G.R. No.

112235 November 29, 1995

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ELIAS LOVEDIORO y CASTRO, defendant-appellant.

KAPUNAN, J.:

Off-duty policeman SPO3 Jesus Lucilo was walking along Burgos St., away from the Daraga, Albay
Public Market when a man suddenly walked beside him, pulled a .45 caliber gun from his waist,
aimed the gun at the policeman's right ear and fired. The man who shot Lucilo had three other
companions with him, one of whom shot the fallen policeman four times as he lay on the ground.
After taking the latter's gun, the man and his companions boarded a tricycle and fled.1

The incident was witnessed from a distance of about nine meters by Nestor Armenta, a 25 year old
welder from Pilar, Sorsogon, who claimed that he knew both the victim and the man who fired the
fatal shot. Armenta identified the man who fired at the deceased as Elias Lovedioro y Castro, his
nephew (appellant's father was his first cousin) and alleged that he knew the victim from the fact that
the latter was a resident of Bagumbayan.

Lucilo died on the same day of massive blood loss from multiple gunshot wounds on the face, the
chest, and other parts of the body.2 On autopsy, the municipal health officer established the cause of
death as hypovolemic shock.3

As a result of the killing, the office of the provincial prosecutor of Albay, on November 6, 1992 filed
an Information charging accused-appellant Elias Lovedioro y Castro of the crime of Murder under
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. The Information reads:

That on or about the 27th day of July, 1992, at more or less 5:30 o'clock in the
afternoon, at Burgos Street, Municipality of Daraga, Province of Albay, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
together with Gilberto Longasa, who is already charged in Crim. Case No. 5931
before RTC, Branch I, and three (3) others whose true identities are at present
unknown and remain at large, conniving, conspiring, confederating and helping one
another for a common purpose, armed with firearms, with intent to kill and with
treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously fire and shoot one SPO3 JESUS LUCILO, a member of the Daraga
Police Station, inflicting upon the latter multiple gunshot wounds causing his death, to
the damage and prejudice of his legal heirs.

After trial, the court a quo found accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Murder. The dispositive portion of said decision, dated September 24, 1993 states:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, this Court finds the
accused ELIAS LOVEDIORO guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal, acting in
conspiracy with his co-accused who are still at large, of the crime of murder, defined
and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, and hereby sentences
him to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua with all the accessories provided by
law; to pay the heirs of the deceased SPO3 Jesus Lucilo through the widow, Mrs.
Remeline Lucilo, the amount of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos representing the
 civil indemnity for death; to pay the said widow the sum of Thirty Thousand
(P30,000.00) Pesos representing reasonable moral damages; and to pay the said
widow the sum of Eighteen Thousand Five Hundred Eighty-Eight (P18,588.00)
Pesos, representing actual damages, without subsidiary imprisonment however, in
case of insolvency on the part of the said accused.

With costs against the accused.

SO ORDERED.

Hence, the instant appeal, in which the sole issue interposed is that portion of trial court decision
finding him guilty of the crime of murder and not rebellion.

Appellant cites the testimony of the prosecution's principal witness, Nestor Armenta, as supporting
his claim that he should have been charged with the crime of rebellion, not murder. In his Brief, he
asseverates that Armenta, a police informer, identified him as a member of the New People's Army.
Additionally, he contends that because the killing of Lucilo was "a means to or in furtherance of
subversive ends,"4 (said killing) should have been deemed absorbed in the crime of rebellion under
Arts. 134 and 135 of the Revised Penal Code. Finally, claiming that he did not fire the fatal shot but
merely acted as a look-out in the liquidation of Lucilo, he avers that he should have been charged
merely as a participant in the commission of the crime of rebellion under paragraph 2 of Article 135
of the Revised Penal Code and should therefore have been meted only the penalty of prison
mayor by the lower court.

Asserting that the trial court correctly convicted appellant of the crime of murder, the Solicitor
General avers that the crime committed by appellant may be considered as rebellion only if the
defense itself had conclusively proven that the motive or intent for the killing of the policeman was
for "political and subversive ends."5 Moreover, the Solicitor General contends that even if appellant
were to be convicted of rebellion, and even if the trial court had found appellant guilty merely of
being a participant in a rebellion, the proper imposable penalty is not prision mayor as appellant
contends, but reclusion temporal, because Executive Order No. 187 as amended by Republic Act
No. 6968, the Coup D'etat Law, prescribes reclusion temporal as the penalty imposable for
individuals found guilty as participants in a rebellion.

We agree with the Solicitor General that the crime committed was murder and not rebellion.

Under Art. 134 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 6968, rebellion is
committed in the following manner:

[B]y rising publicly and taking arms against the Government for the purpose of
removing from the allegiance to said Government or its laws, the territory of the
Republic of the Philippines or any part thereof, of any body of land, naval or other
armed forces, or depriving the Chief Executive or the Legislature wholly or partially,
of any of their powers or prerogatives.6

The gravamen of the crime of rebellion is an armed public uprising against the government.7 By its
very nature, rebellion is essentially a crime of masses or multitudes involving crowd action, which
cannot be confined a prioriwithin predetermined bounds.8 One aspect noteworthy in the commission
of rebellion is that other acts committed in its pursuance are, by law, absorbed in the crime itself
because they acquire a political character. This peculiarity was underscored in the case of People
v. Hernandez,9 thus:
 In short, political crimes are those directly aimed against the political order, as well as
such common crimes as may be committed to achieve a political purpose. The
decisive factor is the intent or motive. If a crime usually regarded as common, like
homicide, is perpetrated for the purpose of removing from the allegiance "to the
Government the territory of the Philippine Islands or any part thereof," then it
becomes stripped of its "common" complexion, inasmuch as, being part and parcel of
the crime of rebellion, the former acquires the political character of the latter.

Divested of its common complexion therefore, any ordinary act, however grave, assumes a different
color by being absorbed in the crime of rebellion, which carries a lighter penalty than the crime of
murder. In deciding if the crime committed is rebellion, not murder, it becomes imperative for our
courts to ascertain whether or not the act was done in furtherance of a political end. The political
motive of the act should be conclusively demonstrated.

In such cases, the burden of demonstrating political motive falls on the defense, motive, being a
state of mind which the accused, better than any individual, knows. Thus, in People v. Gempes,10 this
court stressed that:

Since this is a matter that lies peculiarly with (the accused's) knowledge and since
moreover this is an affirmative defense, the burden is on them to prove, or at least to
state, which they could easily do personally or through witnesses, that they killed the
deceased in furtherance of the resistance movement.

From the foregoing, it is plainly obvious that it is not enough that the overt acts of rebellion are duly
proven. Both purpose and overt acts are essential components of the crime. With either of these
elements wanting, the crime of rebellion legally does not exist. In fact, even in cases where the act
complained of were committed simultaneously with or in the course of the rebellion, if the killing,
robbing, or etc., were accomplished for private purposes or profit, without any political motivation, it
has been held that the crime would be separately punishable as a common crime and would not be
absorbed by the crime rebellion.11

Clearly, political motive should be established before a person charged with a common crime —
alleging rebellion in order to lessen the possible imposable penalty — could benefit from the law's
relatively benign attitude towards political crimes. Instructive in this regard is the case of Enrile v.
Amin,12 where the prosecution sought to charge Senator Juan Ponce Enrile with violation of P.D. No.
1829,13 for allegedly harboring or concealing in his home Col. Gregorio Honasan in spite of the
senator's knowledge that Honasan might have committed a crime. This Court held, against the
prosecution's contention, that rebellion and violation of P.D 1829 could be tried separately14 (on the
principle that rebellion is based on the Revised Penal Code while P.D. 1829 is a special law), that
the act for which the senator was being charged, though punishable under a special law, was
absorbed in the crime of rebellion being motivated by, and related to the acts for which he was
charged in Enrile vs. Salazar (G.R. Nos. 92163 and 92164) a case decided on June 5, 1990. Ruling
in favor of Senator Enrile and holding that the prosecution for violation of P.D. No. 1829 cannot
prosper because a separate prosecution for rebellion had already been filed and in fact decided, the
Court said:

The attendant circumstances in the instant case, however constrain us to rule that
the theory of absorption in rebellion cases must not confine itself to common crimes
but also to offenses under special laws which are perpetrated in furtherance of the
political offense.15
Noting the importance of purpose in cases of rebellion the court in Enrile vs. Amin further
underscored that:

[I]ntent or motive is a decisive factor. If Senator Ponce Enrile is not charged with
rebellion and he harbored or concealed Colonel Honasan simply because the latter is
a friend and former associate, the motive for the act is completely different. But if the
act is committed with political or social motives, that is in furtherance of rebellion,
then it should be deemed to form part of the crime of rebellion instead of being
punished separately.

It follows, therefore, that if no political motive is established and proved, the accused should be
convicted of the common crime and not of rebellion. In cases of rebellion, motive relates to the act,
and mere membership in an organization dedicated to the furtherance of rebellion would not, by and
of itself, suffice.

The similarity of some of the factual circumstances of People v. Ompad, Jr.,16 to the instant case is
striking. Two witnesses, both former NPA recruits identified the accused Ompad, alias "Commander
Brando," a known hitman of the NPA, as having led three other members of the NPA in the
liquidation of Dionilo Barlaan, a military informer, also in a rebel infested area. In spite of his
notoriety as an NPA hitman, Ompad was merely charged with and convicted of murder, not rebellion
because political motive was neither alleged nor proved.

As stated hereinabove, the burden of proof that the act committed was impelled by a political motive
lies on the accused. Political motive must be alleged in the information.17 It must be established by
clear and satisfactory evidence. In People v. Paz and Tica we held:

That the killing was in pursuance of the Huk rebellion is a matter of mitigation or
defense that the accused has the burden of proving clearly and satisfactorily. The
lone uncorroborated assertion of appellant that his superiors told him of Dayrit being
an informer, and his suspicion that he was one such, is neither sufficient or adequate
to establish that the motivation for the killing was political, considering appellant's
obvious interest in testifying to that effect.18

Similarly, in People v. Buco,19 the Court stressed that accused in that case failed to establish that the
reason for the killing of their victim was to further or carry out rebellion. The evidence adduced by the
defense therein simply showed that appellant Francisco Buco was ordered by Tomas
Calma, alias "Commander Sol" to kill municipal mayor Conrado G. Dizon. However, the evidence
likewise showed that Calma was induced by an acquaintance, a civilian, to order the killing on
account of private differences over a ninety (90) hectare piece of land. The court attributed no
political motive for the killing, though committed by known members of the Hukbalahap movement.20

People v. Dasig21 has a factual milieu almost similar to the instant case. There, the Court held that
"the act of killing a police officer, knowing too well that the victim is a person in authority is a mere
component or ingredient of rebellion or an act done in furtherance of a rebellion." In Dasig the Court
however noted that the accused, who was charged with murder, not only admitted his membership
with the NPA but also executed an extrajudicial confession to the effect that he was a member of an
NPA "sparrow unit," a fact to which even the Solicitor General, in his brief therein was in agreement.
The Solicitor General's brief in Dasig which this Court favorably quoted, noted that:

[T]he sparrow unit is the liquidation squad of the New People's Army with the
objective of overthrowing the duly constituted government. It is therefore not hard to
 comprehend that the killing of Pfc. Manatad was committed as a means to or in
furtherance of the subversive ends of the NPA.22

By contrast, the Solicitor General vigorously argues for a different result in the case at bench. He
states that accused-appellant's belated claims to membership in the NPA were not only insubstantial
but also self serving23 an averment to which, given a thorough review of the circumstances of the
case, we fully agree. He states:

[In the case cited] the appellants, admittedly members of the NPA, clearly overcame
the burden of proving motive or intent. It was shown that the political motivation for
the killing of the victim was the fact that Ragaul was suspected as an informer for the
PC. The perpetrators even left a letter card, a drawing on the body of Ragaul as a
warning to others not to follow his example. It is entirely different in the case at bar
where the evidence for the appellant merely contains self-serving assertions and
denials not substantial enough as an indicia of political motivation in the killing of
victim SPO3 Jesus Lucilo.24

In the case at bench, the appellant, assisted by counsel, admitted in his extrajudicial confession to
having participated in the killing of Lucilo as follows:

Q What was that incident if any, please narrate?

A July 27, 1992 at more or less 12:00 noon. I am at home, three male
person a certain alias ALWIN, ALIAS SAMUEL and the other one
unknown to me, fetched me and told me to go with them, so I asked
them where, Alwin handed me a hand gun and same he stopped/call
a passenger jeepney and told me board on said jeepney. (sic)

Q Please continue.

A Upon reaching Daraga, Albay fronting Petron Gasoline Station, we

alighted on said jeep, so we walk towards Daraga Bakery we stopped
walking due to it is raining, when the rain stopped we continue
walking by using the road near the bakery. (sic)

Q When you reached Daraga bakery, as you have said in Q. 7 you

used the road near the bakery where did you proceed?

A I am not familiar with that place, but I and my companion continue

walking, at more less 4:30 P.M. July 27, 1992 one of my companion
told us as to quote in Bicol dialect, to wit: "AMO NA YADI AN
TINAMPO PALUWAS" (This is the place towards the poblacion), so, I
placed myself just ahead of a small store, my three (3) companions
continue walking towards poblacion, later on a policeman sporting
white T-shirt and a khaki pant was walking towards me, while the said
policeman is nearly approaching me, ALWIN shot the said policeman
in front of the small store, when the said policeman fell on the
asphalted road, ALWIN took the service firearm of the said
policeman, then we ran towards the subdivision, then my two (2)
companions commanded a tricycle then we fled until we reached a
hill wherein there is a small bridge, thereafter Ka Samuel took the
handgun that was handed to me by them at Pilar, Sorsogon. (sic)
 Q Do you know the policeman that was killed by your companion?

A I just came to know his name when I reached home and heard it
radio, that he is JESUS LUCILO. (sic)

Q What is your participation in the group?

A Look-out sir.

Q I have nothing more to asked you what else, if there is any? (sic)

A No more sir.25

It bears emphasis that nowhere in his entire extrajudicial confession did appellant ever mention that
he was a member of the New People's Army. A thorough reading of the same reveals nothing which
would suggest that the killing in which he was a participant was motivated by a political purpose.
Moreover, the information filed against appellant, based on sworn statements, did not contain any
mention or allusion as to the involvement of the NPA in the death of SPO3 Lucilo.26 Even prosecution
eyewitness Nestor Armenta did not mention the NPA in his sworn statement of October 19, 1992.27

As the record would show, allegations relating to appellant's membership in the NPA surfaced
almost merely as an afterthought, something which the defense merely picked up and followed
through upon prosecution eyewitness Armenta's testimony on cross-examination that he knew
appellant to be a member of the NPA. Interestingly, however, in the same testimony, Armenta
admitted that he was "forced" to pinpoint appellant as an NPA member.28The logical result, of course,
was that the trial court did not give any weight and credence to said testimony. The trial court, after
all, had the prerogative of rejecting only a part of a witness' testimony while upholding the rest of
it.29While disbelieving the portion of Armenta's testimony on appellant's alleged membership in the
NPA, the trial court correctly gave credence to his unflawed narration about how the crime was
committed.30 Such narration is even corroborated in its pertinent portions, except as to the identity of
the gun wielder, by the testimony of the appellant himself.

In any case, appellant's claim regarding the political color attending the commission of the crime
being a matter of defense, its viability depends on his sole and unsupported testimony. He testified
that, upon the prodding of aliasAlwin and alias Samuel, he joined the NPA because of the
organization's
goals.31 He claimed that his two companions shot Lucilo because he "had offended our
organization,"32 without, however, specifying what the "offense" was. Appellant claimed that he had
been a member of the NPA for five months before the shooting incident.33

As correctly observed by the Solicitor General, appellant's contentions are couched in terms so
general and non-specific34 that they offer no explanation as to what contribution the killing would
have made towards the achievement of the NPA's subversive aims. SPO3 Jesus Lucilo, a mere
policeman, was never alleged to be an informer. No acts of his were specifically shown to have
offended the NPA. Against appellant's attempts to shade his participation in the killing with a political
color, the evidence on record leaves the impression that appellant's bare allegations of membership
in the NPA was conveniently infused to mitigate the penalty imposable upon him. It is of judicial
notice that in many NPA infested areas, crimes have been all-too-quickly attributed to the
furtherance of an ideology or under the cloak of political color for the purpose of mitigating the
imposable penalty when in fact they are no more than ordinary crimes perpetrated by common
criminals. In Baylosis v. Chavez, Jr., Chief Justice Narvasa aptly observed:
 The existence of rebellious groups in our society today, and of numerous bandits, or
irresponsible or deranged individuals, is a reality that cannot be ignored or belittled.
Their activities, the killings and acts of destruction and terrorism that they perpetrate,
unfortunately continue unabated despite the best efforts that the Government
authorities are exerting, although it may be true that the insurrectionist groups of the
right or the left no longer pose a genuine threat to the security of the state. The need
for more stringent laws and more rigorous law-enforcement, cannot be gainsaid.35

In the absence of clear and satisfactory evidence pointing to a political motive for the killing of SPO3
Jesus Lucilo, we are satisfied that the trial court correctly convicted appellant of the crime of
murder.36 It is of no moment that a single eyewitness, Nestor Armenta, sealed his fate, for it is settled
that the testimony of one witness, if credible and positive, is sufficient to convict.37 Against appellant's
claims that he acted merely as a look-out, the testimony of one witness, his blood relative, free from
any signs of impropriety or falsehood, was sufficient to convict the accused.38Moreover, neither may
lack of motive be availing to exculpate the appellant. Lack or absence of motive for committing a
crime does not preclude conviction, there being a reliable eyewitness who fully and satisfactorily
identified appellant as the perpetrator of the felony.39 In the case at bench, the strength of the
prosecution's case was furthermore bolstered by accused-appellant's admission in open court that
he and the eyewitness, his own uncle, bore no grudges against each other.40

Finally, treachery was adequately proved in the court below. The attack delivered by appellant was
sudden, and without warning of any kind.41 The killing having been qualified by treachery, the crime
committed is murder under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code. In the absence of any mitigating and
aggravating circumstances, the trial court was correct in imposing the penalty of reclusion
perpetua together with all the accessories provided by law.

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the trial court's decision dated September 14, 1993,
sentencing the accused of Murder is hereby AFFIRMED, in toto.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 100231. April 28, 1993.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
RODRIGO DASIG @ KA RUBIN DAKU @ ARMAND; EDWIN NUÑEZ Y TABANAS @ MABI; ALVIN
DOE @ AL @ KA ALVIN; ROGER DOE @ KA JAMES @ KA PEPE; TUDING ANDRINO @ KA
ERMI @ KA ROEL @ KA GRINGO MONTAYRE; RUBEN DOE @ KA RUBEN @ KA JOJI @ INO
ECHAVEZ; ANASTACIO BANGKAL @ KA JUNIOR; AND CARLITO MAGASIN @ BOBBY,
accused, RODRIGO DASIG, accused-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Kinaadman and Archival for accused-appellant.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; CONFESSION, AS A RULE, ADMISSIBLE; EXCEPTION; NOT

APPLICABLE IN CASE AT BAR. — The settled jurisprudence on the matter is that a confession is
admissible until the accused successfully proves that it was given as a result of violence,
intimidation, threat or promise of reward or leniency. Appellant relies on the much abused claim that
his extra-judicial confession was legally defective and hence, should not have been admitted and
considered by the trial judge. This accusation is whimsical and obviously a mere refuge for
appellant's turnabout. In an attempt to avoid criminal liability, he now questions the integrity of the
police authorities and the reputation of the lawyer who stood by him during the investigation.
Indubitably established and now a matter of record is the fact that appellant was assisted by Atty.
Parawan who even signed the former's sworn declarations. It is likewise a matter of record that
before appellant made his extra-judicial confession, he was first asked if he was amenable to the
services of Atty. Parawan to which query he answered affirmatively. Finally, the alleged use of force
and intimidation has not been substantiated by evidence other than his self-serving testimony. as
has been pointed out, such allegation is another naive effort of appellant to back track from his prior
voluntary admission of guilt. Evidently, the taking of his extra-judicial confession was done with
regularity and legality.

2. CRIMINAL LAW; REBELLION; ABSORBS THE CRIME OF DIRECT ASSAULT WHEN DONE IN
FURTHERANCE THEREOF. — The crime of rebellion consists of may acts. It is a vast movement of
men and a complex net of intrigues and plots. Acts committed in furtherance of rebellion though
crimes in themselves are deemed absorbed in one single crime of rebellion. The act of killing a
police officer, knowing too well that the victim is a person in authority is a mere component or
ingredient of rebellion or an act done in furtherance of the rebellion. It cannot be made a basis of a
separate charge.

3. ID.; ID.; NOT COVERED BY INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW (R.A. 4203). — The
Indeterminate Sentence Law is not applicable to persons convicted of rebellion (Sec. 2, R.A. 4203),
contrary to the insinuation of the Solicitor General. Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code imposes
the penalty of prision mayor and a fine not exceeding P20,000.00 to any person who promotes,
maintains, or heads a rebellion.

DECISION

NOCON, J p:

Appellant, Rodrigo Dasig is now before Us to plead the reversal of his conviction by the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 28, Mandaue City finding him guilty of Murder with Direct Assault.

He was charged together with Edwin Nuñez and 6 others who are still at large, in an information
which reads:

"That on or about the 4th day of August, 1987, in the city of Mandaue, of this Honorable Court, the
aforenamed accused, conspiring and confederating together and helping one another, with intent to
kill, treachery, evident premeditation, abuse of superior strength and use of motor vehicle, all armed
with unlicensed firearms, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and
shoot one Redempto Manatad, a police officer on traffic duty, at his vital portion which caused his
death soon thereafter, knowing beforehand that the victim was a policeman who was then in the
performance of his official duties."

Upon arraignment, appellant and Edwin Nuñes entered a plea of "not guilty." However, after the
prosecution had presented its first witness, accused Nuñes changed his plea of "not guilty" to
"guilty." Hence, the lower court held in abeyance the promulgation of a judgment against said
accused until the prosecution had finished presenting its evidence. While trial was still ongoing,
Nuñez died on March 10, 1989, thereby extinguishing his criminal liability.

The facts surrounding this case show that in the afternoon of August 4, 1987, Pfc. Redempto
Manatad, Pfc. Ninah Tizon and Pfc. Rene Catamora were tasked by their commanding officer to
assist in canning the traffic at M.N. Briones and Bonifacio Streets in Mandaue City. Pfc. Tizon
controlled the traffic lighting facility; Pfc. Manatad manned the traffic; while Pfc. Catamora acted as
back-up and posted himself at Norkis Trading building.

At about 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon, Pfc. Catamora noticed eight (8) persons, one of whom he
identified as Edwin Nuñez, acting suspiciously. He noticed one of them giving instructions to two of
the men to approach Pfc. Manatad. He followed the two, but sensing that they were being followed,
they immediately proceeded to the middle of the road and engaged Pfc. Catamora to a gun battle. At
that instant, Pfc. Catamora heard a series of shots from the other group and thereafter saw Pfc.
Manatad sprawled on the ground. Being out-numbered and to save his own life, Pat. Catamora
sought refuge at the nearby BIR Office from where he saw two (2) persons take Pfc. Manatad's gun
and again fired at him to make sure that he is dead while the rest of the group including Nuñes acted
as back up. Thereafter, the Nuñes group commandeered a vehicle and fled from the scene of the
shooting. Pfc. Rene Catamora testified that he can identify accused-appellant Nuñes because of a
mole at the bridge of his nose near the left eye which he noticed when the accused passed 2 or 3
meters in front of him together with his companions.

On August 16, 1987, two teams of police officers were tasked to conduct surveillance on a
suspected safehouse of members of the sparrow unit located in Peace Valley, Cebu City. Upon
reaching the place, the group saw Rodrigo Dasig and Edwin Nuñes trying to escape. The team of
Capt. Antonio Gorre captured Nuñes and confiscated a .45 caliber revolver with 3 magazines and
ammunitions, while the group of Sgt. Ronald Arnejo pursued Dasig, who threw a grenade at his
pursuers, but was shot on his left upper arm and subsequently apprehended. A .38 caliber revolver
with 17 live ammunitions were confiscated from him.

