Professional Documents
Culture Documents
2017-2019
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL NETHERLANDS
INTERNAL - NOT FOR QUOTATION
Table of contents
Introduction 3
Overarching developments 4
Europe 15
The Netherlands 19
List of interviewees 22
Introduction
If, in 2015, a group of well-informed analysts, pundits and journalists had attempted to forecast the
developments which they expected would characterise the next two years, would their predictions have
been close to the mark? With the benefit of hindsight it seems safe to say that they probably would have
missed many of the unlikely events which shocked the world in 2016. Brexit and the election of Donald
Trump, to take the two most obvious examples, caught the vast majority of political analysts by surprise.
Forecasting is not exactly a science, and with longer timespans and greater specificity comes greater
risk of failure. Most analysts are therefore reluctant to say anything too specific about the future, or offer
In many cases they are right to do so. The prediction of specific events is, in the long run, of les-
ser importance than signalling and understanding the underlying trends influencing political discourse,
social cohesion, and economic developments which give rise to those specific events. Outlining future
scenarios is therefore more about sketching the landscape ahead than about predicting which signs will
be posted along the road. Such exploration of deeper trends underlying particular occurrences is what
makes forecasting useful and necessary: it helps organisations to understand the changing playing field,
and to map out strategies for best navigating the challenges ahead.
Strategic Studies has been asked to conduct this horizon scan, which is the first in a series of two-yearly
reports in which Amnesty International Netherlands (AINL) will look ahead to the political and societal
playing field of the near future. For this first edition we have conducted extensive desk research, drawn
upon trend analysis conducted for AINL by the Hague Institute for the Internationalisation of Law, spo-
ken to 22 AINL staff members, 17 external experts from government, think tanks, the media and other
NGOs, and held a roundtable at the Dutch ministry of foreign affairs on the future of multilateralism and
the EU. This horizon scan for the most part takes a Dutch-international perspective, and focuses espe-
cially on developments within Europe and the Netherlands. For the sake of readability we have opted to
keep the number of references to an absolute minimum. For further queries about our assertions, sour-
(a.muis@amnesty.nl or l.vantroost@amnesty.nl)
Overarching developments
There was a broad consensus amongst those interviewed on only two things: ours is a time of deep
unpredictability, and the outlook for the future is generally gloomy. The established certainties of yeste-
ryear such as the transatlantic alliance and the advancing integration of the European Union have been
shaken up, and the feeling prevails that anything is now possible. Although looking ahead has always
been a murky exercise, many of the interviewees indicated that they had seldom been this uncertain
about the future. The optimism with which the liberal multilateral world order, the European Union, and
the wide acceptance of human rights norms were formerly viewed has faded. All sides of the political
spectrum are increasingly frustrated with processes of globalisation and the credo that ‘there is no alter-
native’, although most are also at a loss as to what a viable alternative might look like. With mainstream
political thinking coming up empty, the initiative and momentum of public debate in many Western
societies has shifted to nationalist and populist politicians who do offer alternatives, although these are
frequently in direct opposition to the norms and values which define the post-war international order.
The trends and forecasts outlined below generally can be read through the two paradigms of uncertainty
about the future and growing pessimism about the existing system – although there are some excep-
tions. Throughout Europe and the United States people, particularly young people, are organising in
opposition against the dominant political trends, against populism and in favour of internationalism and
issues like a humane refugee policy. The political shift towards nationalistic right-wing populism appears
previously appeared in the Occupy movement, this relatively non-political and unorganised movement
ultimately proved to be ineffective. At the time of writing a passionate anti-populist reaction can again
be witnessed on the progressive left internationally, although it is too early to state with certainty if it has
If these trends persist the political landscape in 2019 will be more uncertain, polarised, and deeply
divided than it is today. This division will also be increasingly applicable to issues of human rights, the
acceptance of which was previously largely shared by parties across the aisles of national parliaments
– but no more. In America president Trump has proposed policies which expand on the worst exces-
ses of the George W. Bush administration. In the UK Theresa May has advocated a departure from the
European Convention of Human Rights. In the Netherlands the 2017 election campaign saw 5 political
parties, including the mainstream ‘system’ parties campaign on promises which were in direct contra-
vention to the Dutch rechtsstaat. On 12 January 2017 Kenneth Roth, director of Human Rights Watch,
published an article in Foreign Policy which encapsulated the current state of mind in the human rights
field. Its title: “We are on the verge of Darkness”. Although states and political parties have always dis-
agreed on which human rights are most valuable or preferable, seldom has the national and international
advocacy of human rights as a concept in itself been this clearly divided along (party)political lines. If
these trends continue on their current path, Amnesty International should prepare for several years in
which its advocacy will be more contested, popular support will no longer be guaranteed, and its political
clout might decrease. Or, perhaps, in 2019 we will look back on our current alarm with wonder and ask
ourselves how we could have been so pessimistic. After all, a near-certainty for the next two years is
that we will continue to be surprised by the one thing that continues to complicate expectations: events.
