Decision Overview

The judgment of the Court was delivered by Justice Dipak Misra, with whom Justice
Prafulla C. Pant agreed. The judgment begins by analyzing the meaning of the terms
‘defamation’ and ‘reputation’, and the interaction of these terms with right of the
freedom of speech and expression. Reviewing various authorities, the Court found that
the term was clear and unambiguous. The Court also found that the concept of
‘reputation’ was included in the protection of ‘dignity’, which was part of the
constitutionally protected right to life. The Court also recognized the sanctity and
significance of the right to freedom of speech and expression in a democracy, but
pointed out that it is subject to reasonable restrictions. Such restrictions should serve
the public interest and should not be excessive. Legislation by which restrictions are
enacted should not invade the rights and should not be arbitrary. The balance to be
achieved should weigh the importance to society of freedom of speech against the
societal importance to the public interest sought to be protected.

The Court observed that the State had chosen the criminal law as one of the avenues
through which to protect reputation. Noting that reputation is protected under Article
21 of the Indian Constitution, which protects life and liberty, the Court found that it was
difficult to subscribe to the view that criminal defamation has an undue chilling effect
on the right to freedom of speech and expression. The Court emphasized that the law on
criminal defamation is clear and thus distinguished other cases in which it had struck
down legislation as infringing freedom of speech, such as Singhal v. Union of
India and Rangarajan.
The Court went on to emphasize the importance of the concepts of constitutional
fraternity and fundamental duty, under which every citizen is expected to respect the
dignity of the other. Noting that this is a constitutional duty, the Court held that it could
not conclude that the existence of criminal defamation is obnoxious to freedom of
speech and expression.

Furthermore, the Court addressed the question whether the criminal defamation
provisions violate the concept of ‘reasonableness’, either substantively or proceduraly,
examining whether it is vague, or arbitrary or disproportionate. Examining the four
explanations included in the Penal Code provision on defamation, the Court concludes
that these were neither vague nor ambiguous. The Court takes note that an imputation
can only be treated as defamatory if it directly or indirectly, in the estimation of others,
lowers a person’s character or his credit. The Court took note that truth is a defense only
when a statement also serves the public good, but opines that if a truthful statement is
not made for any kind of public good but only to malign a person, this should not be
constitutionally protected.

Finally, the Court holds that the penal code provision is not disproportionate. The
reasonableness and proportionality of a restriction is examined from the stand point of
the interest of the general public, and not from the point of view of the person upon
whom the restrictions are imposed. Applying this standard, the Court judged the
criminal defamation laws to be proportionate. The Court rejected the contention that
defamation is fundamentally a notion of the majority meant to cripple the freedom of
speech and expression as too broad a proposition to be treated as a guiding principle to
adjudge the reasonableness of a restriction.