not foster any
closeness or personal affinity with respondent Judge Rubia that would substantiate complainant’s
allegations.
In addition, Atty. Zarate expressed his agreement with respondents’ narration of the events on the alleged
dinner meeting. He argued that if the dinner meeting did take place, this incident should have been the
ground for the motion for inhibition filed.
Atty. Zarate stated that, granting arguendo that the dinner meeting happened, there was nothing "wrong,
improper or illegal" about it. It could have been reasonably interpreted as an extrajudicial means initiated
by respondent Judge Rubia to assuage the parties in the contentious litigation.
The motion for intervention was noted without action by Justice Gaerlan.
On December 15, 2011, the parties, together with their counsels, appeared before Justice Gaerlan. It was
agreed that respondents would file their respective supplemental comments and complainant her reply to
the comment. Complainant manifested that she would present three (3) witnesses: herself and her two
brothers. Respondent Pecanñ a would testify for herself and present Semenidad Pecanñ a, her aunt, as
witness. Respondent Judge Rubia manifested that he would testify on his behalf and present respondent
Pecanñ a as witness.
Respondents Judge Rubia and Pecanñ a filed their respective supplemental comments dated December 15,
2011 and December 16, 2011, respectively. Complainant filed her consolidated reply on January 17, 2012.
A second hearing on the administrative complaint ensued on January 10, 2012 where complainant
testified on the dinner meeting on March 3, 2010.
During the hearing, complainant identified a document containing a list of phone calls showing that she
called respondent Pecanñ a on March 2 and 3, 2010. Counsel for respondent Pecanñ a stipulated that these
calls were made to her.
The hearing of the administrative complaint continued on January 12, 17, and 24, 2012.
In the January 17, 2012 hearing, respondent Pecanñ a testified to the allegations in her comment and
judicial affidavit. She alleged for the first time that the dinner meeting with complainant happened on
March 10, not March 3, 2010.
On January 24, 2012, Mr. Rodel Cortez, secretariat of the Rotary Club of Makati Southwest Chapter, was
presented as witness for respondent Judge Rubia. Rodel testified that the Rotary Club of Makati
Southwest Chapter had a meeting on March 10, 2010 at Numa Restaurant in Bonifacio Global City.
Respondent Judge Rubia attended the meeting as shown in the attendance sheet identified by Rodel.
Rodel testified that after the meeting, he, Billy Francisco, and respondent Judge Rubia walked together
toward the parking area. When they were nearing Burgos Circle where their cars were parked, Rodel
allegedly saw complainant and respondent Pecanñ a approaching them. He then saw respondent Pecanñ a
introduce complainant to respondent Judge Rubia. After the introduction, he saw respondent Judge Rubia
go to his car and drive away.
Respondent Judge Rubia testified for himself. He identified the comment and judicial affidavit filed. He
alleged that the encounter with complainant at Burgos Circle was on March 10, not March 3, 2010.
Complying with the order dated January 31, 2012, the parties filed their respective memoranda.
Justice Gaerlan submitted his investigation report dated March 13, 2012. In his report, Justice Gaerlan
recommended that no penalty be imposed against respondents. He was "convinced that the meeting at
Burgos Circle was just a chance encounter" and found that complainant failed to prove her claim with
substantial evidence that would justify the imposition of a penalty on respondents.
On November 11, 2010, complainant filed a complaint affidavit before the Office of the Court
Administrator charging respondent Pecanñ a for gross misconduct and respondent Judge Rubia for conduct
unbecoming of a judge, partiality, gross ignorance of the law or procedure, incompetence, and gross
misconduct.
The Office of the Court Administrator referred the complaint to respondents for comment.
In her comment, respondent Pecanñ a did not deny meeting complainant on February 20, 2010 through the
introduction of Enrique Sison. However, she claimed that the alleged meeting between complainant and
respondent Judge Rubia was merely a chance encounter.
Respondent Pecanñ a alleged that "sometime [in the] second week of March 2010," when she was on her
way to Makati City to meet her sisters for coffee, complainant invited her for dinner. Respondent Pecanñ a
hesitantly agreed after complainant had insisted. Complainant picked her up at Starbucks 6750 in Makati
City, and they proceeded to Cafeé Juanita in Burgos Circle for dinner. Upon passing by Burgos Circle,
respondent Pecanñ a saw respondent Judge Rubia’s car parked near Cafeé Juanita.
At about past 10:00 p.m., respondent Pecanñ a said that she saw respondent Judge Rubia together with
some companions walking toward his car. She stepped out of the restaurant and greeted him.
Complainant allegedly followed respondent Pecanñ a and so the latter was constrained to introduce
complainant as an employee of Philippine Airlines to respondent Judge Rubia. After the introduction,
respondent Judge Rubia went to his car and left. Complainant and respondent Pecanñ a returned to the
restaurant to finish their food and pay the bill.
Complainant drove respondent Pecanñ a back to Makati City. During the drive, complainant allegedly asked
her help regarding the cases filed in court and inquired as to what she could give to respondent Judge
Rubia because her lawyers instructed her to bribe him. Respondent Pecanñ a only said that respondent
Judge Rubia does not accept money and that he is financially stable.
After the dinner, complainant allegedly kept on sending text messages to respondent Pecanñ a concerning
her case filed in court. Respondent Pecanñ a admitted to the exchanges through text messages she had with
complainant on August 8, 2010 regarding the filing of administrative case against her and respondent
Judge Rubia.
Respondent Pecanñ a denied being an advocate of Atty. Zarate. She maintained the position that she should
not be held administratively liable for what she construed to be primarily judicial matters, such as the
bases for respondent Judge Rubia’s decisions and orders in court.
Respondent Judge Rubia filed his comment on January 17, 2011.
Respondent Judge Rubia claimed that the alleged meeting between him and his co-respondent Pecanñ a
together with complainant was a mere chance encounter. He denied any pre-arranged dinner meeting,
stating that after the brief encounter with complainant, he had to rush home to attend to his ailing wife.
He stated that he was only introduced to complainant because she was an employee of Philippine Airlines
where he was a former executive. Respondent Judge Rubia argued that if the alleged meeting with
complainant did take place, it should have been mentioned in the first motion for inhibition. Further, he
emphasized that it took complainant eight (8) months since the alleged dinner meeting to file a motion
for inhibition and an administrative case.
Respondent Judge Rubia surmised that complainant and her counsel, hoping for a favorable outcome of
the cases filed, initiated contact with respondent Pecanñ a. The filing of the administrative case against him
was only to compel him to inhibit from the cases to seek a friendlier forum.
Moreover, respondent Judge Rubia denied knowledge of any text messages exchanged between
complainant and respondent Pecanñ a as well as any active advocacy in favor of opposing counsel, Atty.
Zarate.
As to the allegations of partiality concerning the orders he issued for the cases filed, respondent Judge
Rubia argued that the best forum to ventilate complainant’s allegations was not through an
administrative proceeding but through judicial recourse.
Due to the gravity of the charges and the conflicting facts presented by the parties, the Office of the Court
Administrator recommended the referral of the administrative complaint to a Court of Appeals Justice for
investigation, report, and recommendation.
The record shows that the Rotary Club of Makati, Southwest Chapter, employed Rodel in 1989. He was
appointed Secretariat in 1994 where respondent Judge Rubia was a former President and remains an
active member.
The finding that respondent Judge Rubia is administratively liable could taint the reputation of the
organization that the witness has been serving for more than 20 years. It would be a definite blow to the
reputation of the Rotary Club of Makati, Southwest Chapter, if its former President were to be found guilty
of the offenses that complainant imputed upon respondent Judge Rubia. The possibility of Rodel testifying
in favor of respondent Judge Rubia as a result of his loyalty to the latter and the Rotary Club puts into
question the characterization that he is disinterested. The substance of Rodel’s narration of events should
also be scrutinized.
Complainant alleged that the dinner meeting set among her, respondent Pecanñ a, and respondent Judge
Rubia took place on March 3, 2010, as indicated in the investigation report of Justice Gaerlan. The record
shows that the Investigating Justice accepted the formal offer of Exhibit A, which was complainant’s
judicial affidavit establishing the date of the dinner as March 3, 2010 in Cafeé Juanita. Complainant also
alleged in her complaint that respondent Judge Rubia came from Mandarin Hotel in Makati from the
Rotary Club of Makati, Southwest Chapter meeting.
The testimony of Rodel and the evidence submitted by respondents alleged that the chance meeting of
respondent Judge Rubia with complainant and respondent Pecanñ a took place on March 10, 2010 on the
side street of Burgos Circle in Bonifacio Global City, after the Rotary Club of Makati, Southwest Chapter
meeting and dinner at Numa Restaurant, on their way to the parking lot. This means that the testimony of
and the evidence presented by Rodel do not disprove the occurrence of the dinner meeting as alleged by
complainant, since the meeting of the Rotary Club and the dinner meeting alleged by complainant took
place on different dates. Assuming that the alleged chance meeting between complainant and respondent
Judge Rubia took place on March 10, 2010 as alleged by respondents, this does not discount the veracity
of complainant’s allegations. Both the Rotary Club of Makati, Southwest Chapter dinner and the dinner
meeting alleged by complainant took place in the vicinity of Bonifacio Global City. This could have allowed
respondent Judge Rubia ample time to travel to the dinner meeting after the meeting of the Rotary Club of
Makati.
The investigation report stated that the attendance sheet and the program of meeting that Rodel
submitted corroborated his testimony. The date indicated on the attendance sheet and on the program of
meeting was March 10, 2010, not March 3, 2010. However, there was nothing to indicate the time of
arrival or departure of the attendees. Neither was there an indication of the time when the meeting began
or ended. The attendance sheet and the program of meeting, by themselves or taken as corroborative
evidence of Rodel’s testimony, do not discount the distinct and tangible possibility that the dinner
meeting as narrated by complainant took place. On the other hand, we find the allegation that the dinner
meeting took place on March 3, 2010 more credible.
Complainant presented a document containing a list of calls she made from January to March 2010. She
identified her cellular phone number as well as respondent Pecanñ a’s Respondent Pecanñ a admitted that
the number identified by complainant was her number. On March 2 and 3, 2010, calls were made to
respondent Pecanñ a’s number. Respondent Pecanñ a admitted that she had received a call from complainant
before the latter picked her up at 6750 Makati City. However, no calls to respondent Pecanñ a were
recorded on March 10, 2010 in the document presented. On the other hand, the calls made to respondent
Pecanñ a as shown in the document coincided with complainant’s allegations.
Finally, during the December 15, 2011 hearing, respondent Judge only manifested that he would testify
for himself and present respondent Pecanñ a as witness. He did not manifest that he would be presenting
Rodel or any participant in the Rotary Club meeting as his witness.
The totality of these circumstances places doubt on the alibi of respondent Judge Rubia and Rodel’s
narration of events.
The differing accounts on the dates and the venues were not addressed in the investigation report of
Justice Gaerlan. The report failed to mention that complainant alleged that respondent Judge Rubia
arrived late precisely because he came from a meeting of the Rotary Club of Makati. These glaring
inconsistencies did not add evidentiary weight to respondents’ claims. They only put into question the
veracity of the exculpatory evidence.
Justice Gaerlan relied on the testimony of Rodel Cortez as against the uncorroborated testimony of
complainant.
Justice Gaerlan emphasized the fact that it had taken complainant eight (8) months before she filed the
administrative complaint. He stated that the deliberate concealment of the meeting was inconsistent with
her resolve to prove respondent Judge Rubia’s alleged partiality toward the counsel of the opposing party.
As to the other charges against respondent Judge Rubia, Justice Gaerlan stated that the administrative
case was not the proper recourse for complainant. The proper action for her was to pursue remedial
action through the courts "to rectify the purported error" in the court proceedings.
The Office of the Court Administrator referred the report to this court.
The issue in this case is whether respondents Judge Rubia and Pecanñ a should be held administratively
liable.
This court must set aside the findings of fact and reject the report of Justice Samuel Gaerlan. Respondents
Judge Rubia and Pecanñ a should be held administratively liable for their actions. The findings of fact of an
investigating justice must be accorded great weight and finality similar with the weight given to a trial
court judge’s since an investigating justice personally assessed the witnesses’ credibility. However, this
rule admits of exceptions.
In J. King & Sons Company, Inc. v. Judge Hontanosas, Jr., this court held:
Such findings may be reviewed if there appears in the record some fact or circumstance of weight which
the lower court may have overlooked, misunderstood or misappreciated, and which, if properly
considered, would alter the result of the case. Among the circumstances which had been held to be
justifiable reasons for the Court to re-examine the trial court or appellate court’s findings of facts are,
when the interference made is manifestly mistaken; when the judgment is based on misapprehension of
facts; and when the finding of fact of the trial court or appellate court is premised on the supposed
absence of evidence and is contradicted by evidence on record. (Citations omitted)
These exceptions are applicable in this case. In disregarding the complainant’s testimony and relying on
the testimony of Cortez, respondent Judge Rubia’s witness, Justice Gaerlan said:
While respondents were able to present a witness to corroborate their version of the incident on all
material points, complainant miserably failed on this regard. The Investigating Justice who had the
untrammeled opportunity to observe the deportment and demeanor of the respondent’s witness, Rodel
Cortez (Cortez) during the hearing finds his forthright narration of facts credible and rang with truth. The
clear, candid and unmistakable declaration of Cortez that the incident that transpired along the sidewalk
of Burgos Circle was just a chance encounter, absent any ulterior motive for him to perjure, swayed this
Investigating Justice to believe that the dinner meeting between Judge Rubia and Barias did not [take]
place. A testimony is credible if it bears the earmarks of truth and sincerity and has been delivered in a
spontaneous, natural, and straightforward manner.
Not only that. Cortez’[s] testimony was likewise corroborated by other pieces of evidence, such as the
Program of Meeting and the Attendance Sheet of the Rotary Club of Makati Southwest which tend to prove
that at that particular date and time Judge Rubia was in a rotary meeting and was not dining with Rubia
and Pecanñ a. These evidence, when taken together, debase the uncorroborated version of incident as
narrated by Barias. Barias[’] self-serving declarations have no evidentiary value when ranged against the
testimony of a credible witness on affirmative matters. (Emphasis supplied)
We cannot agree with Justice Gaerlan’s assessment of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight given
to their testimonies.
Justice Gaerlan placed too much importance on the testimony of Rodel Cortez, the Secretariat of the
Rotary Club of Makati, Southwest Chapter, and qualified him as a "disinterested" witness.
A disinterested witness’ testimony is afforded evidentiary weight by his or her lack of interest in the
outcome of the case. This lack of stake makes the disinterested witness’ testimony more believable. To
actively take part in litigation as a party or a witness entails willingness to commit to the arduous and
exacting nature of most judicial proceedings. The disinterested witness’ candor and submission to the
proceedings before the court add credibility and believability to the content of his or her testimony.
To qualify a witness as truly disinterested, courts should analyze the circumstances that surround his or
her testimony.
ATTY. FERNANDEZ:
And in fact in your comment and in your supplemental comment you were explaining the context of these
messages?
EILEEN PECANÑ A:
Alin po doon?
ATTY. FERNANDEZ
The first one? "bakit sya galit baka lalo tayong mapahamak"
EILEEN PECANÑ A:
Ang ipinapaliwanag ko chance meeting outside the street.
ATTY. FERNANDEZ
How about the part where "administrative[. . . .]"
EILEEN PECANÑ A:
The reason why I said that is because as employees of the court, whenever an administrative case is filed
against us[,] we will be investigated like this, and our benefits and promotion chances we will be
disqualified.
ATTY. FERNANDEZ
In your text messages you never mentioned to Emilie that it would end up in an administrative case
because you simply thought that it was a chance meeting?
EILEEN PECANÑ A:
Ano po sir?
ATTY. FERNANDEZ:
You cannot fathom why it will end up as an administrative case because it was only a chance meeting?
EILEEN PECANÑ A:
Immediately on the text messages she knows already what happened why should I have to explain?
....
ATTY. FERNANDEZ:
Did you tell her while exchanging text messages that it was just a chance meeting?
EILEEN PECANÑ A:
No more, sir.
ATTY. FERNANDEZ:
So you no longer took it upon you to tell Emilie to advise her lawyer not to get mad becauseit was only a
chance meeting? (No answer from the witness.)131
Respondents also alleged that the chance encounter happened because respondent Pecanñ a, while having
dinner with complainant, stepped out of the restaurant to greet respondent Judge Rubia on the side street
of Burgos Circle. Since complainant allegedly followed respondent Pecanñ a out of the restaurant, the latter
introduced complainant to respondent Judge Rubia.
This allegation is quite implausible after taking into account the following admissions:
1. Respondent Pecanñ a described her relationship with Judge Rubia as "[w]ala naman po masyado. My
dealing with the Judge is only in relation with my work because during flag ceremonies he always
reminds us not to act as go between or not to be involved in the cases filed in the court."
2. Respondent Judge Rubia is not the immediate superior of respondent Pecanñ a as the latter is in the
Office of the Clerk of Court.
3. Respondent Pecanñ a was having dinner with complainant whom she knew had a pending case before
respondent Judge Rubia.
4. Respondent Judge Rubia always reminded court employees not to have dealings with litigants.
There was clearly no reason for respondent Pecanñ a to go out of her way to greet respondent Judge Rubia.
In fact, after allegedly being repeatedly reminded that court employees should not have any dealings with
litigants, respondent Pecanñ a should not have gone out to greet respondent Judge Rubia since she was
dining with a litigant.
The odds that complainant and respondent Pecanñ a would meet respondent Judge Rubia by pure
coincidence are highly improbable. Granted, chance meetings between persons may take place, but a
chance meeting between a litigant in the company of a court employee who acceded to assisting the
litigant in a case and the judge deciding that case is outside the realm of common experience. The odds of
This court has held:
In administrative proceedings, the quantum of proof required to establish a respondent’s malfeasance is
not proof beyond reasonable doubt but substantial evidence, i.e., that amount of relevant evidence that a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, is required. Faced with conflicting
versions of complainant and respondent, the Court gives more weight to the allegations and testimony of
the complainant and her witnesses who testified clearly and consistently before the Investigating Judge.
(Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)
After scrutinizing the testimony of complainant and the evidence she presented to support her
allegations, we find her account of the event to be genuine and believable.
Complainant’s narration of the dinner meeting held on March 3, 2010 and her account of events leading
up to the dinner meeting were detailed and comprehensive. The conversation alleged by complainant that
took place with respondents during the meeting was replete with details.
The strongest corroborative evidence to support complainant’s allegations was the exchange of text
messages between complainant and respondent Pecanñ a regarding the dinner meeting. These text
messages were admitted by respondent Pecanñ a. However, Justice Gaerlan failed to give any weight to the
exchange of text messages. This fact was not included in his investigation report. 129
The content of the text messages of respondent Pecanñ a belied respondents’ claim that the alleged dinner
meeting in Burgos Circle was only a chance encounter.
AILEEN PECANÑ A [sic]
Bkt xa galit kng mkpg kta ka smin widout his knowledge. I cnt fathom y wil it end up filing an admin case.
(August 8, 2010, 4:29 p.m.)
AILEEN PECANÑ A [sic]
Pls Emily do something 2 pacify ur lawyer, juj rubia will definitely get mad wid us. (August 8, 2010, 4:30
p.m.) (Emphasis supplied)
Respondent Pecanñ a used the phrase, "mkpg kta," which may be translated to "have a meeting." "Mkpg kta"
can in no way mean a chance encounter.
Further, respondent Pecanñ a’s text messages sent to complainant belied her claim of an innocent chance
encounter. She said that respondent Judge Rubia would get angry after complainant had informed her
that her lawyer might file an administrative case against them. Respondent Judge Rubia would not have
had a reason to get upset because of the possibility of administrative liability if an innocent and
coincidental encounter happened and not a dinner meeting. However, if the meeting took place as alleged
by complainant, this would have logically led to a hostile reaction from respondents, particularly
respondent Judge Rubia.
In her testimony before Justice Gaerlan, respondent Pecanñ a gave the following testimony:
ATTY FERNANDEZ:
In August 2010, you admitted in your comment and your supplemental comment that you received a text
coming from Emilie Barias saying her lawyer is mad with her because of that meeting, isn’t it?
EILEEN PECANÑ A:
Yes, sir.
ATTY FERNANDEZ:
In fact you admitted that there were text messages coming from you and Judge Rubia in March 2010, isn’t
it?
EILEEN PECANÑ A:
Yes, sir.
ATTY FERNANDEZ:
And in fact, you admitted that there were [sic] indeed a text message coming from you and this is: ["]ha
anong ipafile baka lalo tayong mapapahamk?["] And another message says "bakit siya...another...did you
do something to pacify her lawyer...so you affirm these message [sic]? EILEEN PECANÑ A:
Yes, sir.
ATTY FERNANDEZ:
Based on those messages of yours, is it correct that you fear....?
EILEEN PECANÑ A:
I am not afraid in a way na pinalalabas nila.
"Court personnel, regardless of position or rank, are expected to conduct themselves in accordance with
the strict standards of integrity and morality."
The complaint states that respondents were allegedly acting in favor of Atty. Noe Zarate, counsel for the
opposing parties in the three cases pending in the sala of respondent Judge Rubia. Because of
respondents’ actions, complainant and all who will be made aware of the events of this case will harbor
distrust toward the judiciary and its processes. For this alone, respondents should be held
administratively liable.
For respondent Pecanñ a, the fact that she allowed herself to be placed in a position that could cause
suspicion toward her work as a court personnel is disconcerting.
As a court employee, respondent Pecanñ a should have known better than to interact with litigants in a way
that could compromise the confidence that the general public places in the judiciary. Respondent Pecanñ a
should have refused to meet with complainant in her home. She should have refused any other form of
extended communication with complainant, save for those in her official capacity as a Data Encoder of the
court. This continued communication between complainant and respondent Pecanñ a makes her culpable
for failure to adhere to the strict standard of propriety mandated of court personnel.
Respondent Pecanñ a admitted to meeting with complainant several times, despite the former’s knowledge
of the pendency of cases in the court where she is employed and in addition to the text messages
exchanged between them. She had a duty to sever all forms of communication with complainant or to
inform her superiors or the proper authority of complainant’s attempts to communicate with her.
Respondent Pecanñ a failed to do so. Instead, she continued to communicate with complainant, even to the
extent of advising complainant against filing an administrative case against her and respondent Judge
Rubia.
Respondent Pecanñ a violated Canon 1 of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel:
CANON I
FIDELITY TO DUTY
....
SECTION 3. Court personnel shall not discriminate by dispensing special favors to anyone. They shall not
allow kinship, rank, position or favors from any party to influence their official acts or duties.
....
SECTION 5. Court personnel shall use the resources, property and funds under their official custody in a
judicious manner and solely in accordance with the prescribed statutory and regulatory guidelines or
procedures.
Respondent Pecanñ a’s actions constitute a clear violation of the requirement that all court personnel
uphold integrity and prudence in all their actions. As stated in Villaros v. Orpiano:
Time and time again, we have stressed that the behavior of all employees and officials involved in the
administration of justice, from judges to the most junior clerks, is circumscribed with a heavy
responsibility. Their conduct must be guided by strict propriety and decorum at all times in order to
merit and maintain the public’s respect for and trust in the judiciary. Needless to say, all court personnel
must conduct themselves in a manner exemplifying integrity, honesty and uprightness.
Respondent Pecanñ a should, thus, be held administratively liable for her actions.
Respondent Judge Rubia committed gross violations of the New Code of Judicial Conduct
By meeting a litigant and advising her to talk to opposing counsel, respondent Judge Rubia violated
several canons of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.
Respondent Judge Rubia failed to act in a manner that upholds the dignity mandated by his office. He was
already made aware of the impropriety of respondent Pecanñ a’s actions by virtue of her admissions in her
comment. At the time of the referral of the complaint to the Office of the Court Administrator, respondent
Judge Rubia was already the Executive Judge of Branch 24 of the Regional Trial Court of Binñ an, Laguna. As
a judge, he had the authority to ensure that all court employees, whether or not they were under his
direct supervision, act in accordance with the esteem of their office.
Respondent Pecanñ a even alleged that respondent Judge Rubia made several warnings to all court
employees not to intercede in any case pending before any court under his jurisdiction as Executive Judge.
However, nothing in the record shows that respondent Judge Rubia took action after being informed of
such an occurrence are, indeed, one in a million. The sheer improbability of such an occurrence already
puts into question the truth of respondents’ allegations.
Based on these considerations, the narrative of complainant is more believable and must be afforded
greater evidentiary weight.
Delay in filing of administrative complaint is not a defense
The investigation report placed particular emphasis on the eight-month period between the alleged
dinner meeting and the filing of the administrative complaint. The eight-month delay in the filing of the
administrative complaint is of no consequence.
Delay in filing an administrative complaint should not be construed as basis to question its veracity or
credibility. There are considerations that a litigant must think about before filing an administrative case
against judges and court personnel. This is more so for lawyers where the possibility of appearing before
the judge where an administrative complaint has been filed is high.
Here, respondent Judge Rubia presided over three cases that involved complainant and her late husband’s
estate. He wielded an unmistakable amount of control over the proceedings.
Filing an administrative case against respondents is a time-consuming ordeal, and it would require
additional time and resources that litigants would rather not expend in the interest of preserving their
rights in the suit. Complainant might have decided to tread with caution so as not to incur the ire of
respondent Judge Rubia for fear of the reprisal that could take place after the filing of an administrative
complaint.
Judges and court personnel wield extraordinary control over court proceedings of cases filed. Thus,
litigants are always cautious in filing administrative cases against judges and court personnel.
In any case, administrative offenses, including those committed by members of the bench and bar, are not
subject to a fixed period within which they must be reported. In Heck v. Judge Santos, this court held that:
Pursuant to the foregoing, there can be no other conclusion than that an administrative complaint against
an erring lawyer who was thereafter appointed as a judge, albeit filed only after twenty-four years after
the offending act was committed, is not barred by prescription. If the rule were otherwise, members of
the bar would be emboldened to disregard the very oath they took as lawyers, prescinding from the fact
that as long as no private complainant would immediately come forward, they stand a chance of being
completely exonerated from whatever administrative liability they ought to answer for. It is the duty of
this Court to protect the integrity of the practice of law as well as the administration of justice. No matter
how much time has elapsed from the time of the commission of the act complained of and the time of the
institution of the complaint, erring members of the bench and bar cannot escape the disciplining arm of
the Court. This categorical pronouncement is aimed at unscrupulous members of the bench and bar, to
deter them from committing acts which violate the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Code of
Judicial Conduct, or the Lawyer’s Oath. (Emphasis supplied)
If this court saw fit to penalize a member of the bench for an offense committed more than twenty years
prior to the filing of the complaint, then the eight-month period cannot prejudice the complainant.
The interval between the time when the offense was committed and the time when the offense was
officially reported cannot serve as a basis to doubt the veracity of complainant’s allegations. This court’s
mandate to discipline members of the judiciary and its personnel is implemented by pertinent rules and
statutes. Judges are disciplined based on whether their actions violated the New Code of Judicial Conduct.
Court personnel are also governed by the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel and are appointed in
accordance with the Civil Service Law, as provided for in Section 5, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.
None of these rules for administrative discipline mandates a period within which a complaint must be
filed after the commission or discovery of the offense. This court determines with finality the liability of
erring members of the judiciary and its employees. The gravity of an administrative offense cannot be
diminished by a delay in the filing of a complaint.
To dismiss the commission of the offense based on this eight-month period is to ignore the distinct and
tangible possibility that the offense was actually committed. The commission of the offense is not
contingent on the period of revelation or disclosure. To dismiss the complaint on this ground is
tantamount to attaching a period of prescription to the offense, which does not apply in administrative
charges.
Respondent Pecanñ a’s actions amount to violations of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel
The Code dictates that a judge, in order to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of
the judiciary, must behave with propriety at all times. As we have recently explained, a judge’s official life
cannot simply be detached or separated from his personal existence. Thus:
Being the subject of constant public scrutiny, a judge should freely and willingly accept restrictions on
conduct that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen.
A judge should personify judicial integrity and exemplify honest public service. The personal behavior of
a judge, both in the performance of official duties and in private life should be above suspicion. (Citations
omitted)
In De la Cruz, this court emphasized the need for impartiality of judges:
. . . [A] judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all his activities. A judge is
not only required to be impartial; he must also appear to be impartial. x x x Public confidence in the
judiciary is eroded by irresponsible or improper conduct of judges.
. . . In this connection, the Court pointed out in Joselito Rallos, et al. v. Judge Ireneo Lee Gako Jr., RTC
Branch 5, Cebu City, that:
Well-known is the judicial norm that "judges should not only be impartial but should also appear
impartial." Jurisprudence repeatedly teaches that litigants are entitled to nothing less than the cold
neutrality of an impartial judge. The other elements of due process, like notice and hearing, would
become meaningless if the ultimate decision is rendered by a partial or biased judge. Judges must not only
render just, correct and impartial decisions, but must do so in a manner free of any suspicion as to their
fairness, impartiality and integrity.
This reminder applies all the more sternly to municipal, metropolitan and regional trial court judges like
herein respondent, because they are judicial front-liners who have direct contact with the litigating
parties.
They are the intermediaries between conflicting interests and the embodiments of the people’s sense of
justice. Thus, their official conduct should be beyond reproach. (Citations omitted, emphasis supplied)
In the motion for intervention filed by Atty. Zarate before Justice Gaerlan, Atty. Zarate stated that even if
respondent Judge Rubia was present at the dinner meeting, it was merely an attempt to reconcile the
parties and reach an extrajudicial solution.
This is telling of a culture of tolerance that has led to the decay of the exacting nature of judicial propriety.
Instead of being outraged by respondent Judge Rubia’s meeting an opposing party, Atty. Zarate defended
respondent Judge Rubia’s actions.
Had it been true that a settlement was being brokered by respondent Judge Rubia, it should have been
done in open court with the record reflecting such an initiative.
As to complainant’s questioning of respondent Judge Rubia’s actions in the issuance of the orders in her
pending cases and the exercise of his judgment, this court agrees that complainant should resort to the
appropriate judicial remedies. This, however, does not negate the administrative liability of respondent
Judge Rubia. His actions failed to assure complainant and other litigants before his court of the required
"cold neutrality of an impartial judge." Because of this, respondent Judge Rubia also violated Canon 3 of
the New Code of Judicial Conduct on Impartiality:
CANON 3. IMPARTIALITY
Impartiality is essential to the proper discharge of the judicial office. It applies not only to the decision
itself but also to the process by which the decision is made.
Section 1. Judges shall perform their judicial duties without favor, bias, or prejudice.
Section 2. Judges shall ensure that his or her conduct, both in and out of court, maintains and enhances
the confidence of the public, the legal profession and litigants in the impartiality of the judge and of the
judiciary.
Section 3. Judges shall, so far as is reasonable, so conduct themselves as to minimize the occasions on
which it will be necessary for them to be disqualified from hearing or deciding cases.
Section 4. Judges shall not knowingly, while a proceeding is before, or could come before them, make any
comment that might reasonably be expected to affect the outcome of such proceeding or impair the
manifest fairness of the process. Nor shall judges make any comment in public or otherwise that might
affect the fair trial of any person or issue.
Complainant correctly cited Pascual v. Judge Bonifacio 151 where this court held:
respondent Pecanñ a’s interactions with a litigant, such as ascertaining her actions, conducting an inquiry
to admonish or discipline her, or at least reporting her actions to the Office of the Court Administrator.
For this failure alone, respondent Judge Rubia should be held administratively liable. Furthermore, the
evidence on record supports the allegations that a meeting with complainant, a litigant with several cases
pending before his sala, took place. Respondent Judge Rubia’s mere presence in the dinner meeting
provides a ground for administrative liability.
In Gandeza Jr. v. Tabin, this court reminded judges:
Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct requires a judge to avoid not only impropriety but also the mere
appearance of impropriety in all activities.
To stress how the law frowns upon even any appearance of impropriety in a magistrate’s activities, it has
often been held that a judge must be like Caesar’s wife - above suspicion and beyond reproach.
Respondent’s act discloses a deficiency in prudence and discretion that a member of the Judiciary must
exercise in the performance of his official functions and of his activities as a private individual. It is never
trite to caution respondent to be prudent and circumspect in both speech and action, keeping in mind
that her conduct in and outside the courtroom is always under constant observation. (Emphasis supplied,
citations omitted) Respondent Judge Rubia clearly failed to live up to the standards of his office. By
participating in the dinner meeting and by failing to admonish respondent Pecanñ a for her admitted
impropriety, respondent Judge Rubia violated Canons 1 and 2 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.
Canon 1 INDEPENDECE
Judicial Independence is a pre-requisite to the rule of law and a fundamental guarantee of a fair trial. A
judge shall therefore uphold and exemplify judicial independence in both its individual and institutional
aspects.
Section 1. Judges shall exercise the judicial function independently on the basis of their assessment of the
facts and in accordance with a conscientious understanding of the law, free of any extraneous influence,
inducement, pressure, threat or interference, direct or indirect, from any quarter or for any reason.
Section 6. Judges shall be independent in relation to society in general and in relation to the particular
parties to a dispute which he or she has to adjudicate.
Section 8. Judges shall exhibit and promote high standards of judicial conduct in order to reinforce public
confidence in the judiciary, which is fundamental to the maintenance of judicial independence.
Canon 2 INTEGRITY
Integrity is essential not only to the proper discharge of the judicial office but also to the personal
demeanor of judges.
Section 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but that it is perceived to be
so in view of a reasonable observer.
Section 2. The behavior and conduct of judges must reaffirm the people’s faith in the integrity of the
judiciary. Justice must not merely be done but must also be seen to be done.
Section 3. Judges should take or initiate appropriate disciplinary measures against lawyers or court
personnel for unprofessional conduct of which the judge may have become aware.
In De la Cruz v. Judge Bersamira, this court explained the necessity of a judge’s integrity:
By the very nature of the bench, judges, more than the average man, are required to observe an exacting
standard of morality and decency. The character of a judge is perceived by the people not only through his
official acts but also through his private morals as reflected in his external behavior. It is therefore
paramount that a judge’s personal behavior both in the performance of his duties and his daily life, be
free from the appearance of impropriety as to be beyond reproach. Only recently, in Magarang v. Judge
Galdino B. Jardin, Sr., the Court pointedly stated that:
While every public office in the government is a public trust, no position exacts a greater demand on
moral righteousness and uprightness of an individual than a seat in the judiciary. Hence, judges are
strictly mandated to abide by the law, the Code of Judicial Conduct and with existing administrative
policies in order to maintain the faith of the people in the administration of justice.
In Castillo v. Judge Calanog, Jr., this court held:
The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge must be free of a whiff of impropriety not
only with respect to his performance of his judicial duties, but also to his behavior outside his sala as a
private individual. There is no dichotomy of morality: a public official is also judged by his private morals.
Respondent Judge Rubia’s actions belittled the integrity required of judges in all their dealings inside and
outside the courts. For these actions, respondent Judge Rubia now lost the requisite integrity, impartiality,
and propriety fundamental to his office. He cannot be allowed to remain a member of the judiciary.
Respondents in this case failed to subscribe to the highest moral fiber mandated of the judiciary and its
personnel. Their actions tainted their office and besmirched its integrity. In effect, both respondents are
guilty of gross misconduct. This court defined misconduct as "a transgression of some established and
definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer." In
Camus v. The Civil Service Board of Appeals, this court held that "[m]isconduct has been defined as
‘wrong or improper conduct’ and ‘gross’ has been held to mean ‘flagrant; shameful’. . . . This Court once
held that the word misconduct implies a wrongful intention and not a mere error of judgment."
Both respondents are indeed guilty of gross misconduct. However, respondent Judge Rubia is also guilty
of conduct unbecoming of a judge for violating Canons 2, 3, and 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.
This is not to say that complainant comes to these proceedings with clean hands either. As a litigant, she is
enjoined to act in such a way that will not place the integrity of the proceedings in jeopardy. Her liability,
however, is not the subject of these proceedings. To ensure that these actions will no longer be committed
by any party, respondents must be sanctioned accordingly, in keeping with the court’s mandate to uphold
a character of trust and integrity in society. WHEREFORE, the court resolved tore docket the case as a
regular administrative matter. Respondent Judge Marino Rubia is hereby DISMISSED from the service,
with corresponding forfeiture of all retirement benefits, except accrued leave credits, and disqualified
from reinstatement or appointment in any public office, including government owned or -controlled
corporations. Respondent Eileen Pecanñ a is SUSPENDED for one (1) year for gross misconduct. This
decision is immediately executory. Respondent Judge Rubia is further ordered to cease and desist from
discharging the functions of his office upon receipt of this decision. Let a copy hereof be entered in the
personal records of respondents.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 179914 June 16, 2014
SPOUSES REYNALDO AND HILLY G. SOMBILON, Petitioners, vs. ATTY. REY FERDINAND GARAY AND
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
A.M. No. RTJ-06-2000
ATTY. REY FERDINAND T. GARAY, Petitioner, vs. JUDGE ROLANDO S. VENADAS, SR., Respondent.
A judge owes the public and the court the duty to know the law by heart and to have the basic rules of
procedure at the palm of his hands.
Before us are two consolidated cases: (1) a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court assailing the June 13, 2007 Decision and the August 8, 2007 Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. SP No. 00477-MIN; and (2) an Administrative Complaint against Judge Rolando S. Venadas, Sr.
(Judge Venadas, Sr.) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malaybalay, Bukidnon, Branch 8, for Grave Abuse
of Authority and Grave Misconduct.
Factual Antecedents
Spouses Reynaldo and Hilly G. Sombilon (spouses Sombilon) were the previous owners of a 601-square
meter property, with two buildings constructed on it, in South Poblacion, Maramag, Bukidnon. The said
property, which they mortgaged to the Philippine National Bank (PNB) as security for their loan, was
foreclosed and sold at public auction on July 15, 1998, where PNB emerged as the winning bidder in the
amount of P2,355,000.00. Consequently, on August 20, 1998, a Certificate of Sale was issued in PNB’s
name, which was duly registered with the Registry of Deeds for Bukidnon on August 25, 1999. The one-
year redemption period lapsed but spouses Sombilon failed to redeem the property.
In 2005, spouses Sombilon sought the help of Atty. Rey Ferdinand T. Garay (Atty. Garay), a Public
Attorney’s Office (PAO) lawyer, who was once appointed by the court as counsel de officio for Hilly
Sombilon in a criminal case and who happens to be the owner of a lot adjacent to the property. Spouses
Sombilon told Atty. Garay that they wanted to reacquire the property from PNB, but had no money to
repurchase it. Thus, they were hoping that he would agree to advance the money and, in exchange, they
Upon assumption of office, a judge becomes the visible representation of the law and of justice.
Membership in the judiciary circumscribes one's personal conduct and imposes upon him a number of
inhibitions, whose faithful observance is the price one has to pay for holding such an exalted position.
Thus, a magistrate of the law must comport himself at all times in such a manner that his conduct, official
or otherwise, can withstand the most searching public scrutiny, for the ethical principles and sense of
propriety of a judge are essential to the preservation of the people's faith in the judicial system. This
Court does not require of judges that they measure up to the standards of conduct of the saints and
martyrs, but we do expect them to be like Caesar's wife in all their activities. Hence, we require them to
abide strictly by the Code of Judicial Conduct.
