I. Rules.
Since Balatong and Labong did
Ludong, Balatong, and Labong were
charged with murder. After trial, the court
announced that the case was considered
submitted for decision. Subsequently, the
Clerk of Court issued the notices of
promulgation of judgment which were
duly received. On promulgation
day, Ludong and his lawyer appeared.
The lawyers
of Balatong and Labong appeared but
without their clients and failed to
satisfactorily explain their absence when
queried by the court. Thus, the judge
ordered the Clerk of Court to proceed
with the reading of the judgment
convicting all the accused. With respect
to Balatong and Labong, the judge
ordered that the judgment be entered in
the criminal docket and copies be
furnished their lawyers. The lawyers
of Ludong, Balatong, and Labong filed
within the reglementary period a Joint
Motion for Reconsideration. The court
favorably granted the motion
of Ludong downgrading his conviction
from murder to homicide but denied the
motion as
regards Balatong and Labong. (4%)
(A) Was the court correct in taking
cognizance of the Joint Motion for
Reconsideration?
(B) Can Balatong and Labong appeal
their conviction in case Ludong accepts
his conviction for homicide?
ANSWERS:
(A) No, the court was not correct in
taking cognizance of the Joint Motion for
Reconsideration insofar
as Balatong and Labong were
concerned.
Under Section 6 Rule 120, if the judgment
was for conviction and the failure of the
accused to appear was without justifiable
cause, he shall lose the remedies
available under the Rules of Court and
the court shall order his arrest. The
accused may regain the remedies only if
he surrenders and files a motion for leave
to avail of the remedies under the Rules of
Court.
Here the failure
of Balatong and Labong to appear was
without justifiable cause as even their
lawyers were not aware of the reason for
their absence. Hence they lost their
remedies under the
not surrender and file a motion for leave
to avail of remedies, it was incorrect for
the trial court to take cognizance of the
joint motion for reconsideration insofar
as Balatong and Labong were
concerned. The trial court should instead
have ordered their arrest. (People v. De
Grano, 5 June 2009, Peralta, J.).
On the other hand, it was correct for the
trial court to take cognizance of the joint
motion for reconsideration insofar
as Ludong was concerned since he and
his lawyer were present during the
promulgation.
(B) No, Balatong and Labong cannot
appeal their conviction in
case Ludong accepts his conviction for
homicide.
Since Balatong and Labong failed to
appear during the promulgation of the
conviction without justifiable cause, they
lost the remedies under the Rules of Court
including the remedy of an appeal.
II.
McJolly is a trouble-maker of sorts,
always getting into brushes with the law.
In one incident, he drove his Humvee
recklessly, hitting a pedicab which sent
its driver and passengers in different
directions. The pedicab driver died, while
two (2) of the passengers suffered slight
physical injuries. Two (2) Informations
were then filed against McJolly. One,
for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in
Homicide and Damage to Property, and
two, for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in
Slight Physical Injuries. The latter case was
scheduled for arraignment earlier, on
which occasion McJolly immediately
pleaded guilty. He was meted out the
penalty of public censure. A month later,
the case for reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide was also set for
arraignment. Instead of
pleading, McJolly interposed the defense
of double jeopardy. Resolve. (4%)
ANSWER:
The defense of double jeopardy is
meritorious and the second information
for reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide should be quashed on the
ground of double jeopardy.
The Supreme Court has held that reckless
imprudence is a single crime and that its
consequences on persons and property
are material only to determine the
penalty.
Here there was only one act and crime
of reckless imprudence. The death, the
physical injuries, and the damage to the
tricycle are only consequences of the
same reckless act of McJolly. Hence
there was double jeopardy when a
second information arising from the same
reckless act was brought against the
accused. (Ivler v. Modesto-San Pedro, 17
November 2010).
III.
While passing by a dark uninhabited part
of their barangay, PO2 Asintado observed
shadows and heard screams from a
distance. PO2 Asintado hid himself behind
the bushes and saw a man beating a
woman whom he recognized as his
neighbor, Kulasa. When Kulasa was
already in agony, the man stabbed her
and she fell on the ground. The man
hurriedly left thereafter.
PO2 Asintado immediately went
to Kulasa’s rescue. Kulasa, who was then
in a state of hysteria, kept mentioning
to PO2 Asintado “Si Rene, gusto akong
patayin! Sinaksak niya ako!” When PO2
Asintado was about to carry
her, Kulasa refused and said “Kaya ko.
