1. The name Atty. Anthony E.
Santos is listed as a
(1) HEINZ R. HECK, complainant, vs. JUDGE
ANTHONY E. SANTOS, REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT, BRANCH 19, CAGAYAN DE ORO
CITY,[1] respondent.
CALLEJO SR., J.:
May a retired judge charged with notarizing documents
without the requisite notary commission more than twenty
years ago be disciplined therefor? This is the novel issue
presented for resolution before this Court.
The instant case arose when in a verified Letter-
Complaint dated March 21, 2001 Heinz R. Heck prayed for
the disbarment of Judge Anthony E. Santos, Regional Trial
Court, Branch 19, Cagayan de Oro City.
The complainant alleged that prior to the respondents
appointment as RTC judge on April 11, 1989, he violated the
notarial law, thus:
Judge Santos, based on ANNEX A,
was not duly commissioned as notary public
until January 9, 1984 but still subscribed and
forwarded (on a non-regular basis) notarized
documents to the Clerk of Court VI starting
January 1980 uncommissioned until the 9th of
January 1984.
a) Judge Santos was commissioned further
January 16th 1986 to December 31st 1987 and
January 6th 1988 to December 31st 1989 but
the records fail to show any entry at the Clerk
of Court after December 31st 1985 until
December 31st 1989.
b) Judge Santos failed to forward his Notarial
Register after the expiration of his commission
in December 1989.[2]
...
WHEREFORE in light of the foregoing complainant pray[s] to
order respondent:
1. To disbar Judge Anthony E. Santos and to
prohibit him from all future public service.
2. To forfeit [the] retirement benefits of Judge
Santos.
3. To prohibit Judge Santos from future practice
of Law.
4. To file a criminal suit against Judge Santos.
5. To conduct a speedy investigation and not to
grant/accept any delaying tactics from Judge
Santos or any agency and or public servants
involved in this administrative case.
6. To pay all costs and related costs involved in
this administrative case.
and prays for other relief in accordance with equity and
fairness based on the premises.[3]
The complainant submitted a certification from Clerk of
Court, Atty. Beverly Sabio-Beja, Regional Trial Court, Misamis
Oriental, which contained the following:
THIS CERTIFIES that upon verification from the records
found and available in this office, the following data appear:
duly commissioned notary public in the
following years:
a. January 9, 1984 to December 31, 1985
b. January 16, 1986 to December 31, 1987
c. January 6, 1988 to December 31, 1989
2. Based on the records of transmittals of notarial
reports, Atty. Anthony E. Santos submitted his
notarial reports in the ff. years:
a. January 1980 report - was submitted on
Feb. 6, 1980
b. February to April 1980 report - was
submitted on June 6, 1980
c. May to June 1980 report - was submitted
on July 29, 1980
d. July to October 1980 report - submitted but
no date of submission
e. November to December 1980-no entry
f. January to February 1981 - no entry
g. March to December 1981 - submitted but
no date of submission
h. January to December 1982 - submitted but
no date of submission
i. January to June 1983 - submitted on
January 5, 1984
j. July to December 1983 - no entry
k. January to December 1984 - submitted on
January 20, 1986
l. January to December 1985 - submitted on
January 20, 1986
4. Records fail to show any entry of transmittal of
notarial documents under the name Atty.
Anthony Santos after December 1985.
5. It is further certified that the last notarial
commission issued to Atty. Anthony Santos
was on January 6, 1988 until December 31,
1989.[4]
In his Answer dated June 13, 2001, the respondent
judge categorically denied the charges against him. He also
submitted a certification[5] from Clerk of Court, Atty. Sabio-
Beja, to prove that there was no proper recording of the
commissioned lawyers in the City of Cagayan de Oro as well
as the submitted notarized documents/notarial register. The
respondent further averred as follows:
That the complainant has never been privy to the documents
notarized and submitted by the respondent before the Office
of the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Misamis
Oriental, nor his rights prejudiced on account of the said
notarized documents and therefore not the proper party to
raise the said issues;
That the complainant was one of the defendants in Civil
Case No. 94-334 entitled Vinas Kuranstalten Gesmbh et al.
versus Lugait Aqua Marine Industries, Inc., and Heinz Heck,
for Specific Performance & Sum of Money, filed before the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 19, Cagayan de Oro City,
wherein respondent is the Presiding Judge. The undersigned
resolved the case in favor of the plaintiffs.[6]
Pursuant to the report of the Office of the Court
Administrator recommending the need to resort to a full-
blown investigation to determine the veracity of the parties
assertions, the Court, in a Resolution dated September 10,
2001, resolved to: (a) treat the matter as a regular
administrative complaint; and (b) refer the case to Associate
Page 1 of 38
Justice Edgardo P. Cruz of the Court of Appeals (CA) for
investigation, report and recommendation.[7]
In his Letters dated December 10, 2001 and February
1, 2002, the complainant requested that the hearing be held
at Cagayan de Oro City. Justice Cruz initially denied the
request but upon the complainants insistence, the matter
was forwarded to the Court, which favorably acted thereon
in a Resolution dated July 8, 2002.[8] The complainant
presented his evidence in Cagayan de Oro City before retired
Court of Appeals Justice Romulo S. Quimbo.[9]
In a Sealed Report dated August 14, 2003,
Investigating Justice Edgardo P. Cruz made the following
recommendation:
It is recommended that [i] respondent (who retired on May
22, 2002) be found guilty of violation of the Notarial Law by
(a) notarizing documents without commission; (b) tardiness
in submission of notarial reports; and (c) non-forwarding of
his notarial register to the Clerk of Court upon expiration of
his commission; and [ii] that for these infractions, he be
suspended from the practice of law and barred from being
commissioned as notary public, both for one year, and his
present commission, if any, be revoked.[10]
According to the Investigating Justice, the respondent
did not adduce evidence in his defense, while the
complainant presented documentary evidence to support the
charges:
It is noteworthy that in his answer, respondent did not claim
that he was commissioned as notary public for the years
1980 to 1983 nor deny the accuracy of the first certification.
He merely alleged that there was no proper recording of the
commissioned lawyers in the City of Cagayan de Oro nor of
the submitted Notarized Documents/Notarial Register. And,
as already observed, he presented no evidence, particularly
on his appointment as notary public for 1980 to 1983
(assuming he was so commissioned) and submission of
notarial reports and notarial register.
On the other hand, the second certification shows that there
were only two Record Books available in the notarial section
of the RTC of Misamis Oriental (Cagayan de Oro City); and
that the (f)irst book titled Petitions for Notarial Commission
contains items on the Name, Date Commission was issued
and Expiration of Commission of the notary public. First
entry appearing was made on December 1982.
If respondent was commissioned in 1980 to 1983, then the
first book would disclose so (at least, for the years 1982 and
1983). However, he did not present said book. Neither did
he present a certification from the Clerk of Court, RTC of
Misamis Oriental, or documents from his files showing that
he was commissioned in 1980 to 1983. Similarly, he did not
submit a certificate of appointment for all those years. Under
Section 238 of the Notarial Law, such certificate must be
prepared and forwarded by the Clerk of Court, RTC, to the
Office of the Solicitor General, together with the oath of
office of the notary public.[11]
Thus, the Investigating Justice concluded, based on the
evidence presented by the complainant, that the respondent
notarized documents in 1980 and 1983 without being
commissioned as a notary public therefor, considering that
his earliest commission of record was on January 9, 1984.[12]
The Procedural Issues
Before the Court passes upon the merits of the instant
complaint, a brief backgrounder.
On the Applicability of
Resolution A.M. No. 02-
9-02-SC
On September 17, 2002, we issued Resolution A.M. No.
02-9-02-SC,[13] to wit:
Some administrative cases against Justices of the Court of
Appeals and the Sandiganbayan; judges of regular and
special courts; and the court officials who are lawyers are
based on grounds which are likewise grounds for the
disciplinary action of members of the Bar for violation of the
Lawyers Oath, the Code of Professional Responsibility, and
the Canons of Professional Ethics, or for such other forms of
breaches of conduct that have been traditionally recognized
as grounds for the discipline of lawyers.
In any of the foregoing instances, the administrative case
shall also be considered a disciplinary action against the
respondent justice, judge or court official concerned as a
member of the Bar. The respondent may forthwith be
required to comment on the complaint and show cause why
he should not also be suspended, disbarred or otherwise
disciplinary sanctioned as a member of the Bar. Judgment in
both respects may be incorporated in one decision or
resolution.
Before the Court approved this resolution,
administrative and disbarment cases against members of the
bar who were likewise members of the court were treated
separately. Thus, pursuant to the new rule, administrative
cases against erring justices of the CA and the
Sandiganbayan, judges, and lawyers in the government
service may be automatically treated as disbarment
cases. The Resolution, which took effect on October 1, 2002,
also provides that it shall supplement Rule 140 of the Rules
of Court, and shall apply to administrative cases already filed
where the respondents have not yet been required to
comment on the complaints.
Clearly, the instant case is not covered by the
foregoing resolution, since the respondent filed his
Answer/Comment on June 13, 2001.
The Procedure To Be Followed
In Disbarment Cases Involving
A Retired Judge For Acts
Committed While He Was Still
A Practicing Lawyer
The undisputed facts are as follows: (1) the respondent
is a retired judge; (2) the complainant prays for his
disbarment; and (3) the acts constituting the ground for
disbarment were committed when the respondent was still a
practicing lawyer, before his appointment to the
judiciary. Thus, the respondent is being charged not for acts
committed as a judge; he is charged, as a member of the
bar, with notarizing documents without the requisite notarial
commission therefor.
Section 1, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court on
Disbarment and Discipline of Attorneys provides:
Section 1. Proceedings for the disbarment, suspension, or
discipline of attorneys may be taken by the Supreme Court
motu proprio, or by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) upon verified complaint of any person. The complaint
shall state clearly, and concisely the facts complained of and
shall be supported by affidavits of persons having personal
Page 2 of 38
knowledge of the facts therein alleged and/or by such
documents as may substantiate said facts.
The IBP Board of Governors may, motu proprio or upon
referral by the Supreme Court or by a Chapter Board of
Officers, or at the instance of any person, initiate and
prosecute proper charges against erring attorneys including
those in the government service: Provided, however, That all
charges against Justices of the Court of Tax Appeals and
lower courts, even if lawyers are jointly charged with them,
shall be filed with the Supreme Court: Provided, further,
That charges filed against Justices and Judges before the
IBP, including those filed prior to their appointment to the
Judiciary, shall be immediately forwarded to the Supreme
Court for disposition and adjudication.[14]
The investigation may thereafter commence either
before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), in
accordance with Sections 2 to Sections 12 of Rule 139-B, or
before the Supreme Court in accordance with Sections 13
and 14, thus:
Section 13. Supreme Court Investigators. - In proceedings
initiated motu proprio by the Supreme Court or in other
proceedings when the interest of justice so requires, the
Supreme Court may refer the case for investigation to the
Solicitor General or to any officer of the Supreme Court or
judge of a lower court, in which case the investigation shall
proceed in the same manner provided in Sections 6 to 11
hereof, save that the review of the report shall be conducted
directly by the Supreme Court.
Section 14. Report of the Solicitor General or other Court
designated Investigator. Based upon the evidence adduced
at the investigation, the Solicitor General or other
Investigator designated by the Supreme Court shall submit
to the Supreme Court a report containing his findings of fact
and recommendations together with the record and all the
evidence presented in the investigation for the final action of
the Supreme Court.
It is clear from the Rules then that a complaint for
disbarment is cognizable by the Court itself, and its
indorsement to the IBP is not mandatory. The Court may
refer the complaint for investigation, report and
recommendation to the Solicitor General, any officer of the
court or a judge of a lower court, on which the Court will
thereafter base its final action.[15]
Although the respondent has already retired from the
judiciary, he is still considered as a member of the bar and
as such, is not immune to the disciplining arm of the
Supreme Court, pursuant to Article VIII, Section 6[16]of the
1987 Constitution. Furthermore, at the time of the filing of
the complaint, the respondent was still the presiding judge
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 19, Cagayan de Oro
City. As such, the complaint was cognizable by the Court
itself, as the Rule mandates that in case the respondent is a
justice of the Court of Tax Appeals or the lower court, the
complaint shall be filed with the Supreme Court.[17]
The Substantive Issues
The Retirement Or Resignation
Of A Judge Will Not Preclude
The Filing Thereafter Of An
Administrative Charge Against
Him For Which He Shall Still
Be Held Answerable If Found
Liable Therefor
The fact that a judge has retired or has otherwise been
separated from the service does not necessarily divest the
Court of its jurisdiction to determine the veracity of the
allegations of the complaint, pursuant to its disciplinary
authority over members of the bench. As we held in Gallos v.
Cordero:[18]
The jurisdiction that was ours at the time of the filing of the
administrative complaint was not lost by the mere fact that
the respondent, had ceased in office during the pendency of
his case. The Court retains jurisdiction either to pronounce
the respondent public official innocent of the charges or
declare him guilty thereof. A contrary rule would be fraught
with injustice and pregnant with dreadful and dangerous
implications... If innocent, respondent public official merits
vindication of his name and integrity as he leaves the
government which he has served well and faithfully; if guilty,
he deserves to receive the corresponding censure and a
penalty proper and imposable under the situation.[19]
However, recognizing the proliferation of unfounded or
malicious administrative or criminal cases against members
of the judiciary for purposes of harassment, we issued A.M.
No. 03-10-01-SC[20] which took effect on November 3, 2003.
It reads in part:
1. If upon an informal preliminary inquiry by the Office of the
Court Administrator, an administrative complaint against any
Justice of the Court of Appeals or Sandiganbayan or any
Judge of the lower courts filed in connection with a case in
court is shown to be clearly unfounded and baseless and
intended to harass the respondent, such a finding should be
included in the report and recommendation of the Office of
the Court Administrator. If the recommendation is approved
or affirmed by the Court, the complainant may be required
to show cause why he should not be held in contempt of
court. If the complainant is a lawyer, he may further be
required to show cause why he or she should not be
administratively sanctioned as a member of the Bar and as
an officer of the court.
2. If the complaint is (a) filed within six months before the
compulsory retirement of a Justice or Judge; (b) for an
alleged cause of action that occurred at least a year before
such filing and (c) shown prima facie that it is intended to
harass the respondent, it must forthwith be recommended
for dismissal. If such is not the case, the Office of the Court
Administrator must require the respondent to file a comment
within ten (10) days from receipt of the complaint, and
submit to the Court a report and recommendation not later
than 30 days from receipt of the comment. The Court shall
act on the recommendation before the date of compulsory
retirement of the respondent, or if it is not possible to do so,
within six (6) months from such date without prejudice to
the release of the retirement benefits less such amount as
the Court may order to be withheld, taking into account the
gravity of the cause of action alleged in the complaint.
Thus, in order for an administrative complaint against a
retiring or retired judge or justice to be dismissed outright,
the following requisites must concur: (1) the complaint must
have been filed within six months from the compulsory
retirement of the judge or justice; (2) the cause of action
must have occurred at least a year before such filing; and,
(3) it is shown that the complaint was intended to harass the
respondent.
In this case, the Administrative Complaint dated March
21, 2001 was received by the Office of the Court
Page 3 of 38
Administrator on March 26, 2001.[21] The respondent retired
compulsorily from the service more than a year later, or on
May 22, 2002. Likewise, the ground for disbarment or
disciplinary action alleged to have been committed by the
respondent did not occur a year before the respondents
separation from the service. Furthermore, and most
importantly, the instant complaint was not prima facie shown
to be without merit and intended merely to harass the
respondent. Clearly, therefore, the instant case does not fall
within the ambit of the foregoing resolution.
A Judge May Be Disciplined
For Acts Committed Before His
Appointment To The Judiciary
It is settled that a judge may be disciplined for acts
committed prior to his appointment to the judiciary.[22] In
fact, even the new Rule itself recognizes this, as it provides
for the immediate forwarding to the Supreme Court for
disposition and adjudication of charges against justices and
judges before the IBP, including those filed prior to their
appointment to the judiciary.[23] It need not be shown that
the respondent continued the doing of the act or acts
complained of; it is sufficient that the evidence on record
supports the charge on the respondent, considering the
gravity of the offense.
Indeed, there is jurisprudence to the effect that the act
complained of must be continuing in order for the
respondent judge to be disciplined therefor. In Sevilla v.
Salubre,[24] the respondent judge was charged with violating
Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, for acts
committed while he was still a practicing lawyer. The
respondent therein refused to turn over the funds of his
client despite demands, and persisted in his refusal even
after he was appointed as a judge. However, the Court also
stated in this case that the respondents subsequent
appointment as a judge will not exculpate him from taking
responsibility for the consequences of his acts as an officer
of the court.[25]
In the case of Alfonso v. Juanson,[26] we held that
proof of prior immoral conduct cannot be used as basis for
administrative discipline against a judge if he is not charged
with immorality prior to his appointment. We ratiocinated,
thus:
...[I]t would be unreasonable and unfair to presume that
since he had wandered from the path of moral
righteousness, he could never retrace his steps and walk
proud and tall again in that path. No man is beyond
information and redemption. A lawyer who aspires for the
exalted position of a magistrate knows, or ought to know,
that he must pay a high price for that honor - his private and
official conduct must at all times be free from the
appearance of impropriety. ...[27]
The Court ruled in that case that the complainant failed
to prove the charges by substantial evidence.[28] The
complainant therein presented evidence pertaining to the
respondents previous indiscretion while still a practicing
lawyer; no evidence was, however, adduced to prove that
the latter continued to engage in illicit acts after being
appointed to the bench. Thus, the respondent was
exonerated in this case because the complainant failed to
present evidence that the indiscretion continued even after
the respondent was appointed to the judiciary.
The practice of law is so ultimately affected with public
interest that it is both the right and duty of the State to
control and regulate it in order to promote the public
welfare. The Constitution vests this power of control and
regulation in this Court.[29] The Supreme Court, as guardian
of the legal profession, has ultimate disciplinary power over
attorneys, which authority is not only a right but a bounden
duty as well. This is why respect and fidelity to the Court is
demanded of its members.[30]
Notarizing Documents Without
The Requisite Commission
Therefore Constitutes
Malpractice, If Not The Crime
Of Falsification Of Public
Documents
It must be remembered that notarization is not an
empty, meaningless, routinary act. On the contrary, it is
invested with substantive public interest, such that only
those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries
public.[31] Notarization by a notary public converts a private
document into a public one, making it admissible in evidence
without the necessity of preliminary proof of its authenticity
and due execution.[32]
The requirements for the issuance of a commission as
notary public must not be treated as a mere casual
formality.[33] The Court has characterized a lawyers act of
notarizing documents without the requisite commission
therefore as reprehensible, constituting as it does not only
malpractice, but also the crime of falsification of public
documents.[34] For such reprehensible conduct, the Court has
sanctioned erring lawyers by suspension from the practice of
law, revocation of the notarial commission and
disqualification from acting as such, and even disbarment.[35]
In the case of Nunga v. Viray,[36] the Court had the
occasion to state -
Where the notarization of a document is done by a member
of the Philippine Bar at a time when he has no authorization
or commission to do so, the offender may be subjected to
disciplinary action. For one, performing a notarial [act]
without such commission is a violation of the lawyers oath to
obey the laws, more specifically, the Notarial Law. Then, too,
by making it appear that he is duly commissioned when he is
not, he is, for all legal intents and purposes, indulging in
deliberate falsehood, which the lawyers oath similarly
proscribes. These violations fall squarely within the
prohibition of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which provides: A lawyer shall
not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.[37]
The importance of the function of a notary public
cannot, therefore, be over-emphasized. No less than the
public faith in the integrity of public documents is at stake in
every aspect of that function.[38]
The Charge Against The
Respondent Is Supported By
The Evidence On Record
The respondent did not object to the complainants
formal offer of evidence, prompting the Investigating Justice
to decide the case on the basis of the pleadings
filed.[39] Neither did he claim that he was commissioned as
notary public for the years 1980 to 1983, nor deny the
accuracy of the first certification. The respondent merely
alleged in his answer that there was no proper recording of
the commissioned lawyers in the City of Cagayan de Oro nor
of the submitted Notarized Documents/Notarial Register.
Furthermore, as found by the Investigating Justice, the
respondent presented no evidence of his commission as
Page 4 of 38
notary public for the years 1980 to 1983, as well as proof of
submission of notarial reports and the notarial register.[40]
The respondent in this case was given an opportunity
to answer the charges and to controvert the evidence
against him in a formal investigation. When the integrity of a
member of the bar is challenged, it is not enough that he
deny the charges; he must meet the issue and overcome the
evidence against him.[41]
The respondents allegation that the complainant was
not a party in any of the documents so notarized, and as
such was not prejudiced thereby, is unavailing. An attorney
may be disbarred or suspended for any violation of his oath
or of his duties as an attorney and counselor which include
the statutory grounds under Section 27, Rule 138[42] of the
Revised Rules of Court. Any interested person or the
court motu proprio may initiate disciplinary
proceedings. There can be no doubt as to the right of a
citizen to bring to the attention of the proper authority acts
and doings of public officers which citizens feel are
incompatible with the duties of the office and from which
conduct the citizen or the public might or does suffer
undesirable consequences.[43]
An Administrative Complaint
Against A Member Of The Bar
Does Not Prescribe
The qualification of good moral character is a
requirement which is not dispensed with upon admission to
membership of the bar. This qualification is not only a
condition precedent to admission to the legal profession, but
its continued possession is essential to maintain ones good
standing in the profession. It is a continuing requirement to
the practice of law and therefore does not preclude a
subsequent judicial inquiry, upon proper complaint, into any
question concerning ones mental or moral fitness before he
became a lawyer. This is because his admission to practice
merely creates a rebuttable presumption that he has all the
qualifications to become a lawyer.[44] The rule is settled that
a lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct,
even if it pertains to his private activities, as long as it shows
him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity or
good demeanor. Possession of good moral character is not
only a prerequisite to admission to the bar but also a
continuing requirement to the practice of law.[45]
Furthermore, administrative cases against lawyers
belong to a class of their own, distinct from and may
proceed independently of civil and criminal cases.[46] As we
held in the leading case of In re Almacen:[47]
[D]isciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis.
Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, they do not involve a
trial of an action or a suit, but are rather investigations by
the Court into the conduct of one of its officers. Not being
intended to inflict punishment, [they are] in no sense a
criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff
nor a prosecutor therein. [They] may be initiated by the
Court motu proprio. Public interest is [their] primary
objective, and the real question for determination is whether
or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the
privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary
powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to
account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the
end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession
and the proper and honest administration of justice by
purging the profession of members who by their misconduct
have prove[n] themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted
with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of
an attorney. ....[48]
In a case involving a mere court employee[49] the Court
disregarded the Court Administrators recommendation that
the charge for immorality against the respondent be
dismissed on the ground that the complainants failed to
adduce evidence that the respondents immoral conduct was
still ongoing. Aside from being found guilty of illicit conduct,
the respondent was also found guilty of dishonesty for
falsifying her childrens certificates of live birth to show that
her paramour was the father. The complaint in this case was
filed on August 5, 1999, almost twenty years after the illicit
affair ended.[50] The Court held that administrative offenses
do not prescribe.[51]
Pursuant to the foregoing, there can be no other
conclusion than that an administrative complaint against an
erring lawyer who was thereafter appointed as a judge,
albeit filed only after twenty-four years after the offending
act was committed, is not barred by prescription. If the rule
were otherwise, members of the bar would be emboldened
to disregard the very oath they took as lawyers, prescinding
from the fact that as long as no private complainant would
immediately come forward, they stand a chance of being
completely exonerated from whatever administrative liability
they ought to answer for. It is the duty of this Court to
protect the integrity of the practice of law as well as the
administration of justice. No matter how much time has
elapsed from the time of the commission of the act
complained of and the time of the institution of the
complaint, erring members of the bench and bar cannot
escape the disciplining arm of the Court. This categorical
pronouncement is aimed at unscrupulous members of the
bench and bar, to deter them from committing acts which
violate the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Code of
Judicial Conduct, or the Lawyers Oath. This should
particularly apply in this case, considering the seriousness of
the matter involved - the respondents dishonesty and the
sanctity of notarial documents.
Thus, even the lapse of considerable time, from the
commission of the offending act to the institution of the
administrative complaint, will not erase the administrative
culpability of a lawyer who notarizes documents without the
requisite authority therefor.
At Most, The Delay In The Institution Of The
Administrative Case Would Merely Mitigate The
Respondents Liability
Time and again, we have stressed the settled principle
that the practice of law is not a right but a privilege
bestowed by the State on those who show that they possess
the qualifications required by law for the conferment of such
privilege. Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with
conditions. A high sense of morality, honesty, and fair
dealing is expected and required of a member of the
bar.[52] By his actuations, the respondent failed to live up to
such standards;[53] he undermined the confidence of the
public on notarial documents and thereby breached Canon I
of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which requires
lawyers to uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land
and promote respect for the law and legal processes. The
respondent also violated Rule 1.01 thereof which proscribes
lawyers from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct.[54] In representing that he was possessed
of the requisite notarial commission when he was, in fact,
not so authorized, the respondent also violated Rule 10.01 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility and his oath as a
lawyer that he shall do no falsehood.
The supreme penalty of disbarment is meted out only
in clear cases of misconduct that seriously affect the
Page 5 of 38
standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the
court. While we will not hesitate to remove an erring
attorney from the esteemed brotherhood of lawyers where
the evidence calls for it, we will likewise not disbar him
where a lesser penalty will suffice to accomplish the desired
end.[55] Furthermore, a tempering of justice is mandated in
this case, considering that the complaint against the
respondent was filed twenty-four years after the commission
of the act complained of;[56] that there was no private
offended party who came forward and claimed to have been