Thereafter, Dasig was brought to the hospital for treatment, while Nuñes was turned over to the
Metrodiscom for investigation. Meanwhile, Dasig was interrogated by M/Sgt. Ariston Ira of the PC
Criminal Investigation Service on August 19, 1987 at his hospital bed at the Lapulapu Army Hospital
in Cebu City. Assisting Dasig during the interrogation was Atty. Fortunato Parawan of the Creer Law
Office, who was requested by the military to represent appellant who did not have a lawyer. Before
the start of the interrogation, Atty. Parawan asked appellant whether he was willing to avail of his
services, to which appellant agreed. M/Sgt. Ira then appraised Dasig of his constitutional rights. The
interrogation was conducted in Cebuano upon appellant's request.

Dasig confessed that he and the group of Edwin Nuñes killed Pfc. Manatad. He likewise admitted
that he and Nuñes were members of the sparrow unit and the their aliases were "Armand" and
"Mabi," respectively. The extra-judicial confession of appellant marked as Exhibit "J" 2 was signed by
him on every page thereof with the first page containing a certification likewise signed by him, which
states: "I hereby certify that the herein statement is free and voluntary, and that I am assisted by my
counsel in the course of this investigation" followed by the signed conformity of Atty. Parawan. The
extra-judicial confession was subscribed and sworn to before Cebu City Asst. Fiscal Salvador
Solima.

In the present appeal, Dasig contends that the procedure by which his extra-judicial confession was
taken was legally defective, and contrary to his Constitutional rights. He further contends that
assuming he conspired in the killing of Pfc. Manatad, he should be convicted at most of simple
rebellion and not murder with direct assault.

Appellant also claims that the custodial interrogation was done while he was still very sick and
consequently, he could not have fully appreciated the wisdom of admitting such a serious offense.
That even with the presence of counsel, his extra-judicial confession is inadmissible in evidence as
said counsel did not actively assist him and advise him of his rights. In effect, his presence was
merely to give a semblance of legality to the proceedings and not to protect appellant against
possible abuses of the investigator. Dasig, likewise questions the sincerity of Atty. Parawan in
protecting his rights considering that the latter is a known anti-Communist advocate and that the law
firm to which he belongs has represented high ranking officers of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines.

We find the argument specious. Fiscal Salvador Solima in his certification, Exhibit "J-7-B," stated
that he had personally examined the affiant and that he is convinced that the latter's statement was
free and voluntary and that the affiant signed the same in his presence and swore under oath as to
the veracity of everything therein. Atty. Fortunato L. Parawan also testified that he assisted the
affiant from the start of the investigation up to its termination. Atty. Parawan testified thus:

"Q Who introduced Rodrigo Dasig to you?

A I inquired from the personnel of the hospital the whereabout of Rodrigo Dasig and I introduced
myself as a lawyer. So they informed me the room of Rodrigo Dasig. At that time I introduced myself
as a lawyer who came to assist the person of Rodrigo Dasig. Once we had a confrontation with
Rodrigo Dasig, I asked him whether he was willing to get me as his lawyer in that investigation. Then
he told me yes.

Q Did he tell you whether he as a counsel of his own choice?

A No.

xxx xxx xxx

Q In other words he accepted your services as counsel in connection with that investigation which
was about to be made?

A Yes.

Q Who are the persons present at that time?

A There were guards outside and inside. There was a man from the CIS in the person of Sgt. Ira,
myself and Dasig.

Q What happened after that?

A The CIS started the investigation.

Q You mean this Ariston Ira?

A Yes.

Q Before Ariston Ira conducted the investigation was Dasig informed of his constitutional rights to
remain silent, to counsel and if he chooses to testify or say something, that statement of his will be
used against or in his favor in the court of justice?

A Yes. He was willing to get me as counsel in that investigation.

Q After he was informed of his constitutional rights what transpired next?

A The investigation started.

Q Were you present at the very start of that investigation?

A Yes. I was present from the start until it was finished.

Q Was that reduced to writing?

A Yes.

xxx xxx xxx

Q You said you were present during the entire investigation. Were the answers of the accused,
Rodrigo Dasig, to the questions propounded by the investigator voluntary?

A Yes, they voluntary.

Q After the investigation was finished what transpired next?

A After the investigation, I think that was already past 3:00 or 4:00, we proceeded to the office of the
City Fiscal at F. Ramos St., Cebu City and then we proceeded to the Office of Fiscal Solema (sic)
and then it was subscribed there before Fiscal Solema (sic).

Q Were you present during the proceeding?

A I was also present."

We do not find any reason to doubt the factual findings and conclusions of the trial court that the
extra-judicial confession of the appellant was voluntarily made. Said the trial court:

"The prosecution's evidence clearly shows that herein accused during his investigation was properly
informed and appraised of his constitutional right to remain silent and to have a competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice but since at that time he did not signify his
intention to retain a lawyer of his own choice, so he was provided with a lawyer in the person of Atty.
Fortunato Parawan of the Creer Law Office who was available at that time, to assist him during the
custodial investigation conducted by T/Sgt. Ariston L. Ira at his hospital bed at Camp Lapulapu Army
Station Hospital, Cebu City where he was confined after being hit on his upper left arm and in fact,
Atty. Parawan only consented to assist herein accused after the latter has answered in the
affirmative to his question as to whether he would be amenable to be assisted by him as his counsel
of his own choice.

"The prosecution's evidence further show that Atty. Fortunato Parawan after consenting to be his
counsel was with him when his extra-judicial confession or sworn statement was subscribed and
sworn to by him before Assistant City Fiscal Salvador O. Solima of the Cebu City Fiscal's Office who,
before accused has actually affixed his signature on each and every pages of his extra-judicial
confession, has informed him (accused) of his constitutional rights and has explained the contents of
his extra-judicial confession.
"Moreover, per certification made by Assistant City Fiscal Salvador O. Solima of the Cebu City
Fiscal's Office, clearly shows that accused in executing the same has done so voluntarily and after
having understood the contents thereof which is in the visayan language, a language known to him,
found on the last page thereof now marked as Exhibit "J-7-B."

"Furthermore, this sworn statement of accused Dasig is collaborated by the sworn statement of his
co-accused Edwin Nuñes dated August 18, 1987 which is sworn and subscribed to before City
Fiscal Jopelinito Pareja of the city Fiscal's Office of Cebu City."

The settled jurisprudence on the matter is that a confession is admissible until the accused
successfully proves that it was given as a result of violence, intimidation, threat or promise of reward
or leniency. 5 The case of People of the Philippines v. Parojinog is four square to the case at bar. In
Parojinog this court had this to say:

"Anent his claim that Atty. Fuentes was not his choice, Section 12 (1) of Article III of the 1987
Constitution provides:

'Sec. 12(1). — Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right
to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel
preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel he must provided
with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.'

"It is very clear from the aforequoted provision that a person under investigation for the commission
of an offense may choose his own counsel but if he cannot afford the services of counsel, he must
be provided with one. While the initial choice of the lawyer in the latter case is naturally lodged in the
police investigators, the accused really has the final choice as he may reject the counsel chosen for
him and ask for another one. In the instant case, the records show that no objection was voiced by
the accused throughout the entire proceedings of the investigation and afterwards when he
subscribed to its veracity before City Prosecutor Luzminda V. Uy. Thus, he apparently acquiesced to
the choice of the investigators. He complained for the first time that Atty. Fuentes was not his choice
only during trial. Thus it was too late."

Appellant relies on the much abused claim that his extra-judicial confession was legally defective
and hence, should not have been admitted and considered by the trial judge. This accusation is
whimsical and obviously a mere refuge for appellant's turnabout. In an attempt to avoid criminal
liability, he now questions the integrity of the police authorities and the reputation of the lawyer who
stood by him during the investigation. Indubitably established and now a matter of record is the fact
that appellant was assisted by Atty. Parawan who even signed the former's sworn declarations. It is
likewise a matter of record that before appellant made his extra-judicial confession, he was first
asked if he was amenable to the services of Atty. Parawan to which query he answered affirmatively.
Finally, the alleged use of fore and intimidation has not been substantiated by evidence other than
his self-serving testimony. As has been pointed out, such allegation is another naive effort of
appellant to back track from his prior voluntary admission of guilt. Evidently, the taking of his extra-
judicial confession was done with regularity and legality.

Nevertheless, there is merit in appellant's argument that granting he is guilty, what he committed
was a political crime of simple rebellion, and hence he should not be convicted of murder with direct
assault.

The Solicitor General agrees with the accused-appellant on this point as manifested in the People's
brief, which We quote:
"However, as correctly pointed by appellant, the lower court erroneously convicted him of Murder
with Assault Upon a Person in Authority, instead of Rebellion.

"Rebellion is committed by taking up arms against the government, among other means. (Article
135, Revised Penal Code). In this case, appellant not only confessed voluntarily his membership
with the sparrow unit but also his participation and that of his group in the killing of Pfc. Manatad
while manning the traffic in Mandaue City in the afternoon of August 4, 1987. It is of judicial notice
that the sparrow unit is the liquidation squad of the New People's Army with the objective of
overthrowing the duly constituted government. It is therefore not hard to comprehend that the killing
of Pfc. Manatad was committed as a means to or in furtherance of the subversive ends of the NPA.
Consequently, appellant is liable for the crime of rebellion, not murder with direct assault upon a
person in authority."

The crime of rebellion consists of many acts. It is a vast movement of men and a complex net of
intrigues and plots. Acts committed in furtherance of rebellion though crimes in themselves are
deemed absorbed in one single crime of rebellion. 9 The act of killing a police officer, knowing too
well that the victim is a person in authority is a mere component or ingredient of rebellion or an act
done in furtherance of the rebellion. It cannot be made a basis of a separate charge.

Moreover, in the case of People v. Mangallan 10 We held that where the accused who was charged
with murder admitted his membership with the NPA and the killing of a suspected PC informer, the
crime committed is not murder but rebellion punishable under Articles 134 and 135 of the Revised
Penal Code.

As to the proper imposable penalty, the Indeterminate Sentence Law is not applicable to persons
convicted of rebellion (Sec. 2, R.A. 4203), contrary to the insinuation of the Solicitor General. Article
135 of the Revised Penal Code imposes the penalty of prision mayor and a fine not exceeding
P20,000.00 to any person who promotes, maintains, or heads a rebellion. However, in the case at
bar, there is no evidence to prove that appellant Dasig headed the crime committed. As a matter of
fact he was not specifically pinpointed by Pfc. Catamora as the person giving instructions to the
group which attacked Pfc. Manatad.

Appellant merely participated in committing the act, or just executed the command of an unknown
leader. Hence, he should be made to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of eight (8) years of prision
mayor. For the resulting death, appellant is likewise ordered to pay the heirs of Pfc. Manatad FIFTY
THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as civil indemnity.

Premises considered, We uphold the findings of the trial court that the extra-judicial confession was
legally obtained. However, appellant being a confessed member of the sparrow unit, the liquidation
squad of the New People's Army whose objective is to overthrow the duly constituted government,
the crime committed is simple rebellion and not murder with direct assault.

WHEREFORE, accused Rogelio Dasig is found guilty of participating in an act of rebellion beyond
reasonable doubt and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of eight (8) years of
prision mayor, and to pay the heirs of Pfc. Redempto Manatad, P50,000.00 as civil indemnity.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 93335 September 13, 1990

JUAN PONCE ENRILE, petitioner,

vs.
HON. OMAR U. AMIN, Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 135, HON.
IGNACIO M. CAPULONG, Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 134,
Pairing Judge, SPECIAL COMPOSITE TEAM of: Senior State Prosecutor AURELIO TRAMPE,
State Prosecutor FERDINAND ABESAMIS and Asst. City Prosecutor EULOGIO MANANQUIL;
and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Ponce Enrile, Cayetano, Reyes & Manalastas Law Offices for petitioner.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

Together with the filing of an information charging Senator Juan Ponce Enrile as having committed rebellion complexed with murder 1 with
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, government prosecutors filed another information charging him for violation of Presidential Decree
No. 1829 with the Regional Trial Court of Makati. The second information reads:

That on or about the 1st day of December 1989, at Dasmariñas Village, Makati,
Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, having reasonable ground to believe or suspect that Ex-Col. Gregorio
"Gringo" Honasan has committed a crime, did then and there unlawfully, feloniously,
willfully and knowingly obstruct, impede, frustrate or delay the apprehension of said
Ex. Lt. Col. Gregorio "Gringo" Honasan by harboring or concealing him in his house.

On March 2, 1990, the petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion (a) to hold in abeyance the issuance of a
warrant of arrest pending personal determination by the court of probable cause, and (b) to dismiss
the case and expunge the information from the record.

On March 16, 1990, respondent Judge Ignacio Capulong, as pairing judge of respondent Judge
Omar Amin, denied Senator Enrile's Omnibus motion on the basis of a finding that "there (was)
probable cause to hold the accused Juan Ponce Enrile liable for violation of PD No. 1829."

On March 21, 1990, the petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration and to Quash/Dismiss the
Information on the grounds that:

(a) The facts charged do not constitute an offense;

(b) The respondent court's finding of probable cause was devoid of factual and legal basis; and

(c) The pending charge of rebellion complexed with murder and frustrated murder against Senator
Enrile as alleged co-conspirator of Col. Honasan, on the basis of their alleged meeting on December
1, 1989 preclude the prosecution of the Senator for harboring or concealing the Colonel on the same
occasion under PD 1829.

On May 10, 1990, the respondent court issued an order denying the motion for reconsideration for
alleged lack of merit and setting Senator Enrile's arraignment to May 30, 1990.

The petitioner comes to this Court on certiorari imputing grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction committed by the respondent court in refusing to quash/ dismiss the
information on the following grounds, to wit:

I. The facts charged do not constitute an offense;

 II. The alleged harboring or concealing by Sen. Enrile of Col. Honasan in a supposed
meeting on 1 December 1989 is absorbed in, or is a component element of, the
"complexed" rebellion presently charged against Sen. Enrile as alleged co-
conspirator of Col. Honasan on the basis of the same meeting on 1 December 1989;

III. The orderly administration of Justice requires that there be only one prosecution
for all the component acts of rebellion;

IV. There is no probable cause to hold Sen. Enrile for trial for alleged violation of
Presidential Decree No. 1829;

V. No preliminary investigation was conducted for alleged violation of Presidential

Decree No. 1829. The preliminary investigation, held only for rebellion, was marred
by patent irregularities resulting in denial of due process.

On May 20, 1990 we issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the respondents from
conducting further proceedings in Criminal Case No. 90-777 until otherwise directed by this Court.

The pivotal issue in this case is whether or not the petitioner could be separately charged for
violation of PD No. 1829 notwithstanding the rebellion case earlier filed against him.

Respondent Judge Amin sustained the charge of violation of PD No. 1829 notwithstanding the
rebellion case filed against the petitioner on the theory that the former involves a special law while
the latter is based on the Revised Penal Code or a general law.

The resolution of the above issue brings us anew to the case of People v. Hernandez (99 Phil. 515
[1956]) the rulings of which were recently repeated in the petition for habeas corpus of Juan Ponce
Enrile v. Judge Salazar,(G.R. Nos. 92163 and 92164, June 5, 1990). The Enrile case gave this Court
the occasion to reiterate the long standing proscription against splitting the component offenses of
rebellion and subjecting them to separate prosecutions, a procedure reprobated in
the Hernandez case. This Court recently declared:

The rejection of both options shapes and determines the primary ruling of the Court,
which that Hernandez remains binding doctrine operating to prohibit the complexing
of rebellion with any other offense committed on the occasion thereof, either as a
means to its commission or as an unintended effect of an activity that commutes
rebellion. (Emphasis supplied)

This doctrine is applicable in the case at bar. If a person can not be charged with the complex crime
of rebellion for the greater penalty to be applied, neither can he be charged separately for two (2)
different offenses where one is a constitutive or component element or committed in furtherance of
rebellion.

The petitioner is presently charged with having violated PD No. 1829 particularly Section 1 (c) which
states:

SECTION 1. The penalty of prison correccional in its maximum period, or a fine

ranging from 1,000 to 6,000 pesos or both, shall be imposed upon any person who
knowingly or wilfully obstructs, impedes, frustrates or delays the apprehension of
suspects and the investigation and prosecution of criminal cases by committing any
of the following acts:
 xxx xxx xxx

(c) harboring or concealing, or facilitating the escape of, any person he knows, or has
reasonable ground to believe or suspect has committed any offense under existing
penal laws in order to prevent his arrest, prosecution and conviction.

xxx xxx xxx

The prosecution in this Makati case alleges that the petitioner entertained and accommodated Col.
Honasan by giving him food and comfort on December 1, 1989 in his house. Knowing that Colonel
Honasan is a fugitive from justice, Sen. Enrile allegedly did not do anything to have Honasan
arrested or apprehended. And because of such failure the petitioner prevented Col. Honasan's arrest
and conviction in violation of Section 1 (c) of PD No. 1829.

The rebellion charges filed against the petitioner in Quezon City were based on the affidavits
executed by three (3) employees of the Silahis International Hotel who stated that the fugitive Col.
Gregorio "Gringo" Honasan and some 100 rebel soldiers attended the mass and birthday party held
at the residence of the petitioner in the evening of December 1, 1989. The information (Annex "C", p.
3) particularly reads that on "or about 6:30 p.m., 1 December, 1989, Col. Gregorio "Gringo" Honasan
conferred with accused Senator Juan Ponce Enrile accompanied by about 100 fully armed rebel
soldiers wearing white armed patches". The prosecution thereby concluded that:

In such a situation, Sen. Enrile's talking with rebel leader Col. Gregorio "Gringo"
Honasan in his house in the presence of about 100 uniformed soldiers who were fully
armed, can be inferred that they were co-conspirators in the failed December
coup. (Annex A, Rollo, p. 65; Emphasis supplied)

As can be readily seen, the factual allegations supporting the rebellion charge constitute or include
the very incident which gave rise to the charge of the violation under Presidential Decree No. 1829.
Under the Department of Justice resolution (Annex A, Rollo, p. 49) there is only one crime of
rebellion complexed with murder and multiple frustrated murder but there could be 101 separate and
independent prosecutions for harboring and concealing" Honasan and 100 other armed rebels under
PD No. 1829. The splitting of component elements is readily apparent.

The petitioner is now facing charges of rebellion in conspiracy with the fugitive Col. Gringo Honasan.
Necessarily, being in conspiracy with Honasan, petitioners alleged act of harboring or concealing
was for no other purpose but in furtherance of the crime of rebellion thus constitute a component
thereof. it was motivated by the single intent or resolution to commit the crime of rebellion. As held
in People v. Hernandez, supra:

In short, political crimes are those directly aimed against the political order, as well as
such common crimes as may be committed to achieve a political purpose. The
decisive factor is the intent or motive. (p. 536)

The crime of rebellion consists of many acts. It is described as a vast movement of men and a
complex net of intrigues and plots. (People v. Almasan [CA] O.G. 1932). Jurisprudence tells us that
acts committed in furtherance of the rebellion though crimes in themselves are deemed absorbed in
the one single crime of rebellion. (People v. Geronimo, 100 Phil. 90 [1956]; People v. Santos, 104
Phil. 551 [1958]; People v. Rodriguez, 107 Phil. 659 [1960]; People v. Lava, 28 SCRA 72 [1969]). In
this case, the act of harboring or concealing Col. Honasan is clearly a mere component or ingredient
of rebellion or an act done in furtherance of the rebellion. It cannot therefore be made the basis of a
separate charge. The case of People v. Prieto 2 (80 Phil., 138 [1948]) is instructive:
 In the nature of things, the giving of aid and comfort can only be accomplished by
some kind of action. Its very nature partakes of a deed or physical activity as
opposed to a mental operation. (Cramer v. U.S., ante) This deed or physical activity
may be, and often is, in itself a criminal offense under another penal statute or
provision. Even so, when the deed is charged as an element of treason it becomes
Identified with the latter crime and can not be the subject of a separate punishment,
or used in combination with treason to increase the penalty as article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code provides. Just as one can not be punished for possessing
opium in a prosecution for smoking the Identical drug, and a robber cannot be held
guilty of coercion or trespass to a dwelling in a prosecution for robbery, because
possession of opium and force and trespass are inherent in smoking and in robbery
respectively, so may not a defendant be made liable for murder as a separate crime
or in conjunction with another offense where, as in this case, it is averred as a
constitutive ingredient of treason.

The prosecution tries to distinguish by contending that harboring or concealing a fugitive is

punishable under a special law while the rebellion case is based on the Revised Penal Code; hence,
prosecution under one law will not bar a prosecution under the other. This argument is specious in
rebellion cases.

In the light of the Hernandez doctrine the prosecution's theory must fail. The rationale remains the
same. All crimes, whether punishable under a special law or general law, which are mere
components or ingredients, or committed in furtherance thereof, become absorbed in the crime of
rebellion and can not be isolated and charged as separate crimes in themselves. Thus:

This does not detract, however, from the rule that the ingredients of a crime form part
and parcel thereof, and hence, are absorbed by the same and cannot be punished
either separately therefrom or by the application of Article 48 of the Revised Penal
Code. ... (People v. Hernandez, supra, at p. 528)

The Hernandez and other related cases mention common crimes as absorbed in the crime of
rebellion. These common crimes refer to all acts of violence such as murder, arson, robbery,
kidnapping etc. as provided in the Revised Penal Code. The attendant circumstances in the instant
case, however, constrain us to rule that the theory of absorption in rebellion cases must not confine
itself to common crimes but also to offenses under special laws which are perpetrated in furtherance
of the political offense.

The conversation and, therefore, alleged conspiring of Senator Ponce Enrile with Colonel Honasan
is too intimately tied up with his allegedly harboring and concealing Honasan for practically the same
act to form two separate crimes of rebellion and violation of PD No. 1829.

Clearly, the petitioner's alleged act of harboring or concealing which was based on his acts of
conspiring with Honasan was committed in connection with or in furtherance of rebellion and must
now be deemed as absorbed by, merged in, and Identified with the crime of rebellion punished in
Articles 134 and 135 of the RPC.

Thus, national, as well as international, laws and jurisprudence overwhelmingly favor

the proposition that common crimes, perpetrated in furtherance of a political offense,
are divested of their character as "common" offenses, and assume the political
complexion of the main crime of which they are mere ingredients, and
consequently, cannot be punished separately from the principal offense, or
 complexed with the same, to justify the imposition of a graver penalty. (People v.
Hernandez, supra, p. 541)

In People v. Elias Rodriguez, 107 Phil. 659 [1960], the accused, after having pleaded guilty and
convicted of the crime of rebellion, faced an independent prosecution for illegal possession of
firearms. The Court ruled:

An examination of the record, however, discloses that the crime with which the
accused is charged in the present case which is that of illegal possession of firearm
and ammunition is already absorbed as a necessary element or ingredient in the
crime of rebellion with which the same accused is charged with other persons in a
separate case and wherein he pleaded guilty and was convicted. (at page 662)

xxx xxx xxx

[T]he conclusion is inescapable that the crime with which the accused is charged in
the present case is already absorbed in the rebellion case and so to press it further
now would be to place him in double jeopardy. (at page 663)

Noteworthy is the recent case of Misolas v. Panga, (G.R. No. 83341, January 30, 1990) where the
Court had the occasion to pass upon a nearly similar issue. In this case, the petitioner Misolas, an
alleged member of the New Peoples Army (NPA), was charged with illegal possession of firearms
and ammunitions in furtherance of subversion under Section 1 of PD 1866. In his motion to quash
the information, the petitioner based his arguments on the Hernandez and Geronimo rulings on the
doctrine of absorption of common in rebellion. The Court, however, clarified, to wit:

... in the present case, petitioner is being charged specifically for the qualified offense
of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition under PD 1866. HE IS NOT BEING
CHARGED WITH THE COMPLEX CRIME OF SUBVERSION WITH ILLEGAL
POSSESSION OF FIREARMS. NEITHER IS HE BEING SEPARATELY CHARGED
FOR SUBVERSION AND FOR ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS. Thus, the
rulings of the Court in Hernandez, Geronimo and Rodriguez find no application in this
case.

The Court in the above case upheld the prosecution for illegal possession of firearms under PD 1866
because no separate prosecution for subversion or rebellion had been filed. 3 The prosecution must
make up its mind whether to charge Senator Ponce Enrile with rebellion alone or to drop the
rebellion case and charge him with murder and multiple frustrated murder and also violation of P.D.
1829. It cannot complex the rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder. Neither can it
prosecute him for rebellion in Quezon City and violation of PD 1829 in Makati. It should be noted that
there is in fact a separate prosecution for rebellion already filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City. In such a case, the independent prosecution under PD 1829 can not prosper.