In brief...
Rising migration, declining standards of refugee protection & the ascent of ad hoc solutions
- Climate change will further deteriorate already dire conditions in Sub Sahara Africa and the Middle
East.
- Political willingness to stand up for refugee and migrants’ rights is declining throughout Europe.
-
Economic growth, demographic expansion, and technological developments are likely to increase
migration within Africa and from Africa to Europe in the short- to mid-term.
- The liberal international world order is widely expected to decline due to a US retreat and the inability of
the EU to step up its role. Whereas the international community is built around shared values and mul-
tilateralism, an international system of communities will rely on shared interests and transactionalism.
- There will be an accompanying move towards a ‘spheres of influence’ international system, in which
greater sway for regional powers, as well as a more regionalised interpretation of human rights and
- Regional trends towards illiberalism will continue, as will Russian influence in these.
- The initiative and momentum of the public debate has shifted to the right, with acidic undertones incre-
- Simultaneously this is countered by growing calls for participation and fairness – a rise of progressive
- Economic inequality within societies continues to grow, as do uncertainties about future prosperity and
Known unknowns
- In the technological field, greater automation, robotisation and digitalisation are a near-certainty. But
opinions are strongly divided on whether these will bring greater prosperity or greater inequality. The
only clarity which exists with regard to technological advances is also a cliché: these will be disruptive
to the status quo. Developments in the fields of Artificial Intelligence, big data analysis, and predictive
policing will follow one another rapidly, with deeply uncertain outcomes.1
- Global economic indicators have been moving in an upwards direction for extended periods, in spite of
increased political volatility. World stock indices are at record heights, while actual economic growth is
lagging and the newly added wealth is exceptionally unevenly distributed. Some analysts fear that this
growth contains the seeds for a future economic and social crisis.
- With political, social, and economic instability in Venezuela reaching peak intensity, the Caribbean
parts of the Netherlands could begin to see a considerable refugee flow from that country.
- The EU, responding to external pressures and finding a new internal balance following the Brexit nego-
tiations, could pull together and find its voice as a global actor and renew its position as a normative
- The progressive grassroots reaction to populism and nationalism could sway the international political
tide, causing renewed nationalism to go out of fashion, reversing the rollback of international human
immigration. Most worryingly, the global system of refugee protection is set to deteriorate significantly.
It is widely expected that existing conventions will increasingly become dead letters, while there are few
viable alternatives on offer. The ‘refugee deal’ struck between Europe and Turkey is exemplary for what
1 Technological developments have not been studied in depth for this horizon scan. Strategic Studies has commis-
sioned a report, Legal Futures for the ICC, with the Hague Institute for the Innovation of Law in which technological
advances and their human rights consequences are thoroughly analysed. This study will be completed in May 2017.
is to be expected. It is widely regarded in Europe as a blueprint for further agreements with North Africa
and Middle Eastern regimes. Political leaders throughout the EU will continue to call for regional soluti-
ons for migrants and refugees, rather than processing these in Europe and working out burden-sharing
Multiple interviewees have indicated that such regional solutions would be a necessary step in the pro-
cess of ensuring greater democratic legitimacy for ‘legitimate refugee’ protection. Several also indicated
that if more deportations and stricter migration policies are not implemented, the situation could become
considerably worse for refugees. A growing number of political parties and pundits increasingly dismiss
human rights organisations like Amnesty International and the standards they aim to uphold as “politi-
cally unrealistic”. Human rights organisations may see themselves forced to accept previously hard to
swallow solutions such as refugee quota or external processing, or they may see themselves being incre-
The rift of polarisation and division within Western societies is widely expected to deepen significantly
over the next few years. Barring a sudden political shift towards a widely accepted narrative of greater
inclusion and integration, which no interviewee expected, the ‘us versus them’ narrative can be expected
to remain the dominant political theme in years to come. In the most pessimistic future, this narrative
blends into a joint fear of ‘the other’ and of terrorism, which will result in increasingly pervasive and
oppressive security measures aimed at ensuring greater physical and ‘identity’ security. Such measures
will disproportionally target ethnic and religious minorities, although the gradual dismantling of legal safe-
guards granted under the rechtsstaat will eventually result in reduced liberty for all.