adversely affected by the documents so notarized by the
respondent; and, the fact that the respondent is a retired
judge who deserves to enjoy the full measure of his well-
earned retirement benefits.[57] The Court finds that a fine of
P5,000.00 is justified in this case.
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Anthony E. Santos is
found GUILTY of notarizing documents without the requisite
notarial commission therefor. He is hereby ORDERED to pay
a fine in the amount of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00).
SO ORDERED.
(2) COBALT RESOURCES v. ATTY. RONALD AGUADO
AC. No. 10781, Apr 12, 2016 ]
PER CURIAM:
This is an administrative complaint for disbarment filed by
Cobalt Resources, Inc. (CRI) against respondent Atty. Ronald
C. Aguado (Atty. Aguado) before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for violation of Rules 1.01 and 1.02 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility and the lawyer's oath.
The Antecedents
In its Complaint,[1] CRI alleged that on March 5, 2010, a
group of armed men, clad in vests bearing the mark "PASG"
and pretending to be agents of the Presidential Anti-
Smuggling Group (PASG), hi-jacked its delivery van which
was then loaded with cellular phones worth P1.3 million; that
Dennis Balmaceda (Balmaceda), the driver of the delivery
van, and his companions were all forcibly taken away at gun
point and were dropped at the Country Hill and Golf Club;
that Balmaceda called Antonio Angeles (Angeles), the
Security Director of CRI, who immediately reported the
incident to the Philippine National Police-Criminal
Investigation Detection Unit (PNP-CIDU); that with the use
of Global Positioning Satellite ( GPS) Tracking Device installed
in the cellular phones, Angeles and the PNP-CIDU tracked
down the location of the cellular phones to be in front of
Pegasus Bar along Quezon Avenue, Quezon City; that the
PNP-CIDU, together with Angeles proceeded to Pegasus Bar
and found three (3) vehicles parked in front of the bar: (1)
Toyota Fortuner with Plate No. UNO-68 owned by Atty.
Aguado, (2) Chevrolet Optra with Plate No. ZDW-764 and (3)
a motorcycle with Plate No. NK-1180; that when the PNP-
CIDU approached the vehicles, Anthony Palmes (Palmes) ran
but he was chased by the police officers and was arrested;
that Atty. Aguado who was then standing in the reception
area of Pegasus Bar was not arrested as none of the police
officers knew, at that time, of his participation in the crime;
that the PNP-CIDU searched the vehicles and found the
cellular phones, the Identification Card (ID) showing Atty.
Aguado as Legal Consultant of the PASG, the Mission Order
identifying Atty. Aguado as the Assistant Team Leader, and a
vest bearing the mark PASG.
CRI further averred that the men who hijacked its delivery
van used the fake mission order when it flagged down the
delivery van; that the mission order identified Atty. Aguado
as the assistant team leader and authorized the armed men
to seize CRTs cellular phones; that the PASG issued a
certification stating that the mission order was fake; that
Atty. Aguado carried an ID bearing his picture and name
which showed that he was a PASG legal consultant; and that
this ID was likewise fake as evidenced by a certification
issued by the PASG.
Based on the Sinumpaang Salaysay,[2] dated September 8,
2010, executed by Palmes, CRI concluded that it was Atty.
Aguado who prepared the fake mission order and
masterminded the crime as he was the one who conceived it
and laid down the nitty-gritty details of its execution; and
that it was; he who recruited the armed men who actually
executed the hijacking.
Eventually, two separate Informations for Robbery[3] and
Caraapping[4] were filed against Atty. Aguado and several
others.
The IBP directed Atty. Aguado to submit his answer but,
despite several extensions, he failed to do so.
The IBP then set the case for mandatory conference.
In his Conference Brief,[5] Atty. Aguado denied the
allegations. He averred that "on March 5, 2010, at about
11:00 to 12:00 in the afternoon,"[6] his Toyota Fortuner with
Plate No. UNO-68 was carnapped along Scout Mandarin
while in the custody of his driver; that he reported the
incident to the police authorities; that on March 7, 2010, he
was awakened by relatives informing him that his name was
on the front page of several tabloids in a story connecting
him to the alleged hijacking; and that he was indicted in the
case because of the ID found hanging in his carnapped
vehicle.
In its Report and Recommendation,[7] dated May 3, 2011,
the IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) found Atty.
Aguado liable for unlawful, dishonest, immoral, and deceitful
conduct in falsifying the ID and mission order showing him
as the Legal Consultant and the Assistant Team Leader,
respectively, of the PASG. The IBP-CBD recommended that
he be suspended for two (2) years. It, however, deferred the
issue of Atty. Aguado's purported participation in the alleged
hijacking incident as the issue pertained to a judicial
function.
On March 20, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and
approved the report of the CBD, as follows:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby
unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the
above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as
Annex "A", and finding the recommendation fully supported
by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules
and considering that Respondent committed unlawful,
dishonest, immoral and deceitful conduct by falsifying the ID
and Mission Order, Atty. Ronaldo Aguado is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two
(2) years.[8]
Not satisfied, CRI filed a motion for
reconsideration[9] praying that the May 3, 2011 report of the
IBP-CBD be set aside and that a new resolution ordering the
disbarment of Atty. Aguado be issued. CRI claimed that Atty.
Aguado deserved the ultimate penalty of disbarment as the
falsification of public documents was sufficiently established
and, as the CBD knew, he masterminded the hijacking using
Page 6 of 38
his profession to commit the crime.
On July 25, 2013, Atty. Aguado also filed a motion for
reconsideration[10] of the March 20, 2013 Resolution praying
that it be set aside and a new one be issued dismissing the
complaint. He averred that the charges of usurpation of
authority and falsification filed against him had been
dismissed by the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon
City; that he could not be presumed to be the author of the
falsification because he was never in possession of the
falsified ID and mission order; and that he never used, took
advantage or profit therefrom. Atty. Aguado asserted that
this case should, at the very least, be suspended pending
the resolution of the robbery and carnapping charges against
him.
In a Resolution,[11] dated September 27, 2014, the IBP Board
of Governors denied both motions and affirmed its March 20,
2013 Resolution.
Pursuant to Section 12(c), Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court,
CRI filed a petition for review[12] before the Court. CRI was
firm in its stand that Atty. Aguado be meted out the penalty
of disbarment for his falsification of a PASG mission order
and ID and for his involvement in the hijacking of the CIR
delivery van and its cargo.
Similarly, Atty. Aguado filed a petition for review insisting on
his innocence and praying for the dismissal of the complaint.
The Court's Ruling
The Court finds merit in the petition of CRI.
It must be emphasized that a disbarment proceeding, being
administrative in nature, is separate and distinct from a
criminal action filed against a lawyer and they may proceed
independently of each other.[13] A finding of guilt in the
criminal case does not necessarily mean a finding of liability
in the administrative case.[14] In the same way, the dismissal
of a criminal case on the ground of insufficiency of evidence
against an accused, who is also a respondent in an
administrative case, does not necessarily exculpate him
administratively because the quantum of evidence required
is different. In criminal cases, proof beyond reasonable
doubt is required.[15] "In administrative cases for disbarment
or suspension against lawyers, the quantum of proof
required is clearly preponderant evidence and the burden of
proof rests upon the complainant."[16] Preponderance of
evidence means "evidence which is more convincing to the
court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in
opposition thereto."[17]
Clearly, Atty. Aguado committed the act complained of as it
was established that he was in possession of a falsified ID
showing him as a legal consultant of the PASG and mission
order identifying him as the Assistant Team Leader of the
anti-smuggling operation. Although Atty. Aguado claimed in
his Conference Brief that he was indicted merely on the basis
of an ID found hanging in his carnapped Toyota
Fortuner,[18] his counsel, Atty. Letecia Amon (Atty. Amon),
during the mandatory conference held on February 25, 2011,
acknowledged that the ID and mission order were found in
the Toyota Fortuner owned by Atty. Aguado, thus:
XXX...
From the foregoing, it can be clearly deduced that Atty.
Aguado had participation in the crime as charged in the
complaint, from the planning stage up to its execution.
These falsified documents found in his possession, as
certified found in his possession, as certified as evidenced by
the PASG, were used to facilitate the commission of the
crime. The well-settled rule is that "in the absence of
satisfactory explanation, one found in possession of and who
used a forged document is the forger and therefore guilty of
falsification."[21] Atty. Aguado failed to rebut the allegations.
Other than the police blotter showing that he reported the
carnapping of his vehicle, Atty. Aguado presented no other
convincing evidence to support his denial of the crime. He
also failed to show any ill motive on the part of Palmes in
testifying against him whom he claimed to have met only in
February 2010.
Moreover, his story of the carnapping of his Fortuner cannot
be given credence considering his inconsistent statements on
the matter. In this regard, the Court quotes a portion of the
Report and Recommendation of Commissioner Oliver
Cachapero. Thus:
He, too, blabbered about the supposed carnapping of his
Fortuner car on the same day the hijacking was staged by
supposed PASG personnel suggesting that he was a victim
and not a perpetrator. However, his allegations in this regard
is put in serious doubt. In the QC PD alarm sheet,
Respondent reported that the carnapping took place at 2:30
of March 5, 2010 while in his sworn statement, he claimed
that his car was carnapped at 4:31 p.m. the precise time the
supposed carnapping was staged is too vital that
Respondent could not have overlooked the same in his
narration of facts in his counter-affidavit or in his statement
before the police authorities expecially because he
supposedly reported the incident on the very same day it
happened. But as correctly observed by the Complainant,
even if the report on the time of the carnapping incident
would have been properly made, the hijacking took place
much earlier and therefore the same does not negate the
commission of the crime by the Respondent. Also, the
reporting did not prove the fact of carnapping especially
where, as in this case, no eyewitness account was
presented, no suspect apprehended, and no criminal case
was filed.[22]
The Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR)
explicitly mandates:
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Rule 1.02 - A lawyer shall not counsel or abet
activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening
confidence in the legal system.
It must be emphasized that a membership in the Bar is a
privilege laden with conditions,[23] and granted only to those
who possess the strict intellectual and moral qualifications
required of lawyers as instruments in the effective and
efficient administration of justice.[24] As officers of the courts
and keepers of the public's faith, lawyers are burdened with
the highest degree of social responsibility and so mandated
to behave at all times in a manner consistent with truth and
honor.[25] They are expected to maintain not only legal
proficiency but also this high standard of morality, honesty,
integrity and fair dealing.[26]
Atty, Aguado has committed acts that showed he was unfit
and unable to faithfully discharge his bounden duties as a
member of the legal profession. Because he failed to live up
to the exacting standards demanded of him, he proved
himself unworthy of the privilege to practice law. As
vanguards of our legal system, lawyers, are expected at all
times to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal
professor and to refrain from any act or omission which
Page 7 of 38
might diminish the trust and confidence reposed by the
public in the integrity of the legal profession.[27]
In several cases, the Court, after finding the lawyer guilty of
gross dishonesty, imposed the supreme penalty of
disbarment for engaging in unlawful, dishonest, and deceitful
acts by falsifying documents. In Brennisen v. Atty.
Contawi,[28] the Court disbarred the lawyer when he falsified
a special power of attorney so he could mortgage and sell
his client's property. In Embido v. Atty. Pe, Jr.,[29] the
penalty of disbarment was meted out against the lawyer who
authored the falsification of an inexistent court decision.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Ronald C. Aguado is DISBARRED for
gross misconduct and violation of Rules 1.01 and 1.02 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, and his name is
ordered STRICKEN OFF the roll of attorneys.
Let copies of this decision be furnished the Office of the Bar
Confidant to be made part of his personal records; the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and the Office of the Court
Administrator for circulation to all courts.
SO ORDERED.
(3) Erlinda Foster vs. Atty. Jaime Agtang
A.C. No. 10579 – Legal Ethics – Borrowing From
Clients Not Appropriate
Civil Claims Cannot Be Litigated in a Disbarment Suit
In 2009, Erlinda Foster engaged the services of Atty. Jaime
Agtang in a realty dispute in Ilocos Norte. Agtang’s
acceptance fee was P20,000.00 plus P5,000.00 for incidental
expenses.
For the case, Agtang collected P150,000.00 from Foster as
filing fee. He also advised Foster to shell out a total of
P50,000.00 for them to bribe the judge and get a favorable
decision. Although reluctant, Foster gave in to Agtang’s
demands.
On various occasions, Agtang borrowed money from Foster
for his personal use, i.e., car repair. Such loan amounted to
P122,000.00. Foster, being prudent, asked for receipts for all
funds she handed over to Agtang.
Later however, Foster learned that she lost the case due to
Agtang’s negligence and incompetence in drafting the
complaint. She also found out that the filing fee therefor was
only P22,410 (not P150k). Further, it turned out that Agtang
was once the lawyer of the opposing party. When she asked
Agtang to return her the balance, the said lawyer failed to
do so hence, she filed an administrative complaint against
Agtang.
The IBP Board of Governors (IBP-BOG) eventually ordered
Agtang to return the balance of the filing fee (P127,590.00)
as well as the money he borrowed from Foster
(P122,000.00). It was also recommended that Agtang be
suspended for three months only.
ISSUE: Whether or not the recommendation by the IBP-
BOG is proper.
HELD: No. The recommended penalty of 3 months
suspension is too light. Agtang was disbarred by the
Supreme Court.
Rule 1.0, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
provides that “a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.”
In this case, Agtang is guilty of engaging in dishonest and
deceitful conduct, both in his professional and private
capacity. As a lawyer, he clearly misled Foster into believing
that the filing fees for her case were worth more than the
prescribed amount in the rules, due to feigned reasons such
as the high value of the land involved and the extra
expenses to be incurred by court employees. In other words,
he resorted to overpricing, an act customarily related to
depravity and dishonesty.
When asked to return the balance, he failed and refused to
do so and even had the temerity that it was all the client’s
idea. . A lawyer’s failure to return upon demand the funds
held by him on behalf of his client gives rise to the
presumption that he has appropriated the same for his own
use in violation of the trust reposed in him by his client. Such
act is a gross violation of general morality as well as of
professional ethics. It impairs public confidence in the legal
profession and deserves punishment.
It is clear that Agtang failed to fulfill this duty. He received
various amounts from Foster but he could not account for all
of them. Worse, he could not deny the authenticity of the
receipts presented by Foster.
Rule 16.04, Canon 16 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility states that “a lawyer shall not borrow money
from his client unless the client’s interests are fully protected
by the nature of the case or by independent advice. Neither
shall a lawyer lend money to a client except, when in the
interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses in
a legal matter he is handling for the client.”
In the first place, Agtang should have never borrowed from
Foster, his client. Second, his refusal to pay reflects his
baseness. Deliberate failure to pay just debts constitutes
gross misconduct, for which a lawyer may be sanctioned
with suspension from the practice of law. Lawyers are
instruments for the administration of justice and vanguards
of our legal system. They are expected to maintain not only
legal proficiency, but also a high standard of morality,
honesty, integrity and fair dealing so that the people’s faith
and confidence in the judicial system is ensured. They must,
at all times, faithfully perform their duties to society, to the
bar, the courts and their clients, which include prompt
payment of financial obligations.
The acts of the Agtang constitute malpractice and gross
misconduct in his office as attorney. His incompetence and
appalling indifference to his duty to his client, the courts and
society render him unfit to continue discharging the trust
reposed in him as a member of the Bar.
SIDE ISSUE: May the Court order Agtang to return the
money he borrowed from Foster?
No. The Court held that it cannot order the lawyer to return
money to complainant if he or she acted in a private capacity
because its findings in administrative cases have no bearing
on liabilities which have no intrinsic link to the lawyer’s
professional engagement. In disciplinary proceedings against
lawyers, the only issue is whether the officer of the court is
still fit to be allowed to continue as a member of the Bar.
The only concern of the Court is the determination of
respondent’s administrative liability. Its findings have no
material bearing on other judicial actions which the parties
may choose against each other. To rule otherwise would in
effect deprive respondent of his right to appeal since
administrative cases are filed directly with the Court.
SO ORDERED.
(4) A.C. No. 6980, August 30, 2017
Page 8 of 38
CESAR O. STA. ANA, CRISTINA M. STA. ANA AND
ESTHER STA. ANA-SILVERIO, Complainants, v.ATTY.
ANTONIO JOSE F. CORTES, Respondent.
This is a complaint for disbarment filed by complainants
against Atty. Antonio Jose F. Cortes (respondent) against
whom they imputed deceit and falsification of public
documents in the sale of two parcels of property located at
Bo. Lantic, Carmona, Cavite and covered by Transfer
Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. T-1069335 and T-1069336;
and in the donation of66 pieces of property by Atty. Cesar
Casal (Atty. Casal) and his wife, Pilar P. Casal (Pilar).
Factual Antecedents
In a sworn letter dated August 4, 2005, complainants alleged
that respondent was left ith the care and maintenance of
several properties either owned or under the administration
of Atty. Casal since the latter's death; that respondent
abused his authority, as such administrator, and engineered
the sale or transfer of the said properties, specifically the
two parcels of land covered by TCT Nos. T-1069335 and T-
1069336, which were owned originally by their
(complainants') ancestors; that on May 19, 2004,
respondent, in connivance with Cesar Inis (Inis) and A
Casal's alleged adopted daughter, Gloria Casal Cledera
(Gloria), and her husband, Hugh Cledera (the spouses
Cledera), sold the abovementioned parcels of land to the
Property Company of Friends, Inc. (PCFI).1
Complainants further averred that as the said properties
were originally in the names of Inis, Ruben Loyola (Loyola),
Angela Lacdan (Lacdan) and Cesar Veloso Casal (Veloso),
these persons, in conspiracy with respondent, caused to be
executed a Special Power of Attorney2 (SPA) dated May 4,
2004, under which Loyola, Lacdan and Veloso purportedly
authorized their co-owner Inis to sell the said properties;
that this SPA was, however, forged or falsified, because
Loyola was already dead on August 15, 1994, whereas
Lacdan died on August 31, 2001, and at the time of the
execution of the SPA in Catmona, Cavite, Veloso was in fact
in Tacloban City; and that indeed, as a consequence of
respondent's wrongdoing, criminal cases for Estata through
Falsification of Public Document were filed against
respondent and the spouses Cledera.3
Complainants moreover claimed that respondent notarized
12 falsified Deeds of Donation, dated September 17 and 18,
2003, and supposedly executed in Carmona, Cavite, under
which it was made to appear that Atty. Casal purportedly
donated 66 pieces of property to Gloria; that they
(complainants) caused to be verified/examined Atty. Casal's
"superimposed" signatures on these deeds of donation by
the Questioned Documents Division of the National Bureau
of Investigation (NBI); and that in its Disposition Forms, the
NBI concluded that "the signatures appearing on the said
questioned documents are mere xerox copies which do not
truly and clearly reflect the minute details of the writing
strokes and other aspects relative to the preparation of the
questioned signatures."4
In his answer, respondent asserted that all the criminal
complaints against him had been dismissed, and the criminal
information/s instituted therefor had been withdrawn by the
Department of Justice (DOJ), hence, he had been
exonerated of all the charges against him. Respondent
adverted to the Resolution of Regional State Prosecutor
Ernesto C. Mendoza, which in part declared -
x x x the signatures of Cesar E. Casal appearing on the said
questioned documents are mere xerox copies which do not
truly and clearly reflect the minute details of the writing
strokes and other aspects relative to the preparation of the
questioned signatures.
Nowhere in this report was there a categorical statement
that the document was falsified or the signatures were
forged. x x x5
In a Resolution6 dated November 27, 2006, the Court
resolved to refer this administrative case to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation.
Report and Recommendation of the IBP
The Investigating Commissioner summarized the charges
against respondent as follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(a) First, [r]espondent was involved in the preparation of
the Loyola SPA, which was used to sell the [s)ubject
[p]roperties to PCFI, despite the fact that two (2) of
the alleged signatories therein were already dead at
the time the Loyola SPA was executed;
(b) Second, [r]espondent prepared and notarized 12
Deeds of Donation, which [appear] to be spurious
because the signatures of Atty. Casal thereon were
only superimposed;
(c) Third, [r]espondent notarized the 12 Deeds of
Donation in Quezon City, within his territorial
jurisdiction as a notary public x x x despite the fact
that Atty. Casal signed the same in x x x Cavite, or
outside his jurisdiction as a notary public;
(d) Fourth, [r]espondent caused the preparation of the
Casal SPA, which appears to be spurious because the
signature of Atty. Casal thereon was only
superimposed; and
(e) Fifth, [r]espondent knowingly used the spurious Casal
SPA and executed a Deed of Sale in favor of PCFI
involving other properties.7
After due proceedings, the Investigating Commissioner
submitted a Report8 dated May 14, 2010, finding respondent
not only guilty of dishonesty and deceitful conduct, but also
guilty of having violated hls oath as a notary public.
In finding respondent guilty of using a falsified document,
the Investigating Commissioner noted that although there
was no direct evidence that it was respondent himself who
prepared or drafted the SPA, there was evidence
nonetheless that respondent did actively participate, or take
part, in the offer and sale of the properties to the PCFI; and
that since the execution of the forged or falsified SPA is a
crucial or critical component of the eventual consummation
of the sale to PCFI, respondent could not be heard to say
that he had no knowledge of the use of a falsified
document.9
As regards the 12 Deeds of Donation allegedly executed by
Atty. Casal, the Investigating Commissioner lent more
credence to the unbiased or impartial report of the NBI's
finding that the signatures of Atty. Casal were per se mere
xerox copies; and that moreover, respondent had violated
Section 24010 of the Revised Administrative Code, when he
caused to be acknowledged the Deeds of Donation in his law
office in Quezon City, despite the fact that these were
supposedly signed and executed by Atty. Casal in Cavite.
Page 9 of 38
The Investigating Commissioner opined that respondent Casal and Pilar P. Casal (represented by Atty. Cortes as
"ought to have known that since he was outside his their attorney-in-fact) and our client.17 (Emphasis
territorial jurisdiction as a notary public, he could not have supplied)
performed the acts of a notary public at the time of the Moreover, Mr. Guillermo C. Choa, President of the PCFI,
signing of the 12 Deeds of Donation, including the taking of narrated in his affidavit18 the events leading to another sale
oath of the parties."11 likewise involving properties coowned by Atty. Casal through
the use of the spurious SPA, to
The Investigating Commissioner thus wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
recommended:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary 3) That sometime in August 2003, Sps. Hugh Cledera and
1. ATTY. ANTONIO JOSE F. CORTES be suspended from the Gloria Casal Cledera and Atty. Antonio Jose F. Cortes
practice of law for a period ranging from six (6) months to offered to me for sale several parcels of land owned
two (2) years with a STERN WARNING that repetition of the by Cesar E. Casal (father of Gloria Casal Cledera) including
same or similar acts or conduct shall be dealt with more Lot 5, Psu 10120 and Lot 6, Psu 101205 containing an area
severely; and of 39,670 square meters and 47,638 square meters, more or
less, located at Bo. Lantic, Carmona, Cavite which was then
2. ATTY. ANTONIO JOSE F. CORTES be barred from being registered in the name of Eduardo Gan, et al. under TCT No.
commissioned as a notary public for a period of two (2) T-79153 of the Register of Deeds fur the Province of Cavite.
years, and in the event that he is presently commissioned as
notary public, that his commission be immediately revoked 4) That Sps. Hugh Cledera and Gloria Casal Cledera
and suspended for such period.12 together with Atty. Cortes also presented to me the
In its Resolution13 dated May 10, 2013, the IBP Board of following documents, to wit:
Governors adopted and approved the findings of the
Investigating Commissioner but modified the recommended a) TCT No. T-79153 of the Registry of Deeds for the
penalty to a one-year suspension from the practice of law, Province of Cavite.
with revocation of respondent's notarial license, plus a two-
year disqualification from reappointment as notary public.
The pertinent portion of the Resolution b) Deed of Absolute Sale dated December 15, 1990
reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary executed by heirs of Eduardo B. Gan, et al. in favor of
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby Cesar E. Casal, Cesar Inis, Ruben Loyola and Angela
unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED with modification, Lacdan.
the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part
ofthis Resolution as Annex "A", and finding the c) Deed of Absolute Sale dated December 19, 1990
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record executed by Cesar Veloso Casal, et. al. in favor ofSps.
and the applicable laws and rules and considering Cesar and Pilar Casal.
Respondent's violation of the Notarial Law, Atty. Antonio
Jose F. Cortes is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of
x x x x
law for one (1) year and his Notarial Commission
immediately REVOKED presently commissioned. Further, he
6) That in the Agreement of Purchase and Sale, it was
is DISQUALIFIED from reappointment as Notary Publicfor
agreed that the seller shall register the several Deeds of Sale
two (2) years.
and deliver the titles over said properties to Pro-friends
No motions for reconsideration having been filed by any of
(PCFI). In the above-mentioned Agreement of
the parties, the case is before us for fmal resolution.
Purchase and Sale, Sps. Casal were represented by
Our Ruling
their duly authorized attorney-in-fact, Atty. Antonio
Lawyers are instruments in the administration of justice. As
Jose F. Cortes, of legal age, Filipino, with address at 2/F
vanguards of our legal system, they are expected to
ELCO Bldg., 202 E. Rodriguez, Sr., Blvd., Quezon
maintain not only legal proficiency but also a high standard
City. Present during negotiations for the terms and
of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing. [It is only in
conditions to be contained in the Agreement of Purchase and
living up to the very high standards and tenets of the legal
Sale aside from myself and Atty.Cortes were Sps. Hugh
profession that] the people's faith and confidence in the
and Gloria Cledera, the son-in-law and daughter, respectively
judicial system can be ensured. Lawyers may be disciplined -
of Sps. Casal; x x x19(Emphasis supplied)
whether in their professional or in their private capacity - for
Likewise, it cannot be denied that it was respondent who
any conduct that is wanting in morality, honesty, probity and
engineered the execution of the 12 Deeds of Donation
good demeanor.14
involving 66 pieces of Atty. Casal's property. Respondent
In the instant case, respondent acted with deceit when he
was personally present dwing the alleged signing of the
used the falsified documents to effect the transfer of
Deeds of Donation in Cavite, which deeds he brought
properties owned or administered by the late Atty. Casal. In
afterwards to his law office in Quezon City, and notarized the
a letter15 sent by Atty. Florante O. Villegas, counsel for the
same. Indeed, in his Affidavit, respondent
PCFI, to the spouses Cledera, the former explicitly stated
stated:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
that respondent did have a hand in the negotiation leading
11. When I presented the documents for signature of
to the sale of the properties covered by TCT Nos. T-1069335
the donorsspouses, Cesar E. Casal and Pilar P. Casal, the late
and T-1069336. In clarifying that it only entered into a Deed
Cesar E. Casal stamped the rubber facsimile of his genuine
of Absolute Sale because of the "offer and representation
signature in all the spaces provided in all copies of the Deeds
that spouses Cesar and Pilar Casal are the true owners of
of Donation. At the same time and place, I also saw his wife
the subject parcels of land,"16the PCFI, through its legal
Pilar P. Casal affixed [sic] her own signature in the Deeds of
counsel, declared:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Donation. Also present dming the signing occasion was the
We understand that you, together with Atty. Antonio
donee herself, Dr. Gloria P. Casal, as well as, [sic] her
Jose F. Cortes, offered to sell the said parcels ofland to our
husband, Dr. Hugh Cledera who affixed their signatures in all
client, and that on September 17, 2003, an agreement of
the copies of the Deeds of Donation in my presence.
Purchase and Sale was executed between Spouses Cesar E.