As we have earlier mentioned, the intent or motive is a decisive factor. If Senator Ponce Enrile is not
charged with rebellion and he harbored or concealed Colonel Honasan simply because the latter is a
friend and former associate, the motive for the act is completely different. But if the act is committed
with political or social motives, that is in furtherance of rebellion, then it should be deemed to form
part of the crime of rebellion instead of being punished separately.

In view of the foregoing, the petitioner can not be tried separately under PD 1829 in addition to his
being prosecuted in the rebellion case. With this ruling, there is no need for the Court to pass upon
the other issues raised by the petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Information in Criminal Case No. 90-777 is
QUASHED. The writ of preliminary injunction, enjoining respondent Judges and their successors in
Criminal Case No. 90-777, Regional Trial Court of Makati, from holding the arraignment of Sen. Juan
Ponce Enrile and from conducting further proceedings therein is made permanent.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 92163 June 5, 1990

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, petitioner
vs.
JUDGE JAIME SALAZAR (Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City [Br.
103], SENIOR STATE PROSECUTOR AURELIO TRAMPE, PROSECUTOR FERDINAND R.
ABESAMIS, AND CITY ASSISTANT CITY PROSECUTOR EULOGIO MANANQUIL, NATIONAL
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION DIRECTOR ALFREDO LIM, BRIG. GEN. EDGAR DULA TORRES
(Superintendent of the Northern Police District) AND/ OR ANY AND ALL PERSONS WHO MAY
HAVE ACTUAL CUSTODY OVER THE PERSON OF JUAN PONCE ENRILE, respondents.

G.R. No. 92164 June 5, 1990

SPS. REBECCO E. PANLILIO AND ERLINDA E. PANLILIO, petitioners,

vs.
PROSECUTORS FERNANDO DE LEON, AURELIO C. TRAMPE, FFRDINAND R. ABESAMIS,
AND EULOGIO C. MANANQUIL, and HON. JAIME W. SALAZAR, JR., in his capacity as
Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 103, respondents.

NARVASA, J.:

Thirty-four years after it wrote history into our criminal jurisprudence, People vs. Hernandez 1 once more takes center stage as the focus of a
confrontation at law that would re-examine, if not the validity of its doctrine, the limits of its applicability. To be sure, the intervening period
saw a number of similar cases 2 that took issue with the ruling-all with a marked lack of success-but none, it would Beem, where season and
circumstance had more effectively conspired to attract wide public attention and excite impassioned debate, even among laymen; none,
certainly, which has seen quite the kind and range of arguments that are now brought to bear on the same question.

The facts are not in dispute. In the afternoon of February 27, 1990, Senate Minority Floor Leader
Juan Ponce Enrile was arrested by law enforcement officers led by Director Alfredo Lim of the
National Bureau of Investigation on the strength of a warrant issued by Hon. Jaime Salazar of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City Branch 103, in Criminal Case No. 9010941. The warrant had
issued on an information signed and earlier that day filed by a panel of prosecutors composed of
Senior State Prosecutor Aurelio C. Trampe, State Prosecutor Ferdinand R. Abesamis and Assistant
City Prosecutor Eulogio Mananquil, Jr., charging Senator Enrile, the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda
Panlilio, and Gregorio Honasan with the crime of rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated
murder allegedly committed during the period of the failed coup attempt from November 29 to
December 10, 1990. Senator Enrile was taken to and held overnight at the NBI headquarters on Taft
Avenue, Manila, without bail, none having been recommended in the information and none fixed in
the arrest warrant. The following morning, February 28, 1990, he was brought to Camp Tomas
Karingal in Quezon City where he was given over to the custody of the Superintendent of the
Northern Police District, Brig. Gen. Edgardo Dula Torres.3
On the same date of February 28, 1990, Senator Enrile, through counsel, filed the petition
for habeas corpus herein (which was followed by a supplemental petition filed on March 2, 1990),
alleging that he was deprived of his constitutional rights in being, or having been:

(a) held to answer for criminal offense which does not exist in the statute books;

(b) charged with a criminal offense in an information for which no complaint was
initially filed or preliminary investigation was conducted, hence was denied due
process;

(c) denied his right to bail; and

(d) arrested and detained on the strength of a warrant issued without the judge who
issued it first having personally determined the existence of probable cause. 4

The Court issued the writ prayed for, returnable March 5, 1990 and set the plea for hearing on March
6, 1990. 5 On March 5, 1990, the Solicitor General filed a consolidated return 6 for the respondents in
this case and in G.R. No. 92164 7 Which had been contemporaneously but separately filed by two of
Senator Enrile's co-accused, the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio, and raised similar
questions. Said return urged that the petitioners' case does not fall within the Hernandez ruling
because-and this is putting it very simply-the information in Hernandezcharged murders and other
common crimes committed as a necessary means for the commission of rebellion, whereas the
information against Sen. Enrile et al. charged murder and frustrated murder committed on the
occasion, but not in furtherance, of rebellion. Stated otherwise, the Solicitor General would
distinguish between the complex crime ("delito complejo") arising from an offense being a necessary
means for committing another, which is referred to in the second clause of Article 48, Revised Penal
Code, and is the subject of the Hernandez ruling, and the compound crime ("delito compuesto")
arising from a single act constituting two or more grave or less grave offenses referred to in the first
clause of the same paragraph, with which Hernandez was not concerned and to which, therefore, it
should not apply.

The parties were heard in oral argument, as scheduled, on March 6, 1990, after which the Court
issued its Resolution of the same date 8 granting Senator Enrile and the Panlilio spouses provisional
liberty conditioned upon their filing, within 24 hours from notice, cash or surety bonds of P100,000.00
(for Senator Enrile) and P200,000.00 (for the Panlilios), respectively. The Resolution stated that it
was issued without prejudice to a more extended resolution on the matter of the provisional liberty of
the petitioners and stressed that it was not passing upon the legal issues raised in both cases. Four
Members of the Court 9 voted against granting bail to Senator Enrile, and two 10 against granting bail
to the Panlilios.

The Court now addresses those issues insofar as they are raised and litigated in Senator Enrile's
petition, G.R. No. 92163.

The parties' oral and written pleas presented the Court with the following options:

(a) abandon Hernandez and adopt the minority view expressed in the main dissent of
Justice Montemayor in said case that rebellion cannot absorb more serious crimes,
and that under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code rebellion may properly be
complexed with common offenses, so-called; this option was suggested by the
Solicitor General in oral argument although it is not offered in his written pleadings;
 (b) hold Hernandez applicable only to offenses committed in furtherance, or as a
necessary means for the commission, of rebellion, but not to acts committed in the
course of a rebellion which also constitute "common" crimes of grave or less grave
character;

(c) maintain Hernandez as applying to make rebellion absorb all other offenses
committed in its course, whether or not necessary to its commission or in furtherance
thereof.

On the first option, eleven (11) Members of the Court voted against abandoning Hernandez. Two (2)
Members felt that the doctrine should be re-examined. 10-A In the view of the majority, the ruling
remains good law, its substantive and logical bases have withstood all subsequent challenges and
no new ones are presented here persuasive enough to warrant a complete reversal. This view is
reinforced by the fact that not too long ago, the incumbent President, exercising her powers under
the 1986 Freedom Constitution, saw fit to repeal, among others, Presidential Decree No. 942 of the
former regime which precisely sought to nullify or neutralize Hernandez by enacting a new provision
(Art. 142-A) into the Revised Penal Code to the effect that "(w)hen by reason, or on the occasion, of
any of the crimes penalized in this Chapter (Chapter I of Title 3, which includes rebellion), acts which
constitute offenses upon which graver penalties are imposed by law are committed, the penalty for
the most serious offense in its maximum period shall be imposed upon the offender."' 11 In thus
acting, the President in effect by legislative flat reinstated Hernandez as binding doctrine with the
effect of law. The Court can do no less than accord it the same recognition, absent any sufficiently
powerful reason against so doing.

On the second option, the Court unanimously voted to reject the theory that Hernandez is, or should
be, limited in its application to offenses committed as a necessary means for the commission of
rebellion and that the ruling should not be interpreted as prohibiting the complexing of rebellion with
other common crimes committed on the occasion, but not in furtherance, thereof. While four
Members of the Court felt that the proponents' arguments were not entirely devoid of merit, the
consensus was that they were not sufficient to overcome what appears to be the real thrust
of Hernandez to rule out the complexing of rebellion with any other offense committed in its course
under either of the aforecited clauses of Article 48, as is made clear by the following excerpt from the
majority opinion in that case:

There is one other reason-and a fundamental one at that-why Article 48 of our Penal
Code cannot be applied in the case at bar. If murder were not complexed with
rebellion, and the two crimes were punished separately (assuming that this could be
done), the following penalties would be imposable upon the movant, namely: (1) for
the crime of rebellion, a fine not exceeding P20,000 and prision mayor, in the
corresponding period, depending upon the modifying circumstances present, but
never exceeding 12 years of prision mayor, and (2) for the crime of murder, reclusion
temporal in its maximum period to death, depending upon the modifying
circumstances present. in other words, in the absence of aggravating
circumstances, the extreme penalty could not be imposed upon him. However, under
Article 48 said penalty would have to be meted out to him, even in the absence of a
single aggravating circumstance. Thus, said provision, if construed in conformity with
the theory of the prosecution, would be unfavorable to the movant.

Upon the other hand, said Article 48 was enacted for the purpose of favoring the
culprit, not of sentencing him to a penalty more severe than that which would be
proper if the several acts performed by him were punished separately. In the words
of Rodriguez Navarro:
 La unificacion de penas en los casos de concurso de delitos a que
hace referencia este articulo (75 del Codigo de 1932), esta basado
francamente en el principio pro reo.' (II Doctrina Penal del Tribunal
Supremo de Espana, p. 2168.)

We are aware of the fact that this observation refers to Article 71 (later 75) of the
Spanish Penal Code (the counterpart of our Article 48), as amended in 1908 and
then in 1932, reading:

Las disposiciones del articulo anterior no son aplicables en el caso

de que un solo hecho constituya dos o mas delitos, o cuando el uno
de ellos sea medio necesario para cometer el otro.

En estos casos solo se impondra la pena correspondiente al delito

mas grave en su grado maximo, hasta el limite que represents la
suma de las que pudieran imponerse, penando separadamente los
delitos.

Cuando la pena asi computada exceda de este limite, se sancionaran

los delitos por separado. (Rodriguez Navarro, Doctrina Penal del
Tribunal Supremo, Vol. II, p. 2163)

and that our Article 48 does not contain the qualification inserted in said amendment,
restricting the imposition of the penalty for the graver offense in its maximum period
to the case when it does not exceed the sum total of the penalties imposable if the
acts charged were dealt with separately. The absence of said limitation in our Penal
Code does not, to our mind, affect substantially the spirit of said Article 48. Indeed, if
one act constitutes two or more offenses, there can be no reason to inflict a
punishment graver than that prescribed for each one of said offenses put together. In
directing that the penalty for the graver offense be, in such case, imposed in its
maximum period, Article 48 could have had no other purpose than to prescribe a
penalty lower than the aggregate of the penalties for each offense, if imposed
separately. The reason for this benevolent spirit of article 48 is readily discernible.
When two or more crimes are the result of a single act, the offender is deemed less
perverse than when he commits said crimes thru separate and distinct acts. Instead
of sentencing him for each crime independently from the other, he must suffer the
maximum of the penalty for the more serious one, on the assumption that it is less
grave than the sum total of the separate penalties for each offense. 12

The rejection of both options shapes and determines the primary ruling of the Court, which is
that Hernandezremains binding doctrine operating to prohibit the complexing of rebellion with any
other offense committed on the occasion thereof, either as a means necessary to its commission or
as an unintended effect of an activity that constitutes rebellion.

This, however, does not write finis to the case. Petitioner's guilt or innocence is not here inquired
into, much less adjudged. That is for the trial court to do at the proper time. The Court's ruling merely
provides a take-off point for the disposition of other questions relevant to the petitioner's complaints
about the denial of his rights and to the propriety of the recourse he has taken.

The Court rules further (by a vote of 11 to 3) that the information filed against the petitioner does in
fact charge an offense. Disregarding the objectionable phrasing that would complex rebellion with
murder and multiple frustrated murder, that indictment is to be read as charging simple rebellion.
Thus, in Hernandez, the Court said:

In conclusion, we hold that, under the allegations of the amended information against
defendant-appellant Amado V. Hernandez, the murders, arsons and robberies
described therein are mere ingredients of the crime of rebellion allegedly committed
by said defendants, as means "necessary" (4) for the perpetration of said offense of
rebellion; that the crime charged in the aforementioned amended information is,
therefore, simple rebellion, not the complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder,
arsons and robberies; that the maximum penalty imposable under such charge
cannot exceed twelve (12) years of prision mayor and a fine of P2H,HHH; and that,
in conformity with the policy of this court in dealing with accused persons amenable
to a similar punishment, said defendant may be allowed bail. 13

The plaint of petitioner's counsel that he is charged with a crime that does not exist in the statute
books, while technically correct so far as the Court has ruled that rebellion may not be complexed
with other offenses committed on the occasion thereof, must therefore be dismissed as a mere flight
of rhetoric. Read in the context of Hernandez, the information does indeed charge the petitioner with
a crime defined and punished by the Revised Penal Code: simple rebellion.

Was the petitioner charged without a complaint having been initially filed and/or preliminary
investigation conducted? The record shows otherwise, that a complaint against petitioner for simple
rebellion was filed by the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation, and that on the strength of
said complaint a preliminary investigation was conducted by the respondent prosecutors,
culminating in the filing of the questioned information. 14There is nothing inherently irregular or
contrary to law in filing against a respondent an indictment for an offense different from what is
charged in the initiatory complaint, if warranted by the evidence developed during the preliminary
investigation.

It is also contended that the respondent Judge issued the warrant for petitioner's arrest without
first personallydetermining the existence of probable cause by examining under oath or affirmation
the complainant and his witnesses, in violation of Art. III, sec. 2, of the Constitution. 15 This Court has
already ruled, however, that it is not the unavoidable duty of the judge to make such a personal
examination, it being sufficient that he follows established procedure by personally evaluating the
report and the supporting documents submitted by the prosecutor.16Petitioner claims that the warrant
of arrest issued barely one hour and twenty minutes after the case was raffled off to the respondent
Judge, which hardly gave the latter sufficient time to personally go over the voluminous records of
the preliminary investigation. 17 Merely because said respondent had what some might consider only
a relatively brief period within which to comply with that duty, gives no reason to assume that he had
not, or could not have, so complied; nor does that single circumstance suffice to overcome the legal
presumption that official duty has been regularly performed.

Petitioner finally claims that he was denied the right to bail. In the light of the Court's reaffirmation
of Hernandez as applicable to petitioner's case, and of the logical and necessary corollary that the
information against him should be considered as charging only the crime of simple rebellion, which is
bailable before conviction, that must now be accepted as a correct proposition. But the question
remains: Given the facts from which this case arose, was a petition for habeas corpus in this Court
the appropriate vehicle for asserting a right to bail or vindicating its denial?

The criminal case before the respondent Judge was the normal venue for invoking the petitioner's
right to have provisional liberty pending trial and judgment. The original jurisdiction to grant or deny
bail rested with said respondent. The correct course was for petitioner to invoke that jurisdiction by
filing a petition to be admitted to bail, claiming a right to bail per se by reason of the weakness of the
evidence against him. Only after that remedy was denied by the trial court should the review
jurisdiction of this Court have been invoked, and even then, not without first applying to the Court of
Appeals if appropriate relief was also available there.

Even acceptance of petitioner's premise that going by the Hernandez ruling, the information charges
a non-existent crime or, contrarily, theorizing on the same basis that it charges more than one
offense, would not excuse or justify his improper choice of remedies. Under either hypothesis, the
obvious recourse would have been a motion to quash brought in the criminal action before the
respondent Judge. 18

There thus seems to be no question that All the grounds upon which petitioner has founded the
present petition, whether these went into the substance of what is charged in the information or
imputed error or omission on the part of the prosecuting panel or of the respondent Judge in dealing
with the charges against him, were originally justiciable in the criminal case before said Judge and
should have been brought up there instead of directly to this Court.

There was and is no reason to assume that the resolution of any of these questions was beyond the
ability or competence of the respondent Judge-indeed such an assumption would be demeaning and
less than fair to our trial courts; none whatever to hold them to be of such complexity or
transcendental importance as to disqualify every court, except this Court, from deciding them; none,
in short that would justify by passing established judicial processes designed to orderly move
litigation through the hierarchy of our courts. Parenthentically, this is the reason behind the vote of
four Members of the Court against the grant of bail to petitioner: the view that the trial court should
not thus be precipitately ousted of its original jurisdiction to grant or deny bail, and if it erred in that
matter, denied an opportunity to correct its error. It makes no difference that the respondent Judge
here issued a warrant of arrest fixing no bail. Immemorial practice sanctions simply following the
prosecutor's recommendation regarding bail, though it may be perceived as the better course for the
judge motu proprio to set a bail hearing where a capital offense is charged.19 It is, in any event,
incumbent on the accused as to whom no bail has been recommended or fixed to claim the right to a
bail hearing and thereby put to proof the strength or weakness of the evidence against him.

It is apropos to point out that the present petition has triggered a rush to this Court of other parties in
a similar situation, all apparently taking their cue from it, distrustful or contemptuous of the efficacy of
seeking recourse in the regular manner just outlined. The proliferation of such pleas has only
contributed to the delay that the petitioner may have hoped to avoid by coming directly to this Court.

Not only because popular interest seems focused on the outcome of the present petition, but also
because to wash the Court's hand off it on jurisdictional grounds would only compound the delay that
it has already gone through, the Court now decides the same on the merits. But in so doing, the
Court cannot express too strongly the view that said petition interdicted the ordered and orderly
progression of proceedings that should have started with the trial court and reached this Court only if
the relief appealed for was denied by the former and, in a proper case, by the Court of Appeals on
review.

Let it be made very clear that hereafter the Court will no longer countenance, but will give short shrift
to, pleas like the present, that clearly short-circuit the judicial process and burden it with the
resolution of issues properly within the original competence of the lower courts. What has thus far
been stated is equally applicable to and decisive of the petition of the Panlilio spouses (G.R. No.
92164) which is virtually Identical to that of petitioner Enrile in factual milieu and is therefore
determinable on the same principles already set forth. Said spouses have uncontestedly
pleaded 20 that warrants of arrest issued against them as co-accused of petitioner Enrile in Criminal
Case No. 90-10941, that when they appeared before NBI Director Alfredo Lim in the afternoon of
March 1, 1990, they were taken into custody and detained without bail on the strength of said
warrants in violation-they claim-of their constitutional rights.

It may be that in the light of contemporary events, the act of rebellion has lost that quitessentiany
quixotic quality that justifies the relative leniency with which it is regarded and punished by law, that
present-day rebels are less impelled by love of country than by lust for power and have become no
better than mere terrorists to whom nothing, not even the sanctity of human life, is allowed to stand
in the way of their ambitions. Nothing so underscores this aberration as the rash of seemingly
senseless killings, bombings, kidnappings and assorted mayhem so much in the news these days,
as often perpetrated against innocent civilians as against the military, but by and large attributable
to, or even claimed by so-called rebels to be part of, an ongoing rebellion.

It is enough to give anyone pause-and the Court is no exception-that not even the crowded streets of
our capital City seem safe from such unsettling violence that is disruptive of the public peace and
stymies every effort at national economic recovery. There is an apparent need to restructure the law
on rebellion, either to raise the penalty therefor or to clearly define and delimit the other offenses to
be considered as absorbed thereby, so that it cannot be conveniently utilized as the umbrella for
every sort of illegal activity undertaken in its name. The Court has no power to effect such change,
for it can only interpret the law as it stands at any given time, and what is needed lies beyond
interpretation. Hopefully, Congress will perceive the need for promptly seizing the initiative in this
matter, which is properly within its province.

WHEREFORE, the Court reiterates that based on the doctrine enunciated in People vs.
Hernandez, the questioned information filed against petitioners Juan Ponce Enrile and the spouses
Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio must be read as charging simple rebellion only, hence said petitioners
are entitled to bail, before final conviction, as a matter of right. The Court's earlier grant of bail to
petitioners being merely provisional in character, the proceedings in both cases are ordered
REMANDED to the respondent Judge to fix the amount of bail to be posted by the petitioners. Once
bail is fixed by said respondent for any of the petitioners, the corresponding bail bond flied with this
Court shall become functus oficio. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-6025 May 30, 1964

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
AMADO V. HERNANDEZ, ET AL., accused,
AMADO V. HERNANDEZ, ET AL., defendants-appellants.

-----------------------------

G.R. No. L-6026 May 30, 1964

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
BAYANI ESPIRITU, ET AL., accused,
BAYANI ESPIRITU and TEOPISTA VALERIO, defendants-appellants.

LABRADOR, J.:
This is the appeal prosecuted by the defendants from the judgment rendered by the Court of First
Instance of Manila, Hon. Agustin P. Montesa, presiding, in its Criminal Case No. 15841, People vs.
Amado V. Hernandez, et al., and Criminal Case No. 15479, People vs. Bayani Espiritu, et al. In
Criminal Case No. 15841 (G.R. No. L-6026) the charge is for Rebellion with Multiple Murder, Arsons
and Robberies; the appellants are Amado V. Hernandez, Juan J. Cruz, Genaro de la Cruz, Amado
Racanday, Fermin Rodillas and Julian Lumanog; Aquilino Bunsol, Adriano Samson and Andres
Baisa, Jr. were among those sentenced in the judgment appealed from, but they have withdrawn
their appeal. In Criminal Case No. 15479 (G.R. No. L-6026) the charge is for rebellion with murders,
arsons and kidnappings; the accused are Bayani Espiritu Teopista Valerio and Andres Balsa, Jr.;
they all appealed but Andres Balsa, Jr. withdrew his appeal.

The information filed against defendants Hernandez and others in Criminal Case No. 15481 alleged:

I. That on or about March 15, 1945, and for some time before the said date and continuously
thereafter, until the present time, in the City of Manila, Philippines, and the place which they
had chosen as the nerve center of all their rebellious activities in the different parts of the
Philippines, the said accused, conspiring, confederating and cooperating with each other, as
well as with the thirty-one (31) defendants charged in Criminal Cases Nos. 19071, 14082,
14270, 14315 and 14344 of the Court of First Instance of Manila (decided May 11, 1951) and
also with others whose whereabouts and identities are still unknown, the said accused and
their other co-conspirators, being then high ranking officers and/or members of, or otherwise
affiliated with the Communist Party of the Philippines (P.K.P.), which is now actively engaged
in an armed rebellion against the Government of the Philippines thru act theretofore
committed and planned to be further committed in Manila and other places in the Philippines,
and of which party the "Hukbong Mapagpalaya Ng Bayan"(H.M.B.) otherwise or formerly
known as the "Hukbalahaps" (Huks), unlawfully and did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously help, support, promote, maintain, cause, direct and/or command the
"Hukbong Mapagpalaya Ng Bayan" (H.M.B.) or the "Hukbalahaps" (Huks) to rise publicly and
take arms against the Republic of the Philippines, or otherwise participate in such armed
public uprising, for the purpose of removing the territory of the Philippines from the allegiance
to the government and laws thereof as in fact the said "Hukbong Mapagpalaya Ng Bayan" or
"Hukbalahaps" have risen publicly and taken arms to attain the said purpose by then and
there making armed raids, sorties and ambushes, attacks against police, constabulary and
army detachments as well as innocent civilians, and as a necessary means to commit the
crime of rebellion, in connection therewith and in furtherance thereof, have then and there
committed acts of murder, pillage, looting, plunder, arson, and planned destruction of private
and public property to create and spread chaos, disorder, terror, and fear so as to facilitate
the accomplishment of the aforesaid purpose, as. follows, to wit: (Enumeration of thirteen
attacks on government forces or civilians by Huks on May 6, 1946, August 6, 1946, April 10,
1947, May 9, 1947, August 19, 1947, June, 1946, April 28, 1949, August 25, 1950, August
26, 1950, August 25, 1950, September 12, 1950, March 28, 1950 and March 29, 1950.)