This is indicative of two interrelated trends: first, a consistent and rapid shift towards a securitisation
frame, in which all societal problems are considered through the lens of risk and security, of which
breaches become increasingly unacceptable. Second, and related, is the democratic embrace of this
frame. Electorates have long demanded more ‘hard’ security, valuing efforts in this area more than they
electorally punish governments for invading privacy or violating legal norms. There is little evidence to
suggest a shift in the public mood in the next years, hence further calls for strengthening security mea-
sures is to be expected.
International protection of human rights is expected to come under greater stress, as fewer countries are
subscribing fully to human rights norms. Since citizens will still want to claim human rights protections
within national boundaries, many of the human rights battles will therefore increasingly be fought out in
national courts. The role of the human rights organisations in this will be complicated. Around the world,
the human rights movement is increasingly framed as being exclusively Western. At the same time it is
ironically also losing ground within the West, particularly in Europe, where human rights are increasingly
considered to be an instrument for the protection of ‘others’ such as migrants, rather than European citi-
zens. The result is that human rights organisations are increasingly becoming global Fremdkörper. That
is not to say that the majority of people will no longer seek or demand human rights – they will – but
increasingly for themselves rather than for others (in the West) and with decreasing international sup-
have relatively recently (re)discovered authoritarian tendencies, such as Hungary and Poland, the abro-
gation of civil and human rights is overt. In such places the space for civil society is clearly shrinking.
In others, like Turkey and Russia, there was little space to start with – although the recent crackdown on
civil society in Turkey has been unusually severe, and there is no evidence suggesting that a reversal of
The trend, however, is also noticeable in Western Europe and the United States, albeit in a more latent
incarnation. The ‘us versus them’ thinking which increasingly characterises public and political discourse
around the world is fostering a more fearful climate in which violence, hate speech, and repressive
measures amplify one another in a vicious cycle. Throughout Western Europe politicians are deeply con-
cerned about the number of migrants and refugees attempting to reach their countries each year. Such
fears are not allayed by pressing reports in the online and mainstream media that Jihadi extremists might
be included in their ranks. With each terror strike or act of violence committed by a(n) (allegedly) radi-
calised Muslim this narrative is strengthened. The restrictive legal measures which numerous European
states have consequently adopted will eventually have the effect of decreasing personal liberties for all
by limiting, amongst others, the freedom of expression, criminalising intellectual sympathy or support
for extremist ideologies, and curtailing the right to a fair trial for specific crimes (such as joining ISIS) by
allowing (local) government to curtail personal liberties without referring such instances to the courts.
Although there have usually been understandable reasons, often valid, for curtailing individual liberties
in specific instances of high alert and national emergency, Western society is now moving towards a
state of semi-permanent emergency. The looming threat of terrorism has long been a blanket argument
to legitimise broadening states’ security and surveillance powers, but never to as far-reaching an extent
as it is today. Electorates do not seem to fear a creeping advance of state powers at the expense of
individual liberty. Even in the US, which is currently witnessing a resurgence of citizen and political acti-
vism, the majority of this is directed at the most visibly destructive excesses of the Trump administration,
rather than at the (bi-partisan) underlying securitisation which has caused tremendous funds and power
to flow to globally operating intelligence agencies with little democratic oversight or accountability.
Since the knee-jerk political reaction to a public fear of terrorism will continue to be calls for an expan-
sion of intelligence and security measures, many of those interviewed expect a continuing shift towards
a greater securitisation of political discourse and the public space. Whilst this is understandable, the
result will be an increased restriction of individual liberties, possibly to the extent that needlessly large
groups of people will see their rights curtailed for unnecessarily long periods of time. As one interviewee
sketched the problem of further broadening the powers of the security state in Western Europe:
“What could [intelligence agencies] do with more competencies? Just about everything is
already possible. If there is pressure on them to do even more, things will happen which are sim-
ply unacceptable from a human rights perspective. The current [anti-terrorism] measures are not
clearly in violation of certain human rights principles, but it is almost unavoidable that the next
The security apparatus of the liberal democracies of the West should not be equated with the deep
state institutions of repression wielded by authoritarians. Yet it is disconcerting that the powers yielded
by security and intelligence institutions to protect the effective functioning of democratic institutions
will continue to grow, while democratic and transparent oversight holding the security and intelligence
apparatus accountable will either remain stagnant or decline. Should this trend continue at its current
pace, the largest democratic deficits of the future will be with the very institutions created to defend
democracy.