Page 10 of 38
12. Thereafter, I gathered and brought all the signed
copies of the Deeds of Donation to my office in
Quezon City, and notarized them. Record shows that I
notarized them and entered the documents in my Notarial
Registry on September 17 and 18, 2003.20 (Emphasis
supplied)
By using the falsified SPA and by knowingly notarizing
documents outside of his notarial commission's jurisdiction,
respondent was evidently bereft of basic integrity which is an
indispensable sine qua non of his ongoing membership, in
good standing, in the legal profession, and as a duly-
commissioned notary public.
In actively participating in the offer and sale of property to
PCFI, respondent was guilty of deceit and dishonesty by
leveraging on the use of a spurious Special Power of
Attorney
There can be no debate either as to the fact that respondent
made use of a forged or falsified SPA in his dealings with
PCFI. As the lawyer who assisted in the sale of the
properties through the use of the falsified SPA in question,
he ought to know that the use of such falsified or forged SPA
gives rise to grievous legal consequences which must
inevitably enmesh him professionally. As a member of the
Bar in apparent good legal standing, he effectively held
himself out as a trustworthy agent for the principals he was
purportedly representing in the transaction/s in question.
Respondent's act of notarizing a forged Deed of Donation
outside of his jurisdiction is a violation of his duties as a
notary public, as well as a blatant falsification of public
document
This Court agrees with the fmdings of the IBP Board of
Governors which upheld the impartial report of the NBI and
its findings that the signatures on the Deeds of Donation
were mere photocopies attached to the said Deeds.21 Given
the fact that respondent admitted to having been with the
late Atty. Casal at the time of the execution of the Deed, it
would not be far-fetched to say that the use of the said mere
photocopies was with his knowledge and consent. What is
more, his act of bringing the Deeds of Donation that were
executed in Carmona, Cavite, to his law office in Quezon
City, and notarizing them there, not only violated Section
240 of the Revised Administrative Code but "also [partook]
of malpractice of law and falsification."22
Section 240 of the Revised Administrative Code explicitly
states:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Sec. 240. Territorial jurisdiction. - The jurisdiction of a notary
public in a province shall be co-extensive with the province.
The jurisdiction of a notary public in the City of Manila shall
be co-extensive with said city. No notary shall possess
authority to do any notarial act beyond the limits of
his jurisdiction.23 (Emphasis supplied)
Needless to say, respondent cannot escape from the
clutches of this provision.
The dismissal of the criminal complaints against respondent
did not change the sui generis character of disbarment
proceedings
Respondent's contention that the DOJ had resolved to
withdraw the criminal complaints filed against him and his
co-accused, the spouses Cledera,24 does not persuade. The
dismissal or withdrawal of the criminal complaints/
information/sat the instance of the DOJ, is of no moment. As
a member of the Bar, respondent should know that
administrative cases against lawyers are sui generis, or a
class of their own. "Disciplinary proceedings involve no
private interest and afford no redress for private
grievance."25Disbarment cases are aimed at purging the
legal profession of individuals who obdurately scorn and
despise the exalted standards of the noble profession of law.
It is within this Court's power, as a check and balance to its
own system, to ensure undeviating integrity by members of
the Bar both on the professional and the personal level. It is
only by maintaining this integrity and this loyalty to the law,
to the Courts of Justice and to their client and the public at
large, that lawyers are enabled to maintain the trust reposed
upon them and to deliver justice inside and outside the
courtroom.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Antonio Jose F. Cortes is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1)
year and his Notarial Commission immediately REVOKED, if
he is presently commissioned. Furthermore, he
is DISQUALIFIED from reappointment as Notary Public for
two (2) years, reckoned from the date of finality of this
Resolution.
Furnish a copy of this Resolution to the Office of the Bar
Confidant, which shall append the same to the personal
record of respondent; to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines; and the Office of the Court Administrator, which
shall circulate the same to all courts in the country for their
infonnation and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
(5) A.C. No. 10553, July 05, 2017
FILIPINAS O. CELEDONIO, Complainant, v. ATTY.
JAIME F. ESTRABILLO, Respondent.
For Our resolution is complainant Filipinas O. Celedonio's
disbarment complaint1 against respondent Atty. Jaime F.
Estrabillo, charging the latter with the violation of Canon 1,
Rule 1.01 and 1.02, Canon 9, Rule 1.09, Canon 10, Rule
10.01, Canon 15, Rules 15.03 and 15.04, Canon 17, and
Canon 19, Rule 19.01 and 19.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR).
The Facts
The instant disbarment case stemmed from a criminal case
of Estafa filed by Alfrito D. Mah (Mah) against complainant's
husband in 2006, the latter being accused of embezzling a
substantial amount from Mah's company. In the said case,
respondent was Mah's legal counsel.2
Complainant averred that she tried talking to Mr. Mah's wife,
being one of the sponsors in their wedding, to drop the
criminal case against her husband, but Mrs. Mah responded
that the matter is already in the hands of their lawyer. Thus,
complainant and her husband met several times with the
respondent to negotiate the withdrawal of the criminal case.
Respondent assured the complainant and her husband that
he will talk to his client for the possibility of settling the case
and delaying the prosecution thereof in the meantime.3
In the process of negotiating, respondent advised the
complainant and her husband to execute a deed of sale over
their house and lot covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. 502969-R, which will be used as a collateral for
the settlement of the case. Respondent explained to them
that the said deed of sale will merely be a security while
complainant and her husband are paying the embezzled
money in installments and he assured the spouses that the
said deed of sale will not be registered nor annotated in the
Page 11 of 38
title. The criminal case against complainant's husband was
then dismissed.4
Being the only one who shoulders the family expenses,
complainant, at some point, decided to sell the subject
house and lot.5 However, on December 8, 2008, complainant
received summons from the court regarding a complaint for
specific performance with prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction (WPI) and temporary restraining order
(TRO) filed by Spouses Mah, subject of which was TCT No.
502969-R.6 Apparently, the deed of sale that complainant
and her husband executed as a security for the settlement of
the criminal case was dated May 5, 2008 and notarized by
the respondent. The said complaint averred that herein
complainant and her husband have an obligation to deliver
the subject property to Spouses Mah. Complainant found out
that the respondent requested the Register of Deeds (RD) of
Pampanga to register and annotate the said deed of sale on
the title on November 27, 2008.7
This prompted the complainant to confront the respondent
as this was contrary to what they have agreed upon. The
respondent merely advised complainant to again negotiate
with his client and assured her that he would back her up.
However, complainant's efforts to negotiate were again
proven futile.8
In the meantime, complainant has a deadline for the filing of
a responsive pleading in the said civil case. Also, the hearing
for the application for issuance of a TRO was already
scheduled. When the complainant went back to the
respondent for this matter, the respondent offered to and
indeed prepared a Motion for Extension of Time and Urgent
Motion to Postpone for the complainant dated December 22,
2008 and January 8, 2009, respectively. Complainant alleged
that it was respondent's secretary upon respondent's
instruction, who drafted the said motions and that she was
required to pay the corresponding fees therefor. In view of
the said motion for postponement, complainant did not
appear in the January 9, 2009 hearing.9
It turned out, however, that the said hearing still proceeded.
The respondent even appeared therein and manifested that
he filed a notice of lis pendens and adverse claim with the
RD of Pampanga. Complainant also found out that
respondent filed a Motion to Declare Defendants in Default
in the said case dated February 4, 2009, which was granted
by the court on February 27, 2009. On March 31, 2009, a
decision was rendered in the said case in favor of
respondent's clients. The decision became final and
executory and, thereafter, a writ of execution was issued. 10
Realizing that respondent employed deceit and was double-
dealing with her and her husband to their prejudice,
complainant filed the instant administrative complaint,
praying for the respondent's disbarment.
In his Answer to the instant administrative complaint,
respondent denied complainant's accusations. Despite
admitting that he told the complainant that he would help
her out in negotiating with his client, he averred that he
never compromised his relationship with the latter as
counsel. Respondent explained that he suggested a deed of
second mortgage be made on the subject property, as the
same was still mortgaged with the bank, for the purpose of
settling the criminal case with his client. He admitted
preparing such deed of second mortgage but the same was
not signed by his client as the latter preferred a deed of sale
with a promissory note. The complainant and her husband
then executed the preferred deed of sale. Consequently, Mr.
Mah executed an affidavit of desistance relative to the estafa
case against complainant's husband.11
As to the civil case, respondent averred that upon learning
that the complainant was selling the subject property, he
filed an adverse claim on the said property to protect his
client's rights.12
Respondent, further, denied that he was serving conflicting
interests when he instructed his secretary to draft the
motions for extension of time and postponement for the
complainant. He averred that he informed his clients about it
and denied demanding payment therefor from the
complainant.13
Report and Recommendation of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline
Aside from respondent's act of instructing his secretary to
prepare and file motions for the complainant in the civil case
filed by his client, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)-
Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) found no proof as to the
other allegations in the complaint imputing deceit and other
violations of the CPR against respondent.14 On May 22,
2012, the IBP-CBD recommended
thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, it is respectfully
recommended that respondent Atty. Jaime E. Estrabillo be
suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months.15
Resolutions of the IBP Board of Governors
On March 20, 2013, the IBP issued Resolution No. XX-2013-
187, which reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby
unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED, with
modification, the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case,
herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A", and
finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence
on record and the applicable laws and rules and for
Respondent's violation of Rule 15.03 and Canon 17 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, it being not intentional,
Atty. Jaime E. Estrabillo is hereby REPRIMANDED.16
Both the complainant and the respondent filed their.
respective motions for reconsideration (MR) of the above-
quoted resolution.17
Acting on the said MRs, the IBP Board of Governors issued
Resolution No. XXI-2014-116 on March 21, 2014, which
reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
RESOLVED to DENY respective Motions for Reconsideration
of Complainant and Respondent, there being no cogent
reason to reverse the findings of the Commission and they
being a mere reiteration of the matters which had already
been threshed out and taken into consideration. Further, the
Board RESOLVED to AFFIRM with modification,
Resolution No. XX-2013-187 dated March 20, 2013 and
accordingly ADOPTED and APPROVED the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner SUSPENDING Atty. Jaime E. Estrabillo from
the practice of law to [sic] six (6) months.18
This Court is now called to issue its verdict on the matter.
Issue
Should the respondent be administratively disciplined based
on the allegations in the complaint?
Page 12 of 38
Our Ruling
We answer in the affirmative.
Rule 15.03 - A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests
except by written consent of all concerned given after a full
disclosure of the facts.
CANON 17 - A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF
HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THE TRUST
AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.
Respondent admitted that he instructed his secretary to draft
and file motions for the complainant in the civil case filed by
his client against the latter. Such act is a clear violation of
the above-stated rules. The respondent, however, explained
that it was merely a humanitarian act on his part in helping
the complainant on the matter, to give the latter an
opportunity to settle their accountability to his
client.19Respondent insisted that there was no intention on
his part to violate the trust reposed upon him by his client.
In fact, according to the respondent, it was his client's
interest that he had in mind when he prepared the motions
as this would extend the chance of getting a settlement with
the complainant, which is the end favored by his client.
Such explanation cannot, in any way, absolve him from
liability.
The rules are clear. The relationship between a lawyer and
his/her client should ideally be imbued with the highest level
of trust and confidence.20 The legal profession dictates that
it is not a mere duty, but an obligation, of a lawyer to
'accord the highest degree of fidelity, zeal and fervor in the
protection of the client's interest.21 Thus, part of the lawyer's
duty in this regard is to avoid representing conflicting
interests.22 Jurisprudence is to the effect that a lawyer's act
which invites suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in
the performance of his duty already evinces inconsistency of
interests.23 In broad terms, lawyers are deemed to represent
conflicting interests when, in behalf of one client, it is their
duty to contend for that which duty to another client
requires them to oppose.24
There is, thus, no denying that respondent's preparation and
filing of motions on behalf of the complainant, the adverse
party in the case filed by him for his client, conflicts his
client's interest. Indeed, a motion for extension to file an
answer would not be favorable to his client's cause as the
same would merely delay the judgment sought by his client
in filing the case. Moreso, the motion for postponement of
the TRO hearing would definitely run counter with the
interest of his client as such remedy was precisely sought,
supposedly with urgency, to protect his client's right over the
subject property before complainant could proceed with the
sale of the same.
Moreover, Rule 15.03 above-cited expressly requires a
written consent of all parties concerned after full disclosure
of the facts if ever, for whatever reason, a lawyer will be
involved in conflicting interests. Corollary to this, Rule 15.04
of the CPR substantially states that if a lawyer would act as a
mediator, or a negotiator for that matter, a written consent
of all concerned is also required. Notably, there is no record
of any written consent from any of the parties involved in
this case.
Considering the foregoing, We sustain the findings of the IBP
that respondent violated Rule 15.03 and Canon 17 of the
CPR.
In addition, this Court cannot shun the fact that due to
respondent's acts, complainant lost her day in court.
Admittedly, the complainant cannot impute fault entirely to
the respondent for losing the opportunity to present her
defense in the civil case, as no prudent man will leave the
fate of his or her case entirely to his or her lawyer, much
less to his or her opponent's lawyer. However, We also
cannot blame the complainant for relying upon the motions
prepared by the respondent for her, thinking that in view of
the said motions, she was given more time file an answer
and more importantly, that there was no more hearing on
the scheduled date for her to attend. As it turned out,
respondent even appeared on the date of the hearing that
was supposedly sought to be postponed. This is a clear case
of an unfair act on the part of the respondent. Respondent
may not have an obligation to apprise the complainant of the
hearing as the latter is not his client, but his knowledge of
the motion for postponement, drafted by his secretary upon
his instruction, calls for his fair judgment as a defender of
justice and officer of the court, to inform the complainant
that the hearing was not postponed.
This exactly demonstrates why dealing with conflicting
interests in the legal profession is prohibited it is not only
because the relation of attorney and client is one of trust
and confidence of the highest degree, but also because of
the principles of public policy and good taste.25
As to the other matters raised in the complaint such as the
allegations that the respondent deceived the complainant to
execute the subject deed of sale, among others, We are one
with the IBP-CBD that such imputations were not supported
by sufficient evidence to warrant consideration.
Anent the penalty, considering that this is respondent's first
infraction, and that there is no clear showing that his
malpractice was deliberately done in bad faith or with deceit,
We hold that respondent's suspension from the practice of
law for six (6) months, as recommended by the IBP-CBD and
adopted by the IBP Board of Governors, is warranted.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court resolves to SUSPEND Atty.
Jaime F. Estrabillo from the practice 'of raw for six (6)
months to commence immediately from the receipt of this
Decision, with a WARNING that a repetition of the same or
similar offense will warrant a more severe penalty. Let copies
of this Decision be furnished all courts, the Office of the Bar
Confidant, and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for their
information and guidance. The Office of the Bar Confidant is
directed to append a copy of this Decision to respondent's
record as member of the Bar.
SO ORDERED.
(6) RE: IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR
REINSTATEMENT OF ROLANDO S. TORRES AS A
MEMBER OF THE PHILIPPINE BAR.
July 11, 2017 A.C. No. 5161
ROLANDO S. TORRES, Petitioner
For resolution is the Petition1 dated March 10, 2017 filed by
Rolando S. Torres (Torres) who seeks judicial clemency in
order to be reinstated in the Roll of Attorneys.
Records show that in a Resolution2 dated April 14, 2004
in Ting-Dumali v. Torres,3 the Court meted the supreme
penalty of disbarment on Torres for "presentation of false
testimony; participation in, consent to, and failure to advise
against, the forgery of complainant's signature in a
purported Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement; and gross
Page 13 of 38
misrepresentation in court for the purpose of profiting from
such forgery,"4 thereby committing gross misconduct and
violating Canons 1 and 10 the Code of Professional
Responsibility. The dispositive portion of the said Resolution
reads:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, we find respondent
Atty. Rolando S. Torres guilty of gross misconduct and
violation of the lawyer's oath, as well as Canons 1 and 10 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, thereby rendering
him unworthy of continuing membership in the legal
profession. He is thus ordered DISBARRED from the
practice of law, and his name is ordered stricken off the Roll
of Attorneys, effective immediately.
x x x x5
Aggrieved, Torres twice moved for reconsideration, 6 both of
which were denied with finality by the Court,7 which then
stated that "[n]o further pleadings will be entertained." 8 This
notwithstanding, Torres: (a) filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Lift
Disbarment9 dated January 26, 2006 begging for
compassion, mercy, and understanding;10 and (b) wrote
letters to former Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban11 and
former Associate Justice Dante 0. Tinga12 reiterating his
pleas for compassion and mercy. However, these were
ordered expunged through the Court's Resolutions dated
June 13, 200613 and September 5, 2006,14 considering the
previous directive that no further pleadings will be further
entertained in this case. Still undaunted, Torres continued to
file numerous submissions either seeking his reinstatement
to the bar15 or the reduction of his penalty of disbarment to
suspension,16 all of which were either expunged from the
records17 or denied18 by the Court.
More than ten (10) years from his disbarment, Torres filed a
Petition19 dated June 11, 2015 seeking judicial clemency
from the Court to reinstate him in the Roll of Attomeys. 20 In
a Resolution21 dated August 25, 2015 (August 25, 2015
Resolution), the Court denied the petition, holding that
Torres had failed to provide substantial proof that he had
reformed himself, especially considering the absence of
showing that he had reconciled or attempted to reconcile
with his sister-in-law, the original complainant in the
disbarment case against him; nor was it demonstrated that
he was remorseful over the fraudulent acts he had
committed against her.22
Despite the foregoing, Torres filed the instant petition, again
seeking judicial clemency from the Court to reinstate him in
the Roll of Attorneys.1âwphi1
The Court's Ruling
The petition is not meritorious.
The principle which should hold true for lawyers, being
officers of the court, is that judicial clemency, as an act of
mercy removing any disqualification, should be balanced
with the preservation of public confidence in the courts.
Thus, the Court will grant it only if there is a showing that it
is merited. Proof of reformation and a showing of potential
and promise are indispensable.23 In Re: The Matter of the
Petition for Reinstatement of Rolando S. Torres as a member
of the Philippine Bar,24 the Court laid down the following
guidelines in resolving requests for judicial clemency, to wit:
1. There must be proof of remorse and reformation. These
shall include but should not be limited to certifications or
testimonials of the officer(s) or chapter(s) of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, judges or judges associations and
prominent members of the community with proven integrity
and probity. A subsequent finding of guilt in an
administrative case for the same or similar misconduct will
give rise to a strong presumption of non-reformation.
2. Sufficient time must have lapsed from the imposition of
the penalty to ensure a period of reform.
3. The age of the person asking for clemency must show
that he still has productive years ahead of him that can be
put to good use by giving him a chance to redeem
himself.1âwphi1
4. There must be a showing of promise (such as intellectual
aptitude, learning or legal acumen or contribution to legal
scholarship and the development of the legal system or
administrative and other relevant skills), as well as potential
for public service.
5. There must be other relevant factors and circumstances
that may justify clemency.25
In support of the instant petition for reinstatement, Torres
merely rehashed all the several testimonials and
endorsements which he had already attached to his previous
petitions, in addition to another endorsement, this time
coming from the incumbent Secretary of Justice, stating that
Torres "is a person of good moral character and a law
abiding citizen."26 However, these testimonials and
endorsements do not prove whatsoever that Torres had
already successfully reformed himself subsequent to his
disbarment. Neither do they exhibit remorse towards the
actions which caused his delisting from the Roll of
Attorneys, i.e., the fraudulent acts he committed against his
sister-in-law. In this regard, it is noteworthy to point out that
since the promulgation of the Court's August 25, 2015
Resolution, there was still no showing that Torres had
reconciled or even attempted to reconcile with his sister-in-
law so as to show remorse for his previous faults.
Moreover, Torres also failed to present any evidence to
demonstrate his potential for public service or that he - now
being 70 years of age27 - still has productive years ahead of
him that can be put to good use by giving him a chance to
redeem himself.
In sum, Torres failed to comply with the guidelines for the
grant of judicial clemency; hence, the instant petition must
necessarily be denied.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
(7) ROSA YAP-PARAS, Petitioner, v. ATTY. JUSTO
PARAS, Respondent. [A.C. NO. 4947 : June 7, 2007]
For resolution is this Motion for Contempt and/or
Disbarment1 dated April 11, 2005, filed by herein petitioner-
movant Rosa Yap Paras against respondent Atty. Justo
Paras, for the latter's alleged violation of a suspension order
earlier meted upon him by the Court. The motion alleges:
4. That the respondent in this case admits that he has
continued his practice of law and in fact filed pleadings in
court after the receipt of suspension on the ground that the
alleged filing of his motion for reconsideration suspends or
interrupt (sic) the running of the period to appeal,
and prays that for his violation of the suspension order, the
respondent be declared in contempt of court and be
disbarred.
Briefly, the facts may be stated as follows:
On September 9, 1998, herein petitioner-movant filed a
verified Petition2 praying for the disbarment of her estranged
husband respondent Atty. Justo J. Paras alleging acts of
deceit, malpractice, grave misconduct, grossly immoral
Page 14 of 38
conduct and violation of oath as a lawyer committed by the
latter.
On February 14, 2005, the Court issued a Resolution3 finding
Atty. Paras guilty of committing a falsehood in violation of
his lawyer's oath and of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Thus, the Court resolved to suspend Atty.
Paras from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year,
with a warning that commission of the same or similar
offense in the future will result in the imposition of a more
severe penalty.
Per records, the aforesaid Resolution was received by Atty.
Paras on March 18, 2005. Thereafter, he filed a Motion for
Reconsideration dated March 28, 2005.4
During the pendency of Atty. Paras' motion for
reconsideration, complainant-movant filed with the Court the
instant Motion for Contempt and/or Disbarment, alleging
thereunder, inter alia, that Atty. Paras violated the
suspension order earlier issued by the Court with his
continued practice of law.
In time, the Court issued a Resolution dated July 18,
2005,5 denying for lack of merit Atty. Paras' motion for
reconsideration, to wit:
Administrative Case No. 4947 (Rosa Yap Paras v. Atty. Justo
Paras) - Acting on the respondent's motion for
reconsideration dated March 28, 2005 of the resolution of
February 14, 2005 which suspended him from the practice of
law for a period of one (1) year, the Court Resolves
to DENY the motion for lack of merit.
The Court further Resolves to NOTE:
(a) the complainant's opposition dated April 11, 2005 to the
said motion for reconsideration with leave of Court;
(b) the respondent's motion dated May 6, 2005 for
immediate resolution of the motion for reconsideration;
andcralawlibrary
(c) the complainant's motion for contempt and/or
disbarment dated April 11, 2005, praying that respondent be
declared in contempt of court and ordered disbarred and
to REQUIRE the respondent to COMMENT thereon, within
ten (10) days from notice.
In the same resolution, the Court required Atty. Paras to
comment on petitioner-movant's Motion for Contempt and/or
Disbarment.
After more than a year, or on September 12, 2006 Atty.
Paras filed with the Court a Manifestation6, stating that he
had completely and faithfully served his one (1) year
suspension from the practice of law from August 25, 2005,
the day after he received the denial resolution on his motion
for reconsideration, to August 24, 2006.
It appearing that Atty. Paras failed to file a comment on the
Motion for Contempt and/or Disbarment, the Court issued
another Resolution dated November 27, 2006 requiring Atty.
Paras to show cause why he should not be held in contempt
of court for such failure and to comply with the said
resolution within ten (10) days from receipt.
Consequently, a Comment on Motion for Contempt and
Explanation on Failure to Timely File Required
Comment7 was filed by Atty. Paras denying all the
allegations in petitioner-movant's Motion for Contempt
and/or Disbarment. He likewise claimed that he had never
done nor made any conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to
impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice,
nor undermine or put to naught or violate any of the
pertinent causes enumerated in Section 3, Rule 71 of the
Revised Rules of Court.
Here, we are called upon to impose on Atty. Paras the
highest punishment to an erring lawyer - disbarment - or to
hold him in contempt for his failure to comply with this
Court's resolutions.
In a number of cases,8 we have repeatedly explained and
stressed that the purpose of disbarment is not meant as a
punishment to deprive an attorney of a means of livelihood
but is rather intended to protect the courts and the public
from members of the bar who have become unfit and
unworthy to be part of the esteemed and noble profession.
Likewise, the purpose of the exercise of the power to cite for
contempt is to safeguard the functions of the court to assure
respect for court orders by attorneys who, as much as
judges, are responsible for the orderly administration of
justice.
We find no sufficient basis to support petitioner-movant's
allegation that Atty. Paras violated the Court's suspension
order, what with the fact that Atty. Paras himself took the
initiative to inform the lower courts of his one - year
suspension from law practice.9
It is clear, however, that all lawyers are expected to
recognize the authority of the Supreme Court and obey its
lawful processes and orders. Despite errors which one may
impute on the orders of the Court, these must be respected,
especially by the bar or the lawyers who are themselves
officers of the courts. It is well to emphasize again that a
resolution of the Supreme Court is not be construed as a
mere request, nor should it be complied with partially,
inadequately or selectively.10 Court orders are to be
respected not because the justices or judges who issue them
should be respected, but because of the respect and
consideration that should be extended to the judicial branch
of the government. This is absolutely essential if our
government is to be a government of laws and not of men.11
Here, Atty. Paras admitted that he had been less than
prudent, and indeed fell short, of his obligation to follow,
obey and comply with the specific Order of the Honorable
Supreme Court contained in Its Resolution dated July 18,
2005 due to his deteriorating health condition which required
him to undergo a coronary angiogram and bypass graft12 .
He likewise expressed his profound and immeasurable
sorrowness amidst regrets for his delayed compliance with
the Court's order.
Given the above, the Court takes this opportunity to remind
the parties in the instant case, as well petitioner-movant's
counsels, to avoid further squabbles and unnecessary filing
of administrative cases against each other. An examination
of the records reveals a pervasive atmosphere of animosity
between Atty. Paras and petitioner's counsels as evidenced
by the number of administrative cases between them. It is
well to stress that mutual bickerings and unjustified
recriminations between attorneys detract from the dignity of
the legal profession and will not receive sympathy from this
Court.13 Lawyers should treat each other with courtesy,
fairness, candor and civility.14
All told, the Court deems a reprimand with warning as a
sufficient sanction for Atty Paras' failure to promptly comply
with its directives. The imposition of this sanction in the
present case would be more consistent with the avowed
purpose of a disciplinary case, which is not so much to
punish the individual attorney as to protect the dispensation
of justice by sheltering the judiciary and the public from the
misconduct or inefficiency of officers of the court.15
Page 15 of 38
ACCORDINGLY, the Motion for Contempt and/or
Disbarment is DENIED. However, Atty. Justo Paras is
hereby REPRIMANDED for his failure to observe the
respect due the Court in not promptly complying with this
Court's resolution, with WARNING that a more drastic
punishment will be imposed upon him for a repetition of the
same act.
SO ORDERED.
(8) SPOUSES GERALDY AND LILIBETH
VICTORY, Complainants vs. ATTY. MARIAN JOS.
MERCADO, Respondent
July 12, 2017 A.C. No. 10580
This is a disbarment case against respondent Atty. Marian Jo
S. Mercado for violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and the Lawyer's Oath.
The Facts
Sometime in 2009, Spouses Geraldy and Lilibeth Victory
(Spouses Victory) were enticed by respondent to enter into a
financial transaction with her with a promise of good
monetary returns. As respondent is a lawyer and a person of
reputation, Spouses Victory entrusted their money to
respondent to invest, manage, and administer into some
financial transactions that would earn good profit for the
parties.1
Respondent called and asked Geraldy Victory (Geraldy)
whether he wanted to invest his money. The respondent
promised that for an investment of PhP 400,000, she will
give Geraldy PhP 600,000 in 30 days; and for PhP 500,000,
she will give Geraldy PhP 625,000.2
The investment transactions went well for the first 10
months. Spouses Victory received the agreed return of
profit. Some of such financial transactions were covered by
Memoranda of Agreement.3
Later on, respondent became evasive in returning to
Spouses Victory the money that the latter were supposed to
receive as part of the agreement. Respondent failed to settle
and account the money entrusted to her by Spouses
Victory.4
Spouses Victory alleged that the outstanding obligation of
respondent is PhP 5 Million plus interest or a total of PhP 8.3
Million.5
Spouses Victory filed a criminal complaint for estafa and
violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 with the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Sta. Rosa, Laguna.6
After the filing of said criminal case, respondent met with
Spouses Victory. Respondent proposed to reduce her
obligation from PhP 8.3 Million to PhP 7.5 Million in
staggered payments, to which Spouses Victory agreed.
Respondent then issued three postdated checks in the
amount of PhP 300,000 each. However, said checks
bounced.7
Report and Recommendation
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
Commission on Bar Discipline
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)-Commission on
Bar Discipline (CBD) found that respondent indeed lured
Spouses Victory in entering into a series of financial
transactions with a promise of return of profit. Respondent,
however, failed to deliver such promise. On such premise,
the IBP-CBD recommended respondent's suspension, to wit:
On the basis of the foregoing, it is respectfully recommended
that respondent Atty. Marian Jo S. Mercado be SUSPENDED
for SIX (6) MONTHS from the practice of law.8
Resolutions of the IBP Board of Governors
On March 20, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors issued
Resolution No. XX-2013-199, which reads:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby
unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification,
the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part
of this Resolution as Annex "A ", and finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record
and the applicable laws and rules and considering
Respondent's violation of Canon 7 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility for evading the settlement of her
financial obligations to the complainants and for not
bothering to appear in the investigation of this case, Atty.
Marian Jo S. Mercado is hereby DISBARRED.9 (Emphasis
supplied)
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration,10 which was
denied in Resolution No. XXI-2014-158, to wit:
RESOLVED to DENY Respondent's Motion for
Reconsideration, there being no cogent reason to reverse
the findings of the Commission and it being a mere
reiteration of the matters which had already been threshed
out and taken into consideration. However, considering that
Respondent is currently settling her financial obligations to
Complainants and very apologetic and granting her good
faith in her investment transaction with Complainants,
Resolution No. XX-2013-199 dated March 20, 2013 is hereby
AFFIRMED, with modification, and accordingly the penalty
earlier imposed on Atty. Marian Jo S. Mercado is hereby
reduced to SUSPENSION from the practice of law for one (1)
year. 11 (Emphasis supplied)
Issue
Should the respondent be held administratively liable based
on the allegations in the pleadings of all parties on record?
Our Ruling
Emphatically, a lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity
and dignity of the legal profession. The bar should maintain
a high standard of legal proficiency as well as honesty and
fair dealing. A lawyer brings honor to the legal profession by
faithfully performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the
courts and to his clients.12 Canon 1, Rule 1.01, and Canon 7
provides:
CANON 1 - A LA WYER SHALL UPHOLD THE
CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND
PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND FOR LEGAL PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct.
CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE
INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND
SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.
Exercising its disciplinary authority over the members of the
bar, this Court has imposed the penalty of suspension or
disbarment for any gross misconduct that a lawyer
committed, whether it is in his professional or in his private
capacity. Good character is an essential qualification for the
admission to and continued practice of law. Thus, any
wrongdoing, whether professional or non-professional,
indicating unfitness for the profession justifies disciplinary
action.13
Page 16 of 38
In this case, it is without dispute that respondent has an
outstanding obligation with Spouses Victory, as the latter's
investments which they coursed through the respondent fell
through. To make matters worse, respondent issued several
checks to settle her obligation; unfortunately, said checks
bounced.