II. That during the period of time and under the same circumstances herein-above indicated
the said accused in the above-entitled case, conspiring among themselves and with several
others as aforesaid, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously organized, established, led and/or
maintained the Congress of Labor Organizations (CLO), formerly known as the Committee
on Labor Organizations (CLO), with central offices in Manila and chapters and affiliated or
associated labor unions and other "mass organizations" in different places in the Philippines,
as an active agency, organ, and instrumentality of the Communist Party of the Philippines
(P.K.P.) and as such agency, organ, and instrumentality, to fully cooperate in, and
synchronize its activities — as the CLO thus organized, established, led and/or maintained
by the herein accused and their co-conspirators, has in fact fully cooperated in and
synchronized its activities with the activities of the "Hukbong Mapagpalaya Ng Bayan"
 (H.M.B.) and other organs, agencies, and instrumentalities of the Communist Party of the
Philippines (P.K.P.), to thereby assure, facilitate, and effect the complete and permanent
success of the above-mentioned armed rebellion against the Government of the Philippines.

The information filed against the defendants in Criminal Case No. 15479, Bayani Espiritu Andres
Baisa, Jr. and Teopista Valerio, alleges:

That on or about the 6th day of May, 1946, and for sometime prior and subsequent thereto
and continuously up to the present time, in the City of Manila, the seat of the government of
the Republic of the Philippines, which the herein accused have intended to overthrow, and
the place chosen for that purpose as the nerve center of all their rebellious atrocities in the
different parts of the country, the said accused being then high ranking officials and/or
members of the Communist Party of the Philippines (P.K.P.) and/or of the "Hukbong
Mapagpalaya Ng Bayan" (H.M.B.) otherwise or formerly known as the "Hukbalahaps"
(HUKS), the latter being the armed forces of said Communist Party of the Philippines; having
come to an agreement with the 29 of the 31 accused in Criminal Cases Nos. 14071, 14082,
14270, 14315, 14344 of the Court of First Instance of Manila and decided to commit the
crime of rebellion, and therefore, conspiring and confederating with all of the 29 accused in
said criminal cases, acting in accordance with their conspiracy and in furtherance thereof,
together with many others whose whereabouts and identities are still unknown up to the filing
of this information, and helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously promote maintain, cause, direct and/or command the "Hukbong Mapagpalaya Ng
Bayan", (HMB) or the Hukbalahaps (HUKS) to rise publicly and take Arms against the
Government or otherwise participate therein for the purpose of overthrowing the same, as in
fact, the said "Hukbong Mapagpalaya Ng Bayan" or Hukbalahap (HUKS) have risen publicly
and taken arms against the Government, by then and there making armed raids, sorties and
ambushes, attacks against police, constabulary and army detachment, and as a necessary
means to commit the crime of rebellion, in connection therewith and in furtherance thereof,
by then and there committing wanton acts of murder, spoilage, looting, arson, kidnappings,
planned destruction of private and public buildings, to create and spread terrorism in order to
facilitate the accomplishment of the aforesaid purpose, as follows to wit: (Enumeration of
thirteen attacks on Government forces or civilians by Huks on May 6, 1946. August 6, 1946,
April 10, 1947, May 9, 1947, August 19, 1947, June 1946, April 28, 1949, August 25, 1950,
August 26, 1950, August 25, 1950, September 12, 1950, March 28, 1950 and March 29,
1950).

A joint trial of both cases was held, after which the court rendered the decision subject of the present
appeals.

APPEAL OF AMADO V. HERNANDEZ

After trial the Court of First Instance found, as against appellant Amado V. Hernandez, the following:
(1) that he is a member of the Communist Party of the Philippines and as such had aliases, namely,
Victor or Soliman; (2) that he was furnished copies of "Titis", a Communist publication, as well as
other publications of the Party; (3) that he held the position of President of the Congress of Labor
Organizations; (4) that he had close connections with the Secretariat of the Communist Party and
held continuous communications with its leaders and its members; (5) that he furnished a
mimeographing machine used by the Communist Party, as well as clothes and supplies for the
military operations of the Huks; (6) that he had contacted well-known Communists coming to the
Philippines and had gone abroad to the WFTU conference Brussels, Belgium as a delegate of the
CLO, etc. Evidence was also received by the court that Hernandez made various speeches
encouraging the people to join in the Huk movement in the provinces.
The court also found that there was a close tie-up between the Communist Party and the Congress
of Labor Organizations, of which Hernandez was the President, and that this Congress was
organized by Hernandez in conjunction with other Huks, namely: Alfredo Saulo, Mariano Balgos,
Guillermo Capadocia, etc.

We will now consider the nature and character of both the testimonial as well as the documentary
evidence, independently of each other, to find out if the said evidence supports the findings of the
court.

Testimonial Evidence

Amado V. Hernandez took the oath as member of the Communist Party in the month of October,
1947, at the offices of the Congress of Labor Organizations at 2070 Azcarraga in the presence of
Guillermo Capadocia, Ramon Espiritu, Pedro Castro, Andres Balsa, etc. As a Communist he was
given the pseudonyms of Victor and Soliman, and received copies of the Communist paper "Titis".
He made various speeches on the following dates and occasions:

(1) On August 29, 1948 before the Democratic Peace Rally of the CLO at Plaza Miranda, in
which he announced that the people will soon meet their dear comrade in the person of
Comrade Luis Taruc.

(2) On September 4, 1948 he conferred with Hindu Khomal Goufar at the Escolta, at which
occasion Balgos told Goufar that the PKM, CLO and the Huks are in one effort that the PKM
are the peasants in the field and the Huks are the armed forces of the Communist Party; and
the CLO falls under the TUD of the Communist Party. 1äwphï1.ñët

(3) On October 2, 1948 he went abroad to attend the Second Annual Convention of the
World Federation of Trade Unions and after arrival from abroad a dinner was given to him by
the people of Gagalangin, at which Hernandez delivered a speech and he said that he
preferred to go with the Huks because he felt safer with them than with the authorities of the
Government.

(4) In April, 1949, he made a speech before a group of tenants in Malabon attacking the
frauds in the 1947 elections, graft and corruption in the elections and that if improvement
cannot be made by the ballots, they could be made by bullets; and enjoined the people to go
to the hills and join Luis Taruc the head of the dissidents in the Philippines.

(5) On October 2, 1949 he delivered a speech on the occasion of the commemoration of the
World Peace at the CLO headquarters at 330 P. Campa. He attacked the city mayor and
incited the people to go to Balintawak and see Bonifacio there and thereafter join four
comrades under the leadership of Luis Taruc.

(6) On October 16, 1949 he delivered a speech before a convention of the unemployed at
330 P. Campa. He asked the unemployed to approve a resolution urging the Government to
give them jobs. In conclusion he said that if the Government fails to give them jobs the only
way out was to join the revolutionary forces fighting in the hills. He further said that Mao Tse
Tung, leader of the People's Army in China, drove Chiang Kai Shek from his country, and
that Luis Taruc was also being chased by Government forces run by puppets like Quirino,
etc.

(7) On January 13, 1950 there was another meeting at 330 P. Campa. In his talk Hernandez
expressed regret that two foremost leaders of the CLO, Balgos and Capadocia, had gone to
 the field to join the liberation army of the HMB, justifying their going out and becoming
heroes by fighting in the fields against Government forces until the ultimate goal is achieved.

The above evidence was testified to by Florentino Diolata who was the official photographer of the
CLO since August, 1948.

On the tie-up between the Communist Party and the CLO Guillermo Calayag, a Communist and a
Huk from 1942 to 1950, explained:

(1) The ultimate goal of the Communist Party is to overthrow the president government by
force of aims and violence; thru armed revolution and replace it with the so-called
dictatorship of the proletariat the Communist Party carries its program of armed overthrow of
the present government by organizing the HMB and other forms of organization's such as
the CLO, PKM, union organizations, and the professional and intellectual group; the CLO
was organized by the Trade Union Division TUD of the Communist Party.

(2) A good majority of the members of the Executive Committee and the Central Committee
of the CLO were also top ranking officials of the Communist Party; activities undertaken by
the TUD - the vital undertaking of the TUD is to see that the directives coming from the
organizational bureau of the Communist Party can be discussed within the CLO especially
the Executive Committee. And it is a fact that since a good majority of the members of the
Executive Committee are party members, there is no time, there is no single time that those
directives and decisions of the organizational department, thru the TUD are being objected to
by the Executive Committee of the CLO. These directives refer to how the CLO will conduct
its functions. The executive committee is under the chairmanship of accused Amado V.
Hernandez.

(3) The CLO played its role in the overall Communist program of armed overthrow of the
present government and its replacement by the dictatorship of the proletariat by means of
propaganda - by propagating the principles of Communism, by giving monetary aid, clothing,
medicine and other forms of material help to the HMB. This role is manifested in the very
constitution of the CLO itself which expounded the theory of classless society and the
eradication of social classes (par. 5, Sec. 1, Art. 2, page 18 of the CLO Constitution
contained in the Fourth Annual Convention Souvenir Program of the CLO Exh. "V-1579").
Thru propaganda, the CLO promoted the aims of Communist Party and disseminated
Communist ideas by:

(a) The conspicuous display of the portrait or, pictures of Crisanto Evangelista (Exh.
V-1662), founder of Communism in the Philippines, in the session hall of the CLO
headquarters at 2070 Azcarraga and then at 330 P. Campa;

(b) The distribution of foreign communist reading materials such as the World
Federation of Trade Union Magazine, International Union of Students magazine,
Voice magazine of the marine cooks of the CLO, World Committee of the Defenders
of the Peace magazine, Free Bulgaria magazine, Soviet Russia Today magazine and
World Federation of Democratic Youth magazine (Exhs. V-911, V-907, V-910, V-899,
V-912, V-853, W-996 and V-967);

(c) The publication and distribution of some local subversive publications such as the
"Titis", "Bisig", Kidlat", which are Communist Party organs; "The Philippine Labor
Demands Justice" and "Hands Off Korea" authored by accused Amado V.
Hernandez;
 (d) Principles of Communism were also propagated thru lectures, meetings, and by
means of organization of committees in the educational department as well as
researches in the Worker's Institute of the CLO.

(4) The CLO also helped carry out the program of the Communist Party thru infiltration of
party members and selected leaders of the HMB within the trade unions under the control of
the CLO. The Communist Party thru the CLO assigned Communist Party leaders and
organizers to different factories in order to organize unions. After the organization of the
union, it will affiliate itself with the CLO thru the Communist leaders and the CLO in turn, will
register said union with the Department of Labor; and the orientation and indoctrination of the
workers is continued in the line of class struggle. After this orientation and infiltration of the
Communist Party members and selected leaders of the HMB with the trade unions under the
control of the CLO is already achieved and the group made strong enough to carry out its
aims, they will begin the sporadic strikes and the liquidation of anti-labor elements and anti-
Communist elements and will create a so-called revolutionary crisis. That revolutionary crisis
will be done for the party to give directives to the HMB who are fighting in the countrysides
and made them come to the city gates. The entry of the HMB is being paved by the
simultaneous and sporadic strikes, by ultimate general strikes thru the management of the
CLO.

Important Documents Submitted at Trial

1. Documents which proved that Amado V. Hernandez used the aliases "Victor", or was
referred to as "Victor" or "Soliman".

(a) Letter dated April 23, 1950 (signed) by Victor addressed to Julie telling the latter
of his sympathies for other communists, describing his experiences with Communists
abroad, telling Julie to dispose of materials that may be sent by Victor. (Exh. D-2001-
2004)

(b) "Paano Maisasagawa, etc." — mentions different groups of labor unions of which
Victor heads one group, consisting of the MRRCO, PTLD, PGWU, EMWU and IRWU
(Exh. C-2001-2008) Cadres assigned to different industries. (Exh. V-40-41)

(c) Handwritten certificate of Honofre Mangila states that he knew Amado Hernandez
as Victor from co-party members Hugo and Ely. (Exh. LL)

(d) Letter of Elias to Ka Eto requesting the latter to deliver attached letter to Victor.
(Exh. 1103)

(e) Saulo's letter about his escape, asks Victor why his press statement was not
published in the newspapers. (Exh. C-362) Letter was however published by
Hernandez in the Daily Mirror.

(f) Letter of Taruc to Maclang directing the latter to give copy of Huk Story to Victor.
(Exh. D-463-64)

(g) Notes of Salome Cruz, Huk courier, stating that she went to Soliman at
Pampanga St. to bring to the latter communications from the Communist Party. (Exh.
D-1203) That Soliman was given copies of "Titis". (Exh. D-1209)
 (h) SEC directions to Politburo members, Soliman not to be involved with
Nacionalista Rebels. (Exh. F-92-93. SEC)

(i) Letter of SEC to Politburo reporting that Saulo be sent out and Soliman has
"tendencies of careerism and tendency to want to deal with leaders of the party"; that
he should be asked to choose to go underground or fight legally. (Exh. F-562)

(j) Explanation given by Hernandez why he did not join Saulo in going underground.
(Exh. V-87) (1) His election as councilor until December, 1951. (Exhs. V-42, W-9) (2)
His election as President of CLO until August of following year. (Exhs. V-42, W-9)

2. Letters and Messages of Hernandez.

(a) To Lyden Henry and Harry Reich, tells Huks still fighting. (Exh. V-80)

(b) To SOBSI Jakarta — that Filipinos are joining other communist countries of the
East. (Exh. V-82)

(c) Press release on Saulo's disappearance published by Amado Hernandez. (Exh.

W-116-120)

(d) To Hugh and Eddie, July 8, 1949 — Extends greetings to National Union of
Marine Cooks and Stewards, states that labor has one common struggle — "the
liberation of all the peoples from the chains of tyranny, fascism and imperialism".
(Exh. V-259)

(e) To Kas. Pablo and Estrada - talks of the fight - fight of labor. (Exh. V-85-89)

(f) Appeal to the Women and Asia. (Exh. V-5-10)

(g) Letter to Julie (Exh. V-2001-2004)

(h) Letter to Chan Lieu - states that leaders during the war are being persecuted, like
Taruc. Tells of reward of P100,000.00 on Taruc's head. (Exh. X-85-88)

(i) Letter to John Gates of the Daily Worker — condemns Wall Street maneuvers;
corruption and graft in Quirino administration, etc. (Exh. V-83)

(j) Cablegram: CLO join ILWU commends Harry Bridges, US Communist. (Exh. V-
79)

(k) Communication of Hernandez to CLO at MRRCO — Praises Balgos and

Capadocia for joining the Huks. (Exhs. V-12-22, V-289)

(l) "Philippine labor Demands Justice" — Attacks czars of Wall Street and U.S. Army
and Government. (Exh. V-94) .

(m) Letter to Taruc — June 28, 1948.-States solidarity among the CLO Huks and
PKM. Attacks North Atlantic Pact. Praises Mao Tse Tung (contained in Exh. V-94)
 (n) "Philippines Is Not A Paradise" — States of a delegation to Roxas attacking
unemployment. (Exh. V-90-93)

(o) Article "Progressive Philippines" — (Exh. V-287)

(p) Article "Hands Off Korea" — (Exhs. V-488-494, 495-501, 509-515, W-25-26)

(q) "Limang Buwang Balak Sa Pagpapalakas Ng Organisasyon". (Exh. X-35-38)

(r) Press statement of Hernandez — opposes acceptance of decorations from

Greece by Romulo. (Exh. V-72)

3. Other Activities of Hernandez.

(a) Hernandez received clothes from Pres. Lines thru P. Campa, which clothes he
sent to the field. Letters show of sending of supplies to Huks. (Exh. S-383)

(b) Hernandez was asked to furnish portable typewriter, which he did furnish to Huks.
(Exh. C-364)

(c) Hernandez brought Taruc's letter about facts and incidents about Huks to Bulosan
for inclusion in Bulosan's book. (Exh. FF-1)

(d) Had conference with Kumar Goshal a Hindu, about the Huks and their armed
forces. (Photographs, Exhs. X-6 RR-54-55A)

(e) Supervised taking of pictures of sons of Capadocia and Joven. (Photographs,

Exhs. T-1, RR-136-138A)

(f) Had knowledge of the going underground of Capadocia and Balgos and issued
press release about their going underground. (Exh. F-91)

(g) Victor mentioned to continue as contact for Chino. (Exh. C-362)

(h) Taruc's letter to Maclang shows that Soliman had sent 7 lessons to Taruc. (Exh.
D-451-451-A)

(i) Associated with fellow ranking Communist leaders.

The Court upon consideration of the evidence submitted, found (1) that the Communist Party was
fully organized as a party and in order to carry out its aims and policies a established a National
Congress, a Central Committee (CC), Politburo PB, Secretariat (SEC), Organization Bureau (OB),
and National Courier or Communication Division (NCD), each body performing functions indicated in
their respective names; (2) that in a meeting held on August 11, 1950 the SEC discussed the
creation of a Military Committee of the Party and a new GHQ, under which on September 29, 1950
the SEC organized a special warfare division, with a technological division; (3) that on May 5, 1950 a
body known as the National Intelligence Division was created, to gather essential military intelligence
and, in general, all information useful for the conduct of the armed struggle (4) that a National
Finance Committee was also organized as a part of the Politburo and answerable to it; (5) that the
country was divided into 10 Recos, the 10th Reco comprising the Manila and suburbs command; (6)
that since November, 1949 the CPP had declared the existence of a revolutionary situation and
since then the Party had gone underground and the CPP is leading the armed struggle for national
liberation, and called on the people to organize guerrillas and coordinate with the HMB on the
decisive struggle and final overthrow of the imperialist government; (7) that in accordance with such
plan the CPP prepared plans for expansion and development not only of the Party but also of the
HMB; the expansion of the cadres from 3,600 in July 1950 to 56,000 in September 1951, the HMB
from 10,800 in July 1950 to 172,000 in September 1951, et seq.

Around the month of January, 1950 it was decided by the CPP to intensify HMB military operations
for political purposes. The Politburo sanctioned the attacks made by the Huks on the anniversary of
the HMB on March 25, 1950. The HMB attacks that were reported to the PB were those made in
May, 1946; June, 1946; April 10, 1947; May 9, 1947; August 19, 1947; August 25, 1950; August 26,
1950; October 15 and 17, 1950; May 6, 1946; August 6, 1946; April 10, 1947; May 9, 1947; August
19, 1947; April 29, 1949; August 25, 1950; August 26, 1950; September 12, 1950; March 26, 1950;
March 29, 1950.

The theory of the prosecution, as stated in the lower court's decision, is as follows:

The evidence does not show that the defendants in these cases now before this Court had
taken a direct part in those raids and in the commission of the crimes that had been
committed. It is not, however, the theory of the prosecution that they in fact had direct
participation in the commission of the same but rather that the defendants in these cases
have cooperated, conspired and confederated with the Communist Party in the prosecution
and successful accomplishment of the aims and purposes of the said Party thru the
organization called the CLO (Congress of Labor Organizations).

The Court found that the CLO is independent and separate from the CPP, organized under the same
pattern as the CPP, having its own National Congress, a Central Committee (which acts in the
absence of and in representation of the National Congress), an Executive Committee (which acts
when the National Congress and the Executive Committee are not in session), and seven
permanent Committees, namely, of Organization, Unemployment and Public Relations, Different
Strikes and Pickets, Finance, Auditing, Legislation and Political Action. Members of the Communist
Party dominate the committees of the CLO. The supposed tie-up between CPP and the CLO of
which Hernandez was the President, is described by the court below in finding, thus:

Just how the CLO coordinates its functions with the Communist Party organ under which it operates
was explained by witness Guillermo S. Calayag, one-time ranking member of the Communist Party
and the CLO who typewrites the "Patnubay sa Education" from a handwritten draft of Capadocia,
which is one of the texts used in the Worker's institute of the CLO. According to him, the CLO plays
its role by means of propaganda, giving monetary aid, clothing, medicine and other material forms of
help to the HMB, which constitutes the armed forces of the Communist Party. Propaganda is done
by lectures, meetings, and the organization of committees of the educational department as well as
researches at the CLO Worker's Institute.

Another way of helping the Communist Party of the Philippines is by allowing the Communist
Party leaders to act as organizers in the different factories in forming a union. These Party
Members help workers in the factories to agitate for the eradication of social classes and
ultimately effect the total emancipation of the working classes thru the establishment of the
so-called dictatorship of the proletariat. It is the duty of these Communist Party members to
indoctrinate uninitiated workers in the union to become proselytes of the Communist Party
ideology. After the right number is secured and a union is formed under a communist leader,
this union is affiliated with the CLO and this in turn registers the same with the Department of
Labor. The orientation and indoctrination of the masses is continued with the help of the
 CLO. The primary objective of the CLO is to create what is called a revolutionary crisis. It
seeks to attain this objective by first making demands from the employers for concessions
which become more and more unreasonable until the employers would find it difficult to grant
the same. Then a strike is declared. But the strikes are only preparation for the ultimate
attainment of the Communist goal of armed overthrow of the government. After the workers
in the factories have already struck in general at the behest of the Communist Party thru the
CLO a critical point is reached when a signal is given for the armed forces of the Communist
Party, the HMB, to intervene and carry the revolution now being conducted outside to within
the city.

On the basis of the above findings, the court below found Hernandez guilty as principal of the crime
charged against him and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with the
accessories provided by law, and to pay the proportionate amount of the costs.

Our study of the testimonial and documentary evidence, especially those cited by the Court in its
decision and by the Solicitor General in his brief, discloses that defendant-appellant Amado V.
Hernandez, as a Communist, was an active advocate of the principles of Communism, frequently
exhorting his hearers to follow the footsteps of Taruc and join the uprising of the laboring classes
against capitalism and more specifically against America and the Quirino administration, which he
dubbed as a regime of puppets of American imperialism. But beyond the open advocacy of
Communistic Theory there appears no evidence that he actually participated in the actual conspiracy
to overthrow by force the constituted authority.

Hernandez is the founder and head of the CLO. As such, what was his relation to the rebellion? If,
as testified to by Guillermo S. Calayag, the CLO plays merely the role of propagation by lectures,
meetings and organization of committees of education by Communists; if, as stated, the CLO merely
allowed Communist Party leaders to act as organizers in the different factories, to indoctrinate the
CLO members into the Communist Party and proselytize them to the Communist ideology; if, as also
indicated by Calayag, the CLO purports to attain the ultimate overthrow of the Government first by
making demands from employers for concessions until the employers find it difficult to grant the
same, at which time a strike is declared; if it is only after the various strikes have been carried out
and a crisis is thereby developed among the laboring class, that the Communist forces would
intervene and carry the revolution — it is apparent that the CLO was merely a stepping stone in the
preparation of the laborers for the Communist' ultimate revolution. In other words, the CLO had no
function but that of indoctrination and preparation of the members for the uprising that would come. It
was only a preparatory organization prior to revolution, not the revolution itself. The leader of the
CLO therefore, namely Hernandez, cannot be considered as a leader in actual rebellion or of the
actual uprising subject of the accusation. Hernandez, as President of the CLO therefore, by his
presidency and leadership of the CLO cannot be considered as having actually risen up in arms in
rebellion against the Government of the Philippines, or taken part in the conspiracy to commit the
rebellion as charged against him in the present case; he was merely a propagandist and
indoctrinator of Communism, he was not a Communist conspiring to commit the actual rebellion by
the mere fact of his presidency of the CLO.

The court below declares that since November 1949 the Communist Party of the Philippines had
declared the existence of the revolutionary situation and since then the Party had gone underground,
with the CPP leading the struggle for national integration and that in the month of January 1950, it
was decided by the said Party to intensify the HMB military operations for political purposes. The
court implicates the appellant Hernandez as a co-conspirator in this resolution or acts of the
Communist Party by his mere membership thereto. We find this conclusion unwarranted. The
seditious speeches of Hernandez took place before November, 1949 when the CPP went
underground. The court below has not been able to point out, nor have We been able to find among
all acts attributed to Hernandez, any single fact or act of his from which it may be inferred that he
took part in the deliberations declaring the existence of a revolutionary situation, or that he had gone
underground. As a matter of fact the prosecution's evidence is to the effect that Hernandez refused
to go underground preferring to engage in what they consider the legal battle for the cause.