Mababaw lang to. Habulin mo si Rene.”
The following day, Rene learned
of Kulasa’s death and, bothered by his
conscience, surrendered to the authorities
with his counsel. As his surrender was
broadcasted all over media, Rene opted
to release his statement to the press which
goes:
“I believe that I am entitled to the
presumption of innocence until my guilt is
proven beyond reasonable doubt.
Although I admit that I performed acts
that may take one’s life away, I hope and
pray that justice will be served the right
way. God bless us all.
(Sgd.)
Rene”
The trial court convicted Rene of
homicide on the basis of PO2 Asintado’s
testimony, Kulasa’s statements,
and Rene’s statement to the press. On
appeal, Rene raises the following errors:
1. The trial court erred in giving weight
to PO2 Asintado’s testimony, as the latter
did not have any personal knowledge of
the facts in issue, and violated Rene’s
right to due process when it
considered Kulasa’s statements despite
lack of opportunity for her cross-
examination.
2. The trial court erred in holding
that Rene’s statement to the press was a
confession which, standing alone, would
be sufficient to warrant conviction.
Resolve. (4%)
ANSWER:
Rene’s appeal is denied for lack of merit.
1. contention that the trial court erred in
giving weight to PO2 Asintado’s testimony
since he did not have personal
knowledge of the facts in issue is without
merit. The contention in effect
challenges Kulasa’s statement for being
hearsay.
Under the Rules of Evidence, a statement
made immediately subsequent to
a startling occurrence is excepted from
the hearsay rule as part of the res gestae.
Here Kulasa’s statement was made
immediately subsequent to a starling
occurrence, that is, her stabbing by Rene,
and was made in a state of hysteria,
showing that she was under the influence
of the startling occurrence. Hence
testimony regarding the statement is
excepted from the hearsay rule.
Since Kulasa’s statement is an exception
to the hearsay rule, Rene cannot
complain that his right to due process was
violated when the trial court considered
Kulasa’s statement despite lack of
opportunity to cross-examine her.
There should be no serious question
about the admissibility against an
accused of hearsay where this hearsay
falls under an exception to the hearsay
rule, especially here where the declarant
is dead and thus unavailable to testify.
(ANTONIO R. BAUTISTA, BASIC EVIDENCE
214-215 [2004 ed.]). In U.S. v. Gil, 13 Phil.
530 (1909), the Supreme Court upheld
dying declarations as an exception to the
confrontation clause since “such
declarations have always been regarded
as an exception to the general rule
regarding hearsay evidence.”
2. The argument that the trial court erred
in holding that Rene’s statement to the
press was a confession which, standing
alone, would be sufficient to warrant
conviction is meritorious.
Firstly, Rene’s statement is not a
confession but an admission. A
confession is one wherein a person
acknowledges his guilt of a crime, which
Rene did not do. Secondly, even
assuming it is a confession, standing alone
it would not be sufficient to warrant
conviction since it is an extrajudicial
confession which is not sufficient ground
for conviction unless corroborated by
evidence of corpus delicti. (S3 R133).
Nonetheless this was a harmless error
since the admission of Rene was
corroborated by the testimony of PO2
Asintado on Kulasa’s statement.
IV.
An order of the court requiring a
retroactive re-dating of an order,
judgment or document filing be entered
or recorded in a judgment is: (1%)
(A) pro hac vice
(B) non pro tunc
(C) confession relicta verificatione
(D) nolle prosequi
ANSWER:
(B) (Note: Should be “nunc pro tunc.”).
V.
Landlord, a resident of Quezon City,
entered into a lease contract with Tenant,
a resident of Marikina City, over a
residential house in Las Piñas City. The
lease contract provided, among others,
for a monthly rental of P25,000.00, plus ten
percent (10%) interest rate in case of non-
payment on its due date.
Subsequently, Landlord migrated to the
United States of America (USA) but
granted in favor of his sister Maria, a
special power of attorney to manage the
property and file and defend suits over
the property rented out
to Tenant. Tenant failed to pay the rentals
due for five (5) months. Maria asks your
legal advice on how she can
expeditiously collect from Tenant the
unpaid rentals plus interests due. (6%)
(A) What judicial remedy would you
recommend to Maria?
(B) Where is the proper venue of the
judicial remedy which you
recommended?
(C) If Maria insists on filing an ejectment
suit against Tenant, when do you reckon
the one (1)-year period within which to
file the action?