As a lawyer, respondent is expected to act with the highest

degree of integrity and fair dealing. She is expected to
maintain not only legal proficiency, but also a high standard
of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing so that the
people's faith and confidence in the judicial system is
ensured. She must, at all times, faithfully perform her duties
to society, to the bar, to the courts and to her clients, which
include prompt payment of financial obligations.14

It must be considered that the deliberate failure to pay just

debts and the issuance of worthless checks constitute gross
misconduct, for which a lawyer may be sanctioned with
suspension from the practice of law. Lawyers are
instruments for the administration of justice and vanguards
of our legal system.15

We cannot exempt respondent from liability just because she

encountered financial difficulties in the course of her
investment deals. Respondent even admitted that she
continued to do business despite such financial hardships; as
such, her monetary obligations with different investors
accumulated at an alarming rate. In an attempt to settle her
obligations, respondent issued checks, which all bounced.

To Our mind, the actuations of respondent fell short of the

exacting standards expected of every member of the bar.

In this case, while respondent admitted her responsibility

and signified her intention of complying with the same, We
cannot close our eyes to the fact that respondent committed
infractions. To uphold the integrity of the legal profession,
We deem it proper to uphold the findings as well as the
sanction imposed by the IBP Board of Governors.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, We resolve

to SUSPEND Atty. Marian Jo S. Mercado from the practice
of law for one (1) year to commence immediately from the
receipt of this Decision, with a WARNING that a repetition
of the same or similar offense will warrant a more severe
penalty.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished all courts, the Office

of the Bar Confidant, and the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines for their information and guidance. The Office of
the Bar Confidant is directed to append a copy of this
Decision to respondent's record as member of the Bar.

SO ORDERED.

