Republic of the Philippines appear before the Acceptance Board in order to register for military
SUPREME COURT service in accordance with law, and that the said appellants, in spite
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-45892 July 13, 1938
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
TRANQUILINO LAGMAN, defendant-appellant.
-----------------------------
G.R. No. L-45893 July 13, 1938
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
PRIMITIVO DE SOSA, defendant-appellant.
Severino P. Izon for appellants.
Office of the Solicitor-General Tuason for appellee.
AVANCEÑA, J.:
In these two cases (G.R. Nos. L-45892 and 45893), the appellants
Tranquilino and Primitivo de Sosa are charged with a violation of
section 60 of Commonwealth Act No. 1, known as the National
Defense Law. It is alleged that these two appellants, being Filipinos
and having reached the age of twenty years in 1936, willfully and
unlawfully refused to register in the military service between the 1st
and 7th of April of said year, notwithstanding the fact that they had
been required to do so. The evidence shows that these two
appellants were duly notified by the corresponding authorities to
of these notices, had not registered up to the date of the filing of the
information.
The appellants do not deny these facts, but they allege in defense
that they have not registered in the military service because Primitivo
de Sosa is fatherless and has a mother and a brother eight years old
to support, and Tranquilino Lagman also has a father to support, has
no military learnings, and does not wish to kill or be killed.
Each of these appellants was sentenced by the Court of First Instance
to one month and one day of imprisonment, with the costs.
In this instance, the validity of the National Defense Law, under which
the accused were sentenced, is impugned on the ground that it is
unconstitutional. Section 2, Article II of the Constitution of the
Philippines provides as follows:
SEC. 2. The defense of the state is a prime duty of
government, and in the fulfillment of this duty all citizens
may be required by law to render personal military or civil
service.
The National Defense Law, in so far as it establishes compulsory
military service, does not go against this constitutional provision but
is, on the contrary, in faithful compliance therewith. The duty of the
Government to defend the State cannot be performed except
through an army. To leave the organization of an army to the will of
the citizens would be to make this duty of the Government excusable
should there be no sufficient men who volunteer to enlist therein.
In the United States the courts have held in a series of decisions that
the compulsory military service adopted by reason of the civil war
1
and the world war does not violate the Constitution, because the
power to establish it is derived from that granted to Congress to
declare war and to organize and maintain an army. This is so because
the right of the Government to require compulsory military service is
a consequence of its duty to defend the State and is reciprocal with
its duty to defend the life, liberty, and property of the citizen. In the
case of Jacobson vs. Massachusetts (197 U.S., 11; 25 Sup. Ct. Rep.,
385), it was said that, without violating the Constitution, a person
may be compelled by force, if need be, against his will, against his
pecuniary interests, and even against his religious or political
convictions, to take his place in the ranks of the army of his country,
and risk the chance of being shot down in its defense. In the case of
United States vs. Olson (253 Fed., 233), it was also said that this is not
deprivation of property without due process of law, because, in its
just sense, there is no right of property to an office or employment.

The circumstance that these decisions refer to laws enacted by

reason on the actual existence of war does not make our case any
different, inasmuch as, in the last analysis, what justifies compulsory
military service is the defense of the State, whether actual or whether
in preparation to make it more effective, in case of need. The
circumstance that the appellants have dependent families to support
does not excuse them from their duty to present themselves before
the Acceptance Board because, if such circumstance exists, they can
ask for determent in complying with their duty and, at all events, they
can obtain the proper pecuniary allowance to attend to these family
responsibilities (secs. 65 and 69 of Commonwealth Act No. 1).

The appealed judgment rendered in these two cases is affirmed, with

the costs to the appellants. So ordered.

Villa-Real, Imperial, Diaz, Laurel and Concepcion, JJ., concur.