well as those making their way towards Europe, will continue to rise. In the long run three factors are
likely to cause a considerable increase both within Africa and the Middle East, and in the volume of peo-
1) population growth in Northern and Sub-Sahara Africa and the Middle East is projected to strongly
increase the population of these regions over the course of the coming century: Africa’s population is
2) the average temperatures in these regions are expected to increase significantly due to climate
1 UN, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2015) World Population Prospects, The 2015
Revision, 1.
2 One particularly dire projection has been made for the Persian Gulf, which researchers suggest could become too hot
to sustain human life by 2100, see Jeremy Pall & Elfatih Eltahir (2016) ‘Future temperature in southwest Asia projec-
ted to exceed a threshold for human adaptability’, Nature Climate Change, 6: 197-200.
10
3) societies developing economically tend experience a phase of greater emigration, meaning that eco-
nomic growth in Africa and the Middle East is likely to increase rather than decrease migration in the
It is therefore exceedingly likely that systematically higher numbers of migrants will make the trek towards
highest ever number. Over the course of the next few years their international-legal protection is widely
expected to deteriorate, particularly in Europe. Since this development is most poignantly demonstrated
tion of norms considered beneficial to the populations of all its members. Although this order has never
been uncontested or free of division and conflict, the post-Cold War era – particularly the 1990s – did
witness a surge in multilateralism. This era now seems to have come to a close. Even within the West
there is less enthusiasm for international cooperation, or instruments of international law, particularly
where these impose obligations, limitations, or responsibilities on states which have a decreasing appe-
Multiple interviewees expected a further decline of the value-based international order over the course
of the next few years. This expectation should be tempered by noting, as several interviewees did, that
the existing multilateral structure is still entirely in place, and that it will not be uprooted in several years.
Also it is unclear what benefits such rapid destruction would entail for states, which will have a continued
Still, it is likely that the next few years will see an increase in transactional diplomacy, where states
reach (bilateral) agreements based on shared interests rather than through multilateral channels built on
shared values. Since the existence of multilateralism and transactionalism are not necessarily mutually
exclusive, this shift will occur in complement to the existing international system rather than as a replace-
ment thereof. It would be needlessly alarmist to proclaim the end of multilateralism and the death of the
11
liberal world order – but a gradual shift away from multilateralism is certainly underway.
International organisations will be eased (slowly and haltingly) towards reform which makes them more
amenable to a multipolar world order with multiple spheres of influence (with differing values and inter-
pretations of human rights norms). Exactly what such reforms will look like, and into which roles existing
international organisations will morph, is impossible to say at this time. It is a reasonable assumption,
however, that the future of multilateralism will be a dressed-down and more sober version of the post-
Cold War ideal. Rising powers will continue to demand greater influence in the international system –
particularly the UN, IMF, and World Bank – which they have already been doing for years. Such reform
is a far cry from destruction, although considerable shifts will have to be effectuated for the existing
made a resounding comeback, and the balance between power politics and multilateralism is beginning
to sway towards the former. States feel less bound by international treaties, and derogation from treaties
and international organisations is a subject of serious and open debate in a growing number of parlia-
ments and administrations around the world. In 2016 three African states, Burundi, South Africa, and
Gambia announced their intent to withdraw from the ICC. Gambia and South Africa have since reneged
on this intention, but support for withdrawal from the Court, although contested, remains considerable
within the African Union. Several interviewees expected the withdrawal of more countries from the ICC,
and expressed fears that the ECHR might also see its first departures.