Page 17 of 38
(9) JOCELYN IGNACIO, Complainant vs. ATTY. DANIEL
T. ALVIAR, Respondent
July 17, 2017A.C. No. 11482
This is an administrative case filed by complainant Jocelyn
Ignacio against respondent Atty. Daniel T. Alviar for violation
of Canon 11 , Rule 1.012 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR) for his alleged refusal to refund the
amount of acceptance fees; Canon 123, Rule 12.044 and
Canon 185 Rule 18.036 for his alleged failure to appear in the
criminal case he is handling and to file any pleading therein.
The Facts
In March 2014, respondent was referred to complainant for
purposes of handling the case of complainant's son who was
then apprehended and detained by the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency (PDEA) in Quezon City. Respondent
agreed to represent complainant's son for a stipulated
acceptance fee of PhPl00,000. Respondent further
represented that he could refer the matter to the
Commission on Human Rights to investigate the alleged
illegal arrest made on complainant's son.7
After the initial payments of PhP20,000 and PhP30,000 were
given to respondent, the latter visited complainant's son at
the PDEA detention cell.8 There, respondent conferred with
complainant's son for some 20 minutes. After which,
respondent left.9
Respondent, through his secretary, secured from the Office
of the Pasay City Prosecutor plain copies of the case records.
Respondent also verified twice from the Hall of Justice if the
case was already filed in court.10 It was at this time that
respondent asked, and was paid, the remaining balance of
PhP50,000. Subsequently, respondent filed his notice of
appearance as counsel for complainant's son.11
Sometime in April 2014, complainant informed respondent
that her son's arraignment was set on April 29, 2014.
Respondent, however, replied that he cannot attend said
arraignment due to a previously scheduled hearing. He
committed to either find a way to attend the hearing or ask
another lawyer-friend to attend it for him.
On April 26, 2014, complainant wrote a 1etter12 to
respondent informing the latter that she had decided to seek
the intercession of another lawyer owing to the fact that
respondent cannot attend her son's scheduled arraignment.
Complainant then requested that respondent retain a portion
of the PhP 100,000 to fairly remunerate respondent for the
preparatory legal service he rendered. Respondent denies
having received said letter.13
On the date of the arraignment, neither respondent nor his
promised alternate, appeared. When asked, respondent
replied that he forgot the date of arraignment.14
This incident prompted complainant to write another
letter15 dated May 6, 2014 to respondent, requesting the
latter to formally withdraw as counsel and emphasized that
respondent's withdrawal as counsel is necessary so that she
and her son can hire another lawyer to take his stead. In
said letter, complainant also reiterated her request that a
portion of the PhPl00,000 be remitted to them after
respondent deducts his professional fees commensurate to
the preparatory legal service he rendered.16
When respondent failed to take heed, complainant filed on
June 16, 2014, the instant administrative complaint before
the Commission on Bar Discipline, Integrated Bar of the
Philippines.
At the proceedings therein, respondent failed to attend the
initial mandatory conferences and to file his responsive
pleading, citing as reason therefor the persistent threats to
his life allegedly caused by a former client.17 Upon finally
submitting his Answer18 , respondent denied having
neglected his duties to complainant's son.
Report and Recommendation
of the Commission on Bar Discipline
On January 21, 2016, the Investigating Commissioner found
respondent liable for negligence under Rule 18.03 of the CPR
and recommended a penalty of six months suspension from
the practice of law. The Investigating Commissioner
observed that while respondent performed some tasks as
lawyer for complainant's son, such do not command a fee of
PhPl00,000. It was also emphasized that respondent's failure
to attend the arraignment shows the latter's failure to handle
the case with diligence.19
As such, the Investigating Commissioner disposed:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the
undersigned recommends that respondent be meted out
with the penalty of suspension for six (6) months from the
practice of law and ordered to restitute the amount of One
Hundred Thousand (Phpl00,000) Pesos to the complainant.
Respectfully Submitted.20
Resolution of the Board of Governors
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
On February 25, 2016, the IBP Board of Governors passed
Resolution No. XXII-2016-17821 lowering the recommended
penalty to reprimand with stem warning, thus:
RESOLVED to ADOPT with modification the recommendation
of the Investigating Commissioner reducing the penalty to
REPRJMAND WITH STERN WARNING.22
Pursuant to Rule 139-B, the records of the administrative
case were transmitted by the IBP to the Court for final
action. Complainant further seeks a review23 of the
Resolution No. XXII-2016-178 dated February 25, 2016.
The Issue
The threshold issue to be resolved is whether respondent is
guilty of negligence in handling the case of complainant's
son.
The Ruling of the Court
The Court affirms the Resolution No. XXII-2016-178 dated
February 25, 2016 of the IBP Board of Governors, reducing
the recommended penalty from six months to reprimand
with stem warning. However, on the undisputed factual
finding that respondent only performed preparatory legal
services for complainant's son, he is not entitled to the entire
PhP 100,000 but only to fees determined on the basis
of quantum meruit, Section 24, Rule 138, and Canon 20,
Rule 20.01 of the CPR and that the remainder should be
restituted to complainant.
Acceptance of money from a client establishes an attorney-
client relationship and gives rise to the duty of fidelity to the
client's cause.24 Canon 1825 of the CPR mandates that once a
lawyer agrees to handle a case, it is the lawyer's duty to
serve the client with competence and diligence.
In Voluntad-Ramirez v. Atty. Bautista26 , the Court
citing Santiago v. Fojas27 expounds:
Page 18 of 38
It is axiomatic that no lawyer is obliged to act either as
adviser or advocate for every person who may wish to
become his client. He has the right to decline employment,
subject, however, to Canon 14 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Once he agrees to take up the cause of [his]
client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and must
always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in
him. He must serve the client with competence and
diligence, and champion the latter's cause with wholehearted
fidelity, care and devotion. Elsewise stated, he owes entire
devotion to the interest of his client, warm zeal in the
maintenance and defense of his client's rights, and the
exertion of his utmost learning and ability to the end that
nothing be taken or withheld from his client, save by the
rules of the law, legally applied. This simply means that his
client is entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and
defense that is authorized by the law of the land and he may
expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense. If
much is demanded from an attorney, it is because the
entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it the
correlative duties not only to the client but also to the court,
to the bar, and to the public. A lawyer who performs his duty
with diligence and candor not only protects the interest of
his client; he also serves the ends of justice, does honor to
the bar, and helps maintain the respect of the community to
the legal profession.28
We agree with the finding of the Investigating Commissioner
that respondent failed to competently and diligently attend
to the legal matter entrusted to him. It is undisputed that
respondent came to see complainant's son, his client, only
once for about 20 minutes and no more thereafter; 29 it is
likewise undisputed that respondent failed to attend the
scheduled arraignment despite the latter's commitment to
either find a way to attend, or send a collaborating counsel
to do so;30 that he forgot the date of arraignment is an
equally dismal excuse.
Equally revealing of respondent's negligence was his
nonchalant attitude towards complainant's request for a
refund of a portion of, not even the entire, PhPl00,000. In
his Answer before the IBP, respondent simply denied having
received any of the letters sent by
complainant.31 Respondent's claim that it was complainant
who failed to talk to him and his admission that he "forgot
about complainant"32 reveal his rather casual and
lackadaisical treatment of the complainant and the legal
matter entrusted to him.
If it were true that complainant already failed to
communicate with him, the least respondent could have
done was to withdraw his appearance as counsel. But even
this measure, it appears, respondent failed to perform. His
failure to take such action speaks of his negligence.
In administrative proceedings, only substantial evidence is
required to warrant disciplinary sanctions. Substantial
evidence is consistently defined as relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.33 While the Court finds respondent guilty of
negligence, We cannot ascribe to him any unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct nor causing undue
delay and impediment to the execution of a judgment or
misusing court processes. As such, and consistent with
current jurisprudence, We find the penalty of reprimand with
stem warning commensurate to his offense.34
As regards the restitution of the acceptance fees, We find it
necessary to first distinguish between an attorney's fee and
an acceptance fee as the former depends on the nature and
extent of the legal services rendered, while the other does
not.
On one hand, attorney's fee is understood both in its
ordinary and extraordinary concept.35 In its ordinary
concept, attorney's fee refers to the reasonable
compensation paid to a lawyer by his client for legal services
rendered. While, in its extraordinary concept, attorney's fee
is awarded by the court to the successful litigant to be paid
by the losing party as indemnity for damages.36 In the
present case, the Investigating Commissioner referred to the
attorney's fee in its ordinary concept.
On the other hand, acceptance fee refers to the charge
imposed by the lawyer for mere acceptance of the case. The
rationale for the fee is because once the lawyer agrees to
represent a client, he is precluded from handling cases of the
opposing party based on the prohibition on conflict of
interest. The opportunity cost of mere acceptance is thus
indemnified by the payment of acceptance fee. However,
since acceptance fee compensates the lawyer only for lost
opportunity, the same is not measured by the nature and
extent of the legal services rendered.37
In this case, respondent referred to the PhPl00,000 as his
acceptance fee while to the complainant, said amount
answers for the legal services which respondent was
engaged to provide. Preceding from the fact that
complainant agreed to immediately pay, as she, in fact,
immediately paid the sums of PhP20,000, PhP30,000 and
PhP50,000, said amounts undoubtedly pertain to
respondent's acceptance fee which is customarily paid by the
client upon the lawyer's acceptance of the case.
Be that as it may, the Court had not shied from ordering a
return of acceptance fees in cases wherein the lawyer had
been negligent in the handling of his client's case. Thus,
in Carino v. Atty. De Los Reyes,38 the respondent lawyer who
failed to file a complaint-affidavit before the prosecutor's
office, returned the PhPl 0,000 acceptance fee paid to him
and was admonished to be more careful in the performance
of his duty to his clients. Likewise, in Voluntad-Ramirez v.
Baustista,39 the respondent lawyer was ordered to return the
PhP14,000 acceptance fee because he did nothing to
advance his client's cause during the six-month period that
he was engaged as counsel.
This being the case, the next query to be had is how much
of the acceptance fee should respondent
restitute.1âwphi1 In this regard, the principle of quantum
meruit (as much as he deserves) may serve as a basis for
determining the reasonable amount of attorney's
fees. Quantum meruit is a device to prevent undue
enrichment based on the equitable postulate that it is unjust
for a person to retain benefit without working for it.
Also, Section 24, Rule 138 should be observed in
determining respondent's compensation, thus:
SEC. 24. Compensation of attorney's; agreement as to
fees. An attorney shall be entitled to have and recover from
his client no more than a reasonable compensation for his
services, with a view to the importance of the subject matter
of the controversy, the extent of the services rendered, and
the professional standing of the attorney. No court shall be
bound by the opinion of attorneys as expert witnesses as to
the proper compensation, but may disregard such testimony
and base its conclusion on its own professional knowledge. A
written contract for services shall control the amount to be
paid therefor unless found by the court to be unconscionable
or unreasonable.
The criteria found in the Code of Professional Responsibility
are also to be considered in assessing the proper amount of
compensation that a lawyer should receive.40 Canon 20, Rule
20.01 provides:
Page 19 of 38
CANON 20 A LAWYER SHALL CHARGE ONLY FAIR AND
REASONABLE FEES.
Rule 20.01. A lawyer shall be guided by the following factors
in determining his fees:
(a) The time spent and the extent of the services rendered
or required;
(b) The novelty and difficulty of the question involved;
(c) The importance of the subject matter;
(d) The skill demanded;
(e) The probability of losing other employment as a result of
acceptance of the proffered case;
(f) The customary charges for similar services and the
schedule of fees of the IBP Chapter to which he belongs;
(g) The amount involved in the controversy and the benefits
resulting to the client from the service;
(h) The contingency or certainty of compensation;
(i) The character of the employment, whether occasional or
established; and
(j) The professional standing of the lawyer.
Here, respondent only conferred once with the complainant's
son for 20 minutes, filed his entry of appearance, obtained
copies of the case records and inquired twice as to the
status of the case. For his efforts and for the particular
circumstances in this case, respondent should be allowed a
reasonable compensation of PhP3,000. The remainder, or
PhP97,000 should be returned to the complainant.
WHEREFORE, We find Atty. Daniel T. Alviar LIABLE for
violation of Canon 18 and Rule 18.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and he is
hereby REPRIMANDED with a stem warning that a
repetition of the same or similar act would be dealt with
more severely. Atty. Daniel T. Alviar is ordered
to RESTITUTE to complainant the amount of PhP97,000 out
of the Phpl00,000 acceptance fee.
SO ORDERED.
(10) DR. ELMAR O. PEREZ, Complainant, v. ATTY.
TRISTAN A. CATINDIG AND ATTY. KAREN E.
BAYDO, Respondents.
A.C. No. 5816, March 10, 2015
PER CURIAM:
Before the Court is an administrative complaint 1 for
disbarment filed by Dr. Elmar O. Perez (Dr. Perez) with the
Office of the Bar Confidant on August 27, 2002 against Atty.
Tristan A. Catindig (Atty. Catindig) and Atty. Karen E. Baydo
(Atty. Baydo) (respondents) for gross immorality and
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The Facts
In her complaint, Dr. Perez alleged that she and Atty.
Catindig had been friends since the mid-1960’s when they
were both students at the University of the Philippines, but
they lost touch after their graduation. Sometime in 1983, the
paths of Atty. Catindig and Dr. Perez again crossed. It was at
that time that Atty. Catindig started to court Dr.
Perez.2chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Atty. Catindig admitted to Dr. Perez that he was already wed
to Lily Corazon Gomez (Gomez), having married the latter on
May 18, 1968 at the Central Methodist Church in Ermita,
Manila, which was followed by a Catholic wedding at the
Shrine of Our Lady of Lourdes in Quezon City.3 Atty. Catindig
however claimed that he only married Gomez because he
got her pregnant; that he was afraid that Gomez would
make a scandal out of her pregnancy should he refuse to
marry her, which could have jeopardized his scholarship in
the Harvard Law School.4chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Atty. Catindig told Dr. Perez that he was in the process of
obtaining a divorce in a foreign country to dissolve his
marriage to Gomez, and that he would eventually marry her
once the divorce had been decreed. Consequently, sometime
in 1984, Atty. Catindig and Gomez obtained a divorce decree
from the Dominican Republic. Dr. Perez claimed that Atty.
Catindig assured her that the said divorce decree was lawful
and valid and that there was no longer any impediment to
their marriage.5chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Thus, on July 14, 1984, Atty. Catindig married Dr. Perez in
the State of Virginia in the United States of America (USA).
Their union was blessed with a child whom they named
Tristan Jegar Josef Frederic.6chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Years later, Dr. Perez came to know that her marriage to
Atty. Catindig is a nullity since the divorce decree that was
obtained from the Dominican Republic by the latter and
Gomez is not recognized by Philippine laws. When she
confronted Atty. Catindig about it, the latter allegedly
assured Dr. Perez that he would legalize their union once he
obtains a declaration of nullity of his marriage to Gomez
under the laws of the Philippines. He also promised to legally
adopt their son.7chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Sometime in 1997, Dr. Perez reminded Atty. Catindig of his
promise to legalize their union by filing a petition to nullify
his marriage to Gomez. Atty. Catindig told her that he would
still have to get the consent of Gomez to the said
petition.8chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Sometime in 2001, Dr. Perez alleged that she received an
anonymous letter9 in the mail informing her of Atty.
Catindig’s scandalous affair with Atty. Baydo, and that
sometime later, she came upon a love letter10 written and
signed by Atty. Catindig for Atty. Baydo dated April 25, 2001.
In the said letter, Atty. Catindig professed his love to Atty.
Baydo, promising to marry her once his “impediment is
removed.” Apparently, five months into their relationship,
Atty. Baydo requested Atty. Catindig to put a halt to their
affair until such time that he is able to obtain the annulment
of his marriage. On August 13, 2001, Atty. Catindig filed a
petition to declare the nullity of his marriage to
Gomez.11chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On October 31, 2001, Atty. Catindig abandoned Dr. Perez
and their son; he moved to an upscale condominium in
Salcedo Village, Makati City where Atty. Baydo was
frequently seen.12chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In a Resolution13 dated October 9, 2002, the Court directed
the respondents to file their respective comments, which
they separately did on November 25,
2002.14chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Atty. Catindig, in his Comment,15 admitted that he married
Gomez on May 18, 1968. He claimed, however, that
immediately after the wedding, Gomez showed signs that
she was incapable of complying with her marital obligations,
Page 20 of 38
as she had serious intimacy problems; and that while their
union was blessed with four children, their relationship
simply deteriorated.
Eventually, their irreconcilable differences led to their de
facto separation in 1984. They then consulted Atty.
Wilhelmina Joven (Atty. Joven), a mutual friend, on how the
agreement to separate and live apart could be implemented.
Atty. Joven suggested that the couple adopt a property
regime of complete separation of property. She likewise
advised the couple to obtain a divorce decree from the
Dominican Republic for whatever value it may have and
comfort it may provide them.16chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Thus, on April 27, 1984, Atty. Catindig and Gomez each
executed a Special Power of Attorney addressed to a Judge
of the First Civil Court of San Cristobal, Dominican Republic,
appointing an attorney-in-fact to institute a divorce action
under its laws. Atty. Catindig likewise admitted that a divorce
by mutual consent was ratified by the Dominican Republic
court on June 12, 1984. Further, Atty. Catindig and Gomez
filed a Joint Petition for Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership
before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 133,
which was granted on June 23,
1984.17chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Atty. Catindig claimed that Dr. Perez knew of the foregoing,
including the fact that the divorce decreed by the Dominican
Republic court does not have any effect in the Philippines.
Notwithstanding that she knew that the marriage of Atty.
Catindig and Gomez still subsisted, Dr. Perez demanded that
Atty. Catindig marry her. Thus, Atty. Catindig married Dr.
Perez in July 1984 in the USA.18chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Atty. Catindig claimed that Dr. Perez knew that their
marriage was not valid since his previous marriage to Gomez
was still subsisting, and that he only married Dr. Perez
because he loved her and that he was afraid of losing her if
he did not. He merely desired to lend a modicum of
legitimacy to their relationship.19chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Atty. Catindig claimed that his relationship with Dr. Perez
turned sour. Eventually, he left their home in October 2001
to prevent any acrimony from
developing.20chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
He denied that Atty. Baydo was the reason that he left Dr.
Perez, claiming that his relationship with Dr. Perez started to
fall apart as early as 1997. He asserted that Atty. Baydo
joined his law firm only in September 1999; and that while
he was attracted to her, Atty. Baydo did not reciprocate and
in fact rejected him. He likewise pointed out that Atty. Baydo
resigned from his firm in January
2001.21chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
For her part, Atty. Baydo denied that she had an affair with
Atty. Catindig. She claimed that Atty. Catindig began
courting her while she was employed in his firm. She
however rejected Atty. Catindig’s romantic overtures; she
told him that she could not reciprocate his feelings since he
was married and that he was too old for her. She said that
despite being turned down, Atty. Catindig still pursued her,
which was the reason why she resigned from his law
firm.22chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On January 29, 2003, the Court referred the case to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation,
report and recommendation within 90 days from
notice.23chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On June 2, 2003, the IBP’s Commission on Bar Discipline
(CBD) issued an Order24 setting the mandatory conference of
the administrative case on July 4, 2003, which was later
reset to August 29, 2003. During the conference, the parties
manifested that they were already submitting the case for
resolution based on the pleadings already submitted.
Thereupon, the IBP-CBD directed the parties to submit their
respective position papers within 10 days from notice.
Respondents Atty. Catindig and Atty. Baydo filed their
position papers on October 17, 200325 and October 20,
2003,26 respectively. Dr. Perez filed her position paper27 on
October 24, 2003.
Findings of the IBP Investigating Commissioner
On May 6, 2011, after due proceedings, the Investigating
Commissioner of the IBP-CBD issued a Report and
Recommendation,28 which recommended the disbarment of
Atty. Catindig for gross immorality, violation of Rule 1.01,
Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. The Investigating Commissioner pointed out
that Atty. Catindig’s act of marrying Dr. Perez despite
knowing fully well that his previous marriage to Gomez still
subsisted was a grossly immoral and illegal conduct, which
warrants the ultimate penalty of disbarment. The
Investigating Commissioner further opined
that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
In this case, the undisputed facts gathered from the
evidence and the admissions of Atty. Catindig established a
pattern of grossly immoral conduct that warrants fustigation
and his disbarment. His conduct was not only corrupt or
unprincipled; it was reprehensible to the highest degree.
There is no dichotomy of morality. A lawyer and a professor
of law, both in his official and personal conduct, must display
exemplary behavior. Respondent’s bigamous marriage and
his proclivity for extramarital adventurism have definitely
caused damage to the legal and teaching professions. How
can he hold his head up high and expect his students, his
peers and the community to look up to him as a model
worthy of emulation when he failed to follow the tenets of
morality? In contracting a second marriage notwithstanding
knowing fully well that he has a prior valid subsisting
marriage, Atty. Catindig has made a mockery of an
otherwise inviolable institution, a serious outrage to the
generally accepted moral standards of the community.29
On the other hand, the Investigating Commissioner
recommended that the charge against Atty. Baydo be
dismissed for dearth of evidence; Dr. Perez failed to present
clear and preponderant evidence in support of the alleged
affair between the respondents.
Findings of the IBP Board of Governors
On December 10, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors issued a
Resolution,30 which adopted and approved the
recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.
Atty. Catindig sought a reconsideration31 of the December
10, 2011 Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors, claiming
that the Investigating Commissioner erred in relying solely
on Dr. Perez’s uncorroborated allegations. He pointed out
that, under Section 1 of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, a
complaint for disbarment must be supported by affidavits of
persons having knowledge of the facts therein alleged
and/or by such documents as may substantiate said facts.
He said that despite the absence of any corroborating
testimony, the Investigating Commissioner gave credence to
Dr. Perez’ testimony.
Page 21 of 38
He also claimed that he had absolutely no intention of
committing any felony; that he never concealed the status of
his marriage from anyone. In fact, Atty. Catindig asserted
that he had always been transparent with both Gomez and
Dr. Perez.
The IBP Board of Governors, in its Resolution32 dated
December 29, 2012, denied Atty. Catindig’s motion for
reconsideration.
The Issue
The issue in this case is whether the respondents committed
gross immorality, which would warrant their disbarment.
Ruling of the Court
After a thorough perusal of the respective allegations of the
parties and the circumstances of this case, the Court agrees
with the findings and recommendations of the Investigating
Commissioner and the IBP Board of Governors.
The Code of Professional Responsibility
provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct.
Canon 7 – A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and
dignity of the legal profession and support the activities of
the Integrated Bar.
Rule 7.03 – A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that
adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should
he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous
manner to the discredit of the legal profession.cralawred
In Arnobit v. Atty. Arnobit,33 the Court
held:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
[T]he requirement of good moral character is of much
greater import, as far as the general public is concerned,
than the possession of legal learning. Good moral character
is not only a condition precedent for admission to the legal
profession, but it must also remain intact in order to
maintain one’s good standing in that exclusive and honored
fraternity. Good moral character is more than just the
absence of bad character. Such character expresses itself in
the will to do the unpleasant thing if it is right and the
resolve not to do the pleasant thing if it is wrong. This must
be so because “vast interests are committed to his care; he
is the recipient of unbounded trust and confidence; he deals
with his client’s property, reputation, his life, his
all.”34 (Citation omitted)
In this regard, Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court
provides that a lawyer may be removed or suspended from
the practice of law, inter alia, for grossly immoral conduct.
Thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Sec. 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by Supreme Court
on what grounds. — A member of the bar may be
removed or suspended from his office as attorney by
the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other
gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct,
or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is
required to take before the admission to practice, or for a
wilfull disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court,
or for corruptly or willful appearing as an attorney for a party
to a case without authority so to do. The practice of
soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either
personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes
malpractice. (Emphasis ours)
“A lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any
misconduct showing any fault or deficiency in his moral
character, honesty, probity or good demeanor.”35 Immoral
conduct involves acts that are willful, flagrant, or shameless,
and that show a moral indifference to the opinion of the
upright and respectable members of the community.
Immoral conduct is gross when it is so corrupt as to
constitute a criminal act, or so unprincipled as to be
reprehensible to a high degree, or when committed under
such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the
community’s sense of decency. The Court makes these
distinctions, as the supreme penalty of disbarment arising
from conduct requires grossly immoral, not simply immoral,
conduct.36chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Contracting a marriage during the subsistence of a
previous one amounts to a grossly immoral conduct.
The facts gathered from the evidence adduced by the parties
and, ironically, from Atty. Catindig’s own admission, indeed
establish a pattern of conduct that is grossly immoral; it is
not only corrupt and unprincipled, but reprehensible to a
high degree.
Atty. Catindig was validly married to Gomez twice – a
wedding in the Central Methodist Church in 1968, which was
then followed by a Catholic wedding. In 1983, Atty. Catindig
started pursuing Dr. Perez when their paths crossed again.
Curiously, 15 years into his first marriage and four children
after, Atty. Catindig claimed that his first marriage was then
already falling apart due to Gomez’ serious intimacy
problems.
A year after pursuing Dr. Perez, Atty. Catindig had a de
facto separation from Gomez, dissolved their conjugal
partnership of gains, obtained a divorce decree from a court
in the Dominican Republic, and married Dr. Perez in the USA
all in the same year. Atty. Catindig was so enchanted with
Dr. Perez at that time that he moved heaven and earth just
so he could marry her right away – a marriage that has at
least a semblance of legality.
From his own admission, Atty. Catindig knew that the
divorce decree he obtained from the court in the Dominican
Republic was not recognized in our jurisdiction as he and
Gomez were both Filipino citizens at that time. He knew that
he was still validly married to Gomez; that he cannot marry
anew unless his previous marriage be properly declared a
nullity. Otherwise, his subsequent marriage would be void.
This notwithstanding, he still married Dr. Perez. The
foregoing circumstances seriously taint Atty. Catindig’s sense
of social propriety and moral values. It is a blatant and
purposeful disregard of our laws on marriage.
It has also not escaped the attention of the Court that Atty.
Catindig married Dr. Perez in the USA. Considering that Atty.