2
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-46930 June 10, 1988
DALE SANDERS, AND A.S. MOREAU, JR, petitioners,
vs.
HON. REGINO T. VERIDIANO II, as Presiding Judge, Branch I, Court
of First Instance of Zambales, Olongapo City, ANTHONY M. ROSSI
and RALPH L. WYERS, respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
The basic issue to be resolved in this case is whether or not the
petitioners were performing their official duties when they did the
acts for which they have been sued for damages by the private
respondents. Once this question is decided, the other answers will
fall into place and this petition need not detain us any longer than it
already has.
Petitioner Sanders was, at the time the incident in question occurred,
the special services director of the U.S. Naval Station (NAVSTA) in
Olongapo City. 1 Petitioner Moreau was the commanding officer of
the Subic Naval Base, which includes the said station. 2 Private
respondent Rossi is an American citizen with permanent residence in
the Philippines,3 as so was private respondent Wyer, who died two
years ago. 4 They were both employed as gameroom attendants in
the special services department of the NAVSTA, the former having
been hired in 1971 and the latter in 1969. 5
On October 3, 1975, the private respondents were advised that their
employment had been converted from permanent full-time to
permanent part-time, effective October 18, 1975. 6 Their reaction
was to protest this conversion and to institute grievance proceedings
conformably to the pertinent rules and regulations of the U.S.
Department of Defense. The result was a recommendation from the
hearing officer who conducted the proceedings for the reinstatement
of the private respondents to permanent full-time status plus
backwages. The report on the hearing contained the observation that
"Special Services management practices an autocratic form of
supervision." 7
In a letter addressed to petitioner Moreau on May 17, 1976 (Annex
"A" of the complaint), Sanders disagreed with the hearing officer's
report and asked for the rejection of the abovestated
recommendation. The letter contained the statements that: a ) "Mr.
Rossi tends to alienate most co-workers and supervisors;" b) "Messrs.
Rossi and Wyers have proven, according to their immediate
supervisors, to be difficult employees to supervise;" and c) "even
though the grievants were under oath not to discuss the case with
anyone, (they) placed the records in public places where others not
involved in the case could hear."
On November 7, 1975, before the start of the grievance hearings, a-
letter (Annex "B" of the complaint) purportedly corning from
petitioner Moreau as the commanding general of the U.S. Naval
Station in Subic Bay was sent to the Chief of Naval Personnel
explaining the change of the private respondent's employment status
and requesting concurrence therewith. The letter did not carry his
signature but was signed by W.B. Moore, Jr. "by direction,"
presumably of Moreau.
On the basis of these antecedent facts, the private respondent filed
in the Court of First Instance of Olongapo City a for damages against
3
the herein petitioners on November 8, 1976.8 The plaintiffs claimed
that the letters contained libelous imputations that had exposed
them to ridicule and caused them mental anguish and that the
prejudgment of the grievance proceedings was an invasion of their
personal and proprietary rights.
The private respondents made it clear that the petitioners were being
sued in their private or personal capacity. However, in a motion to
dismiss filed under a special appearance, the petitioners argued that
the acts complained of were performed by them in the discharge of
their official duties and that, consequently, the court had no
jurisdiction over them under the doctrine of state immunity.
After extensive written arguments between the parties, the motion
was denied in an order dated March 8, 1977, 9 on the main ground
that the petitioners had not presented any evidence that their acts
were official in nature and not personal torts, moreover, the
allegation in the complaint was that the defendants had acted
maliciously and in bad faith. The same order issued a writ of
preliminary attachment, conditioned upon the filing of a P10,000.00
bond by the plaintiffs, against the properties of petitioner Moreau,
who allegedly was then about to leave the Philippines. Subsequently,
to make matters worse for the defendants, petitioner Moreau was
declared in a default by the trial court in its order dated August 9,
1977. The motion to lift the default order on the ground that
Moreau's failure to appear at the pre-trial conference was the result
of some misunderstanding, and the motion for reconsideration of the
denial of the motion to dismiss, which was filed by the petitioner's
new lawyers, were denied by the respondent court on September 7,
1977.
This petition for certiorari, prohibition and preliminary injunction was
thereafter filed before this Court, on the contention that the above-
narrated acts of the respondent court are tainted with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
We return now to the basic question of whether the petitioners were
acting officially or only in their private capacities when they did the
acts for which the private respondents have sued them for damages.
It is stressed at the outset that the mere allegation that a government
functionary is being sued in his personal capacity will not