price nor bear the same burden to uphold the value-based liberal world order. The Trump administra-
tion does not seem to have a strategy in place to assess foreign policy priorities, instead seeking to put
‘America First’ by responding to developments and crises on an ad hoc basis without a clear idea of the
course of action which would cause the US to ‘win’, or even what victory might look like. This makes
predicting the administration’s future policy choices next to impossible. The Trump administration has
frequently stated its intention to withdraw from the world stage, but considering that no strategy for such
action appears to have been thought out, and since there are few clear benefits to a total withdrawal
from organisations like the UN, NATO, WTO, IMF or the World Bank, continued American participation
12
in these institutions is a safe bet. Still, a scale-back of American funding to co-operation and develop-
The funding gap which follows from this will probably not be fully compensated by other states, meaning
that the UN will be forced to become a leaner and more efficient organisation, and that additional fun-
It appears unlikely at this time that the EU, mired by continuing internal crises, can step into the role
increasingly being vacated by the US. As it stands, the EU is unsure of its own future, let alone its future
position in the international system. Although European integration is still an unparalleled success in
economic terms, the stability of its political integration has become highly precarious. For the next two
years the EU will be consumed with the Brexit negotiations, maintaining the Eurozone, determining the
future of European integration, maintaining a united front towards Russia, and attempting to stabilise
both its external borders and internal coherence. Much will also depend on the outcome of the French
presidential elections. A le Pen presidency will almost certainly mean the end of the Eurozone, possibly
the EU itself. But even if another candidate wins, the EU will still be absorbed by its internal squabbles.
So long as European leaders are beset by these dragging problems and frequently recurring crises, they
will have little appetite for anything that does not directly contribute to their solution.
lisation and Westernisation – long part and parcel of the foreign policy of Western states, although never
uncontested – has largely been abandoned. In its place has come a growing acceptance of a ‘spheres
of influence’ thinking with an accompanying philosophy of relativism and realism. Over the coming years
this could well mean that human rights violations, particularly where it concerns reproductive or LGBT
rights, will increasingly be defended as part and parcel of an alternative non-Western culture by those in
power in Eastern Europe, East Asia, Africa and the Middle East. Although it has always been a political
choice which human rights to emphasise, we are now witnessing an era in which the perceived universa-
The human rights movement is increasingly framed as being exclusively Western. At the same time it is
ironically also losing ground within the West, particularly in Europe, where human rights are increasingly
considered to be an instrument for the protection of ‘others’ such as migrants, rather than European
13
citizens. The result is that human rights organisations are increasingly becoming global Fremdkörper.
That is not to say that the majority of people will no longer seek or demand human rights – they will –
but increasingly for themselves rather than for others (in the West) and with decreasing international
citizens throughout the world continue to appreciate, or desperately call upon, human rights protections.
The dominant political narrative in the West may have become sceptical of human rights, human rights
treaties, and the international organisations safeguarding them, but this development also engenders a
passionate response. Several countries are now witnessing the rise of grassroots (political) movements
opposing this narrative. The strong and persistent protests against president Trump in the US can be
taken as a sign of this, although the opposition to the current administration is diffuse and seems to
lack ideological and organisational clarity and coherence. In Switzerland the student initiative Operation
Libero has scored several pro-immigration and pro-international victories in referendums. In France and
the Netherlands Emmanuel Macron’s en Marche! and Jesse Klaver’s Groenlinks self-proclaimed move-
ments have demonstrated that progressive political forces can elicit considerable popular support, and
that ours is not only an ‘age of anger’ against globalisation and the other.
in the twenty-first century, and this trend is widely expected to continue. A concurrent development
which is expected to gain currency over the next few years is the growth of economic inequality not just
between societal groups within countries, but between countries as well. The global division of wealth
among nations has always been unequal, but today it stands at a higher rate than at any point in history,
a gap which is set to widen. This will increase tensions within organisations such as the EU, which will
see a growing divergence between the economically thriving countries in the North of Europe, and those
(predominantly in the South and East of Europe) lagging behind. This development also appears within
societies, where unequal division of wealth has fed political and societal unrest for years. The growth
of economic inequality within states, coupled with growing uncertainty about the future availability of
housing, employment, and social security, is widely expected to dominate the Western political debate
14
Europe
will have to reconfigure itself following the Brexit and the 2017 election season. This will hamper
realpolitik, hard power, and multipolar transactional diplomacy. At the same time the EU finds
itself at a historic moment: it can now choose to move forward, grind to a halt, or muddle through.
The course it follows will depend largely on the outcome of the French elections.