ANSWERS:
(A) The judicial remedy that I would
recommend to Maria is to file a collection
suit for the P125,000 rentals in arrears and
the P12,500 interest due. The remedy
would be expeditious since it would be
governed by the Rules on Summary
Procedure as the amount of the demand,
excluding interest, does not exceed
P200,000.
(B) The proper venue of the collection suit
would be in Marikina City, where Tenant
resides.
Under the Rules of Civil Procedure, venue
in personal actions is with the residence of
either the plaintiff or the defendant, at
the plaintiff’s election.
Since the Plaintiff does not reside in the
Philippines, venue may be laid only in
Marikina City where the defendant
Tenant resides.
(C) Maria insists on filing an ejectment suit
against Tenant, the one-year period
within which to file the action shall be
reckoned from the expiration of 5-days
from notice of the last demand to pay
and vacate. (Cruz v. Atencio, 28
February 1959; Sy Oh v. Garcia, 30 June
1969).
VI.
As a rule, courts may not grant an
application for provisional remedy without
complying with the requirements of notice
and hearing. These requirements,
however, may be dispensed with in an
application for: (1%)
(A) writ of preliminary injunction
(B) writ for preliminary attachment
(C) an order granting support pendente
lite
(D) a writ of replevin
ANSWER:
(B)
VII.
Co Batong, a Taipan, filed a civil action VIII.
for damages with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Parañaque City against Jose
Johnny, a naturalized citizen of the United
Penduko, a news reporter of the Philippine
States of America (USA) but formerly a
Times, a newspaper of general circulation
Filipino citizen, executed a notarial will in
printed and published in Parañaque City.
accordance with the laws of the State of
The complaint alleged, among others,
California, USA. Johnny, at the time of his
that Jose Penduko wrote malicious and
death, was survived by his
defamatory imputations against Co
niece Anastacia, an American citizen
Batong; that Co Batong’s business address
residing at the condominium unit
is in Makati City; and that the libelous
of Johnny located at Fort Bonifacio,
article was first printed and published in
Taguig City; a younger
Parañaque City. The complaint prayed
brother, Bartolome, who
that Jose Penduko be held liable to pay
manages Johnny’s fish pond in Lingayen,
P200,000.00, as moral damages;
Pangasinan; and a younger
P150,000.00, as exemplary damages; and
sister, Christina, who
P50,000.00, as attorney’s fees.
manages Johnny’s rental
condominium units in Makati
Jose Penduko filed a Motion to Dismiss on
City. Johnny’s entire estate which he
the following grounds:
inherited from his parents is valued at
P200
1. The RTC is without jurisdiction because
million. Johnny appointed Anastacia as
under the Totality Rule, the claim for
executrix of his will. (4%)
damages in the amount of P350,000.00 fall
(A) Can Johnny’s notarial will be
within the exclusive original jurisdiction of
probated before the proper court in the
the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of
Philippines?
Parañaque City.
(B) Is Anastacia qualified to be the
2. The venue is improperly laid because
executrix of Johnny’s notarial will?
what the complaint alleged is Co
Batong’s business address and not his
residence address. ANSWERS:

Are the grounds invoked in the Motion to (A) Yes, the formal validity of a will is
Dismiss proper? (4%) governed also by the national law of the
decedent. (Article 817, Civil Code).

ANSWER: A will proved and allowed in a foreign

No, the grounds invoked in the motion to
dismiss improper.
1. The invocation of the Totality Rule is
misplaced. Under Art. 360 of the Revised
Penal Code, jurisdiction over a civil action
for damages in case of libel is with the
Court of First Instance, now the Regional
Trial Court. (Nocum v. Tan, 23 September
2005). The said provision does not
mention any jurisdictional amount over
such action; hence the Totality Rule is
inapplicable.
2. The ground that the complaint
mentioned the complainant’s office
address rather than his residence is of no
moment since the complaint also stated
that the libelous article was printed and
first published in Paranaque City. Under
Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code,
venue in a civil action for libel also lies in
the place where the libelous article was
printed and first published.
country, according to the laws of such
country, may be allowed, filed, and
recorded by the proper Regional Trial
Court in the Philippines. (S1 R77).
(B) Yes, assuming that Anastacia is of
legal age, she is qualified to be an
executor although an alien because she
is a resident of the Philippines. (S1 R78).
IX.