It appears now that respondent has failed to live up to those rigorous standards. Whether or not he
purposely went to the Manila Hotel on November 25, 1998 to meet complainant or only had a chance
meeting with him, his act of trying to convince complainant to agree to his proposal is an act of
impropriety. It is improper and highly unethical for a judge to suggest to a litigant what to do to resolve
his case for such would generate the suspicion that the judge is in collusion with one party. A litigant in a
case is entitled to no less than the cold neutrality of an impartial judge. Judges are not only required to be
impartial, but also to appear to be so, for appearance is an essential manifestation of reality. Hence, not
only must a judge render a just decision, he is also duty bound to render it in a manner completely free
from suspicion as to its fairness and its integrity. Respondent's conduct in the instant case inevitably
invites doubts about respondent's probity and integrity. It gives ground for a valid reproach. In the
judiciary, moral integrity is more than a cardinal virtue, it is a necessity. Moreover, a judge's lack of
impartiality or the mere appearance of bias would cause resentment if the party who refused the judge's
proposal subsequently lost his case. It would give rise to suspicion that the judgment was "fixed"
beforehand. Such circumstance tarnishes the image of the judiciary and brings to it public contempt,
disrepute, and ridicule. Thus, we are constrained to rule that respondent violated Rule 2.01 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct. His misconduct is not excused but rather made more glaring by the fact that the
controversy involving complainant was pending in his own sala. (Citations omitted)
The totality of the actions of respondent Judge Rubia is a clear manifestation of a lack of integrity and
impartiality essential to a judge.
By meeting with complainant, respondent Judge Rubia also violated Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct:
CANON 4. PROPRIETY
Propriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to the performance of all the activities of a judge.
Section 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities.
Section 2. As a subject of constant public scrutiny, judges must accept personal restrictions that might be
viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do so freely and willingly. In particular, judges
shall conduct themselves in a way that is consistent with the dignity of the judicial office.
Section 3. Judges shall, in their personal relations with individual members of the legal profession who
practice regularly in their court, avoid situations which might reasonably give rise to the suspicion or
appearance of favoritism or partiality.
On propriety, this court held in Atty. Raul L. Correa v. Judge Medel Arnaldo Belen that: Indeed, the New
Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary exhorts members of the judiciary, in the discharge of
their duties, to be models of propriety at all times.
....
A judge is the visible representation of the law. Thus, he must behave, at all times, in such a manner that
his conduct, official or otherwise, can withstand the most searching public scrutiny. The ethical principles
and sense of propriety of a judge are essential to the preservation of the people's faith in the judicial
system.
Because of the meeting, and the subsequent orders issued after the meeting, respondent Judge Rubia
violated the notions of propriety required of his office. Respondents have relentlessly stood by their
position that the meeting was a chance encounter, and, thus, no impropriety could be attributed to the
meeting itself.
3. To deposit any rent or income arising from the said property which they may have already received to
the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of the Tenth Judicial Region, Malaybalay City; and
Furthermore, all tenants are hereby ordered to deposit any rentals arising from the disputed property to
the said Clerk of Court.
SO ORDERED.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On June 13, 2007, the CA rendered a Decision granting the Petition for Certiorari. The CA found grave
abuse of discretion on the part of Judge Venadas, Sr. in holding in abeyance the implementation of the
Writ of Possession. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
ACCORDINGLY, the petition for certiorari is hereby GRANTED and the assailed July 14, 2005 Order of the
court a quo is hereby SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
Spouses Sombilon moved for reconsideration but the CA denied the same in its August 8, 2007
Resolution.
Hence, spouses Sombilon filed the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari contending that:
THE [CA] COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR AND GRAVELY ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITIONFOR
CERTIORARI OF [ATTY. GARAY AND PNB] AND IN DECLARING THAT THERE WAS GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNT[ING] TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION COMMITTED BYTHE [RTC], BRANCH
[8], MALAYBALAY CITY, WHICH IS CONTRARY [TO] LAW AND APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE
HONORABLE SUPREME COURT.
Spouses Sombilon’s Arguments
Spouses Sombilon insist that the CA should have dismissed the Petition for Certioraridue to the failure of
PNB and Atty. Garay to file a Motion for Reconsideration of the assailed Order.
They also allege that PNB and Atty. Garay engaged in forum-shopping when they filed a Motion to Recall
Order with the RTC, in addition to the Petition for Certiorari they earlier filed with the CA.
As to the assailed Order, they contend that Judge Venadas, Sr. did not commit grave abuse of discretion in
holding in abeyance the implementation of the Writ of Possession because PNB no longer has the legal
personality to apply for a Writ of Possession considering that the subject property had already been sold
to Atty. Garay, who they claim is also not entitled to the Writ of Possession as he is disqualified from
purchasing the subject property pursuant to paragraph 5,
Article 1491 of the Civil Code.
Atty. Garay’s and PNB’s Arguments
Atty. Garay, on the other hand, argues that the CA did not err in granting the Petition for Certiorari as
Judge Venadas, Sr. acted with grave abuse of discretion when he recalled the Writ of Possession without
notice to him and PNB. He also emphasizes that it is a ministerial duty of the court to issue a writ of
possession after the redemption period has lapsed.
PNB, for its part, asserts that as the registered owner of the subject property, it is entitled to the Writ of
Possession. Thus, it was grave abuse of discretion on the part of Judge Venadas, Sr. in holding in abeyance
the implementation of the Writ of Possession, which he had earlier issued.
PNB further avers that it is not privy to the arrangement or relationship between Atty. Garay and spouses
Sombilon. In any case, the prohibition in paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the Civil Code does not apply to the
instant case as Atty. Garay purchased the subject property from PNB and not from spouses Sombilon.
Anent its failure to file a Motion for Reconsideration prior to filing a Petition for Certiorari, PNB explains
that in this case the filing of a Motion for Reconsideration may be dispensed with as the issue involved is
purely one of law, which is an exception under prevailing jurisprudence.
Besides, there was no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy available at the time considering that Judge
Venadas, Sr. issued the assailed Order, holding in abeyance the implementation of the Writ of Possession,
without affording PNB the opportunity to be heard.
Lastly, PNB denies that it committed forum-shopping claiming that it did not institute another action
simultaneously with the Petition for Certiorari it filed with the CA.
A.M. No. RTJ-06-2000
Meanwhile, on November15, 2005, Atty. Garay filed a Verified Complaint against Judge Venadas, Sr.,
charging him with Grave Abuse of Authority and Grave Misconduct when he proceeded with the hearing
promised to sell him the 331-square meter portion of the property, where one of the buildings is located,
for P5 million.
On February 9, 2005, Atty. Garay together with spouses Sombilon went to PNB to inquire about the status
of the property. They were informed by the bank that the property could be purchased at the fair market
value of P2,938,000.00. The following day, Atty. Garay went to the bank alone and offered to buy the
property by making a down payment of P587,600.00 or 20% of the purchase price.
On February 14, 2005, upon learning that Atty. Garay intended to purchase the entire property for
himself, spouses Sombilon offered to buy back the property from PNB. The bank advised them to make a
10% down payment of the bank’s total claim to formalize their offer.
On February 15, 2005, a Final Deed of Conveyance was issued in favor of PNB.
On April 14, 2005, Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 94384 was issued in the name of PNB.
On the same date, PNB decided to approve the purchase offer of Atty. Garay since spouses Sombilon failed
to make the required down payment.
G.R. No. 179914
On May 9, 2005, PNB filed an Ex-Parte Petition for Issuance of a Writ of Possession before the RTC of
Malaybalay City, Bukidnon. The case was docketed as Special Civil Case No. 375-05 and raffled to Branch
8, presided over by Judge Venadas, Sr.
On June 10, 2005, Judge Venadas, Sr. issued an Order granting the Petition and, on June27, 2005, he issued
a Writ of Possession in favor of PNB.
On June 22, 2005, PNB informed spouses Sombilon that Atty. Garay’s offer to purchase the property had
been approved due to their failure to pay the full down payment.
On July 10, 2005, spouses Sombilon moved for a reconsideration of the issuance of the Writ of Possession
arguing that Atty. Garay, who was the former counsel of Hilly, was barred from purchasing the property
pursuant to paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the Civil Code.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On July 14, 2005, Judge Venadas, Sr. issued an Order holding in abeyance the implementation of the Writ
of Possession, a portion of which reads:
Although, ordinarily a writ of possession is issued by the court because it is a mandatory and ministerial
duty under Act 3135, x x x there is x x x an exception to this rule that if the implementation and
enforcement of the writ of possession would work [great] injustice to the registered owner because the
petitioner PNB or in this case Atty. Garay counsel for the Sombilon[s] is not entitled thereto. There is
much to be said about the conduct of Atty. Garay in manipulating that the property in question was finally
bought by him from the PNB not to mention the possible violation of the [canon] of legal and judicial
ethics. However, the court cannot ignore the version of Mrs. Sombilon. The court will give Atty. Garay [the
opportunity] to rebut the evidence presented by spouses Sombilon and he is directed to appear on August
2, 2005, at 8:30 in the morning. And if this case cannot be accommodated in the morning [,] it will
proceed in the afternoon.
Send proper notice to Atty. Rey Ferdinand Garay for him to appear on said date.
In the meantime, the full implementation x x x of the Writ of Possession is hereby held in abeyance.
Sheriff Claudio C. Bugahod is hereby directed to return all items to the house of Spouses Sombilon and to
restore them in full possession of the property, if already implemented and enforced.
SO ORDERED.
Aggrieved, Atty. Garay and PNB elevated the case to the CA via a Petition for Certiorari with prayer for
issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Injunction under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
Initially, on August 2, 2005, the CA dismissed the Petition for Certiorari for several procedural defects.
However, on reconsideration, the CA reinstated the Petition.
On July 25, 2006, the CA issued a Resolution granting the PNB and Atty. Garay’s application for a TRO.
Thus:
Accordingly, let a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) be issued upon the posting of a Five Thousand Peso
(P5,000.00) bond within five (5) days from receipt hereof ordering, [petitioners] to:
1. Cease and desist from doing any act which is destructive of, or involves danger to, or alters the nature
and condition of the property;
2. Cease and desist from collecting rent or income [for the use of] the said property;
for Judge Venadas, Sr. to hold in abeyance the implementation of the Writ of Possession. Clearly, he
committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed Order holding in abeyance the
implementation of the Writ of Possession because PNB, as the registered owner, is entitled to the
possession of the subject property as a matter of right.
Regarding the failure of PNB and Atty. Garay to move for a reconsideration of the assailed Order prior to
the availment of a special civil action for certiorari, we agree with PNB that the filing of a motion for
reconsideration may be dispensed with where the decision is a patent nullity or where there is violation
of due process, such as in the instant case.
All told, we find no error on the part of the CA in granting the Petition for Certiorari.
A.M. No. RTJ-06-2000
As to the Administrative Complaint filed against Judge Venadas, Sr., we agree with the findings and
recommendations of the OCA.
Records show that spouses Sombilon failed to comply with the three-day notice rule and the required
proof of service embodied in Sections 4, 5, and 6 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court, thereby rendering the
motion fatally defective. Despite this, Judge Venadas, Sr. still took cognizance of the motion filed by
spouses Sombilon, depriving PNB and Atty. Garay of their right to due process.
To exculpate himself from the charges against him, Judge Venadas, Sr. claims that the motion was
personally served on PNB and its counsel on July 12, 2005 but they refused to receive the same. However,
as aptly pointed out by the OCA, no affidavit was submitted to substantiate such allegation. Thus, we
agree with the Court Administrator that Judge Venadas, Sr. is guilty of grave abuse of authority bordering
on gross ignorance of procedure for blatantly disregarding Sections 4, 5, and 6, Rule 15 of the Rules of
Court.
Blatant disregard of basic, elementary, and well-known rules of procedure and law is gross ignorance of
the law, which is classified as a serious charge under Rule 140, Section 8 of the Rules of Court, as amended
by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, punishable by either dismissal from service, suspension for more than three
months but not exceeding six months, or a fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00.
Thus, in view of his blatant disregard of the rules and his grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed
Order, and considering that this is his first offense, we find Judge Venadas, Sr. guilty of grave abuse of
authority bordering on gross ignorance of the law and is hereby fined the amount of P20,000.00.
Incidentally, in the April 18, 2007 Resolution in A.M. No. 12600-Ret., the Court approved the application
of Judge Venadas, Sr. for disability retirement but withheld the amount of P100,000.00 pending the final
resolution of this case. In view thereof, the fine of P20,000.00 herein imposed on Judge Venadas, Sr. is to
be deducted from the withheld amount of P100,000.00.
WHEREFORE, in G.R. No. 179914, the Petition is hereby DENIED. The June 13, 2007 Decision and the
August 8, 2007 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 00477-MIN are hereby AFFIRMED.
In Administrative Matter No. RTJ-06-2000, Judge Rolando S. Venadas, Sr. of the Regional Trial Court of
Malaybalay City, Bukidnon, Branch 8, is hereby found guilty of grave abuse of authority bordering on
gross ignorance of the law and is ordered to pay a FINE of TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (P20,000.00) to
be deducted from the withheld amount of P100,000.00 from his retirement benefits pursuant to the April
18, 2007 Resolution in A.M. No. 12600-Ret.
SO ORDERED.
RE: INTERVIEW WITH LORNA KAPUNAN ON CORRUPTION IN THE JUDICIARY, A.M. NO. 13-
11-09-SC, AUGUST 12, 2014
Sirs/Mesdames:
Please take notice that the Court en bane issued a Resolution dated AUGUST 12, 2014, which reads as
follows:
"A.M. No. 13-11-09-SC (Re: Interview with Atty. Lorna Kapunan on Corruption in the Judiciary.) -
Submitted to the Court for disposition is the Compliance, dated December 12, 2013, of Atty. Loma Patajo-
Kapunan (Atty. Kapunan), pursuant to the directive of the Court in its November 26, 2013 Resolution.
In the said Resolution, the Court directed Atty. Kapunan to explain her answers in an interview by
Anthony Tabema (Taberna) in his show "Umagang Kay Ganda" on November 21, 2013 regarding
corruption in the judiciary, within ten (10) days from notice.
of spouses Sombilon’s motion for reconsideration of the Order granting the issuance of the Writ of
Possession despite lack of notice to PNB and for holding in abeyance the Writ of Possession he issued in
Special Civil Case No. 375-05.
Atty. Garay’s Arguments
Atty. Garay claims that Judge Venadas, Sr. should be administratively sanctioned for holding in abeyance
the Writ of Possession he earlier issued and for ignoring Sections 4, 5, and 6 of Rule 15 of the Rules of
Court as he proceeded to hear the motion despite lack of notice to PNB.
Judge Venadas, Sr.’s Arguments
In his defense, Judge Venadas, Sr. denies the charges against him arguing that he did not annul the Writ of
Possession but merely stayed its execution and implementation to prevent any injustice. He insists there
was no violation of due process because he immediately scheduled a hearing for PNB to present its
evidence.
Report and Recommendation of the
Office of the Court Administrator (OCA)
The OCA, in its Report, found Judge Venadas, Sr. administratively liable for grave abuse of authority
bordering on gross ignorance of procedure. Although the OCA did not touch on the issue of whether Judge
Venadas, Sr. should be administratively sanctioned for holding in abeyance the implementation of the
Writ of Possession as it was still pending with the CA at that time, it nevertheless found Judge Venadas, Sr.
guilty of blatantly disregarding Sections 4, 5, and 6 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court when he acted on the
defective motion filed by spouses Sombilon. It also pointed out that PNB and Atty. Garay were deprived of
their rights to due process as no proper notice was sent to them. Thus, the OCA recommended that:
a) the instant administrative complaint be DOCKETED as a regular administrative complaint;
b) respondent Judge Rolando S. Venadas,Sr. be found guilty of gross ignorance of procedure; and
c) respondent Judge Rolando S. Venadas, Sr. be ordered to pay a FINE of TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS
(P20,000.00) with a WARNING that a similar transgression x x x will be dealt with more severely.
On November 26, 2007, the Court resolved to consolidate A.M. No. RTJ-06-2000 with G.R. No. 179914.
Issues
Stripped of the non-essentials, the issues boil down to: (1) whether Judge Venadas, Sr. committed grave
abuse of discretion in holding in abeyance the implementation of the Writ of Possession; and (2) whether
he should be administratively sanctioned for holding in abeyance the implementation of the Writ of
Possession and for disregarding Sections 4, 5, and 6, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court.
Our Ruling
G.R. No. 179914
The issuance of a writ of possession is ministerial upon the court.
A debtor has one year from the date the Certificate of Sale is registered with the Register of Deeds within
which to redeem his property. During the one-year redemption period, the purchaser may possess the
property by filing a petition for the issuance of a writ of possession before the court, upon the posting of a
bond. But after the one-year period, the purchaser has a right to consolidate the title and to possess the
property, without need of a bond. And once title is consolidated under the name of the purchaser, the
issuance of the writ of possession becomes ministerial on the part of the court; thus, no discretion is left
to the court. Questions regarding the regularity and validity of the mortgage or the foreclosure sale may
not be raised as a ground to oppose or hold in abeyance the issuance of the writ of possession as these
must be raised in a separate action for the annulment of the mortgage or the foreclosure sale. The
pendency of such action is also not a ground to stay the issuance of a writ of possession.
In this case, the redemption period had long lapsed when PNB applied for the issuance of the Writ of
Possession. In fact, the title over the subject property had already been consolidated in PNB’s name. Thus,
it was ministerial upon Judge Venadas, Sr. to issue the Writ of Possession in favor of PNB, the registered
owner of the subject property.
Though there are instances when the issuance of the Writ of Possession may be deferred, we find none of
these recognized exceptions present in the instant case. Spouses Sombilon claim that the sale between
PNB and Atty. Garay was invalid as it was done in violation of paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the Civil Code.
However, the alleged invalidity of the sale is not a ground to oppose or defer the issuance of the Writ of
Possession as this does not affect PNB’s right to possess the subject property. Thus, there was no reason
and bribe money based on hearsay and/or general knowledge within the legal circles, she, in the interest
of candor and transparency, would use the appropriate caveats - "known to receive," "I am told' and "hindi
ko po alam."
Nonetheless, Atty. Kapunan cites the pronouncement of the Court in the case of In re Almacen on the
obligations and duties of the members of the Bar as officers of the court, thus:
xxx
Moreover, every citizen has the right to comment upon and criticize the actuations of public officers. This
right is not diminished by the fact that the criticism is aimed at a authority, nor that it is articulated by a
lawyer." xxx Judicial officers, like other public servants, must answer for their official actions before the
chancery of public opinion.
xxx
Courts thus treat with forbearance and restraint a lawyer who vigorously assails their actuations. For
courageous and fearless advocates are the strands that weave durability into the tapestry of justice.
Hence, as citizen and officers of the court, every lawyer is expected not only to exercise the right, but also
to consider it his duty to expose the shortcomings and indiscretions of courts and judges.
Atty. Kapunan goes further to quote Justice Fred Ruiz Castro that "criticism of the courts has, indeed, been
an important part of the traditional work of the lawyer."
Hence, as a citizen and officer of the court, a lawyer is expected not only to exercise the right, but also to
consider it his duty to avail of such right. No law may abridge this right. Nor is he professionally
answerable for a scrutiny into the official conduct of the judges, which would not expose him to legal
animadversion as a citizen.
Atty. Kapunan further states that no less than the Honorable Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno, in a
speech delivered on September 25, 2013 in celebration of Law Day by the Philippine Bar Association, had
urged lawyers to help the Court in its effort to eliminate the so-called "hoodlums in robes" in the judiciary.
The Chief Justice also challenged lawyers to expose cases of bribery or extortion involving judges and
vowed to support "whistleblowers."
Atty. Kapunan, thus, claims that the remarks made in the subject interview were not intended to insult,
malign, embarrass, or bring the Court into disrepute. She is not unmindful, she said, of the admonition of
this Court that "a lawyer is entitled to voice his criticism within the context of the constitutional
guarantee of freedom of speech which must be exercised responsibly. After all, every right carries with it
the corresponding obligation. Freedom is not freedom from responsibility, but freedom with
responsibility."
The Court's Disposition
In sum, Atty. Kapunan admits to have made remarks with reference to corruption in the judiciary, but
denies to have uttered the same to degrade the court and bring it to disrepute. In invoking her
constitutional guarantee to freedom of speech, she explains though that she js not unaware of the
corresponding obligation to exercise said right responsibly.
True, well-recognized is the right of a lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as a citizen, to criticize
the courts or any of its officers. This right, however, is not without limitations. Atty. Kapunan should be
reminded that comments made against the courts must not go beyond the bounds of courtesy and
fairness in order not to destroy the people's trust in the judicial system. As held in In re Almacen:
Citing Re: Letter dated September 21, 2005 ofAtty. Noel S. Sorreda, 464 SCRA 32, 4205] sic.
But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill over the
walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on the one hand, and abuse
and slander of courts and the judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross
violation of the duty of respect to courts. It is such a misconduct that subjects a lawyer to disciplinary
action.
Likewise, in Spouses Tiangco v. Aguilar, the Court wrote:
The right to criticize, which is guaranteed by the freedom of speech and of expression in the Bill of Rights
of the Constitution, must be exercised responsibly, for every right carries with it a corresponding
The Court required Atty. Kapunan to submit an explanation because, in an interview before a nationwide
television audience, she made unwarranted remarks which tended to erode public trust and confidence in
the judiciary. She made unfounded insinuations that some members of the judiciary can easily be bribed
at the expense of justice.
Attached to her Compliance, as Annex "A," is the verbatim transcript of the subject interview by Tabema,
and, as Annex "B," the reproduction in CD form of the said interview.
In the said Compliance, Atty. Kapunan avers that, generally, the topic in the one hour face-to-face
interview was her life as a lawyer, which started with her family background and flowed into a discussion
of her law practice and her experiences with the courts and the justice system. In the course of the
discussion, she made certain statements pertaining to corruption in the judiciary.
Atty. Kapunan, however, claims that, mindful of a lawyer's duty to observe and maintain the respect due to
the courts and judicial officers, she refrained from using grossly disrespectful, contemptuous and
derogatory language against the courts and individual judges. This can be noted, according to her, from
the replies she gave during the interview as shown in the transcript, the relevant portions of which she
quoted as follows:
A: Paano niyo po sasabihin na ang isang abugado ay mahina?
L: Mahina in the sense na-Kasi ang duty ng abugado tatlo e. First of all your duty is to the courts. Because
we are all officers of the court. And of course your duty is also to your client, fidelity to client. And the
third duty is duty to the bar, to your legal profession. Sino ang hindi magaling na abugado, number one,
yung has total disrespect to the courts. Meaning, nambabayad ng judge, 'di ba? That is disrespect because
it shows you na you can buy justice in this country and that disrespects the integrity of the judicial
system. Yung kliyente, your duty to your client. Kung lagi mong sinasabi sa kliyente, mananalo ka bayaran
natin si ganoon, what skills did you give your client? Or you do not advise your client well. Or you just
don't know the law. Disservice yun sa kliyente. Hindi magaling na abugado yun. xxx (Annex "A" at page 2-
3)
A: Meron na po ba kayong nakalaban na nagbayad po sa judge, talo kayo?
L: Ah, yes. Actually, wala namang natatalong kaso e. Nadadaya. (Laughs) Parang candidate. Hindi naman
natatalo 'yung kandidato. Nadadaya. No, sadly there are quite a number still. Although the clean up has
started from the time of former CJ Puno. At na- identify niya lahat ng mga kailangang tanggalin. There was
not enough time. Or 'yung mga notorious ay may kanya-kanyang padrino. (Annex "A" at page 3-4)
A: May kilala po kayong justice ng SC na nababayaran?
L:Oo.
A: Kwan po, sitting justice?
L: Ah, sitting justice? Mas lalong hindi ko sasabihin kung sitting justice, ano. (Laughs) That means may
kaso kami doon. No. Yes. Some justice both in the CA and the SC have been known to receive. Known to
receive. Because sometimes, hindi mo naman alam kung totoo 'yun o hindi e. Kasi that's the problem
with bribery, wala namang resibo ang bribe. At wala namang mag-aamin na nagbigay at walang mag-
aamin na tumanggap. That's why the SC is having such a difficult time to remove-anong tawag doon?
Thieves in robes. (T: Hoodlums in robes.) Hoodlums in robes. Because walang gustong mag-testify,
whether kliyente or lawyer because babalikan ka e.
A: Sa pagkakaalam niyo, magkano na ang bayaran ngayon diyan? Pagdating sa CA saka sa SC.
L: Well, I am told ah, na ang restraining order daw sa CA can be as much as 5 million. (T: Hmm?) And sa
level naman ng prosecution, I am told that 'yung whether to file a case- whether for the fiscal to file a case
or not to file a case, that's half a million. Five hundred thousand. I am told.
A: Sa SC po? Hindi niyo binanggit.
L: Ah sa SC hindi ko po alam. Kung minsan retirement na e. Retirement fee na 'yan. (T: Nako, ang laki ho
noon.)
A: Kung sa bagay meron pong justice ng SC, hinabol pa naka-retire na.
L: 'Di ba nag-midnight decision.
A: Si Justice Reyes ba 'yun?
L: Ay hindi ko alam. (Laughs) (Transcript, Annex "A" at pp. 4-5) 1/ 2
At any rate with reference to the above quoted responses, Atty. Kapunan explains that she made no
personal accusation against any court or judge. She adds that when imparting information on corruption
WHEREFORE, the Compliance submitted by Atty. Loma Patajo- Kapunan, dated December 12, 2013, is
NOTED."
IPI No. 12-205-CA-J December 10, 2013
RE: VERIFIED COMPLAINT OF THOMAS S. MERDEGIA AGAINST HON. VICENTE S.E. VELOSO,
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE COURT OF APPEALS, RELATIVE TO CA G.R. SP No. 119461.
x---------------x
A.C. No.: 10300
RE: RESOLUTION DATED OCTOBER 8, 2013 IN OCA IPI No. 12-205-CA-J AGAINST ATTY. HOMOBONO
ADAZA II.
On October 8, 2013, we issued a Resolution dismissing the administrative complaint of Tomas S. Merdegia
against Court of Appeals Associate Justice Vicente S.E. Veloso. In this same Resolution, we also directed
Atty. Homobono Adaza II, Merdegia’s counsel, to show cause why he should not be cited for contempt.
After considering Atty. Adaza’s explanation, we find his account insufficient, and find him guilty of indirect
contempt.
According to Atty. Adaza, he should not bepunished for indirect contemptas he was merely performing his
duty as Merdegia’s counsel when he assisted him in preparing the administrative complaint against
Justice Veloso. Atty. Adaza asserted that both he and his client observed Justice Veloso’s partiality during
the oral arguments, but instead of immediately filing an administrative complaint against him, he
counseled Merdegia to first file a Motion to Inhibit Justice Veloso from the case. However, upon finding
that Justice Veloso refused to inhibit himself, Merdegia repeated his request to file an administrative
complaint against Justice Veloso, to which Atty. Adaza acceded. Thus, Atty. Adaza pleaded that he should
not be faulted for assisting his client, especially when heal so believes in the merits of his client’s case.
Atty. Adaza’s explanation, read together with the totality of the facts of the case, fails to convince us of his
innocence from the contempt charge.
As Atty. Adaza himself admitted, he prepared the administrative complaint after Justice Veloso refused to
inhibit himself from a case he was handling. The complaint and the motion for inhibition were both based
on the same main cause: the alleged partiality of Justice Veloso during the oral arguments of Merdegia’s
case. The resolution dismissing the motion for inhibition should have disposed of the issue of Justice Veloso’s
bias. While we do not discount the fact that it was Justice Veloso who penned the resolution denying the
motion for inhibition, we note that he was allowed to do this under the 2009 Internal Rules of the Court of
Appeals. Had Merdegia and Atty. Adaza doubted the legality of this resolution, the proper remedy would
have been to file a petition for certiorari assailing the order denying the motion for inhibition. The settled
rule is that administrative complaints against justices cannot and should not substitute for appeal and
other judicial remedies against an assailed decision or ruling. While a lawyer has a duty to represent his
client with zeal, he must do so within the bounds provided by law. He is also duty-bound to impress upon
his client the propriety of the legal action the latter wants to undertake, and to encourage compliance
with the law and legal processes.
A reading of Merdegia’s administrative complaint shows an apparent failure to understand that cases are
not always decided in one’s favor, and that an allegation of bias must stem from an extrajudicial source
other than those attendant to the merits and the developments in the case. In this light, we cannot but
attribute to Atty. Adaza the failure to impress upon his client the features of our adversarial system, the
substance of the law on ethics and respect for the judicial system, and his own failure to heed what his
duties as a professional and as an officer of the Court demand of him in acting for his client before our
courts.
To be sure, deciding administrative cases against erring judges is not an easy task. We have to strike a
balance between the need for accountability and integrity in the Judiciary, on the one hand, with the need
to protect the independence and efficiency of the Judiciary from vindictive and enterprising litigants, on
the other. Courts should not be made to bow down to the wiles of litigants who bully judges into
inhibiting from cases or deciding cases in their favor, but neither should we shut our doors from litigants
brave enough to call out the corrupt practices of people who decide the outcome of their cases. Indeed,
litigants who feel unjustly injured by malicious and corrupt acts of erring judges and officials should not
obligation. Freedom is not freedom from responsibility, but freedom with responsibility. In Zaldivar vs.
Gonzales (166 SCRA 316, 353-354 [1988]), it was held:
Respondent Gonzales is entitled to the constitutional guarantee of free speech. No one seeks to deny him
that right, least of all this Court. What respondent seems unaware of is that freedom of speech and of
expression, like all constitutional freedoms, is not absolute and that freedom of expression needs on
occasion to be adjusted to and accommodated with the requirements of equally important public
interests. One of these fundamental public interests is the maintenance of the integrity and orderly
functioning of the administration of justice. There is no antinomy between free expression and the
integrity of the system of administering justice. For the protection and maintenance of freedom of
expression itself can be secured only within the context of a functioning and orderly system of dispensing
justice, within the context, in other words, of viable independent institutions for delivery of justice which
are accepted by the general community.
Moreover, it is well to remind Atty. Kapunan that, as a member ofthe Bar, she is under the obligation to
maintain at all times a respectful attitude toward the courts. This responsibility of a lawyer in relation to
the court is imposed under the Code ofProfessional Responsibility. Specifically, Canon 10 and 11 provide:
CANON 10 -A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.
CANON 11 - A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE AND MAINTAIN THE RESPECT DUE TO THE COURTS AND TO
JUDICIAL OFFICERS AND SHOULD INSIST ON SIMILAR CONDUCT BY OTHERS.
Rule 11.03 - A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behavior before
the Courts.
This responsibility under the said Code is closely entwined with her vow in the attorney's oath, to
conduct herself as a lawyer with all good fidelity to the courts, as well as her duties under Section 20 (b),
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and the first canon of the Canons of Professional Ethics, thus:
For, membership in the Bar imposes upon a person obligations and duties which are not mere flux and
ferment. His investiture into the legal profession places upon his shoulders no burden more basic, more
exacting and more imperative than that of respectful behavior toward the courts. He vows solemnly to
conduct himself "with all good fidelity xxx to the courts; and the Rules of Court constantly remind him "to
observe and maintain the respect due to courts of justice and judicial officers." The first canon of legal
ethics enjoins him "to maintain towards the courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary
incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme importance."
These rules of courteous demeanor must, according to the Court, be observed not only in open court, but
also out of court.
While it appears that, at the moment, there is no solid basis to proceed against her, the Court is not
disposed to shelve the matter in the meantime. Justice Brion is ofthe view that the matter should be dealt
with appropriately given the extent and gravity of the substance of her disclosure on the alleged
corruption in the judiciary and the public perception her statements represent. In his Reflections, he said,
that the Court should "proactively react to the smoke that Atty. Kapunan has raised" as a fire must have
existed somewhere behind her statements which, according to him, should not be left unattended to.
As also pointed out by Justice Brion, Atty. Kapunan's disclosures as to the presence and prevalence of
corruption in the judiciary were made in one of the most watched program in the country before millions
of televiewers, an audience that largely does not appreciate what hearsay means. Hence, according to him,
the Court's inaction on this case would certainly place in question the integrity of the justice system in the
public's eyes. He, thus, suggests as an alternative that the matter be referred for further investigation as
done in the "Ma'am Arlene" inquiry.
Justice Leonen concurs with Justice Brion's proposal. He adds that the Court needs to proactively address
alleged corruption in the judiciary. To accomplish this purpose, he specifically proposes the creation of its
own active investigation unit (Internal Affairs Unit) that answers to a committee ofthe Supreme Court.
Justice Leonen in his Concurring Opinion also expresses his support on the ponencia's recognition that
lawyers do enjoy the constitutional guarantee of freedom of expression. For this reason, he does not fault
Atty. Kapunan for her statements on national television. He, however, finds Atty. Kapunan liable for
acknowledging that she has heard and probably experienced acts ofcorruption and for admitting that she
has done nothing to make the perpetrators answerable.
respondent is also WARNED that further similar misbehavior on his part may be a ground for the
institution of disciplinary proceedings against him.
SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. MTJ-13-1834 October 2, 2013
(Formerly OCA l.P.l. No. 12-2541)
JESUS D. CARBAJOSA, Complainant, vs. JUDGE HANNIBAL R. PATRICIO, Presiding Judge, Municipal
Circuit Trial Court, President Roxas, Capiz, Respondent.
This is an administrative case for Gross Ignorance of the Law, Manifest Bias and Partiality against Judge
Hannibal R. Patricio (Judge Patricio), commenced thru a verified Complaint filed before the Office of Court
of Administrator (OCA) by Jesus D. Carbajosa (Carbajosa).
Carbajosa is the private complainant in Criminal Case No. 2540 for grave coercion against accused
Dolores Bieles (Bieles), heard and tried before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of President
Roxas-Pilar, President Roxas, Capiz, in the sala of then Presiding Judge Geomer C. Delfin. The charge
stemmed from Bieles’ menacing and intimidating attitude in preventing Carbajosa from bringing to Iloilo
City fifteen (15) sacks of milled corn by removing and unloading the same out of the latter’s Efren Bus
Liner.
In a Decision dated August 6, 2002, the MCTC convicted Bieles of the crime charged and sentenced her to
imprisonment of four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor as minimum to six (6) months of
arresto mayor as maximum, and ordered her to pay: (1) a fine of P500.00 with subsidiary imprisonment
in case of insolvency; and (2) the amount of P20,000.00 representing the fifteen (15) sacks of milled corn
or its equivalent value as the first lien on judgment.
On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Roxas City, Branch 18,affirmed Bieles’ conviction but
modified her sentence by increasing the maximum penalty imposed to two (2) years, four (4) months and
one (1) day of prision correccional. This modified judgment was later affirmed by the Court of Appeals
(CA) in a Decision dated October 26, 2006 and eventually by this Court when Bieles’ petition for review
on certiorari was denied in a Resolution dated August 13, 2008 for late filing and for absence of reversible
error in the appealed judgment. Likewise denied was Bieles’ ensuing motion for reconsideration. The
Court thereafter issued an Entry of Judgment stating that the Resolution of August 13, 2008 has become
final and executory on January 15, 2009. Undeterred, Bieles filed a Motion to Set Aside Entry of Judgment
but the same was denied in the Resolution dated June 1, 2009.
Meanwhile, Carbajosa filed a motion before the RTC for the remand of the case to the court of origin for
proper execution. The motion was granted in the RTC’s Order dated December 21, 2009. Carbajosa
thereafter filed a Motion for Execution of Judgment before the MCTC presided by herein respondent Judge
Patricio. Bieles opposed the motion stating that she sent a letter addressed to the Chief Justice, Honorable
Reynato S. Puno asking for a review of her case on the merits. She claimed that the letter was favorably
acted upon as evidenced by the first endorsement dated January 25, 2010 requesting the Clerk of Court of
the Third Division to include the case in its agenda.
Judge Patricio resolved the conflict by issuing an Order dated April 7, 2010 wherein he reckoned that it
will be best to hold in abeyance the resolution of Carbajosa’s Motion for Execution of Judgment and await
the result of the referral/endorsement made by the Chief Justice before a ruling on the propriety of the
issuance of a writ of execution is made, viz:
It is the honest belief of the undersigned, that the resolution of the issuance of the writ of execution,
opposition, and objection of the parties in the above-entitled case be held in abeyance, considering that
the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court had referred to the Clerk of Court of the Third Division the letter of
[Bieles].
The holding in abeyance of the resolution is in [deference] to the first endorsement made by the Chief
Justice. The undersigned deemed it proper to first wait the result of the referral of the Chief Justice before
it will rule on the propriety of the issuance of the writ of execution.
On April 19, 2010, Carbajosa manifested his objection to the foregoing order and insisted on the issuance
of a writ of execution averring that in the absence of any restraining order, its issuance is imperative so as
not to unduly delay the administration of justice.
be punished for filing administrative cases against them; neither should these litigants be unjustly
deterred from doing sobya wrong signal from this Court that they would be made to explain why they
should not be cited for contempt when the complaints they filed prove to be without sufficient cause.
What tipped the balance against Atty. Adaza, in this case, is the totality of the facts of the case that, when
read together with the administrative complaint heprepared, shows that his complaint is merelyan
attempt to malign the administration of justice. We note Atty. Adaza’s penchantfor filingmotions for
inhibition throughout the case: first, against Judge Ma. Theresa Dolores C. Gomez Estoesta of the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, who issued an order unfavorable to his client; and second, against all the justices of
the Court of Appeals division hearing his appeal, for alleged bias during the oral arguments onhiscase.
Theseindicators, taken together with the baseless administrative complaint against Justice Veloso after he
penned an order adverseto Atty. Adaza’s client, disclosethat there was more to the administrative
complaint than the report of legitimate grievances against members of the Judiciary.
In Re: Verified Complaint of Engr. Oscar L. Ongjoco, etc., we cited a litigant in indirect contempt of court for
his predisposition to indiscriminately file administrative complaints against members of the Judiciary. We
held that this conduct degrades the judicial office, interferes with the due performance of their work for
the Judiciary, and thus constitutes indirect contempt of court. Applying this principle to the present case,
we hold that Atty. Adaza’s acts constitute an improper conduct that tends to degrade the administration of
justice, and is thus punishable for indirect contempt under Section 3(d), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court.
As a final note, Atty. Adaza’s contemptuous conduct may also be subject to disciplinary sanction as a
member of the bar. If we do not now proceed at all against Atty. Adaza to discipline him, we are prevented
from doing so by our concern for his due process rights. Our Resolution of October 8, 2013 only asked
him to show cause why he should not be cited in contempt, and not why he should not be administratively
penalized. To our mind, imposing a disciplinary sanction against Atty. Adaza through a contempt
proceeding violates the basic tenets of due process as a disciplinary action is independent and separate
from a proceeding for contempt. A person charged of an offense, whether in an administrative or criminal
proceeding, must be informed of the nature of the charge against him, and given ample opportunity to
explain his side.
While the two proceedings can proceed simultaneously with each other, a contempt proceeding cannot
substitute for a disciplinary proceeding for erring lawyers, and vice versa. There can be no substitution
between the two proceedings, as contempt proceedings against lawyers, as officers of the Court, are
different in nature and purpose from the discipline of lawyers as legal professionals. The two proceedings
spring from two different powers of the Court. The Court, in exercising its power of contempt, exercises
an implied and inherent power granted to courts in general. 14 Its existence is essential to the preservation
of order in judicial proceedings; to the enforcement of judgments, orders and mandates of courts; and,
consequently, in the administration of justice; thus, it may be instituted against any person guilty of acts
that constitute contempt of court. Further, jurisprudence describes a contempt proceeding as penal and
summary in nature; hence, legal principles applicable to criminal proceedings also apply to contempt
proceedings. A judgment dismissing the charge of contempt, for instance, may no longer be appealed in
the same manner that the prohibition against double jeopardy bars the appeal of an accused’s acquittal.