automatically remove him from the protection of the law of public
officers and, if appropriate, the doctrine of state immunity. By the
same token, the mere invocation of official character will not suffice
to insulate him from suability and liability for an act imputed to him
as a personal tort committed without or in excess of his authority.
These well-settled principles are applicable not only to the officers of
the local state but also where the person sued in its courts pertains
to the government of a foreign state, as in the present case.
The respondent judge, apparently finding that the complained acts
were prima facie personal and tortious, decided to proceed to trial to
determine inter alia their precise character on the strength of the
evidence to be submitted by the parties. The petitioners have
objected, arguing that no such evidence was needed to substantiate
their claim of jurisdictional immunity. Pending resolution of this
question, we issued a temporary restraining order on September 26,
1977, that has since then suspended the proceedings in this case in
the court a quo.
In past cases, this Court has held that where the character of the act
complained of can be determined from the pleadings exchanged
between the parties before the trial, it is not necessary for the court
to require them to belabor the point at a trial still to be conducted.
Such a proceeding would be superfluous, not to say unfair to the
4
defendant who is subjected to unnecessary and avoidable
inconvenience.
Thus, in Baer v. Tizon, 10 we held that a motion to dismiss a complaint
against the commanding general of the Olongapo Naval Base should
not have been denied because it had been sufficiently shown that the
act for which he was being sued was done in his official capacity on
behalf of the American government. The United States had not given
its consent to be sued. It was the reverse situation in Syquia v.
Almeda Lopez," where we sustained the order of the lower court
granting a where we motion to dismiss a complaint against certain
officers of the U.S. armed forces also shown to be acting officially in
the name of the American government. The United States had also
not waived its immunity from suit. Only three years ago, in United
States of America v. Ruiz, 12 we set aside the denial by the lower court
of a motion to dismiss a complaint for damages filed against the
United States and several of its officials, it appearing that the act
complained of was governmental rather than proprietary, and
certainly not personal. In these and several other cases 13 the Court
found it redundant to prolong the other case proceedings after it had
become clear that the suit could not prosper because the acts
complained of were covered by the doctrine of state immunity.
It is abundantly clear in the present case that the acts for which the
petitioners are being called to account were performed by them in
the discharge of their official duties. Sanders, as director of the
special services department of NAVSTA, undoubtedly had
supervision over its personnel, including the private respondents,
and had a hand in their employment, work assignments, discipline,
dismissal and other related matters. It is not disputed that the letter
he had written was in fact a reply to a request from his superior, the
other petitioner, for more information regarding the case of the
private respondents.14 Moreover, even in the absence of such
request, he still was within his rights in reacting to the hearing
officer's criticism—in effect a direct attack against him—-that Special
Services was practicing "an autocratic form of supervision."
As for Moreau,what he is claimed to have done was write the Chief
of Naval Personnel for concurrence with the conversion of the private
respondents' type of employment even before the grievance
proceedings had even commenced. Disregarding for the nonce the
question of its timeliness, this act is clearly official in nature,
performed by Moreau as the immediate superior of Sanders and
directly answerable to Naval Personnel in matters involving the
special services department of NAVSTA In fact, the letter dealt with
the financial and budgetary problems of the department and
contained recommendations for their solution, including the re-
designation of the private respondents. There was nothing personal
or private about it.
Given the official character of the above-described letters, we have
to conclude that the petitioners were, legally speaking, being sued as
officers of the United States government. As they have acted on
behalf of that government, and within the scope of their authority, it
is that government, and not the petitioners personally, that is
responsible for their acts. Assuming that the trial can proceed and it
is proved that the claimants have a right to the payment of damages,
such award will have to be satisfied not by the petitioners in their
personal capacities but by the United States government as their
principal. This will require that government to perform an affirmative
act to satisfy the judgment, viz, the appropriation of the necessary
amount to cover the damages awarded, thus making the action a suit
against that government without its consent.
There should be no question by now that such complaint cannot
prosper unless the government sought to be held ultimately liable
has given its consent to' be sued. So we have ruled not only in Baer
but in many other decisions where we upheld the doctrine of state