Catindig knew that his previous marriage remained valid, the
logical conclusion is that he wanted to marry Dr. Perez in the
USA for the added security of avoiding any charge of bigamy
by entering into the subsequent marriage outside Philippine
jurisdiction.
Moreover, assuming arguendo that Atty. Catindig’s claim is
true, it matters not that Dr. Perez knew that their marriage is
a nullity. The fact still remains that he resorted to various
legal strategies in order to render a façade of validity to his
otherwise invalid marriage to Dr. Perez. Such act is, at the
very least, so unprincipled that it is reprehensible to the
Page 22 of 38
highest degree.
Further, after 17 years of cohabiting with Dr. Perez, and
despite the various legal actions he resorted to in order to
give their union a semblance of validity, Atty. Catindig left
her and their son. It was only at that time that he finally
decided to properly seek the nullity of his first marriage to
Gomez. Apparently, he was then already entranced with the
much younger Atty. Baydo, an associate lawyer employed by
his firm.
While the fact that Atty. Catindig decided to separate from
Dr. Perez to pursue Atty. Baydo, in itself, cannot be
considered a grossly immoral conduct, such fact forms part
of the pattern showing his propensity towards immoral
conduct. Lest it be misunderstood, the Court’s finding of
gross immoral conduct is hinged not on Atty. Catindig’s
desertion of Dr. Perez, but on his contracting of a
subsequent marriage during the subsistence of his previous
marriage to Gomez.
“The moral delinquency that affects the fitness of a member
of the bar to continue as such includes conduct that
outrages the generally accepted moral standards of the
community, conduct for instance, which makes ‘a mockery of
the inviolable social institution of marriage.’”37 In various
cases, the Court has held that disbarment is warranted when
a lawyer abandons his lawful wife and maintains an illicit
relationship with another woman who has borne him a
child.38chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Atty. Catindig’s subsequent marriage during the subsistence
of his previous one definitely manifests a deliberate
disregard of the sanctity of marriage and the marital vows
protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our laws. By
his own admission, Atty. Catindig made a mockery out of the
institution of marriage, taking advantage of his legal skills in
the process. He exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of
morality required of him as a member of the bar, which thus
warrant the penalty of disbarment.
The Court is not unmindful of the rule that the power to
disbar must be exercised with great caution, and only in a
clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing
and character of the lawyer as an officer of the Court and as
a member of the bar. Where a lesser penalty, such as
temporary suspension, could accomplish the end desired,
disbarment should never be decreed. Nevertheless, in this
case, the seriousness of the offense compels the Court to
wield its power to disbar, as it appears to be the most
appropriate penalty.
Atty. Catindig’s claim that Dr. Perez’s allegations against him
are not credible since they are uncorroborated and not
supported by affidavits contrary to Section 1, Rule 139-B of
the Rules of Court, deserves scant consideration. Verily, Atty.
Catindig himself admitted in his pleadings that he indeed
married Dr. Perez in 1984 while his previous marriage with
Gomez still subsisted. Indubitably, such admission provides
ample basis for the Court to render disciplinary sanction
against him.
There is insufficient evidence to prove the affair
between the respondents.
The Court likewise agrees with the Investigating
Commissioner that there is a dearth of evidence to prove the
claimed amorous relationship between the respondents. As it
is, the evidence that was presented by Dr. Perez to prove
her claim was mere allegation, an anonymous letter
informing her that the respondents were indeed having an
affair and the purported love letter to Atty. Baydo that was
signed by Atty. Catindig.
The Court has consistently held that in suspension or
disbarment proceedings against lawyers, the lawyer enjoys
the presumption of innocence, and the burden of proof rests
upon the complainant to prove the allegations in his
complaint. The evidence required in suspension or
disbarment proceedings is preponderance of
evidence.39chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The presentation of the anonymous letter that was received
by Dr. Perez only proves that the latter indeed received a
letter informing her of the alleged relations between the
respondents; it does not prove the veracity of the allegations
therein. Similarly, the supposed love letter, if at all, only
proves that Atty. Catindig wrote Atty. Baydo a letter
professing his love for her. It does not prove that Atty.
Baydo is indeed in a relationship with Atty. Catindig.
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing
disquisitions, the Court resolves to ADOPT the
recommendations of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines. Atty. Tristan A. Catindig is
found GUILTY of gross immorality and of violating the
Lawyer’s Oath and Rule 1.01, Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility and is
hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law.
Let a copy of this Decision be entered into the records of
Atty. Tristan A. Catindig in the Office of the Bar Confidant
and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of
Attorneys. Likewise, copies of this Decision shall be furnished
to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and circulated by the
Court Administrator to all appellate and trial courts.
The charge of gross immorality against Atty. Karen E. Baydo
is hereby DISMISSED for lack of evidence.
This Decision takes effect immediately.
SO ORDERED.
(11) ATTY. ROY B. ECRAELA, Complainant, v. ATTY. IAN
RAYMOND A. PANGALANGAN, Respondent.
A.C. No. 10676, September 08, 2015
The Case
Before the Court is a Petition for Disbarment1 filed by Atty.
Roy B. Ecraela with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) on April 12, 2007
against Atty. Ian Raymond A. Pangalangan for his illicit
relations, chronic womanizing, abuse of authority as an
educator, and "other unscrupulous activities" which cause
"undue embarrassment to the legal profession." Complainant
claims that respondent's actions involve deceit, malpractice,
gross misconduct and grossly immoral conduct in violation of
the Lawyer's Oath.
The Facts
Complainant and respondent were best friends and both
graduated from the University of the Philippines (UP) College
of Law in 1990, where they were part of a peer group
or barkada with several of their classmates. After passing the
bar examinations and being admitted as members of the Bar
in 1991, they were both registered with the IBP Quezon City.
Respondent was formerly married to Sheila P. Jardiolin
Page 23 of 38
(Jardiolin) with whom he has three (3) children. Complainant
avers that while married to Jardiolin, respondent had a series
of adulterous and illicit relations with married and unmarried
women between the years 1990 to 2007. These alleged illicit
relations involved:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
a. AAA,2 who is the spouse of a colleague in the UP
College of Law, from 1990 to 1992, which
complainant had personal knowledge of such illicit
relations;
b. BBB, sometime during the period from 1992 to
1994 or from 1994 to 1996, despite being already
married to Jardiolin;
c. CCC, despite being married to Jardiolin and while
also being romantically involved with DDD;
d. DDD, sometime during the period from 2000 to
2002, despite still being married to Jardiolin and
while still being romantically involved with CCC;
e. EEE, who is related to complainant, sometime
during the period from May 2004 until the filing of
the Petition, while still being romantically involved
with CCC.3
Complainant claims that respondent, with malice and without
remorse, deceived CCC and DDD by representing himself to
be a bachelor, thereby convincing the two women to start a
love affair with him, when in truth, he was then still married
to Jardiolin.4cralawrednad
Aside from these illicit affairs, complainant avers that
sometime during the period of 1998 to 2000, respondent, as
a lawyer of the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel
(OGCC), represented the interest of Manila International
Airport Authority (MIAA) in cancellation proceedings filed by
MIAA against Kendrick Development Corporation (KDC).
However, despite being a public officer and a government
counsel, respondent conspired with Atty. Abraham Espejo,
legal counsel of KDC, and assisted KDC in its case, thereby
sabotaging MIAA's case, and, in effect, that of the Philippine
Government.3cralawrednad
Complainant further claims that respondent even attempted
to bribe then Solicitor Rolando Martin of the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) in exchange for the latter's
cooperation in the dismissal of the cancellation proceedings
in favor of KDC. In return for his "earnest efforts" in assisting
KDC in its case, respondent was allegedly rewarded with a
Toyota Corolla XL with plate number ULS-835 by Atty.
Espejo. The vehicle was seen several times by respondent's
classmates and officemates being driven and parked by
respondent in his own home and in the OGCC premises
itself.6cralawrednad
In connection with his involvement in the MIAA case,
complainant claims that respondent was summoned in a
Senate inquiry concerning rampant faking of land titles in the
Philippines, which included an investigation of the alleged
spurious land titles of KDC. In Senate Committee Final
Report No. 367, the Senate Blue Ribbon and Justice &
Human Rights Committees recommended that respondent be
investigated and prosecuted by the Office of the
Ombudsman (Ombudsman) for graft and corruption, as well
as disbarment or disciplinary sanction by this Court for grave
misconduct or violation of the Revised Penal
Code.7cralawrednad
It was further alleged that, during the pendency of the
Senate Inquiry, respondent even attempted to conceal the
evidence by requesting complainant's parents, spouses
Marcelo F. Ecraela and Visitacion B. Ecraela, to have the
Toyota Corolla XL parked in their residence in Cainta, Rizal,
for an indefinite period of time. Respondent's request,
however, was refused by the spouses when they learned
that the vehicle was the subject of the Senate
Inquiry.8cralawrednad
It appears from the documents presented by complainant
that the Ombudsman issued a Resolution finding probable
cause against respondent, and an Information was
thereafter filed with the Sandiganbayan for violation of
Section 3 (b) of Republic Act No. (RA) 3019.9cralawrednad
Complainant also claims that respondent abused his
authority as an educator in Manuel L. Quezon University, San
Sebastian College, College of St. Benilde, and Maryknoll
College, where respondent induced his male students to
engage in "nocturnal preoccupations" and entertained the
romantic gestures of his female students in exchange for
passing grades.10cralawrednad
The Petition was docketed as CBD Case No. 07-1973.
In an Order11 dated April 16, 2007, the Director for Bar
Discipline, Honorable Rogelio A. Vinluan, required
respondent to file his verified answer.
In his undated Answer,12 respondent opted not to present
any counter-statement of facts in support of his defense.
Instead, respondent simply argued that the petition suffers
from procedural and substantive infirmities, claiming that
petitioner failed to substantiate the allegations or charges
against him. Respondent pointed out that Annex "J" of the
Petition entitled "Arguments in Support of the Disbarment"
lacked formal requirements, and thus, should be treated as a
mere scrap of paper. Respondent also asserts that the e-mail
messages attached to the petition were inadmissible for
having been obtained in violation of the Rules on Electronic
Evidence.13 He claims that the identities of the owners of the
e-mail messages, as well as the allegations of illicit relations
and abuse of authority, were not properly established.
Respondent further argues that the statements of
complainant's witnesses were merely self-serving and
deserved scant consideration.
Complainant filed a Comment (to the Respondent's
Answer),14 stating that the allegations in the complaint were
deemed admitted by reason of respondent's failure to make
specific or even general denials of such in his Answer.
In his Reply (to the Comment filed by
Complainant),15 respondent simply denied all of
complainant's accusations in the petition, allegedly for "lack
of knowledge and information sufficient to form a belief as to
the truth or falsity thereof."16cralawrednad
On August 3, 2007, 1BP-CBD Investigating Commissioner
Leland R. Villadolid, Jr. (Commissioner Villadolid) set the
case for mandatory conference on August 28, 2007,17 which
respondent failed to attend. It appears that respondent filed
a Motion to Cancel Hearing,18 praying for the resetting of the
mandatory conference allegedly due to a previously
scheduled hearing on the same date. Respondent's motion
was opposed by complainant and eventually denied by
Commissioner Villadolid in his Order19dated August 28, 2007.
In the same order, complainant's Manifestation20 praying
that subpoenas be issued to several persons who shall be
complainant's hostile witnesses was granted by
Page 24 of 38
Commissioner Villadolid. Accordingly, the case was
scheduled for the presentation of complainant's witnesses on
September 11, 2007 and the respective subpoenas21 were
issued.
A day before the scheduled hearing, the IBP-CBD received
respondent's Motion for Reconsideration,22praying that the
Order dated August 28, 2007 be set aside and that the
hearing be reset to sometime during the third week of
October. In said motion, respondent informed the IBP-CBD
that he has viral conjunctivitis or more commonly known as
"sore eyes" and has been ordered by the doctor to rest for at
least one to two weeks while his eyes are being treated.
Attached to his motion were photocopies of two medical
certificates, stating that a certain R. Pangalangan was
suffering from sore eyes.
During the scheduled hearing on September 11, 2007,
complainant opposed petitioner's motion, arguing that based
on his personal verification with the court personnel of
Branch 77 of Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) of Parafiaque
City, there was no case calendared for hearing on the date
of the previous setting. Complainant also argued that this is
another ploy of respondent to delay the proceedings
because he knew that complainant worked overseas and was
only in the country for a limited period of time. Finding merit
in complainant's opposition, respondent's motion was denied
and complainant was allowed to present his
witnesses.23cralawrednad
Complainant presented his witnesses, as follows: Assistant
Solicitor General Karl Miranda (ASG Miranda), Ms. Laarni
Morallos (Ms. Morallos), Atty. Glenda T. Litong (Atty. Litong),
Atty. Emelyn W. Corpus (Atty. Corpus), Mr. Marcelo Ecraela,
and Mrs. Visitacion Ecraela.
ASG Miranda testified on his participation in the KDC case as
reflected in the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee Report, as
well as on his recollection that the Senate Report had
recommended the disbarment of respondent.
Ms. Morallos, Atty. Litong, and Atty. Corpus were presented
to establish that the email messages submitted by
complainant indeed originated from respondent based on
their familiarity with respondent, particularly, the email
messages which contained references to his daughter, his
relationship with complainant, and respondent's high blood
pressure.
Atty. Litong further testified that respondent personally
introduced DDD to her as his girlfriend and that sometime in
2002 or 2003, she saw respondent with another girl in
Glorietta despite still being married to his wife. Atty. Litong
also recalled encountering respondent at a party sometime
in 2007 where he was with CCC, whom she perceived to be
respondent's girlfriend at that time. She also confirmed that
respondent had, in more than one occasion, brought with
him his students during their drinking sessions and had even
one student driving for him.
For her testimony, Atty. Corpus corroborated Atty. Litong's
statements about respondent's preoccupations with his
students. Atty. Corpus also testified that DDD called her at
her office sometime in 2000 or 2001 to inform her that the
latter had broken up with respondent upon learning that he
was actually married. Atty. Corpus surmised based on her
telephone conversation with DDD that respondent did not
tell the latter his actual marital status. Aside from this, Atty.
Corpus also recalled that during complainant's farewell party
in February 2007, respondent introduced CCC as his
girlfriend of six years, or since the year 2000 or 2001.
To expedite the hearing, the spouses Ecraela were made to
affirm the execution of their affidavits since their testimonies
were based on the affidavits that complainant included in his
petition.
Once complainant's presentation of witnesses was
concluded, the mandatory conference/hearing was
terminated and the parties were directed to submit their
respective verified position papers with supporting
documentary evidence within thirty (30) days from receipt of
the transcript of stenographic notes. After which, the case
was considered submitted for report and recommendation.
On September 18, 2007, the IBP-CBD received complainant's
Manifestation (with Comments),24pertaining to respondent's
Motion to Cancel Hearing and praying for the IBP-CBD to
formally request for records from Branch 77 of MTC,
Paranaque City to verify respondent's claim that he had a
hearing in said court during the first scheduled mandatory
conference. On the same date, the IBP-CBD also received
complainant's Compliance (with
Comments),25cralawred submitting the certified photo copies
of the Senate Committee Final Report No. 367, the
Resolution dated January 22, 2001 of the Ombudsman, and
the Information dated June 30, 2003 filed with the
Sandiganbayan.
On January 8, 2008, the IBP-CBD received complainant's
Position Paper.26 Complainant thereafter filed two
Manifestations,27 asserting that respondent is already barred
from submitting his verified position paper and that any
decision or judgment would have to be based solely on
complainant's Verified Position Paper.28cralawrednad
Findings of the IBP Investigating Commissioner
After the case was submitted for report and
recommendation, Commissioner Villadolid rendered a
Report,29 finding that there is more than sufficient evidence
establishing respondent's gross misconduct affecting his
standing and moral character as an officer of the court and
member of the bar.
On the issue of respondent's alleged violations of the
Revised Penal Code30 and/or RA 301931 as reflected in the
Senate Report, the Ombudsman's Resolution, and the
Information, Commissioner Villadolid found that despite
respondent's denials, complainant was able to present
certified true copies of the relevant documents which
support his allegations in the petition.
As for the alleged illicit affairs of respondent, Commissioner
Villadolid discredited complainant's assertion that respondent
is guilty of gross immoral conduct for his alleged adulterous
relations with EEE. Based on the Report, complainant was
not able to discharge the burden of proving the authenticity
of the email messages pertaining to this adulterous affair;
thus, they were deemed inadmissible. However,
Commissioner Villadolid found merit in complainant's claim
that respondent committed grossly immoral conduct by
having illicit relations with DDD, CCC, and BBB, all while still
married to Jardiolin, to wit:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
4.21 In engaging in such illicit relationships, Respondent
disregarded the sanctity of marriage and the marital vows
protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our laws,
which as a lawyer he swore under oath to protect. The 1987
Constitution, specifically Article XV. Section 2 thereof clearly
provides that marriage, an inviolable social institution, is the
Page 25 of 38
foundation of the family and shall be protected by the state.
x x x x
4.23 Moreover. Respondent violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1,
and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which provides that "a lawyer shall not
engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct"
nor shall a lawyer "engage in conduct that adversely reflects
on his fitness to practice law. nor shall he, whether in public
or private life, behave in scandalous manner to the discredit
of the legal profession".32
Accordingly, the IBP-CBD reached and gave the following
conclusion and recommendation:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
V. Conclusion/Recommendations
5.1 In view of the foregoing, and considering that there is
more than sufficient evidence establishing Respondent's
gross misconduct affecting his standing and moral character
as an officer of the court and member of the bar. this
Commissioner respectfully recommends that Respondent be
suspended from the practice of law for a period of two (2)
years with a STERN WARNING that Respondent should
reform his conduct in a manner consistent with the norms
prescribed by the Canons of Professional Responsibility."33
Findings of the IBP Board of Governors
On March 20, 2013, the Board of Governors of the IBP
issued a Resolution34 adopting and approving, with
modification, the Report and Recommendation of
Commissioner Villadolid. As modified, the Board of Governors
disbarred respondent, thus:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
RESOLUTION NO. XX-2013-280 CBD Case No. 07-
1973 Atty. Roy B. Ecraela vs.
Atty. Ian Raymundo A. Pangalangan
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby
unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED, with
modification, the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case,
herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A", and
finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence
on record and the applicable laws and rules and considering
Respondent's violations of Article XV of the 1987
Constitution, Section 2, Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 and Rule 7.03
of Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and
the Lawyer's Oath, Atty. Ian Raymundo A. Pangalangan is
hereby DISBARRED and his name Ordered Stricken Off
from the Roll of Attorneys.
On July 9, 2013, the IBP received respondent's Motion for
Reconsideration35 dated July 3, 2013, to which complainant
was required to submit his comment.36cralawrednad
For his part, complainant filed a Motion for Reconsideration
(of the IBP-CBD Report dated June 28, 2012)37 dated August
17, 2013. Similarly, respondent was required to comment on
complainant's motion in an Order38 dated August 27, 2013.
On the same date, complainant filed his Comment and/or
Opposition (to the Respondent's Motion for
Reconsideration).39cralawrednad
Subsequently, respondent filed a Comment on/Opposition to
the Motion for Reconsideration with Leave40dated September
12, 2013, as well as a Reply to the Comment and/or
Opposition41 dated September 20, 2013.
On May 3, 2014, the Board of Governors of the IBP passed a
resolution denying respondent's motion for
reconsideration.42 Thereafter, the Director for Bar Discipline
forwarded the records of this case to this Court on
November 11, 2014.43cralawrednad
The Issue
The issue in this case is whether the respondent committed
gross immoral conduct, which would warrant his disbarment.
The Court's Ruling
After a thorough examination of the records, the Court
agrees with the Board of Governors' resolution finding that
Atty. Pangalangan's grossly immoral conduct was fully
supported by the evidences offered.
The Code of Professional Responsibility
provides:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE
CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND
PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL
PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct.
x x x x
CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD
THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE
INTEGRATED BAR.
Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that
adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he,
whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous
manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
The practice of law is a privilege given to those who possess
and continue to possess the legal qualifications for the
profession.44 Good moral character is not only required for
admission to the Bar, but must also be retained in order to
maintain one's good standing in this exclusive and honored
fraternity.45
We are not unmindful of the serious consequences of
disbarment or suspension proceedings against a member of
the Bar. Thus, the Court has consistently held that clearly
preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the imposition
of administrative penalties on a member of the Bar. This, We
explained in Aba v. De Guzman,
Jr.:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Preponderance of evidence means that the evidence
adduced by one side is, as a whole, superior to or has
greater weight than that of the other. It means evidence
which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief
than that which is offered in opposition thereto. Under
Section 1 of Rule 133. in determining whether or not there is
preponderance of evidence, the court may consider the
following: (a) all the facts and circumstances of the case; (b)
the witnesses' manner of testifying, their intelligence, their
means and opportunity of knowing the facts to which they
are testifying, the nature of the facts to which they testify,
the probability or improbability of their testimony; (c) the
Page 26 of 38
witnesses' interest or want of interest, and also their
personal credibility so far as the same may ultimately appear
in the trial; and (d) the number of witnesses, although it
docs not mean that preponderance is necessarily with the
greater number.
When the evidence of the parties are evenly balanced or
there is doubt on which side the evidence preponderates,
the decision should be against the party with the burden of
proof according to the equipoise doctrine.
To summarize, the Court has consistently held that in
suspension or disbarment proceedings against lawyers, the
lawyer enjoys the presumption of innocence, and the burden
of proof rests upon the complainant to prove the allegations
in his complaint. The evidence required in suspension or
disbarment proceedings is preponderance of evidence. In
case the evidence of the parties are equally balanced, the
equipoise doctrine mandates a decision in favor of the
respondent.46
The IBP-CBD Report sufficiently showed by preponderant
evidence the grounds by which respondent has been found
committing gross immorality in the conduct of his personal
affairs.
This Court has, in numerous occasions, revoked the licenses
of lawyers who were proven to have not only failed to retain
good moral character in their professional and personal lives,
but have also made a mockery of the institution of marriage
by maintaining illicit affairs.
In Guevarra v. Eala, respondent Atty. Eala was disbarred
because he showed disrespect for an institution held sacred
by the law, by having an extramarital affair with the wife of
the complainant. In doing so, he betrayed his unfitness to be
a lawyer.47cralawrednad
A year later, Atty. Arnobit met the same fate as Atty. Eala
when the Court revoked his privilege to practice law after his
philandering ways was proven by preponderant evidence
in Arnobit v. Arnobit.48 We ruled:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
As officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of
good moral character but must also be seen to be of good
moral character and leading lives in accordance with the
highest moral standards of the community. A member of the
bar and an officer of the court is not only required to refrain
from adulterous relationships or keeping a mistress but must
also so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by
creating the impression that he is flouting those moral
standards.
x x x x
The fact that respondent's philandering ways are far
removed from the exercise of his profession would not save
the day for him. For a lawyer may be suspended or
disbarred for any misconduct which, albeit unrelated to the
actual practice of his profession, would show him to be unfit
for the office and unworthy of the privileges with which his
license and the law invest him. To borrow from Orbe v.
Adaza, "[t]he grounds expressed in Section 27, Rule 138. of
the Rules of Court are not limitative and are broad enough
to. cover any misconduct x x x of a lawyer in his professional
or private capacity." To reiterate, possession of good moral
character is not only a condition precedent to the practice of
law, but a continuing qualification for all members of the
bar.49
Similarly, in the more recent case of Dr. Elmar O. Perez v.
Atty. Tristan Catindig,50 the Court disbarred respondent Atty.
Catindig for blatantly and purposefully disregarding our laws
on marriage by resorting to various legal strategies to render
a facade of validity to his invalid second marriage, despite
the existence of his first marriage. We
said:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The moral delinquency that affects the fitness of a member
of the bar to continue as such includes conduct that
outrages the generally accepted moral standards of the
community, conduct for instance, which makes 'a mockery of
the inviolable social institution of marriage.'" In various
cases, the Court has held that disbarment is
warranted when a lawyer abandons his lawful wife
and maintains an illicit relationship with another
woman who has borne him a child.51 (emphasis ours.)
In the present case, complainant alleged that respondent
carried on several adulterous and illicit relations with both
married and unmarried women between the years 1990 to
2007, including complainant's own wife. Through
documentary evidences in the form of email messages, as
well as the corroborating testimonies of the witnesses
presented, complainant was able to establish respondent's
illicit relations with DDD and CCC by preponderant evidence.
Respondent's main defense against the alleged illicit
relations was that the same were not sufficiently established.
In his answer, respondent simply argued that complainant's
petition contains self-serving averments not supported by
evidence. Respondent did not specifically deny complainant's
allegations and, instead, questioned the admissibility of the
supporting documents. Due to respondent's own failure to
attend the hearings and even submit his own position paper,
the existence of respondent's illicit relations with DDD and
CCC remain uncontroverted.
The IBP-CBD Report was correct when it found that
respondent violated Article XV, Section 2 of the 1987
Constitution, to wit:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
4.21 In engaging in such illicit relationships, Respondent
disregarded the sanctity of marriage and the marital vows
protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our laws,
which as a lawyer he swore under oath to protect. The 1987
Constitution, specifically Article XV, Section 2 thereof clearly
provides that marriage, an inviolable social institution,
is the foundation of the family and shall be protected
by the State.52(emphasis in the original.)
Aside from respondent's illicit relations, We agree with
Commissioner Villadolid's findings that respondent violated
Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, as well
as Rule 10.01 and Rule 10.03 thereof.
The Code of Professional Responsibility
provides:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
CANON 10 - A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS
AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.
Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor
consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or
allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.
x x x
Rule 10.03 - A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure
and shall not misuse them to defeat the ends of justice.
Page 27 of 38