In contrast, a disciplinary proceeding against an erring lawyer is sui generis in nature; it is neither purely
civil nor purely criminal. Unlike a criminal prosecution, a disciplinary proceeding is not intended to inflict
punishment, but to determine whether a lawyer is still fit to be allowed the privilege of practicing law. It
involves an investigation by the Court of the conduct of its officers, and has, for its primary objective,
public interest. Thus, unlike a contempt proceeding, the acquittal of the lawyer from a disciplinary
proceeding cannot bar an interested party from seeking reconsideration of the ruling. Neither does the
imposition of a penalty for contempt operate as res judicata to a subsequent charge for unprofessional
conduct.
Contempt proceedings and disciplinary actions are also governed by different procedures. Contempt of
court is governed by the procedures under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, whereas disciplinary actions in
the practice of law are governed by Rules 138 and 139 thereof.
IN THESE LIGHTS, the Court finds Atty. Homobomo Adaza II GUILTY OF INDIRECT CONTEMPT for filing a
frivolous suit against Court of Appeals Associate Justice Vicente S.E. Veloso, and hereby sentences him to
pay, within the period of fifteen days from the promulgation of this judgment, a fine of P5,000.00. The
unalterable. The enforcement of such judgment should not be hampered or evaded; for the immediate
enforcement of the parties’ rights, confirmed by final judgment, is a major component of the ideal
administration of justice. Our penal laws and rules of procedure, in particular, enjoin that when the
judgment of conviction is already final and executory its execution is ministerial.
Respondent Judge Patricio, however, demonstrated ignorance of the above rule by repeatedly refusing to
execute the final and executory judgment of conviction against Bieles.
The justification proffered by Judge Patricio is not well-taken. As correctly observed by the OCA, the
Court’s Resolution dated August 13,2008 in G.R. No. 182956 affirming the conviction of Bieles and the
Entry of Judgment dated January 15, 2009 evidently carried more legal and procedural significance and
effect in Criminal Case No. 2540, as against the endorsement referring the letter of Bieles to the Third
Division for Agenda. The endorsement did not result in a definite action on the part of the Court as it did
not even remotely suggest that G.R. No. 182956 will be re-opened. Hence, there was absolutely no
justifiable reason for Judge Patricio to rely on the latter and thereby thwart the basic rules on execution of
judgment.
The rules on execution are comprehensive enough for a judge not to know how to apply them or to be
confused by any auxiliary incidents. The issuance of a writ of execution for a final and executory judgment
is ministerial. In other words, a judge is not given the discretion whether or not to implement the
judgment. He is to effect execution without delay and supervise implementation strictly in accordance
with the judgment. Judge Patricio’s actuations unmistakably exhibit gross ignorance of the law.
Apropos are the following pronouncements in Spouses Monterola v. Judge Caoibes, Jr. where the Court
found a judge administratively liablefor gross ignorance of the law when he unreasonably delayed and
refused the issuance of a writ of execution for a final judgment, viz:
Observance of the law, which respondent ought to know, is required of every judge. When the law is
sufficiently basic, a judge owe sit to his office to simply apply it; anything less than that is either deliberate
disregard thereof or gross ignorance of the law. It is a continuing pressing responsibility of judges to keep
abreast with the law and changes therein. Ignorance of the law, which everyone is bound to know, excuses
no one ― not even judges ― from compliance therewith. We cannot expect a judge to deliberately
disregard an unequivocal rule on execution and a doctrine laid down by the Supreme Court. Canon 4 of
the Canons of Judicial Ethics requires that the judge should be studious of the principles of law. Canon18
mandates that he should administer his office with due regard to the integrity of the system of the law
itself, remembering that he is not a depository of arbitrary power, but a judge under the sanction of law.
Indeed, it has been said that when the inefficiency springs from a failure to consider a basic and elemental
rule, a law or principle in the discharge of his duties, a judge is either too incompetent and undeserving of
the position and the title he holds or is too vicious that the oversight or omission was deliberately done in
bad faith and in grave abuse of judicial authority x x x.
While judges should not be disciplined for inefficiency on account merely of occasional mistakes or errors
of judgments, it is highly imperative that they should be conversant with fundamental and basic legal
principles in order to merit the confidence of the citizenry. Respondent Judge has shown lack of
familiarity with our laws, rules and regulations as to undermine the public confidence in the integrity of
the courts x x x. (Citations omitted)
Under A.M. No. 01-8-1 0-SC or the Amendment to Rule 140 of the Rules of Court Re: Discipline of Justices
and Judges, gross ignorance of the law is a serious charge, punishable by a tine of more than P20,000.00,
but not exceeding P40,000.00, suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than
three (3) months but not exceeding six ( 6) months, or dismissal from the service. Based on the attendant
circumstances of this case, a fine of P21,000.00 is the appropriate penalty.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent Judge Hannibal R. Patricio, Presiding Judge, Municipal
Circuit Trial Court, President Roxas-Pilar, President Roxas, Capiz is hereby FOUND GUILTY of Gross
Ignorance of the Law and FINED in the amount of P21 ,000.00, with a stern WARNING that a repetition of
the same will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. MTJ-11-1778 June 5, 2013
(Formerly OCA IPI No. 08-1966-MTJ)
On May 24, 2010, Judge Patricio issued an Order reiterating his previous stance that there is a necessity to
await the result of the referral made by the Chief Justice to the Third Division Clerk of Court, thus:
Wherefore, the previous order of this Court granting the holding in abeyance of the issuance of a writ of
execution still stands.
Furnish copy of this order to the offended party, the private prosecutor, as well as [Bieles] and their
counsel for their information.
SO ORDERED.
Bieles thereafter moved that the property bond she initially posted be substituted by a cash bond because
the former was already needed by her bondsman. The motion was vehemently opposed by Carbajosa. On
May31, 2011, Judge Patricio issued an Order 16 granting Bieles’ motion explaining that the same is not
covered by Section 4, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court prohibiting an accused to put up a bail bond when
there is already a final and executory judgment. Judge Patricio clarified that this is not a case for the
posting of a bond but rather, the substitution of one posted at the beginning stage of the case.
In the same Order, Judge Patricio disclosed that he sent a query to the OCA regarding the effect of the
Chief Justice’s endorsement of Bieles’ letter to the implementation of the final judgment of her conviction.
In an endorsement dated September 29, 2010, Deputy Court Administrator (DCA) Raul Villanueva
referred his query to Atty. Wilhelmina Geronga (Atty.Geronga), Chief of the OCA-Legal Office for comment.
In a letter dated September 5, 2011, Atty. Geronga informed Judge Patricio that the subject matter of his
query is judicial in nature hence, beyond the mandate of the OCA. Also, as a matter of policy, the OCA
refrains from rendering an opinion on matters that may later on be brought to the Court for judicial
determination. Atty. Geronga suggested that the issue be resolved based on pertinent jurisprudence and
relevant laws.
In the meantime, two (2) motions were awaiting Judge Patricio’s ruling, viz: (a) Carbajosa’s motion to
recall the Order dated May 31, 2011approving the substitution of Bieles’ property bond by a cash bond;
and (b) motion to suspend proceedings filed by Bieles.
Both motions were resolved in an Order dated January 6, 2012.Carbajosa’s motion was denied for being
filed out of time while Bieles’ motion to suspend proceedings was granted.
In so ruling, Judge Patricio ratiocinated that the motion to recall the Order dated May 31, 2011 can be
likened to a motion for reconsideration that must be filed within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the
Order sought to be reviewed. Having been filed two (2) months after June 17, 2011, the date Carbajosa
received the Order dated May 31, 2011, the motion to recall is considered filed out of time.
Anent the granting of Bieles’ motion to suspend proceedings, Judge Patricio again reasoned that any
action on the issuance of the writ of execution should await the resolution by the Third Division of the
Supreme Court on Bieles’ letter as endorsed by the Chief Justice, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court hereby grants the instant motion to suspend proceedings
filed by [Bieles] until the indorsement made by the then Chief Justice Reynato Puno for the review of this
case had been resolved by said Division.
Furnish copy of this order to the parties and counsels.
SO ORDERED.
These circumstances prompted Carbajosa to institute the herein administrative complaint imputing gross
ignorance of the law, manifest partiality and evident bad faith against Judge Patricio in continuously
deferring the issuance of a writ of execution for the final and executory judgment in Criminal Case No.
2540.
In his Comment, Judge Patricio admitted postponing the resolution of Carbajosa’s motion for the issuance
of a writ of execution but he denied that he acted in bad faith and/or with partiality. He claimed that he
was merely abiding by the endorsement made by the Chief Justice that the letter of accused Bieles be
referred to the Third Division for action.
The administrative case was referred to the OCA for evaluation. In its Report dated July 24, 2013, the OCA
accorded merit to the complaint. The OCA found Judge Patricio guilty of gross ignorance of the law and
recommended that he should be fined in the amount of P21,000.00.
We agree with the OCA’s findings and recommendation.
Any delay in the full execution of a final and executory decision is repugnant to the ideal administration of
justice. Hence the rule that once a judgment attains finality, it thereby becomes immutable and
complaint. However, up until her dismissal from the service by the Court on November 23, 2010,
respondent had not complied with the OCA directives. Moreover, respondent also failed to comply, despite
due notice, with the Resolutions dated March 10, 2008 and July 14, 2008 of the Court itself.
Respondent’s failure to submit her Comment and compliance as required by the OCA and this Court is
tantamount to insubordination, inefficiency, and neglect of duty. It was respondent’s duty then not only to
obey the lawful orders of her superiors, but also to defend herself against complainant’s charges and
prove her fitness to remain a member of the bench. By her failure to comply with the OCA and this Court’s
directives, respondent judge has completely lost her chance to defend herself.
As to the merits of the administrative complaint, the pleadings and evidence on record clearly establish
respondent’s liability for undue delay in resolving Civil Case No. 20129.
Section 15(1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, mandates that cases or matters filed with the lower
courts must be decided or resolved within three months from the date they are submitted for decision or
resolution. With respect to cases falling under the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, first level
courts are only allowed 30 days following the receipt of the last affidavit and position paper, or the
expiration of the period for filing the same, within which to render judgment. Section 6 of the said Rule
also requires first level courts to render judgment motu proprio or upon motion of the plaintiff if the
defendant fails to file an answer to the complaint within the allowable period.
Judges are oft-reminded of their duty to act promptly upon cases and matters pending before their courts.
Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct directs judges to "dispose of the court’s business
promptly and decide cases within the required periods." Canons 6 and 7 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics
further exhort judges to be prompt and punctual in the disposition and resolution of cases and matters
pending before their courts:
6. PROMPTNESS
He should be prompt in disposing of all matters submitted to him, remembering that justice delayed is
often justice denied.
7. PUNCTUALITY
He should be punctual in the performance of his judicial duties, recognizing that the time of litigants,
witnesses, and attorneys is of value and that if the judge is unpunctual in his habits, he sets a bad example
to the bar and tends to create dissatisfaction with the administration of justice.
Administrative Circular No. 1 dated January 28, 1988 likewise reminds all judges to observe scrupulously
the periods prescribed in Section 15, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution and to act promptly on all
motions and interlocutory matters pending before their courts.
Prompt disposition of cases is attained basically through the efficiency and dedication to duty of judges. If
judges do not possess those traits, delay in the disposition of cases is inevitable to the prejudice of
litigants. Accordingly, judges should be imbued with a high sense of duty and responsibility in the
discharge of their obligation to administer justice promptly. In this case, respondent judge failed to live up
to the exacting standards of duty and responsibility that her position required. Upon the failure of the
defendant Estor to file her Answer in Civil Case No. 20129, respondent was then required under Section 6
of the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure to render judgment in Civil Case No. 20129 within 30
days. She failed to do so contrary to the rationale behind the said Rule, which was precisely adopted to
promote a more expeditious and inexpensive determination of cases, and to enforce the constitutional
rights of litigants to the speedy disposition of cases.
Section 9, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended, classifies undue delay in rendering a decision and
violation of Supreme Court directives as less serious charges which are punishable with the penalty of
suspension from office without salary and other benefits for one month to three months, or a fine of
P10,000 to P20,000. Given that respondent had been previously dismissed from the service in Lugares v.
Gutierrez-Torres, however, the penalty of suspension is already inapplicable. Thus, the Court imposes
upon respondent for her undue delay in resolving Civil Case No. 20129 a fine in the maximum amount of
P20,000, and another fine of P10,000 for her repeated failure to obey this Court’s directives, both
amounts to be deducted from her accrued leave credits.
WHEREFORE, respondent Lizabeth Gutierrez-Torres is found LIABLE of the less serious charges of undue
delay in resolving Civil Case No. No. 20129 and violation or Supreme Court directives. She is FINED the
amount or P20,000 for the first offense and another P10,000 for the second offense, both amounts to be
MARICOR L. GARADO, Complainant, vs. JUDGE LIZABETH GUTIERREZ-TORRES, Respondent.
Before us is a Verified Complaint-Affidavit, filed by complainant Maricor L. Garado charging respondent
Judge Lizabeth Gutierrez-Torres, Presiding Judge, Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 60, Mandaluyong City,
with violation of the Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct in connection with Civil Case No.
20129 entitled "Maricor Garado v. Rose Virgie Estor."
Complainant alleges that she is the plaintiff in the aforesaid civil case for sum of money and damages. She
complaints that the case is covered by the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure and only involves a
claim for the payment of a loan amounting to P50,000 plus interest and a claim for damages amounting to
P30,000, but the case has remained unresolved for more than 20 months from the time it was filed.
Complainant narrates that her complaint against defendant Rose Virgie Estor was filed on August 22,
2005. After respondent judge denied defendant Estor’s motion to dismiss on July 3, 2006, Estor thereafter
filed an Urgent Ex-parte Motion for Extension of Time (To File Responsive Pleading) followed by a second
motion to dismiss on November 16, 2006. Complainant, meanwhile, filed a motion to render judgment
with an opposition to the second motion to dismiss on November 27, 2006. The two motions were
submitted for resolution on November 27, 2006 and January 15, 2007, respectively, but both motions
remained unresolved as of the date of the filing of the complaint on May 9, 2007.
In a 1st Indorsement dated May 17, 2007, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) directed Judge
Torres to file her Comment on the complaint within ten days. Respondent judge received the 1st Tracer
against respondent judge on July 24, 2007 requiring her to file the May 25, 2007, but failed to comply
with the directive. Thus, the OCA issued required Comment within five days from notice. Respondent
judge also received the 1st Indorsement on Tracer on August 3, 2007, but still failed to comply.
On March 10, 2008, this Court’s Third Division issued a Resolution directing respondent judge to: (1)
show cause why she should not be administratively sanctioned in view of her refusal to submit her
Comment despite the two directives, and (2) file her Comment within five days from receipt of notice,
otherwise, an administrative case will be filed against her. Respondent judge received a copy of the
Resolution on April 16, 2008, but again ignored the same. Consequently, the Court issued another
Resolution6 on July 14, 2008 imposing upon Judge Torres a fine of P1,000, to be paid within ten days from
receipt, or imprisonment of five days if the fine is not paid within the period of ten days. The July 14, 2008
Resolution also directed respondent judge to comply with the Court’s Show Cause Resolution dated
March 10, 2008. Despite receipt of the Resolution, however, Judge Torres neither complied with the
Resolution nor paid the fine.
Thus, on April 21, 2010, the Court issued a Resolution and resolved to await the payment of the fine by
respondent judge; to consider the filing of her Comment as waived; and to refer this administrative
matter to the OCA for final evaluation, report and recommendation.
On November 11, 2010, the OCA submitted its Memorandum to the Court finding respondent judge
administratively liable and recommending that the Court:
1. RE-DOCKET the case as a regular administrative matter against respondent Judge Lizabeth G. Torres;
2. DISMISS respondent Judge Lizabeth G. Torres from the service and impose upon her all the attendant
penalties; and
3. IMPOSE upon respondent Judge Lizabeth G. Torres the penalty of FIVE (5) days imprisonment for her
failure to pay the FINE of P1,000.00 within the required period, pursuant to the Court’s Resolution dated
14 July 2008.
In recommending the penalty of dismissal, the OCA noted that in five previous administrative cases,
respondent was found liable for undue delay in rendering a decision, resolution or order, and sternly
warned that the commission of the same or similar offense will be dealt with more severely. The OCA also
noted eight other pending administrative cases filed by different litigants against respondent judge
involving offenses of similar nature. As well, the OCA noted the four instances under the present
administrative case where respondent judge failed to comply with directives/orders issued by this Court.
We agree with the OCA that respondent judge should be held administratively liable.
At the outset, the Court notes that respondent had been given ample opportunity to address the
complaint against her. The OCA sent and respondent judge received the 1st Indorsement dated May 17,
2007 and 1st Tracer dated July 24, 2007, both of which explicitly required her to file her Comment on the
one thousand pesos, my god, I told you I will lecture you, but you did not want me to. Why? As long
as you were promised by the mayor? You have no etiquette!)
O Bondying ika, maski ambugan camo kana alkalde, tutubudon ninyo? Urgent na ono? Din a kamo
pwendeng butigan. Pigbubutigan camo. Amo yan sabihon ko ka ninyo! (You Bondying, even if the mayor
is telling you lies, will you follow her? What urgent? You could not be lied upon again! You are
being deceived, thats what I will tell you!)
Pedro N. Mora, former municipal councilor of Bula, Camarines Sur, in his affidavit also conformed that he
heard the respondent judge utter: Ambog, Ambog iyan (lies, they are lies); Butig! Caya mo yan? Maski
Butig! Maski Piglalado Camo! (Lies! Can you do that? Even if they are lies? Even if you are being
deceived?) and Dale Sana Camong Dale! (You do things recklessly) during the session of Sangguniang
Bayan of Bula, held on 21 February 2000. xxx
Ferdinand T. Aguilar, another former councilor of Bula, Camarines Sur, likewise attested to the
intemperate language used by the respondent during the regular session of the Sangguniang Bayan of
Bula on 21 February 2000. Aguilar however adds that he too became the object of respondents ire when
the latter publicly told him the following:
O, Aguilar, ono pigsusunod mo? Ilinga, ilinga tolos ninyo, ono regal, o ono regal ninyo? You cannot suspend
the rule without 2/3 votes! Ono, magbasa kamo! Saying kito sweldo ninyo! (You Aguilar, What are you
following? Look, look at this, what is the regulation, what are your regulations? You cannot
suspend the rule without the 2/3 votes! You read! Your salary is just a waste!);
O, ika (pointing at Aguilar) O ono pigsusunod mo? O, kua raw, basaha ninyo! Onong klaseng Sanggunian
adi? Di nagsusunod sa regal a, Ferdinand? Di ninyo piggagamit to mga payo ninyo! O, ilinga! Basaha
Ferdinand. (You, [pointing at Aguilar] what are you following? You get [the rules] and read them!
What kind of Sanggunian is this? You not following the rules a, Ferdinand? You are not using your
head! You look and read it, Ferdinand.);
Ika sana Ferdinand saying kito alintak mo! Uray ni ina nya, onong urgent na nakakaptan ninyo? Kon pig-
gagamit ya mga gamit kot munisipyo, di ninyo pigaactibaran! (You Ferdinand you what is in your head
is such a waste. Ass of your mother! To what urgent matter that you are holding on? If it is the
property of this municipality is the one being used, you are not acting on it.);
Ika Ferdinand nag-aadal ka kin abugasiya, nagpapabuta man ika, ining, pigbubutigan na kamo? (You
Ferdinand, you are studying law and yet you were blinded even though you are cheated);
Ika, Ferdinand basahon ko, kon gusto mo bikolon ko, di san sinasabing bago magtaong permit agko
Ordinansa. Si isay ya nagsasabi? Ya tinatawam kin poder ngowan uya Sangguniang Bayan ya mig-taong
lisensya! Tinawan na kin lisensa o ono pa? (You Ferdinand, I will read to you, if you want I will read it
to you in our dialect. That it is never stated there that before issuing permit, there should be an
ordinance first. Who said that? The one that is given the power is the Sangguniang Bayan the one
that will issue the license! He [Rolando Canet] was already given a license, what else?);
Ika Aguilar, basahon mo iton a! da siton nagsasabing bago tawan kin lisensya, kumasta ngona kin
ordinansa! O sa cockfighting o kon sa demonyo! Ining sa bulangan na ini 1964 pa ako, a! ngani ninyong
maintindihan. Ngowan, si Rolando Canet agko lisensiya, huli ta abo ni Decena, natugon man kamo gusto
ninyong anularan! Ngowan, gusting bumayad abong pabayadon. Magbasa kamo, 21 mil, buray ni ina niya!
Ako, nag-absent akong kabangang aldow para magatender kading session, sangribo ana nauda kanako!
Gusto ko sanang porbaran kamo adding osipon na kon talagang nakastahan na kamo! Magbasa kamo, 21
mil, buray ni ina niya, 21 mil. (You Aguilar, read that [referring to the rules], it is never stated here
that before you issue a license, you have to pass first an ordinance, in the cockfighting or whatever
devil is that! This law about the cockfighting this has been the law since 1964 so that you will
understand. Now, Rolando Canet has a license, just because Decena does not want to give permit
you want the same annulled. Now, he wants to pay but does not want to accept the same. You read,
21 thousand [referring to our salary] ass of your mother! I did not report for half a day just to
attend this session and I lost P1,000.00 in the process in the form of salary just so I will be able to
prove for myself about the rumors that you have been bought [or to that effect]! You read! Twenty
one thousand! Ass of your mother, twenty one thousand!)
Sayang Ferdinand, kun arog ya naturan mo, di ida makakapasar, amo yan sasabihon ko kanimo! Kon arog
kito ya studio mo, babaliktaron mo to demonyong iton, a, maski ton butig, amo tutuboron mo a, tibaad di
deducted from her accrued leave credits. To effect the penalties imposed, the Employee's Leave Division,
Office of Administrative Services-OCA, is DIRECTED to ascertain respondent Lizabeth Gutierrez-Torres's
total earned leave credits. Thereafter, the Finance Division, Fiscal Management Office-OCA, is DIRECTED
to compute the monetary value or respondent Lizabeth Gutierrez-Torres's total accrued leave credits and
deduct therefrom the amount of the fines imposed, without prejudice to whatever penalty the Court may
impose on other remaining and/or pending administrative cases against her, if any.
SO ORDERED.
[AM No. RTJ-02-1669. April 14, 2004]
HON. JULIETA A. DECENA, HON. VIRGILIO D. PONTANAL, HON. AMELITA A. IBASCO, HON. GERRY D.
RAA, HON. PEDRO N. MORA. JR., and HON. FERDINAND T. AGUILAR, complainants, vs. JUDGE NILO A.
MALANYAON, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 32, Pili, Camarines Sur,
respondent.
The regular session of a municipal council was interrupted by a heckler in the audience hurling various
accusatory remarks and insults at the council members. The heckler is a judge, the incident, the subject of
this case.
On 26 May 2000, the Office of the Court Administrator received a Joint Affidavit-Complaint executed by
various municipal officials of Bula, Camarines Sur. The affiants-complainants, Mayor Julieta A. Decena
(Decena), Vice-mayor Virgilio D. Pontanal (Pontanal), and Councilors Amelita A. Ibasco (Ibasco), Gerry D.
Raa (Raa), Pedro N. Mora, Jr. (Mora), and Ferdinand T. Aguila (Aguilar) sought the dismissal from the
service and the disbarment of respondent Judge Nilo A. Malanyaon (Judge Malanyaon), Presiding Judge of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 32, of Pili, Camarines Sur, on account of his conduct during the 21
February 2000 session of the Sangguniang Bayan of Bula.
In a Resolution dated 19 June 2002, the Court referred the matter for investigation, report and
recommendation to Court of Appeals Justice Eriberto U. Rosario, Jr. After Justice Rosario sought to be
excused owing to his forthcoming retirement then, the Court referred the matter to the Court of Appeals
for assignment to a Justice by court-wide raffle. The case was raffled to Justice Andres B. Reyes, Jr. After
conducting several hearings on the case, Justice Reyes, Jr. rendered a Report and Recommendation
(Report), which was received by this Court on 22 July 2003. From the Report, we draw the following
antecedent facts:
On 21 February 2000, the Sangguniang Bayan of Bula, Camarines Sur convened its regular session, with
Vice-mayor Pontanal presiding. Among the matters on the agenda was the revocation of two previous
council resolutions authorizing Rolando N. Canet (Canet) to operate a cockpit in the municipality. A
former vice-mayor of Bula, Canet is also the nephew-in-law of Judge Malanyaon. Both Judge Malanyaon
and Canet attended the 21 February 2000 session of the Sangguniang Bayan. Canet, however, came along
with many supporters. Noticing his presence, the Sanggunian offered to recognize Judge Malanyaon; but
he declined, saying that he merely wanted to be an observer.
From that point on, the episode during the Sanggunian session as culled in the Report on the basis of the
submitted affidavits transpired in this wise:
Subsequently, during the deliberations, the vice mayor attested that respondent interrupted the session
by shouting comments in their vernacular such as: Ambog, Ambog iyan (lies, they are lies); Butig! Caya
mo yan? Maski Butig! Maski Piglalado Camo! (Lies! Can you do that? Even if they are lies? Even if you
are being deceived?) and Dale Sana Camong Dale! (You do things recklessly). During the deliberations
relative to the authority of Mr. Rolando N. Canet to operate a cockpit, the respondent judge, with blazing
eyes and a red face further interrupted the session by lambasting the municipal councilors with
disparaging and insulting remarks, which left the whole proceedings in confusion.
In the heat of respondents outbursts, he uttered the following remarks to the vice mayor:
Ika Bondying (the vice mayors nickname),. So kag-igin MO BUKO ADTONG MADAYA, Di adto nag gagamit
kana kuwa kan municipyo, o camo ginagamit mo si Revo mo! Mag adal kamo, a biente uno mil,
susmareosep kamo. Sabi co ka ninyo mig-lecture aco pero abo man kamo, o taono, basta camo matugaan
ni alkalde? Mga uda ugali! (You Bodying, your father was not deceitful. He was not using the
property of the municipality, now you are using your Revo. You all study! You are receiving twenty
their constituents, making them look witless and obtuse, and thereby creating a mockery of the
proceedings. The disruptive presence of several supporters of Canet, a local town politician, porated the
protest against the plan to revoke the cockpit license with political color. Judge Malanyaons active
participation in apparent concert with Canets supporters exposed him as nothing but a common lobbyist,
as he forgot to act as a judge with the standard judicial temperament and prudence.
Fifth. Judge Malanyaon obstructed the Sangguniang members from performing their official duties. As
Investigating Justice Reyes, Jr. pointed out, the acts complained of Judge Malanyaon is no less a crime
under Article 144 of the Revised Penal Code. As a judge, respondent should very well know how
deleterious it would be to the discharge of his functions if the court hearings he presides over would be
rudely interrupted by fulsome tirades delivered by a spectator in the audience. If such a situation arise in
his courtroom, Judge Manlayaon would have every right to take offense to the disruption in the
proceedings. A legislative session is no less an official proceeding as a court session and any one who
disrupts either proceedings deserves to be sanctioned.
Sixth. The Code of Judicial Conduct requires that a judge shall neither allow family relationships to
influence judicial conduct or judgment, nor allow the prestige of judicial office to be used or lent to
advance the private interests of others. It does not escape our attention that Judge Malanyaon was
agitated during the Sanggunian session because the interests of his nephew-in-law were under attack.
Perhaps, Judge Malanyaon honestly believed that the revocation of Canets cockpit license was illegal. Yet,
it would not justify his undisguised attempt to prevent the threatened detrimental action against his
relative with his influence. We agree with the conclusion of Investigating Justice Reyes, Jr. that Judge
Malanyaon allowed himself to be used by his nephew-in-law to promote the latters private interests, in
contravention of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
Judge Malanyaon needs to be reminded that his judicial identity does not terminate at the end of the day
when he takes off his judicial robes. Even when garbed in casual wear outside of the halls of justice, a
judge retains the air of authority and moral ascendancy that he or she wields inside the sala. As the Court
once held:
Being the subject of constant public scrutiny, a judge should freely and willingly accept restrictions on
conduct that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen.
A judge should personify judicial integrity and exemplify honest public service. The personal behavior of
a judge, both in the performance of official duties and in private life should be above suspicion.
It may strike perhaps as a poetically tragic notion, but for very good reasons, a judge's official life cannot
simply be detached or separated from his personal existence. Indeed, the Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon
2 in particular, mandates that a judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all
activities, as well as behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality
of the judiciary. Thus, the Court has to dismiss outright Judge Malanyaons suggestion that his actions be
evaluated as one of a taxpayer or ordinary citizen and not as that of a judge. In fact, his utterances were
not made under a cloak of anonymity, for the members of the council, as well as some of the people in the
gallery knew very well that he was a judge. It is highly probable that his invectives took on a greater
imperative on the listeners precisely because he was a judge, with all the authority attendant to the office.
The conduct of Judge Malanyaon relative to the 21 February 2000 legislative session of the Sangguniang
Bayan of Bula is inexcusable and simply cannot be condoned. His actuations constitute palpable violations
of the Code of Judicial Conduct:
CANON 2 A JUDGE SHOULD AVOID IMPROPRIETY AND THE APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY IN ALL
ACTIVITIES.
Rule 2.01. A judge should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and
impartiality of the judiciary
xxx
Rule 2.03. A judge shall not allow family, social, or other relationships to influence judicial conduct or
judgment. The prestige of judicial office shall not be used or lent to advance the private interests of
others, nor convey or permit others to convey the impression that they are in a special position to
influence the judge.
The Office of the Court Administrator recommends that respondent be fined Five Thousand Pesos
(P5,000.00). In his seventeen (17) years in the judiciary, Judge Malanyaon has not been sanctioned, except
ika maka-abogado, kon maka-abogado man, makakarsel ka! (What a waste Ferdinand, if thats what you
learned, you will not pass [the Bar exams] thats what I will tell you. What are you going to tell
them, if that is how you understand, that you will reverse this kind of devil even if it is a lie and yet
you will follow the same. You might not become a lawyer, and if you become one you will go to jail.)
Ernesto B. Ballaber, who is the incumbent Barangay Captain of Salvacion, Bula, Camarines Sur, testified
through his affidavit that he was present and seated beside the respondent judge on the date in question.
He noticed that the respondent judge was drunk as the latter gave off a strong alcoholic scent. Moreover,
Ballebar observed that the respondents eyes were watery and red.
Ballebars deduction that Judge Malanyaon was drunk was reinforced when the respondent stood up,
banged the table and shouted in the vernacular: Butig!, Butig! Butig! (Lies! Lies! Lies!) and Ambog!
Ambog iyan! (Lie! Its a lie!) during the session. Ballebar further testified that the respondent also
verbally abused the members of the Sangguniang.
xxx
Gerry D. Raa asseverated that when the issue on the resolutions affecting the operation of the cockpit
arena by Rolando N. Canet was being taken up by the council, Judge Malanyaon suddenly pushed the table
in front of him, bolted from his chair and fiercely castigated the members of the Sangguniang Bayan with
every personal attacks. In fact, Raa attested that the respondent publicly discredited and humiliated him
during the session by imputing that he was operating an illegal cockpit in the municipality. (Emphasis not
ours.)
Mora and Raa, as well as two other witnesses for the complainants confirmed that Judge Malanyaon
reeked of liquor as he proceeded with his tirade.
According to Bartolome D. Parro, the Sangguniang Bayan OIC Secretary, because of the outbursts of Judge
Malanyaon the session was suspended. Meanwhile, the Sanggunian members were involuntarily detained
at the session hall. They were unable to leave as the entrance and exits were blocked by supporters of
Canet. Meanwhile, Judge Malanyaon continued his outbursts against the councilors.
Admitting his presence during the Sanggunian session, Judge Malanyaon explained, however, that he was
there not as a judge but in his private capacity as a taxpayer. He denied he was drunk, even as he admitted
he was enraged and furious over the proceedings at the Sanggunian. He did not deny delivering a diatribe,
but he claimed his actions were appropriate since the proposed revocation of his nephew-in-laws cockpit
license was illegal in his estimation.
All told, Judge Malanyaon did not dispute the facts as laid down by the complainants and the latters
witnesses. He justified his behavior though as the fulminations of a righteously outraged citizen which
according to him should be segregated from his function as a judge.
Judge Malanyaon deserves to be taken to task for his outrageous behavior as it clearly violates the Code of
Judicial Conduct.
First. The remarks uttered are patently defamatory and even vulgar. Indeed, such utterances should not
be expected of a public official worthy of his office. At fault is not the sentiment harbored, but the
impolitic choice of words employed to express such sentiment. It is not even particularly relevant if Judge
Malanyaon was inebriated at that time, for the reckless character of his remarks are in themselves
palpable, whether they were delivered in a drunken or sober state.
Second. Judge Malanyaons harangue was directed at the members of the Sangguniang Bayan in the course
of a regular session of the body. The members of the Sanggunian are, by reason of their public office,
entitled to the respect of other people, especially their fellow public officers. Judge Malanyaons diatribe
indicates his inability to accord his fellow public officials their due.
Third. Judge Malanyaon made his remarks in a public forum. Obviously, however, he forgot or even failed
to realize that he is a representative of the judicial branch of government, the judge being the visible
representation of the law and, more importantly, of justice. The judiciary is loathe to interfere with the
due exercise by co-equal branches of government of their official functions, absent any justiciable action
brought in due course.
Fourth. It must be understood that Judge Malanyaons remarks were aimed at preventing the Sanggunian
from revoking the cockpit license of Canet. In doing so, he was attempting to interfere with the will of the
Sanggunian as an independent legislative body. As observed by Investigating Justice Reyes, Jr., the
awkward situation was aggravated when Judge Malanyaon publicly humiliated the councilors in front of
than sixty (60) kilometers away from Cebu City and entails a travel time of almost two (2) hours. Liloan,
Cebu, on the other hand, is more than ten (10) kilometers away from Cebu City.
The judicial audit team, after tape-recording interviews with other court and government personnel, also
reported the following:
1) Celeste P. Retuya admitted that she assisted couples who wanted to get married by checking whether
their documents were complete and referred them to Judges Tormis, Necessario, and Rosales afterwards;
2) Corazon P. Retuya referred couples who wanted to get married to Judge Necessario. There were also
"assistants" who would go over the couples’ documents before these couples would be referred to Judge
Necessario. Retuya also narrated several anomalies involving foreign nationals and their acquisition of
marriage licenses from the local civil registrar of Barili, Cebu despite the fact that parties were not
residents of Barili. Those anomalous marriages were solemnized by Judge Tormis;
3) Rhona F. Rodriguez assisted couples and referred them to any of the available judges. She admitted that
after the payment of the solemnization fee of three hundred pesos (P300), a different amount, as agreed
upon by the parties and the judge, was paid to the latter. She admitted that she accepted four thousand
pesos (P4,000) for facilitating the irregular marriage of Moreil Baranggan Sebial and Maricel Albater
although she gave the payment to a certain "Mang Boy";
4) Emma D. Valencia admitted that she assisted couples seeking to get married and that most of the
marriage licenses were obtained from the local civil registrar of Barili and Liloan, Cebu because the
registrars in those towns were not strict about couples’ attendance in the family planning seminar. She
also admitted that couples gave her food while the judge received five hundred pesos (P500) if the
marriage was solemnized inside the chambers. Foreigners were said to have given twice the said amount.
The judge accepted one thousand five hundred pesos (P1,500) for gasoline expenses if the marriage was
celebrated outside the chambers;
5) Marilou Cabanñ ez admitted that she assisted couples and referred them to Judges Tormis, Necessario, or
Rosales. However, she denied receiving any amount from these couples. She told the audit team that
during the 8th, 18th, and 28th of the month, seven (7) to eight (8) couples would go directly to Judge
Rosabella M. Tormis for a fifteen-minute marriage solemnization;
6) Desiderio S. Aranas admitted that he started assisting couples in 2003. He told the investigating team
that Judge Gil Acosta would talk to couples wishing to get married without a license. He would produce a
joint affidavit of cohabitation form on which he or the clerk of court would type the entries. The judge
would then receive an envelope containing money from the couple. Aranas also confirmed the existence
of "open-dated" marriage certificates;
7) Antonio Flores, Branch 9 Process Server of RTC Cebu City, told the investigating team that couples
looked for Judge Geraldine Faith A. Econg, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 9, Cebu City,
"para menos ang bayad." The excess of three hundred pesos (P300) that couples paid to Judge Econg as
solemnization fee went to a certain "sinking fund" of Branch 9;
8) Rebecca L. Alesna admitted that she usually referred couples to Judges Necessario or Tormis. Couples
who wanted to get married under Article 34 of the Family Code were advised to buy a pro-forma affidavit
of joint cohabitation for ten pesos (P10);
9) Arvin Oca, Branch 1 Process Server of the MTCC of Cebu City, admitted that he referred couples to
Branch 2, Clerk of Court, Harrish Co. Oca declared that on 28 June 2007, he accompanied a couple to the
chambers of Judge Necessario. He informed the judge that the couple only had birth certificates. The
respondent judge then inquired about their ages and asked them if they had been previously married
then proceeded to solemnize the marriage; and
10) Filomena C. Lopez, local civil registrar of Barili, Cebu, declared that she does not scrutinize marriage
applications. Couples who are non-Barili residents are able to obtain marriage licenses from her Barili
office because these couples have relatives residing in Barili, Cebu. She also added that while couples still
need to submit a certificate of attendance in the family planning seminar, they may attend it before or
after the filing of the application for marriage license.
Affidavits of private persons were also attached to the records. Jacqui Lou Baguio-Manera was a resident
of Panagdait, Mabolo, Cebu and on 21 May 2007, she and her then fianceé wanted to set a marriage date.
Her younger sister who was married in a civil wedding last year gave her the number of a certain "Meloy".
After talking to Meloy on the phone, the wedding was scheduled at 2 p.m. on 23 May 2007 and the couple
once by reprimand. With the comparative seriousness of the offense, a fine of Twenty Thousand Pesos
(P20,000.00) would serve as an appropriate penalty.
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Nilo A. Malanyaon is hereby found GUILTY of conduct unbecoming of a
judge, in violation of Canon 2, Rule 2.01 and Rule 2.03 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. He is ordered to
pay a FINE of TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (P20,000.00) with a STERN WARNING that the commission of
the same or a similar act or omission in the future will be dealt with more severely.
A.M. No. MTJ-07-1691 April 2, 2013
(Formerly A.M. No. 07-7-04-SC)
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, Petitioner, vs. JUDGE ANATALIO S. NECESSARIO, Branch 2;
JUDGE GIL R. ACOSTA, Branch 3; JUDGE ROSABELLA M. TORMIS, Branch 4; and JUDGE EDGEMELO C.
ROSALES, Branch 8; all of MTCC-Cebu ·City; CELESTE P. RETUYA, Clerk III, MTCC Branch 6, Cebu
City; CORAZON P. RETUYA, Court Stenographer, MTCC, Branch 6, Cebu City; RHONA F. RODRIGUEZ,
Administrative Officer I, Office of the Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court (RTC) Cebu City; EMMA D.
VALENCIA, Court Stenographer III, RTC, Branch 18, Cebu City; MARILOU CABANEZ, Court
Stenographer, MTCC, Branch 4, Cebu City; DESIDERIO S. ARANAS, Process Server, MTCC, Branch 3,
Cebu City; REBECCA ALESNA, Court Interpreter, MTCC, Branch 1, Cebu City; and HELEN MONGGAYA,
Court Stenographer, MTCC, Branch 4, Cebu City. Respondents.
This Court has long held that "[the] administration of justice is circumscribed with a heavy burden of
responsibility. It requires that everyone involved in its dispensation ― from the presiding judge to the
lowliest clerk ― live up to the strictest standards of competence, honesty, and integrity in the public
service."
THE CASE
This is an administrative case that stemmed from the 6 July 2007 Memorandum of the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA). The judicial audit team created by the OCA reported alleged irregularities in the
solemnization of marriages in several branches of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) and Regional
Trial Court (RTC) in Cebu City. Certain package fees were offered to interested parties by "fixers" or
"facilitators" for instant marriages.