5
immunity as applicable not only to our own government but also to
foreign states sought to be subjected to the jurisdiction of our
courts. 15
The practical justification for the doctrine, as Holmes put it, is that
"there can be no legal right against the authority which makes the
law on which the right depends.16 In the case of foreign states, the
rule is derived from the principle of the sovereign equality of states
which wisely admonishes that par in parem non habet imperium and
that a contrary attitude would "unduly vex the peace of
nations." 17 Our adherence to this precept is formally expressed in
Article II, Section 2, of our Constitution, where we reiterate from our
previous charters that the Philippines "adopts the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of the land.
All this is not to say that in no case may a public officer be sued as
such without the previous consent of the state. To be sure, there are
a number of well-recognized exceptions. It is clear that a public
officer may be sued as such to compel him to do an act required by
law, as where, say, a register of deeds refuses to record a deed of
sale; 18 or to restrain a Cabinet member, for example, from enforcing
a law claimed to be unconstitutional; 19 or to compel the national
treasurer to pay damages from an already appropriated assurance
fund; 20 or the commissioner of internal revenue to refund tax over-
payments from a fund already available for the purpose; 21 or, in
general, to secure a judgment that the officer impleaded may satisfy
by himself without the government itself having to do a positive act
to assist him. We have also held that where the government itself has
violated its own laws, the aggrieved party may directly implead the
government even without first filing his claim with the Commission
on Audit as normally required, as the doctrine of state immunity
"cannot be used as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice." 22
This case must also be distinguished from such decisions as Festejo v.
Fernando, 23 where the Court held that a bureau director could be
sued for damages on a personal tort committed by him when he
acted without or in excess of authority in forcibly taking private
property without paying just compensation therefor although he did
convert it into a public irrigation canal. It was not necessary to secure
the previous consent of the state, nor could it be validly impleaded
as a party defendant, as it was not responsible for the defendant's
unauthorized act.
The case at bar, to repeat, comes under the rule and not under any
of the recognized exceptions. The government of the United States
has not given its consent to be sued for the official acts of the
petitioners, who cannot satisfy any judgment that may be rendered
against them. As it is the American government itself that will have
to perform the affirmative act of appropriating the amount that may
be adjudged for the private respondents, the complaint must be
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
The Court finds that, even under the law of public officers, the acts of
the petitioners are protected by the presumption of good faith,
which has not been overturned by the private respondents. Even
mistakes concededly committed by such public officers are not
actionable as long as it is not shown that they were motivated by
malice or gross negligence amounting to bad faith.24 This, to, is well
settled .25 Furthermore, applying now our own penal laws, the letters
come under the concept of privileged communications and are not
punishable, 26 let alone the fact that the resented remarks are not
defamatory by our standards. It seems the private respondents have
overstated their case.
A final consideration is that since the questioned acts were done in
the Olongapo Naval Base by the petitioners in the performance of
their official duties and the private respondents are themselves
6
American citizens, it would seem only proper for the courts of this Our Temporary restraining order of September 26,1977, is made
country to refrain from taking cognizance of this matter and to treat PERMANENT. No costs.
it as coming under the internal administration of the said base.
SO ORDERED.
The petitioners' counsel have submitted a memorandum replete with
citations of American cases, as if they were arguing before a court of Narvasa, Gancayco, Grino-Aquiño and Medialdea, JJ., Concur.
the United States. The Court is bemused by such attitude. While
these decisions do have persuasive effect upon us, they can at best Footnotes
be invoked only to support our own jurisprudence, which we have
developed and enriched on the basis of our own persuasions as a 1 Rollo, pp. 2, 26.
people, particularly since we became independent in 1946.
2 Ibid.
We appreciate the assistance foreign decisions offer us, and not only
from the United States but also from Spain and other countries from 3 Id.
which we have derived some if not most of our own laws. But we
should not place undue and fawning reliance upon them and regard 4 Id., p. 319.
them as indispensable mental crutches without which we cannot
come to our own decisions through the employment of our own 5 Id., pp. 4, 27, 91.
endowments We live in a different ambience and must decide our
own problems in the light of our own interests and needs, and of our 6 Id., pp. 5, 91.
qualities and even idiosyncrasies as a people, and always with our
own concept of law and justice. 7 Id., p. 5, 28, 91.