In the Petition, complainant alleged that respondent was the
subject of a Senate Inquiry and had a pending case for graft
and corruption against him with the Sandiganbayan, to
wit:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
13. Respondent has been recommended by the Senate Blue
Ribbon and Justice & Human Rights Committees to be
investigated and prosecuted by the Ombudsman, the same
as contained in their "Committee Final Report No. 367"
herein attached as Annex D;
14. Respondent has also been recommended by the above-
mentioned committees to suffer the penalty of disbarment,
among others, as evidenced by the herein attached Annex
D-1, and it is believed that a case for graft and corruption
against him is still pending with the Sandiganbayan.''53
Instead of refuting these claims, respondent merely pointed
out in his Answer that complainant failed to adduce
additional evidence that a case had been filed against him,
and that complainant's statements were merely self-serving
averments not substantiated by any evidence. In his Reply,
respondent even specifically denied complainant's averments
for "lack of knowledge and information sufficient to form a
belief as to the truth or falsity thereof."
We agree with Commissioner Villadolid's findings in the IBP-
CBD Report, viz:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
4.8 It (sic) is thus indisputable that Respondent's pretensions
in his Answer were made in attempt to mislead this
Commission. Respondent could have easily admitted or
denied said allegations or explained the same, as he (sic)
clearly had knowledge thereof, however, he (sic) chose to
take advantage of Complainant" s position of being not
present in the country and not being able to acquire the
necessary documents, skirt the issue, and mislead the
Commission. In doing so, he has violated Canon 10 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides that "a
lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the
court" as well as Rule 10.01 and Rule 10.03 thereof which
states that "a lawyer should do no falsehood nor
consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he
mislead, or allow the court to be misled by any
artifice" and that "a lawyer shall observe the rules of
procedure and shall not misuse them to defeat the
ends of justice."
4.9 Courts [as well as this Commission] are entitled to
expect only complete candor and honesty from the lawyers
appearing and pleading before them. Respondent, through
his actuations, has been lacking in the candor required of
him not only as a member of the Bar but also as an officer of
the Court. In view of the foregoing, the Commission finds
that Respondent has violated Canon 10, Rule 10.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, for which he should be
disciplined.54 (emphasis in the original.)
In denying complainant's allegations, respondent had no
other intention but to mislead the IBP, which intention was
more so established because complainant was able to submit
supporting documents in the form of certified true copies of
the Senate Report, the Ombudsman's Resolution, and
Information.
We also agree with Commissioner Villadolid's finding that
respondent violated the lawyer's oath which he took before
admission to the Bar.
In all, Atty. Pangalangan displayed deplorable arrogance by
making a mockery out of the institution of marriage, and
taking advantage of his legal skills by attacking the Petition
through technicalities and refusing to participate in the
proceedings. His actions showed that he lacked the degree
of morality required of him as a member of the bar, thus
warranting the penalty of disbarment.
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing, the Court
resolves to ADOPT the resolution of the IBP Board of
Governors approving and adopting, with modification, the
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner. Accordingly, respondent Atty. Ian Raymond
A. Pangalangan is found GUILTYof gross immorality and of
violating Section 2 of Article XV of the 1987 Constitution,
Canon 1 and Rule 1.01, Canon 7 and Rule 7.03, and Rule
10.01 of Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
and the Lawyer's Oath and is hereby DISBARRED from the
practice of law.
Let a copy of this Decision be entered into the personal
records of Atty. Ian Raymond A. Pangalangan with the Office
of the Bar Confidant and his name is ORDERED
STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Likewise, let copies
of this Decision be furnished to all chapters of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines and circulated by the Court
Administrator to all the courts in the country for their
information and guidance.
This Decision takes effect immediately.
SO ORDERED.
(12) JOSEANO GUEVARRA VS. ATTY. JOSE
EMMANUEL EALA
Joselano Guevarra (complainant) filed on March 4, 2002 a
Complaint for Disbarment[1] before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) Committee on Bar Discipline (CBD) against
Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala a.k.a. Noli Eala (respondent)
for grossly immoral conduct and unmitigated violation of the
lawyers oath.
In his complaint, Guevarra gave the following account:
He first met respondent in January 2000 when his
(complainants) then-fiancee Irene Moje (Irene) introduced
respondent to him as her friend who was married to
Marianne (sometimes spelled Mary Ann) Tantoco with whom
he had three children.
After his marriage to Irene on October 7, 2000, complainant
noticed that from January to March 2001, Irene had been
receiving from respondent cellphone calls, as well as
messages some of which read I love you, I miss you, or
Meet you at Megamall.
Complainant also noticed that Irene habitually went home
very late at night or early in the morning of the following
day, and sometimes did not go home from work. When he
asked about her whereabouts, she replied that she slept at
her parents house in Binangonan, Rizal or she was busy with
her work.
In February or March 2001, complainant saw Irene and
respondent together on two occasions. On the second
occasion, he confronted them following which Irene
abandoned the conjugal house.
On April 22, 2001, complainant went uninvited to Irenes
birthday celebration at which he saw her and respondent
celebrating with her family and friends. Out of
embarrassment, anger and humiliation, he left the venue
immediately. Following that incident, Irene went to the
Page 28 of 38
conjugal house and hauled off all her personal belongings,
pieces of furniture, and her share of the household
appliances.
Complainant later found, in the masters bedroom, a folded
social card bearing the words I Love You on its face, which
card when unfolded contained a handwritten letter
dated October 7, 2000, the day of his wedding to Irene,
reading:
My everdearest Irene,
By the time you open this, youll be moments away from
walking down the aisle. I will say a prayer for you that you
may find meaning in what youre about to do.
Sometimes I wonder why we ever met. Is it only for me to
find fleeting happiness but experience eternal pain? Is it only
for us to find a true love but then lose it again? Or is it
because theres a bigger plan for the two of us?
I hope that you have experienced true happiness with me. I
have done everything humanly possible to love you. And
today, as you make your vows . . . I make my own vow to
YOU!
I will love you for the rest of my life. I loved you from the
first time I laid eyes on you, to the time we spent together,
up to the final moments of your single life. But more
importantly, I will love you until the life in me is gone and
until we are together again.
Do not worry about me! I will be happy for you. I have
enough memories of us to last me a lifetime. Always
remember though that in my heart, in my mind and in my
soul, YOU WILL ALWAYS . . . AND THE WONDERFUL
THINGS YOU DO!
BE MINE . . . . AND MINE ALONE, and I WILL ALWAYS BE
YOURS AND YOURS ALONE!
I LOVE YOU FOREVER, I LOVE YOU FOR ALWAYS. AS LONG
AS IM LIVING MY TWEETIE YOULL BE![2]
Eternally yours,
NOLI
Complainant soon saw respondents car and that of Irene
constantly parked at No. 71-B 11th Street, New Manila
where, as he was to later learn sometime in April 2001,
Irene was already residing. He also learned still later that
when his friends saw Irene on or about January 18,
2002 together with respondent during a concert, she was
pregnant.
In his ANSWER,[3] respondent admitted having sent the I
LOVE YOU card on which the above-quoted letter was
handwritten.
On paragraph 14 of the COMPLAINT reading:
14. Respondent and Irene were even FLAUNTING THEIR
ADULTEROUS RELATIONSHIP as they attended social
functions together. For instance, in or about the third week
of September 2001, the couple attended the launch of the
Wine All You Can promotion of French wines, held at the
Mega Strip of SM Megamall B at Mandaluyong City. Their
attendance was reported in Section B of the Manila
Standard issue of 24 September 2001, on page
21. Respondent and Irene were photographed together;
their picture was captioned: Irene with Sportscaster Noli
Eala. A photocopy of the report is attached as Annex
C.[4] (Italics and emphasis in the original; CAPITALIZATION
of the phrase flaunting their adulterous relationship
supplied), respondent, in his ANSWER, stated:
4. Respondent specifically denies having ever
flaunted an adulterous relationship with Irene as alleged in
paragraph 14 of the Complaint, the truth of the matter being
that their relationship was low profile and known only to
the immediate members of their respective families,
and that Respondent, as far as the general public was
concerned, was still known to be legally married to Mary
Anne Tantoco.[5] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
On paragraph 15 of the COMPLAINT reading:
15. Respondents adulterous conduct with the complainants
wife and his apparent abandoning or neglecting of his own
family, demonstrate his gross moral depravity, making him
morally unfit to keep his membership in the bar. He flaunted
his aversion to the institution of marriage, calling it a piece
of paper. Morally reprehensible was his writing the love
letter to complainants bride on the very day of her wedding,
vowing to continue his love for her until we are together
again, as now they are.[6] (Underscoring supplied),
respondent stated in his ANSWER as follows:
5. Respondent specifically denies the allegations in
paragraph 15 of the Complaint regarding
his adulterous relationship and that his acts demonstrate
gross moral depravity thereby making him unfit to keep his
membership in the bar, the reason being that Respondents
relationship with Irene was not under scandalous
circumstances and that as far as his relationship with his
own family:
5.1 Respondent has maintained a civil, cordial and peaceful
relationship with [his wife] Mary Anne as in fact they still
occasionally meet in public, even if Mary Anne is aware
of Respondents special friendship with Irene.
xxxx
5.5 Respondent also denies that he has flaunted his
aversion to the institution of marriage by calling the
institution of marriage a mere piece of paper because his
reference [in his above-quoted handwritten letter to Irene]
to the marriage between Complainant and Irene as a piece
of paper was merely with respect to the formality of the
marriage contract.[7] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Respondent admitted[8] paragraph 18 of the COMPLAINT
reading:
18. The Rules of Court requires lawyers to support the
Constitution and obey the laws. The Constitution regards
marriage as an inviolable social institution and is the
foundation of the family (Article XV, Sec. 2).[9]
And on paragraph 19 of the COMPLAINT reading:
19. Respondents grossly immoral conduct runs afoul of
the Constitution and the laws he, as a lawyer, has
been sworn to uphold. In pursuing obsessively his illicit
love for the complainants wife, he mocked the institution
of marriage, betrayed his own family, broke up the
complainants marriage, commits adultery with his wife,
and degrades the legal profession.[10] (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied), respondent, in his ANSWER, stated:
7. Respondent specifically denies the allegations in
paragraph 19 of the Complaint, the reason being that under
the circumstances the acts of Respondent with respect to his
purely personal and low profile special relationship with
Irene is neither under scandalous circumstances nor
tantamount to grossly immoral conduct as would be a
Page 29 of 38
ground for disbarment pursuant to Rule 138, Section 27 of
the Rules of Court.[11] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
To respondents ANSWER, complainant filed a Commissioner observed:
REPLY,[12] alleging that Irene gave birth to a girl and Irene
named respondent in the Certificate of Live Birth as the girls
father. Complainant attached to the REPLY, as Annex A, a
copy of a Certificate of Live Birth[13] bearing Irenes signature
and naming respondent as the father of her daughter
Samantha Irene Louise Moje who was born on February 14,
2002 at St. Lukes Hospital.
Complainants REPLY merited a REJOINDER WITH MOTION
TO DISMISS[14] dated January 10, 2003 from respondent in
which he denied having personal knowledge of the
Certificate of Live Birth attached to the complainants
Reply.[15] Respondent moved to dismiss the complaint due to
the pendency of a civil case filed by complainant for the
annulment of his marriage to Irene, and a criminal complaint
for adultery against respondent and Irene which was
pending before the Quezon City Prosecutors Office.
During the investigation before the IBP-CBD, complainants
Complaint-Affidavit and REPLY to ANSWER were adopted as
his testimony on direct examination.[16]Respondents counsel
did not cross-examine complainant.[17]
After investigation, IBP-CBD Investigating Commissioner
Milagros V. San Juan, in a 12-page REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATION[18] dated October 26, 2004, found the
charge against respondent sufficiently proven.
The Commissioner thus recommended[19] that respondent be
disbarred for violating Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility reading:
Rule 1.01: A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct (Underscoring
supplied), and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the same
Code reading:
Rule 7.03: A lawyer shall not engage
in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice
law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in
a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession. (Underscoring supplied)
The IBP Board of Governors, however, annulled and set
aside the Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner and accordingly dismissed the case for lack of
merit, by Resolution dated January 28, 2006 briefly reading:
RESOLUTION NO. XVII-2006-06
Joselano C. Guevarra vs. Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala
a.k.a. Noli Eala
RESOLVED to ANNUL and SET ASIDE, as it is hereby
ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE, the Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner, and to APPROVE
the DISMISSAL of the above-entitled case for lack of
merit.[20] (Italics and emphasis in the original)
Hence, the present petition[21] of complainant before this
Court, filed pursuant to Section 12 (c), Rule 139[22] of the
Rules of Court.
The petition is impressed with merit.
Oddly enough, the IBP Board of Governors, in setting aside
the Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner and
dismissing the case for lack of merit, gave no
reason therefor as its above-quoted 33-word Resolution
shows.
Respondent contends, in his Comment[23] on the present
petition of complainant, that there is no evidence against
him.[24] The contention fails. As the IBP-CBD Investigating
While it may be true that the love letter dated October 7,
2000 (Exh. C) and the news item published in the Manila
Standard (Exh. D), even taken together do not sufficiently
prove that respondent is carrying on an adulterous
relationship with complainants wife, there are other pieces of
evidence on record which support the accusation of
complainant against respondent.
It should be noted that in his Answer dated 17 October
2002, respondent through counsel made the
following statements to wit: Respondent specifically
denies having [ever] flaunted an adulterous relationship with
Irene as alleged in paragraph [14] of the Complaint, the
truth of the matter being [that] their relationship was low
profile and known only to immediate members of their
respective families . . . , and Respondent specifically denies
the allegations in paragraph 19 of the complaint, the reason
being that under the circumstances the acts of the
respondents with respect to his purely personal and low
profile relationship with Irene is neither under scandalous
circumstances nor tantamount to grossly immoral conduct . .
.
These statements of respondent in his Answer are an
admission that there is indeed a special relationship
between him and complainants wife, Irene,
[which] taken together with the Certificate of Live
Birth of Samantha Louise Irene Moje (Annex H-1)
sufficiently prove that there was indeed an illicit
relationship between respondent and Irene which resulted
in the birth of the child Samantha. In the Certificate of
Live Birth of Samantha it should be noted that
complainants wife Irene supplied the information
that respondent was the father of the child. Given the
fact that the respondent admitted his special relationship
with Irene there is no reason to believe that Irene
would lie or make any misrepresentation regarding
the paternity of the child. It should be underscored
that respondent has not categorically denied that he
is the father of Samantha Louise Irene
Moje.[25] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Indeed, from respondents ANSWER, he does not deny
carrying on an adulterous relationship with Irene, adultery
being defined under Art. 333 of the Revised Penal Code as
that committed by any married woman who shall have
sexual intercourse with a man not her husband and by the
man who has carnal knowledge of her, knowing her to be
married, even if the marriage be subsequently declared
void.[26] (Italics supplied) What respondent denies
is having flaunted such relationship, he maintaining that it
was low profile and known only to the immediate members
of their respective families.
In other words, respondents denial is a negative
pregnant,
a denial pregnant with the admission of the substantial facts
in the pleading responded to which are not squarely
denied. It was in effect an admission of the averments it was
directed at. Stated otherwise, a negative pregnant is a form
of negative expression which carries with it in affirmation or
at least an implication of some kind favorable to the adverse
party. It is a denial pregnant with an admission of the
substantial facts alleged in the pleading. Where a fact is
alleged with qualifying or modifying language and the words
of the allegation as so qualified or modified are literally
Page 30 of 38
denied, it has been held that the qualifying
circumstances alone are denied while the fact itself is
admitted.[27] (Citations omitted; emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
A negative pregnant too is respondents denial of having
personal knowledge of Irenes daughter Samantha Louise
Irene Mojes Certificate of Live Birth. In said certificate, Irene
named respondent a lawyer, 38 years old as the childs
father. And the phrase NOT MARRIED is entered on the
desired information on DATE AND PLACE OF MARRIAGE. A
comparison of the signature attributed to Irene in the
certificate[28] with her signature on the Marriage
Certificate[29] shows that they were affixed by one and the
same person. Notatu dignum is that, as the Investigating
Commissioner noted, respondent never denied being the
father of the child.
Franklin A. Ricafort, the records custodian of St. Lukes
Medical Center, in his January 29, 2003 Affidavit[30] which he
identified at the witness stand, declared that Irene gave the
information in the Certificate of Live Birth that the childs
father is Jose Emmanuel Masacaet Eala, who was 38 years
old and a lawyer.[31]
Without doubt, the adulterous relationship between
respondent and Irene has been sufficiently proven by more
than clearly preponderant evidence that evidence adduced
by one party which is more conclusive and credible than that
of the other party and, therefore, has greater weight than
the other[32] which is the quantum of evidence needed in an
administrative case against a lawyer.
Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of
their own. They are distinct from and they may proceed
independently of civil and criminal cases.
. . . of proof for these types of cases differ. In a criminal
case, proof beyond reasonable doubt is necessary; in an
administrative case for disbarment or suspension, clearly
preponderant evidence is all that is
required.[33] (Emphasis supplied)
Respondent insists, however, that disbarment does not lie
because his relationship with Irene was not, under Section
27 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, reading:
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme
Court, grounds therefor. ─ A member of the bar may be
disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the
Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by
reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude,
or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take
before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience
appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without
authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for
the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents
or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
The disbarment or suspension of a member of the Philippine
Bar by a competent court or other disciplinatory agency in a
foreign jurisdiction where he has also been admitted as an
attorney is a ground for his disbarment or suspension if the
basis of such action includes any of the acts hereinabove
enumerated.
The judgment, resolution or order of the foreign court or
disciplinary agency shall be prima facie evidence of the
ground for disbarment or suspension (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied), under scandalous circumstances.[34]
The immediately-quoted Rule which provides the grounds
for disbarment or suspension uses the phrase grossly
immoral conduct, not under scandalous
circumstances.Sexual intercourse under scandalous
circumstances is, following Article 334 of the Revised Penal
Code reading:
ART. 334. Concubinage. - Any husband who shall keep a
mistress in the conjugal dwelling, or, shall have sexual
intercourse, under scandalous circumstances, with a woman
who is not his wife, or shall cohabit with her in any other
place, shall be punished by prision correccional in its
minimum and medium periods.
x x x x,
an element of the crime of concubinage when a married
man has sexual intercourse with a woman elsewhere.
Whether a lawyers sexual congress with a woman not his
wife or without the benefit of marriage should be
characterized as grossly immoral conduct depends on the
surrounding circumstances.[35] The case at bar involves a
relationship between a married lawyer and a married woman
who is not his wife. It is immaterial whether the affair was
carried out discreetly. Apropos is the following
pronouncement of this Court in Vitug v. Rongcal:[36]
On the charge of immorality, respondent does not deny that
he had an extra-marital affair with complainant, albeit brief
and discreet, and which act is not so corrupt and false as to
constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be
reprehensible to a high degree in order to merit disciplinary
sanction. We disagree.
xxxx
While it has been held in disbarment cases that the mere
fact of sexual relations between two unmarried adults is not
sufficient to warrant administrative sanction for such illicit
behavior, it is not so with respect to betrayals of the
marital vow of fidelity. Even if not all forms of extra-
marital relations are punishable under penal law, sexual
relations outside marriage is considered disgraceful and
immoral as it manifests deliberate disregard of the
sanctity of marriage and the marital vows protected by
the Constitution and affirmed by our laws.[37](Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
And so is the pronouncement in Tucay v. Atty. Tucay:[38]
The Court need not delve into the question of whether or
not the respondent did contract a bigamous marriage . . . It
is enough that the records of this administrative case
substantiate the findings of the Investigating Commissioner,
as well as the IBP Board of Governors, i.e., that indeed
respondent has been carrying on an illicit affair with
a married woman, a grossly immoral conduct
and indicative of an extremely low regard for the
fundamental ethics of his profession. This detestable
behavior renders him regrettably unfit and
undeserving of the treasured honor and privileges
which his license confers upon him.[39] (Underscoring
supplied)
Respondent in fact also violated the lawyers oath he took
before admission to practice law which goes:
I _________, having been permitted to continue in the
practice of law in the Philippines, do solemnly swear that I
recognize the supreme authority of the Republic of the
Philippines; I will support its
Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of
the duly constituted authorities therein; I will do no
falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; I will not
wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or
Page 31 of 38
unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same; I will
delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct myself
as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and
discretion with all good fidelity as well as to the courts as to
my clients; and I impose upon myself this voluntary
obligation without any mental reservation or purpose of
evasion. So help me God. (Underscoring supplied)
Respondent admittedly is aware of Section 2 of Article XV
(The Family) of the Constitution reading:
Section 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the
foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State.
In this connection, the Family Code (Executive Order No.
209), which echoes this constitutional provision, obligates
the husband and the wife to live together, observe mutual
love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and
support.[40]
Furthermore, respondent violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility which proscribes a
lawyer from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct, and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the same
Code which proscribes a lawyer from engaging in any
conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law.
Clutching at straws, respondent, during the pendency of the
investigation of the case before the IBP Commissioner, filed
a Manifestation[41] on March 22, 2005 informing the IBP-CBD
that complainants petition for nullity of his (complainants)
marriage to Irene had been granted by Branch 106 of
the Quezon City Regional Trial Court, and that the criminal
complaint for adultery complainant filed against respondent
and Irene based on the same set of facts alleged in the
instant case, which was pending review before the
Department of Justice (DOJ), on petition of complainant, had
been, on motion of complainant, withdrawn.
The Secretary of Justices Resolution of January 16,
2004 granting complainants Motion to Withdraw Petition for
Review reads:
Considering that the instant motion was filed before the
final resolution of the petition for review, we are inclined to
grant the same pursuant to Section 10 of Department
Circular No. 70 dated July 3, 2000, which provides that
notwithstanding the perfection of the appeal, the petitioner
may withdraw the same at any time before it is finally
resolved, in which case the appealed resolution shall
stand as though no appeal has been
taken.[42] (Emphasis supplied by complainant)
That the marriage between complainant and Irene was
subsequently declared void ab initio is immaterial. The acts
complained of took place before the marriage was declared
null and void.[43] As a lawyer, respondent should be aware
that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband
and wife are presumed, unless proven otherwise, to have
entered into a lawful contract of marriage.[44] In carrying on
an extra-marital affair with Irene prior to the judicial
declaration that her marriage with complainant was null and
void, and despite respondent himself being married, he
showed disrespect for an institution held sacred by the law.
And he betrayed his unfitness to be a lawyer.
As for complainants withdrawal of his petition for review
before the DOJ, respondent glaringly omitted to state
that before complainant filed his December 23, 2003Motion
to Withdraw his Petition for Review, the DOJ had already
promulgated a Resolution on September 22, 2003 reversing
the dismissal by the Quezon City Prosecutors Office of
complainants complaint for adultery. In reversing the City
Prosecutors Resolution, DOJ Secretary
Simeon Datumanong held:
Parenthetically the totality of evidence adduced by
complainant would, in the fair estimation of the Department,
sufficiently establish all the elements of the offense of
adultery on the part of both respondents. Indeed, early on,
respondent Moje conceded to complainant that she was
going out on dates with respondent Eala, and this she did
when complainant confronted her about Ealas frequent
phone calls and text messages to her. Complainant also
personally witnessed Moje and Eala having a rendezvous on
two occasions. Respondent Eala never denied the fact that
he knew Moje to be married to complainant[.] In fact, he
(Eala) himself was married to another
woman. Moreover, Mojes eventual abandonment of their
conjugal home, after complainant had once more confronted
her about Eala, only served to confirm the illicit relationship
involving both respondents. This becomes all the more
apparent by Mojes subsequent relocation in No. 71-B,
11th Street, New Manila, Quezon City, which was a few
blocks away from the church where she had exchange
marital vows with complainant.
It was in this place that the two lovers apparently
cohabited. Especially since Ealas vehicle and that
of Mojes were always seen there. Moje herself admits that
she came to live in the said address whereas Eala asserts
that that was where he held office. The happenstance that it
was in that said address that Eala and Moje had decided to
hold office for the firm that both had formed smacks too
much of a coincidence. For one, the said address appears to
be a residential house, for that was where Moje stayed all
throughout after her separation from complainant. It was
both respondents love nest, to put short; their illicit affair
that was carried out there bore fruit a few months later
when Moje gave birth to a girl at the nearby hospital of St.
Lukes Medical Center. What finally militates against the
respondents is the indubitable fact that in the certificate of
birth of the girl, Moje furnished the information
that Eala was the father. This speaks all too eloquently
of the unlawful and damning nature of the adulterous
acts of the respondents. Complainants supposed illegal
procurement of the birth certificate is most certainly beside
the point for both respondents Eala and Moje have not
denied, in any categorical manner, that Eala is the
father of the child Samantha Irene
Louise Moje.[45] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
It bears emphasis that adultery is a private offense which
cannot be prosecuted de oficio and thus leaves the DOJ no
choice but to grant complainants motion to withdraw his
petition for review. But even if respondent and Irene were to
be acquitted of adultery after trial, if the Information for
adultery were filed in court, the same would not have been a
bar to the present administrative complaint.
Citing the ruling in Pangan v. Ramos,[46] viz:
x x x The acquittal of respondent Ramos [of] the criminal
charge is not a bar to these [administrative]
proceedings. The standards of legal profession are not
satisfied by conduct which merely enables one to escape the
penalties of x x x criminal law. Moreover, this Court, in
disbarment proceedings is acting in an entirely different
capacity from that which courts assume in trying criminal
case[47] (Italics in the original),
this Court in Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pools, Inc. v.
Atty. Naldoza,[48] held:
Page 32 of 38
 Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of
their own. They are distinct from and they may proceed
independently of civil and criminal cases.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Resolution
No. XVII-2006-06 passed on January 28, 2006 by the Board
of Governors of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippinesis ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.
Respondent, Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala,
is DISBARRED for grossly immoral conduct, violation of his
oath of office, and violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon
7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Let a copy of this Decision, which is
immediately executory, be made part of the records of
respondent in the Office of the Bar Confidant, Supreme
Court of the Philippines. And let copies of the Decision be
furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and circulated
to all courts.
This Decision takes effect immediately.
SO ORDERED.
(13) ADELITA B. LLUNAR, Complainant, v. ATTY.
ROMULO RICAFORT, Respondent. A.C. No. 6484, June
16, 2015
The present administrative case stemmed from the
complaint-affidavit1 that Adelita B. Llunar (complainant) filed
against Atty. Romulo Ricafort (respondent) for gross and
inexcusable negligence and serious misconduct.
Antecedents
In September 2000, the complainant, as attorney-in-fact of
Severina Bafiez, hired the respondent to file a case against
father and son Ricardo and Ard Cervantes (Ard) for the
recovery of a parcel of land allegedly owned by the Banez
family but was fraudulently registered under the name of
Ricardo and later was transferred to Ard.
The property, which Ard had mortgaged with the Rural Bank
of Malilipot, Albay, was the subject of foreclosure
proceedings at the time the respondent was hired. The
respondent received from the complainant the following
amounts: (a) P70,000.00 as partial payment of the
redemption price of the property; (b) P19,000.00 to cover
the filing fees; and (c) P6,500.00 as attorney's fees.
Three years later, the complainant learned that no case
involving the subject property was ever filed by the
respondent with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Legaspi
City. Thus, the complainant demanded that the respondent
return to her the amount of P95,000.00.
The respondent refused to return the whole amount of
P95,000.00 to the complainant. He argued that a
complaint2 for annulment of title against Ard Cervantes had
actually been filed in court, though not by him, but by
another lawyer, Atty. Edgar M. Abitria. Thus, he was willing
to return only what was left of the P95,000.00 after
deducting therefrom the P50,000.00 that he paid to Atty.
Abitria as acceptance fee for handling the case.
The complainant refused to recognize the complaint for
annulment of title filed by Atty. Abitria and claimed that she
had no knowledge of Atty. Abitria's engagement as counsel.
Besides, the complaint was filed three (3) years late and the
property could no longer be redeemed from the bank. Also,
the complainant discovered that the respondent had been
suspended indefinitely from the practice of law since May 29,
2002, pursuant to this Court's decision in Administrative Case
No. 5054,3 which the complainant suspected was the reason
another lawyer, and not the respondent, filed the complaint
for annulment of title in court.
In a resolution4 dated February 2, 2005, the Court referred
the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report, and recommendation.
In a report5 dated May 22, 2009, IBP Investigating
Commissioner Cecilio C. Villanueva found the respondent to
have been grossly negligent in handling the complainant's
case and to have gravely abused the trust and confidence