THE FACTS
On 3 July 2007, Atty. Rullyn Garcia, Region 7 Judicial Supervisor, proceeded to Cebu City and headed the
audit team created by OCA in investigating Branches 2, 3, 4, and 8 of the MTCC in Cebu City. A female and
male lawyer of the audit team went undercover as a couple looking to get married. They went to the
Palace of Justice and were directed by the guard on duty to go to Branch 4 and look for a certain "Meloy".
The male lawyer feared that he would be recognized by other court personnel, specifically the Clerk of
Court of Branch 4 who was a former law school classmate. The two lawyers then agreed that only the
female lawyer would go inside and inquire about the marriage application process. Inside Branch 4, a
woman named Helen approached and assisted the female lawyer. When the female lawyer asked if the
marriage process could be rushed, Helen assured the lawyer that the marriage could be solemnized the
next day, but the marriage certificate would only be dated the day the marriage license becomes available.
Helen also guaranteed the regularity of the process for a fee of three thousand pesos (P3,000) only.
In its 10 July 2007 Resolution, this Court treated the Memorandum dated 6 July 2007 of the judicial audit
team as a formal administrative complaint and directed Judge Anatalio S. Necessario, Judge Gil R. Acosta,
Judge Rosabella M. Tormis, and Judge Edgemelo C. Rosales to submit their respective comments. The
Court also suspended the judges pending resolution of the cases against them.
On 24 August 2007, the OCA through Senior Deputy Court Administrator Zenaida N. Elepanñ o submitted
its Memorandum dated 29 August 2007 and Supplemental Report. Six hundred forty-three (643)
marriage certificates were examined by the judicial audit team. The team reported that out of the 643
marriage certificates examined, 280 marriages were solemnized under Article 34 of the Family Code. The
logbooks of the MTCC Branches indicate a higher number of solemnized marriages than the number of
marriage certificates in the courts’ custody. There is also an unusual number of marriage licenses
obtained from the local civil registrars of the towns of Barili and Liloan, Cebu. There were even marriages
solemnized at 9 a.m. with marriage licenses obtained on the same day. The town of Barili, Cebu is more
certificate of legal capacity to marry, passport picture, date of arrival, and divorce papers when the party
is divorced; fourth, he then asks the parties and their witnesses questions regarding cohabitation and
interviews the children of the parties, if any.
Judge Rosabella M. Tormis denies the charges brought by the OCA. She calls the actions of the judicial
audit team during the investigation an "entrapment". She also claims that there is nothing wrong with
solemnizing marriages on the date of the issuance of the marriage license and with the fact that the
issued marriage license was obtained from a place where neither of the parties resided. As to the pro
forma affidavits of cohabitation, she argues that she cannot be faulted for accepting it as genuine as she
and the other judges are not handwriting experts. The affidavits also enjoy the presumption of regularity.
Judge Tormis also discredits the affidavit of Baguio-Manera as hearsay. The respondent said that when
Baguio-Manera and her husband were confronted with the affidavit they executed, they affirmed the
veracity of the statements, particularly the fact that they have been living together for five years. The
judge also attributes the irregularity in the number of marriages solemnized in her sala to the filing
clerks.
Judge Edgemelo C. Rosales denies violating the law on marriage. He maintains that it is the local civil
registrar who evaluates the documents submitted by the parties, and he presumes the regularity of the
license issued. It is only when there is no marriage license given that he ascertains the qualifications of
the parties and the lack of legal impediment to marry. As to the affidavits of cohabitation, the judge
believes there is nothing wrong with the fact that these are pro forma. He states that marriage certificates
are required with the marriage license attached or the affidavit of cohabitation only and the other
documents fall under the responsibility of the local civil registrar. He surmises that if the marriage
certificate did not come with the marriage license or affidavit of cohabitation, the missing document
might have been inadvertently detached, and it can be checked with the proper local civil registrar. As to
the payment of the docket fee, he contends that it should be paid after the solemnization of the marriage
and not before because judges will be pre-empted from ascertaining the qualifications of the couple.
Besides, the task of collecting the fee belongs to the Clerk of Court. The judge also argues that
solemnization of marriage is not a judicial duty.
On 12 November 2007, Judges Tormis and Rosales filed a Memorandum of Law with Plea for Early
Resolution, Lifting of Suspension and Dismissal of Case. This Court in a Resolution dated 11 December
2007 lifted the suspension of the respondent judges but prohibited them from solemnizing marriages
until further ordered.
On 7 December 2007, Judges Tormis and Rosales filed a Motion for Early Resolution with Waiver of
Formal and/or Further Investigation and Motion to Dismiss. In a Resolution dated 15 January 2008, the
Court noted the motion and granted the prayer of Judges Tormis and Rosales for the payment of their
unpaid salaries, allowances and all other economic benefits from 9 July 2007.
THE REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE OCA
In its Memorandum dated 15 June 2010, the OCA recommended the dismissal of the respondent judges
and some court employees, and the suspension or admonition of others. The OCA summarized the
liabilities of the respondents, to wit:
JUDGE ANATALIO S. NECESSARIO is guilty of gross inefficiency or neglect of duty for solemnizing
marriages with questionable documents and wherein one of the contracting parties is a foreigner who
submitted a mere affidavit of his capacity to marry in lieu of the required certificate from his embassy. He
is also guilty of gross ignorance of the law for solemnizing marriages under Article 34 of the Family Code
wherein one or both of the contracting parties were minors during the cohabitation.
xxx
JUDGE GIL R. ACOSTA is guilty of gross inefficiency or neglect of duty for failure to make sure that the
solemnization fee has been paid. He is also guilty of gross ignorance of the law for solemnizing marriages
under Article 34 of the Family Code wherein one or both of the contracting parties were minors during
the cohabitation.
JUDGE EDGEMELO C. ROSALES is guilty of gross inefficiency or neglect of duty for solemnizing marriages
with questionable documents, for failure to make sure that the solemnization fee has been paid and for
solemnizing marriages wherein one of the contracting parties is a foreigner who submitted a mere
were asked to bring their birth certificates. No marriage license was required from them. Meloy asked for
a fee of one thousand five hundred pesos (P1,500). According to Baguio-Manera, their marriage certificate
was marked as "No marriage license was necessary, the marriage being solemnized under Art. 34 of
Executive Order No. 209". Their marriage was solemnized that day by Judge Rosabella M. Tormis. Baguio-
Manera claimed that they did not understand what that statement meant at that time. However, in her
affidavit, she declared that the situation premised under Article 34 did not apply to her and her fianceé .
Mary Anne Flores-Patoc was a resident of Barrio Luz, Cebu City. In her 5 July 2007 affidavit, she recounted
how she and her boyfriend went to the Provincial Capitol to get married in February 2006. While logging
in at the entrance, they were offered assistance by the guards for a fee of one thousand five hundred pesos
(P1,500). The guard also offered to become "Ninong" or a witness to the wedding. The couple became
suspicious and did not push through with the civil wedding at that time.
On 27 November 2007, the Court En Banc issued a resolution: a) requiring Judges Anatalio S. Necessario,
Gil R. Acosta, Rosabella M. Tormis, and Edgemelo C. Rosales of the MTCC, Branches 2, 3, 4, and 8,
respectively, of Cebu City, to comment on the findings of the 14 August 2007 Supplemental Report of the
OCA, within fifteen (15) days from notice; b) directing the Process Servicing Unit to furnish the judges
with a copy of the Supplemental Report; c) requiring the court personnel listed below to show cause
within fifteen (15) days from notice why no disciplinary action should be taken against them for their
alleged grave misconduct and dishonesty and impleading them in this administrative matter:
1) Celeste P. Retuya, Clerk III, MTCC, Branch 6, Cebu City;
2) Corazon P. Retuya, Court Stenographer, MTCC, Branch 6, Cebu City;
3) Rhona F. Rodriguez, Administrative Officer I, Office of the Clerk of Court, RTC, Cebu City;
4) Emma D. Valencia, Court Stenographer III, RTC, Branch 18, Cebu City;
5) Marilou Cabanñ ez, Court Stenographer, MTCC, Branch 4, Cebu City;
6) Desiderio S. Aranas, Process Server, MTCC, Branch 3, Cebu City;
7) Rebecca Alesna, Court Interpreter, MTCC, Branch 1, Cebu City;
8) Helen Mongaya, Court Stenographer, MTCC, Branch 4, Cebu City.
The Court in the same resolution also: a) ordered the referral to the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for
the Visayas for appropriate action on the administrative matter involving the violation of the law on
marriage by Ms. Filomena C. Lopez, Local Civil Registrar of Barili, Cebu, and one Ms. Veronica S. Longakit,
former Local Civil Registrar of Liloan, Cebu; b) directed the Process Serving Unit to furnish the Office of
the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas with a copy of the Supplemental Report of the OCA; and c)
required Judge Geraldine Faith A. Econg, RTC, Branch 9, Cebu City, to comment within fifteen (15) days
from notice on the statement of staff member Antonio Flores saying that Branch 9’s court personnel
received an amount in excess of the P300 solemnization fee paid by couples whose marriages were
solemnized by her. This amount goes to the court’s "sinking fund".
In their Comments and/or Answers to the Memorandum dated 5 July 2007 of the OCA and its
Supplemental Report, the respondent judges argued the following:
Judge Anatalio S. Necessario relies on the presumption of regularity regarding the documents presented
to him by contracting parties. He claims that marriages he solemnized under Article 34 of the Family Code
had the required affidavit of cohabitation. He claims that pro forma affidavits of cohabitation have been
used by other judges even before he became a judge. He avers that he ascertains the ages of the parties,
their relationship, and the existence of an impediment to marry. He also asks the parties searching
questions and clarifies whether they understood the contents of the affidavit and the legal consequences
of its execution. The judge also denies knowledge of the payment of solemnization fees in batches. In
addition, he argues that it was a process server who was in-charge of recording marriages on the logbook,
keeping the marriage certificates, and reporting the total number of marriages monthly.
Judge Gil R. Acosta argues that the law only requires a marriage license and that he is not required to
inquire whether the license was obtained from a location where one of the parties is an actual resident.
The judge believes that it is not his duty to verify the signature on the marriage license to determine its
authenticity because he relies on the presumption of regularity of public documents. The judge also
outlines his own procedure in solemnizing marriages which involves: first, the determination whether the
solemnization fee was paid; second, the presentation of the affidavit of cohabitation and birth certificates
to ascertain identity and age of the parties; third, if one of the parties is a foreigner, the judge asks for a
marriage license coming from Liloan for over a period of years. There were also twenty-two (22)
marriages solemnized by the judge with incomplete documents such missing as marriage license,
certificate of legal capacity to marry, and the joint affidavit of cohabitation.
Judge Necessario solemnized nine (9) marriages that had questionable supporting documents such as
marriage licenses. The OCA found that the place of residence of the contracting parties appearing in the
supporting documents differ from the place where they obtained their marriage license. The documents
invited suspicion because of erasures and superimpositions in the entries of residence. Likewise, in lieu of
the required certificate of legal capacity to marry, a mere affidavit was submitted by the parties. Variations
in the signatures of the contracting parties were also apparent in the documents.
The respondent judge solemnized forty-three (43) marriages under Article 34 of the Family Code. These
marriages appeared dubious since the joint affidavit of cohabitation of the parties show minority of one
or both of them during cohabitation. For example, he solemnized on 14 May 2004 the marriage of 22-
year-old Harol D. Amorin and 19-year-old Dinalyn S. Paraiso who are residents of Lapu-Lapu City.
There are also sixteen (16) marriage licenses with attached official receipts of the solemnization fee but
the corresponding marriage certificates cannot be found. The presence of the receipts implies that these
marriages were solemnized.
Liability of Judge Gil R. Acosta
Judge Acosta solemnized a total of eighty-seven (87) marriages from 2003 to 2007. However, the logbook
showed that he solemnized two hundred seventy-two (272) marriages while the monthly reports of cases
showed that he solemnized five hundred twelve (512) marriages over the same period. Out of the 87
marriages, he solemnized seventy-five (75) under
Article 34 of the Family Code. This is equivalent to 86.21% of the marriages solemnized under Article 34
in a four-year period.
There were forty-one (41) marriage certificates signed by Judge Tormis or Judge Necessario as
solemnizing officers found in his custody. There were also ten (10) marriages under Article 34 of the
Family Code where one or both of the contracting parties were minors during cohabitation. To illustrate,
respondent judge solemnized on 4 May 2004 the marriage of Julieto W. Baga, 22 years old, and Esterlita P.
Anlangit, 18 years old.
There were seventeen (17) marriages under Article 34 where neither of the contracting parties were
residents of Cebu City. The judge solemnized three (3) marriages without the foreign party’s required
certificate of legal capacity to marry. Lastly, there was no proof of payment of the solemnization fee in
almost all of the marriages the judge officiated.
Liability of Judge Rosabella M. Tormis
Judge Tormis solemnized a total of one hundred eighty-one (181) marriages from 2003 to 2007 based on
the marriage certificates actually examined. However, the monthly report of cases showed that she
solemnized three hundred five (305) marriages instead for the years 2004 to 2007. The OCA report also
noted that it was only in July 2007 that her court started to use a logbook to keep track of marriages.
Respondent judge solemnized thirty-seven (37) marriages with incomplete or missing documents such as
the marriage license, certificate of legal capacity to marry, and the joint affidavit of cohabitation. In
several instances, only affidavits were submitted by the foreign parties in lieu of the certificate of legal
capacity to marry.
Judge Tormis solemnized thirteen (13) marriages despite the questionable character of the validity of the
required documents particularly the marriage license. The judicial audit team found numerous erasures
and superimpositions on entries with regard to the parties’ place of residence.
In one instance, the judge solemnized the marriage of Rex Randy E. Cujardo and Anselma B. Laranio on 28
December 2006 despite the marriage license containing a rubberstamp mark saying, "THIS LICENSE
EXPIRES ON" and a handwritten note saying "12/28/06" under it.
The judge solemnized a total of forty-seven (47) marriages under Article 34 of the Family Code wherein
the marriage requirements’ authenticity was doubtful due to the circumstances of the cohabitation of the
parties and the given address of the parties. These irregularities were evident in the case of 22-year-old
John Rey R. Tibalan and Ana Liza Secuya who were married on 25 May 2007. The residential address of
the couple in the marriage certificate is "Sitio Bamboo, Buhisan, Cebu City." However, there was an
affidavit of his capacity to marry in lieu of the required certificate from his embassy. He is also guilty of
gross ignorance of the law for solemnizing a marriage without the requisite marriage license.
JUDGE ROSEBELLA M. TORMIS is guilty of gross inefficiency or neglect of duty for solemnizing marriages
with questionable documents, for failure to make sure that the solemnization fee has been paid, for
solemnizing marriages wherein one of the contracting parties is a foreigner who submitted a mere
affidavit of his capacity to marry in lieu of the required certificate from the embassy and for solemnizing a
marriage with an expired license.
xxx
HELEN MONGGAYA is guilty of grave misconduct for violating Section 2, Canon I of the Code of Conduct
for Court Personnel that prohibits court personnel from soliciting or accepting any gift, favor or benefit
based on any or explicit or implicit understanding that such gift, favor or benefit shall influence their
official actions and for giving false information for the purpose of perpetrating an irregular marriage.
RHONA RODRIGUEZ is guilty of gross misconduct for violating Section 2, Canon I of the Code of Conduct
for Court Personnel and for inducing Maricel Albater to falsify the application for marriage license by
instructing her to indicate her residence as Barili, Cebu.
DESIDERIO ARANAS and REBECCA ALESNA are guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service for providing couples who are to be married under Article 34 of the Family Code with the required
affidavit of cohabitation.
CELESTE RETUYA, EMMA VALENCIA and REBECCA ALESNA are guilty of violating Section 2(b), Canon III
of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel which prohibits court personnel from receiving tips or other
remuneration for assisting or attending to parties engaged in transactions or involved in actions or
proceedings with the Judiciary.
The OCA, however, recommended the DISMISSAL of the complaints against Judge Geraldine Faith A.
Econg, Corazon P. Retuya, and Marilou Cabanñ ez, for lack of merit.
THE ISSUE
The issue now before this Court is whether the judges and personnel of the MTCC and RTC in Cebu City
are guilty of gross ignorance of the law, gross neglect of duty or gross inefficiency and gross misconduct,
and in turn, warrant the most severe penalty of dismissal from service.
THE COURT’S RULING
The findings in the 2010 Memorandum of the Office of the Court Administrator are supported by the
evidence on record and applicable law and jurisprudence.
This Court has long held that court officials and employees are placed with a heavy burden and
responsibility of keeping the faith of the public. In Obanñ ana, Jr. v. Ricafort, we said that:
Any impression of impropriety, misdeed or negligence in the performance of official functions must be
avoided. This Court shall not countenance any conduct, act or omission on the part of all those involved in
the administration of justice which would violate the norm of public accountability and diminish the faith
of the people in the Judiciary.
The OCA described accurately the Palace of Justice in Cebu City as a hub of swift marriages. The
respondent judges and court personnel disregarded laws and procedure to the prejudice of the parties
and the proper administration of justice.
The OCA found that Judges Anatalio S. Necessario, Gil R. Acosta, Rosabella M. Tormis, and Edgemelo C.
Rosales are all guilty of gross inefficiency or neglect of duty when they solemnized marriages without
following the proper procedure laid down by law, particularly the Family Code of the Philippines and
existing jurisprudence. The OCA listed down aspects of the solemnization process which were
disregarded by the judges. The Court will now discuss the individual liabilities of the respondent judges
and court personnel vis-aà -vis the evidence presented by the OCA against them.
Liability of Judge Anatalio S. Necessario
The OCA reported that Judge Necessario solemnized a total of one thousand one hundred twenty-three
(1,123) marriages from 2005 to 2007. However, only one hundred eighty-four (184) marriage certificates
were actually examined by the judicial audit team. Out of the 184 marriages, only seventy-nine (79) were
solemnized with a marriage license while one hundred five (105) were solemnized under Article 34 of the
Family Code. Out of the 79 marriages with license, forty-seven (47) of these licenses were issued by the
Local Civil Registrar of Liloan, Cebu. This translates to 42.93% of the marriages he solemnized with
years old who were married by mere submission of a pro forma joint affidavit of cohabitation. These
affidavits were notarized by the solemnizing judge himself or herself.
Finally, positive testimonies were also given regarding the solemnization of marriages of some couples
where no marriage license was previously issued. The contracting parties were made to fill up the
application for a license on the same day the marriage was solemnized.
The Court does not accept the arguments of the respondent judges that the ascertainment of the validity
of the marriage license is beyond the scope of the duty of a solemnizing officer especially when there are
glaring pieces of evidence that point to the contrary. As correctly observed by the OCA, the presumption
of regularity accorded to a marriage license disappears the moment the marriage documents do not
appear regular on its face.
In People v. Jansen, this Court held that:
…the solemnizing officer is not duty-bound to investigate whether or not a marriage license has been duly
and regularly issued by the local civil registrar. All the solemnizing officer needs to know is that the
license has been issued by the competent official, and it may be presumed from the issuance of the license
that said official has fulfilled the duty to ascertain whether the contracting parties had fulfilled the
requirements of law.
However, this Court also said in Sevilla v. Cardenas, that "the presumption of regularity of official acts may
be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty." The visible
superimpositions on the marriage licenses should have alerted the solemnizing judges to the irregularity
of the issuance.
It follows also that although Article 21 of the Family Code requires the submission of the certificate from
the embassy of the foreign party to the local registrar for acquiring a marriage license, the judges should
have been more diligent in reviewing the parties’ documents and qualifications. As noted by the OCA, the
absence of the required certificates coupled with the presence of mere affidavits should have aroused
suspicion as to the regularity of the marriage license issuance.
The judges’ gross ignorance of the law is also evident when they solemnized marriages under Article 34
of the Family Code without the required qualifications and with the existence of legal impediments such
as minority of a party. Marriages of exceptional character such as those made under Article 34 are,
doubtless, the exceptions to the rule on the indispensability of the formal requisite of a marriage license.
Under the rules of statutory construction, exceptions as a general rule should be strictly but reasonably
construed. The affidavits of cohabitation should not be issued and accepted pro forma particularly in view
of the settled rulings of the Court on this matter. The five-year period of cohabitation should be one of a
perfect union valid under the law but rendered imperfect only by the absence of the marriage contract.
The parties should have been capacitated to marry each other during the entire period and not only at the
time of the marriage.
To elaborate further on the gravity of the acts and omissions of the respondents, the Family Code provides
the requisites for a valid marriage:
Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:
(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;
(2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in Chapter 2 of this Title; and
(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the contracting parties before the
solemnizing officer and their personal declaration that they take each other as husband and wife in the
presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age. (53a, 55a)
Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio,
except as stated in Article 35 (2). A defect in any of the essential requisites shall not affect the validity of
the marriage but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and
administratively liable. (n)
The absence of a marriage license will clearly render a marriage void ab initio. The actions of the judges
have raised a very alarming issue regarding the validity of the marriages they solemnized since they did
not follow the proper procedure or check the required documents and qualifications. In Aranes v. Judge
Salvador Occiano, the Court said that a marriage solemnized without a marriage license is void and the
subsequent issuance of the license cannot render valid or add even an iota of validity to the marriage. It is
application for marriage license attached to the marriage certificate showing that Secuya’s address is "F.
Lopez Comp. Morga St., Cebu City."
Liability of Judge Edgemelo C. Rosales
Judge Rosales solemnized a total of one hundred twenty-one (121) marriages from 2006 to 2007 based
on the marriage certificates examined by the judicial audit team. However, only three (3) marriages were
reported for the same period. Out of the 121 marriages the judge solemnized, fifty-two (52) or 42.98%
fall under Article 34 of the Family Code. Thirty-eight (38) marriage licenses out of the sixty-six (66)
obtained or 57.57% were from the local civil registrar of Barili, Cebu. Nineteen (19) or 28.79% were from
the local civil registrar of Liloan, Cebu. Nine (9) or 13.64% were from other local civil registrars.
There were marriage documents found in his court such as marriage licenses, applications for marriage
license, certificates of legal capacity to contract marriage, affidavits in lieu of certificate of legal capacity to
contract marriage, joint affidavits of cohabitation, and other documents referring to the solemnization of
one hundred thirty-two (132) marriages, with no corresponding marriage certificates. He solemnized two
marriages of Buddy Gayland Weaver, an American citizen, to two different persons within nine (9)
months. No copy of the required certificate of legal capacity to contract marriage or the divorce decree
was presented.
The judge solemnized thirty-seven (37) marriages without or with incomplete supporting documents
such as the certificate of legal capacity to marry and the joint affidavit of cohabitation. He solemnized nine
(9) marriages under questionable circumstances such as the submission of an affidavit or affirmation of
freedom to marry in lieu of the certificate of legal capacity to marry, the discrepancies in the residence of
the contracting parties as appearing in the marriage documents, and the solemnization of the marriage
on the same day the marriage license was issued.
Judge Rosales also solemnized forty-three (43) marriages with no proof that the solemnization fee of
P300 was paid. On the other hand, there were twenty-six (26) marriages whose solemnization fees were
paid late.
To summarize, the liabilities of the judges are the following:
First, Judges Necessario, Tormis and Rosales solemnized marriages even if the requirements submitted by
the couples were incomplete and of questionable character. Most of these documents showed visible signs
of tampering, erasures, corrections or superimpositions of entries related to the parties’ place of
residence. These included indistinguishable features such as the font, font size, and ink of the computer-
printed entries in the marriage certificate and marriage license. These actions of the respondent judges
constitute gross inefficiency. In Vega v. Asdala, the Court held that inefficiency implies negligence,
incompetence, ignorance, and carelessness.
Second, the judges were also found guilty of neglect of duty regarding the payment of solemnization fees.
The Court, in Rodrigo-Ebron v. Adolfo, defined neglect of duty as the failure to give one’s attention to a
task expected of him and it is gross when, from the gravity of the offense or the frequency of instances,
the offense is so serious in its character as to endanger or threaten public welfare. The marriage
documents examined by the audit team show that corresponding official receipts for the solemnization
fee were missing or payment by batches was made for marriages performed on different dates. The OCA
emphasizes that the payment of the solemnization fee starts off the whole marriage application process
and even puts a "stamp of regularity" on the process.
Third, Judges Necessario, Tormis, and Rosales also solemnized marriages where a contracting party is a
foreigner who did not submit a certificate of legal capacity to marry from his or her embassy. What the
foreigners submitted were mere affidavits stating their capacity to marry. The irregularity in the
certificates of legal capacity that are required under Article 21 of the Family Code displayed the gross
neglect of duty of the judges. They should have been diligent in scrutinizing the documents required for
the marriage license issuance. Any irregularities would have been prevented in the qualifications of
parties to contract marriage.
Fourth, Judges Necessario, Acosta, and Tormis are likewise guilty of gross ignorance of the law under
Article 34 of the Family Code with respect to the marriages they solemnized where legal impediments
existed during cohabitation such as the minority status of one party. The audit team cites in their
Supplemental Report that there were parties whose ages ranged from eighteen (18) to twenty-two (22)
Mongaya acted improperly and in a manner opposite of what is expected of court personnel. Her actions
placed doubts on the integrity of the courts.
Rhona Rodriguez, Administrative Officer I of the Office of the Clerk of Court of the MTCC, Cebu City, is
guilty of gross misconduct. She assisted the couple, Moreil Sebial and Maricel Albater, and demanded and
accepted P4,000 from them.146 The act was a violation of Section 2, Canon I of the Code of Conduct for
Court Personnel. As found by the OCA and adopted by this Court, Rodriguez induced Albater to falsify the
application for marriage license by instructing her to indicate her residence as Barili, Cebu. The claim that
she gave the amount to a certain Borces who was allegedly the real facilitator belies her participation in
facilitating the marriage. According to the OCA, when the couple went back for their marriage certificate,
they approached Rodriguez and not Borces. When Borces told Rodriguez that the marriage certificate had
been misplaced, it was Rodriguez who instructed Sebial to fill up another marriage certificate.
This Court has held that improper solicitations prohibited by Section 2, Canon I of the Code of Conduct for
Court Personnel, merits a grave penalty. Such penalty can be dismissal from service.
Desiderio Aranas, Branch 3 Process Server, MTCC, Cebu City and Rebecca Alesna are guilty of conduct
prejudicial to the best of interest of the service. Aranas provided couples who were to be married under
Article 34 of the Family Code with the required affidavit of cohabitation. On the other hand, Alesna refers
such couples to Aranas to acquire the said affidavit which according to Alesna costs P10. As aptly put by
the OCA, even if the amount involved in the transaction is minimal, the act of soliciting money still gives
the public the wrong impression that court personnel are making money out of judicial transactions.
The Court said in Roque v. Grimaldo that acts of court personnel outside their official functions constitute
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service because these acts violate what is prescribed for
court personnel. The purpose of this is to maintain the integrity of the Court and free court personnel
from suspicion of any misconduct.
Celeste P. Retuya, Clerk III of Branch 6 of the MTCC, Cebu City, Emma Valencia, Stenographer III of Branch
18, RTC, Cebu City, and Rebecca Alesna, Court Interpreter of Branch 1, MTCC, Cebu City, admitted to the
audit team that they received food from couples they assisted. This is in violation of Section 2(b), Canon
III of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel which prohibits court personnel from receiving tips or
other remuneration for assisting or attending to parties engaged in transactions or involved in actions or
proceedings with the Judiciary. As recommended by the OCA, they are admonished considering that this
is their first offense and the tips were of minimal value. In Reyes-Domingo v. Morales, this Court held that
commission of an administrative offense for the first time is an extenuating circumstance.
The Court finds that there is insufficient evidence against Corazon P. Retuya. The OCA reports that
Corazon Retuya admitted initially that she received P5,000 from spouses Ichiro Kamiaya and Mary Grace
Gabiana to secure necessary documents. The information was volunteered by Corazon Retuya with no
supporting sworn statement from the couple. However, she denies this fact later on in her Comment.
Finding the earlier statement of Corazon Retuya as unclear and lacking support from evidence, the Court
adopts the findings of the OCA and decides to give her the benefit of the doubt.
The Court also finds insufficient evidence to support the claims against Marilou Cabanñ ez. Cabanñ ez was
only implicated in this case through the sworn statement of Jacqui Lou Baguio-Manera who attested that
they paid a certain "Meloy" P1,200 for the wedding under Article 34 of the Family through the assistance
of Cabanñ ez. Cabanñ ez denies that she was the one who assisted the couple and explained that it may have
been Celerina Plaza, the personal assistant of Judge Rosabella M. Tormis. Baguio-Manera got the
nickname "Meloy" not from Cabanñ ez herself but from Baguio-Manera’s younger sister. When Baguio-
Manera met the said "Meloy" at the Hall of Justice, she did not obtain confirmation that the said "Meloy" is
Cabanñ ez. The Court adopts the findings of the OCA that there is lack of positive identification of Cabanñ ez
and finds merit in her denial.
The Court accepts the recommendation of the OCA as to the dismissal of the case against Judge Geraldine
Faith A. Econg. The judge was only implicated through the statement of Process Server Antonio Flores
about an "alleged sinking fund". No evidence was presented as to the collection of an excess of the
solemnization fee. Neither was it proven that Judge Econg or her staff had knowledge of such fund.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondents:
1. Judge Anatalio S. Necessario, Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 2, Cebu City,
GUILTY of gross inefficiency or neglect of duty and of gross ignorance of the law and that he be
the marriage license that gives the solemnizing officer the authority to solemnize a marriage and the act
of solemnizing the marriage without a license constitutes gross ignorance of the law.
As held by this Court in Navarro v. Domagtoy:
The judiciary should be composed of persons who, if not experts are at least proficient in the law they are
sworn to apply, more than the ordinary layman. They should be skilled and competent in understanding
and applying the law. It is imperative that they be conversant with basic legal principles like the ones
involved in the instant case. It is not too much to expect them to know and apply the law intelligently.
It is important to note that the audit team found out that Judge Rosabella M. Tormis ordered Celerina
Plaza, a personal employee of the judge, to wait for couples outside the Hall of Justice and offer services.
Crisanto Dela Cerna also stated in his affidavit that Judge Tormis instructed him to get all marriage
certificates and bring them to her house when she found out about the judicial audit. In the language of
the OCA, Judge Tormis considered the solemnization of marriages not as a duty but as a business. The
respondent judge was suspended for six (6) months in A.M. No. MTJ-071-962 for repeatedly disregarding
the directives of this Court to furnish the complainant a copy of her comment. She was also fined the
amount of five thousand pesos (P5,000) in A.M. Nos. 04-7-373-RTC and 04-7-374 RTC. She was
reprimanded twice in A.M. No. MTJ-05-1609 and in A.M. No. MTJ-001337. Finally, in the very recent case
of Office of the Court Administrator v. Hon. Rosabella M. Tormis and Mr. Reynaldo S. Teves, A.M. No. MTJ-
12-1817, promulgated last 12 March 2013, Judge Tormis was found guilty of gross inefficiency, violation
of Supreme Court rules, directives and circulars and gross ignorance of the law by this Court. She was
dismissed from service, with forfeiture of all benefits and privileges, except accrued leave credits, if any,
with prejudice to reemployment in any branch or instrumentality of the government, including
government-owned or controlled corporations.
The respondent judges violated Canons 2 and 6 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics which exact competence,
integrity and probity in the performance of their duties. This Court previously said that "Ignorance of the
law is a mark of incompetence, and where the law involved is elementary, ignorance thereof is considered
as an indication of lack of integrity." In connection with this, the administration of justice is considered a
sacred task and upon assumption to office, a judge ceases to be an ordinary mortal. He or she becomes
the visible representation of the law and more importantly of justice.
The actuations of these judges are not only condemnable, it is outright shameful.
Liability of Other Court Personnel
The Court agrees with the recommendations of the OCA on the liability of the following employees:
Helen Mongaya, Court Interpreter of Judge Rosabella M. Tormis, MTCC, Branch 4, Cebu City, is guilty of
grave misconduct when she informed the female lawyer of the judicial audit team that she can facilitate
the marriage and the requirements on the same day of the lawyer’s visit.
What Monggaya was proposing was an open-dated marriage in exchange for a fee of P3,000. Section 2,
Canon I of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel prohibits court personnel from soliciting or accepting
gifts, favor or benefit based on any explicit or implicit understanding that such gift, favor or benefit shall
influence their official actions.
Mongaya’s claim that she was merely relating to the lady lawyer what she knew from other offices as the
usual practice is inexcusable. As found by the OCA in its Memorandum, "Monggaya deliberately gave false
information for the purpose of perpetrating an illegal scheme. This, in itself, constitutes grave
misconduct." Sec. 52, Rule IV of the Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service defines grave misconduct as "a grave offense that carries the
extreme penalty of dismissal from the service even on a first offense.
In Villaceran v. Rosete, this Court held that:
Court personnel, from the lowliest employee, are involved in the dispensation of justice; parties seeking
redress from the courts for grievances look upon court personnel, irrespective of rank or position, as part
of the Judiciary. In performing their duties and responsibilities, these court personnel serve as sentinels
of justice and any act of impropriety on their part immeasurably affects the honor and dignity of the
Judiciary and the people’s trust and confidence in this institution. Therefore, they are expected to act and
behave in a manner that should uphold the honor and dignity of the Judiciary, if only to maintain the
people's confidence in the Judiciary.
Let a copy of this Decision be included in the respondents’ files that are with the Office of the Bar
Confidant and distributed to all courts and to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. MTJ-11-1801 (Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 11-2438 MTJ) February 27, 2013
ANONYMOUS, Complainant, vs. JUDGE RIO C. ACHAS, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 2,
Ozamiz City, Misamis Occidental, Respondent.
Before the Court is an anonymous letter-complaint, dated August 2, 2010, alleging immorality and
conduct unbecoming of a judge against respondent Judge Rio C. Achas (Judge Achas), Presiding Judge,
Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 2, Ozamiz City, Misamis Occidental.
The letter calls on the Court to look into the morality of respondent Judge Achas and alleges that: (1) it is
of public knowledge in the city that Judge Achas is living scandalously with a woman who is not his wife;
(2) he lives beyond his means; (3) he is involved with illegal activities through his connection with bad
elements, the kuratongs; ( 4) he comes to court very untidy and dirty; (5) he decides his cases unfairly in
exchange for material and monetary consideration; and (6) he is involved with cockfighting/gambling.
In the Indorsement, dated September 30, 2010, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) referred the
matter to Executive Judge Miriam Orquieza-Angot (Judge Angot) for Discreet Investigation and Report.
In her Report, dated November 26, 2010, Judge Angot found that Judge Achas had been separated from
his legal wife for quite some time and they are living apart; and that he found for himself a young woman
with whom he would occasionally go out with in public and it was not a secret around town. Anent the
allegations that Judge Achas was living beyond his means and was involved in illegal activities, Judge
Angot reported that she could not be certain whether such were true, and only ascertained that he had
established friendships or alliances with people of different social standings from around the city. Judge
Angot opined that the allegation that Judge Achas would come to court untidy and dirty was a matter of
personal hygiene and in the eye of the beholder. Lastly, she found the charge that Judge Achas decided
cases unfairly in exchange for consideration to be vague and unsubstantiated.
In his Comment, dated February 4, 2011, Judge Achas denied all the allegations against him and claimed
that they were hatched to harass him, pointing to disgruntled professionals, supporters and local
candidates who lost during the May 2010 elections. He asserted that after 28 years in the government
service, he had remained loyal to his work and conducted himself in a righteous manner.
In the Resolution, dated December 14, 2011, the Court resolved to redocket the case as a regular
administrative matter and to refer the same to the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Ozamiz
City for investigation, report and recommendation.
In her Report, dated April 4, 2012, Executive Judge Salome P. Dungog (Judge Dungog) stated that an
investigation was conducted. Judge Achas and his two witnesses testified in his defense, namely, his
Branch Clerk of Court, Renato Zapatos; and his Process Server, Michael Del Rosario. The anonymous
complainant never appeared to testify. During the investigation, Judge Achas again denied all the charges
but admitted that he was married and only separated de facto from his legal wife for 26 years, and that he
reared game cocks for leisure and extra income, having inherited such from his forefathers. Judge Dungog
found that "it is not commendable, proper or moral per Canons of Judicial Ethics to be perceived as going
out with a woman not his wife," and for him to be involved in rearing game cocks.
In its Memorandum, dated December 17, 2012, the OCA recommended that Judge Achas be reprimanded
as to the charge of immorality. It was further recommended that he be ordered to refrain from going to
cockpits or avoid such places altogether, with a warning that the same or similar complaint in the future
shall be dealt with more severely. The other charges were recommended to be dismissed for lack of merit.
The Court agrees, with modification.
Under Section 1 of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, anonymous complaints may be filed against judges, but
they must be supported by public records of indubitable integrity. Courts have acted in such instances
needing no corroboration by evidence to be offered by the complainant. Thus, for anonymous complaints,
the burden of proof in administrative proceedings which usually rests with the complainant, must be
buttressed by indubitable public records and by what is sufficiently proven during the investigation. If the
burden of proof is not overcome, the respondent is under no obligation to prove his defense.
DISMISSED FROM THE SERVICE with forfeiture of his retirement benefits, except leave credits, if any, and
that he be disqualified from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-
owned or -controlled corporation;
2. Judge Gil R. Acosta, Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 3, Cebu City, GUILTY of gross
inefficiency or neglect of duty and of gross ignorance of the law and that he be DISMISSED FROM THE
SERVICE with forfeiture of his retirement benefits, except leave credits, if any, and that he be disqualified
from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or -controlled
corporation;
3. Judge Rosabella M. Tormis, Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 4, Cebu City, GUILTY
of gross inefficiency or neglect of duty and of gross ignorance of the law and that she would have been
DISMISSED FROM THE SERVICE with forfeiture of her retirement benefits, except leave credits, if any, and
disqualified from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or
-controlled corporation, had she not been previously dismissed from service in A.M. No. MTJ-12-1817
(Formerly A.M. No. 09-2-30-MTCC);
4. Judge Edgemelo C. Rosales, Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 8, Cebu City, GUILTY
of gross inefficiency or neglect of duty and of gross ignorance of the law and that he be DISMISSED FROM
THE SERVICE with forfeiture of his retirement benefits, except leave credits, if any, and that he be
disqualified from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or
-controlled corporation;
5. Helen Mongaya, Court Interpreter, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 4, Cebu City, GUILTY of
violating Section 2, Canon I of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel and that she be DISMISSED FROM
THE SERVICE with forfeiture of her retirement benefits, except leave credits, if any, and that she be
disqualified from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or
-controlled corporation;
6. Rhona F. Rodriguez, Administrative Officer I, Office of the Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court, Cebu City,
GUILTY of gross misconduct for Section 2, Canon I of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel and for
inducing Maricel Albater to falsify the application for marriage and that she be DISMISSED FROM THE
SERVICE with forfeiture of her retirement benefits, except leave credits, if any, and that she be disqualified
from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or -controlled
corporation;
7. Desiderio S. Aranas, Process Server, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 3, Cebu City, GUILTY of
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and that he be SUSPENDED without pay for a period
of six (6) months with a warning that a similar offense shall be dealt with more severely;
8. Rebecca Alesna, Court Interpreter, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 1, Cebu City, GUILTY of
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and of violating Section 2(b), Canon III of the Code of
Conduct for Court Personnel and that she be SUSPENDED without pay for a period of six (6) months with
a warning that a similar offense shall be dealt with more severely;
9. Celeste Retuya, Clerk III, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 6, Cebu City, and Emma Valencia,
Stenographer III, Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Cebu City, GUILTY of conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service and of violating Section 2(b), Canon III of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel
and that they be ADMONISHED with a warning that a similar offense shall be dealt with more severely;
The complaints against Judge Geraldine Faith A. Econg, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 9,
Cebu City; Corazon P. Retuya, Court Stenographer, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 6, Cebu City; and
Marilou Cabanñ ez, Court Stenographer, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, are DISMISSED for lack of merit.