Over the course of the next two years, the EU, assuming its continued existence, will have to
reconfigure at least three things: its relationship with the United Kingdom following Brexit, the
balance between its communal aspects and the sovereignty of the member states (an end to the
ever closer union seems likely), and the Eurozone. Multiple interviewees indicated that the EU,
working at its accustomed glacial place until spurred into action by crisis, was unlikely to resolve
this existential debate within two years. The EU is more likely to muddle through than to radically
change or dissipate entirely. Although if the EU’s model or general direction does not change at
all, calls for more ‘exits’ will certainly continue, and it is not unlikely that some of them will be
successful.
politics in the coming years. Although some interviewees pointed out that at its core, populism
contains a critical reminder of the democratic ideal (representation of the people) the majority of
interviewees considered it to constitute a threat to the rule of law. In the words of one interviewee:
“it attacks all existing institutions, problematising law, politics, science, the media” without offe-
ring alternatives viable for a heterogonous population. The reasons for the enduring international
populist surge vary from country to country, but its rise is most widely attributed to widespread
and growing frustration about the faltering materialisation of promised wealth, economic growth,
and the fear that current levels of affluence and socio-economic security cannot be upheld. The
resulting rise in tensions divides societies along socio-economic, educational, cultural, but also
15
Although the populist vote remains a minority faction in most countries, it has been exceedingly suc-
cessful in making its voice heard. With the possible exception of the (close) Brexit vote, the majority of
voters in most countries still favour the status quo, and continue to attach value to the existing system of
human rights and the rule of law. Yet in many countries, like in the Netherlands, political leaders incre-
asingly cater to the political narrative of a vocal minority by adopting watered-down versions of populist
rhetoric. In others, like Canada, however this narrative is explicitly and successfully countered. With
some exaggeration, the international political debate of the next few years will be framed by this dicho-
tomy: hard right-wing populist movements on the one hand, and Trudeauesque inclusive movements on
the other. At least, it seems likely that such a dichotomy will catch the eye of the media. Middle-of-the-
road political parties will have to fight harder to capture the public’s attention, imagination, and votes
Following this trend, it is increasingly unlikely that new international agreements and legislation improving
human rights standards will be agreed upon. As one interviewee described the prevailing sentiment: “at
ving for national sovereignty have now returned to the forefront of European politics. There was broad
consensus amongst those interviewed that the EU was facing a deeper uncertainty than it had in the
past, due in most part to the current anti-EU policy of Donald Trump, the looming election of anti-Euro-
zone and Eurosceptic Marine le Pen, and the general trend of growing Euroscepticism in most member
states.
With regard to human rights, where formerly a broad consensus on general principles has usually been
the norm, such agreement is now dissipating. Existing rifts over issues such as refugee resettlement,
migration, economic inequality and relations with Russia are widely expected to deepen, with the shift
towards illiberal democracy in Hungary and Poland as potentially the most worrying trend from a human
rights perspective. If both these countries continue on their current track, and the European Commission
fails to invoke its rule of law mechanism, or fellow member states remain relatively uncritical, the reputa-
tion of the EU as a human rights actor, both as an advocate and an example, will deteriorate significantly.
1 Although such easy dichotomies are defied by countries such as Spain and Greece, where the ‘populist’ parties are of
a more hard-left bent, and Italy, where Beppe Grillo is difficult to pin down on political positions.
16
This is by no means a certain outcome, but if it does occur, an EU of multiple speeds – identified by a
large number of interviewees as the most likely outcome of EU reform – might then also come into being
with regard to values and human rights norms. This would entail that EU member states will increasingly
operate in shifting coalitions, not only where it concerns matters such as the extent of economic inte-
gration, but also on normative and humanitarian issues. One interviewee voiced the expectation that in
such a Europe burden sharing would be disproportione, but that it might be the only effective strategy
Convention and the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees. Although sympathy for the plight of
refugees was universally shared, many had little lost love for the Refugee Convention, which one inter-
viewee called “theoretically and practically impossible to execute”. Others were enthusiastic about see-
ing it scrapped. Although a consensus existed that the treaty might be amended, a large majority of
interviewees indicated that in practice this would be exceedingly difficult, in addition to there being little
enthusiasm for this amongst the state parties. Several interviewees held the belief that renegotiation
would be pointless since the chances for improvement of refugee rights were slim, whereas the pos-
sibilities for a deterioration of their rights and protections were considerable. The most likely outcome of
this stalemate seems to be the increasing disregard of obligations under the convention and protocol,