We have also looked into the different documents which have been presented at the time of the trial
and which were confiscated from the office of the Politburo of the Communist Party. The speeches
of Hernandez were delivered before the declaration by the Communist Party of a state of
revolutionary situation in 1949. Neither was it shown that Hernandez was a member of the Executive
Committee, or of the SEC, or of the Politburo of the Communist Party; so NO presumption can arise
that he had taken part in the accord or conspiracy declaring a revolution. In short, there has been no
evidence, direct or indirect, to relate or connect the appellant Hernandez with the uprising or the
resolution to continue or maintain said uprising, his participation in the deliberations leading to the
uprising being inferred only from the fact that he was a communist.

The practice among the top Communists, as declared by the trial court appears to have been for
important members, if they intend actually to join the rebellion, to go underground, which meant
leaving the city, disappearing from sight and/or secretly joining the forces in the field.

The document, Exhibit F-562, which is quoted in the decision, contains the directive of the SEC of
September 1, 1950, to Saulo and Hernandez, which reads:

11. In view of the new developments in the city, send out Elias who prefers to work outside.
Present problem of fighting legally to Com. Soliman. If Soliman is prepared for martyrdom,
retain him to fight legally. If not, send him out with Elias. Same goes with Com. Mino and
other relatively exposed mass leaders.

And the lower court itself found that whereas Saulo went underground and joined the underground
forces outside the City, Hernandez remained in the City, engaged in the work of propaganda,
making speeches and causing the publication of such matters as the Communist Party leaders
directed him to publish.

That Hernandez refused to go underground is a fact which is further corroborated by the following
reasons (excuses) given by him for not going underground, namely (1) that his term of councilor of
the City of Manila was to extend to December, 1951; and (2) that he was elected President of the
CLO for a term which was to end the year 1951.

As a matter of fact the SEC gave instructions to Hernandez not to be involved with Nacionalista
Rebels, and reported to the Politburo that Hernandez "has tendencies of careerism, and tending to
want to deal with leaders of the Nacionalista Party instead of following CPP organizational
procedures."

The court below further found that Hernandez had been furnishing supplies for the Huks in the field.
But the very document dated December 3, 1949, Exhibit D-420422, cited in the decision (printed, p.
49), is to the effect that clothes and shoes that Hernandez was supposed to have sent have not
been received. It is true that some clothes had been sent thru him to the field, but these clothes had
come from a crew member of a ship of the American President Lines. He also, upon request, sent a
portable typewriter to the SEC or Politburo. Furthermore, a certain Niagara Duplicating machine
received by Hernandez from one Rolland Scott Bullard a crew member of the SS President
Cleveland, appease later to have been forwarded by him to the officers of the SEC or the Politburo.

Lastly, it further appears that Taruc and other CPP leaders used to send notes to appellant
Hernandez, who in turn issued press releases for which he found space in the local papers. His acts
in this respect belong to the category of propaganda, to which he appears to have limited his actions
as a Communist.

The acts of the appellant as thus explained and analyzed fall under the category of acts of
propaganda, but do not prove that he actually and in fact conspired with the leaders of the
Communist Party in the uprising or in the actual rebellion, for which acts he is charged in the
information. And his refusal to go underground because of his political commitments occasioned by
his term of election as president of the CLO and the impressions caused by his acts on the
Communist leaders, to the effect that he was in direct communication or understanding with the
Nacionalista Party to which he was affiliated, creates in Us the reasonable doubt that it was not his
Communistic leanings but his political ambitions, that motivated his speeches sympathizing with the
Huks. For which reason We hold that the evidence submitted fails to prove beyond reasonable doubt
that he has conspired in the instigation of the rebellion for which he is held to account in this criminal
case.

The question that next comes up for resolution is: Does his or anyone's membership in the
Communist Party per se render Hernandez or any Communist guilty of conspiracy to commit
rebellion under the provisions of Article 136 of the Revised Penal Code? The pertinent provision
reads:

ART. 136. Conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion or insurrection. — The conspiracy
and proposal to commit rebellion or insurrection shall be punished, respectively, by prision
correccional in its maximum period and a fine which shall not exceed 5,000 pesos, and
by prision correccional in its medium period and a fine not exceeding 2,000 pesos.

The advocacy of Communism or Communistic theory and principle is not to be considered as a

criminal act of conspiracy unless transformed or converted into an advocacy of action. In the very
nature of things, mere advocacy of a theory or principle is insufficient unless the communist
advocates action, immediate and positive, the actual agreement to start an uprising or rebellion or an
agreement forged to use force and violence in an uprising of the working class to overthrow
constituted authority and seize the reins of Government itself. Unless action is actually advocated or
intended or contemplated, the Communist is a mere theorist, merely holding belief in the supremacy
of the proletariat a Communist does not yet advocate the seizing of the reins of Government by it. As
a theorist the Communist is not yet actually considered as engaging in the criminal field subject to
punishment. Only when the Communist advocates action and actual uprising, war or otherwise, does
he become guilty of conspiracy to commit rebellion. Borrowing the language of the Supreme Court of
the United States:

In our jurisprudence guilt is personal, and when the imposition of punishment on a status or
on conduct can only be justified by reference to the relationship of that status or conduct to
other concededly criminal activity (here advocacy of violent overthrow), that relationship must
be sufficiently substantial to satisfy the concept of personal guilt in order to withstand attack
under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Membership, without more, in an
organization engaged in illegal advocacy, it is now said, has not heretofore been recognized
by this Court to be such a relationship. ... .

What must be met, then, is the argument that membership, even when accompanied by the
elements of knowledge and specific intent, affords an insufficient quantum of participation in
the organization's alleged criminal activity, that is, an insufficiently significant form of aid and
encouragement to permit the imposition of criminal sanctions on that basis. It must indeed be
recognized that a person who merely becomes a member of an illegal organization, by that
"act" alone need be doing nothing more than signifying his assent to its purposes and
 activities on one hand, and providing, on the other, only the sort of moral encouragement
which comes from the knowledge that others believe in what the organization is doing. It may
indeed be argued that such assent and encouragement do fall short of the concrete, practical
impetus given to a criminal enterprise which is lent for instance by a commitment on the part
of the conspirator to act in furtherance of that enterprise. A member, as distinguished from a
conspirator, may indicate his approval of a criminal enterprise by the very fact of his
membership without thereby necessarily committing himself to further it by any act or course
of conduct whatever. (Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 6 L. ed. 782)

The most important activity of appellant Hernandez appears to be the propagation of improvement of
conditions of labor through his organization, the CLO. While the CLO of which he is the founder and
active president, has communistic tendencies, its activity refers to the strengthening of the unity and
cooperation between labor elements and preparing them for struggle; they are not yet indoctrinated
in the need of an actual war with or against Capitalism. The appellant was a politician and a labor
leader and it is not unreasonable to suspect that his labor activities especially in connection with the
CLO and other trade unions, were impelled and fostered by the desire to secure the labor vote to
support his political ambitions. It is doubtful whether his desire to foster the labor union of which he
was the head was impelled by an actual desire to advance the cause of Communism, not merely to
advance his political aspirations.

Insofar as the appellant's alleged activities as a Communist are concerned, We have not found, nor
has any particular act on his part been pointed to Us, which would indicate that he had advocated
action or the use of force in securing the ends of Communism. True it is, he had friends among the
leaders of the Communist Party, and especially the heads of the rebellion, but this notwithstanding,
evidence is wanting to show that he ever attended their meetings, or collaborated and conspired with
said leaders in planning and encouraging the acts of rebellion, or advancing the cause thereof.
Insofar as the furnishing of the mimeograph machine and clothes is concerned, it appears that he
acted merely as an intermediary, who passed said machine and clothes on to others. It does not
appear that he himself furnished funds or material help of his own to the members of the rebellion or
to the forces of the rebellion in the field.

But the very act or conduct of his in refusing to go underground, in spite of the apparent desire of the
chief of the rebellion, is clear proof of his non-participation in the conspiracy to engage in or to foster
the rebellion or the uprising.

We next consider the question as to whether the fact that Hernandez delivered speeches of
propaganda in favor of Communism and in favor of rebellion can be considered as a criminal act of
conspiracy to commit rebellion as defined in the law. In this respect, the mere fact of his giving and
rendering speeches favoring Communism would not make him guilty of conspiracy, because there
was no evidence that the hearers of his speeches of propaganda then and there agreed to rise up in
arms for the purpose of obtaining the overthrow of the democratic government as envisaged by the
principles of Communism. To this effect is the following comment of Viada:

CUESTION 10. El que hace propaganda entre sus convecinos, induciendoles a que el dia
que se anunciara la subasta de consumes se echaran a la calle para conseguir aunque
fuera preciso acudir a la fuerza el reparto entre los vecinos ricos solamente, sera
responsable de un delito de conspiracion para la sedicion? — El Tribunal Supreme ha
resuelto la negative al casar cierta sentencia de la Audiencia de Valencia, que entendio lo
contrario: "Considerando que, con areglo a lo que dispone el art. 4. del Codigo Penal, hay
conspiracion cuando dos o mas personas se conciertan para la execution de un delito y
resuelven cmeterlo; y no constando que existiera ese concierto en cuanto a los hechos que
se refieren en la tercera pregunta del veredicto, pues en ella solo se habla de los actos de
 induccion que el procesado realizo, sin expresar el efecto que la mismo produjo en el animo
de las personas a quienes se dirigian, ni si estas aceptaron o no lo que se las propuso,
resulta evidence que faltan los clementos integrantes de la conspiracion, etc." (Se. de 5 de
Julio de 1907, Gaceta de 7 de Enero de 1909.) (Viada, Tomo I, Codigo Penal, p. 152)

In view of all the above circumstances We find that there is no concrete evidence proving beyond
reasonable doubt that the appellant (Hernandez) actually participated in the rebellion or in any act of
conspiracy to commit or foster the cause of the rebellion. We are constrained, in view of these
circumstances, to absolve, as We hereby absolve, the appellant Amado V. Hernandez from the
crime charged, with a proportionate share of the costs de oficio.

APPEAL OF OTHER DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS

All the other defendants were found guilty as accomplices in the crime of rebellion as charged in the
information and were each sentenced to suffer the penalty of 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor,
with the accessories provided by law, and to pay their proportionate share of the costs.

Legal Considerations. — Before proceeding to consider the appeals of the other defendants, it is
believed useful if not necessary to lay dawn the circumstances or facts that may be determinative of
their criminal responsibility or the existence or nature thereof. To begin with, as We have
exhaustively discussed in relation to the appeal of Hernandez, we do not believe that mere
membership in the Communist Party or in the CLO renders the member liable, either of rebellion or
of conspiracy to commit rebellion, because mere membership and nothing more merely implies
advocacy of abstract theory or principle without any action being induced thereby; and that such
advocacy becomes criminal only if it is coupled with action or advocacy of action, namely, actual
rebellion or conspiracy to commit rebellion, or acts conducive thereto or evincing the same.

On the other hand, membership in the HMB (Hukbalahap) implies participation in an actual uprising
or rebellion to secure, as the Huks pretend, the liberation of the peasants and laboring class from
thraldom. By membership in the HMB, one already advocates uprising and the use of force, and by
such membership he agrees or conspires that force be used to secure the ends of the party. Such
membership, therefore, even if there is nothing more, renders the member guilty of conspiracy to
commit rebellion punishable by law.

And when a Huk member, not content with his membership, does anything to promote the ends of
the rebellion like soliciting contributions, or acting as courier, he thereby becomes guilty of
conspiracy, unless he takes to the field and joins in the rebellion or uprising, in which latter case he
commits rebellion.

In U.S. v. Vergara, infra, the defendants organized a secret society commonly known as the
"Katipunan", the purpose of which was to overthrow the government by force. Each of the
defendants on various times solicited funds from the people of Mexico, Pampanga. The Court held
that the defendants were guilty of conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion or insurrection and
not of rebellion or insurrection itself. Thus, the Court ruled that:

From the evidence adduced in this case we are of the opinion that the said defendants are
guilty, not of inciting, setting or foot, or assisting or engaging in rebellion, but rather of the
crime of conspiring to overthrow, put down, and destroy by force the Government of the
United States in the Philippine Islands, and therefore we find that said defendants, and each
of them, did, together with others, in the months of February and March, 1903, in the
Province of Pampanga, Philippine Islands, conspire to overthrow, put down, and to destroy
 by force the Government of the United States in the Philippine Islands. (U.S. v. Vergara, et
al., 3 Phil. 432, 434.)

JUAN J. CRUZ

The court found him to be a Communist with various aliases, a member of the Central Committee of
the CLO member of the Central Committee of the CPP and as such committed to the establishment
of the dictatorship of the proletariat To the same effect is the testimony of Guillermo Calayag.

There is no evidence to connect him with the rebellion or to the conspiracy to commit rebellion. He
should therefore be absolved of the charges contained in the information.

AMADO RACANDAY

The trial court found him guilty as a Communist, a Secretary and Executive Committee member of
the CLO a communications center of the Communist Party, having been found in possession of
letters from Federico Maclang to Salome Cruz, and solicitor of contributions for the Huks.

Racanday admits being a member of the Executive Committee of the CLO Editor of the Kidlat of the
Government Workers Union, receiving copies of the Titis. Calayag testified that he was a member of
the Central Committee of the Communist Party entrusted with the duty of receiving directives of the
Regional Committee of the Communist Party.

The letters found in his possession are dated February 14, 1950, before the Communist Party went
underground. We have been unable to find the evidence upon which the court bases its conclusion
that he received contributions for the Huks. With these circumstances in mind, We are not convinced
beyond reasonable doubt that as a Communist he took part in the conspiracy among the officials of
the Communist Party to take part and support the rebellion of the Huks.

We are, therefore, constrained to absolve him of the charges filed against him.

GENARO DE LA CRUZ

The court found him to be a Communist since 1945, an officer of an organized Communist branch in
Pasay City, a member of the Central Committee and Treasurer of the CLO. He admitted his
membership and his position as member of the executive committee and treasurer of the CLO these
facts being corroborated by the witness Guillermo Calayag.

His membership in the Communist Party dates as far back as the year 1945. As a communist,
Genaro de la Cruz received quotas and monetary contributions coming from the areas under his
jurisdiction, and one time he made a receipt from a member from Caloocan at the CLO headquarters
at Azcarraga signing the receipt as "Gonzalo" which is one of his aliases. He also distributed copies
of the "Titis" magazine. `

While his membership in the Communist Party plus his having received contributions for the party
indicate that he is an active member, it was not shown that the contributions that he received from
Communist Party members were received around the year 1950 when the Central Committee of the
Communist Party had already agreed to conspire and go underground and support the Huk
rebellion. Under these circumstances We cannot find him guilty of conspiracy to commit rebellion
because of the lack of evidence to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
JULIAN LUMANOG

The court found him to be an organizer of HMB among the mill workers, solicited contributions for
the HMB and Central Committee member of the CLO as per Testimony of Guillermo Calayag.

He admitted that he joined the Communist Party because he was made to believe that the Party is
for the welfare of the laborers. He also admitted being a member of the Central Committee of the
CLO Calayag testified that Lumanog organized the HMB units of the Communist Party in the Lumber
Unions and attended a Communist meeting held by Maclang.

Domingo Clarin testified that he (Julian Lumanog) used to give the money collected by him to one
Nicasio Pamintuan, one of the members of the HMB Special Unit Trigger Squad) in Manila for the
use of the said unit.

Considering that the HMB was engaged in a rebellion to overthrow the government, it is evident that
by giving his contributions he actually participated in the conspiracy to overthrow the government
and should, therefore, be held liable for such conspiracy, and should be sentenced accordingly.

FERMIN RODILLAS

The trial court found that Fermin Rodillas was a member of the CPP and the CLO that his activities
consisted in soliciting contributions, in cash and in kind, from city residents for the use of the HMB,
turning over said collections to the Party; that he has given asylum to a wanted Hukbalahap at his
house at Juan Luna St., Gagalangin, which house was used as Military post. The above findings of
the court are fully supported by the testimony of Domingo Clarin.

Considering that while he has not actually taken part in the rebellion, he has shown sympathy with
the cause by soliciting contributions for it and had given shelter to the Huks. We feel that the court
was fully justified in finding him guilty, but We hold that he should be declared liable merely as a co-
conspirator in the crime of conspiracy to commit rebellion, and should be sentenced accordingly.

BAYANI ESPIRITU

This appellant was found by the court to be a Communist, he having admitted membership in the
Communist Party since 1945; that his duties as a Communist was to help in the office of the National
Finance Committee, assorting papers and written documents; that sometimes he accompanied the
purchaser of medicines, shoes, papers, foodstuffs and clothing to be given to the Huks; that he is a
member of the Communication Division of the CPP in Manila, in charge of distribution of letters or
communications; that he admits having written to Salome Cruz, courier of the Communist Party,
when he asked for his necessities, such as money and shoes, etc.

The facts found by the court are sufficiently supported by the communications and evidence
submitted by the prosecution. The exhibits show that he was in constant communication with the
communists; serving them as courier. His oath as a member of the Communist Party was submitted
in court and in it he admits obedience to all orders of the Party and to propagate the stability of the
PKP.

Considering that the PKP was engaged in an actual uprising against the constituted Government
and that Bayani Espiritu was in constant communication with the Communist Party and served it as
courier, We believe that the court was fully justified in finding him guilty. However, We believe that
not having actually taken up arms in the uprising he may only be declared guilty of conspiracy to
commit rebellion.

TEOPISTA VALERIO

The court below found that this appellant joined the Communists in 1938 in San Luis, Pampanga,
under Casto Alejandrino, who later became her common-law husband; that her aliases are "Estrella"
and "Star"; that she was found in possession of various documents written to top Communists like
Alejandrino, Lava and Romy, as well as a letter from Taruc congratulating her for the delivers, of a
son.

Jose Taguiang testified that she was a member of the Provincial Committee of the CPP in Nueva
Ecija, later Chairman of the Finance Department, and then promoted to Finance Officer of the
Central Luzon Committee. Alicia Vergara, a Huk courier, testified that she delivered letter from the
mountains to Teopista Valerie, who was in turn also a courier.

Without considering the close relationship that she had with top Communist Casto Alejandrino, We
are satisfied that she herself was, aside from being a Huk courier, also a Huk, a member of the HMB
from 1942 to 1951. As she was a Communist and at the same time a member of the HMB, and
considering that the HMB was engaged in an uprising to uproot the legitimate government, there
cannot be any question that she was in conspiracy with the other members of her Party against the
constituted government. We hold, therefore, that the evidence proves beyond reasonable doubt that
she is guilty of conspiracy to commit rebellion.

DEFENDANTS NOT INCLUDED IN DECISION

In Crim. Case No. 15841 (G.R. No. L-6025) the charge against Guillermo Capadocia, Mariano P.
Balgos, Alfredo B. Saulo and Jacobo Espino was dismissed because they have not been
apprehended at the time of the trial.

PEOPLE VS. EVANGELISTA, 57 PHIL. 354 AND

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 1700, DISTINGUISHED

In the case at bar the prosecution is for actual rebellion which consists in rising publicly and taking
aims against the Government for the purpose of removing from the allegiance to said Government or
its laws, the territory of the Philippines, or any part thereof, etc., a crime defined in Article 134 of the
Revised Penal Code; whereas Evangelista was charged and convicted for inciting to rebellion under
Art. 138, Revised Penal Code (formerly Sec. 2, Act No. 292). As the specific charge against
appellants is that of rising up in arms in actual rebellion against the Government, they cannot be held
guilty of inciting the people to arms under Article 138, which is a different offense.

On the other hand, Rep. Act 1700, known as the Anti-subversion Act, which penalizes membership
in any organization or association committed to subvert the Government, cannot be applied to the
appellants because said Act was approved on June 20, 1957 and was not in force at the time of the
commission of the acts charged against appellants (committed 1945-1950) ; the Anti-Subversion Act
punishes participation or membership in an organization committed to overthrow the duly constituted
Government, a crime district from that of actual rebellion with which appellants are charged.

CONCLUSION
WHEREFORE, in Criminal Case No. 15841 (G.R. No. L-6025) defendants-appellants Amado V.
Hernandez, Juan J. Cruz, Amado Racanday and Genaro de la Cruz are absolved from the charges
contained in the information, with their proportionate share of the costs de oficio. The defendants-
appellants Julian Lumanog and Fermin Rodillas in Criminal Case No. 15841 (G.R. No. L-6025) and
the defendants-appellants Bayani Espiritu and Teopista Valerio in Criminal Case No. 15479 (G.R.
No. L-6026) are hereby found guilty of the crime of conspiracy to commit rebellion, as defined and
punished in Article 136 of the Revised Penal Code, and each and everyone of them is hereby
sentenced to suffer imprisonment for five years, four months and twenty-one days of prision
correccional, and to pay a fine of P5,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and
to pay their proportional share of the costs. So ordered.

DIRECT ASSAULT

G.R. No. 173150 July 28, 2010

LYDIA C. GELIG, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

An examination of the entire records of a case may be explored for the purpose of arriving at a
correct conclusion, as an appeal in criminal cases throws the whole case open for review, it being
the duty of the court to correct such error as may be found in the judgment appealed from.1

Petitioner Lydia Gelig (Lydia) impugns the Decision2 promulgated on January 10, 2006 by the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 27488 that vacated and set aside the Decision3 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Cebu City, Branch 23, in Criminal Case No. CU-10314. The RTC Decision
convicted Lydia for committing the complex crime of direct assault with unintentional abortion but the
CA found her guilty only of the crime of slight physical injuries.

Factual Antecedents

On June 6, 1982, an Information4 was filed charging Lydia with Direct Assault with Unintentional
Abortion committed as follows:

That on the 17th day of July, 1981 at around 10:00 o’clock in the morning, at Barangay Nailon,
Municipality of Bogo, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously assault,
attack, employ force and seriously intimidate one Gemma B. Micarsos a public classroom teacher of
Nailon Elementary School while in the performance of official duties and functions as such which
acts consequently caused the unintentional abortion upon the person of the said Gemma S.
Micarsos.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Lydia pleaded not guilty during her arraignment. Thereafter, trial ensued.

The Prosecution’s Version

Lydia and private complainant Gemma B. Micarsos (Gemma), were public school teachers at the
Nailon Elementary School, in Nailon, Bogo, Cebu. Lydia’s son, Roseller, was a student of Gemma at
the time material to this case.

On July 17, 1981, at around 10:00 o’clock in the morning, Lydia confronted Gemma after learning
from Roseller that Gemma called him a "sissy" while in class. Lydia slapped Gemma in the cheek
and pushed her, thereby causing her to fall and hit a wall divider. As a result of Lydia’s violent
assault, Gemma suffered a contusion in her "maxillary area", as shown by a medical
certificate5 issued by a doctor in the Bogo General Hospital. However, Gemma continued to
experience abdominal pains and started bleeding two days after the incident. On August 28, 1981,
she was admitted in the Southern Islands Hospital and was diagnosed, to her surprise, to have
suffered incomplete abortion. Accordingly, a medical certificate6 was issued.

The Defense’s Version

Lydia claimed that she approached Gemma only to tell her to refrain from calling her son names, so
that his classmates will not follow suit. However, Gemma proceeded to attack her by holding her
hands and kicking her. She was therefore forced to retaliate by pushing Gemma against the wall.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

On October 11, 2002, the trial court rendered a Decision convicting Lydia of the complex crime of
direct assault with unintentional abortion. The dispositive portion reads:

WHEREFORE, the court finds the accused LYDIA GELIG, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of direct assault with unintentional abortion, and she is hereby sentenced to suffer an
Indeterminate Penalty of SIX (6) MONTHS OF ARRESTO MAYOR AS MINIMUM TO FOUR (4)
YEARS, TWO (2) MONTHS OF PRISION CORRECCIONAL AS MAXIMUM. She is likewise ordered
to pay the offended party the amount of Ten Thousand (₱10,000.00) Pesos as actual damages and
Fifteen Thousand (₱15,000.00) Pesos for moral damages.