The case against Judge Rosabella M. Tormis, including the sworn statements of Celerina Plaza and
Crisanto dela Cerna, should be REFERRED to the Office of the Bar Confidant for the purpose of initiating
disbarment proceedings against the judge.
The Honorable Mayors of Barili, Cebu and Liloan, Cebu, are to be furnished copies of the Supplemental
Report dated 14 August 2007 and are ADVISED to conduct an investigation with respect to the statements
of Filomena C. Lopez, Civil Registrar of Barili, Cebu, and Bonita I. Pilones, Civil Registrar of Liloan, Cebu,
regarding the processing of marriage licenses and to take the necessary action as the findings of the
investigation may warrant.
Seven years later, similar charges of immoral cohabitation and cockfighting have again been levelled
against Judge Achas. Considering that his immoral behaviour is not a secret around town, it is apparent
that respondent judge has failed to ensure that his conduct is perceived to be above reproach by the
reasonable observer, and has failed to avoid the appearance of impropriety in his activities, to the
detriment of the judiciary as a whole.
No position demands greater moral righteousness and uprightness from its occupant than does the
judicial office. Judges in particular must be individuals of competence, honesty and probity, charged as
they are with safeguarding the integrity of the court and its proceedings. He should behave at all times so
as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, and avoid impropriety
and the appearance of impropriety in all his activities. His personal behaviour outside the court, and not
only while in the performance of his official duties, must be beyond reproach, for he is perceived to be the
personification of law and justice. Thus, any demeaning act of a judge degrades the institution he
represents.
Under Section 10 in relation to Section 11 C (1) of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended,
"unbecoming conduct" is classified as a light charge, punishable by any of the following sanctions: (1) a
fine of not less than Pl,000.00 but not exceeding P10,000.00; and/or (2) censure; (3) reprimand; ( 4)
admonition with warning. The Court, thus, finds that the penalty of a fine in the amount of P5,000.00 and
reprimand are proper under the circumstances.
WHEREFORE, for violation of the New Code of Judicial Conduct, respondent Judge Rio Concepcion Achas
is REPRlMANDED and FINED in the amount of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00), ADMONISHED not
to socially mingle with cockfighting enthusiasts and bettors, and STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of
the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC February 8, 2011
IN THE MATTER OF THE CHARGES OF PLAGIARISM, ETC., AGAINST ASSOCIATE JUSTICE MARIANO C.
DEL CASTILLO.
Petitioners Isabelita C. Vinuya, et al., all members of the Malaya Lolas Organization, seek reconsideration
of the decision of the Court dated October 12, 2010 that dismissed their charges of plagiarism, twisting of
cited materials, and gross neglect against Justice Mariano Del Castillo in connection with the decision he
wrote for the Court in G.R. No. 162230, entitled Vinuya v. Romulo.
Mainly, petitioners claim that the Court has by its decision legalized or approved of the commission of
plagiarism in the Philippines. This claim is absurd. The Court, like everyone else, condemns plagiarism as
the world in general understands and uses the term.
Plagiarism, a term not defined by statute, has a popular or common definition. To plagiarize, says Webster,
is "to steal and pass off as one’s own" the ideas or words of another. Stealing implies malicious taking.
Black’s Law Dictionary, the world’s leading English law dictionary quoted by the Court in its decision,
defines plagiarism as the "deliberate and knowing presentation of another person's original ideas or
creative expressions as one’s own." The presentation of another person’s ideas as one’s own must be
deliberate or premeditated—a taking with ill intent.
There is no commonly-used dictionary in the world that embraces in the meaning of plagiarism errors in
attribution by mere accident or in good faith.
Certain educational institutions of course assume different norms in its application. For instance, the
Loyola Schools Code of Academic Integrity ordains that "plagiarism is identified not through intent but
through the act itself. The objective act of falsely attributing to one’s self what is not one’s work, whether
intentional or out of neglect, is sufficient to conclude that plagiarism has occurred. Students who plead
ignorance or appeal to lack of malice are not excused."
But the Court’s decision in the present case does not set aside such norm. The decision makes this clear,
thus:
To paraphrase Bast and Samuels, while the academic publishing model is based on the originality of the
writer’s thesis, the judicial system is based on the doctrine of stare decisis, which encourages courts to
cite historical legal data, precedents, and related studies in their decisions. The judge is not expected to
In the present case, no evidence was attached to the letter-complaint. The complainant never appeared,
and no public records were brought forth during the investigation. Respondent Judge Achas denied all the
charges made against him, only admitting that he was separated de facto from his wife and that he reared
fighting cocks.
The charges that he (1) lives beyond his means, (2) is involved with illegal activities through his
connection with the kuratongs, (3) comes to court very untidy and dirty, and (4) decides his cases unfairly
in exchange for material and monetary consideration were, therefore, properly recommended dismissed
by the OCA for lack of evidence.
The charges that (1) it is of public knowledge that he is living scandalously with a woman not his wife and
that (2) he is involved with cockfighting/gambling are, however, another matter.
The New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary pertinently provides:
CANON 2
INTEGRITY
Integrity is essential not only to the proper discharge of the judicial office but also to the personal
demeanor of judges.
SEC. 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but that it is perceived to be so
in the view of a reasonable observer.
SEC. 2. The behavior and conduct of judges must reaffirm the people’s faith in the integrity of the
judiciary. Justice must not merely be done but must also be seen to be done.
xxx xxx xxx
CANON 4
PROPRIETY
Propriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to the performance of all the activities of a judge.
SEC. 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities.
SEC. 2. As a subject of constant public scrutiny, judges must accept personal restrictions that might be
viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do so freely and willingly. In particular, judges
shall conduct themselves in a way that is consistent with the dignity of the judicial office.
xxx xxx xxx
Judge Angot’s discreet investigation revealed that the respondent judge found "for himself a suitable
young lass whom he occasionally goes out with in public and such a fact is not a secret around town."
Judge Achas denied this and no evidence was presented to prove the contrary. He did admit, however, that
he had been estranged from his wife for the last 26 years. Notwithstanding his admission, the fact
remains that he is still legally married to his wife. The Court, therefore, agrees with Judge Dungog in
finding that it is not commendable, proper or moral for a judge to be perceived as going out with a woman
not his wife. Such is a blemish to his integrity and propriety, as well as to that of the Judiciary.
For going out in public with a woman not his wife, Judge Achas has clearly failed to abide by the above-
cited Canons of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for Philippine Judiciary.
Regarding his involvement in cockfighting, however, there is no clear evidence. Judge Achas denied
engaging in cockfighting and betting. He admitted, however, that he reared fighting cocks for leisure,
having inherited the practice from his forefathers. While gamecocks are bred and kept primarily for
gambling, there is no proof that he goes to cockpits and gambles. While rearing fighting cocks is not
illegal, Judge Achas should avoid mingling with a crowd of cockfighting enthusiasts and bettors as it
undoubtedly impairs the respect due him. As a judge, he must impose upon himself personal restrictions
that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do so freely and willingly.
The Court further notes that in A.M. No. MTJ-04-1564, Judge Achas was charged with immorality for
cohabiting with a woman not his wife, and with gross misconduct and dishonesty for personally accepting
a cash bond in relation to a case and not depositing it with the clerk of court, and for maintaining a flock
of fighting cocks and actively participating in cockfights. The Court, in 2005, found him guilty of gross
misconduct for personally receiving the cash bond and fined him in the amount of P15,000.00 with a
stern warning. The charge of immorality was dismissed for lack of evidence. Although the Court, at the
same time, noted that the charge of maintaining a flock of fighting cocks and participating in cockfights
was denied by the respondent judge, it made no ruling on the charge.
language from a party’s brief are used without giving attribution. Thus judges are free to use whatever
sources they deem appropriate to resolve the matter before them, without fear of reprisal. This
exemption applies to judicial writings intended to decide cases for two reasons: the judge is not writing a
literary work and, more importantly, the purpose of the writing is to resolve a dispute. As a result, judges
adjudicating cases are not subject to a claim of legal plagiarism.
If the Court were to inquire into the issue of plagiarism respecting its past decisions from the time of Chief
Justice Cayetano S. Arellano to the present, it is likely to discover that it has not on occasion
acknowledged the originators of passages and views found in its decisions. These omissions are true for
many of the decisions that have been penned and are being penned daily by magistrates from the Court of
Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax Appeals, the Regional Trial Courts nationwide and with
them, the municipal trial courts and other first level courts. Never in the judiciary’s more than 100 years
of history has the lack of attribution been regarded and demeaned as plagiarism.
This is not to say that the magistrates of our courts are mere copycats. They are not. Their decisions
analyze the often conflicting facts of each case and sort out the relevant from the irrelevant. They identify
and formulate the issue or issues that need to be resolved and evaluate each of the laws, rulings,
principles, or authorities that the parties to the case invoke. The decisions then draw their apt
conclusions regarding whether or not such laws, rulings, principles, or authorities apply to the particular
cases before the Court. These efforts, reduced in writing, are the product of the judges’ creativity. It is here
—actually the substance of their decisions—that their genius, originality, and honest labor can be found,
of which they should be proud.
In Vinuya, Justice Del Castillo examined and summarized the facts as seen by the opposing sides in a way
that no one has ever done. He identified and formulated the core of the issues that the parties raised. And
when he had done this, he discussed the state of the law relevant to their resolution. It was here that he
drew materials from various sources, including the three foreign authors cited in the charges against him.
He compared the divergent views these present as they developed in history. He then explained why the
Court must reject some views in light of the peculiar facts of the case and applied those that suit such
facts. Finally, he drew from his discussions of the facts and the law the right solution to the dispute in the
case. On the whole, his work was original. He had but done an honest work.
The Court will not, therefore, consistent with established practice in the Philippines and elsewhere, dare
permit the filing of actions to annul the decisions promulgated by its judges or expose them to charges of
plagiarism for honest work done.
This rule should apply to practicing lawyers as well. Counsels for the petitioners, like all lawyers handling
cases before courts and administrative tribunals, cannot object to this. Although as a rule they receive
compensation for every pleading or paper they file in court or for every opinion they render to clients,
lawyers also need to strive for technical accuracy in their writings. They should not be exposed to charges
of plagiarism in what they write so long as they do not depart, as officers of the court, from the objective
of assisting the Court in the administration of justice.
As Duncan Webb said:
In presenting legal argument most lawyers will have recourse to either previous decisions of the courts,
frequently lifting whole sections of a judge’s words to lend weight to a particular point either with or
without attribution. The words of scholars are also sometimes given weight, depending on reputation.
Some encyclopaedic works are given particular authority. In England this place is given to Halsbury’s
Laws of England which is widely considered authoritative. A lawyer can do little better than to frame an
argument or claim to fit with the articulation of the law in Halsbury’s. While in many cases the very
purpose of the citation is to claim the authority of the author, this is not always the case. Frequently
commentary or dicta of lesser standing will be adopted by legal authors, largely without attribution.
xxxx
The converse point is that originality in the law is viewed with skepticism. It is only the arrogant fool or
the truly gifted who will depart entirely from the established template and reformulate an existing idea in
the belief that in doing so they will improve it. While over time incremental changes occur, the wholesale
abandonment of established expression is generally considered foolhardy.
The Court probably should not have entertained at all the charges of plagiarism against Justice Del
Castillo, coming from the losing party. But it is a case of first impression and petitioners, joined by some
produce original scholarship in every respect. The strength of a decision lies in the soundness and general
acceptance of the precedents and long held legal opinions it draws from.
Original scholarship is highly valued in the academe and rightly so. A college thesis, for instance, should
contain dissertations embodying results of original research, substantiating a specific view. This must be
so since the writing is intended to earn for the student an academic degree, honor, or distinction. He earns
no credit nor deserves it who takes the research of others, copies their dissertations, and proclaims these
as his own. There should be no question that a cheat deserves neither reward nor sympathy.
But the policy adopted by schools of disregarding the element of malicious intent found in dictionaries is
evidently more in the nature of establishing what evidence is sufficient to prove the commission of such
dishonest conduct than in rewriting the meaning of plagiarism. Since it would be easy enough for a
student to plead ignorance or lack of malice even as he has copied the work of others, certain schools
have adopted the policy of treating the mere presence of such copied work in his paper sufficient
objective evidence of plagiarism. Surely, however, if on its face the student’s work shows as a whole that
he has but committed an obvious mistake or a clerical error in one of hundreds of citations in his thesis,
the school will not be so unreasonable as to cancel his diploma.
In contrast, decisions of courts are not written to earn merit, accolade, or prize as an original piece of
work or art. Deciding disputes is a service rendered by the government for the public good. Judges issue
decisions to resolve everyday conflicts involving people of flesh and blood who ache for speedy justice or
juridical beings which have rights and obligations in law that need to be protected. The interest of society
in written decisions is not that they are originally crafted but that they are fair and correct in the context
of the particular disputes involved. Justice, not originality, form, and style, is the object of every decision
of a court of law.
There is a basic reason for individual judges of whatever level of courts, including the Supreme Court, not
to use original or unique language when reinstating the laws involved in the cases they decide. Their duty
is to apply the laws as these are written. But laws include, under the doctrine of stare decisis, judicial
interpretations of such laws as are applied to specific situations. Under this doctrine, Courts are "to stand
by precedent and not to disturb settled point." Once the Court has "laid down a principle of law as
applicable to a certain state of facts, it will adhere to that principle, and apply it to all future cases, where
facts are substantially the same; regardless of whether the parties or property are the same."
And because judicial precedents are not always clearly delineated, they are quite often entangled in
apparent inconsistencies or even in contradictions, prompting experts in the law to build up regarding
such matters a large body of commentaries or annotations that, in themselves, often become part of legal
writings upon which lawyers and judges draw materials for their theories or solutions in particular cases.
And, because of the need to be precise and correct, judges and practitioners alike, by practice and
tradition, usually lift passages from such precedents and writings, at times omitting, without malicious
intent, attributions to the originators.
Is this dishonest? No. Duncan Webb, writing for the International Bar Association puts it succinctly. When
practicing lawyers (which include judges) write about the law, they effectively place their ideas, their
language, and their work in the public domain, to be affirmed, adopted, criticized, or rejected. Being in the
public domain, other lawyers can thus freely use these without fear of committing some wrong or
incurring some liability. Thus:
The tendency to copy in law is readily explicable. In law accuracy of words is everything. Legal disputes
often centre round the way in which obligations have been expressed in legal documents and how the
facts of the real world fit the meaning of the words in which the obligation is contained. This, in
conjunction with the risk-aversion of lawyers means that refuge will often be sought in articulations that
have been tried and tested. In a sense therefore the community of lawyers have together contributed to
this body of knowledge, language, and expression which is common property and may be utilized,
developed and bettered by anyone.
The implicit right of judges to use legal materials regarded as belonging to the public domain is not
unique to the Philippines. As Joyce C. George, whom Justice Maria Lourdes Sereno cites in her dissenting
opinion, observed in her Judicial Opinion Writing Handbook:
A judge writing to resolve a dispute, whether trial or appellate, is exempted from a charge of plagiarism
even if ideas, words or phrases from a law review article, novel thoughts published in a legal periodical or
amended its petition to include its claim for refund of the excess taxes paid from 2001 until 2003.
On October 15, 2004, the RTC dismissed the petition on the ground that the period to file the claim had
already prescribed and that Surfield had failed to exhaust administrative remedies. The RTC ruled that the
grant of a tax refund was not a ministerial duty compellable by writ of mandamus.
Surfield, represented by the petitioners, elevated the dismissal to the CTA via petition for review (CTA AC
No. 5 entitled Surfield Development Corporation v. Hon. City Treasurer and Hon. City Assessor, Mandaluyong
City). The appeal was assigned to the First Division, composed of Presiding Justice Ernesto D. Acosta,
Associate Justice Lovell R. Bautista and Associate Justice Caesar A. Casanova.
In its decision dated January 5, 2006, the CTA First Division denied the petition for lack of jurisdiction
and for failure to exhaust the remedies provided under Section 253 and Section 226 of Republic Act No.
7160 (Local Government Code).
Undeterred, the petitioners sought reconsideration in behalf of Surfield, insisting that the CTA had
jurisdiction pursuant to Section 7(a)(3) of Republic Act No. 9282; and arguing that the CTA First Division
manifested its lack of understanding or respect for the doctrine of stare decisis in not applying the ruling
in Ty v. Trampe (G.R. No. 117577, December 1, 1995, 250 SCRA 500), to the effect that there was no need
to file an appeal before the Local Board of Assessment Appeals pursuant to Section 22 of Republic Act No.
7160.
On March 15, 2006, the CTA First Division denied Surfields motion for reconsideration. On the issue of
jurisdiction, the CTA First Division explained that the jurisdiction conferred by Section 7(a)(3) of Republic
Act No. 1125, as amended by Republic Act No. 9282, referred to appeals from the decisions, orders, or
resolutions of the RTCs in local tax cases and did not include the real property tax, an ad valorem tax, the
refund of excess payment of which Surfield was claiming. Accordingly, the CTA First Division ruled that
the jurisdiction of the CTA concerning real property tax cases fell under a different section of Republic Act
No. 9282 and under a separate book of Republic Act No. 7160.
In addition, the CTA First Division, taking notice of the language the petitioners employed in the motion
for reconsideration, required them to explain within five days from receipt why they should not be liable
for indirect contempt or be made subject to disciplinary action, thusly:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, petitioners Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
And insofar as the merits of the case are concerned let this Resolution be considered as the final decision
on the matter.
However, this Court finds the statements of petitioners counsel that it is gross ignorance of the law for the
Honorable Court to have held that it has no jurisdiction over this instant petition; the grossness of this
Honorable Courts ignorance of the law is matched only by the unequivocal expression of this Honorable
Courts jurisdiction over the instant case and this Court lacked the understanding and respect for the
doctrine of stare decisis as derogatory, offensive and disrespectful. Lawyers are charged with the basic
duty to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers; they vow
solemnly to conduct themselves with all good fidelity to the courts. As a matter of fact, the first canon of
legal ethics enjoins them to maintain towards the courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the
temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its superior importance. Therefore,
petitioners counsel is hereby ORDERED to explain within five (5) days from receipt of this Resolution why
he should not be held for indirect contempt and/or subject to disciplinary action.
SO ORDERED.
The petitioners submitted a compliance dated March 27, 2006, in which they appeared to apologize but
nonetheless justified their language as, among others, necessary to bluntly call the Honorable Courts
attention to the grievousness of the error by calling a spade by spade.
In its first assailed resolution, the CTA First Division found the petitioners apology wanting in sincerity
and humility, observing that they chose words that were so strong, which brings disrepute the Courts
honor and integrity for brazenly pointing to the Courts alleged ignorance and grave abuse of discretion, to
wit:
In their Compliance, the Court finds no sincerity and humility when counsels Denis B. Habawel and Alexis
F. Medina asked for apology. In fact, the counsels brazenly pointed the Courts alleged ignorance and grave
abuse of discretion. Their chosen words are so strong, which brings disrepute the Courts honor and
integrity. We quote:
faculty members of the University of the Philippines school of law, have unfairly maligned him with the
charges of plagiarism, twisting of cited materials, and gross neglect for failing to attribute lifted passages
from three foreign authors. These charges as already stated are false, applying the meaning of plagiarism
as the world in general knows it.
True, Justice Del Castillo failed to attribute to the foreign authors materials that he lifted from their works
and used in writing the decision for the Court in the Vinuya case. But, as the Court said, the evidence as
found by its Ethics Committee shows that the attribution to these authors appeared in the beginning
drafts of the decision. Unfortunately, as testified to by a highly qualified and experienced court-employed
researcher, she accidentally deleted the same at the time she was cleaning up the final draft. The Court
believed her since, among other reasons, she had no motive for omitting the attribution. The foreign
authors concerned, like the dozens of other sources she cited in her research, had high reputations in
international law.
Notably, those foreign authors expressly attributed the controversial passages found in their works to
earlier writings by others. The authors concerned were not themselves the originators. As it happened,
although the ponencia of Justice Del Castillo accidentally deleted the attribution to them, there remained
in the final draft of the decision attributions of the same passages to the earlier writings from which those
authors borrowed their ideas in the first place. In short, with the remaining attributions after the
erroneous clean-up, the passages as it finally appeared in the Vinuya decision still showed on their face
that the lifted ideas did not belong to Justice Del Castillo but to others. He did not pass them off as his
own.
With our ruling, the Court need not dwell long on petitioners’ allegations that Justice Del Castillo had also
committed plagiarism in writing for the Court his decision in another case, Ang Ladlad v. Commission on
Elections. Petitioners are nit-picking. Upon close examination and as Justice Del Castillo amply
demonstrated in his comment to the motion for reconsideration, he in fact made attributions to passages
in such decision that he borrowed from his sources although they at times suffered in formatting lapses.
Considering its above ruling, the Court sees no point in further passing upon the motion of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines for leave to file and admit motion for reconsideration-in-intervention dated January
5, 2011 and Dr. Peter Payoyo’s claim of other instances of alleged plagiarism in the Vinuya decision.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court DENIES petitioners’ motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 174759 (September 7, 2011)
DENIS B. HABAWEL and ALEXIS F. MEDINA, Petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS, FIRST
DIVISION, Respondent.
Found guilty of direct contempt by the First Division of the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA First Division), and
sanctioned with imprisonment for a period of ten days and a fine of P2,000.00, the petitioners have come
to the Court for relief through certiorari, claiming that the CTA First Divisions finding and sentence were
made in grave abuse of its discretion because the language they used in their motion for reconsideration
as the attorneys for a party was contumacious. Specifically, they assail the resolution dated May 16, 2006,
whereby the CTA First Division disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds Attorneys Denis B. Habawel and Alexis F. Medina of
the Ponce Enrile Reyes and Manalastas Law Offices guilty of DIRECT CONTEMPT. Each counsel is hereby
ORDERED TO PAY a fine of Two Thousand Pesos and to SUFFER IMPRISONMENT for a period of ten (10)
days.
SO ORDERED. and the resolution dated July 26, 2006, whereby the CTA First Division denied their motion
for reconsideration and reiterated the penalties.
Antecedents
The petitioners were the counsel of Surfield Development Corporation (Surfield), which sought from the
Office of the City Treasurer of Mandaluyong City the refund of excess realty taxes paid from 1995 until
2000. After the City Government of Mandaluyong City denied its claim for refund, Surfield initiated a
special civil action for mandamus in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Mandaluyong City, which was
docketed as SCA No. MC03-2142 entitled Surfield Development Corporation v. Hon. City Treasurer of
Mandaluyong City, and Hon. City Assessor of Mandaluyong City, and assigned to Branch 214. Surfield later
disrespectful should be viewed within the context of the general tone and language of their motion for
reconsideration; that their overall language was tempered, restrained and respectful and should not be
construed as a display of contumacious attitude or as a flouting or arrogant belligerence in defiance of the
court to be penalized as direct contempt; that the CTA First Division did not appreciate the sincerity of
their apology; and that they merely pointed out the error in the decision of the CTA First Division.
For its part, the CTA First Division contends that a reading of the motion for reconsideration and the
character of the words used therein by the petitioners indicated that their statements reflected no
humility, nor were they expressive of a contrite heart; and that their submissions instead reflected
arrogance and sarcasm, that they even took the opportunity to again deride the public respondent on the
manner of how it wrote the decision.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) opines that submitting a pleading containing derogatory,
offensive and malicious statements to the same court or judge in which the proceedings are pending
constitutes direct contempt; and that the CTA First Division did not abuse its discretion in finding the
petitioners liable for direct contempt under Section 1, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court.
Ruling
We dismiss the petition for certiorari, and declare that the CTA First Division did not abuse its discretion,
least of all gravely, in finding that the petitioners committed direct contempt of court.
Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates all attorneys to observe and maintain the
respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and to insist on similar conduct by others. Rule 11.03 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility specifically enjoins all attorneys thus:
Rule 11.03. A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behavior before
the Courts.
It is conceded that an attorney or any other person may be critical of the courts and their judges provided
the criticism is made in respectful terms and through legitimate channels. In that regard, we have long
adhered to the sentiment aptly given expression to in the leading case of In re: Almacen:
xxx every citizen has the right to comment upon and criticize the actuations of public officers. This
right is not diminished by the fact that the criticism is aimed at a judicial authority, or that it is
articulated by a lawyer. Such right is especially recognized where the criticism concerns a
concluded litigation, because then the courts actuation are thrown open to public consumption.
xxx
Courts and judges are not sacrosanct. They should and expect critical evaluation of their
performance. For like the executive and the legislative branches, the judiciary is rooted in the soil
of democratic society, nourished by the periodic appraisal of the citizens whom it is expected to
serve.
Well-recognized therefore is the right of a lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as a citizen, to
criticize in properly respectful terms and through legitimate channels the acts of courts and
judges. xxx
xxx
Hence, as a citizen and as officer of the court, a lawyer is expected not only to exercise the right,
but also to consider it his duty to avail of such right. No law may abridge this right. Nor is he
professionally answerable for a scrutiny into the official conduct of the judges, which would not
expose him to legal animadversion as a citizen. xxx
xxx
But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill over
the walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on the one hand, and
abuse and slander of courts and the judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a
gross violation of the duty of respect to courts. It is such a misconduct that subjects a lawyer to
disciplinary action. (emphasis supplied)
The test for criticizing a judges decision is, therefore, whether or not the criticism is bona fide or done in
good faith, and does not spill over the walls of decency and propriety.
Here, the petitioners motion for reconsideration contained the following statements, to wit: (a) [i]t is
gross ignorance of the law for the Honorable Court to have held that it has no jurisdiction over the instant
a) Admittedly, the language of the Motion for Reconsideration was not endearing. However, the
undersigned counsel found it necessary to bluntly call the Honorable Courts attention to the grievousness
of the error by calling a spade a spade. The advocacy needed a strong articulation of the gravity of the
error of the Honorable Court in avoiding the substantial and transcendental issues by the simple
expedient of dismissing the petition for alleged lack of jurisdiction, in violation of Section 14, Article VIII
of the Constitution, which requires that the Decision must express clearly and distinctly the facts and the
law on which the Decision was based (par. 3 of the Compliance; docket, p. 349);
b) Since the Honorable Court simply quoted Section 7(a)(5) and it totally ignored Section 7(a)(3), to
perfunctorily find that (U)ndoubtedly, appeals of the decisions or rulings of the Regional Trial Court
concerning real property taxes evidently do not fall within the jurisdiction of the CTA, the undersigned
counsel formed a perception that the Honorable Court was totally unaware or ignorant of the new
provision, Section 7(a)(3). Hence, the statements that it was gross ignorance of the law for the Honorable
Court to have held that it has not [sic] jurisdiction, as well as, the grossness of the Honorable Courts
ignorance of the law is matched only by the unequivocal expression of this Honorable Courts jurisdiction
over the instant case were an honest and frank articulation of undersigned counsels perception that was
influenced by its failure to understand why the Honorable Court totally ignored Section 7(a)(3) in ruling
on its lack of jurisdiction (par. 10 of the Compliance; docket, p. 353);
Accordingly, the CTA First Division adjudged both of the petitioners guilty of direct contempt of court for
failing to uphold their duty of preserving the integrity and respect due to the courts, sentencing each to
suffer imprisonment of ten days and to pay P2,000.00 as fine.
Seeking reconsideration, the petitioners submitted that they could not be held guilty of direct contempt
because: (a) the phrase gross ignorance of the law was used in its legal sense to describe the error of
judgment and was not directed to the character or competence of the decision makers; (b) there was no
unfounded accusation or allegation, or scandalous, offensive or menacing, intemperate, abusive, abrasive
or threatening, or vile, rude and repulsive statements or words contained in their motion for
reconsideration; (c) there was no statement in their motion for reconsideration that brought the
authority of the CTA and the administration of the law into disrepute; and ( d) they had repeatedly offered
their apology in their compliance.
Their submissions did not convince and move the CTA First Division to reconsider, which declared
through its second assailed resolution that:
The tone of an irate lawyer would almost always reveal the sarcasm in the phrases used. The scurrilous
attacks made in the guise of pointing out errors of judgment almost always result to the destruction of the
high esteem and regard towards the Court. and disposed thusly:
WHEREFORE, petitioners Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. Each counsel is
hereby ORDERED TO PAY a fine of Two Thousand Pesos and to SUFFER IMPRISONMENT for a period of
ten (10) days.
SO, ORDERED.
Issues
Arguing that they were merely prompted by their (z)ealous advocacy and an appalling error committed
by the CTA First Division to frankly describe such error as gross ignorance of the law, the petitioners now
attribute grave abuse of discretion to the CTA First Division in finding that:
I
THE PETITIONERS LANGUAGE IN THE SUBJECT MOTION AND COMPLIANCE WAS CONTUMACIOUS;
II
THE PETITIONERS WERE NOT SINCERE IN THEIR APOLOGY AND WERE ARROGANT;
III
THE EXERCISE OF CONTEMPT POWER WAS WITHIN THE LIMITS SET BY THE SUPREME COURT; AND
IV
THE PETITIONERS WERE GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF DIRECT CONTEMPT.
The petitioners continue to posit that the phrase gross ignorance of the law was used in its strict legal
sense to emphasize the gravity of the error of law committed by the CTA First Division; and that the
statements described by the CTA First Division as abrasive, offensive, derogatory, offensive and
ignorance of the law is matched only by the unequivocal expression of this Honorable Courts jurisdiction
over the instant case were an honest and frank articulation of undersigned counsels perception that was
influenced by its failure to understand why the Honorable Court totally ignored Section 7(a)(3) in ruling
on its lack of jurisdiction. (emphasis supplied)
We might have been more understanding of the milieu in which the petitioners made the statements had
they convinced us that the CTA First Division truly erred in holding itself bereft of jurisdiction over the
appeal of their client. But our review of the text of the legal provisions involved reveals that the error was
committed by them, not by the CTA First Division. This result became immediately evident from a reading
of Section 7(a)(3) and Section 7(a)(5) of Republic Act No. 9282, the former being the anchor for their
claim that the CTA really had jurisdiction, to wit:
Section 7. Jurisdiction. The CTA shall exercise:
(a) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review by appeal, as herein provided:
xxx
(3) Decisions, orders or resolutions of the Regional Trial Courts in local tax cases originally
decided or resolved by them in the exercise of their original or appellate jurisdiction; (emphasis
supplied)
xxx
(5) Decisions of the Central Board of Assessment Appeals in the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction over cases involving the assessment and taxation of real property originally decided
by the provincial or city board of assessment appeals; (emphasis supplied)
xxx
As can be read and seen, Section 7(a)(3) covers only appeals of the (d)ecisions, orders or resolutions of
the Regional Trial Courts in local tax cases originally decided or resolved by them in the exercise of their
original or appellate jurisdiction. The provision is clearly limited to local tax disputes decided by the
Regional Trial Courts. In contrast, Section 7(a)(5) grants the CTA cognizance of appeals of the (d)ecisions
of the Central Board of Assessment Appeals in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction over cases
involving the assessment and taxation of real property originally decided by the provincial or city board
of assessment appeals. In its resolution of March 15, 2006, therefore, the CTA First Division forthrightly
explained why, contrary to the petitioners urging, Section 7(a)(3) was not applicable by clarifying that a
real property tax, being an ad valorem tax, could not be treated as a local tax.
It would have been ethically better for the petitioners to have then retreated and simply admitted their
blatant error upon being so informed by the CTA First Division about the untenability of their legal
position on the matter, but they still persisted by going on in their compliance dated March 27, 2006 to
also blame the CTA First Division for their perception about the CTA First Divisions being totally oblivious
of Section 7(a)(3) due to the terseness of the Decision dated 05 January 2006, viz:
12. Undersigned counsel regrets having bluntly argued that this Honorable Court was grossly
ignorant of Section 7(a)(3) because from the terseness of the Decision dated 05 January 2006, the
undersigned counsel perceived the Honorable Court as being totally oblivious of Section 7(a)(3).
Had the reasons discussed in the Resolution dated 15 March 2006 been articulated in the 05
January 2006 decision, there would have been no basis for undersigned counsels to have formed
the above-mentioned perception. (emphasis supplied
The foregoing circumstances do not give cause for the Court to excuse the petitioners contemptuous and
offensive language. No attorney, no matter his great fame or high prestige, should ever brand a court or
judge as grossly ignorant of the law, especially if there was no sincere or legitimate reason for doing so.
Every attorney must use only fair and temperate language in arguing a worthy position on the law, and
must eschew harsh and intemperate language that has no place in the educated ranks of the Legal
Profession. Truly, the Bar should strive to win arguments through civility and fairness, not by heated and
acrimonious tone, as the Court aptly instructed in Slade Perkins v. Perkins, to wit:
The court notices with considerable regret the heated and acrimonious tone of the remarks of the
counsel for appellant, in his brief, in speaking of the action of the trial judge. We desire to express
our opinion that excessive language weakens rather than strengthens the persuasive force of legal
reasoning. We have noticed a growing tendency to use language that experience has shown not to
be conducive to the orderly and proper administration of justice. We therefore bespeak the
petition; (b) [t]he grossness of the Honorable Courts ignorance of the law is matched only by the
unequivocal expression of this Honorable Courts jurisdiction; and (c) the Honorable Courts lack of
understanding or respect for the doctrine of stare decisis.
The CTA First Division held the statements to constitute direct contempt of court meriting prompt
penalty.
We agree.
By such statements, the petitioners clearly and definitely overstepped the bounds of propriety as
attorneys, and disregarded their sworn duty to respect the courts. An imputation in a pleading of gross
ignorance against a court or its judge, especially in the absence of any evidence, is a serious allegation,
and constitutes direct contempt of court. It is settled that derogatory, offensive or malicious statements
contained in pleadings or written submissions presented to the same court or judge in which the
proceedings are pending are treated as direct contempt because they are equivalent to a misbehavior
committed in the presence of or so near a court or judge as to interrupt the administration of justice. This
is true, even if the derogatory, offensive or malicious statements are not read in open court. Indeed, in
Dantes v. Judge Ramon S. Caguioa, where the petitioners motion for clarification stated that the
respondent judges decision constituted gross negligence and ignorance of the rules, and was pure
chicanery and sophistry, the Court held that a pleading containing derogatory, offensive or malicious
statements when submitted before a court or judge in which the proceedings are pending is direct
contempt because it is equivalent to a misbehavior committed in the presence of or so near a court or
judge as to interrupt the administration of justice.
In his dissent, Justice Del Castillo, although conceding that the petitioners statements were strong,
tactless and hurtful, regards the statements not contemptuous, or not necessarily assuming the level of
contempt for being explanations of their position in a case under consideration and because an
unfavorable decision usually incites bitter feelings.
Such contempt of court cannot be condoned or be simply ignored and set aside, however, for the
characterization that the statements were strong, tactless and hurtful, although obviously correct,
provides no ground to be lenient towards the petitioners, even assuming that such strong, tactless and
hurtful statements were used to explain their clients position in the case. The statements manifested a
disrespect towards the CTA and the members of its First Division approaching disdain. Nor was the
offensiveness of their strong, tactless and hurtful language minimized on the basis that snide remarks or
sarcastic innuendos made by counsels are not considered contemptuous considering that unfavorable
decision usually incite bitter feelings. By branding the CTA and the members of its First Division as totally
unaware or ignorant of Section 7(a)(3) of Republic Act No. 9282, and making the other equally harsh
statements, the petitioners plainly assailed the legal learning of the members of the CTA First Division. To
hold such language as reflective of a very deliberate move on the part of the petitioners to denigrate the
CTA and the members of its First Division is not altogether unwarranted.
The petitioners disdain towards the members of the CTA First Division for ruling against their side found
firm confirmation in their compliance, in which they unrepentantly emphasized such disdain in the
following telling words:
3. Admittedly, the language of the Motion for Reconsideration was not endearing. However, the
undersigned counsel found it necessary to bluntly call the Honorable Courts attention to the
grievousness of the error by calling a spade a spade. The advocacy needed a strong articulation of
the gravity of the error of the Honorable Court in avoiding the substantial and transcendental
issues by the simple expedient of dismissing the petition for alleged lack of jurisdiction, in
violation of Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution, which requires that the Decision must express
clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which the Decision was based.
xxx
10. Since the Honorable Court simply quoted Section 7(a)(5), and it totally ignored Section 7(a)(3), to
perfunctorily find that (U)ndoubtedly, appeals of the decisions or rulings of the Regional Trial Court
concerning real property taxes evidently do not fall within the jurisdiction of the CTA, the undersigned
counsel formed a perception that the Honorable Court was totally unaware or ignorant of the new
provision, Section 7(a)(3). Hence the statements that it was gross ignorance of the law for the
Honorable Court to have held that it has no jurisdiction, as well as, the grossness of the Honorable Courts
disciplinary aspect. The Court concurs with the offended courts treatment of the offensive language as
direct contempt. Thus, we impose on each of them a fine of P2,000.00, the maximum imposable fine
under Section 1 of Rule 71, taking into consideration the fact that the CTA is a superior court of the same
level as the Court of Appeals, the second highest court of the land. The penalty of imprisonment, as earlier
clarified, is deleted. Yet, they are warned against using offensive or intemperate language towards a court
or its judge in the future, for they may not be as lightly treated as they now are.
ACCORDINGLY, we DISMISS the petition for certiorari; UPHOLD the resolutions dated May 16, 2006 and
July 26, 2006; and MODIFY the penalty imposed on Attorney Denis B. Habawel and Attorney Alexis F.
Medina by deleting the penalty of imprisonment and sentencing them only to pay the fine of P2,000.00
each.
SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. RTJ-13-2366 [Formerly OCA IPI No. 11-3740-RTJ], February 04, 2015
JILL M. TORMIS, Complainant, v. JUDGE MEINRADO P. PAREDES, Respondent
For consideration is the Report and Recommendation of Justice Maria Elisa Sempio Diy (Justice Diy),
Court of Appeals, Cebu City, submitted to this Court pursuant to its January 14, 2013 Resolution, referring
the complaint filed by Jill M. Tormis (Jill) against respondent Judge Meinrado P. Paredes (Judge Paredes),
Presiding Judge, Branch 13, Regional Trial Court (RTC), Cebu City, for investigation, report and
recommendation
The Fact
In her Affidavit/Complaint, dated September 5, 2011, Jill charged Judge Paredes with grave misconduct.
Jill was a student of Judge Paredes in Political Law Review during the first semester of school year 2010-
2011 at the Southwestern University, Cebu City. She averred that sometime in August 2010, in his class
discussions, Judge Paredes named her mother, Judge Rosabella Tormis (Judge Tormis), then Presiding
Judge of Branch 4, Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Cebu City, as one of the judges involved in the
marriage scams in Cebu City. Judge Paredes also mentioned in his class that Judge Tormis was abusive of
her position as a judge, corrupt, and ignorant of the law
Jill added that Judge Paredes included Judge Tormis in his discussions not only once but several times. In
one session, Judge Paredes was even said to have included in his discussion Francis Mondragon Tormis
(Francis), son of Judge Tormis, stating that he was a “court-noted addict.” She was absent from class at
that time, but one of her classmates who was present, Rhoda L. Litang (Rhoda), informed her about the
inclusion of her brother. To avoid humiliation in school, Jill decided to drop the class under Judge Paredes
and transfer to another law school in Tacloban City
Jill also disclosed that in the case entitled “Trinidad O. Lachica v. Judge Tormis”(Lachica v. Tormis), her
mother was suspended from the service for six (6) months for allegedly receiving payment of a cash bail
bond for the temporary release of an accused for the warrant she had issued in a case then pending
before her sala. Judge Paredes was the one who reviewed the findings conducted therein and he
recommended that the penalty be reduced to severe reprimand
Jill, however, claimed that Judge Paredes committed an offense worse than that committed by her mother.