The private respondents must, if they are still sominded, pursue their 8 Id., pp- 26-34.
claim against the petitioners in accordance with the laws of the
United States, of which they are all citizens and under whose 9 Id., pp- 90-94.
jurisdiction the alleged offenses were committed. Even assuming
that our own laws are applicable, the United States government has
10 57 SCRA 1.
not decided to give its consent to be sued in our courts, which
therefore has not acquired the competence to act on the said claim,.
11 84 Phil. 312.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The challenged orders dated
12 136 SCRA 487.
March 8,1977, August 9,1977, and September 7, 1977, are SET ASIDE.
The respondent court is directed to DISMISS Civil Case No. 2077-O.

7
13 Lim v. Brownell, et al., 107 Phil. 344; Parreño v. 23 50 O.G. 1556.
McGranery, 92 Phil. 791; Lim v. Nelson, 87 Phil. 328;
Marvel Building Corp. v. Philippine War Damage 24 Philippine Racing Club, Inc., et al. v. Bonifacio, et
Commission, 85 Phil. 27. al., 109 Phil. 233.

14 Rollo, pp. 35-40. 25 Cabungcal, et al. v. Cordova, et al., 11 SCRA 584,

15 Syquia v. Almeda Lopez, supra; Marvel Building
Corp. v. Philippine War Damage Commission, supra;
Lim v. Nelson, supra; Philippine Alien Property
Administration v. Castelo, 89 Phil. 568; Parreño v.
McGranery, supra; Johnson v. Turner, 94 Phil. 807-all
cited in Baer case; United States of America v.
Ruiz, supra.
cited in Mabutol v. Pascual, 124 SCRA 867; Mindanao
Realty Corp. v. Kintanar, 6 SCRA 814; U.S. v. Santos,
36 Phil. 853. 2'
26 Art. 354, par. 1, Revised Penal Code; see also U.S.
v. Bustos, 37 Phil. 731; and Deano v. Godinez, 12
SCRA 843.

16 Kawanakoa v. Polybank, 205 U.S. 349.

17 De Haber v. Queen of Portugal, 17 QB 171.

18 Krivenko v. Register of Deeds, 79 Phil. 461.

19 Javellana v. Executive Secretary, 50 SCRA 30:

Ichong v. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155.

20 Treasurer of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals,

G.R. No. L-42805, August 31, 1987.

21 National Development Company v. Commissioner

of Internal Revenue, 151 SCRA 472.

22 Amigable v. Cuenca, 43 SCRA 360, reiterating

Ministerio v. Court of First Instance of Cebu, 40 SCRA
464.