SO ORDERED.7

Thus, Lydia filed an appeal.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The CA vacated the trial court’s judgment. It ruled that Lydia cannot be held liable for direct assault
since Gemma descended from being a person in authority to a private individual when, instead of
pacifying Lydia or informing the principal of the matter, she engaged in a fight with Lydia.8 Likewise,
Lydia’s purpose was not to defy the authorities but to confront Gemma on the alleged name-calling
of her son.9

The appellate court also ruled that Lydia cannot be held liable for unintentional abortion since there
was no evidence that she was aware of Gemma’s pregnancy at the time of the incident.10 However,
it declared that Lydia can be held guilty of slight physical injuries, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed Decision of the Regional Trial Court-Branch 23
of Cebu City, dated October 11, 2002 is hereby VACATED AND SET ASIDE. A new one is entered
CONVICTING the accused-appellant for slight physical injuries pursuant to Article 266 (1) of the
Revised Penal Code and sentencing her to suffer the penalty of arresto menor minimum of ten (10)
days.

SO ORDERED.11

Issues

Still dissatisfied, Lydia filed this petition raising the following as errors:

1. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in finding that the petitioner is liable for Slight
Physical Injuries pursuant to Article 266 (1) of the Revised Penal Code and sentencing her to
suffer the penalty of arrestomenor minimum of ten days.

2. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in finding that the petitioner can be convicted of
Slight Physical Injuries under the information charging her for Direct Assault with
Unintentional Abortion.12

Our Ruling

The petition lacks merit.

When an accused appeals from the judgment of his conviction, he waives his constitutional
guarantee against double jeopardy and throws the entire case open for appellate review. We are
then called upon to render such judgment as law and justice dictate in the exercise of our
concomitant authority to review and sift through the whole case to correct any error, even if
unassigned.13

The Information charged Lydia with committing the complex crime of direct assault with unintentional
abortion. Direct assault is defined and penalized under Article 148 of the Revised Penal Code. The
provision reads as follows:

Art. 148. Direct assaults. - Any person or persons who, without a public uprising, shall employ force
or intimidation for the attainment of any of the purposes enumerated in defining the crimes of
rebellion and sedition, or shall attack, employ force, or seriously intimidate or resist any person in
authority or any of his agents, while engaged in the performance of official duties, or on occasion of
such performance, shall suffer the penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum
periods and a fine not exceeding 1,000 pesos, when the assault is committed with a weapon or
when the offender is a public officer or employee, or when the offender lays hands upon a person in
authority. If none of these circumstances be present, the penalty of prision correccional in its
minimum period and a fine not exceeding 500 pesos shall be imposed. 1avvphi1

It is clear from the foregoing provision that direct assault is an offense against public order that may
be committed in two ways: first, by any person or persons who, without a public uprising, shall
employ force or intimidation for the attainment of any of the purposes enumerated in defining the
crimes of rebellion and sedition; and second, by any person or persons who, without a public
uprising, shall attack, employ force, or seriously intimidate or resist any person in authority or any of
his agents, while engaged in the performance of official duties, or on occasion of such
performance.14

The case of Lydia falls under the second mode, which is the more common form of assault. Its
elements are:
 1. That the offender (a) makes an attack, (b) employs force, (c) makes a serious intimidation,
or (d) makes a serious resistance.

2. That the person assaulted is a person in authority or his agent.

3. That at the time of the assault the person in authority or his agent (a) is engaged in the
actual performance of official duties, or [b] that he is assaulted by reason of the past
performance of official duties.

4. That the offender knows that the one he is assaulting is a person in authority or his agent
in the exercise of his duties.

4. That there is no public uprising.15

On the day of the commission of the assault, Gemma was engaged in the performance of her official
duties, that is, she was busy with paperwork while supervising and looking after the needs of pupils
who are taking their recess in the classroom to which she was assigned. Lydia was already angry
when she entered the classroom and accused Gemma of calling her son a "sissy". Lydia refused to
be pacified despite the efforts of Gemma and instead initiated a verbal abuse that enraged the
victim. Gemma then proceeded towards the principal’s office but Lydia followed and resorted to the
use of force by slapping and pushing her against a wall divider. The violent act resulted in Gemma’s
fall to the floor.

Gemma being a public school teacher, belongs to the class of persons in authority expressly
mentioned in Article 152 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. The pertinent portion of the
provision reads as follows:

Art. 152. Persons in Authority and Agents of Persons in Authority – Who shall be deemed as such. –

xxxx

In applying the provisions of articles 148 and 151 of this Code, teachers, professors, and persons
charged with the supervision of public or duly recognized private schools, colleges and universities,
and lawyers in the actual performance of their professional duties or on the occasion of such
performance shall be deemed persons in authority. (As amended by Batas Pambansa Bilang 873,
approved June 12, 1985).16

Undoubtedly, the prosecution adduced evidence to establish beyond reasonable doubt the
commission of the crime of direct assault. The appellate court must be consequently overruled in
setting aside the trial court’s verdict. It erred in declaring that Lydia could not be held guilty of direct
assault since Gemma was no longer a person in authority at the time of the assault because she
allegedly descended to the level of a private person by fighting with Lydia. The fact remains that at
the moment Lydia initiated her tirades, Gemma was busy attending to her official functions as a
teacher. She tried to pacify Lydia by offering her a seat so that they could talk properly,17 but Lydia
refused and instead unleashed a barrage of verbal invectives. When Lydia continued with her
abusive behavior, Gemma merely retaliated in kind as would a similarly situated person. Lydia
aggravated the situation by slapping Gemma and violently pushing her against a wall divider while
she was going to the principal’s office. No fault could therefore be attributed to Gemma.

The prosecution’s success in proving that Lydia committed the crime of direct assault does not
necessarily mean that the same physical force she employed on Gemma also resulted in the crime
of unintentional abortion. There is no evidence on record to prove that the slapping and pushing of
Gemma by Lydia that occurred on July 17, 1981 was the proximate cause of the abortion. While the
medical certificate of Gemma’s attending physician, Dr. Susan Jaca (Dr. Jaca), was presented to the
court to prove that she suffered an abortion, there is no data in the document to prove that her
medical condition was a direct consequence of the July 17, 1981 incident.18 It was therefore vital for
the prosecution to present Dr. Jaca since she was competent to establish a link, if any, between
Lydia’s assault and Gemma’s abortion. Without her testimony, there is no way to ascertain the exact
effect of the assault on Gemma’s abortion.

It is worth stressing that Gemma was admitted and confined in a hospital for incomplete abortion on
August 28, 1981, which was 42 days after the July 17, 1981 incident. This interval of time is too
lengthy to prove that the discharge of the fetus from the womb of Gemma was a direct outcome of
the assault. Her bleeding and abdominal pain two days after the said incident were not substantiated
by proof other than her testimony. Thus, it is not unlikely that the abortion may have been the result
of other factors.

The Proper Penalty

Having established the guilt of the petitioner beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of direct assault,
she must suffer the penalty imposed by law. The penalty for this crime is prision correccional in its
medium and maximum periods and a fine not exceeding ₱1,000.00, when the offender is a public
officer or employee, or when the offender lays hands upon a person in authority.19 Here, Lydia is a
public officer or employee since she is a teacher in a public school. By slapping and pushing
Gemma, another teacher, she laid her hands on a person in authority. 1avv phi 1

The penalty should be fixed in its medium period in the absence of mitigating or aggravating
circumstances.20Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,21 the petitioner should be sentenced to
an indeterminate term, the minimum of which is within the range of the penalty next lower in
degree, i.e., arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period, and
the maximum of which is that properly imposable under the Revised Penal Code, i.e., prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods.

Thus, the proper and precise prison sentence that should be imposed must be within the
indeterminate term of four (4) months and one (1) day to two (2) years and four (4) months of arresto
mayor, maximum to prision correccional minimum to three (3) years, six (6) months and twenty-one
(21) days to four (4) years, nine (9) months and ten (10) days of prision correccional in its medium
and maximum periods. A fine of not more than ₱1,000.00 must also be imposed on Lydia in
accordance with law.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals finding petitioner Lydia Gelig guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of slight physical injuries is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Judgment
is hereby rendered finding Lydia Gelig guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of direct assault
and is ordered to suffer an indeterminate prison term of one (1) year and one (1) day to three (3)
years, six (6) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision correccional. She is also ordered to pay a
fine of ₱1,000.00.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 88189 July 9, 1996

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
TIBURCIO ABALOS, accused-appellant.

REGALADO, J.:p

In this appeal, accused-appellant Tiburcio Abalos seeks absolution from the judgment of conviction rendered by the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 27, of Catbalogan, Samar which pronounced him guilty of the complex crime of direct assault with murder in Criminal Case No. 2302.
His arguments in the present appeal turn on the central question of unwarranted credence allegedly extended by the trial court to the version
of the criminal incident narrated by the sole prosecution witness. The totality of the evidence adduced, however, indubitably confirms
appellant's guilt of the offense charged. Accordingly, we affirm.

An information filed in the trial court, dated April 21, 1983, imputed the crime of direct assault with
murder to herein appellant Tiburcio Abalos, alias "Ewet," with the allegations —

That on or about the 20th day of March, 1983, at nighttime, in the Municipality of
Catbalogan, Province of Samar, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with deliberate intent to kill, with
treachery and evident premeditation and knowing fully well that one Sofronio Labine
was an agent of a person in authority being a member of the Integrated National
Police with station at Catbalogan, Samar, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and strike said Sofronio Labine with a piece of wood,
which said accused ha(d) conveniently provided himself for the purpose while said
P/Pfc. Sofronio Labine, a duly appointed and qualified member of the said INP, was
engaged in the performance of his official duties or on the occasion of such
performance, that is, maintaining peace and order during the barangay fiesta of
Canlapwas, of said municipality, thereby inflicting upon him "Lacerated wound 2
inches parietal area right. Blood oozing from both ears and nose" which wound
directly caused his death.

That in the commission of the crime, the aggravating circumstance of nocturnity was
present.1

At his arraignment on June 7, 1983, appellant, with the assistance of counsel, entered a plea of not
guilty.2 The trial conducted thereafter culminated in the decision3 of the trial court on February 3,
1989 finding appellant guilty as charged and meting out to him the penalty of "life imprisonment, with
the accessories of the law." Appellant was likewise ordered to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the
sum of P30,000.00; actual and compensatory damages in the amount of P2,633.00, with P15,000.00
as moral damages; and to pay the costs. 4

As recounted by prosecution witness Felipe Basal, a farmer residing in Barangay Pupua,

Catbalogan, Samar, appellant assaulted the victim, Pfc. Sofronio Labine, at around 8:00 P.M. of
March 20, 1983, which was then the day of the barangay fiesta celebrations in Barangay
Canlapwas, Catbalogan, Samar. The incident transpired near the house of appellant at the
said barangay. Felipe Basal was then having a drinking session in front of the shanty of one Rodulfo
Figueroa, Jr. which was situated just a few meters from the residence of appellant.

According to Basal, at about that time he noticed the father of appellant, Police Major Cecilio Abalos,
scolding his employees in his transportation business for turning in only two hundred pesos in
earnings for that day. While Major Abalos was thus berating his employees, appellant arrived and
asked his father not to scold them and to just let them take part in the barangay festivities. This
infuriated the elder Abalos and set off a heated argument between father and son.5

While the two were thus quarreling, a woman shouted "Justicia, boligue kumi! Adi in mag-a-
aringasa." meaning, "Police officer, help us! Somebody's making trouble here." The victim, Pfc.
Sofronio Labine, then appeared on the scene and asked Major Abalos, "What is it, sir?" The victim
saluted Abalos when the latter turned around to face him. As Major Abalos leveled his carbine at
Labine, appellant hurriedly left and procured a piece of wood, about two inches thick, three inches
wide and three feet long, from a nearby Ford Fiera vehicle.

He then swiftly returned and unceremoniously swung with that wooden piece at Labine from behind,
hitting the policeman at the back of the right side of his head. Labine collapsed unconscious in a
heap, and he later expired from the severe skull fracture he sustained from that blow. Felipe Basal
and his wife took flight right after appellant struck the victim, fearful that they might be hit by possible
stray bullets6 should a gunfight ensue.

Appellant's testimony, on the other hand, is of a different tenor. He admits having struck Labine with
a piece of wood during the incident in question but claims that he did so in the erroneous belief that
his father was being attacked by a member of the New People's Army (NPA). According to appellant,
he was then seated inside their family-owned Sarao jeepney parked beside the store of Rodulfo
Figueroa, Jr. near their home in Barangay Canlapwas when he noticed a man in fatigue uniform
suddenly accost his father. At that time, appellant's father had just arrived from a trip from Wright,
Samar and had just alighted from his service vehicle, a Ford Fiera.

The man tried to disarm Major Abalos of his firearm but the latter resisted and while the two were
grappling for possession of the gun, appellant instinctively went to the rescue of his father. He got a
piece of wood from Figueroa's store with which he then clubbed Labine whom he did not recognize
at that point. When Labine fell to the ground from the blow, appellant immediately fled to Barangay
Mercedes nearby, fearing that the man had companions who might retaliate. When he came to know
of the identity of his victim the following morning, he forthwith surrendered to the authorities.7

As mentioned at the outset, the foregoing version of the factual antecedents as presented by
appellant was roundly rejected by the lower court which found the same unworthy of belief. Appellant
ascribes reversible errors to the trial court (a) in not giving credence to the evidence adduced by the
defense; (b) in believing the evidence presented by the prosecution; (c) in relying on the
prosecution's evidence which falls short of the required quantum of evidence that would warrant a
conviction; (d) in finding that treachery attended the commission of the crime and failing to credit in
appellant's favor his voluntary surrender; and (e) in finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime charged.8

In the main, appellant insists that the trial court should not have given credence to the story of the
lone eyewitness for the prosecution. He also contends that since the testimony of that witness bore
clear traces of incredibility, particularly the fact that he could not have had a clear view of the
incident due to poor visibility, the prosecution should have presented as well the woman who had
called for help at the height of the incident if only to corroborate Basal's narration of the events.
Appellant also assails as inherently incredible the fact that it took quite a time for witness Felipe
Basal to come forward and divulge what he knew to the authorities. All these, unfortunately, are
flawed arguments.

From the evidence in the case at bar, the prosecution has convincingly proved, through the clear
and positive testimony of Basal, the manner in which the victim was killed by herein appellant. The
record is bereft of any showing that said prosecution witness was actuated by any evil motivation or
dubious intent in testifying against appellant. Moreover, a doctrine of long standing in this jurisdiction
is that the testimony of a lone eyewitness, if credible and positive, is sufficient to convict an
accused.9 There was thus no need, as appellant would want the prosecution to do, to present in
court the woman who shouted for assistance since her testimony would only be corroborative in
nature.

The presentation of such species of evidence in court would only be warranted when there are
compelling reasons to suspect that the eyewitness is prevaricating or that his observations were
inaccurate. 10 Besides, it is up to the People to determine who should be presented as prosecution
witness on the basis of its own assessment of the necessity for such testimony. 11 Also, no
unreasonable delay could even be attributed to Felipe Basal considering that during the wake for
Pfc. Labine, Basal came and intimated to the widow of the victim that he was going to testify
regarding her husband's slaying. 12

Appellant's contention that the deceased had attacked and attempted to divest his father of his
firearm is rather preposterous considering that no reason was advanced as to why the deceased
patrolman would assault a police officer of superior rank. Parenthetically, the condition of visibility at
the time of the incident was conducive not only to the clear and positive identification of appellant as
the victim's assailant but likewise to an actual and unobstructed view of the events that led to the
victim's violent death.

Basal was seated just a few meters away from the protagonists whom he all knew, he being also a
long-time resident of that municipality. There was a twelve-foot high fluorescent lamppost located
along the road and which, by appellant's own reckoning, was just seventeen meters away from
them. 13 Notwithstanding the fact that a couple of trees partly obstructed the post, the illumination
cast by the fluorescent lamp and the nearby houses provided sufficient brightness for the
identification of the combatants.

Curiously enough, appellant's assertion that there was poor visibility is ironically contradicted by his
testimony which is detailed on facts that one could readily recall after witnessing an event in broad
daylight. While appellant considers unbelievable Basal's identification of him supposedly because of
inadequate lighting, he himself, under the same conditions, could clearly see his father's assailant
wearing a fatigue uniform which was different from that worn by policemen. He even asserts that he
saw his father clutching the carbine with his hands holding the butt while his purported assailant held
on tightly to the rifle. 14 What these facts establish is that the lights in the area at the time of the
incident were enough to afford Basal an excellent view of the incident, contrary to appellant's
pretense. Appellant's testimony is thus negated by the rule that evidence, to be believed, must have
been given not only by a credible witness, but that the same must also be reasonably acceptable in
itself.

Appellant's flight right after he had assaulted the victim is also corrosive of his testimony. For, if it
were true that he had merely labored under the wrong notion that his father was being attacked by a
member of the NPA, and that it was an innocent case of error in personae, he could have readily
surrendered to his father right then and there. After all, Cecilio Abalos was a police major and was
the Station Commander of the Integrated National Police (INP) in Wright, Samar. Further, there was
no necessity at all for him to flee from the crime scene for fear of retaliation considering that he was
in the company of his own father who, aside from his position, was then armed with a carbine.
Appellant's explanation is, therefore, absurd and should be considered as self-serving evidence with
no weight in law.

On the offense committed by appellant, the trial court correctly concluded that he should be held
accountable for the complex crime of direct assault with murder. There are two modes of
committing atentados contra la autoridad o sus agentes under Article 148 of the Revised Penal
Code. The first is not a true atentado as it is tantamount to rebellion or sedition, except that there is
no public uprising. On the other hand, the second mode is the more common way of committing
assault and is aggravated when there is a weapon employed in the attack, or the offender is a public
officer, or the offender lays hands upon a person in authority. 15

Appellant committed the second form of assault, the elements of which are that there must be an
attack, use of force, or serious intimidation or resistance upon a person in authority or his agent; the
assault was made when the said person was performing his duties or on the occasion of such
performance; and the accused knew that the victim is a person in authority or his agent, that is, that
the accused must have the intention to offend, injure or assault the offended party as a person in
authority or an agent of a person in authority. 16

Here, Labine was a duly appointed member of the then INP in Catbalogan, Samar and, thus, was an
agent of a person in authority pursuant to Article 152 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
There is also no dispute that he was in the actual performance of his duties when assaulted by
appellant, that is, he was maintaining peace and order during the fiesta in Barangay Canlapwas.
Appellant himself testified that he personally knew Labine to be a policeman 17 and, in fact, Labine
was then wearing his uniform. These facts should have sufficiently deterred appellant from attacking
him, and his defiant conduct clearly demonstrates that he really had the criminal intent to assault and
injure an agent of the law.

When the assault results in the killing of that agent or of a person in authority for that matter, there
arises the complex crime of direct assault with murder or homicide. 18 The killing in the instant case
constituted the felony of murder qualified by alevosia through treacherous means deliberately
adopted Pfc. Labine was struck from behind while he was being confronted at the same time by
appellant's father. The evidence shows that appellant deliberately went behind the victim whom he
then hit with a piece of wood which he deliberately got for that purpose.

Obviously, appellant resorted to such means to avoid any risk to himself, knowing fully well that his
quarry was a policeman who could readily mount a defense. The aggravating circumstances of
evident premeditation and nocturnity, however, were not duly proven, as correctly ruled by the court
below. On the other hand, appellant's voluntary surrender even if duly taken into account by the trial
court would have been inconsequential.

The offense is a complex crime, the penalty for which is that for the graver offense, to be imposed in
the maximum period. Considering that the more serious crime of murder then carried the penalty
of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death, the imposable penalty should have been
death. The mitigating circumstance, in that context, would have been unavailing and inapplicable
since the penalty thus imposed by the law is indivisible. 19 At all events, the punishment of death
could not be imposed as it would have to be reduced to reclusion perpetua due to the then existing
proscription against the imposition of the death penalty. 20

However, the designation by the trial court of the imposable penalty as "life imprisonment" is
erroneous, as the same should properly be denominated as reclusion perpetua. 21 Also, the death
indemnity payable to the heirs of the victim, under the present jurisprudential policy, is P50,000.00.

ACCORDINGLY, with the MODIFICATION that the penalty imposed upon accused-appellant
Tiburcio Abalos should be reclusion perpetua, and that the death indemnity is hereby increased to
P50,000.00, the judgment of the court a quo in Criminal Case No. 2302 is AFFIRMED in all other
respects, with costs against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-84921 June 8, 1993

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ROLANDO DURAL (also known as RONNIE JAVELON) and BERNARDO ITUCAL, JR., y
BALDERAS, accused. ROLANDO DURAL and BERNARDO ITUCAL, JR., accused appellants.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

An amended information for Double Murder with Assault Upon Agents of Persons In Authority was
filed on 15 February 1988 with the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City charging the accused
Rolando Dural, also known as Ronnie Javelon, and Bernardo Itucal Jr. as follows:

That on or about the 31st day of January, 1988 at Caloocan City, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring together, confederating and mutually aiding one another, without
any justifiable cause and with intent to kill with treachery, evident premeditation and
abuse of superior strength, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously
attack, assault and employ personal violence upon the persons of TSGT. CARLOS
PABON PC and CIC RENATO MANGLIGOT PC, as duly appointed and qualified
members of the Philippine Constabulary, CAPCOM, Camp Bagong Diwa, Bicutan,
Taguig, while the latter were engaged in the performance of their official duties,
knowing the said TSGT CARLOS PABON PC and CIC RENATO MANGLIGOT PC,
to be agents of persons in authority by then and there shooting TSGT. CARLOS
PABON, PC and CIC RENATO MANGLIGOT PC, on the different parts of their
bodies, thereby inflicting upon the latter serious physical injuries, which eventually
caused their death.

Contrary to law.1

The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. C-30112 and assigned to branch 131 of the said
court. Both accused entered a plea of not guilty upon their arraignment on 14 March 1988.2 Pre-trial
was conducted on 30 March 19883and, thereafter, the trial on the merits ensued.

The witnesses who testified for the prosecution were Rodrigo Pascual, Sgt. Douglas Tagapulot, Cpl.
Angel Floranda, Guillermo Jaramilla, Vicente Rosadiño, Pfc. Juanito Abella, Edwin Balag, Rener
Ramos, Dennis Santos, Erlinda Pabon and Erlinda Mangligot. The parties agreed to dispense with
the testimony of Dr. Desiderio Moralida, whose autopsy reports on the victims were admitted by the
defense. The witnesses who testified for the defense were Carmelita Aldaya, Lorelie Itucal, Armando
Amba, Nilda Maravilla, Bernardo Itucal, Grace Guevarra and Rolando Dural.

On 31 August 1988, the trial court promulgated a decision 4 finding the accused guilty as charged.
The dispositive portion thereof reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, the prosecution having proven the guilt of the accused ROLANDO
DURAL otherwise known RONNIE JAVELON and BERNARDO ITUCAL, JR. y
BALDERAS beyond reasonable doubt, this Court finds both accused GUILTY of the
 crime of DOUBLE MURDER, qualified by treachery with ASSAULTS UPON
AGENTS OF PERSONS IN AUTHORITY and hereby sentences each of them to
suffer the penalty of double RECLUSION PERPETUA; to indemnify jointly and
severally the heirs of the deceased T/Sgt. Carlos Pabon PC and CIC Renato
Mangligot PC in the sum of P30,000.00 each as death indemnity; to pay Mrs. Erlinda
Pabon the sum of P23,299.00 representing the amount she spent for the burial and
wake of her husband T/Sgt. Carlos Pabon; to pay Mrs. Erlinda Mangligot the sum of
P29,550.00 representing the expenses she incurred for the wake and burial of her
husband CIC Renato Mangligot; and to pay the costs.

It appearing that both accused are detention prisoners, the period of preventive
imprisonment they underwent shall be given full credit in their favor.