She averred that on March 13, 2011, Judge Paredes accepted a cash bail bond in the amount of Six
Thousand Pesos (P6,000.00) for the temporary release of one Lita Guioguio in a case entitled, “People of
the Philippines v. Lita Guioguio,” docketed as Criminal Case No. 148434-R, then pending before Branch 8,
MTCC, Cebu City (Guioguio case)
Thus, she prayed that Judge Paredes be administratively sanctioned for his actuations
Comment of Judge Parede
In his Comment, dated October 28, 2011, Judge Paredes denied the accusations of Jill. He stated that
Judge Tormis had several administrative cases, some of which he had investigated; that as a result of the
investigations, he recommended sanctions against Judge Tormis; that Judge Tormis used Jill, her daughter,
to get back at him; that he discussed in his class the case of Lachica v. Tormis, but never Judge Tormis’
involvement in the marriage scams nor her sanctions as a result of the investigation conducted by the
Court; that he never personally attacked Judge Tormis’ dignity and credibility; that the marriage scams in
Cebu City constituted a negative experience for all the judges and should be discussed so that other
judges, court employees and aspiring lawyers would not emulate such misdeeds; that the marriage scams
attorneys of this court to desist from such practices, and to treat their opposing attorneys, and the
judges who have decided their cases in the lower court adversely to their contentions with that
courtesy all have a right to expect. (emphasis supplied)
We do not hesitate to punish the petitioners for the direct contempt of court. They threw out self-
restraint and courtesy, traits that in the most trying occasions equate to rare virtues that all members of
the Legal Profession should possess and cherish. They shunted aside the nobility of their profession. They
wittingly banished the ideal that even the highest degree of zealousness in defending the causes of clients
did not permit them to cross the line between liberty and license. Indeed, the Court has not lacked in
frequently reminding the Bar that language, though forceful, must still be dignified; and though emphatic,
must remain respectful as befitting advocates and in keeping with the dignity of the Legal Profession. It is
always worthwhile to bear in mind, too, that the language vehicle did not run short of expressions that
were emphatic, yet respectful; convincing, yet not derogatory; and illuminating, yet not offensive. No
attorney worthy of the title should forget that his first and foremost status as an officer of the Court calls
upon him to be respectful and restrained in his dealings with a court or its judge. Clearly, the petitioners
criticism of the CTA First Division was not bona fide or done in good faith, and spilled over the walls of
propriety.
The power to punish contempt of court is exercised on the preservative and not on the vindictive
principle, and only occasionally should a court invoke its inherent power to punish contempt of court in
order to retain that respect without which the administration of justice must falter or fail. We reiterate
that the sanction the CTA First Division has visited upon the petitioners was preservative, for the sanction
maintained and promoted the proper respect that attorneys and their clients should bear towards the
courts of justice.
Inasmuch as the circumstances indicate that the petitioners tone of apology was probably feigned, for
they did not relent but continued to justify their contemptuous language, they do not merit any leniency.
Nonetheless, the penalty of imprisonment for ten days and a fine of P2,000.00 is excessive punishment of
the direct contempt of court for using contemptuous and offensive language and verges on the vindictive.
The Court foregoes the imprisonment.
The Courts treatment of contemptuous and offensive language used by counsel in pleadings and other
written submissions to the courts of law, including this Court, has not been uniform. The treatment has
dealt with contemptuous and offensive language either as contempt of court or administrative or ethical
misconduct, or as both. The sanction has ranged from a warning (to be more circumspect), a reprimand
with stern warning against a repetition of the misconduct, a fine of P2,000.00, a fine of P5,000.00, and
even indefinite suspension from the practice of law.
The sanction has usually been set depending on whether the offensive language is viewed as contempt of
court or as ethical misconduct. In Re: Letter Dated 21 February 2005 of Atty. Noel S. Sorreda, the errant
lawyer who made baseless accusations of manipulation in his letters and compliance to this Court was
indefinitely suspended from the practice of law. Although he was further declared guilty of contempt of
court, the Court prescribed no separate penalty on him, notwithstanding that he evinced no remorse and
did not apologize for his actions that resulted from cases that were decided against his clients for valid
reasons. In Re: Conviction of Judge Adoracion G. Angeles, the complaining State Prosecutor, despite his
strong statements to support his position not being considered as direct contempt of court, was warned
to be more circumspect in language. In contrast, Judge Angeles was reprimanded and handed a stern
warning for the disrespectful language she used in her pleadings filed in this Court, which declared such
language to be below the standard expected of a judicial officer. In Nuez v. Atty. Arturo B. Astorga, Atty.
Astorga was meted a P2,000.00 fine for conduct unbecoming of a lawyer for hurling insulting language
against the opposing counsel. Obviously, the language was dealt with administratively, not as contempt of
court. In Ng v. Atty. Benjamin C. Alar, the Court prescribed a higher fine of P5,000.00 coupled with a stern
warning against Atty. Alar who, in his motion for reconsideration and to inhibit, cast insults and diatribes
against the NLRC First Division and its members. Yet again, the fine was a disciplinary sanction.
Despite having earlier directed the petitioners through its resolution of March 15, 2006 that they should
explain within five (5) days from receipt of this Resolution why (they) should not be held for indirect
contempt and/or subject to disciplinary action, the CTA First Division was content with punishing them
for direct contempt under Section 1, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, and did not anymore pursue the
received the respective memoranda of the parties.
In her memorandum, Jill contended that Judge Paredes’ act of discussing Judge Tormis’ cases in class
where she was present was an open display of insensitivity, impropriety and lack of delicadeza bordering
on oppressive and abusive conduct, which fell short of the exacting standards of behavior demanded of
magistrates. She asserted that the defense of Judge Paredes that he could not be made administratively
liable as the act was not made in the performance of his official duties did not hold water because a judge
should be the embodiment of what was just and fair not only in the performance of his official duties but
also in his everyday life.
Jill also averred that Judge Paredes violated the subjudice rule when he discussed the marriage scam
involving Judge Tormis in 2010 because at that time, the case was still being investigated; that the
administrative case relative to the marriage scam was decided only on April 2, 2013; that Judge Paredes
was not the Executive Judge of the MTCC when he received the cash bail bond in the Guiguio case; that he
could not prove that the executive judge of the MTCC was unavailable before accepting the cash bail bond;
and that the assertion of Judge Paredes of his being an anti-corruption judge and a lone nominee of the
IBP Cebu City Chapter to the Foundation of Judicial Excellence did not exculpate him from committing the
acts complained of.
In his Reply-Memorandum, Judge Paredes reiterated the allegations contained in his previous pleadings.
He added that the marriage scams scandalized the Judiciary and became public knowledge when Atty.
Rullyn Garcia of the OCA held a press conference on the matter; that, hence, every citizen, including him,
may comment thereon; that in the hierarchy of rights, freedom of speech and expression ranked high; that
Judge Tormis never intervened in the present case; that if he indeed made derogatory remarks against
Judge Tormis, she should have filed a criminal action for oral defamation; and that calling for the ouster of
drug addicts could not be considered an abuse, but was meant for the protection of the Judiciary.
In her Report and Recommendation, Justice Diy found Judge Paredes guilty of conduct unbecoming of a
judge. She opined that his use of intemperate language during class discussions was inappropriate. His
statements in class, tending to project Judge Tormis as corrupt and ignorant of the laws and procedure,
were obviously and clearly insensitive and inexcusable.
Justice Diy disregarded the defense of Judge Paredes that his discussions of the administrative case of
Judge Tormis in class was an exercise of his right to freedom of expression. She cited the New Code of
Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary 15 which urged members of the Judiciary to be models of
propriety at all times. She quoted with emphasis Section 6 which stated that “Judges, like any other
citizen, are entitled to freedom of expression, belief, association and assembly, but in exercising such rights,
they shall always conduct themselves in such a manner as to preserve the dignity of the judicial office and
the impartiality and independence of the judiciary.”
Justice Diy likewise rejected Judge Paredes’ position that he could not be held administratively liable for
his comments against Judge Tormis and Francis as these were uttered while he was not in the exercise of
his judicial functions. Jurisprudence, as well as the New Code of Judicial Conduct, required that he
conduct himself beyond reproach, not only in the discharge of his judicial functions, but also in his other
professional endeavors and everyday activities.
Justice Diy found merit in Jill’s allegation that Judge Paredes violated the subjudice rule when the latter
discussed the marriage scams involving Judge Tormis in 2010 when the said issue was still being
investigated. She cited, as basis for Judge Paredes’ liability, Section 4, Canon 3 of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct.
As regards Judge Paredes’ receipt of the cash bail bond in relation to the Guioguio case, Justice Diy
absolved him of any liability as the charge of grave misconduct was not supported by sufficient evidence.
She accepted Judge Paredes’ explanation that he merely followed the procedure laid down in Section 14,
Chapter 5 of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC when he approved the bail bond.
Based on these findings, Justice Diy came up with the following recommendations, thus:
The undersigned Investigating Justice finds that indeed Judge Paredes is guilty of conduct unbecoming of
a judge. Conduct unbecoming of a judge is classified as a light offense under Section 10, Rule 140 of the
Revised Rules of Court, penalized under Section 11 (c) thereof by any of the following: (1) a Fine of not
less than P1,000.00 but not exceeding P10,000.00; (2) Censure; (3) Reprimand; and (4) Admonition with
warning.
were also discussed during meetings of RTC judges and in schools where remedial law and legal ethics
were taught; that he talked about past and resolved cases, but not the negative tendencies of Judge
Tormis; that there was nothing wrong in discussing the administrative cases involving Judge Tormis
because these cases were known to the legal community and some were even published in the Supreme
Court Reports Annotated (SCRA) and other legal publications; and that when he was the executive judge
tasked to investigate Judge Tormis, he told her to mend her ways, but she resented his advice
Judge Paredes further stated that when Jill was still his student, she did not complain about or dispute his
discussions in class regarding the administrative liabilities of her mother; that the matter was not also
brought to the attention of the Dean of Southwestern University or of the local authorities; that he
admitted saying that Judge Tormis had a son named Francis who was a drug addict and that drug
dependents had no place in the judiciary; and that he suggested that Francis should be removed from the
judiciary
He denied, however, having stated that Francis was appointed as court employee as a result of the
influence of Judge Tormis. She is not an influential person and it is the Supreme Court who determines
the persons to be appointed as court employees. Judge Tormis, however, allowed her drug dependent son
to apply for a position in the judiciary.
Regarding the specific act being complained of, Judge Paredes admitted that he personally accepted a cash
bail bond of P6,000.00 for the temporary release of Lita Guioguio on March 13, 2011. He claimed though
that the approval of the bail bond was in accordance with Section 14, Chapter 5 of A.M. No. 03-8-62-SC
which allowed executive judges to act on petitions for bail and other urgent matters on weekends, official
holidays and special days. Judge Paredes explained that he merely followed the procedure. As Executive
Judge, he issued a temporary receipt and on the following business day, a Monday, he instructed the
Branch Clerk of Court to remit the cash bond to the Clerk of Court. The Clerk of Court acknowledged the
receipt of the cash bond and issued an official receipt. It was not his fault that the Clerk of Court
acknowledged the receipt of the cash bond only in the afternoon of March 21, 2011.
Lastly, Judge Paredes averred that the discussions relative to the administrative cases of Judge Tormis
could not be the subject of an administrative complaint because it was not done in the performance of his
judicial duties.
Reply of the Complainant
In her Verified-Reply, dated November 23, 2011, Jill countered that her mother had nothing to do with the
filing of the present complaint; that she was forced to leave her family in Cebu City to continue her law
studies elsewhere because she could no longer bear the discriminating and judgmental eyes of her
classmates brought about by Judge Paredes’ frequent discussions in class of her mother’s administrative
cases; that her mother was indeed one of the judges implicated in the marriage scams, but when Judge
Paredes discussed the matter in his classes, the case of her mother was not yet resolved by the Court and,
thus, in 2010, it was still premature; and that Judge Paredes was aware that administrative cases were
confidential in nature.
Jill claimed that the intention to humiliate her family was evident when Judge Paredes branded her
brother, Francis, as a “drug addict.”
Rejoinder of Judge Paredes
In his Rejoinder, dated December 2, 2011, Judge Paredes asserted that it was not premature to discuss the
marriage scams in class because the scandal was already disclosed by Atty. Rullyn Garcia and was also
written in many legal publications, and that the drug addiction of Francis was known in the Palace of
Justice of Cebu City.
In its Report, dated September 12, 2012, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) stated that the
conflicting allegations by the parties presented factual issues that could not be resolved based on the
evidence on record then. Considering the gravity and the sensitive nature of the charges, a full-blown
investigation should be conducted by the CA.
On January 14, 2013, pursuant to the recommendation of the OCA, the Court referred the administrative
complaint to the Executive Justice of the CA, Cebu Station, for investigation, report and recommendation
within sixty (60) days from receipt of the records.
On March 26, 2013, the case was raffled to, and the records were received by, Justice Diy. Thereafter, the
appropriate notices were issued and the confidential hearings were conducted. Afterwards, Justice Diy
propriety at all times. Canon 4 instructs:
CANON 4
PROPRIETY
SEC. 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities.
xxx
SEC. 2. As a subject of constant public scrutiny, judges must accept personal restrictions that might be
viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do so freely and willingly. In particular, judges
shall conduct themselves in a way that is consistent with the dignity of the judicial office.
A judge should always conduct himself in a manner that would preserve the dignity, independence and
respect for himself, the Court and the Judiciary as a whole. He must exhibit the hallmark judicial
temperament of utmost sobriety and self-restraint. He should choose his words and exercise more
caution and control in expressing himself. In other words, a judge should possess the virtue of gravitas.
Furthermore, a magistrate should not descend to the level of a sharp-tongued, ill-mannered petty tyrant
by uttering harsh words, snide remarks and sarcastic comments. He is required to always be temperate,
patient and courteous, both in conduct and in language.
In this case, records show that Judge Paredes failed to observe the propriety required by the Code and to
use temperate and courteous language befitting a magistrate. Indeed, Judge Paredes demonstrated
conduct unbecoming of a judge.
When Judge Paredes failed to restrain himself and included Francis, whose condition and personal
circumstances, as properly observed by Justice Diy, had no relevance to the topic that was then being
discussed in class, it strongly indicated his intention to taint their reputations.
The inclusion of Judge Tormis and Francis in his class discussions was never denied by Judge Paredes who
merely justified his action by invoking his right to freedom of expression. Section 6, Canon 4 of the New
Code of Judicial Conduct recognizes that judges, like any other citizen, are entitled to freedom of
expression. Such right, however, is not without limitation. Section 6, Canon 4 of the Code also imposes a
correlative restriction on judges: in the exercise of their freedom of expression, they should always
conduct themselves in a manner that preserves the dignity of the judicial office and the impartiality and
independence of the Judiciary. In the exercise of his right to freedom of expression, Judge Paredes should
uphold the good image of the Judiciary of which he is a part. He should have avoided unnecessary and
uncalled for remarks in his discussions and should have been more circumspect in his language. Being a
judge, he is expected to act with greater circumspection and to speak with self-restraint. Verily, Judge
Paredes fell short of this standard.
The Court cannot sustain the assertion of Judge Paredes that he cannot be held administratively liable for
his negative portrayal of Judge Tormis and Francis in his class discussions. Judge Paredes should be
reminded of the ethical conduct expected of him as a judge not only in the performance of his judicial
duties, but in his professional and private activities as well. Sections 1 and 2, Canon 2 of the Code
mandates:
CANON 2
INTEGRITY
Integrity is essential not only to the proper discharge of the judicial office but also to the personal
demeanor of judges.
SECTION 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but that it is
perceived to be so in the view of a reasonable observer.
SECTION 2. The behavior and conduct of judges must reaffirm the people’s faith in the integrity of the
judiciary. Justice must not merely be done but must also be seen to be done.
(Emphases supplied)
Any impropriety on the part of Judge Paredes, whether committed in or out of the court, should not be
tolerated for he is not a judge only occasionally. It should be emphasized that the Code of Judicial Ethics
mandates that the conduct of a judge must be free of a whiff of impropriety not only with respect to his
performance of his judicial duties, but also to his behavior outside his sala and as a private individual.
There is no dichotomy of morality, a public official is also judged by his private morals. The Code dictates
that a judge, in order to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, must
behave with propriety at all times. A judge’s official life cannot simply be detached or separated from his
Inasmuch as this is Judge Paredes’ first offense and considering the factual milieu and the peculiar
circumstances attendant thereto, it is respectfully recommended that Judge Paredes be meted out with
the penalty of REPRIMAND with a warning that a repetition of the same or a similar offense will be dealt
with more severely.
The Court’s Ruling
The Court adopts the findings and recommendations of Justice Diy except as to the penalty.
Misconduct is defined as a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more
particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer. The misconduct is grave if it
involves any of the additional elements of corruption, willful intent to violate the law, or to disregard
established rules, which must be established by substantial evidence. As distinguished from simple
misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of established
rule, must be manifest in a charge of grave misconduct. Corruption, as an element of grave misconduct,
consists in the act of an official or fiduciary person who unlawfully and wrongfully uses his station or
character to procure some benefit for himself or for another person, contrary to duty and the rights of
others.
To constitute misconduct, the act or acts must have a direct relation to and be connected with the
performance of his official duties. Considering that the acts complained of, the remarks against Judge
Tormis and Francis, were made by Judge Paredes in his class discussions, they cannot be considered as
“misconduct.” They are simply not related to the discharge of his official functions as a judge. Thus, Judge
Paredes cannot be held liable for misconduct, much less for grave misconduct.
Discussion of a subjudice matter, however, is another thing.
On subjudice matters, Section 4, Canon 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct provides:
CANON 3
IMPARTIALITY
SEC. 4. Judges shall not knowingly, while a proceeding is before or could come before them, make any
comment that might reasonably be expected to affect the outcome of such proceeding or impair the
manifest fairness of the process. Nor shall judges make any comment in public or otherwise that
might affect the fair trial of any person or issue. (Emphasis supplied)
The subjudice rule restricts comments and disclosures pertaining to the judicial proceedings in order to
avoid prejudging the issue, influencing the court, or obstructing the administration of justice. The
rationale for the rule was spelled out in Nestle Philippines, Inc. v. Sanchez, where it was stated that it is a
traditional conviction of civilized society everywhere that courts and juries, in the decision of issues of
fact and law should be immune from every extraneous influence; that facts should be decided upon
evidence produced in court; and that the determination of such facts should be uninfluenced by bias,
prejudice or sympathies.
Notably, when Judge Paredes discussed the marriage scams involving Judge Tormis in 2010, the
investigation relative to the said case had not yet been concluded. In fact, the decision on the case was
promulgated by the Court only on April 2, 2013. In 2010, he still could not make comments on the
administrative case to prevent any undue influence in its resolution. Commenting on the marriage scams,
where Judge Tormis was one of the judges involved, was in contravention of the subjudice rule. Justice Diy
was, therefore, correct in finding that Judge Paredes violated Section 4, Canon 3 of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct.
The Court shares the view of Justice Diy that although the reasons of Judge Paredes for discussing the
marriage scams in his classes seemed noble, his objectives were carried out insensitively and in bad
taste. The pendency of the administrative case of Judge Tormis and the publicity of the marriage scams
did not give Judge Paredes unrestrained license to criticize Judge Tormis in his class discussions. The
publicity given to the investigation of the said scams and the fact that it was widely discussed in legal
circles let people expressed critical opinions on the issue. There was no need for Judge Paredes to “rub
salt to the wound,” as Justice Diy put it.
Judge Paredes in using intemperate language and unnecessary comments tending to project Judge Tormis
as a corrupt and ignorant judge in his class discussions, was correctly found guilty of conduct unbecoming
of a judge by Justice Dy.
Indeed, the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary requires judges to exemplify
Construction and Maximo and Aida Mercado to reinstate the complainants to their former position[s] without
loss of seniority rights and to pay jointly and severally, their full backwages from October 28, 2000 up to the date
of this decision plus ten (10%) percent attorney’s fees of the total monetary award. The Research and
Information Unit of this Office is hereby directed to compute complainants[’] monetary award which shall form
part of this decision. The complaint for damages is dismissed. The complaint against Shoemart, Inc., is likewise
DISMISSED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.
The respondents in the labor case, namely the Spouses Mercado, doing business under the name and style of
M.A. Mercado Construction, interposed an appeal which was dismissed for failure to post an appeal bond. Thus,
an Alias Writ of Execution was issued to implement the Decision. Thereafter, the complainants in the labor case
filed an Ex Parte Motion for Amendment of an Alias Writ of Execution. They claimed that they could hardly
collect the judgment award from M.A. Mercado Construction because it allegedly transferred its assets to M.A.
Blocks Work, Inc. They thus prayed that the Alias Writ of Execution be amended to include M.A. Blocks Work, Inc.
and all its incorporators/stockholders as additional entity/personalities against which the writ of execution
shall be enforced. In an Order dated February 10, 2006, respondent granted the motion to amend the alias writ
of execution. Accordingly, on February 17, 2006 an Amended Alias Writ of Execution was issued to enforce the
monetary judgment amounting to P19,527,623.55 against M.A. Blocks Work, Inc. and all its incorporators. By
way of special appearance, M.A. Blocks Work, Inc., together with three of its stockholders who are the
complainants in this administrative case, namely Yolanda A. Andres, Minette A. Mercado and Elito P. Andres, filed
an Urgent Motion to Quash the Amended Alias Writ of Execution, contending that they are not bound by the
judgment as they were not parties to the labor case. In an Order dated March 13, 2006, however, respondent
denied the Urgent Motion to Quash. Aggrieved, herein complainants filed the instant Complaint for Disbarment,
which we referred to the IBP on March 4, 2007 for investigation, report and recommendation.
IBP’s Report and Recommendation
In his Report and Recommendation dated September 6, 2010, the Investigating Commissioner found respondent
guilty of gross ignorance of the law and recommended that he be suspended from the practice of law for a period
of six months. This was adopted and approved with modification by the IBP Board of Governors in an April 12,
2011 Resolution, to wit:
RESOLUTION NO. XIX-2011-110 Adm. Case No. 7158 Yolanda A. Andres, et al. vs. Atty. Salimathar V. Nambi
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification
the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case herein made part
of this Resolution as Annex “A”; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and
the applicable laws and rules, considering respondent[’s] contumacious disregard of the lawful Order of
Supreme Court and the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP, and for his failure to appear despite due notices,
Atty. Salimathar V. Nambi is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months. (Emphasis in the
original).
Issue
Whether respondent is guilty of gross ignorance of the law and of violating the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
Our Ruling
At the outset, it must be emphasized that in this administrative proceeding, our discussion should be limited
only on the issue of whether respondent acted in gross ignorance of the law when he granted the motion to
amend the alias writ of execution; when he issued an Amended Alias Writ of Execution to enforce the monetary
judgment against M.A. Blocks Work, Inc. and all its incorporators; and when he denied complainants’ Urgent
Motion to Quash. As a rule, for one to be held administratively accountable for gross ignorance of the law, there
must be a showing that the error was gross and patent as to support a conclusion that the actor was so moved
with malice, bad faith, corruption, fraud, and dishonesty. As such, our discussion should be focused primarily on
whether respondent grossly erred in issuing the above orders as to amount to malice, bad faith, corruption, fraud
and dishonesty. On the other hand, we need not delve into the issue of whether there is an apparent
misapplication of the doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate fiction when respondent issued the Amended
Alias Writ of Execution. For one, it is outside the ambit of this administrative proceeding. Moreover, the issue of
whether the doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate fiction applies is the subject of an appeal brought by
complainants before the National Labor Relations Commission and eventually to the Court of Appeals. We
perused the records of the case particularly respondent’s Order dated March 13, 2006 denying complainants’
Urgent Motion to Quash. Therein, we note that respondent’s ruling was not arrived at arbitrarily; on the contrary,
he cited grounds based on his personal assessment of the facts at hand, viz:
As culled from the case record, there is substantial evidence that respondents Maximo A. Mercado and Aida A.
Mercado, who are doing business under the name and style of M.A. Mercado Construction put up a corporation
personal existence. Thus, being a subject of constant public scrutiny, a judge should freely and willingly
accept restrictions on conduct that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen. He should
personify judicial integrity and exemplify honest public service. The personal behavior of a judge, both in
the performance of official duties and in private life should be above suspicion.
Regarding the act of receiving the cash bail bond in the Guioguio case, Justice Diy correctly found that it
cannot be regarded as grave misconduct. The Court finds merit in the position of Judge Paredes that the
approval, as well as the receipt, of the cash bail bond, was in accordance with the rules. Thus:
Finally, the Investigating Officer disagrees with Jill’s allegation that Judge Paredes committed grave
misconduct when he personally received cash bail bond in relation to the Guioguio case. Judge Paredes
justified his action by stating that he was merely following the procedure set forth in Section 14, Chapter
5 of A.M. No. 03-02-SC, which authorizes executive judges to act on petitions for bail on Saturdays after
1:00 o’clock in the afternoon, Sundays, official holidays, and special days. Said rule also provides that
should the accused deposit cash bail, the executive judge shall acknowledge receipt of the cash bail bond
in writing and issue a temporary receipt therefor. Considering that Judge Paredes merely followed said
procedure, he cannot be held administratively liable for his act of receiving the cash bail bond in the
Guioguio case.
Moreover, respondent judge is authorized to receive the cash bail bond under Section 17 (a), Rule 114 of
the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. Under said provision, the bail bond may be filed either with the
court where the case is pending, or with any Regional Trial Court (RTC) of the place of arrest, or with any
judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court or the Municipal Trial Court of the place of arrest.
Lastly, Section 1 (h), Chapter 4 of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC provides that executive judges are authorized to
exercise other powers and prerogatives which are necessary or incidental to the performance of their
functions in relation to court administration. In the instant case, Judge Paredes was merely exercising
powers incidental to his functions as an Executive Judge since he was the only judge available when Lita
Guioguio posted bail. Notably, Lita Guioguio’s payment for cash bail bond was made on a Sunday. In
addition, the judge assigned to the court where the Guioguio case was then pending and the executive
judge of the MTCC, Cebu City were not available to receive the bail bond. Judge Paredes was the only
judge available since the practice was for one judge to be present on Saturdays. However, there was no
judge assigned for duty during Sundays.
Relative to the matter above-discussed, the insinuation made by complainant Jill of any irregularity
reflected in the issuance of the two (2) orders of release of different dates is not backed up by sufficient
evidence.
Conduct unbecoming of a judge is classified as a light offense under Section 10, Rule 140 of the Rules of
Court and penalized under Section 11(C) thereof by any of the following: (1) A fine of not less than
P1,000.00 but not exceeding P10,000.00; (2) Censure; (3) Reprimand; and (4) Admonition with warning.
Considering that this is the first offense of Judge Paredes, the appropriate penalty under the
circumstances is admonition.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds Judge Meinrado P. Paredes, Presiding Judge of Branch 13 of the Regional
Trial Court of Cebu City, administratively liable for conduct unbecoming of a judge and ADMONISHES him
therefor.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 7158, March 09, 2015
YOLANDA A. ANDRES, MINETTE A. MERCADO, AND ELITO P. ANDRES , Complainants, v. ATTY.
SALIMATHAR V. NAMBI, Respondent.
This is a Complaint for Disbarment filed against then Labor Arbiter Salimathar V. Nambi (respondent) on the
ground of gross ignorance of the law in issuing an Amended Alias Writ of Execution against M.A. Blocks Work,
Inc. and its incorporators, the herein complainants, who are not parties to the case.
Factual Antecedents
On December 10, 2003, respondent rendered a Decision in a consolidated labor case against M.A. Mercado
Construction and spouses Maximo and Aida Mercado (spouses Mercado), the fallo of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering respondents, M.A. Mercado
WHEREFORE, the Court REPRIMANDS respondent Atty. Salimathar V. Nambi for obstinately and unjustifiably
refusing to obey lawful orders of the Court and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, with a warning that a
repetition of the same or similar act or offense shall be dealt with more severely. Let copies of this Resolution be
furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant and noted in Atty. Nambi’s record as a member of the Bar.
SO ORDERED.
OCA IPI NO. 14-220-CA-J, March 17, 2015
RE: COMPLAINT DATED JANUARY 28, 2014 OF WENEFREDO PARREÑO, ET AL., AGAINST HON. CELIA
C. LIBREA-LEAGOGO, HON. ELIHU A. YBAÑEZ AND HON. AMY C. LAZARO-JAVIER, ASSOCIATE
JUSTICES OF THE COURT OF APPEALS, RELATIVE TO CA G.R. SP NO. 108807
We hereby resolve the administrative complaint brought against Court of Appeals (CA) Associate Justice Celia C.
Librea-Leagogo, Associate Justice Elihu A. Ybanñ ez and Associate Justice Amy C. Lazaro Javier for their undue
delay in rendering the decision in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 108807 entitled Susan Enriquez and Alma Rodriguez v.
Wenefredo Parreno, Ronnie Cuevas and Joseph Denamarca.
Antecedents
Complainants Wenefredo Parrenñ o and Ronnie Cuevas, with Joseph Denamarca, filed a protest in the Department
of Environment and Natural Resources of the National Capital Region (DENR-NCR) against the issuance of
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 14391 and TCT No. 14188 in favor of Susan Enriquez and Alma Rodriguez
covering two lots inside the Signal Village, Taguig. The DENR-NCR dismissed the protest, but the dismissal was
subsequently reversed by the DENR. Aggrieved, Enriquez and Rodriguez appealed to the Office of the President
(OP), which denied their appeal. With their motion for reconsideration having been similarly denied, Enriquez
and Rodriguez appealed to the CA by petition for review, and it is such appeal from which this administrative
complaint arose.
It appears that on June 26, 2012, the Special Sixteenth (16 th) Division of the CA issued its resolution submitting
C.A.-G.R. SP No. 108807 for decision. However, the complainants lament that from the issuance of the resolution
until the filing of their complaint on February 8, 2014, the respondents, who comprised the Special 16 th Division
of the CA, had not rendered the decision, which the complainants insist was in patent violation of the mandatory
period within which the respondents should decide under Section 15(1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.
The Court required the respondents to submit their comments on the administrative complaint.
In her comment, Justice Librea-Leagogo narrated that she became the Chairperson of the CA 16 th Division
effective June 4, 2012 conformably with CA Office Order No. 220-12-ABR, and she served as such until July 5,
2012 in accordance with the successive reorganizations implemented in the CA under CA Office Order No. 198-
12-ABR and CA Office Order No. 220-12-ABR, respectively. Citing Section 1, Rule VI of the 2009 Internal Rules of
the Court of Appeals (2009 IRCA), Justice Librea-Leagogo denied liability for incurring any undue delay because
of her short stint as the Chairperson of the 16 th Division, and considering further that C.A.-G.R. SP No. 108807
followed Justice Ybanñ ez as the assigned ponente in his transfer to the Fourteenth (14 th) Division pursuant to CA
Office Order No. 220-12-ABR, and eventually to the Thirteenth (13 th) Division, the Division that ultimately
promulgated the awaited decision on February 28, 2014.
Justice Ybanñ ez admitted in his comment that C.A.-G.R. SP No. 108807 was part of his initial caseload following his
transfer to Manila in December 2009. He stated that he had conscientiously complied with the Zero Backlog
Project (ZBP) initiated by Presiding Justice Andres B. Reyes, Jr. by giving utmost priority to the older cases
assigned to him; that he had already assigned C.A.-G.R. SP No. 108807 to a member of his legal staff, but the latter
had meanwhile fallen seriously ill; that due to lack of personnel and a heavy caseload, he had hired a contractual-
lawyer who later resigned upon being offered a permanent position in another agency of the Government; that
after disposing of the older cases assigned to him, he had rendered the decision in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 108807 on
February 28, 2014 before becoming aware of the administrative complaint; and that he had not been remiss in
his duty and responsibility to promptly administer justice by virtue of his disposing a monthly average of 15
cases.
Justice Lazaro-Javier explained her participation in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 108807 as limited to the adoption and
promulgation on June 26, 2012 of the resolution submitting the case for decision because only filled in the brief
vacancy occasioned by the temporary absence of Justice Victoria Isabel Paredes, then the regular Member of the
16th Division. She pointed out, however, that she had nothing more to do with the case upon the return of Justice
Paredes; hence, she could not be administratively liable for any delay in deciding the case.
Issue
Are the respondents liable for undue delay in deciding C.A.-G.R. SP No. 108807?
Ruling
in the name of M.A. Block Works, Inc. where individual movants are one of the incorporators. We give credence to
the argument of the complainants that the incorporators therein are relatives of Maximo A. Mercado and Aida
Mercado as shown by the Articles of Incorporation adduced by the former. The incorporators listed have similar
family names of the Mercados and the Andreses and common address at Gen. Hizon, Quezon City and 50 Daisy
St., Quezon City, and Maximo A. Mercado is the biggest stockholder. Aside from the Articles of Incorporation,
complainants also submitted a Letter of Intent/Notice To Proceed where respondents, despite their
representation that they have already ceased their business operation, are still continuing their business
operation. The documents submitted by the complainants were corroborated by certification issued by Maggie T.
Jao, AVP-Assistant Controller of SM Prime Holdings, Inc. that based on their records, an amount of P3,291,300.00
representing a sum total of all goods, effects, money and credit that was garnished belong to M.A. Mercado
Construction and/or Maximo Mercado and/or Aida Mercado and/or M.A. Block Works, Inc. and/or Gertrudes
Casilda A. Mercado, Yolanda A. Andres, Minette A. Mercado and/or Elito P. Andres. This Office has therefore,
enough reason to conclude that respondents Maximo A. Mercado and Aida Mercado and the movants herein are
one and the same. Movants are alter egos or business conduits to defraud the complainants and to consequently
evade payment of judgment award. x x x As respondents are duly notified and aware of the execution
proceedings, the argument of denial of due process is untenable.
It is apparent from the foregoing disquisition that respondent’s conclusion had some bases and was not plucked
from thin air, so to speak. Clearly, respondent did not act whimsically or arbitrarily; his ruling could not in any
manner be characterized as imbued with malice, fraud or bad faith. To reiterate what we have already stated
above, we are not here to judge in this present administrative proceeding whether respondent’s ratiocination on
the application of the piercing of corporate veil is correct; our only concern here is to decide whether
respondent’s error was so gross as to amount to fraud and dishonesty. Based on the above-quoted disquisition, it
cannot be said, by any stretch of imagination, that respondent’s error, if any, was so gross or that he was actuated
by malice when he issued the above orders. His conclusion was reached after an examination of the documents
presented and evaluation and assessment of the arguments raised by the parties. He did not capriciously rule on
the issues presented; on the contrary, he exerted efforts to weigh the positions of the contending parties. In any
event, we hold that respondent should not be held accountable for committing an honest mistake or an error in
the appreciation of the facts of the case before him. Otherwise every labor arbiter or any judicial or quasi-judicial
officer for that matter, would be continually plagued with the possibility of being administratively sanctioned for
every honest mistake or error he commits. For sure, this would not augur well to the administration of justice as
a whole. Pertinently, the Court ruled in Andrada v. Judge Banzon, viz:
Well-settled is the rule that unless the acts were committed with fraud, dishonesty, corruption, malice or ill-will,
bad faith, or deliberate intent to do an injustice, respondent judge may not be held administratively liable for
gross misconduct, ignorance of the law or incompetence of official acts in the exercise of judicial functions and
duties, particularly in the adjudication of cases. Further, to hold a judge administratively accountable for every
erroneous rule or decision he renders would be nothing short of harassment and would make his position
doubly unbearable. To hold otherwise would be to render judicial office untenable, for no one called upon to try
the facts or interpret the law in the process of the administration of justice can be infallible in his judgment.
Based on the foregoing, we have no basis to hold respondent administratively liable for gross ignorance of the
law. However, we note that respondent had consistently and obstinately disregarded the Court’s and IBP’s
orders. It is on record that respondent totally ignored the Court’s June 7, 2006 Resolution directing him to file his
Comment. He also failed to attend the mandatory conference before the IBP’s Commission on Bar Discipline
despite notice. Neither did he file his Position Paper. As a former Labor Arbiter, respondent should know that
orders of the court “are not mere requests but directives which should have been complied with promptly and
completely.” “He disregarded the oath he took when he was accepted to the legal profession ‘to obey the laws and
the legal orders of the duly constituted legal authorities.’ x x x His conduct was unbecoming of a lawyer who is
called upon to obey court orders and processes and is expected to stand foremost in complying with court
directives as an officer of the court.” Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. – A member of the bar may be
disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other
gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for
a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an
attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of
gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. (Emphasis supplied)
Considering that this appears to be respondent’s first infraction, we find it proper to impose on him the penalty
of reprimand with warning that commission of the same or similar infraction will be dealt with more severely.
MARILOU T. RIVERA, Complainant, vs. JUDGE JAIME C. BLANCAFLOR, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
BRANCH 26, STA. CRUZ, LAGUNA, Respondent.
Before the Court is the administrative matter that stemmed from the complaint-affidavit filed on July 16,
2008 by Marilou T. Rivera (Rivera) with the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), charging Judge Jaime
C. Blancaflor [Judge Blancaflor, Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 26, Sta. Cruz, Laguna] with Bribery,
Gross Misconduct, Immorality and violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act [Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 3019].
The Antecedents
The facts — as set out in the final report and recommendation of Associate Justice Remedios A. Salazar-
Fernando (Justice Fernando) of the Court of Appeals — are summarized below.
Rivera alleged that she had been engaged in assisting litigants to obtain judicial bonds since year 2000.
Sometime in February 2008, she asked her daughter Shiela T. De Mata (De Mata), who was also a
bondsman, to help her secure a bail bond for accused Ricardo Catuday (Catuday). Catuday was charged of
violating Section 11 of R. A. No. 9165 (the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002) by the Office of
the Provincial Prosecutor (OPP) of Laguna.
On February 27, 2008, Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Dan B. Rodrigo (Prosecutor Rodrigo)
recommended a bail of 200,000.00 for Catuday who moved to reduce his bail to120,000.00 before the
Office of the Executive Judge, RTC, Sta. Cruz, Laguna. De Mata brought a copy of the motion to Prosecutor
Rodrigo who did not object to the motion and who signified his conformity by writing "no objection" and
affixing his signature and the date "4/14/08" on the face of the motion.
De Mata thereafter brought the document to the Office of the Clerk of Court (OCC), RTC, Sta. Cruz, Laguna
for the approval of Judge Blancaflor who was then the Executive Judge. De Mata failed to see Judge
Blancaflor; she was told by Dennis Trinidad (Trinidad), a member of the OCC staff, that Judge Blancaflor
was not in the court. Trinidad volunteered to bring the motion to Judge Blancaflor at Tagpuan Restaurant
(in Pila, Laguna that the judge allegedly owned) for the judge’s approval. Trinidad, however, returned
without securing the requested approval. De Mata was told to come back the next day.
De Mata went back to the OCC the following morning and was advised this time by Gemma Gallardo
(Gemma), another OCC personnel, to personally approach Judge Blancaflor about Catuday’s motion. De
Mata acted as advised, but Judge Blancaflor simply told De Mata that it was not her job to ask for the
motion’s approval and that she should return it to the OCC. De Mata at that point approached a Kuya
Moring, the process server of Branch 27, about her predicament. Kuya Moring introduced her to Judge
Blancaflor’s driver who tried to help, but the judge still refused to act on the motion. De Mata next
approached Manuel Bugain (Bugain), a court employee at Branch 26. Bugain offered to bring the motion
to Judge Blancaflor who was then in Barangay Layugan, Pagsanjan, Laguna. When Bugain returned, he
told De Mata that Judge Blancaflor refused to sign the motion because it did not bear the signature of
Prosecutor Rodrigo.