In migrant and refugee policy, there is a clear trend towards a greater emphasis on state sovereignty,
hard borders and more transactional policy (such as ‘refugee deals’) rather than acting on a moral impe-
rative. Migrant and refugee policy is almost universally expected to become stricter and more harshly
implemented. There was a wide expectation that the EU member states would logically gravitate towards
constructing a wall around Europe, either one made from barbed wire or one constructed through strict
immigration enforcement. The implementation of a European quota for refugees is almost certainly in
the cards – allowing for agreement on their relocation within the EU, which will surely lead to strongly
states would leave the ECHR in the next two years. Others expressed the frustration that the human
17
rights regime had expanded so significantly that it now extended to fields which many consider to be the
purview of national politics – inevitably leading to political clashes between (politicians from) states and
the European courts in Strasbourg and Luxembourg. One interviewee expressed the sentiment that “the
regime of human rights treaties will receive several cold showers”, but added that he believed its core
Should states begin to seriously consider departure, the UK is a logical first candidate. Theresa May,
prime minister of the UK, has long resisted the ECHRs jurisdiction over the UK, arguing that the UK
should leave the European Convention rather than the European Union. At the Conservative Party confe-
rence in 2016 she vowed to protect British soldiers from a “legal witch hunt” by seeking to opt out of the
One interviewee noted that tensions between member states of the Council of Europe and the ECHR
were likely to increase significantly, as a result of which several of them would likely seek to open up the
treaty system in which the European system of human rights protection is embedded. Multiple intervie-
wees expected that the Court would become more reticent in its jurisprudence, for fear of non-compli-
ance by member states. Exactly what would happen to the Court in case of departure is terra incognita,
Several interviewees also indicated a looming legitimacy problem for the international corpus of human
rights and the institutions guarding these, which are increasingly considered to be “elitist” – or at least
are increasingly being framed as such. If the rift between the popular and elite perceptions of human
rights and justice widens too far, this will result in a disconnect between, in the words of one interviewee,
the “unworldly NGO’s with an overly uniform vision of the world” and the general populace, which fails to
see the relevance of an emphasis on such issues as transgender rights or ethnic profiling.
Still it is altogether too early to take an overly cynical turn. These trends are worrying because they pose
a significant departure from the high level of human rights standards to which Europe has become
accustomed, but realignment is not the same as resignation. In the words of one interviewee:
“several splinters will be chafed from the human rights advances constructed with the optimism
of the 1990s … but I believe that within Western Europe this can be halted … the human rights
agenda will become less ambitious than it was in the nineties, but I am convinced that the
18
The Netherlands
societal polarisation. It has become a truism to state that the public debate, or what sometimes passes
for it, is hardening. Sympathy for the entire spectrum of human rights and advocacy organisations like
Amnesty has become far less self-evident. Our social bubbles – both online and in the real world – are
making it increasingly difficult to reach out to people outside Amnesty’s natural constituency. Barring the
sudden and unexpected rise of a widespread drive for greater social harmony, and an effective method
for online and offline bubble breaking, this trend will certainly persist. The political landscape of the next
years will be more multifaceted and divided than it has been in decades, with the largest political party
(the liberal VVD) holding only slightly more than a fifth of the seats in parliament.
affected by globalisation. Although this has brought considerable wealth, over the last few years this pro-
cess has also increasingly become associated with fear and frustration. The dividing lines between the
‘winners’ and ‘losers’ of an open economy and European integration have deepened. Political leaders are
increasingly unwilling to stick out their necks for large international trade agreements such as TTIP and
CETA, both of which face growing public opposition. Should TTIP make it to the phase of parliamentary
The underlying structure of the globalised economy, however is largely beyond the effective control of
national parliaments, particularly those of relatively small and open countries like the Netherlands. Where
globalisation is concerned such states find themselves in a political conundrum: on the one hand they
profit strongly from globalisation, on the other hand it means that they have to play by rules largely made
by others. Over the last few years the call for national control has grown stronger, which obviously crea-
tes friction with the internationalist status quo. Since the globalised economy, mechanisms of European
integration, and the international legal framework are all highly technical and administered by a relatively
closed and highly specialised managerial and bureaucratic system – which by its nature eschews politi-
cal debate – national political parties find themselves at a loss for meaningful political alternatives. Since
the 1990s both the right and left sides of the political spectrum have accepted the constraints of the
globalised system, meaning that the margins for political change have decreased significantly.