8
 FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 106440. January 29, 1996]
ALEJANDRO MANOSCA, ASUNCION MANOSCA and LEONICA
MANOSCA, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS,
HON. BENJAMIN V. PELAYO, Presiding Judge, RTC-Pasig,
Metro Manila, Branch 168, HON. GRADUACION A. REYES
CLARAVAL, Presiding Judge, RTC-Pasig, Metro Manila,
Branch 71, and REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:
In this appeal, via a petition for review on certiorari, from the
decision[1] of the Court of Appeals, dated 15 January 1992, in CA-G.R.
SP No. 24969 (entitled Alejandro Manosca, et al. v. Hon. Benjamin V.
Pelayo, et al.), this Court is asked to resolve whether or not the public
use requirement of Eminent Domain is extant in the attempted
expropriation by the Republic of a 492-square-meter parcel of land
so declared by the National Historical Institute (NHI) as a national
historical landmark.
The facts of the case are not in dispute.
Petitioners inherited a piece of land located at P. Burgos Street,
Calzada, Taguig, Metro Manila, with an area of about four hundred
ninety-two (492) square meters. When the parcel was ascertained by
the NHI to have been the birthsite of Felix Y. Manalo, the founder
of Iglesia Ni Cristo, it passed Resolution No. 1, Series of 1986,
pursuant to Section 4[2] of Presidential Decree No. 260, declaring the
land to be a national historical landmark. The resolution was, on 06
January 1986, approved by the Minister of Education, Culture and
Sports. Later, the opinion of the Secretary of Justice was asked on the
legality of the measure. In his Opinion No. 133, Series of 1987, the
Secretary of Justice replied in the affirmative; he explained:
According to your guidelines, national landmarks are places or
objects that are associated with an event, achievement,
characteristic, or modification that makes a turning point or stage in
Philippine history.Thus, the birthsite of the founder of the Iglesia ni
Cristo, the late Felix Y. Manalo, who, admittedly, had made
contributions to Philippine history and culture has been declared as
a national landmark. It has been held that places invested with
unusual historical interest is a public use for which the power of
eminent domain may be authorized x x x.
In view thereof, it is believed that the National Historical Institute as
an agency of the Government charged with the maintenance and
care of national shrines, monuments and landmarks and the
development of historical sites that may be declared as national
shrines, monuments and/or landmarks, may initiate the institution of
condemnation proceedings for the purpose of acquiring the lot in
question in accordance with the procedure provided for in Rule 67 of
the Revised Rules of Court. The proceedings should be instituted by
the Office of the Solicitor General in behalf of the Republic.
Accordingly, on 29 May 1989, the Republic, through the Office
of the Solicitor-General, instituted a complaint for
expropriation[3] before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig for and in
behalf of the NHI alleging, inter alia, that:
Pursuant to Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 260, the National
Historical Institute issued Resolution No. 1, Series of 1986, which was
approved on January, 1986 by the then Minister of Education, Culture
and Sports, declaring the above described parcel of land which is the
birthsite of Felix Y. Manalo, founder of the Iglesia ni Cristo, as a
9
National Historical Landmark. The plaintiff perforce needs the land as
such national historical landmark which is a public purpose.
At the same time, respondent Republic filed an urgent motion
for the issuance of an order to permit it to take immediate possession
of the property. The motion was opposed by petitioners. After a
hearing, the trial court issued, on 03 August 1989,[4] an order fixing
the provisional market (P54,120.00) and assessed (P16,236.00)
values of the property and authorizing the Republic to take over the
property once the required sum would have been deposited with the
Municipal Treasurer of Taguig, Metro Manila.
Petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint on the main thesis
that the intended expropriation was not for a public purpose and,
incidentally, that the act would constitute an application of public
funds, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of Iglesia
ni Cristo, a religious entity, contrary to the provision of Section 29(2),
Article VI, of the 1987 Constitution.[5]Petitioners sought, in the
meanwhile, a suspension in the implementation of the 03rd August
1989 order of the trial court.
On 15 February 1990, following the filing by respondent
Republic of its reply to petitioners motion seeking the dismissal of the
case, the trial court issued its denial of said motion to
dismiss.[6] Five (5) days later, or on 20 February 1990,[7] another
order was issued by the trial court, declaring moot and academic the
motion for reconsideration and/or suspension of the order of 03
August 1989 with the rejection of petitioners motion to dismiss.
Petitioners motion for the reconsideration of the 20th February 1990
order was likewise denied by the trial court in its 16th April
1991 order.[8]
Petitioners then lodged a petition for certiorari and prohibition
with the Court of Appeals. In its now disputed 15th January
1992 decision, the appellate court dismissed the petition on the
ground that the remedy of appeal in the ordinary course of law was
an adequate remedy and that the petition itself, in any case, had
failed to show any grave abuse of discretion or lack of jurisdictional
competence on the part of the trial court. A motion for the
reconsideration of the decision was denied in the 23rd July 1992
resolution of the appellate court.
We begin, in this present recourse of petitioners, with a few
known postulates.
Eminent domain, also often referred to as expropriation and,
with less frequency, as condemnation, is, like police power and
taxation, an inherent power of sovereignty. It need not be clothed
with any constitutional gear to exist; instead, provisions in our
Constitution on the subject are meant more to regulate, rather than
to grant, the exercise of the power. Eminent domain is generally so
described as the highest and most exact idea of property remaining