De Mata went back to Branch 26, together with Councilor Cecil Magana (Magana), whose assistance she
sought upon Bugain’s advice, to secure the requested approval. Whilethe motion was being handed to
Judge Blancaflor, he blurted out: "Hindi granted yan! Magbayad siya ng P200,000.00. Ayaw ko ng drugs!
Hindi granted yan!" Frustrated by the turn of events, De Mata returned the unapproved motion to Rivera.
On May 27, 2008, Rivera brought the motion to Branch 91, RTC, Sta. Cruz, Laguna as Judge Blancaflor was
then out on a seminar. The following day, Judge Divinagracia Ongkeko (Judge Ongkeko), the Presiding
Judge of Branch 91 and Vice-Executive Judge of RTC, Sta. Cruz, Laguna, issued an order granting Catuday’s
motion to reduce bond. Rivera immediately secured a bail bond for Catuday from the Industrial Insurance
Company and presented it to Branch 26 for Catuday’s provisional release.
Still, Judge Blancaflor refused to issue a release order, saying that he never approved Catuday’s reduced
bailbond of P120,000.00. Rivera then learned from one Teresa Mirasol (Mirasol) that Judge Blancaflor
refused to approve Catuday’s motion because it was Rivera who was working for it. According to Mirasol,
the information was given to her over the phone by Noralyn Villamar (Villamar), a.k.a.Macky, allegedly
Judge Blancaflor’s live-in partner.
Rivera further alleged that she experienced the same treatment from Judge Blancaflor when she worked
for the approval of the bail of Roel Namplata (Namplata) who was charged with violation of Section 15 of
R.A. No. 9165, also by the OPP, Laguna. Namplata’s recommended bail was P60,000.00. After securing
The administrative complaint is without merit.
The Constitution mandates a lower collegiate court like the CA to resolve a case within 12 months from the
submission of the last required pleading or as set by the court itself. This is clear from paragraphs (1) and (2),
Section 15 of Article VIII of the Constitution, to wit:
Section 15. (1) All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this Constitution must be decided or resolved
within twenty-four months from date of submission for the Supreme Court, and, unless reduced by the Supreme
Court, twelve months for all lower collegiate courts, and three months for all lower courts.
(2) A case or matter shall be deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading,
brief, or memorandum required by the Rules of Court or by the court itself.
xxxx
Did the respondents incur any administrative liability for the delay?
Although C.A.-G.R. SP No. 108807 was submitted for decision by the Special 16th Division on June 26, 2012 after
the parties did not file their memoranda, it was the 13 th Division of the CA (composed of Justice Ybanñ ez as the
ponente, Justice Japar B. Dimaampao as the Chairman, and Justice Melchor Quirino C. Sadang) that promulgated
the decision on February 28, 2014, or nearly 20 months later. Accordingly, the Court answers the query in the
negative, for, pursuant to Section 1, Rule VI of the 2009 IRCA, the adjudication of cases was the responsibility of
the assigned Justice and the Members of the Division to which he or she then belonged. Determining who should
be administratively accountable must consider the specific role each of the respondents played leading to the
resolution of C.A.-G.R. SP No. 108807. Under the applicable rule of the 2009 IRCA, the liability for undue delay in
resolving C.A.-G.R. SP No. 108807 might devolve only on the Members of the 13 th Division who actually
promulgated the decision.
Justice Librea-Leagogo and Justice Lazaro-Javier were not accountable for the delay in rendering the judgment.
Justice Librea-Leagogo had a limited participation in respect of C.A.- G.R. SP No. 108807 because the
reorganization of the CA ensuing after the promulgation of the resolution by the Special 16 th Division on June 26,
2012 caused her transfer to the 15 th Division through CA Office Order No. 220-12-ABR, terminating her
responsibility in C.A.- G.R. SP No. 108807. Justice Lazaro-Javier should also be exculpated because her
participation was limited to her acting as a special Member of the 16 th Division in lieu of Justice Paredes. Such
substitution prevented a vacuum in the regular 16th Division, and conformed to the procedure stated in Section
6(d), Rule I of the 2009 IRCA. The constitution of the Special 16 th Division was by virtue of CA Office Order No.
220-12-ABR.
Justice Ybanñ ez, as the ponente for C.A. G.R. SP No. 108807, carried the case with him when he was transferred to
the 13th Division. But whether or not he was administratively liable for the delay of eight months should depend
on the relevant circumstances. Although often holding that a heavy caseload is insufficient reason to excuse a
Judge from disposing his cases within the reglementary period, the Court has applied this rule by considering the
causes of the delay. In Marquez v. Manigbas, the Court relieved the respondent judge from liability because the
delay had been caused by the sudden deluge of cases brought about by the expansion of the jurisdiction of the
municipal trial courts. In Santos v. Lorenzo, the Court held that a delay of seven months in deciding a case could
be excused because of the heavy caseload of the trial courts in the National Capital Judicial Region. In Lubaton v.
Lazaro, the Court, in sparing the respondent from the sanctions earlier imposed for undue delay, cited the good
faith of the judge, the motivation of the complainant for bringing the charge, and the excessively heavy caseload
of 3,500 cases, 1,800 of which involved detainees, leaving her only Fridays for the study of her cases and the
resolution of pending incidents and issuance of the proper orders. The Court, in reversing the sanctions,
observed that "it would be unkind and inconsiderate on the part of the Court to disregard respondent Judge's
limitations and exact a rigid and literal compliance with the rule."
The delay in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 108807 could not be said to have been incurred by Justice Ybanñ ez with malice or
deliberate attempt to impede the dispensation of justice. He assigned C.A.-G.R. SP No. 108807 to a member of his
legal staff, but the latter had fallen seriously ill in the meantime, forcing him to hire a contractual-lawyer for the
purpose. The latter subsequently joined another agency of the Government on a permanent basis. Thus, Justice
Ybanñ ez could promulgate the decision only on February 28, 2014. His explanation for the delay, being entirely
plausible, is accepted.
WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES for lack of merit the administrative complaint against Justice Celia C. Librea-
Leagogo, Justice Elihu A. Ybanez and Justice Amy C. Lazaro-Javier.
SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. RTJ-11-2290 November 18, 2014
[Formerly OCA IPI No. 08-2954-RTJ]
about the raffle of cases. Also, he had absolutely no involvement in the engagement of Atty. Pilares as a
lawyer in the case as he does not entertain fixers.
Judge Blancaflor brushed off the immorality charge against him. He branded it as malicious and a mere
fabrication of Rivera. He alleged that Rivera even hired a Solomon Ondevilla (Ondevilla) to execute an
affidavit against him, but Ondevilla subsequently denied that he executed and signed the affidavit.
Judge Blancaflor questioned Rivera’s credibility, claiming that she is known for filing fabricated charges
and malicious complaints against lawyers, judges and other public officials, among them, an Atty.
Cayetano Santos. Further, she has also been charged with numerous criminal offenses, mostly swindling
or estafa cases and violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, and is known to have an illicit relationship with
different men.
In his Comment to Rivera’s supplemental affidavit, Judge Blancaflor reiterated his denial of Rivera’s
charges against him. In particular, he took exception to Annex "B" of the supplemental affidavit, which
referred to Namplata’s motion to reduce bail bond and which allegedly carried his marginal note of
approval. Judge Blancaflor claimed that the document was manufactured and was not on file with the
court. He added that the marginal note approving a reduced bail of P40,000.00 was forged; even
assuming that it was genuine, it was not a formal order and he still had the discretion on whether
toreduce the P60,000.00 recommended bail. By way of a reply-affidavit, Rivera countered that she is a
legitimate bondsman as she is an agent of Genric Insurance and that she is also a swimming instructor
and in business through her "Rivera Swimming Lessons." With respect to Tagpuan Restaurant, she
clarified that the property is registered in the name of Villamar, Judge Blancaflor’s live-in partner, and that
the two also purchased and co-owned several parcels of land in Layugan, Pagsanjan, Laguna.
Rivera also claimed that Ondevilla withdrew his affidavit relating Judge Blancaflor’s illicit relationship
with Villamar because the two of them threatened to file a case against him and would have him
imprisoned. She stressed that Judge Blancaflor’s attack on her person has nothing to do with the case she
filed against him.
Justice Fernando’s Investigation/Findings/Recommendation
In compliance with the Court’s resolution of August 17, 2011, Justice Fernando conducted a thorough
investigation of the complaint, in the course of which, she conducted several hearings, received affidavits
and documentary evidence, heard testimonies of witnesses, and even conducted an ocular inspection.
Justice Fernando found Judge Blancaflor guilty of (1) bribery, gross misconduct and violation of R.A. 3019;
and (2) immorality. She recommended that the judge be dismissed from the service, with prejudice to his
reinstatement or appointment to any public office, and likewise recommended the forfeiture of the
judge’s retirement benefits, if any.
The OCA Report and Recommendation
On July 24, 2013, the Court referred Justice Fernando’s final report to the OCA for evaluation, report and
recommendation. In its memorandum of February 25, 2014, the OCA submitted its report to the Court,
adopting the findings and recommendations of Justice Fernando.
The Court’s Ruling
After considering Justice Fernando’s report and the records of the case, we note that she conducted a very
thorough investigation. We uphold her findings and recommendation as we find sufficient basis to
dismiss respondent Judge Blancaflor from the service.
Re: charge of bribery, gross misconduct and violation of R.A. No. 3019
The first count against Judge Blancaflor regarding this charge involved his alleged: (1) refusal to approve
Catuday’s motion to reduce bail bond, despite a "no objection" from the prosecutor; (2) refusal to order
Catuday’s release, despite Judge Ongkeko’s grant of the motion; (3) refusal to order Namplata’s release,
despite his own approval of the motion to reduce bail bond; and (4) offer of money to Byron and Ricel to
prevent them from testifying in the motion for his inhibition in the Leron case.
While Judge Blancaflor has the discretion to approve or disapprove a motion to reduce bail, it appears
from the records that he abused this prerogative in the cases of Catuday and Namplata. Through Judge
Blancaflor’s inaccessibility (he was usually not in the court in the afternoon) and refusal to take action on
their pleas for provisional liberty, Catuday and Namplata and the people working for the approval of their
motions (Rivera and De Mata) suffered inordinate delay and frustrations in securing the motions’
approval. In more ways than one, Judge Blancaflor gave De Mata and Rivera a run-around in Catuday’s
Prosecutor Rodrigo’s consent and with the help of Gemma, she succeeded in securing Judge Blancaflor’s
approval with the handwritten notation: "Approved P40,000.00 for surety bond. 3-27-08 (SGD.) Judge
Blancaflor."
After obtaining a bail bond for Namplata, Rivera tried to secure a release order from Judge Blancaflor who
refused to honor the bond as it had been belatedly filed. He even brought back the cost of the bond to
P60,000.00. In the afternoon of June 12, 2008, Rivera learned that Judge Blancaflor declared that he
would not release Namplata unless a criminal case is filed against her by Rina Tranilla (Tranilla), a sister
of Namplata. True enough, Tranilla filed a complaint for estafa against Rivera at around 4:00 o’clock that
afternoon. The following day, Judge Blancaflor’s order was issued, dated June 10, 2008, for Namplata’s
release.
Explaining her difficulties with Judge Blancaflor in relation with her work as a bondsman, Rivera claimed
that the judge harbored ill will against her because of her involvement in Special Proceeding No. 4605
entitled Arsenio S. Leron, et al. v. Benjamin S. Leron, et al.,then pending before Judge Blancaflor’s sala.
Rivera alleged that she was the attorney-in-fact of one of the defendants in the case, Dr. Emelita R. Leron
(Dr. Leron) who filed on March 2, 2007 a motion for inhibition against Judge Blancaflor. The motion
allegedly recited in detail Judge Blancaflor’s misdeeds and gross misconduct, manifest partiality and
indiscretion in fraternizing with clients and litigants in connection with the case.
Rivera further alleged that Judge Blancaflor inhibited himself from the case after she executed an affidavit
attesting to (1) the judge’s recommendation to the plaintiff, Normita Leron, to secure the services of Atty.
Ricardo Pilares, Jr. (Atty. Pilares); (2) the rigging of the raffle of the case to Judge Blancaflor; and (3) the
irregular service of summons to the defendants in the case. Moreover, her son Byron Torres (Byron) and
son-inlaw Ricel De Mata (Ricel)) also executed a joint affidavit stating that Judge Blancaflor "bribed" them
not to testify in connection with the motion for inhibition.
Lastly, Rivera maintained that Judge Blancaflor should be charged with immorality for maintaining an
illicit relationship with Villamar, who is not his wife.
In a Supplemental Affidavit, dated July 29, 2008, Rivera reiterated her charge that Judge Blancaflor
committed gross misconduct in (1) fraternizing with litigants;(2) maintaining an illicit affair with a
woman not his wife; and (3) exhibiting personal bias and prejudice against her in her efforts to obtain
bail bonds for Catuday and Namplata.
Judge Blancaflor’s Comment
In his Comment dated August 26, 2008, Judge Blancaflor denied Rivera’s accusations and dismissed them
as "mere concoctions" of her "fertile imagination."
Judge Blancaflor claimed that neither Rivera nor her daughter approached him regarding Catuday’s and
Namplata’s bail bonds. Even assuming that they did, he refused their requests because they were not
authorized bondsmen or agents of any duly accredited surety company. They were acting as fixers, he
explained; thus, he was justified in denying their requests. Further, Judge Blancaflor claimed that he
strictly observes a policy of refusing to reduce the required bail in drug-related cases even if approval is
recommended by the investigating prosecutor. He could not also order Catuday’s release because it was
Judge Ongkeko who granted his motion to reduce bail; in his view, Judge Ongkeko should also order
Catuday’s release.
Judge Blancaflor considered as "fantastic" Rivera’s account that she and De Mata brought the motions to
reduce bail of Catuday and Namplata to Tagpuan Restaurant in Pila, Laguna for his approval. He
maintained that Rivera’s account was simply untrue because as a matter of policy, he does not allow court
personnel or any other person for that matter, to bring the case records or any part thereof outside the
court premises. Moreover, he does not own a restaurant in Pila, Laguna, nor a house, chapel and resort in
Pagsanjan, Laguna.
In the Leron case, Judge Blancaflor recalled that Rivera asked him to extend assistance to her boss, Dr.
Leron, a defendant in the case. He denied her request and since then, she started harassing and
blackmailing him and even filed an administrative case against him.
Shortly thereafter, the Lerons (defendants in Special Proceeding No. 4605), with Rivera’s active
participation, started circulating stories against him, which culminated in the filing of a letter-complaint
before Executive Judge Mary Ann E. Corpus-Manñ alac (Judge Corpus-Manñ alac) accusing him of bias,
partiality and bribery. The Lerons however eventually withdrew the complaint after being enlightened
Q: The reason Judge Blancaflor why you did not anymore honor your marginal note reducing the amount
from 60 to 40 is that you came to know that it was Waling, the complainant, and her daughter Shiela who
was (sic) following it up with you?
A: That is not correct, sir. What you claim that I did not honor the original marginal note is because I did
not see it in the original file of the case.
Q: But the more important reason Judge is that you came to know that it was the complainant and her
daughter who were following up this bail bond case and when you came to know that follow up of the
complainant and her daughter, you wanted it returned back to 60 because you said it was too long in
coming, the P40,000.00 bond, is that correct?
A: That is not correct sir:
Q: And another condition of yours before the bail could be approved by you is that the sister or Namplata
must file a case of estafa against the complainant which she did and one day after, the case against the
complainant for estafa was filed before the Office of the City Prosecutor, you issued the Order of Release,
is that correct?
A: That is not correct. That is your own language, sir.
Q: That is the testimony of the witnesses.
In an effort to justify his errors and omissions in relation to Catuday’s and Namplata’s motions, Judge
Blancaflor argued that he refused to act on the motions because he hates drugs and,in the case of
Namplata, there was a delay in the processing of the bail bond.
We are not at all convinced by Judge Blancaflor’s explanations. His excuses – which were marked by
inconsistencies and typified by his initial denial that he approved Namplata’s motion, only to admit the
approval before Justice Fernando – cannotjustify his failure to act. Action by the judge was clearly called
for by the urgency of the matter before him – the plea for provisional liberty of Catuday and Namplata
who enjoy the right to bail despite the serious offenses they were charged with. His unexplained refusal in
these cases can only support Rivera’s claim that his inaction was due to Rivera’s intervention in the
approval of the motions, a clear sign of his personal bias and prejudice against her. This, in our view,
ispatently a gross misconduct on the part of Judge Blancaflor.
It appears from the records that Judge Blancaflor’s antipathy towards Rivera arose from her involvement
in the Leron case when she testified against the judge in a motion for his inhibition from the case. The
motion must have caused considerable anxiety and concern for the judge so that he even exerted efforts
to neutralize Rivera, to the extent of offering cash to Byron (Rivera’s son) and Ricel (Rivera’s son-in-law)
who executed a joint Affidavit that Judge Blancaflor and Villamar offered them P10,000.00 each and even
warned them not to testify at the hearing on the motion. The two showed the cash to Rivera and they had
the incident entered in the police blotter. In this regard, Torres and Ricel deposed:
xxxx
1. x x x Kami ay namamasukan kay Armando Q. Torres ("ARMANDO") na tatay ni BYRON at biyenan na
lalaki ni RICEL. Kami ay laging nagkakaroon ng komunikasyon kay Noralyn M. Villamar a.k.a. Macky
("Macky") dahil may mga transaksiyon silang pinag-uusapan ng aming tatay na si Armando.
2. Noong ika-02 Marso 2007, araw ng Biyernes, mga 5:00 – 5:30 ng hapon, tumawag si Macky kay Byron
at sinabi na gusto daw siya makausap nito tungkol sa pagtetestigo nila laban kay Judge Jaime C. Blancaflor
("Judge Blancaflor"), at sinabihan na pumunta sa bahay nila.
3. Pagdating ni Byron sa bahay nila Macky at Judge Blancaflor sa Brgy. Layugan ng mga bandang 6:00 ng
gabi, tinanong ni Macky si Byron "Bakit natin kailangang maglaban?"Nagkunwari akong walang alam at
tumahimik na lang ako.
4. Nilapitan ako (Byron) ni Judge Blancflor at sinabi na: "Byron, ayaw ko tayong mag-kabanggaan. Kung
lilitaw kayo sa hearing sa petsa 6 ay ipapakulongko kayo. Ito ang ten thousand (P10,000.00), ito ay hindi
suhol. Wag ka lang tumistigo. Kung tetestigo ka, mapipilitan kaming lumaban. Kayang-kaya kitang gawan
ng kaso tulad ng rape at anumang kaso na puwedeng isaksak sa iyo.
5. Pinahabol pa ni Macky na: "Kahit patayan pwede kami."
6. Noong 03 ng Marso 2007, araw ng Sabado, bandang 5:10 ng hapon, pumunta si Macky at si Guillen
Almonte sa bahay ng tatay namin na si Armando sa Brgy. Duhat kung saan kami ay nagtratrabaho.
7. Galit na galit si Macky at sinabi nito kay Armando ngunit nakatingin sa amin: "Pare, bakit ganito? Ano
ang ginawa ng mga bata? Kayong dalawa, tinanggap namin kayo nang maayos sa Layugan."
and Namplata’s cases for no plausible reason other than the judge’s strong antipathy towards Rivera.
This is serious misconduct and a violation of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary
which mandates that "judges shall perform their judicial duties without favor, bias or prejudice," and that
they "shall ensure that his or her conduct, both in and out of court, maintains and enhances the
confidence of the public, the legal profession and litigants in the impartiality of the judge and of the
judiciary."
For instance, when De Mata learned that Judge Blancaflor said that he did not approve Catuday’s motion
for reduction of his bail because Prosecutor Rodrigo was against the motion, she went to see the
prosecutor about it. Prosecutor Rodrigo told her that there was no problem with the motion, so he signed
it, but he did not know why Judge Blancaflor would not approve the motion. De Mata then asked the help
of Magana, yet even with Magana’s intercession, Judge Blancaflor refused to sign the motion, saying that
he did not like drugs. Magana wondered why Catuday’s motion was not approved when all the other
surety bonds were approved. The following testimony of De Mata confirmed the difficulties De Mata and
her mother experienced in their work as bondsmen in Judge Blancaflor’s sala:
xxxx
Q: After Mr. Bugain told you that Judge Blancaflor refuses to sign for the reason that Fiscal Rodrigo also
does not approve of the said motion, what did you do?
A. I went to Fiscal Rodrigo and asked him what was the problem with the motion?
Q: What did Fiscal Rodrigo [tell] you?
A: He said there was really no problem with the motion so he signed it. He did not know why the motion
of Catuday was left pending.
xxxx
Q: During this time, this Mayora was also in branch 26?
A: Yes, ma’m, and she was also wondering why our application cannot be approved while all the other
surety bonds were approved.
Q: Can you tell us who this Mayora is, what is her occupation?
A: She was a councilor, the wife of the previous mayor. If there are people who cannot afford to pay bail,
they ask her for help and she helps people.
xxxx
Judge Blancaflor denied the allegations, contending that Catuday’s motion was not filed with the OCC and
never reached him.27 Justice Fernando found otherwise, citing the Order dated May 28, 2008 of Judge
Ongkeko, Vice-Executive Judge of the RTC, Sta. Cruz, Laguna, granting the motion when Judge Blancaflor
was attending a seminar in Tagaytay City. Judge Ongkeko could not have issued the order had it not been
filed with the OCC. But what was more surprising was Judge Blancaflor’s refusal to acknowledge and to
act on the order of approval. This belies Judge Blancaflor’s excuses for not acting on Catuday’s motion and
lends credence to Rivera’s submission that the judge’s refusal was to spite her.
The same thing happened when Rivera processed Namplata’s bail bond. As the records show, Judge
Blancaflor approved Namplata’s motion for reduction of bail. The judge admitted his approval during the
investigation. When he was asked: "Do you clearly remember Judge that you reduced it as shown by your
signature from P60,000,00 to P40,000.00 bail?," he answered: "That is correct sir, that day," referring to
March 27, 2008. Yet, he refused to approve Namplata’s temporary release. In fact, in his Comment to
Rivera’s supplemental complaint, he disowned the marginal note he made on a copy of Namplata’s motion
reducing his bail bond to P40,000.00.
The following exchanges during the investigation further indicate that Judge Blancaflor overstepped and
abused his authority as a judge when he took time to release Namplata, despite his approval of
Namplata’s bail bond at its original amount which he earlier reduced to P40.000.00:
J. Fernando:
But you admit you issued a March 27 Order reducing it to P40,000.00?
Judge Blancaflor:
The marginal note I admit, Your Honor.
J. Fernando:
Yes, that’s fine.
Atty. Aguirre (Rivera’s, counsel):
understand, based on the judge’s letter to him, that the case — a settlement of estate dispute — belonged
to the Family Court then handled by Judge Blancaflor. Due to the judge’s letter, he assumed that the case
was within the jurisdiction of the Family Court so that it was his ministerial duty to forward the case to
Judge Blancaflor’s sala.
Not only does it appear that Judge Blancaflor intervened in the assignment of the Leron case, he also had
a hand in ensuring who would represent the disputants, by suggesting, in the presence of and with the
active participation of Villamar, that the lawyers for the parties would be Atty. Pilares for the plaintiffs and
Atty. Stephen David (Atty. David) for the defendants. He even went to the extent of voicing out how the
case should turn out.
Thus, Dr. Leron deposed: "Tinanong ko si Judge Blancaflor kung matatalo ako kahit sabihin ko na wala
naman talaga ang lahat ng hinahanap nila. Sagot ni Judge Blancaflor ‘Pwede, depende sa presentasyon ng
abogado mo.’ Tinanong ko kung sino yong abogado na sinasabi ni Macky. Sagot ni Judge Blancaflor[,] si
[Atty. David] at dinagdag pa niya ‘kumpare ko yan,magaling yan, at taga-Tektite, madali nating maayos ang
kaso.’ Nabanggit din niya na kumpare ni Atty. David si
Atty. Pilares. Sinabi niya pa ‘mas lamang kayo kasi mas alam niyo nangyayari kaysa sa kabila.’"
Also, Ricel, Rivera’s son-in-law, stated under oath that he saw Judge Blancaflor and plaintiff Gilbert Leron
(Gilbert) during the blessing of the chapel inside the compound of the judge’s house on January 16, 2007
and he overheard Judge Blancaflor assuring Gilbert not to worry about the case saying: "Pare wag na kayo
mag-alala, ayos na ang kaso nyo nina Dr. Leron," while they were drinking beer.
Judge Blancaflor argued that he had no interest whatsoever in the Leron case as it was forwarded to
Branch 26 in the ordinary course of business since cases falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Family Court are directly forwarded to Branch 26, his branch. His letter to Atty. Trinidad should not be
considered against him because he was then a new family court judge. He further argued that he did not
refer Atty. Pilares to the plaintiffs; he even dismissed the case for prematurity and inhibited himself from
the case after it was re-raffled.
We do not find Judge Blancaflor’s explanations convincing. The circumstances of the Leron case left Judge
Blancaflor no other recourse but to inhibit. As Justice Fernando aptly observed, it was more prudent for
the judge to inhibit than to be placed under a cloud of distrust by the parties. On the matter of the parties’
legal representation alone, we find credible the statements of Rivera, Dr. Leron and Ricel that not only did
Judge Blancaflor refer lawyers to the parties but, more seriously, he gave them hints that they would
prevail in the case.
Judge Blancaflor’s interference in the case in the way just described is not only gross misconduct; it also
constitutes a violation of R.A. No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, particularly Section 3(e)
which provides: "In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the
following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful: x
x x Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official administrative or judicial
functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence x x x."
To be sure, even if Judge Blancaflor inhibited himself from the Leron case, he cannot extricate himself
from the legal mess he brought upon himself. His interference in the case caused an undue injury to the
party who should have prevailed had the case pushed through; and an unwarranted benefit to the party
who should have lost had the case been decided on the merits. Worse, he exhibited evident bad faith
when he gave both parties expectations of winning the case. Thus, there is every reason to find probable
cause against him for violation of R.A. No. 3019.
It is unfortunate that Judge Blancaflor lost sight of the exacting standards demanded of the office of a
judge in the Leron case. Time and again, judges have been reminded that as magistrates, they must
comport themselves in such a manner that their conduct, official or otherwise, can bear the most
searching scrutiny of the public that looks up to them as the epitome of integrity and justice. Sad to state,
Judge Blancaflor failed to pass this "searching scrutiny."
Re: charge of immorality
On the charge of immorality – for allegedly maintaining an illicit relationship with Villamar who is not his
wife – Justice Fernando aptly observed that Judge Blancaflor offered no evidence, except general denials
to disprove his moral indiscretion, which appeared to be widely known in the community at the time
8. Hindi na kami umimik at hinayaan naming magsalita na lamang si Macky.
9. Sinabi pa ni Macky na: "Huwag na nating patagalin ito. Ayaw kong tayo ang magkabanggaan. Kung
lalaban kayo, lalaban kami hanggang patayan."
10. Nagtangkang umalis si Byron kaya sumigaw si Macky na: "Byron! Huwag kang umiwas. Problema
natin to. Huwag kang umalis!"
11. Nag-isip si Byron ng dahilan upang maka-alis. Bago siya nakaalis, pahabol na sinabi ni Macky na:
"Mag-aabot ako ng tulong, huwag lang kayong sumali."
12. Nang nakaalis na si Byron mga bandang 6:00 pm, naglabas ng pera si Macky at inaabot ito kay Ricel,
ngunit hindi niya ito kinuha. Kaya ang ginawa ni Macky ay kinausap si Armando at inilagay ang pera sa
mesa at sinabi na: "Pare, kung ayaw magtiwala ng anak mo sa amin, ito ang P20,000.00 para kay Byron at
para kay Ricel. Ikaw na ang bahala. Meron pang kasunod yan kung pipirma sila ng Affidavit of Desistance."
In his comment on Rivera’s complaint, Judge Blancaflor denied the alleged offer, claiming that the alleged
sums did not come from him but from Armando Torres (Torres) and were "given as support to his son
Byron and son-in-law Ricel." When Rivera saw the P20,000.00, she grabbed it from Byron and proceeded
to the police station and made a false story of bribery against him. Judge Blancaflor offered in evidence
two affidavits Armando executed dated March 6, 2007 and August 22, 2008.
Again, the explanation fails to persuade us. Armando is Rivera’s estranged husband. Their union produced
Byron and De Mata, the wife of Ricel. Rivera and Armando separated in 1983. It was a case of a marriage
turned sour where the spouses filed cases against one another, as Armando himself stated in his affidavit
of August 22, 2008. We should not be too quick therefore to admit Armando’s statements as unvarnished
truth, especially when he did not even appear during the investigation to affirm the statements attributed
to him, despite several subpoenas for him to testify, the last one being on December 6, 2012.
On the other hand, Rivera and Byron reported the bribery incident to the police. The following exchanges
on what transpired in the police station significantly shed light on this incident and bolstered Rivera’s
claim that Judge Blancaflor committed a serious misconduct in relation with the Leron case, thus:
Q: Now, do you remember what this is all about, the incident reported by Byron Torres?
A: It was a threat.
Q. Will you please read it again to refresh your memory?
(Witness reading the blotter)
Q: What you read, the entry in the blotter is in your handwriting?
A. Yes sir.
Q: What do you remember about this P10,000.00?
J. Fernando: 10 or 20?
A: P10,000.00
J. Fernando: 10 lang?
A: Yes, P10,000.00.
Wag siyang aatend sa hearing saa-sais kung hindi sila ang magkakabangga ni Judge Blancaflor. Q: What is
that P10,000.00 there?
A: Ang akin pong pagkakaintindi ito ay suhol dahil nakalagay dito hindi ito suhol. Wag kang tumestigo
dahil kung tetestigo ka ay mapipilitan lumaban gawan ka ng kaso. Pag tumestigo siya gagawa siya ng kaso.
Translation:
If he testified, he would have a case filed against him.
xxxx
Q: But the signature here of Byron, did he sign it in your presence?
A: Yes sir.
Q: And the witness also signed it in your presence?
A: Yes, sir, in my presence.
The root cause of the Leron case, as Justice Fernando established and stressed, was the irregular
assignment of the case which was directly brought to Judge Blancaflor’s sala without going through a
raffle. Atty. Arthur Trinidad, Jr. (Atty. Trinidad), then RTC Clerk of Court, Sta. Cruz, Laguna, testified that
the case, Special Proceeding No. 4605, which was filed on November 15, 2006 was not included in the
schedule of raffle of cases for the period November 10 to 30, 2006 and was brought to the judge’s sala
even before the case was supposed to be raffled on November 30, 2006 because he was made to
Q: So despite the fact that you are not close to Macky, Macky intimidated (sic) to you that Judge Blancaflor
is her live-in-partner?
A: Yes, Your Honor.
Justice Fernando stressed that Judge Blancaflor did not categorically deny the allegations of an illicit
relationship with Villamar. While he stated that his marriage to his wife Nora Lopez was already annulled,
the annulment became final only on July 18, 2012 by virtue of an entry of judgment from the RTC, Br. 199,
Las Pinñ as City. Thus, he was still a married man at the time of his liaison with Villamar.
For maintaining a relationship with Villamar, Judge Blancaflor crossed the line of a proper and acceptable
conduct as a magistrate and a private person. In Re: Complaint of Mrs. Rotilla A. Marcos and her children
against Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos, we said: "x x x The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of
a judge must be free of a whiff of impropriety not only with respect to his performance of his official
duties, but also to his behavior outside his sala and as a private individual. There is no dichotomy of
morality: a public official is also judged by his private morals. The code dictates that a judge, in order to
promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, must behave with propriety at
all times. x x x."
In sum, we find substantial evidence to hold Judge Blancaflor guilty as charged. This conclusion, as
correctly observed by Justice Fernando:
x x x jibes with the affidavits and testimonies of complainant Rivera and her witnesses. His acts of
fraternizing with lawyers and litigants, his partiality in the performance of his duties, his act of giving
bribe money to two (2) witnesses to a case in order for them to withdraw, and maintaining an illicit affair
with a woman not his wife tarnished the image of the judiciary. Respondent judge demonstrated himself
to be wanting of moral integrity x x x He is therefore unfit to remain in office and discharge his functions
and duties as judge. (Emphasis supplied)
Indeed, as observed by the OCA, it has been established that "[t]he findings of investigating magistrates
on the credibility of witnesses are given great weight by reason of their unmatched opportunity to see the
deportment of the witnesses as they testified."
Gross misconduct, bribery, violation of R.A. No. 3019 and immorality, all of them constituting violations of
the Code of Judicial Conduct, are serious charges under Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court
punishable under Section 11 of the same Rule by any of the following: (1) dismissal from the service,
forfeiture of the benefits as the Court may determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or
appointment to any public office, including government-owned or controlled corporations; forfeiture of
benefits shall in no case include accrued leave credits; (2) suspension from office without salary and
other benefits for more than three (3) months but not exceeding six (6) months; or (3) a fine of more than
P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00.
Considering the gravity of the offenses committed by Judge Blancaflor, we approve and adopt the
recommendations of Justice Fernando and the OCA for his dismissal from the service, with the accessory
penalties.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, Presiding Judge Jaime C. Blancaflor, Branch 26, Regional Trial Court,
Sta. Cruz, Laguna, is found GUILTY of gross misconduct, violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act (R.A. No. 3019) and immorality, constituting serious violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct under
Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court.
Judge Blancaflor is DISMISSED from the service, with forfeiture of his retirement and other monetary
benefits, except accrued leave credits. He is DISQUALIFIED from reinstatement or appointment to any
public office, including government-owned or controlled corporations.
This ruling shall be without prejudice to any disciplinary action that may be brought against Judge
Blancaflor as a lawyer under A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC. Accordingly, Judge Blancaflor is directed to COMMENT
within ten (10) days from receipt of this decision and to show cause why he should not also be
suspended, disbarred or otherwise disciplinarily sanctioned as a member of the Philippine Bar.
SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. RTJ-09-2200 April 2, 2014
(formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 08-2834-RTJ)
material to the case. As the records show, statements made here and there by witnesses and personalities
drawn into the case confirm the special relationship between Judge Blancaflor and Villamar such that
Villamar had no hesitation in speaking for the judge on matters concerning him and his work.
The community, it seemed, had accepted them as man and wife, given that they stayed in Layugan,
Pagsanjan, Laguna and owned Tagpuan Restaurant in Pila, Laguna. This restaurant, incidentally, even
became Judge Blancaflor’s extension office, usually in the afternoons, as deposed by Rivera, De Mata,
Byron, Ricel and Judge Blancaflor’s staff whose assistance Rivera and De Mata sought in their effort to
secure the provisional liberty for their clients Catuday and Namplata. The depositions were backed up by
pictures of (1) the places where Tagpuan Restaurant used to stand and where the two were residing, and
(2) the events in the life of the live-in partners. Notably, Exhs. "N," "N-1," and "N-2" 49 were separate
camera shots of the place where Tagpuan Restaurant used to stand; Exh. "A-15-C" was a picture of Gilbert,
a party in the Leron case, attending the blessing of the chapel inside the compound of Judge Blancaflor’s
house; Exh. "E" was a picture of Judge Blancaflor and Villamar together in a hut located inside the
compound of their house in Layugan, Pagsanjan, Laguna, apparently relaxing; and Exhs. "F," "G," and "H"
were pictures of Villamar picking up Judge Blancaflor from his office at the RTC, Sta. Cruz, Laguna, using
her Pajero with plate no. XHF 887.
Judge Blancaflor belittled the immorality charge, dismissing it as merely a fabrication and a product of
Rivera’s fertile imagination. To substantiate his claim, he cited the withdrawal of Ondevilla’s affidavit
confirming Rivera’s charge that he was maintaining an illicit liaison with Villamar.
Again, we are not persuaded by the judge’s response. Given the fact that Judge Blancaflor is a person of
authority and his involvement in the "bribery" incident (as revealed by Byron and Ricel whom the judge
even threatened if they would testify against him), we find more credibility in Rivera’s submission that
Ondevilla withdrew his affidavit on the immorality charge because the judge likewise threatened him.
The confluence of the statements of Rivera and the others (Byron, De Mata, Ricel and Mirasol), the
information provided by Judge Blancaflor’s staff, and the exhibits described above, constitute more than
enough support for the immorality charge against Judge Blancaflor. These interwoven pieces of evidence
pointing to the relationship between the judge and Villamar, several of which materialized over a period
of time, could not conceivably have been the result of Rivera’s fabrications. As De Mata testified during the
investigation:
ATTY. SHALIM:
Q: Ms. Witness, you mentioned that Noralyn Villamar is the live-in partner of Judge Blancaflor. How do
you know this?
A: Because Tita Macky herself was the one who told me that Judge Blancaflor is her live-in partner.
xxxx
J. FERNANDO:
Q: If you know, how long have Judge Blancaflor and Noralyn been living together as live-in partners?
A: 2006, your Honor.
Q: So they started as live-in partners since 2006?
A: June of 2006, Your Honor, because that was when I came back from Manila.
Q: As far as you are concerned, you only learned about it in 2006?
A. Yes , Your Honor.
Q: Have you seen them really living together as live-in partners?
A: No, Your Honor. It was my husband because they were still at Layugan because my husband was the
driver of my father at that time.
xxxx
Q: Are you saying that Judge and Macky are living in Layugan?
A: Yes, Your Honor.
xxxx
Q: Are you sure that Macky told you that Judge Blancaflor is her live-in partner?
A: Yes, Your Honor.
Q: How did she tell you?
A: It was just in a casual way that she told me that Judge is her current live-in partner because previously
it was a Colonel.
13. The respondent adamantly refused to inhibit herself and showed special interest and personal
involvement in the case.
ii. Supplemental Complaint
The complainant likewise filed a supplemental complaint dated April 14, 2008 where he alleged that the
respondent committed an act of impropriety when she displayed her photographs in a social networking
website called "Friendster" and posted her personal details as an RTC Judge, allegedly for the purpose of
finding a compatible partner. She also posed with her upper body barely covered by a shawl, allegedly
suggesting that nothing was worn underneath except probably a brassiere.
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) in its 1st Indorsement dated March 18, 2008, referred the
complaints to the respondent for comment.
a. Comment to January 21, 2008 Complaint
The respondent vehemently denied the allegations against her. While she admitted that she crafted a
workable, feasible rehabilitation plan best suited for SCP, she maintained that she did so only to render
fairness and equity to all the parties to the rehabilitation proceedings. She also submitted that if indeed
she erred in modifying the rehabilitation plan, hers was a mere error of judgment that does not call for an
administrative disciplinary action. Accordingly, she claimed that the administrative complaints were
premature because judicial remedies were still available.
The respondent also argued that the rules do not prohibit informal meetings and conferences. On the
contrary, she argued that informal meetings are even encouraged in view of the summary and non-
adversarial nature of rehabilitation proceedings. Since Section 21, Rule 4 of the Rules gives the
rehabilitation receiver the power to meet with the creditors, then there is all the more reason for the
rehabilitation judge, who has the authority to approve the plan, to call and hold meetings with the parties.
She also pointed out that it was SCP which suggested that informal meetings be called and that she only
agreed to hold these meetings on the condition that all the parties would attend.
As to her alleged failure to observe the reglementary period, she contended that she approved the
rehabilitation plan within the period prescribed by law. She argued that the matter of granting extension
of time under Section 11, Rule 4 of the Rules pertains not to the SC, but to the rehabilitation court.