Bayani, an overseas worker based in
Dubai, issued in favor of Agente, a special
power of attorney to sell his house and
lot. Agente was able to sell the property
but failed to remit the proceeds to Bayani,
as agreed upon. On his return to the
Philippines, Bayani, by way of a demand
letter duly received by Agente, sought to
recover the amount due
him. Agente failed to return the amount as
he had used it for the construction of his
own house.
Thus, Bayani filed an action X.
against Agente for sum of money with
Prince Chong entered into a lease
damages. Bayani subsequently filed
contract with King Kong over a
an ex-parte motion for the issuance of a
commercial building where the former
writ of preliminary attachment duly
conducted his hardware business. The
supported by an affidavit. The court
lease contract stipulated, among others,
granted the ex-parte motion and issued a
a monthly rental of P50,000.00 for a four
writ of preliminary attachment
(4)-year period commencing on January
upon Bayani’s posting of the required
1, 2010. On January 1, 2013, Prince
bond. Bayani prayed that the court’s
Chong died. Kin Il Chong was appointed
sheriff be deputized to serve and
administrator of the estate of Prince
implement the writ of attachment. On
Chong, but the former failed to pay the
November 19, 2013, the Sheriff served
rentals for the months of January to June
upon Agente the writ of attachment and
2013 despite King Kong’s written
levied on the latter’s house and lot. On
demands.
November 20, 2013, the Sheriff served
Thus, on July 1, 2013, King Kong filed with
on Agente summons and a copy of the
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) an action for
complaint. On November 22,
rescission of contract with damages and
2013, Agente filed an Answer with Motion
payment of accrued rentals as of June 30,
to Discharge the Writ of
2013. (4%)
Attachment alleging that at the time the
(A) Can Kin Il Chong move to dismiss the
writ of preliminary attachment was issued,
complaint on the ground that the RTC is
he has not been served with summons
without jurisdiction since the amount
and, therefore, it was improperly
claimed is only P300,000.00?
issued. (4%)
(B) If the rentals accrued during the
(A) Is Agente correct?
lifetime of Prince Chong, and King
(B) Was the writ of preliminary attachment
Kong also filed the complaint for sum of
properly executed?
money during that time, will the action be
dismissible upon Prince Chong’s death
ANSWERS: during the pendency of the case?
(A) No, Agente is not correct.
ANSWERS:
Under the Rules of Civil Procedure, a writ
of attachment may issue even before (A) No, Kin II Chong cannot move to
service of summons upon the defendant. dismiss the complaint on the ground that
(S2 R57). the RTC is without jurisdiction since the
amount claimed is only P300,000.
(B) No, the writ of preliminary attachment
not properly executed. Under B.P. Blg. 129, the RTC has original
and exclusive jurisdiction over actions
Under S5 R57, no levy on preliminary
incapable of pecuniary estimation.
attachment shall be enforced unless
there is prior or simultaneous service of the Here the action is for rescission which is
summons and the accompanying papers. incapable of pecuniary estimation. The
(S5 R The Supreme Court has held that P300,000 accrued rentals is only incidental
subsequent service of summons will not to the main purpose of the action which is
cure the irregularity that attended the to rescind the lease contract.
enforcement of the writ (Onate v.
(B) No, the action will not be dismissible
Abrogar, 23 February 1995).
upon Prince Chong’s death during the
Here the sheriff levied upon the house pendency of the case.
and lot prior to the service of the
Under S20 R3, when the action is on a
summons and the complaint upon
contractual money claim and the
Agente. Hence the writ of preliminary
defendant dies before entry of final
attachment was not properly
judgment, the action shall not be
executed. The subsequent service of
dismissed but shall instead be allowed to
summons and the complaint did not cure
continue until entry of final judgment.
the irregularity in the enforcement of the
writ. Here the action is on a contractual
money claim, that is, a claim for rentals
based on a lease contract. Hence it shall
be allowed to continue until final
judgment. (S20 R3, S5 R86).
XI.
A search warrant was issued for the
purpose of looking for unlicensed firearms
in the house of Ass-asin, a notorious gun
for hire. When the police served the
warrant, they also sought the assistance
of barangay tanods who were assigned to
look at other portions of the premises
around the house. In a nipa hut thirty (30)
meters away from the house of Ass-asin,
a barangay tanod came upon a kilo of
marijuana that was wrapped in newsprint.
He took it and this was later used by the
authorities to charge Ass-asin with illegal
possession of marijuana. Ass-
asin objected to the introduction of such
evidence claiming that it was illegally
seized. Is the objection
of Assasin valid? (4%)
ANSWER:
Yes, the objection of Ass-asin is valid.