in the government that may be acquired for some public purpose
through a method in the nature of a forced purchase by the State.[9] It
is a right to take or reassert dominion over property within the state
for public use or to meet a public exigency. It is said to be an essential
part of governance even in its most primitive form and thus
inseparable from sovereignty.[10] The only direct constitutional
qualification is that private property shall not be taken for public use
without just compensation.[11] This proscription is intended to
provide a safeguard against possible abuse and so to protect as well
the individual against whose property the power is sought to be
enforced.
Petitioners assert that the expropriation has failed to meet the
guidelines set by this Court in the case of Guido v. Rural Progress
Administration,[12] to wit: (a) the size of the land expropriated; (b) the
large number of people benefited; and, (c) the extent of social and
economic reform.[13] Petitioners suggest that we confine the concept
of expropriation only to the following public uses,[14] i.e., the -
10
x x x taking of property for military posts, roads, streets, sidewalks,
bridges, ferries, levees, wharves, piers, public buildings including
schoolhouses, parks, playgrounds, plazas, market places, artesian
wells, water supply and sewerage systems, cemeteries, crematories,
and railroads.
This view of petitioners is much too limitative and restrictive.
The court, in Guido, merely passed upon the issue of the extent
of the Presidents power under Commonwealth Act No. 539 to,
specifically, acquire private lands for subdivision into smaller home
lots or farms for resale to bona fide tenants or occupants. It was in
this particular context of the statute that the Court had made the
pronouncement. The guidelines in Guido were not meant to be
preclusive in nature and, most certainly, the power of eminent
domain should not now be understood as being confined only to the
expropriation of vast tracts of land and landed estates.[15]
The term public use, not having been otherwise defined by the
constitution, must be considered in its general concept of meeting a
public need or a public exigency.[16] Black summarizes the
characterization given by various courts to the term; thus:
Public Use. Eminent domain. The constitutional and statutory basis
for taking property by eminent domain. For condemnation purposes,
public use is one which confers same benefit or advantage to the
public; it is not confined to actual use by public. It is measured in
terms of right of public to use proposed facilities for which
condemnation is sought and, as long as public has right of use,
whether exercised by one or many members of public, a public
advantage or public benefit accrues sufficient to constitute a public
use. Montana Power Co. vs. Bokma, Mont. 457 P. 2d 769, 772, 773.
Public use, in constitutional provisions restricting the exercise of the
right to take private property in virtue of eminent domain, means a
use concerning the whole community as distinguished from
particular individuals. But each and every member of society need
not be equally interested in such use, or be personally and directly
affected by it; if the object is to satisfy a great public want or
exigency, that is sufficient. Rindge Co. vs. Los Angeles County,
262 U.S. 700, 43 S.Ct. 689, 692, 67 L.Ed. 1186. The term may be said
to mean public usefulness, utility, or advantage, or what is productive
of general benefit. It may be limited to the inhabitants of a small or
restricted locality, but must be in common, and not for a particular
individual. The use must be a needful one for the public, which
cannot be surrendered without obvious general loss and
inconvenience. A public use for which land may be taken defies
absolute definition for it changes with varying conditions of society,
new appliances in the sciences, changing conceptions of scope and
functions of government, and other differing circumstances brought
about by an increase in population and new modes of
communication and transportation. Katz v. Brandon, 156 Conn., 521,
245 A.2d 579,586.[17]
The validity of the exercise of the power of eminent domain for
traditional purposes is beyond question; it is not at all to be said,
however, that public use should thereby be restricted to such
traditional uses. The idea that public use is strictly limited to clear
cases of use by the public has long been discarded. This Court in Heirs
of Juancho Ardona v. Reyes,[18] quoting from Berman v. Parker
(348 U.S. 25; 99 L. ed. 27), held:
We do not sit to determine whether a particular housing project is or
is not desirable. The concept of the public welfare is broad and
inclusive. See DayBrite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 US 421, 424, 96
L. Ed. 469, 472, 72 S Ct 405. The values it represents are spiritual as
well as physical, aesthetic as well as monetary. It is within the power
of the legislature to determine that the community should be
beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well as clean, well-balanced
11
as well as carefully patrolled. In the present case, the Congress and
its authorized agencies have made determinations that take into
account a wide variety of values. It is not for us to reappraise them.
If those who govern the District of Columbia decide that the Nations
Capital should be beautiful as well as sanitary, there is nothing in the
Fifth Amendment that stands in the way.
Once the object is within the authority of Congress, the right to
realize it through the exercise of eminent domain is clear. For the
power of eminent domain is merely the means to the end. See
Luxton v. North River Bridge Co. 153 US 525, 529, 530, 38 L. ed. 808,
810, 14 S Ct 891; United States v. Gettysburg Electric R. Co. 160 US
668, 679, 40 L. ed. 576, 580, 16 S Ct 427.
It has been explained as early as Sea v. Manila Railroad
[19]
Co., that:
x x x A historical research discloses the meaning of the term public
use to be one of constant growth. As society advances, its demands
upon the individual increase and each demand is a new use to which
the resources of the individual may be devoted. x x x for whatever is
beneficially employed for the community is a public use.
Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando states:
The taking to be valid must be for public use. There was a time when
it was felt that a literal meaning should be attached to such a
requirement. Whatever project is undertaken must be for the public
to enjoy, as in the case of streets or parks. Otherwise, expropriation
is not allowable. It is not so any more. As long as the purpose of the
taking is public, then the power of eminent domain comes into play.
As just noted, the constitution in at least two cases, to remove any
doubt, determines what is public use. One is the expropriation of
lands to be subdivided into small lots for resale at cost to individuals.
The other is the transfer, through the exercise of this power, of
utilities and other private enterprise to the government. It is accurate
to state then that at present whatever may be beneficially employed
for the general welfare satisfies the requirement of public use.[20]
Chief Justice Fernando, writing the ponencia in J.M. Tuason &
Co. vs. Land Tenure Administration,[21] has viewed the Constitution a
dynamic instrument and one that is not to be construed narrowly or
pedantically so as to enable it to meet adequately whatever
problems the future has in store. Fr. Joaquin Bernas, a noted
constitutionalist himself, has aptly observed that what, in fact, has
ultimately emerged is a concept of public use which is just as broad
as public welfare.[22]
Petitioners ask: But (w)hat is the so-called unusual interest that
the expropriation of (Felix Manalos) birthplace become so vital as to
be a public use appropriate for the exercise of the power of eminent
domain when only members of the Iglesia ni Cristo would
benefit? This attempt to give some religious perspective to the case
deserves little consideration, for what should be significant is the
principal objective of, not the casual consequences that might follow
from, the exercise of the power. The purpose in setting up the marker
is essentially to recognize the distinctive contribution of the late Felix
Manalo to the culture of the Philippines, rather than to
commemorate his founding and leadership of the Iglesia ni
Cristo. The practical reality that greater benefit may be derived by
members of the Iglesia ni Cristo than by most others could well be
true but such a peculiar advantage still remains to be merely
incidental and secondary in nature. Indeed, that only a few would
actually benefit from the expropriation of property does not
necessarily diminish the essence and character of public use.[23]
Petitioners contend that they have been denied due process in
the fixing of the provisional value of their property. Petitioners need
merely to be reminded that what the law prohibits is the lack of
12
opportunity to be heard;[24] contrary to petitioners argument, (2) No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid,
the records of this case are replete with pleadings[25] that could have or employed, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of
dealt, directly or indirectly, with the provisional value of the property. any sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution, or system of
religion, or of any priest, preacher, minister, or other religious
Petitioners, finally, would fault respondent appellate court in
teacher, or dignitary as such, except when such priest, preacher,
sustaining the trial courts order which considered inapplicable the
minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces, or to any penal
case of Noble v. City of Manila.[26] Both courts held correctly. The
institution, or government orphanage or leprosarium.
Republic was not a party to the alleged contract of exchange between
[6]
the Iglesia ni Cristo and petitioners which (the contracting parties) Rollo, pp. 68-69.
alone, not the Republic, could properly be bound. [7]
Rollo, p. 70.
All considered, the Court finds the assailed decision to be in [8]
Rollo, pp. 71-76.
accord with law and jurisprudence.
[9]
Blacks Law Dictionary, 6th ed., p. 523.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. No costs.
[10]
Visayan Refining Company vs. Camus, 40 Phil. 550.
SO ORDERED.
[11]
Sec. 9, Art. III, 1987 Constitution.
Padilla, Bellosillo, Kapunan, and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.
[12]
84 Phil. 847.
[13]
Rollo, pp. 38-39.
[14]
[1]
Penned by Justice Nathanael De Pano, Jr., with the concurrence of Rollo, p.42.
Justices Luis Victor and Fortunato Vailoces. [15]
See Province of Camarines Sur vs. Court of Appeals, 222 SCRA
[2]
The National Museum and the National Historical Commission are 173.
hereby vested with the right to declare other such historical and [16]
See U.S. vs. Toribio, 15 Phil. 85.
cultural sites as National Shrines, Monuments, and/or Landmarks, in [17]
accordance with the guidelines set forth in R.A. 4846 and the spirit of Blacks Law Dictionary, p. 1232.
this Decree. [18]
125 SCRA 220.
[3]
Rollo, pp. 77-82. [19]
42 Phil. 102.
[4]
Rollo, pp. 66-67. [20]
Enrique Fernando, The Constitution of the Philippines, 2nd ed.,
[5]
Sec. 29. xxx. pp. 523-524.
[21]
31 SCRA 413.

13
[22]
Joaquin Bernas, The Constitution of the Republic of
the Philippines, Vol. 1, 1987 ed., p. 282.
[23]
Philippine Columbian Association v. Panis, 228 SCRA 668.
[24]
Capuno v. Jaramillo, 234 SCRA 212.
[25]
Those pleadings include:
(a) An urgent motion that the hearing on the fixing of the propertys
provisional value and the taking of possession by the Republic over
the same be held in abeyance until after petitioners shall have
received a copy of the complaint and summons (Rollo, pp. 86-88;
(b) A motion to dismiss, dated 08 August 1989, seeking to dismiss the
complaint instituted by the Republic on the ground that the
expropriation in question is not for a public purpose and contrary to
Section 29(a), Article VI, of the 1987 Constitution (Rollo, pp. 90-91);
(c) A motion for reconsideration and/or suspension of the
implementation of the 03 August 1989 Order (Rollo, pp. 93-95); and
(d) A motion for reconsideration of the orders dated 15 and 20
February, 1990 (Rollo, pp. 103-111).
[26]
The Noble case holds that where there is a valid and subsisting
contract between the owners of the property and the expropriating
authority, there is no need or reason for expropriation (67 Phil. 1).

14