The respondent likewise refuted the allegations of bias and partiality. First, she claimed that her denial of
the complainant’s motion for inhibition was not due to any bias or prejudice on her part but due to lack of
basis. Second, she argued that her decision was not orchestrated to favor EPCIB, as evidenced by the fact
that EPCIP itself (as some other creditors did) promptly appealed her decision to the Court of Appeals
(CA). Third, she did not remove Atty. Gabionza as SCP’s rehabilitation receiver because she disagreed that
the grounds the complainant raised warranted his removal.
She also found no merit to the allegation of conflict of interest. Lastly, she maintained that the rest of the
complainant’s allegations were not substantiated and corroborated by evidence.
The respondent further alleged that she did not gravely abuse her authority in not issuing a subpoena as
Section 1, Rule 3 of the Interim Rules on Corporate Rehabilitation of the Rules specifically states that the
court may decide matters on the basis of affidavits and other documentary evidence.
On the allegation of conflict of interest, she maintained that the allegations were not proven and
substantiated by evidence. Finally, the respondent also believed that there was nothing improper in
expressing her ideas during the informal meetings.
b. Comment to April 14, 2008 Supplemental Complaint
In her comment on the supplemental complaint, the respondent submitted that the photos she posted in
the social networking website "Friendster" could hardly be considered vulgar or lewd. She added that an
"off-shouldered" attire is an acceptable social outfit under contemporary standards and is not forbidden.
She further stated that there is no prohibition against attractive ladies being judges; she is proud of her
photo for having been aesthetically made. Lastly, she submitted that the ruling of the Court in the case of
Impao v. Judge Makilala should not be applied to her case since the facts are different.
On July 4, 2008, the complainant filed a reply, insisting that the respondent’s acts of posting "seductive"
pictures and maintaining a "Friendster" account constituted acts of impropriety, in violation of Rules 2.01,
2.02 and 2.03, Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
In a Resolution dated September 9, 2009, the Court re-docketed the complaints as regular administrative
matters, and referred them to the CA for investigation, report and recommendation.
ANTONIO M. LORENZANA, Complainant, vs. JUDGE MA. CECILIA I. AUSTRIA, Regional Trial Court,
Branch 2, Batangas City, Respondent.
We resolve in this Decision the administrative complaints filed by Antonio M. Lorenzana (complainant)
against Judge Ma. Cecilia I. Austria (respondent), Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 2, Batangas City.
The records show that the administrative complaints arose from the case "In the Matter of the Petition to
have Steel Corporation of the Philippines Placed under Corporate Rehabilitation with Prayer for the
Approval of the Proposed Rehabilitation Plan," docketed as SP. Proc. No. 06-7993, where the respondent
was the presiding judge. The complainant was the Executive Vice President and Chief Operating Officer of
Steel Corporation of the Philippines (SCP), a company then under rehabilitation proceedings.
i. Complaint
In his verified complaint dated January 21, 2008, the complainant alleged that in the course of SP. Proc.
No. 06-7993, the respondent committed Gross Ignorance of the Law, Grave Abuse of Authority, Gross
Misconduct, Grave Incompetence, Irregularity in the Performance of Duty, Grave Bias and Partiality, Lack
of Circumspection, Conduct Unbecoming of a Judge, Failure to Observe the Reglementary Period and
Violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility, as shown by the following instances:
1. The respondent appointed Atty. Santiago T. Gabionza, Jr. as rehabilitation receiver over SCP’s objections
and despite serious conflict of interest in being the duly appointed rehabilitation receiver for SCP and, at
the same time, the external legal counsel of most of SCP’s creditors; he is also a partner of the law firm
that he engaged as legal adviser.
2. The respondent conducted informal meetings (which she termed as "consultative meetings" in her
Order dated May 11, 2007) in places outside her official jurisdiction (i.e., a first class golf club, a hotel and
sports club facilities in Metro Manila) and where she arbitrarily dictated the terms, parameters and
features of the rehabilitation plan she wanted to approve for SCP. She also announced in the meetings that
she would prepare the rehabilitation plan for SCP.
3. The modified rehabilitation plan submitted by Atty. Gabionza is a replica of what the respondent
dictated to him. Thus, the respondent exceeded the limits of her authority and effectively usurped and
pre-empted the rehabilitation receiver’s exercise of functions.
4. The respondent ordered that the proceedings of the informal meetings be off-record so that there
would be no record that she had favored Equitable-PCI Bank (EPCIB).
5. The respondent had secret meetings and communications with EPCIB to discuss the case without the
knowledge and presence of SCP and its creditors.
6. The respondent appointed Gerardo Anonas (Anonas) as Atty. Gabionza’s financial adviser and, at the
same time, as her financial adviser to guide her in the formulation and development of the rehabilitation
plan, for a fee of P3.5M at SCP’s expense. Anonas is also the cousin-in-law of the managing partner of Atty.
Gabionza’s law firm.
7. The respondent encouraged EPCIB to raise complaints or accusations against SCP, leading to EPCIB’s
filing of a motion to create a management committee.
8. When requested to conduct an evidentiary meeting and to issue a subpoena (so that SCP could confront
EPCIB’s witnesses to prove the allegation that there was a need for the creation of a management
committee), the respondent denied SCP’s requests and delayed the issuance of the order until the last
minute.
9. At the hearing of September 14, 2007, the respondent intimidated SCP’s counsel, Atty. Ferdinand
Topacio; blocked his every attempt to speak; refused to recognize his appearances in court; and made
condescending and snide remarks.
10. The respondent failed to observe the reglementary period prescribed by the Interim Rules of
Procedure on Corporate Rehabilitation (Rules). She approved the rehabilitation plan beyond the 180 days
given to her in the Rules, without asking for permission to extend the period from the Supreme Court
(SC).
11. The respondent erroneously interpreted and applied Section 23, Rule 4 of the Rules (the court’s
power to approve the rehabilitation plan) to include the power to amend, modify and alter it.
12. The respondent took a personal interest and commitment to decide the matter in EPCIB’s favor and
made comments and rulings in the proceedings that raised concerns regarding her impartiality.
4) respondent Judge Austria be ADMONISHED to refrain from further acts of impropriety with a stern
warning that a repetition of the same or any similar act will be dealt with more severely.
In arriving at its recommendation the OCA found that the respondent was not guilty of gross ignorance of
the law as the complainant failed to prove that her orders were motivated by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty
or corruption.
The OCA also found that the charges of bias and partiality in handling the rehabilitation proceedings were
not supported by evidence. It accepted the respondent’s explanation in the charge of failure to observe
the reglementary period.
Lastly, the OCA maintained that the allegations of grave abuse of authority and gross incompetence are
judicial in nature, hence, they should not be the subject of disciplinary action. On the other hand, on
allegations of conduct unbecoming of a judge, violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility (Code),
lack of circumspection and impropriety, the OCA shared Justice Gonzales-Sison’s observations that the
respondent’s act of posting seductive photos in her Friendster account contravened the standard of
propriety set forth by the Code.
The Court’s Ruling
We agree with the recommendation of both Justice Gonzales-Sison and the OCA for the imposition of a
fine on the respondent but modify the amount as indicated below. We sustain Justice Gonzales-Sison’s
finding of gross ignorance of the law in so far as the respondent ordered the creation of a management
committee without conducting an evidentiary hearing. The absence of a hearing was a matter of basic due
process that no magistrate should be forgetful or careless about.
On the Charges of Grave Abuse of Authority;
Irregularity in the Performance of Duty; Grave
Bias and Partiality; and Lack of Circumspection
It is well settled that in administrative cases, the complainant bears the onus of proving the averments of
his complaint by substantial evidence. In the present case, the allegations of grave abuse of authority,
irregularity in the performance of duty, grave bias and partiality, and lack of circumspection are devoid of
merit because the complainant failed to establish the respondent’s bad faith, malice or ill will. The
complainant merely pointed to circumstances based on mere conjectures and suppositions. These, by
themselves, however, are not sufficient to prove the accusations. "[M]ere allegation is not evidence and is
not equivalent to proof."
"[U]nless the acts were committed with fraud, dishonesty, corruption, malice or ill-will, bad faith, or
deliberate intent to do an injustice, [the] respondent judge may not be held administratively liable for
gross misconduct, ignorance of the law or incompetence of official acts in the exercise of judicial functions
and duties, particularly in the adjudication of cases."
Even granting that the respondent indeed erred in the exercise of her judicial functions, these are, at best,
legal errors correctible not by a disciplinary action, but by judicial remedies that are readily available to
the complainant. "An administrative complaint is not the appropriate remedy for every irregular or
erroneous order or decision issued by a judge where a judicial remedy is available, such as a motion for
reconsideration or an appeal." Errors committed by him/her in the exercise of adjudicative functions
cannot be corrected through administrative proceedings but should be assailed instead through judicial
remedies.
On the Charges of Grave Bias and Partiality
We likewise find the allegations of bias and partiality on the part of the respondent baseless. The truth
about the respondent’s alleged partiality cannot be determined by simply relying on the complainant’s
verified complaint. Bias and prejudice cannot be presumed, in light especially of a judge’s sacred
obligation under his oath of office to administer justice without respect to the person, and to give equal
right to the poor and rich. There should be clear and convincing evidence to prove the charge; mere
suspicion of partiality is not enough.
In the present case, aside from being speculative and judicial in character, the circumstances cited by the
complainant were grounded on mere opinion and surmises. The complainant, too, failed to adduce proof
indicating the respondent’s predisposition to decide the case in favor of one party. This kind of evidence
would have helped its cause. The bare allegations of the complainant cannot overturn the presumption
The CA’s Report and Recommendation
On November 13, 2009, Justice Marlene Gonzales-Sison, the Investigating Justice, conducted a hearing,
followed by the submission of memoranda by both parties. In her January 4, 2010 Report and
Recommendation, Justice Gonzales-Sison ruled that the complaints were partly meritorious. She found
that the issues raised were judicial in nature since these involved the respondent’s appreciation of
evidence.
She also added that while the CA resolved to set aside the respondent’s decision in the rehabilitation
proceedings, it was not by reason of her ignorance of the law or abuse of authority, but because the
rehabilitation plan could no longer be implemented in view of SCP’s financial predicament.
On the allegation of grave bias and partiality in handling the rehabilitation proceedings, Justice Gonzales-
Sison ruled that the complainant failed to present any clear and convincing proof that the respondent
intentionally and deliberately acted against SCP’s interests; the complaint merely relied on his opinions
and surmises.
On the matter of the respondent’s inhibition, she noted that in cases not covered by the rule on
mandatory inhibition, the decision to inhibit lies within the discretion of the sitting judge and is primarily
a matter of conscience.
With respect to the respondent’s informal meetings, Justice Gonzales-Sison found nothing irregular
despite the out-of-court meetings as these were agreed upon by all the parties, including SCP’s creditors.
She also found satisfactory the respondent’s explanation in approving the rehabilitation plan beyond the
180-day period prescribed by the Rules.
The foregoing notwithstanding, Justice Gonzales-Sison noted the respondent’s unnecessary bickering
with SCP’s legal counsel and ruled that her exchanges and utterances were reflective of arrogance and
superiority. In the words of the Justice Gonzales-Sison:
Rather than rule on the manifestations of counsels, she instead brushed off the matter with what would
appear to be a conceited show of a prerogative of her office, a conduct that falls below the standard of
decorum expected of a judge. Her statements appear to be done recklessly and were uncalled for. xxx.
Section 6[,] Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary states that: judges
shall maintain order and decorum in all proceedings before the court and be patient, dignified and
courteous in relation to litigants, witnesses, lawyers and others whom the judge deals in an official
capacity. Judicial decorum requires judges to be temperate in their language at all times. Failure on this
regard amounts to a conduct unbecoming of a judge, for which Judge Austria should be held liable.
On the respondent’s Friendster account, she believes that her act of maintaining a personal social
networking account (displaying photos of herself and disclosing personal details as a magistrate in the
account) – even during these changing times when social networking websites seem to be the trend –
constitutes an act of impropriety which cannot be legally justified by the public’s acceptance of this type
of conduct. She explained that propriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to the performance
of all the activities of a judge and that judges shall conduct themselves in a manner consistent with the
dignity of the judicial office.
Finally, Justice Gonzales-Sison noted the CA’s May 16, 2006 Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 100941 finding that
the respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering the creation of a management committee
without first conducting an evidentiary hearing in accordance with the procedures prescribed under the
Rules. She ruled that such professional incompetence was tantamount to gross ignorance of the law and
procedure, and recommended a fine of P20,000.00. She also recommended that the respondent be
admonished for failing to observe strict propriety and judicial decorum required by her office.
The Action and Recommendation of the OCA
In its Memorandum dated September 4, 2013, the OCA recommended the following:
RECOMMENDATION: It is respectfully recommended for the consideration of the Honorable Court that:
1) the Report dated January 4, 2010 of Investigating Justice Marlene Gonzales-Sison be NOTED;
2) respondent Judge Ma. Cecilia I. Austria, Branch 2, Regional Trial Court, Batangas City, Batangas, be
found GUILTY of conduct unbecoming a judge and for violation of Section 6, Canon 4 of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct;
3) respondent Judge Austria be FINED in the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (Php20,000.00); and
without the benefit of a hearing and despite the demand for one, was tantamount to punishable
professional incompetence and gross ignorance of the law.
On the Ground of Failure to Observe
the Reglementary Period
On the respondent’s failure to observe the reglementary period prescribed by the Rules, we find the
respondent’s explanation to be satisfactory.
Section 11, Rule 4 of the previous Rules provides:
Sec. 11. Period of the Stay Order. – xxx
The petition shall be dismissed if no rehabilitation plan is approved by the court upon the lapse of one
hundred eighty (180) days from the date of the initial hearing. The court may grant an extension beyond
this period only if it appears by convincing and compelling evidence that the debtor may successfully be
rehabilitated. In no instance, however, shall the period for approving or disapproving a rehabilitation plan
exceed eighteen (18) months from the date of filing of the petition. 37
Under this provision, the matter of who would grant the extension beyond the 180-day period carried a
good measure of ambiguity as it did not indicate with particularity whether the rehabilitation court could
act by itself or whether Supreme Court approval was still required. Only recently was this uncertainty
clarified when A.M. No. 00-8-10-SC, the 2008 Rules of Procedure on Corporate Rehabilitation, took effect.
Section 12, Rule 4 of the Rules provides:
Section 12. Period to Decide Petition. - The court shall decide the petition within one (1) year from the
date of filing of the petition, unless the court, for good cause shown, is able to secure an extension of the
period from the Supreme Court.
Since the new Rules only took effect on January 16, 2009 (long after the respondent’s approval of the
rehabilitation plan on December 3, 2007), we find no basis to hold the respondent liable for the extension
she granted and for the consequent delay.
On the Ground of Conduct
Unbecoming of a Judge
On the allegation of conduct unbecoming of a judge, Section 6, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct states that:
SECTION 6. Judges shall maintain order and decorum in all proceedings before the court and be patient,
dignified and courteous in relation to litigants, witnesses, lawyers and others with whom the judge deals
in an official capacity. Judges shall require similar conduct of legal representatives, court staff and others
subject to their influence, direction or control.
A judge should always conduct himself in a manner that would preserve the dignity, independence and
respect for himself/herself, the Court and the Judiciary as a whole. He must exhibit the hallmark judicial
temperament of utmost sobriety and self-restraint. He should choose his words and exercise more
caution and control in expressing himself. In other words, a judge should possess the virtue of gravitas.
As held in De la Cruz (Concerned Citizen of Legazpi City) v. Judge Carretas, a judge should be considerate,
courteous and civil to all persons who come to his court; he should always keep his passion guarded. He
can never allow it to run loose and overcome his reason. Furthermore, a magistrate should not descend to
the level of a sharp-tongued, ill-mannered petty tyrant by uttering harsh words, snide remarks and
sarcastic comments.
Similarly in Attys. Guanzon and Montesino v. Judge Rufon, the Court declared that "although respondent
judge may attribute his intemperate language to human frailty, his noble position in the bench
nevertheless demands from him courteous speech in and out of court.
Judges are required to always be temperate, patient and courteous, both in conduct and in language."
Accordingly, the respondent’s unnecessary bickering with SCP’s legal counsel, her expressions of
exasperation over trivial procedural and negligible lapses, her snide remarks, as well as her
condescending attitude, are conduct that the Court cannot allow. They are displays of arrogance and air of
superiority that the Code abhors.
Records and transcripts of the proceedings bear out that the respondent failed to observe judicial
temperament and to conduct herself irreproachably. She also failed to maintain the decorum required by
the Code and to use temperate language befitting a magistrate. "As a judge, [she] should ensure that [her]
that the respondent acted regularly and impartially. We thus conclude that due to the complainant’s
failure to establish with clear, solid, and convincing proof, the allegations of bias and partiality must fail.
On the Charges of Grave Incompetence
and Gross Ignorance of the Law
We agree with the findings of the OCA that not every error or mistake of a judge in the performance of his
official duties renders him liable. "[A]s a matter of policy, in the absence of fraud, dishonesty or
corruption, the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action even though
such acts are erroneous."
In the present case, what was involved was the respondent’s application of Section 23, Rule 4 of the Rules,
which provides:
Sec. 23. Approval of the Rehabilitation Plan. - The court may approve a rehabilitation plan even over the
opposition of creditors holding a majority of the total liabilities of the debtor if, in its judgment, the
rehabilitation of the debtor is feasible and the opposition of the creditors is manifestly unreasonable.
The respondent approved the rehabilitation plan submitted by Atty. Gabionza, subject to the
modifications she found necessary to make the plan viable. The complainant alleged that in modifying the
plan, she exceeded her authority and effectively usurped the functions of a rehabilitation receiver. We
find, however, that in failing to show that the respondent was motivated by bad faith or ill motives in
rendering the assailed decision, the charge of gross ignorance of the law against her should be dismissed.
"To [rule] otherwise would be to render judicial office untenable, for no one called upon to try the facts or
interpret the law in the process of administering justice can be infallible in his judgment."
To constitute gross ignorance of the law, it is not enough that the decision, order or actuation of the judge
in the performance of his official duties is contrary to existing law and jurisprudence. It must also be
proven that he was moved by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption or had committed an error so
egregious that it amounted to bad faith.
In the present case, nothing in the records suggests that the respondent was motivated by bad faith, fraud,
corruption, dishonesty or egregious error in rendering her decision approving the modified rehabilitation
plan. Besides his bare accusations, the complainant failed to substantiate his allegations with competent
proof. Bad faith cannot be presumed and this Court cannot conclude that bad faith intervened when none
was actually proven.
With respect to the action of the respondent in ordering the creation of a management committee without
first conducting an evidentiary hearing for the purpose, however, we find the error to be so egregious as
to amount to bad faith, leading to the conclusion of gross ignorance of the law, as charged.
Due process and fair play are basic requirements that no less than the Constitution demands. In
rehabilitation proceedings, the parties must first be given an opportunity to prove (or disprove) the
existence of an imminent danger of dissipation, loss, wastage or destruction of the debtor-company’s
assets and properties that are or may be prejudicial to the interest of minority stockholders, parties-
litigants or the general public. The rehabilitation court should hear both sides, allow them to present
proof and conscientiously deliberate, based on their submissions, on whether the appointment of a
management receiver is justified. This is a very basic requirement in every adversarial proceeding that no
judge or magistrate can disregard.
In SCP’s rehabilitation proceedings, SCP was not given at all the opportunity to present its evidence, nor
to confront the EPCIB witnesses. Significantly, the CA, in its May 16, 2006 decision, found that the
respondent’s act of denying SCP the opportunity to disprove the grounds for the appointment of a
management committee was tantamount to grave abuse of discretion. As aptly observed by Justice
Gonzales-Sison:
[T]he acts of the respondent judge (Judge Austria) in creating a MANCOM without observing the
procedures prescribed under the IRPGICC clearly constitute grave abuse of discretion amounting to
excess of jurisdiction.
Indeed, while a judge may not be held liable for gross ignorance of the law for every erroneous order that
he renders, this does not mean that a judge need not observe due care in the performance of his/her
official functions. When a basic principle of law is involved and when an error is so gross and patent, error
can produce an inference of bad faith, making the judge liable for gross ignorance of the law. On this basis,
we conclude that the respondent’s act of promptly ordering the creation of a management committee,
both in the performance of their duties and their daily personal lives, they should be beyond reproach.
Judges necessarily accept this standard of conduct when they take their oath of office as magistrates.
Imposable Penalty
Under Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, gross ignorance of
the law or procedure is classified as a serious charge. Under Section 11(A) of the same Rule, a serious
charge merits any of the following sanctions:
1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may determine, and
disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or
controlled corporations; provided, however, that the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued
leave credits;
2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3), but not exceeding six
(6), months; or
3. A fine of more than P20,000.00, but not exceeding P40,000.00.
On the other hand, conduct unbecoming of a judge is classified as a light offense under Section 10, Rule
140 of the Rules of Court. It is penalized under Section 11(C) thereof by any of the following: (1) A fine of
not less than P1,000.00 but not exceeding P10,000.00; (2) Censure; (3) Reprimand; and ( 4) Admonition
with warning.
Judge Austria's record shows that she had never been administratively charged or found liable for any
wrongdoing in the past. Since this is her first offense, the Court finds it fair and proper to temper the
penalty for her offenses.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds Judge Ma. Cecilia I. Austria guilty of GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW for
which she is FINED Twenty-One Thousand Pesos (P21,000,00). Judge Austria is likewise hereby
ADMONISHED to refrain from further acts of IMPROPRIETY and to refrain from CONDUCT UNBECOMING
OF A JUDGE, with the STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with
more severely.
SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. RTJ-15-2426 [Formerly A.M. No. 05-3-83-MTC], June 16, 2015
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, Complainant, v. JUDGE ALEXANDER BALUT, Respondent.
On October 9, 2007, the Court partially resolved this case by disposing it as follows:
WHEREFORE the Court finds and declares:
1. Judge Alexander S. Balut GUILTY of undue delay in deciding 33 cases submitted for decision and in failing to
resolve 101 motions within the 90-day reglementary period. He is FINED twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00),
with a stern warning that a repetition of the same shall be dealt with more severely.
2. Judith En. Salimpade GUILTY of gross neglect of duty, dishonesty and grave misconduct. She is DISMISSED
from the service. She is DIRECTED to RESTITUTE the amount of P1,817,378.59 representing the amount of
shortages in her collections. Her withheld salaries are to be applied to her accountabilities. The Office of
Administrative Services, OCA is DIRECTED to compute Ms. Salimpade's leave credits and forward the same to
the Finance Division, Fiscal Management Office-OCA which shall compute the money value of the same, the
amount to be deducted from the shortages to be restituted.
3. Eduardo Esconde GUILTY of gross neglect of duty. He is DISMISSED from the service. He is also ORDERED to
restitute his accountabilities in the amount of P58,100.00
4. Lydia O. Ramos GUILTY of neglect of duty. She is FINED P5,000, which should be deducted from her
retirement benefits.
The Office of the Court Administrator Legal Office is DIRECTED to file appropriate criminal charges against
Judge Alexander Balut, Judith En. Salimpade and Eduardo Esconde.
SO ORDERED.
As stated in the October 9, 2007 Resolution, the facts of the case are as follows:
On May 3, 2003, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) conducted a judicial audit and physical inventory of
cases at the Municipal Trial Courts (MTCs) of Bayombong and Solano, Nueva Vizcaya. Judge Alexander S. Balut
was the acting presiding judge in both courts.
xxx xxx xxx
Aside from the judicial audit, a financial audit was also conducted in the MTCs of Bayombong and Solano as well
as the MCTC of Aritao-Sta. Fe.
In the MTC, Bayombong, where Judith En. Salimpade was Clerk of Court II, the audit team found an unremitted
conduct is always above reproach and perceived to be so by a reasonable observer. [She] must never show
conceit or even an appearance thereof, or any kind of impropriety."
Section 1, Canon 2 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct states that:
SECTION 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but that it is perceived to be
so in the view of a reasonable observer.
In these lights, the respondent exhibited conduct unbecoming of a judge and thus violated Section 6,
Canon 6 and Section 1, Canon 2 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.
On the Ground of Impropriety
We are not unaware of the increasing prevalence of social networking sites in the Internet – a new
medium through which more and more Filipinos communicate with each other. While judges are not
prohibited from becoming members of and from taking part in social networking activities, we remind
them that they do not thereby shed off their status as judges. They carry with them in cyberspace the
same ethical responsibilities and duties that every judge is expected to follow in his/her everyday
activities. It is in this light that we judge the respondent in the charge of impropriety when she posted her
pictures in a manner viewable by the public.
Lest this rule be misunderstood, the New Code of Judicial Conduct does not prohibit a judge from joining
or maintaining an account in a social networking site such as Friendster. Section 6, Canon 4 of the New
Code of Judicial Conduct recognizes that judges, like any other citizen, are entitled to freedom of
expression. This right "includes the freedom to hold opinions without interference and impart
information and ideas through any media regardless of frontiers." Joining a social networking site is an
exercise of one’s freedom of expression. The respondent judge’s act of joining Friendster is, therefore, per
se not violative of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.
Section 6, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct, however, also imposes a correlative restriction on
judges: in the exercise of their freedom of expression, they should always conduct themselves in a manner
that preserves the dignity of the judicial office and the impartiality and independence of the Judiciary.
This rule reflects the general principle of propriety expected of judges in all of their activities, whether it
be in the course of their judicial office or in their personal lives. In particular, Sections 1 and 2 of Canon 4
of the New Code of Judicial Conduct prohibit impropriety and even the appearance of impropriety in all of
their activities:
SECTION 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities.
SECTION 2. As a subject of constant public scrutiny, judges must accept personal restrictions that might
be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do so freely and willingly. In particular,
judges shall conduct themselves in a way that is consistent with the dignity of the judicial office.
Based on this provision, we hold that the respondent disregarded the propriety and appearance of
propriety required of her when she posted Friendster photos of herself wearing an "off-shouldered"
suggestive dress and made this available for public viewing.
To restate the rule: in communicating and socializing through social networks, judges must bear in mind
that what they communicate – regardless of whether it is a personal matter or part of his or her judicial
duties – creates and contributes to the people’s opinion not just of the judge but of the entire Judiciary of
which he or she is a part. This is especially true when the posts the judge makes are viewable not only by
his or her family and close friends, but by acquaintances and the general public.
Thus, it may be acceptable for the respondent to show a picture of herself in the attire she wore to her
family and close friends, but when she made this picture available for public consumption, she placed
herself in a situation where she, and the status she holds as a judge, may be the object of the public’s
criticism and ridicule. The nature of cyber communications, particularly its speedy and wide-scale
character, renders this rule necessary.
We are not also unaware that the respondent’s act of posting her photos would seem harmless and
inoffensive had this act been done by an ordinary member of the public. As the visible personification of
law and justice, however, judges are held to higher standards of conduct and thus must accordingly
comport themselves.
This exacting standard applies both to acts involving the judicial office and personal matters. The very
nature of their functions requires behavior under exacting standards of morality, decency and propriety;
Balut. On the face of the slips of this class of withdrawals were notations such as "Judge," "for Judge," "taken by
Judge xxx" and "given to Judge" written by Ramos.
On May 9, 2002, Judge Balut issued a Certification stating that his accountability with the Fiduciary Fund
collection of MCTC Aritao-Sta. Fe as of April 2002 amounted to P207,774.42.
However, before the final report on the court's shortages was completed, various amounts totalling P802,299.82
were deposited by Judge Balut, Esconde and Ramos in the court's LBP Account No. 3251-0544-51, as
restitution/payment of part of the shortage of P846,710.00.
As of August, 2004, Ramos had fully settled the balance of her accountability. On the other hand, Esconde still
had a balance of accountability in MCTC, Aritao-Sta. Fe of P58,100.00 which, as of the time this case was
submitted by the OCA for the Court's consideration, has remained unsettled. (Emphases supplied)
In its Resolution, the Court ordered Respondent Judge Alexander Balut (Judge Balut) to pay a fine for his failure
to decide 33 cases and 101 motions without properly requesting for an extension. The Court, however, did not
rule on the administrative liability of Judge Balut with respect to the result of the financial audit for the reason
that he was not given a chance to present his side on the matter.
Consequently, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), in its Memorandum, sought reconsideration of the
Court's decision stating that although Judge Balut was not formally required to comment on the findings of the
audit team regarding the shortage in the court collections, he was not denied due process of law. The OCA
explained that Judge Balut was able to present his side in his Letter to OCA, dated December 9, 2006. The OCA,
thus, asked for the re-opening of the case or in the alternative, that Judge Balut be required to comment on the
findings of the financial audit.
In its Resolution, dated December 16, 2008, the Court directed Judge Balut to comment on the audit report and,
upon the recommendation of the OCA, referred the matter to the Court of Appeals ( CA) for investigation, report
and recommendation.
Thereafter, the CA, in its Report and Recommendation, recommended the dismissal of the charges against Judge
Balut for failure of the OCA to clearly substantiate and prove the participation of Judge Balut in the financial
transactions of the courts. On his admission that he borrowed money from the judiciary fund, the CA opined that
Judge Balut could no longer be penalized as he was previously fined by the Court in its October 9, 2007
Resolution.
The Court finds itself unable to agree with the recommendation of the CA.
In administrative cases, the quantum of proof necessary is substantial evidence or such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind may accept as adequate to support a conclusion. The standard of substantial evidence is
justified when there is reasonable ground to believe that respondent is responsible for the misconduct
complained of, even if such evidence is not overwhelming or even preponderant.
A review of the records shows that Judge Balut actually messed with the court collections. The three clerks of
court of MTC Bayombong, MTC Solano and MCTC Aritao-Sta Fe categorically stated that Judge Balut borrowed
money from the court funds and executed certifications to that effect. They separately reported that Judge
Balut had been borrowing money from the various funds of the court collections. In fact, Lydia Ramos (Ramos),
the Clerk of Court of MCTC-Antao-Sta. Fe, presented several withdrawal slips where the back portions were
signed either by Judge Balut or his court interpreter, Salvador Briones, as the recipient of the cash
withdrawn from the funds of the court. These withdrawal slips likewise bore the notations of Ramos such as
"Judge," "for Judge," "taken by Judge," and "given to Judge" to serve as her reminder that the money withdrawn
were given to Judge Balut.
Significantly, Judge Balut himself issued the Certification stating that his cash accountability as of April
2002 with the Fiduciary Fund was P207,774.42 and there were certifications issued by the clerks of
court attesting that he had settled his accountabilities with the court funds.
The CA opinion that Judge Balut could no longer be penalized for his admission that he had borrowed money
from the judiciary fund because the Court already fined him in its October 9, 2007 resolution is erroneous. In the
said resolution, the Court categorically stated that Judge Balut was fined for undue delay in deciding 33 cases
submitted for decision and for failing to resolve 101 motions within the 90-day reglementary period.
Once again, the Court stresses that judges must adhere to the highest tenets of judicial conduct. Because of the
sensitivity of his position, a judge is required to exhibit, at all times, the highest degree of honesty and integrity
and to observe exacting standards of morality, decency and competence. He should adhere to the highest
standards of public accountability lest his action erode the public faith in the Judiciary.
Judge Balut fell short of this standard for borrowing money from the collections of the court. He knowingly and
deliberately made the clerks of court violate the circulars on the proper administration of court funds. He
miserably failed to become a role model of his staff and other court personnel in the observance of the standards
of morality and decency, both in his official and personal conduct.
amount of P18,702.00 representing the court's collection from August 3, 2003 to August 18, 2003. Said amount
was deposited only on August 18, 2003, upon advise by the audit team, in the Land Bank of the Philippines
account. Furthermore, 31 booklets of accountable forms issued to Ms. Salimpade by the Property Division, SC
and OCA were not accounted for. Also, the court had a total Judiciary Development Fund (JDF) collection of
P348,993.60 from January 1990 to August 2003. However, only P186,330.98 was remitted by Ms. Salimpade
leaving a balance of P162,662.62; the total Clerk of Court General Fund (CCGF) collections from January 1996 to
August 2003 (audit scope) showed an unremitted amount of P30,411.70; and as of August 31, 2003 the
Fiduciary Fund had a total cash shortage of P1,864,304.27 which covered the collections from 1995 to August
2003.
In sum, the shortages in the various funds incurred by Salimpade as of August 31, 2003 totalled P2,057,378.59.
Salimpade, when asked about the shortages, explained that Judge Balut, since 1995 had been getting
money from the JDF collections. She had given in to the requests of Judge Balut out of fear of him. She also
admitted that she lent her co-employees money which she took from her collections.
Parenthetically, in September 2003, Judge Balut turned over P240,000.00 to Salimpade and the latter
issued a certification stating that the former had completely settled his monetary accountability to the
MTC, Bayombong. Judge Balut delivered to the Fiscal Monitoring Division, Court Management Office (CMO) OCA
the certification and deposit slip evidencing the turnover of the P240,000.00.
The audit team also found that Salimpade failed to regularly submit her monthly report of collections, as
required in Supreme Court Circular No. 32-93. Consequently, Salimpade's salaries were withheld effective August
2003 to the present.
In the MTC, Solano, the spot cash count on the court's collection disclosed that Eduardo Esconde, Clerk of Court,
had an unremitted/undeposited cash on hand amounting to P59,545.00. However, the Official Receipts issued to
cover said amounts were not accounted for. The said cash amount was deposited on August 21, 2003 to Land
Bank JDF Account No. 0591-0116-34.
A review of the receipts on file from May 2001 to July 2003 also showed a total cash shortage of P106,527.80.
However, on August 29, 2003, Esconde deposited in the CCGF and JDF bank accounts sums corresponding to the
said shortage. Esconde explained to the audit team that Judge Balut borrowed various amounts from the
collections. He stated that Judge Balut started borrowing funds when the former was still the Clerk of Court of
MCTC, Aritao-Sta. Fe. He transferred to MTC, Solano, to get out of the shadow of Judge Balut. But, much to
his dismay, Judge Balut was designated Acting Presiding Judge of MTC, Solano and continued the practice
of borrowing money from the collections of the court.
In the MCTC, Aritao-Sta. Fe, the audit team found that Lydia Ramos, Clerk of Court, succeeded Eduardo S.
Esconde on July 16, 2000, without proper turnover of accountabilities. The team also found that the amount of
P540.00, part of the JDF collections from August 1, 2003 to August 21, 2003, remained undeposited at the time of
audit. Said amount was remitted to the Chief Accountant, Supreme Court on September 10, 2003. Also, Mrs.
Ramos opened an account at the Rural Bank of Aritao, Inc. for the Fiduciary Fund of the court instead of
maintaining an account with Landbank. Said account was closed on September 11, 2003 and an account was
opened at Landbank, Bambang, on the same date. A comparison of the court's CCGF collections and remittances
for the period of November 1995 to July 2003 revealed a shortage of P510.00. Mr. Esconde incurred during his
incumbency a cash shortage of P430.00 while Mrs. Ramos incurred a shortage of P80.00 as of July 31, 2003.
From August 2003 to June 5, 2004, Mrs. Ramos incurred a shortage of P430.00. She deposited the amount of
P400.00 on August 23, 2004 leaving a shortage of P30.00. Withdrawals from the Fiduciary Fund account on
various dates, totalling P243,900.00 for the refund and return of cash bonds to 20 litigants, were not supported
by any official court orders. Of the 20 litigants 15 did not acknowledge receipt of the amount refunded. The
Fiduciary Fund collection of the court from April 1996 to August 31, 2003 amounted to P2,064,978.00. As of
August 31, 2003, however, the amount of P846,710.00 was unaccounted for by Mr. Esconde and Mrs. Ramos.
Both denied that the shortages incurred were of their own doing and they instead pointed to Judge Balut as the
offender.
Ramos related to the audit team the constant requests/orders of Judge Balut to hand over to him money
from the Fiduciary Fund collections. In these instances, she requested Judge Balut to affix his signature at the
back portion of the withdrawal slips as the cash recipient. However, not all of the transactions were evidenced by
an acknowledgement receipt. Ramos further stated that Judge Balut also collected the money through
Salvador Briones, Court Interpreter of MCTC-Aritao-Sta. Fe, whose signature also appeared at the back portion
of withdrawal slips as cash recipient. The total withdrawals from the Fiduciary Fund Account given to Judge
Balut, as evidenced by withdrawal slips bearing the signatures of Judge Balut and Briones, for the benefit
of the former, as cash recipients, amounted to P193,500.00.
Aside from these, withdrawals from the Fiduciary Fund account totalling P90,500.00 were also given to Judge
The act of misappropriating court funds constitutes dishonesty and grave misconduct, punishable by dismissal
from the service even on the first offense. For said reason, the respondent deserves a penalty no lighter than
dismissal. This Court has never tolerated and will never condone any conduct which violates the norms of public
accountability, and diminish, or even tend to diminish, the faith of the people in the justice system.
The Court has considered the recommendation of imposing the penalty of suspension. That, however, would be
unfair to Clerk of Court Judith En. Salimpade, Municipal Trial Courts of Bayombong and Solano; and Clerk of
Court Eduardo Esconde of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Arita-Sta. Fe, who were both dismissed from the
service for the same offense. Clerk of Court Lydia Ramos was fined but only because she had already retired from
the service. And it would send a wrong message to the public that the Court has different standards - one for the
magistrates and another for the rank-and-file.
The fact that Judge Balut fully paid his cash liabilities will not shield him from the consequences of his
wrongdoings. His unwarranted interference in the Court collections deserves administrative sanction and not
even the full payment of his accountabilities will exempt him from liability. "It matters not that these personal
borrowings were paid as what counts is the fact that these funds were used outside of official business."
Similarly, his nearly 22 years in the service would not serve to mitigate his liability. His offense was not a single
or isolated act but it constituted a series of acts committed in a span of several years. In other words, he was a
repeated offender, perpetrating his misdeeds with impunity not once, not twice, but several times in
three (3) different stations. In the case of In Re: Report on the Judicial and Financial Audit Conducted in the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Koronadal City, it was written:
For misappropriating court funds in concert with Ines, Judge Sardido has been charged with grave misconduct.
Admitting that he indeed "borrowed" money from court funds, the latter recounted that on four occasions in
1994, he had borrowed P130,000 to be able to purchase a car and thereafter borrowed intermittently through
the years, for reasons ranging from the schooling needs of his children to the illness of his parents. That he
intended to repay the amounts "borrowed" is immaterial. These funds should never be used outside of
official business. Rule 5.04 of Canon 5 of the Code of Judicial Conduct states:
"A judge or any immediate member of the family shall not accept a gift, bequest, favor or loan from anyone except
as may be allowed by law."
Time and time again, this Court has emphasized that "the judge is the visible representation of the law, and more
importantly, of justice. It is from him that the people draw their will and awareness to obey the law. For the judge
to return that regard, he must be the first to abide by the law and weave an example for others to follow."
Sadly, the foregoing facts clearly show that Judge Sardido has not only miserably failed to present himself as an
example to his staff and to others, but has also shown no compunction in violating the law, as well as the rules
and regulations. His dishonesty, gross misconduct, and gross ignorance of the law tarnish the image of the judiciary
and would have warranted the maximum penalty of dismissal, were it not for the fact that he had already been
dismissed from the service in another administrative case. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
WHEREFORE, finding Judge Alexander Balut GUILTY of gross misconduct, the Court hereby imposes upon him
the penalty of DISMISSAL from the service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and with prejudice to re-
employment in any branch of the government, including government-owned and controlled corporations, except
the money value of accrued earned leave credits.
Judge Balut is hereby ORDERED to cease and desist immediately from rendering any order or decision, or from
continuing any proceedings, in any case whatsoever, effective upon receipt of a copy of this resolution.
This disposition is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.
The Office of the Court Administrator shall see to it that a copy of this resolution be immediately served on the
respondent.
SO ORDERED.