SO ORDERED.5

The evidence for the prosecution upon which the judgment of conviction is anchored is summarized
by the trial court in this wise:

Two prosecution eye witnesses (sic) Rener Ramos and Dennis Santos when
presented to (sic) the witness stand corroborated each other's testimony more
specifically on material points and testified that:

"At about 12 o'clock in the afternoon of January 31, 1988 both of

them (prosecution witnesses Rener Ramos and Dennis Santos) were
at the Macaneneng Street in Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City as they
were supposed to go a (sic) "tupadahan" however, they were not able
to arrive at the tupadahan because while on their way or from a
distance of twelve (12) arms-length they heard successive gunfires
(sic) so they run (sic) and hid themselves in a concrete fence near a
store; from the place they were hiding or from a distance of ten (10)
arms-length they saw three (3) men each of them armed with .45 (sic)
pistol, firing upon at (sic) the two Capcom soldiers on board a
Capcom mobile car which was then on a full stop although its engine
was still running; two of the gunmen positioned themselves beside
each of the side of the mobile car while the third gunman whom they
identified as accused Rolando Dural otherwise known as Ronnie
Javelon (Dural for brevity) claimed the hood of the mobile car and
positioned himself in front of the car; after the two Capcom soldiers
were immobilized, the gunman standing near the driver's seat opened
the left front door of the car and got the .45 (sic) service pistol and
armalite of the Capcom soldiers; thereafter, the three gunmen left;
during the shooting incident they also noticed the presence of two
persons, one was inside an owner jeep while the other one whom
they identified as accused Bernardo Itucal, Jr. (Itucal for brevity) was
standing near the scene of the incident with one of his arm (sic)
raised while one of his hand (sic) was holding a .45 caliber pistol;
immediately after the three (gunmen) who fired at the Capcom
soldiers left; (sic) the man who was riding on the owner jeep told
accused Itucal that he was leaving and instructed Itucal to take care
of everything; witness Dennis Santos even quoted the very word (sic)
of the man on board the owner jeep Pare, bahala ka na diyan; after
that, the accused Itucal walked away; two days after the incident or
 on February 3, 1988 eyewitnesses Ramos and Santos voluntarily
went at (sic) the Capcom headquarters at Dagat-Dagatan, Caloocan
City to narrate what they have witnessed, consequently the
investigator brought them at (sic) the Capcom headquarters at
Bicutan then at (sic) Camp Panopio Hospital; at the said hospital,
they saw one of the three gunmen (referring to accused Dural) who
shot the two Capcom soldiers; then they went back at (sic) Bicutan
headquarters where they gave their respective statements (Exhs. "D"
and "E").6

Both Itucal and Dural denied authorship of the crime charged and interposed the defense of alibi.
The former, a student of the Guzman Institute of Technology at Rosario Street, Bagong Barrio,
Caloocan City, claims that at about 12:00 noon of 31 January 1988, while he was eating inside his
house at 63 Rosario Street, Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City, he heard gun reports and shouts and
when he peeped through the window, he saw people running or scampering away. He and his sister
Lorelie, wanted to go nearby Macaneneng Street from where the gun reports came, but they were
not able to reach it because of the presence of many onlookers at the scene of the shooting incident.
Before 12:00 noon or in the morning of 31 January 1988, he was at the Chapel conversing with
some people there.

Accused Rolando Dural, a.k.a. Ronnie Javelon, who admitted that his real name is Rolando Dural,
testified thus: that he stayed in his sister's house at Block 10, Lot 4 South City Homes, Biñan,
Laguna from 29 November 1987 up to 31 January 1988; two (2) days before 1 February 1988, he
told his sister, Agnes Javelon, that his stomach and chest were aching and although he was
suffering for quite a long time, it was only on 1 February 1988 when he experienced severe pain; as
a consequence, his sister got in touch with Dr. Jeremias de la Cruz; the said doctor first brought him
to the latter's clinic in Quezon City where his cyst was removed and his wound at the left side of his
body was sutured; the he was brought to the St. Agnes Hospital where he was admitted under the
name Ronnie Javelon for the reason that it was his sister who will be shouldering his hospital bills
and expenses.7

The trial court rejected the defense of alibi on the ground that eyewitnesses Rener Ramos and
Dennis Santos, whose testimonies "were logical, straightforward and probable" and whose
"credibility was not shaken in any manner by the rigorous examination to which they have been
exposed," positively identified the accused.8 It appreciated against the accused only the qualifying
circumstance of treachery.

Not satisfied with the lower court's decision, accused Dural and Itucal, hereinafter referred to as the
Appellants filed their notice of appeal on 1 September 1988.9

Appellants interpose the following assignment of errors in their Brief: 10

1 The lower court erred in finding conspiracy among and between the accused.

2 The lower court erred in giving weight to the testimonies of the prosecution's
witnesses notwithstanding their inconsistencies on relevant and material points.

3 The lower court erred in not considering the defense of alibi interposed by both
accused.

4 The lower court erred in not considering the illegality of the arres of both accused in
favor of their defenses.
 5 The lower court erred in considering the qualifying circumstance of treachery. 11

In the first assigned error, appellants challenge the trial court's finding that conspiracy existed among
the accused, with Itucal acting as lookout. They allege that the evidence for the prosecution failed to
establish that the appellants knew of the criminal intent of their alleged two (2) unidentified
companions.

The People 12 maintains, however, that conspiracy was established by the presence of the appellants
and their companions at the scene of the crime and their participation in the killing of the victims.
Witnesses Ramos and Santos testified that they saw Dural go atop the hood of the CAPCOM car
and fire a shot at one of the CAPCOM soldiers seated in the front seat. One Edwin Balag, a witness
for the prosecution and a neighbor of Itucal, testified that he had witnessed the shooting of the
CAPCOM soldiers and thereafter saw Itucal go atop the hood of the CAPCOM car 13 and shout
"Mabuhay and Sparrow."

A conspiracy exists when two (2) or more persons to an agreement concerning the commission of a
felony and decide to commit it. 14 Direct proof is not essential to prove conspiracy, it may be shown
by acts and circumstances from which may be logically inferred the existence of a common design
among the accused to commit the crime charged. 15 It is sufficient that the malefactors shall have
acted in concert pursuant to the same objective. 16Confederacy was established beyond cavil in this
case among appellant Rolando Dural, a.k.a. Ronnie Javelon, and the two (2) other gunmen. Armed
with deadly weapons, they arrived together, each proceeding directly to a pre-assigned spot from
where they suddenly and unexpectedly shot their victims. They then fled together toward the same
direction after divesting the victims of their firearms. All these acts are eloquent proof of a common
plan and design deliberately and carefully executed with precision through coordinated action.

There is no doubt in Our minds as to the participation of appellant

Dural — the evidence for the prosecution sufficiently established his guilt with moral certainty.

Appellant Itucal, however, deserves a different treatment. The trial court held him liable as a co-
conspirator because its finding that he acted as the look-out and was armed with a .45 caliber pistol.
Our evaluation of the evidence yields factual foundation for such a finding. It is based on claims,
bordering on speculation, of prosecution witnesses Rener Ramos and Dennis Santos that from what
they saw, Itucal must have been a look-out. They did not categorically declared that Itucal was such.
They only presumed or speculated that he was. The following is the testimony on direct examination
of Rener Ramos:

Q Now aside from the persons that you have mentioned firing at the
soldiers inside the Capcom car, were there any other persons if any?

xxx xxx xxx

A Yes, sir.

Q What were they doing?

A I saw two persons, sir, one was inside the owner jeep and the other
one was sanding near the scene of the incident.

Q How far was this owner jeep parked from the Capcom car?
A More or less 2 to ½ arms length (sic) away, sir.

Q What about this other person whom you saw standing near the car,
how far was he from the capcom car?

A More or less two armslength (sic) away, sir.

Q What was this person, standing near the car doing at the time?

A He was standing there and he had his arm raised and one of his
hand (sic) was holding a .45 caliber pistol.

Q Will you tell us what was his participation in the killing?

xxx xxx xxx

A From what I saw, sir, he must have been the look-out.

xxx xxx xxx

Q Now, you said, where are these two persons that you have
mentioned, the one you said was seated on the driver seat of the
owner jeep and the one holding a 45 caliber firearm, which (sic)
according to you acted as a look-out, if ever you will see them again
would you be able to identify them?

A Yes sir.

Q Will you please look around the court room, and see if they are
around, and if they are around please point to them?

A Only is here (sic), sir.

Q Please point to him?

A That person, sir.

(Witness pointing to prisoner on left, stood up and gave his name as

Bernardo Itucal).

Q Now, was he the one holding the firearm standing near the capcom
car, mobile car, which refers (sic) to be the look out?

A Yes sir.

Q Now, after these three persons who actually fired upon the soldiers'
car left, what did the other two do, if any?
 A The one who was riding at the owner jeep told the other person
who was standing outside he was leaving the said person to take
care of everything.

Q To whom (sic) this person addressing?

A The person who was standing, sir, and holding the .45 caliber.

Q You were referring to accused Bernardo Itucal?

A Yes sir.

Q And afterwards what happened?

A The person who was carrying 45 pistol walked away, sir and we
left, sir, because we fell (sic) nervous at that time, sir. 17

The pertinent portion of the direct testimony of Dennis Santos on the same point is as follows:

Q Now, aside from these persons including Rolando Dural whom you
saw firing their gun, were there other persons there aside from the
three?

A Yes sir, there were still other (sic).

Q How many?

A Two (2), sir.

Q What were they doing at that time?

A One was boaring (sic) a vehicle and he was sporting a violet

standing near the basketball court and from what i saw he acted as a
look out, sir.

Q How far was this look out from (sic) the capcom car?

A About two armslength away, sir.

Q How about the owner jeep how far was it parked in relation to the
capcom car?

A The same distance, sir.

Q What did that look out do if, any, that you have mentioned?

A The person who was inside the owner jeep shouted in a loud voice
and said, "Pare bahala ka na diyan." And the one who acted as a
look out followed the three gunmen who entered Rosal Street, sir.
 Q Now, was this look out that you have mentioned armed at that time
or not?

A I did not notice, sir.

Q If ever you will see this look out again would you able (sic) to
identify him?

A Yes, sir.

Q Will you please look around the courtroom and see if he is inside,
and if he is inside please point to him.

A Witness pointing to the other prisoner stood up and gave his name
as Bernardo Itucal.

Q What about the driver of the said owner jeep is he inside the
courtroom?

A No, sir he was not present. 18

On cross-examination, Rener Ramos categorically admitted that it was only when the three (3)
gunmen had swiftly walked away toward Rosal Street that he saw Itucal for the first time:

Q In other words, there was only or it was only after the gunmen have
fled that you were able to see Bernardo Itucal, isn't?

Fiscal:

That would be misleading, your honor. Not fled.

xxx xxx xxx

Q You stated awhile ago that after the gunmen have taken the 45
caliber and the armalite of the soldier, they ran away, isn't?

A They walked away fast, sir.

Q Away from the sight (sic) where the killing took place, isn't?

A Yes sir, they were turning their heads towards a street (sic) Rosal.

Q And it was at that point that you were saying that you saw
Bernardo Itucal standing with a 45 on his hand and very near the
incident, isn't?

A Yes, sir.

Q And this was the first time that you saw Bernardo Itucal, isn't?
 A Yes sir. 19

Dennis Santos also admitted on cross-examination that he saw Itucal for the first time only after the
gunmen had left the scene, thus:

Q You said that the look out was accused Bernardo Itucal, you have
seen Bernardo Itucal only after the gunmen have went (sic) away
from the scene of the incide (sic), isn't?

A Yes sir. 20

and that the only basis for his belief that Itucal was the lookout was the following parting statement of
the driver of the owner-type jeep addressed to Itucal: "Pare, bahala ka na diyan." Thus:

Q Why did you say that, Mr. Witness, that Bernardo Itucal was a look
out?

A Because I heard the passenger of the owner jeep bid goodbye, sir,
so I gathered that he was his companion and he remarked, "Pare,
bahala ka na diyan." 21

If Itucal was the lookout, he had to come either ahead of or simultaneously with the gunmen. By the
very nature of his duty or task, a lookout should not come to the scene of the crime after its
consummation. There is absolutely no evidence that Itucal came ahead of or simultaneously with the
gunmen; on the contrary, as shown above, he was seen for the first time only after the gunmen had
walked away. That he was armed, which could have enhanced the prosecution's theory that he was
a co-conspirator, was not likewise sufficiently proven. While Rener Ramos testified that he was, his
companion, Dennis Santos, who similarly focused his eyes on Itucal and the others and witnessed
almost everything that took place, did not notice any weapon in Itucal's possession. According to
Rener Ramos, Itucal "had his arm raised and one of his hand (sic) was holding a 45 caliber pistol." If
such were indeed the fact, Dennis Santos would not have failed to see it. That is not all to it. Another
prosecution witness, Edwin Balag — who even testified that he had seen Itucal, his neighbor whom
he had known for more than two (2) years, 22 climb atop the hood of the CAPCOM car after the
gunmen shot the soldiers and shout "mabuhay ang sparrow" — did not state that Itucal was
armed. 23 The prosecuting Fiscal did not attempt to extract any information or testimony to that effect
from him. It was the court which asked the appropriate question after the re-direct examination of
Balag, but the witness categorically admitted that Itucal was not armed at that time, thus:

COURT:

Itucal was not armed at that time?

A No, sir. 24

That Itucal shouted "mabuhay ang sparrow" and was told by the driver of the owner-type jeep:
"Pare, bahala ka na diyan," do not conclusively prove that he was a co-conspirator in the absence of
any evidence, as in this case, that he was a member of a subversive organization which operates
the sparrow unit and that the driver of the owner-type jeep was also a co-conspirator. Even
assuming for the sake of argument that he was a sympathizer of such a subversive organization,
mere sympathy is not enough to prove his participation in the conspiracy. The parting statement of
the driver of the owner-type jeep could be addressed to anybody at the scene and is susceptible of
two (2) interpretations, one of which is inconsistent with the participation of Itucal either in the
planning of the crime or in the execution of such plan. In the light of the presumption of innocence
guaranteed by the Constitution, and in the absence of credible inculpatory evidence, that
interpretation in his favor must prevail. While admittedly the alibi of Itucal is weak, the evidence of
the prosecution against him is likewise feeble. The prosecution cannot use the weakness of Itucal's
defense to enhance its case; it must rely on the strength of its own evidence. 25 And considering that
Itucal's culpability could only be anchored on his participation in a conspiracy, such participation
must be proved by clear and convincing evidence. The prosecution has failed to successfully
discharge that burden in this case, leaving this Court unconvinced, due to reasonable doubt, of the
guilt of Itucal.

With the foregoing exposition, resolution of the second and third assigned errors is no longer
necessary. However, for the satisfaction of accused Dural, let it be stated that the alleged
inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses as to whether there was a basketball
game going on at the time the first gunfire was heard, who among the appellants climbed atop the
hood of the CAPCOM car, and which of the two (2) written statements of Ramos and Santos were
first made, refer to trivial or minor points. Settled is the rule that discrepancies on minor matters do
not impair the essential integrity of the prosecution's evidence as a whole or reflect on the witnesses'
honesty. 26 As a matter of fact, there is at all no inconsistency in the testimonies of the witnesses on
the second issue. As correctly pointed out by the People, both appellants did in fact climb atop the
hood. According to Ramos and Santos, Dural did so and fired at one of the soldier seated in the front
seat of the car. 27 According to Balag, Itucal climbed atop the hood only after the three (3) gunmen
had fired at their victims. 28

As to alibi, it is a fundamental juridical dictum that it cannot prevail over the positive identification of
the accused. 29In the instant case, Dural was positively identified by the principal witnesses for the
prosecution. It is equally settled that for alibi to prosper, it must not only be shown that the accused
was at some other place at the time of the incident but that it was physically impossible for him to
have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. 30 This was not proven by Dural.

The fourth assigned error is without merit. It is too late for the appellant to question the illegality of
their arrests. The irregularity, if any, was cured when they submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of
the trial court by filing a petition for bail, 31 entering a plea of not guilty and actively participating at the
pre-trial and trial.

Nor is there merit in the fifth assigned error. Per the testimonies of Rener Ramos and Dennis
Santos, the victims, who had no opportunity to defend themselves as they were still inside the
CAPCOM car which was still maneuvering, were shot at close range immediately after the three (3)
gunmen, one of whom is appellant Dural, surrounded the car with each positioning himself, at pre-
assigned spots, i.e., the left, right and front portions of the car. The autopsy reports 32 showed that
both victims sustained gunshot wounds mostly in the head. The suddenness of the attack on the
unwary victims and the simultaneous and coordinated gunfire trained at them insured the execution
of the dead without risk to the gunmen arising from any defense which the victims might make.
Treachery then attended the commission of the deed. The killing of the two (2) CAPCOM soldiers
was thus qualified to murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. There is treachery when
the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods, or forms in
the execution thereof which tend direct and especially to insure its execution, without risk to himself
arising from the defense which the offended party might make. 33

There is no doubt in Our minds that appellant Dural and the two (2) other gunmen knew that the
victims, T/Sgt. Carlos Pabon and CIC Renato Mangligot, were members of the Philippine
Constabulary detailed with the CAPCOM as they were then in uniform and riding an official
CAPCOM car. The victims, who were agents of persons in authority, were in the performance of
official duty as peace officers and law enforcers. For having assaulted and killed the said victims, in
conspiracy with the other two (2) gunmen, appellant Dural also committed direct assault under
Article 148 of the Revised Penal Code. The crimes he committed, therefore, are two (2) complex
crimes of murder with direct assault upon an agent of a person in authority. Pursuant then to Article
48 of the Revised Penal Code, the maximum of the penalty for the more serious crime which is
murder, should be imposed. The maximum of the penalty prescribed for murder under Article 248 of
the Revised Penal Code is death penalty, 34 the proper imposable penalty would be reclusion
perpetua. The trial court correctly imposed on appellant Dural two (2) penalties of reclusion
perpetua. In conformity with the prevailing jurisprudence, the indemnity for each death shall be
increased from P30,000.00 to P50,000.00.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:

(1) AFFIRMING, insofar as accused-appellant ROLANDO DURAL (also known as RONNIE

JAVELON) is concerned, the Decision of Branch 131 of the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City in
Criminal Case No. C-30112, subject to the above modification of the death penalty.

(2) ACQUITTING, on the ground of reasonable doubt, accused-appellant BERNARDO ITUCAL, JR.;
and

(3) Ordering accused-appellant ROLANDO DURAL (also known as RONNIE JAVELON) to pay one-
half (1/2) of the costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 76338-39 February 26, 1990

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
RENATO TAC-AN Y HIPOS, accused-appellant.

The Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Amadeo D. Seno for accused-appellant.

FELICIANO, J.:

Accused Renato Tac-an appeals from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Tagbilaran City,
convicting him of qualified illegal possession of a firearm and ammunition in Criminal Case No. 4007
and of murder in Criminal Case No. 4012 and imposing upon him the penalty of death in both cases.

On 18 December 1984, appellant was charged with violation of Section 1, paragraph (2), of
Presidential Decree No. 1866, committed as follows:

That, on or about the 14th day of December 1984, in the City of Tagbilaran
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, while acting under the influence of drugs and without any license or permit
from the proper authorities, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
 have ill his possession, custody and control an unlicensed firearm, a SMITH &
WESSON Airweight caliber .38 revolver with Serial Number 359323 with Five (5)
spent shells and Five (5) live ammunitions and without any justifiable cause and with
intent to kill, used the said firearm and ammunitions to shoot one Francis Ernest
Escano III hitting and inflicting upon the latter the following gunshot wounds or
injuries, to wit:

MULTIPLE GUNSHOT WOUNDS — Head & Chest (through and

through);

Head Entrance — 1.4 x 2.2 cm., Left Fronto-Temporal Area; Port —

1.3 x 0.3 cm.; Right Cheek. 3.5 cm. above the right external meatus;

Chest Entrance — 0.3 x 1 cm. — Right Infrascapular Area at the level

of the 7th Intercostal Rib (Back); Exist — 0.3 cm. dia; above the right
nipple;

Y-shape laceration, check at the right angle of the mouth, Right

Dimensions: 3 x 1.2 cm. x 1.8

which gunshot wounds or injuries directly caused his death, to the damage and
prejudice of the Republic of the Philippines.

Acts committed contrary to the provisions of Section 1, paragraph 2 of the

Presidential Decree No. 1866. 1

On 11 January 1985, an amended information 2 for murder was also filed against appellant reading
as follows:

That, on or about the 14th day of December, 1984 in the City of Tagbilaran,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, without any justifiable cause and with intent to kill, evident pre-meditation
treachery, while acting under the influence of drugs, with cruelty and deliberately
augmenting the suffering of the victim, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and shot one Francis Ernest Escano with the use of an
unlicensed SMITH & WESSON Airweight caliber .38 revolver with Serial Number
359323 hitting and inflicting upon the latter the following gunshot wounds or injuries,
to wit:

MULTIPLE GUNSHOT WOUNDS — Head and Chest (Through &

Through);

Head Entrance — 14 x 2.2 cm., Left Fronto-temporal Area; Port — l.3

x 0.3 cm., Right Cheek, 3.5 cm., above the right external meatus;

Chest Entrance — 0.3 x 1 cm. — right Infrascapular Area at the level

of the 7th Inter-Costal Rib (back); exit — 0.3 cm. dia; above the right
nipple

Y-shape laceration, cheek at the angle of the mouth, Right

 Dimensions: 3 x 1.2 cm. x 1.8.

which gunshot wounds or injuries directly caused his death, to the damage and
prejudice of the heirs of the deceased namely: Judge & Mrs. Francisco Rey H.
Escano, in the amount to be proved during the trial of the case.

Acts committed contrary to the provisions of Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code,
in relation to Section 17 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 179, with the qualifying aggravating
circumstances of evident premeditation, treachery and acting under the influence of
dangerous drugs and cruelty.

Appellant entered a plea of not guilty in both cases. The two (2) criminal cases were consolidated
upon motion of the prosecution and tried jointly. On 31 July 1986, the trial court rendered a
decision 3 convicting appellant under both informations. The dispositive portion of the decision read
as follows:

WHEREFORE, all the foregoing premises considered, decision is hereby rendered in

Criminal Case No. 4007 finding the accused Renato Tac-an y Hipos GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunitions qualified with
Murder under Section 1, paragraphs 1 and 2 of Presidential Decree No. 1866 and
hereby sentences said Renato Tac-an y Hipos to suffer the penalty of DEATH.
Further, decision is also rendered in Criminal Case No. 4012 finding the same
accused Renato Tac-an y Hipos GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Murder under
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Batas Pambansa Blg. 179 and
P.D. 1866. Appreciating the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation
(treachery used to qualify the crime to murder) and the special aggravating
circumstances of acting while under the influence of dangerous drugs and with the
use of an unlicensed firearm and with insult to a person in authority and there being
no mitigating circumstance to offset them, and sentences the said Renato Tac-an y
Hipos to suffer the penalty of DEATH. The accused is likewise ordered to indemnify
the heirs of the deceased Francis Ernest Escano in the amount of THIRTY
THOUSAND PESOS (P30,000.00); to pay actual compensatory damages in the
amount of ONE HUNDRED EIGHT THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED TEN PESOS
(P108,310.00); to pay moral damages to Judge Francisco Escano, Jr., the sum of
ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P100,000.00) and to Mrs. Lydia Escano the
sum of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P100,000.00) for the mental anguish
and suffering each experienced because of the death of Francis Ernest. All such
amount shall earn legal interest from the time this decision shall become final and
executory until fully satisfied. The accused shall also pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.

Immediately after promulgation of the decision, appellant signified his intention to appeal to this
Court, although the same was subject to automatic review by this Court.

In his brief, appellant assigned the following as errors allegedly committed by the trial court:

I. The lower court erred in believing the prosecution's version of the case instead of
according full faith and credence to the defendant's version.

II. The trial court erred in not holding that Renato Tac-an was justified in shooting the
deceased.
 III. The trial court erred in not holding that in (sic) the least the defendant acted in
incomplete self-defense in shooting the deceased.

IV. The trial court erred in not holding that P.D. 1866 is inapplicable to the defendant
inasmuch as said decree was enforceable only during the existence of the Martial
Law Regime.

V. The trial court erred in not holding that the defendant was placed twice in jeopardy
for having been prosecuted for violation of P.D. 1866 despite his being prosecuted
for murder in an information which alleges that the accused used an unlicensed
firearm in killing the deceased.