reposed in him by the complainant, thereby, violating
Canons 156 and 17,7 and Rules 1.01,8 16.03,9 18.03,10 and
18.0411 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).
Also, the Investigating Commissioner found the respondent
to have erred in not informing his client that he was under
indefinite suspension from the practice of law. Due to these
infractions, Commissioner Villanueva recommended that the
respondent remain suspended indefinitely from the practice
of law.
In Resolution No. XIX-2011-224 dated May 14, 2011, the IBP
Board of Governors agreed with the Investigating
Commissioner's findings on the respondent's liability but
modified the recommended penalty from indefinite
suspension to disbarment.12 It also ordered the respondent
to return to the complainant the amount of P95,000.00
within thirty (30) days from notice. The respondent moved
for reconsideration.
In his motion for reconsideration,13 the respondent argued
that his referral of the complainant's case to Atty. Abitria was
actually with the complainant's knowledge and consent; and
that he paid Atty. Abitria P50,000.00 for accepting the case.
These facts were confirmed by Atty. Abitria in an
affidavit14 dated November 17, 2004, but were alleged to
have been overlooked by Commissioner Villanueva in his
report. The IBP Board of Governors, in Resolution No. XX-
2013-710 dated June 21, 2013, denied the respondent's
motion for reconsideration.15chanrobleslaw
Our Ruling
We find the respondent guilty of Grave Misconduct in
his dealings with his client and in engaging in the
practice of law while under indefinite suspension,
and thus impose upon him the ultimate penalty of
DISBARMENT.
The respondent in this case committed several infractions
making him liable for grave misconduct. First, the
respondent did not exert due diligence in handling the
complainant's case. He failed to act promptly in redeeming
the complainant's property within the period of redemption.
What is worse is the delay of three years before a complaint
to recover the property was actually filed in court. The
respondent clearly dilly-dallied on the complainant's case and
wasted precious time and opportunity that were then readily
available to recover the complainant's property. Under these
facts, the respondent violated Rule 18.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (CPR), which states that "a lawyer
shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable."
Second, the respondent failed to return, upon demand, the
amounts given to him by the complainant for handling the
Page 33 of 38
latter's case. On three separate occasions, the respondent
received from the complainant the amounts of P19,000.00,
P70,000.00, and P6,500.00 for purposes of redeeming the
mortgaged property from the bank and filing the necessary
civil case/s against Ard Cervantes. The complainant
approached the respondent several times thereafter to follow
up on the case/s to be filed supposedly by the respondent
who, in turn, reassured her that actions on her case had
been taken.
After the complainant discovered three years later that the
respondent had not filed any case in court, she demanded
that the respondent return the amount of P95,000.00, but
her demand was left unheeded. The respondent later
promised to pay her, but until now, no payment of any
amount has been made. These facts confirm that the
respondent violated Canon 16 of the CPR, which mandates
every lawyer to "hold in trust all moneys and properties of
his client that may come into his possession"16 and to
"account for all money or property collected or received for
or from the client."17 In addition, a lawyer's failure to return
upon demand the funds or property he holds for his client
gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated these
funds or property for his own use to the prejudice of, and in
violation of the trust reposed in him by his
client.18chanrobleslaw
Third, the respondent committed dishonesty by not being
forthright with the complainant that he was under indefinite
suspension from the practice of law. The respondent should
have disclosed this fact at the time he was approached by
the complainant for his services. Canon 15 of the CPR states
that "a lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in
all his dealings and transactions with his clients." The
respondent lacked the candor expected of him as a member
of the Bar when he accepted the complainant's case despite
knowing that he could not and should not practice law.
Lastly, the respondent was effectively in the practice of law
despite the indefinite suspension imposed on him. This
infraction infinitely aggravates the offenses he committed.
Based on the above facts alone, the penalty of suspension
for five (5) years from the practice of law would have been
justified, but the respondent is not an ordinary violator of
the profession's ethical rules; he is a repeat violator of these
rules. In Nuñez v. Atty. Ricafort,19 we had adjudged the
respondent liable for grave misconduct in failing to turn over
the proceeds of the sale of a property owned by his client
and in issuing bounced checks to satisfy the alias writ of
execution issued by the court in the case for violation of
Batas Pambansa Big. 22 filed against him by his client. We
then suspended him indefinitely from the practice of law - a
penalty short of disbarment. Under his current liability -
which is no different in character from his previous offense -
we have no other way but to proceed to decree his
disbarment. He has become completely unworthy of
membership in our honorable profession.
With respect to the amount to be returned to the
complainant, we agree with the IBP that the respondent
should return the whole amount of P95,000.00,
without deductions, regardless of whether the engagement
of Atty. Abitria as counsel was with the complainant's
knowledge and consent.
In the first place, the hiring of Atty. Abitria would not have
been necessary had the respondent been honest and diligent
in handling the complainant's case from the start. The
complainant should not be burdened with the expense of
hiring another lawyer to perform the services that the
respondent was hired to do, especially in this case where
there was an inexcusable non-delivery of such services.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Romulo Ricafort is
hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law and his
name REMOVED from the Roll of Attorneys, effective
immediately upon his receipt of this Decision. Also, he
is ORDERED to RETURN the amount of P95,000.00 to
complainant Adelita B. Llunar, within thirty (30) days from
notice of this Decision.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to the respondent's
personal record and furnished the Office of the Bar
Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the
Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts
in the country. This Decision should likewise be posted on
the Supreme Court website for the information of the
general public.
SO ORDERED.
(14) Erlinda Sistual, et al. Vs. Atty. Eliordo Ogena;
A.C. No. 9807; February 2, 2016
PER CURIAM:
In a Complaint,[1] dated June 1, 2006, filed before the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), complainants Erlinda
C. Sistual, Flordelisa[2] S. Leysa, Leonisa S. Espabo, and
Arlan C. Sistual (complainants) alleged that respondent Atty.
Eliordo Ogena (Atty. Ogena), who was the legal counsel of
their late father, Manuel A. Sistual (Manuel), wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously falsified several documents which
included, among others, a Special Power of Attorney ( SPA),
Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate, Affidavit of Identification
of Heirs, Deed of Donation, and a Deed of Absolute Sale by
making it appear that all the children of Manuel and their
mother, Erlinda Sistual (Erlinda), executed the documents;
that as a result of the falsification of the said documents,
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 60467, registered in
the name of “Heirs of Martin Sistual, represented by Manuel
Sistual,”[3] was cancelled and was subdivided into several
lots; and that these lots were sold to interested buyers.
In his Answer with Affirmative/Special Defenses and Motion
to Dismiss,[4] Atty. Ogena denied the allegations. He averred
that in 1987, he was engaged by Manuel to represent the
heirs of Martin Sistual in a complaint for recovery of
possession filed by Abid Mendal (Abid) and Abundio Sistual
(Abundio)[5] that Manuel was the representative of the Heirs
of Martin Sistual; that the heirs of Martin Sistual were able to
obtain a favorable decision[6] in the said case; that pursuant
to the said decision, Lot 464 was awarded to the heirs of
Martin Sistual and TCT No. T-60467 was issued in their
names; that when Manuel died on November 15, 1993, the
heirs of Martin Sistual executed an SPA,[7]dated December
31, 1993, designating Bienvenido Sistual (Bienvenido) as
their attorney-in-fact; that Erlinda, the wife of Manuel,
manifested her desire to represent the heirs of Martin
Sistual, so her two children, Isidro Sistual and Flordelisa
Sistual, also executed an SPA in her favor; that the heirs of
Martin Sistual opposed the appointment of Erlinda and
executed another SPA,[8] dated October 5, 1995, in favor of
Bienvenido; and that in the October 5, 1995 SPA, Atty.
Ogena wrote the names of complainants Erlinda and
Flordeliza Sistual but they did not sign it.
As to the incident that led to the subdivision of TCT No. T-
60467, Atty. Ogena explained that Bienvenido, upon the
prodding of the heirs of Martin Sistual with the exception of
the complainants, caused the subdivision of the property
covered by TCT No. T-60467 into several sub-lots identified
Page 34 of 38
as TCT Nos.
76078,[9] 76079,[10] 76080,[11] 76081,[12]76082,[13] 76083,[14]
76084,[15] 76085,[16] and 76086,[17] and that the
corresponding subdivision plans and technical descriptions
thereof were duly approved by the Regional Director, Bureau
of Lands, Davao City; and that the subdivided lots were in
the names of all the heirs of Martin Sistual including the
complainants.
On September 7, 1996, the heirs of Dolores Sistual Tulay
executed an Extrajudicial Settlement[18] whereby the 1/7
share of their mother in the lot covered by TCT No. T-60467
was waived, repudiated and relinquished in favor of their
father, Domingo Tulay; that the heirs of Manuel Sistual also
executed an Extrajudicial Settlement[19] waiving their 1/7
share in the same property in favor of their mother, Erlinda.
On April 10 and 15, 1997, the heirs of Martin Sistual
including complainants executed two deeds of donation[20] in
favor of Barangay Lamian conveying the lot covered by TCT
Nos. T-76083 and T-76086 to be used for its public market.
Atty. Ogena denied that the aforementioned documents
were falsified as they were actually executed and duly signed
by all the parties therein; and that all the signatures of
complainants appearing in the aforementioned documents
were identical; that the deeds of donation were duly attested
to by Barangay Captain Conrado Toledo and the barangay
kagawads;[21] and that the aforementioned documents did
not in any way prejudiced the complainants. The execution
thereof did not defraud them or any of the heirs of Martin
Sistual as the issuance of the nine (9) new and separate
titles in the names of all the heirs, as co-owners, was
beneficial and favorable to all of them.
Finally, as to the Absolute Deed of Sale,[22]
dated July 18,
1989, executed by spouses Manuel and Erlinda in favor of
Socorro Langub, Atty. Ogena also denied that this was
falsified as this was duly executed, signed and subscribed by
all the parties. Atty. Ogena submitted a copy of the said
deed of sale[23] to prove that it was duly executed and
signed by Manuel and Erlinda, as the vendors; and Socorro
Langub, as the vendee.
In its Report and Recommendation,[24] the IBP-Commission
on Bar Discipline (CBD) stated that it is bereft of any
jurisdiction to determine whether Atty. Ogena committed
forgery in the aforementioned documents. It,
however, found several irregularities in the documents
notarized by Atty. Ogena. First, in the SPA, the signatures of
Flordelisa Sistual and Isidro Sistual were absent and the
Community Tax Certificates (CTC) of the signatories namely:
Bernardina Sistual Anson, Jesusa Sistual Español, and
Erlinda, were not indicated. In the Extrajudicial Settlement of
Estate of Deceased Manuel, although all the heirs signed,
only the CTC of Erlinda and Flordelisa were indicated. In the
Affidavit of Identification of Heirs of Martin Sistual, the CTC
of Solfia S. Maribago was absent; and in the Extrajudicial
Settlement of Estate of Deceased Dolores Sistual with Waiver
of Hereditary Shares, only the CTC of Domingo Tulay was
indicated. Thus, the IBP-CBD recommended that Atty.
Ogena’s notarial commission be revoked and that he be
permanently disqualified from reappointment as Notary
Public; and that he be suspended from the practice of law
for a period of one (1) year.
On December 10, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors adopted
and approved with modification the Report and
Recommendation of the IBP-CBD. The IBP Board of
Governors revoked Atty. Ogena’s commission as notary
public and permanently disqualified him from reappointment
as Notary Public. It, however, deleted the penalty of
suspension.[25]
On March 29, 2012, Atty. Ogena filed a motion for
reconsideration before the IBP.
In a Resolution, dated November 10, 2012, the IBP Board of
Governors denied the motion for reconsideration and
affirmed with modification its earlier resolution, revoking
Atty. Ogena’s notarial commission indefinitely.
The Court agrees with the findings of the IBP except as to
the penalty it imposed. To begin with, complainants’
allegation of forgery was not clearly substantiated and there
was no concrete proof that the complainants were
prejudiced. They submitted a copy of the affidavits[26] for
falsification executed by Erlinda and Flordelisa, both
subscribed before the City of Prosecutor on February 20,
2006; Memoranda for Preliminary Investigation[27] issued by
Office of the City Prosecutor, Koronadal, South Cotabato;
Letter,[28] Memorandum,[29] and Order[30] issued by the
Bureau of Lands, but these do not suffice to prove the
allegation of forgery and/or falsification.
Atty. Ogena, however, violated the 2004 Rules on Notarial
Practice specifically Rule IV, Section 2(b), which provides:
Section 2. Prohibitions. – (a) x x x
(b) A person shall not perform a notarial act if the person
involved as signatory to the instrument or document –
(1) is not in the notary’s presence personally at the time of
the notarization; and
(2) is not personally known to the notary public or otherwise
identified by the notary public through competent evidence
of identity as defined by these Rules.
Doubtless, Atty. Ogena was negligent in the performance of
his duty as a notary public. He failed to require the personal
presence of the signatories of the documents and proceeded
to notarize the aforementioned documents without the
signatures of all the parties. Likewise, Atty. Ogena failed to
comply with the most basic function that a notary public
must do -to require the parties to present their residence
certificates or any other document to prove their identities.
This Court, in Gonzales v. Atty. Ramos,[31] wrote:
Notarization is not an empty, meaningless routinary act. It is
invested with substantive public interest. The notarization by
a notary public converts a private document into a public
document, making it admissible in evidence without further
proof of its authenticity. A notarial document is, by law,
entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. A notary public
must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the
performance of their duties; otherwise, the public’s
confidence in the integrity of the document would be
undermined.
By notarizing the aforementioned documents, Atty. Ogena
engaged in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.[32] His conduct is fraught with dangerous
possibilities considering the conclusiveness on the due
execution of a document that our courts and the public
accord to notarized documents.[33] His failure to perform his
duty as a notary public resulted not only in damaging
complainants’ rights but also in undermining the integrity of
a notary public and in degrading the function of notarization.
Thus, Atty. Ogena should be liable for such negligence, not
only as a notary public but also as a lawyer.
Pursuant to the pronouncement in Re: Violation of Rules on
Notarial Practice,[34] Atty. Ogena should be suspended for
Page 35 of 38
two (2) years from the practice of law and forever barred
from becoming a notary public.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Eliordo Ogena
is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two (2) years
and is BARRED PERMANENTLY from being commissioned
as Notary Public.
This decision is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.
Let copies of this decision be furnished all courts in the
country and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for their
information and guidance. Let also a copy of this decision be
appended to the personal record of Atty. Eliordo Ogena in
the Office of the Bar Confidant.
SO ORDERED.
(15) Antero M. Sison, Jr. Vs. Atty. Manuel N.
Camacho; A.C. No. 10910; January 12, 2016
In his verified affidavit-complaint,[1] dated September 17,
2012, filed before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD), complainant Atty.
Antero M. Sison, Jr. (Atty. Sison), president of Marsman-
Drysdale Agribusiness Holdings Inc. (MDAHI), charged
respondent Atty. Manuel Camacho (Atty. Camacho) with
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility ( CPR). He
accused Atty. Camacho of violating Rule 1.01, for dishonestly
entering into a compromise agreement without
authorization, and Rule 16.01, for failure to render an
accounting of funds which were supposed to be paid as
additional docket fees.
Complainant’s Position
Atty. Sison alleged that Atty. Camacho was the counsel of
MDAHI in an insurance claim action against Paramount Life
& General Insurance Corp. (Paramount Insurance), docketed
as Civil Case No. 05-655, before the Regional Trial Court,
Makati City, Branch 139 (RTC). The initial insurance claim of
MDAHI against Paramount Insurance was P14,863,777.00.
On March 4, 2011, Atty. Camacho met with Atty. Enrique
Dimaano (Atty. Dimaano), corporate secretary of MDAHI,
and proposed to increase their claim to P64,412,534.18 by
taking into account the interests imposed. Atty. Camacho,
however, clarified that the increase in the claim would
require additional docket fees in the amount of
P1,288,260.00, as shown in his hand-written
computation.[2] MDAHI agreed and granted the said amount
to Atty. Dimaano which was evidenced by a Payment
Request/Order Form.[3] On May 27, 2011, Atty. Dimaano
gave the money for docket fees to Atty. Camacho who
promised to issue a receipt for the said amount, but never
did.[4]
Atty. Sison later discovered that on May 26, 2011, the RTC
had already rendered a decision[5] in favor of MDAHI
granting its insurance claim plus interests in the amount of
approximately P65,000,000.00.
On August 11, 2011, Atty. Camacho sent a letter [6] to MDAHI
recommending a settlement with Paramount Insurance in
Civil Case No. 05-655 in the amount of PI5,000,000.00
allegedly to prevent a protracted appeal with the appellate
court. MDAHI refused the offer of compromise and did not
indicate its conforme on the letter of Atty. Camacho.
Surprisingly, even without the written conformity of MDAHI,
Atty. Camacho filed the Satisfaction of Judgment,[7]dated
August 15, 2011, before the RTC stating that the parties had
entered into a compromise agreement.
On August 18, 2011, Atty. Sison met with Atty. Camacho to
clarify the events that transpired.[8] He asked Atty. Camacho
whether he paid the amount of P1,288,260.00 as additional
dockets fees, and the latter replied that he simply gave it to
the clerk of court as the payment period had lapsed.
Disappointed with the actions of Atty. Camacho, Atty. Sison
sent a letter,[9] dated August 24, 2011, stating that he was
alarmed that the former would accept a disadvantageous
compromise; that it was against company policy to bribe any
government official with respect to the P1,288,260.00 given
to the clerk of court; and that MDAHI would only pay
P200,000.00 to Atty. Camacho as attorney’s fees.
Respondent’s Position
In his verified answer,[10] dated October 30, 2012, Atty.
Camacho denied all the allegations against him. He stressed
that he had the authority to enter into the compromise
agreement. Moreover, the alleged docket fees given to him
by MDAHI formed part of his attorney’s fees.
He further stated in his position paper[11] that the judgment
debt was paid and accepted by MDAHI without any
objection, as duly evidenced by an acknowledgment
receipt.[12] Thus, there was no irregularity in the compromise
agreement.
With respect to the amount handed to him, Atty. Camacho
averred that he filed a Motion to Compel Plaintiff to Pay
Attorney’s Fee on September 13, 2011 before the RTC. The
Court granted the said motion in its April 12, 2012
Order[13] stating that the amount of PI,288,260.00 was
considered as part of his attorney’s fees.
On July 6, 2012, the RTC issued an Order[14] resolving the
motion for reconsideration filed by both parties in favor of
Atty. Camacho. In the said order, the RTC opined that only
P300,000.00 was previously paid to Atty. Camacho[15] as
attorney’s fees. Based on the foregoing, Atty. Camacho
asserted that the amount of P1,288,260.00 which he
received, truly formed part of his unpaid attorney’s fees. He
stressed that the said RTC order had attained finality and
constituted res judicata on the present administrative case.
He added that MDAHI disregarded the RTC order as it filed
an estafa case against him concerning the amount of
PI,288,260.00.
Report and Recommendation
After the mandatory conference on January 24, 2013 and
upon a thorough evaluation of the evidence presented by
the parties in their respective position papers, the IBP-CBD
submitted its Report and Recommendation,[16] dated April 1,
2013 finding Atty. Camacho to have violated the provisions
of Rule 1.01 and Rule 16.01 of the CPR and recommending
the imposition of the penalty of one (1) year suspension
from the practice of law against him. In its Resolution No.
XX-2013-474,[17] dated April 16, 2013, the Board of
Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (Board)
adopted the said report and recommendation of
Investigating Commissioner Eldrid C. Antiquiera.
Aggrieved, Atty. Camacho filed a motion for
reconsideration[18] before the Board reiterating that the
compromise agreement was valid because MDAHI did not
reject the same and that the amount of P1,288,260.00
formed part of his attorney’s fees.
In his Comment/Opposition,[19] Atty. Sison countered that
Atty. Camacho never denied that he filed the satisfaction of
judgment without the written authority of MDAHI and that
there was a pending estafa case against him before the
Regional Trial Court, Makati City, Branch 146, docketed as
Page 36 of 38
Criminal Case No. 13-1688, regarding the P1,288,260.00
handed to him.
In its Resolution No. XXI-2014-532,[20] dated August 10,
2014, the Board adopted the report and
recommendation[21] of National Director Dominic CM. Solis.
The Board partially granted the motion for reconsideration
and dismissed, without prejudice, the charge regarding the
failure to account for the money, because it was premature
to act on such issue due to the pending criminal case against
the Atty. Camacho. Accordingly, the penalty of one (1) year
suspension imposed was lowered to six (6) months
suspension from the practice of law.
Hence, the case was elevated to the Court.
The Court’s Ruling
The Court finds that Atty. Camacho violated Rules 1.01 and
16.01 of the CPR.
Entering into a compromise
agreement without written
authority of the client
Those in the legal profession must always conduct
themselves with honesty and integrity in all their dealings.
Members of the Bar took their oath to conduct themselves
according to the best of their knowledge and discretion with
all good fidelity as well to the courts as to their clients and to
delay no man for money or malice. These mandates apply
especially to dealings of lawyers with their clients
considering the highly fiduciary nature of their
relationship.[22]
In the practice of law, lawyers constantly formulate
compromise agreements for the benefit of their clients.
Article 1878 of the Civil Code provides that ” [s]pecial
powers of attorney are necessary in the following cases: xxx
(3) To compromise, to submit questions to arbitration, to
renounce the right to appeal from a judgment, to waive
objections to the venue of an action or to abandon a
prescription already acquired xxx.”
In line with the fiduciary duty of the Members of the Bar,
Section 23, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court specifies a
stringent requirement with respect to compromise
agreements, to wit:
Sec. 23. Authority of attorneys to bind clients. – Attorneys
have authority to bind their clients in any case by any
agreement in relation thereto made in writing, and in taking
appeals, and in all matters of ordinary judicial procedure.But
they cannot, without special authority, compromise
their client’s litigation, or receive anything in
discharge of a client’s claim but the full amount in
cash.
[Emphasis and Underscoring Supplied]
In the case at bench, the RTC decision, dated May 26, 2011,
awarded MDAHI approximately P65,000,000.00. When
Paramount Insurance offered a compromise settlement in
the amount of P15,000,000.00, it was clear as daylight that
MDAHI never consented to the said offer. As can be gleaned
from Atty. Camacho’s letter, MDAHI did not sign the
conforme regarding the compromise agreement.[23]
Glaringly, despite the lack of a written special authority, Atty.
Camacho agreed to a lower judgment award on behalf of his
client and filed a satisfaction of judgment before the RTC.
The said pleading also failed to bear the conformity of his
client.[24] Although MDAHI subsequently received the
payment of P15M from Paramount Insurance, it does not
erase Atty. Camacho’s transgression in reaching the
compromise agreement without the prior consent of his
client.
For entering into a compromise agreement without the
written authority of his client, Atty. Camacho violated Rule
1.01 of the CPR, which states that “[a] lawyer shall not
engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.” Members of the Bar must always conduct
themselves in a way that promotes public confidence in the
integrity of the legal profession.[25]
Failing to account for
the money of the client
Atty. Camacho was also charged with violation of Rule 16.01
of the CPR, which provides for a lawyer’s duty to “account
for all money or property collected or received for or from
the client.”
Here, Atty. Sison alleged that MDAHI gave Atty. Camacho
the amount of PI,288,260.00 as payment of additional
docket fees but the latter failed to apply the same for its
intended purpose. In contrast, Atty. Camacho invoked the
July 6, 2012 Order of the RTC which declared the MDAHI
allegation as unsubstantiated, and claimed that the said
amount formed part of his attorney’s fees. The Board, on the
other hand, opined that it was still premature to decide such
issue because there was a pending estafa case, docketed as
Criminal Case No. 13-1688, filed by MDAHI against Atty.
Camacho involving the same amount of P1,288,260.00.
The Court is of the view that it is not premature to rule on
the charge against Atty. Camacho for his failure to account
for the money of his client. The pending case against him is
criminal in nature. The issue therein is whether he is guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of misappropriating the amount of
P1,288,260.00 entrusted to him by his client. The present
case, however, is administrative in character, requiring only
substantial evidence. It only entails a determination of
whether Atty. Camacho violated his solemn oath by failing to
account for the money of his client. Evidently, the
adjudication of such issue in this administrative case shall
not, in any way, affect the separate criminal proceeding.
In disciplinary proceedings against lawyers, the only issue is
whether the officer of the court is still fit to be allowed to
continue as a member of the Bar. The only concern of the
Court is the determination of the respondent’s administrative
liability. The findings in this case will have no material
bearing on other judicial action which the parties may
choose to file against each other. While a lawyer’s wrongful
actuations may give rise at the same time to criminal, civil,
and administrative liabilities, each must be determined in the
appropriate case; and every case must be resolved in
accordance with the facts and the law applicable and the
quantum of proof required in each.[26]
Delving into the substance of the allegation, the Court rules
that Atty. Camacho indeed violated Rule 16.01 of the CPR.
When Atty. Camacho personally requested MDAHI for
additional docket fees, the latter obediently granted the
amount of P1,288,260.00 to the former. Certainly, it was
understood that such amount was necessary for the
payment of supposed additional docket fees in Civil Case No.
05-655. Yet, when Atty. Sison confronted Atty. Camacho
regarding the said amount, the latter replied that he simply
gave it to the clerk of court as the payment period had
lapsed. Whether the said amount was pocketed by him or
improperly given to the clerk of court as a form of bribery, it
was unmistakably clear that Atty. Camacho did not apply the
amount given to him by his client for its intended legal
purpose.
Page 37 of 38
Atty. Camacho did not even deny making that request to
MDAHI for additional docket fees and receiving such amount
from his client. Rather, he set up a defense that the said
amount formed part of his attorney’s fees. Such defense,
however, is grossly contradictory to the established purpose
of the P1,288,260.00. In its Payment Request/Order
Form,[27] it is plainly indicated therein that MDAHI released
the said amount only to be applied as payment for additional
docket fees, and not for any other purposes. Consequently,
the lame excuse of Atty. Camacho is bereft of merit because
it constitutes a mere afterthought and a manifest disrespect
to the legal profession. Atty. Camacho is treading on a
perilous path where the payment of his attorney’s fees is
more important than his fiduciary and faithful duty of
accounting the money of his client. Well-settled is the rule
that lawyers are not entitled to unilaterally appropriate their
clients’ money for themselves by the mere fact that the
clients owe them attorney’s fees.[28]
Moreover, Atty. Camacho failed to issue a receipt to MDAHI
from the moment he received the said amount. In Tarog v.
Ricafort,[29] the Court held that ethical and practical
considerations made it both natural and imperative for a
lawyer to issue receipts, even if not demanded, and to keep
copies of the receipts for his own records. Pursuant to Rule
16.01 of the CPR, a lawyer must be aware that he is
accountable for the money entrusted to him by the clients,
and that his only means of ensuring accountability is by
issuing and keeping receipts.
Worse, on May 26, 2011, the RTC already rendered its
decision in Civil Case No. 05-655, adjudging MDAHI entitled
to an insurance claim in the amount of approximately
P65,000,000.00. From that date on, there was no more need
for additional docket fees. Apparently, still unaware of the
judgment, MDAHI subsequently released the money for
additional docket fees to Atty. Dimaano, who handed it to
Atty. Camacho on May 27, 2011. Despite a decision having
been rendered, Atty. Camacho did not reject the said
amount or return it to his client upon receipt. Instead, he
unilaterally withheld the said amount by capriciously invoking
the payment of his attorney’s fees.
The fiduciary nature of the relationship between the counsel
and his client imposes on the lawyer the duty to account for
the money or property collected or received for or from his
client. Money entrusted to a lawyer for a specific purpose
but not used for the purpose should be immediately
returned. A lawyer’s failure, to return upon demand, the
funds held by him on behalf of his client gives rise to the
presumption that he has appropriated the same for his own
use in violation of the trust reposed in him by his client. Such
act is a gross violation of general morality as well as of
professional ethics. It impairs public confidence in the legal
profession and deserves punishment.[30]
Administrative penalty
A member of the Bar may be penalized, even disbarred or
suspended from his office as an attorney, for violation of the
lawyer’s oath and/or for breach of the ethics of the legal
profession as embodied in the CPR. The practice of law is a
profession, a form of public trust, the performance of which
is entrusted to those who are qualified and who possess
good moral character. The appropriate penalty for an errant
lawyer depends on the exercise of sound judicial discretion
based on the surrounding facts.[31]
In Luna v. Galarrita,[32] the Court suspended the respondent
lawyer for two (2) years because he accepted a compromise
agreement without valid authority and he failed to turn over
the payment to his client. In the case ofMelendrez v.
Decena[33] the lawyer therein was disbarred because he
entered into a compromise agreement without the special
authority of his client and he drafted deceptive and
dishonest contracts. Similarly, in Navarro v. Meneses
III,[34] another lawyer, who misappropriated the money
entrusted to him by his client which he failed and/or refused
to account for despite repeated demands,
was disbarred because his lack of personal honesty and good
moral character rendered him unworthy of public confidence.
In this case, Atty. Camacho entered into a compromise
agreement without the conformity of his client which is
evidently against the provisions of the CPR and the law.
Moreover, he deliberately failed to account for the money he
received from his client, which was supposed to be paid as
additional docket fees. He even had the gall to impute that
the money was illicitly given to an officer of the court. The
palpable indiscretions of Atty. Camacho shall not be
countenanced by the Court for these constitute as a blatant
and deliberate desecration of the fiduciary duty that a lawyer
owes to his client.
The Court finds that Atty. Camacho’s acts are so
reprehensible, and his violations of the CPR are so flagrant,
exhibiting his moral unfitness and inability to discharge his
duties as a member of the Bar. His actions erode rather than
enhance the public perception of the legal profession.
Therefore, in view of the totality of his violations, as well as
the damage and prejudice they caused to his client, Atty.
Camacho deserves the ultimate penalty of disbarment.
Further, he must be ordered to return the amount of
P1,288,260.00 to MDAHI, which he received in his
professional capacity for payment of the purported additional
docket fees. Disciplinary proceedings revolve around the
determination of the respondent-lawyer’s administrative
liability, which must include those intrinsically linked to his
professional engagement.[35]
WHEREFORE, Atty. Manuel N. Camacho is found guilty of
violating Rule 1.01 and Rule 16.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. For reasons above-stated, he
is DISBARRED from the practice of law and his name
stricken off the Roll of Attorneys, effective immediately.
Furthermore, Atty. Manuel N. Camacho is ORDERED to
return to Marsman-Drysdale Agribusiness Holdings Inc. the
money intended to pay for additional docket fees which he
received from the latter in the amount of P1,288,260.00
within ninety (90) days from the finality of this decision.
Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Office of the Bar
Confidant to be entered into the records of respondent Atty.
Manuel N. Camacho. Copies shall likewise be furnished the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court
Administrator for circulation to all courts concerned.
SO ORDERED.
Page 38 of 38