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Partly because of this, the political discourse of the 2017 election was dominated by more local and
national topics, such as education, healthcare, the elderly, and identity. Although domestic topics usu-
ally sway elections, the fact that there is little the Netherlands can change about international arrange-
ments means that the future political debate will continue to be focused on national issues. Since both
the political left and right accept internationalism, the only real opposition (and apparent alternative)
comes from anti-establishment parties which advocate radical alternatives such as leaving the EU and
a strong reaffirmation of national identity. The debate around the vague issue of national identity is set
to continue for at least a decade. If the current trend continues this will lead to a hardening divide along
religious and ethnic lines. The same is widely expected to happen with regard to the ‘renationalisation’ of
political and legal decisions, as the number of voices calling for a withdrawal from legal treaties and the
the disappointing election results for the extreme-right wing PVV party (20 out of a 150 seats) were a
striking signal, these followed a lacklustre campaign which featured deeply negative and impractical
messages such as the closing of all mosques and Muslim schools, and banning the Koran. Although
all mainstream parties have indicated that they will refuse to govern with the PVV, watered-down versi-
ons of some of its core ideas have gained wide political currency. The notion that mainstream parties
should make concessions to the hardening societal and political climate or be replaced by populists, has
definitively taken hold in The Hague. Over the course of the 2017 elections the political climate turned
definitively against Islam and a strong emphasis was placed on security and national identity. Although
here, as on the international level, an electoral movement which defined itself largely in opposition to
these themes swept up a considerable proportion of the vote. Both the green Groenlinks (14 seats) and
the progressive-liberal D66 (19 seats) realised strong electoral gains. The 2017 elections suggested that
both Euroscepticism and pro-Europeanism are on the rise in the Netherlands. Barring a process of nati-
onal reconciliation, this widening rift is set to deepen, with both sides increasingly regarding the ideas of
the other as ‘dangerous’ or ‘naïve’, something already long underway in the Anglo-Saxon world. This can
Having experienced the electoral windfall of an emphasis on security and identity, the mainstream VVD
(33 seats) and CDA (19 seats) parties are unlikely to change course. The social democratic PvdA (9
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seats, down from 38) has been eviscerated and will likely re-evaluate its political profile. The PVV will
certainly keep up its virulently anti-Muslim message, although it has demonstrated a pattern of radicali-
sation over the last decade which will be difficult to maintain without simultaneously proposing to abolish
the constitution, the independent judiciary, derogating from all human rights treaties, and ensure the co-
operation of security services for a programme of religious persecution. An interesting political dynamic
is the arrival of the anti-European, hard-right FVD in parliament (2 seats). This party presents itself as
an intellectual alternative to the PVV, espousing an agenda of cultural, national and aesthetic purity. If
the performance of PVV-leader Geert Wilders continues to flag, the FVD can expect major gains in the
next election. Although the widely feared populist victory has not materialised in 2017, its spectre has
lent incidents have become part and parcel of our society after 9/11. This political debate is dominated
by those calling for more action, more restrictive security measures, and greater authority for the state
while removing legal safeguards. The frame of securitisations, which regards all issues through the prism
of safety and security, has effectively framed issues like privacy and the legal checks of the rechtsstaat
(rule of law) as roadblocks on the highway to greater security. Although the liberal democrats and greens
continue to advocate both, the general political and societal trends certainly favour greater securitisation.
Civil servants within the security and justice ministry are growing increasingly frustrated with this deve-
lopment, as are civil society organisations like Amnesty. Yet, barring a sudden increase in popular sup-
port for the fundamental principles of the rule of law, its further deterioration is to be expected – at least
until the point where the public’s concern about the impeding of civil liberties starts to outweigh fears for
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List of Interviewees
External experts
Frans Bieckmann: founder & editor-in-chief of The Broker
Ybo Buruma: judge at the Hoge Raad (the Dutch Supreme Court)
Rene Cuperus: columnist Volkskrant and sr. fellow at the Wiardi Beckman Stichting, the Dutch research
centre for social democracy of the PvdA party (in government 2012-2017)
Helen Duffy: professor of international humanitarian law and human rights at Leiden University; director
Paul Frissen: professor of public management at Tilburg University; dean of the Nederlandse School
Laura van den Heuvel: communications adviser College voor de Rechten van de Mens (Netherlands
Jan-Peter Loof: law lecturer at Leiden University; member of the College voor de Rechten van de Mens
Patrick van Schie: director of the Teldersstichting, the liberal think tank associated with the VVD party
Mathieu Segers: dean of University College Maastricht; professor of European history and integration.
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