VI. The trial court erred in not adjudging the defendant innocent of murder.

From the record, the facts may be collated and summarized as follows:

Appellant Renato Tac-an, then eighteen (18) years and seven (7) months of age, and the deceased
Francis Ernest Escano III, fifteen (15) years old, were classmates in the third year of high school of
the Divine Word College in Tagbilaran City. They were close friends, being not only classmates but
also members of the same gang, the Bronx gang. Renato had been to the house where Francis and
his parents lived, on one or two occasions. On those occasions, Francis' mother noticed that Renato
had a handgun with him. Francis was then advised by his mother to distance himself from Renato. 4

Francis withdrew from the Bronx gang. The relationship between Renato and Francis turned sour.
Sometime in September 1984, Renato and Francis quarrelled with each other, on which occasion
Francis bodily lifted Arnold Romelde from the ground. Arnold was friend and companion to Renato.
The quarrel resulted in Renato and Francis being brought to the high school principal's office. The
strained relationship between the two (2) erstwhile friends was aggravated in late November 1984
when Francis teamed that Renato, together with other members of the Bronx gang, was looking for
him, apparently with the intention of beating him up. Further deterioration of their relationship
occurred sometime in the first week of December 1984, when graffiti appeared on the wall of the
third year high school classroom and on the armrest of a chair in that classroom, deprecating the
Bronx gang and describing Renato as "bayot" (homosexual) 5 Renato attributed the graffiti to
Francis.

At about 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon of 14 December 1984, Renato entered Room 15 of the high
school building to attend his English III class. Renato placed his scrapbook prepared for their
Mathematics class on his chair, and approached the teacher, Mrs. Liliosa Baluma, to raise a
question. Upon returning to his chair, he found Francis sitting there, on the scrapbook. Renato was
angered by what he saw and promptly kicked the chair on which Francis was seated. Francis,
however, explained that he had not intentionally sat down on Renato's scrapbook. A fistfight would
have ensued but some classmates and two (2) teachers, Mrs. Baluma and Mr. Damaso Pasilbas,
intervened and prevented them from assaulting each other. After the two (2) had quieted down and
apparently shaken hands at the instance of Mrs. Baluma, the latter resumed her English III class.
Francis sat on the last row to the extreme right of the teacher while Renato was seated on the same
last row at the extreme left of the teacher. While the English III class was still going on, Renato
slipped out of the classroom and went home to get a gun. He was back at the classroom
approximately fifteen (15) minutes later. 6

The Mathematics class under Mr. Damaso Pasilbas scheduled for 3:00 p.m. had just started in
Room 15 when Renato suddenly burst into the room, shut the door and with both hands raised,
holding a revolver, shouted "Where is Francis?" Upon sighting Francis seated behind and to the light
of student Ruel Ungab, Renato fired at Francis, hitting a notebook, a geometry book and the armrest
of Ruel's chair. Francis and Ruel jumped up and with several of their classmates rushed forward
towards the teacher's platform to seek protection from their teacher. Renato fired a second time, this
time hitting the blackboard in front of the class. Francis and the other students rushed back towards
the rear of the room. Renato walked towards the center of the classroom and fired a third time at
Francis, hitting the concrete wall of the classroom. Francis and a number of his classmates rushed
towards the door, the only door to and from Room 15. Renato proceeded to the teacher, s platform
nearest the door and for the fourth time fired at Francis as the latter was rushing towards the door.
This time, Francis was hit on the head and he fell on the back of Ruel and both fell to the floor. Ruel
was pulled out of the room by a friend; Francis remained sprawled on the floor bleeding profusely. 7

Renato then went out of Room 15, and paced between Rooms 14 and 15. A teacher, Mr. Pablo
Baluma, apparently unaware that it was Renato who had gunned down Francis, approached Renato
and asked him to help Francis as the latter was still alive inside the room. Renato thereupon re-
entered Room 15, closed the door behind him, saying: "So, he is still alive. Where is his chest?"
Standing over Francis sprawled face down on the classroom floor, Renato aimed at the chest of
Francis and fired once more. The bullet entered Francis' back below the right shoulder, and exited
on his front chest just above the right nipple. 8

Renato then left with two (2) remaining students and locked Francis alone inside Room 15. Renato
proceeded to the ground floor and entered the faculty room. There, he found some teachers and
students and ordered them to lock the door and close the windows, in effect holding them as
hostages. He also reloaded his gun with five (5) bullets. After some time, a team of Philippine
Constabulary troopers led by Capt. Larino Lazo arrived and surrounded the faculty room. With a
hand-held public address device, Capt. Lazo called upon Renato to surrender himself Renato did not
respond to this call. Renato's brother approached Capt. Lazo and volunteered to persuade his
brother to give up. Renato's father who, by this time had also arrived, pleaded with Renato to
surrender himself Renato then turned over his gun to his brother through an opening in the
balustrade of the faculty room. Capt. Lazo took the gun from Renato's brother, went to the door of
the faculty room, entered and placed Renato under arrest. 9

Meantime, as soon as Renato left Room 15, some teachers and students came to rescue Francis
but could not open the door which Renato had locked behind him. One of the students entered the
room by climbing up the second floor on the outside and through the window and opened the door
from the inside. The teachers and students brought Francis down to the ground floor from whence
the PC soldiers rushed him to the Celestino Gallares Memorial Hospital. 10 Francis died before
reaching the hospital.

Capt. Lazo brought Renato to the PC Headquarters at Camp Dagohoy, Tagbilaran City. The officer
deposited the revolver recovered from Renato which was an Airweight Smith and Wesson .38
caliber revolver, with Serial No. 359323, as well as the five (5) live bullets removed from the said
revolver, and the five (5) empty cartridges which Renato had turned over to him. Ballistic
examination conducted by Supervising Ballistician, Artemio Panganiban, National Bureau of
Investigation, Cebu, showed that the empty cartridge cases had been fired from the revolver
recovered from Renato. 11

Appellant at the outset assails the trial court for having believed the prosecution's version of the facts
instead of the version offered by the appellant. The trial court took into account, inter alia, the
positive and direct testimony of:

1. Mrs. Liliosa Baluma who testified as to, among other things, the events which took
place inside her English III classroom immediately before the shooting;
 2. Ruel Ungab — a fifteen (15) year old classmate of Renato and Francis, who had
fallen on the floor with Francis when the latter was finally hit by Renato;

3. Damaso Pasilbas — the Mathematics teacher who was holding his class when
Renato had burst into Room 15 and started firing at Francis; and

4. Napoleon Jumauan — another sixteen (16) year old, classmate of Renato and
Francis who was inside the classroom when Renato had started firing at Francis and
who was only about a foot away from the head of Francis when Renato, having re-
entered Room 15, had fired at Francis as the latter was sprawled on the floor of the
classroom.

After careful examination of the record, we find no reason to disagree with the conclusion of the trial
court that Renato had indeed shot and killed Francis under the circumstances and in the manner
described by these witnesses.

1. The claim of self-defense.

Renato claimed that he was acting in self-defense, or at least in incomplete self-defense, when he
shot Francis. For a claim of self-defense to be sustained, the claimant must show by clear and
convincing evidence that the following requisites existed:

a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim;

b) reasonable necessity of the means employed by the accused to repel the

aggression; and

c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the accused. 12

Testifying in his own behalf, Renato said that a few minutes before the end of Mrs. Baluma's English
III class, Francis had approached him:

(Atty. Seno, Defense Counsel)

Q: How did it happened (sic) that you had a conversation with

Francis?

(Renato)

A: While the class was going on, Mrs. Baluma was writing on the
blackboard.

Q: Then what happened?

A: While our teacher was writing on the blackboard Francis suddenly

got near me.

Q: And what happened when Francis approached you?

 A: He said, 'So you are brave now you had a (sic) guts to fight
against me.'

Q: And what else did he say?

A: He said, 'Go home, get your firearm because I will go home to get
a gun.'

Q: Was that all that he told you?

A: He further said, 'You go home get your firearm, if you won't go

home and get a gun, I will go to your place and kill you including your
parents, brothers and sisters.'

Q: And after that where did Francis go?

A: Before the bell rang he went ahead. 13

(Emphasis supplied)

We note at the outset that there was no evidence before the Court, except Renato's own testimony,
that Francis had uttered the above statements attributed to him by Renato. Although there had been
about twenty-five (25) other students, and the teacher, in the classroom at the time, no corroborating
testimony was offered by the defense. In the second place, assuming (arguendo merely) that
Francis had indeed made those statements, such utterances cannot be regarded as the unlawful
aggression which is the first and most fundamental requirement of self-defense. Allegedly uttered in
a high school classroom by an obviously unarmed Francis, such statements could not reasonably
inspire the "well grounded and reasonable belief" claimed by Renato that "he was in imminent
danger of death or bodily harm." 14 Unlawful aggression refers to an attack that has actually broken
out or materialized or at the very least is clearly imminent: it cannot consist in oral threats or a
merely threatening stance or posture. 15Further as pointed out by the Solicitor General, Francis was
obviously without a firearm or other weapon when Renato returned and burst into Room 15
demanding to know where Francis was and forthwith firing at him repeatedly, without the slightest
regard for the safety of his other classmates and of the teacher. There being no unlawful aggression,
there simply could not be self-defense whether complete or incomplete, 16 and there is accordingly no
need to refer to the other requirements of lawful self-defense.

2. The claim that P.D. No. 1866 is inapplicable.

As pointed out at the outset, appellant was charged with unlawful possession of an unlicensed
firearm, a Smith and Wesson Airweight.38 caliber revolver with five (5) spent bullets and five (5) live
ones and with having used such firearm and ammunition to shoot to death Francis Ernest Escano III,
in violation of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866.

Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 provides, in relevant part, that:

Section 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of

Firearms or Ammunition or Instruments Used or Intended to be Used in the
Manufacture of Firearms or Ammunition. — The penalty of reclusion temporal in its
maximum period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon any person who shall
unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess any firearms, part of
 firearm, ammunition, or machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be used in
the manufacture of any firearm or ammunition.

If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, the penalty
of death shall be imposed. (Emphasis supplied)

Appellant urges that P.D. No. 1866 is inapplicable to him "considering that the reason for its [P.D.
No. 1866] issuance no longer exists." He argues that P.D. No. 1866 was enforceable only during the
existence of martial law, and that when martial law was "lifted in 1979," the reason for the
"existence" of P.D. No. 1866 faded away, with the result that the "original law on firearms, that is,
Section 2692 of the [Revised] Administrative Code, together with its pre-martial law amendments,
came into effect again thereby replacing P.D. No. 1866." 17

There is nothing in P.D. No. 1866 (which was promulgated on 29 June 1983) which suggests that it
was intended to remain in effect only for the duration of the martial law imposed upon the country by
former President Marcos. Neither does the statute contain any provision that so prescribes its
lapsing into non-enforceability upon the termination of the state or period of martial law. On the
contrary, P.D. No. 1866 by its own terms purported to "consolidate, codify and integrate" all prior
laws and decrees penalizing illegal possession and manufacture of firearms, ammunition and
explosives in order "to harmonize their provisions as well as to update and revise certain provisions
and prior statutes "in order to more effectively deter violators of the law on firearms, ammunitions
and explosives." 18 Appellant's contention is thus without basis in fact.

3. The claim of double jeopardy.

It is also contended by appellant that because he had already been charged with illegal possession
of a firearm and ammunition in Criminal Case No. 4007, aggravated by the use of such unlicensed
firearm to commit a homicide or murder, he was unconstitutionally placed in jeopardy of punishment
for the second time when he was charged in Criminal Case No. 4012 with murder "with the use of an
unlicensed [firearm]," in violation of Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Section 17 of
B.P. Blg. 179.

It is elementary that the constitutional right against double jeopardy protects one against a second or
later prosecution for the same offense, and that when the subsequent information charges another
and different offense, although arising from the same act or set of acts, there is no prohibited double
jeopardy. In the case at bar, it appears to us quite clear that the offense charged in Criminal Case
No. 4007 is that of unlawful possession of an unlicensed firearm penalized under a special statute,
while the offense charged in Criminal Case No. 4012 was that of murder punished under the
Revised Penal Code. It would appear self-evident that these two (2) offenses in themselves are quite
different one from the other, such that in principle, the subsequent filing of Criminal Case No. 4012 is
not to be regarded as having placed appellant in a prohibited second jeopardy.

We note that the information in Criminal Case No. 4007 after charging appellant with unlawful
possession of an unlicensed firearm and ammunition, went on to state that said firearm and
ammunition had been used to shoot to death Francis Ernest Escaño III. We note also that the
amended information in Criminal Case No. 4012 after charging appellant with the unlawful killing of
Francis Ernest Escaño III, stated that the killing had been done with the use of an unlicensed
firearm. We believe these additional allegations in the two (2) informations did not have the effect of
charging appellant with having committed the same offense more than once.

However, in sentencing Renato to suffer the penalty of death for the crime of murder, the trial court
did take into account as a "special aggravating circumstance" the fact that the killing of Francis had
been done "with the use of an unlicensed firearm." In so doing, we believe and so hold, the trial court
committed error. There is no law which renders the use of an unlicensed firearm as an aggravating
circumstance in homicide or murder. Under an information charging homicide or murder, the fact that
the death weapon was an unlicensed firearm cannot be used to increase the penalty for the second
offense of homicide or murder to death (or reclusion perpetua under the 1987 Constitution). The
essential point is that the unlicensed character or condition of the instrument used in destroying
human life or committing some other crime, is not included in the inventory of aggravating
circumstances set out in Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code. 19

In contrast, under an information for unlawful possession (or manufacture, dealing in, acquisition or
disposition) of a firearm or ammunition, P.D. No. 1866 authorizes the increase of the imposable
penalty for unlawful possession or manufacture, etc. of the unlicensed firearm where such firearm
was used to destroy human life. Although the circumstance that human life was destroyed with the
use of the unlicensed firearm is not an aggravating circumstance under Article 14 of the Revised
Penal Code, it may still be taken into account to increase the penalty to death (reclusion perpetua,
under the 1987 Constitution) because of the explicit provisions of P.D. No. 1866. As noted earlier,
the unlawful possession of an unlicensed firearm or ammunition is an offense punished under a
special law and not under the Revised Penal Code.

4. The claim that there was no treachery.

Appellant contends that there was no treachery present because before any shot was fired, Renato
had shouted "where is Francis?" Appellant in effect suggests his opening statement was a warning
to Francis and that the first three (3) shots he had fired at Francis were merely warning shots.
Moreover, building upon his own testimony about the alleged threat that Francis had uttered before
he (Renato) left his English III class to go home and get a gun, appellant argues that Francis must
have anticipated his return and thus had sufficient time to prepare for the coming of the
appellant. 20 Appellant's contention, while ingenious, must be rejected. The trial court made a finding
of treachery taking explicit account of the following factors:

1. Room 15 of the Divine Word College High School Department Tagbilaran City, is
situated in the second floor of the building. It is a corner room and it has only one (1)
door which is the only means of entry and exit;

2. At the time of the attack, the deceased was seated on his chair inside his
classroom and was writing on the armrest of his chair and also talking to Ruel Ungab
and while their teacher, Mr. Damaso Pasilbas was checking the attendance. The
deceased was not aware of any impending assault neither did he have any means to
defend himself;

3. The accused used an airweight Smith & Wesson .38 caliber revolver in shooting to
death the defenseless and helpless Francis Ernest Escaño;

4. The attack was so sudden and so unexpected. the accused consciously conceived
that mode of attack;

5. The accused fired at Francis again and again and did not give him a chance to
defend himself. After the deceased was hit on the head and fell to the floor while he
was already sprawled and completely defenseless the accused fired at him again
and the deceased was hit on the chest;
 6. The deceased was not armed. He was totally defenseless. He was absolutely not
aware of any coming attack. 21

The Court also pointed out that Renato must have known that Francis while inside Room 15 had no
means of escape there being only one (1) door and Room 15 being on the second floor of the
building. Renato in effect blocked the only exit open to Francis as he stood on the teacher's platform
closest to the door and fired as Francis and Ruel sought to dash through the door. Renato's question
"where is Francis?" cannot reasonably be regarded as an effort to warn Francis for he shot at
Francis the instant he sighted the latter, seated and talking to Ruel Ungab. That Renato fired three
(3) shots before hitting Francis with the fourth shot, can only be ascribed to the indifferent
markmanship of Renato and to the fact that Francis and the other students were scurrying from one
part of the room to the other in an effort to evade the shots fired by Renato. The cumulative effect of
the circumstances underscored by the trial court was that the attack upon Francis had been carried
out in a manner which disabled Francis from defending himself or retaliating against Renato. Finally,
the circumstance that Renato, having been informed that Francis was still alive, re-entered Room 15
and fired again at Francis who lay on the floor and bathed with his own blood, manifested Renato's
conscious choice of means of execution which directly and especially ensured the death of his victim
without risk to himself. 22 We are compelled to agree with the trial court that treachery was here
present and that, therefore, the killing of Francis Ernest Escaño III was murder.

5. The claim that there was no evident premeditation.

The trial court also found the presence of evident premeditation and appreciated the same as a
generic aggravating circumstance. Here, it is the urging of the appellant that the requisites of evident
premeditation had not been sufficiently shown. In order that evident premeditation may be taken into
account, there must be proof of (a) the time when the offender formed his intent to commit the crime;
(b) an action manifestly indicating that the offender had clung to his determination to commit the
crime; and (c) of the passage of a sufficient interval of time between the determination of the
offender to commit the crime and the actual execution thereof, to allow him to reflect upon the
consequences of his act. 23 The defense pointed out that barely fifteen (15) minutes had elapsed
from the time Renato left his English III class and the time he returned with a gun. While there was
testimony to the fact that before that fatal day of 14 December 1984, anger and resentment had
welled up between Francis and Renato, there was no evidence adequately showing when Renato
had formed the intention and determination to take the life of Francis. Accordingly, we must discard
evident premeditation as an aggravating circumstance.

6. The claim that the killing was not done under the influence of a dangerous drug.

Section 17 of B.P. Blg. 179 which was promulgated on 2 March 1982 provides as follows:

SEC. 17. The provisions of any law to the contrary notwithstanding, when a crime is
committed by an offender who is under the influence of dangerous drugs, such state
shall be considered as a qualifying aggravating circumstance in the definition of a
crime and the application of the penalty provided for in the Revised Penal Code.

The trial court found that Francis was killed by Renato while the later was under the influence of a
dangerous drug, specifically marijuana, and took that into account as a "special aggravating
circumstance". No medical evidence had been submitted by the prosecution to show that Renato
had smoked marijuana before gunning down Francis. Fourteen (14) days had elapsed after
December 14, 1984 before Renato was medically examined for possible traces of marijuana; the
results of the examination were negative. Defense witness Dr. Rogelio Ascona testified that in order
to have a medically valid basis for determining the presence of marijuana in the human system, the
patient must be examined within twenty-four (24) hours from the time he is supposed to have
smoked marijuana. 24 The prosecution had presented Orlando Balaba, a student at the Divine Word
College, High School Department, who testified that he found Renato and one Jaime Racho inside
the men's room of the High School Department sucking smoke from a hand-rolled thing that look like
a cigarette, that he had asked Renato what that was and that Renato had
replied damo (marijuana). 25 While the testimony of Orlando Balaba was corroborated by two (2)
other prosecution witnesses, we believe that Orlando Balaba's testimony was incompetent to show
that what Renato and Jaime Racho were smoking inside the men's room was indeed marijuana. It
was pointed out by apellant that Orlando Balaba had never smoked nor smelled marijuana.

In the absence of medical evidence, the Court took into account certain detailed factors as
circumstantial evidence supporting the testimony of Orlando Balaba. These circumstances were:

The circumstance of place where the killing was committed, the circumstance of the
manner of the attack, the circumstance of holding hostage some teachers and
students inside the faculty room, the circumstance of terrifying an entire school, the
circumstance that sitting on a scrapbook is too insignificant as to arouse passion
strong enough to motivate a killing, are circumstantial evidences that gave the court
no room for doubt that prosecution witnesses Orlando Balaba, Benjamin Amper and
Allan de la Serna truthfully told the court that they saw the accused smoking
marijuana inside the comfort room at 1:45 in the afternoon of December 14, 1984. ...
. 26

The above circumstances pointed to by the trial court may be indicative of passionate anger on the
part of Renato; we do not believe that they necessarily show that Renato had smoked marijuana
before entering his English III class. In the absence of competent medical or other direct evidence of
ingestion of a dangerous drug, courts may be wary and critical of indirect evidence, considering the
severe consequences for the accused of a finding that he had acted while under the influence of a
prohibited drug. The Court considers that the evidence presented on this point was simply
inadequate to support the ruling of the trial court that Renato had shot and killed Francis while under
the influence of a prohibited drug.

7. The claim that appellant had voluntarily surrendered.

Appellant contends that he had voluntarily surrendered and that the trial court should have
considered that mitigating circumstance in his favor. The trial court did not, and we consider that it
correctly refused to do so. Firstly, Renato surrendered his gun, not himself, 27 by handing over the
weapon through the balustrade of the faculty room. Secondly, he surrendered the gun to his brother,
who was not in any case a person in authority nor an agent of a person in authority. 28 Thirdly,
Renato did not surrender himself he was arrested by Capt. Lazo. The fact that he did not resist
arrest, did not constitute voluntary surrender. 29 Finally, if it be assumed that Renato had surrendered
himself, such surrender cannot be regarded as voluntary and spontaneous. Renato was holed up in
the faculty room, in effect holding some teachers and students as hostages. The faculty room was
surrounded by Philippine Constabulary soldiers and there was no escape open to him. He was not
entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.

8. Whether or not the crime was committed in contempt of or with insult to the public
authorities.

The trial court held that the shooting to death of Francis had been done "in contempt of or with insult
to the public authorities:
 Under Republic Act 1978, as amended, a teacher of a public or private school is
considered a person in authority. The fact that Mr. Damaso Pasilbas, the teacher in
mathematics, was already checking the attendance did not deter the accused from
pursuing his evil act, The accused ignored his teacher's presence and pleas. Not yet
satisfied with the crime and terror he had done to Francis and the entire school, the
accused entered the faculty room and held hostage the teachers and students who
were inside that room. To the court, this act of the accused was an insult to his
teachers and to the school, an act of callus disregard of other's feelings and safety
and completely reprehensible. 30

We believe the trial court erred in so finding the presence of a generic aggravating circumstance.
Article 152 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 1978 and Presidential
Decree No. 299, provides as follows:

Art. 152. Persons in authority and agents of persons in authority. — Who shall be
deemed as such. — In applying the provisions of the preceding and other articles of
this Code, any person directly vested with jurisdiction, whether as an individual or as
a member of some court or government corporation, board, or commission, shall be
deemed a person in authority. A barrio captain and a barangay chairman shall also
be deemed a person in authority.

A person who by direct provision of law or by election or by appointment by

competent authority, is charged with the maintenance of public order and the
protection and security of life and property, such as a barrio councilman, barrio
policeman and barangay leader and any person who comes to the aid of persons in
authority, shall be deemed an agent of a person in authority.

In applying the provisions of Articles 148 and 151 of this Code, teachers,
professors and persons charged with the supervision of public or duly recognized
private schools, colleges and universities, and lawyers in the actual performance of
their professional duties or on the occasion of such performance, shall be deemed
persons in authority. (As amended by P.D. No. 299, September 19, 1973 and Batas
Pambansa Blg. 873, June 12, 1985).

Careful reading of the last paragraph of Article 152 will show that while a teacher or professor of a
public or recognized private school is deemed to be a "person in authority," such teacher or
professor is so deemed only for purposes of application of Articles 148 (direct assault upon a person
in authority), and 151 (resistance and disobedience to a person in authority or the agents of such
person) of the Revised Penal Code. In marked contrast, the first paragraph of Article 152 does not
identify specific articles of the Revised Penal Code for the application of which any person "directly
vested with jurisdiction, etc." is deemed "a person in authority." Because a penal statute is not to be
given a longer reach and broader scope than is called for by the ordinary meaning of the ordinary
words used by such statute, to the disadvantage of an accused, we do not believe that a teacher or
professor of a public or recognized private school may be regarded as a "public authority" within the
meaning of paragraph 2 of Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code, 31 the provision the trial court
applied in the case at bar.

ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the trial court dated 31 July 1986 is hereby MODIFIED in the
following manner and to the following extent only:

1. In Criminal Case No. 4007, appellant shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua;
 2. In Criminal Case No. 4012 — (a) the aggravating circumstances of evident
premeditation and of having acted with contempt of or insult to the public authorities
shall be DELETED and not taken into account; and (b) the special aggravating
circumstances of acting while under the influence of dangerous drugs and with the
use of an unlicensed firearm shall similarly be DELETED and not taken into account.
There being no generic aggravating nor mitigating circumstances present, the
appellant shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

The two (2) penalties of reclusion perpetua shall be served successively in accordance with the
provisions of Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code. As so modified, the decision of the trial court is
hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against appellant.

SO ORDERED.

ARBITRARY DETENTION