Under the Constitution, the right of the
people against unlawful search is
inviolable except in cases where a valid
search warrant was issued or in
exceptional cases where the law provides
for a warrantless search. (Sec. 2, Art. III,
Constitution). Under the fruit of the
poisonous tree doctrine, items seized by
virtue of an unlawful search are
inadmissible in evidence. (Sec. 3[2], Art.
III, Constitution).
Here the the seizure of the marijuana was
illegal since it was not pursuant to a
search warrant. The search warrant was
for the search and seizure of unlicensed
firearms not marijuana. Nor would the
exception regarding items seized under
plain view apply. The marijuana was
wrapped in newsprint and clearly not in
plain sight. Hence the marijuana may not
be introduced in evidence over Ass-asin’s
objection.
XII.
Mary Jane met Shiela May at the
recruitment agency where they both
applied for overseas employment. They
exchanged pleasantries, including details
of their personal circumstances.
Fortunately, Mary Jane was deployed to
work as front desk receptionist at a hotel
in Abu Dhabi where she met Sultan
Ahmed who proposed marriage, to which
she readily accepted. Unfortunately
for Shiela May, she was not deployed to
work abroad, and this made her envious
of Mary Jane.
Mary Jane returned to the Philippines to
prepare for her wedding. She secured
from the National Statistics Office (NSO) a
Certificate of No Marriage. It turned out
from the NSO records that Mary Jane had
previously contracted marriage with John
Starr, a British citizen, which she never did.
The purported marriage between Mary
Jane and John Starr contained all the
required pertinent details on Mary
Jane. Mary Jane later on learned
that Shiela May is the best friend of John
Starr.
As a lawyer, Mary Jane seeks your advice
on her predicament. What legal remedy
will you avail to enable Mary Jane to
contract marriage with Sultan
Ahmed? (4%)
ANSWER:
The legal remedy I would avail to enable
Mary Jane to contract marriage with
Sultan Ahmed is to file a petition under
Rule 108 to cancel entries in the marriage
contract between John Starr and Mary
Jane, particularly the portion and entries
thereon relating to the wife.
Rule 108 may be availed of to cancel
erroneous or invalid entries in the Civil
Registry. Here the entry of Mary Jane as
the wife of John Starr is clearly erroneous
and invalid as she never contracted
marriage with anybody, much less John
Starr. There is no need to file a petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage since
there was no marriage to speak of in the
first place, the marriage contract being a
sham contract. (Republic v. Olaybar, 10
February 2014, Peralta, J.).
XIII.
A foreign dog trained to sniff dangerous
drugs from packages, was hired by FDP
Corporation, a door to door forwarder
company, to sniff packages in their depot
at the international airport. In one of the
routinary inspections of packages waiting
to be sent to the United States of America
(USA), the dog sat beside one of the
packages, a signal that the package
contained dangerous drugs. Thereafter,
the guards opened the package and
found two (2) kilograms of cocaine.
The owner of the package was arrested
and charges were filed against him.
During the trial, the prosecution, through
the trainer who was present during the
incident and an expert in this kind of field,
testified that the dog was highly trained to
sniff packages to determine if the
contents were dangerous drugs and the
sniffing technique of these highly trained
dogs was accepted worldwide and had
been successful in dangerous drugs
operations. The prosecution moved to
admit this evidence to justify the opening
of the package. The accused objected
on the grounds that: (i) the guards had no
personal knowledge of the contents of the
package before it was opened; (ii) the
testimony of the trainer of the dog is
hearsay; and (iii) the accused could not
cross-examine the dog. Decide. (4%)
ANSWER:
The accused’s objections are overruled.
The objection that the guards had no
personal knowledge of the contents of
the package before it was opened is
misplaced. The one testifying is the trainer
not the guards and he had personal
knowledge of the circumstances since he
was present during the incident. Besides
there is no rule of evidence that one
cannot testify about the contents of a
package if he did not have prior personal
knowledge of its contents before opening
it.
The objection that the testimony of the
trainer of the dog is hearsay is not
valid. Hearsay is an out-of-court
declaration made by a person which is
offered for the truth of the matter
asserted.
Here what is involved is a dog who is not
a person who can make an out-of-court
declaration. (Lempert & Saltzburg, A
MODERN APPROACH TO EVIDENCE 370-
371 [1982]). A dog is not treated as a
declarant or witness who can be cross-
examined. (People v. Centolella, 305
N.Y.S.2d 279). Hence testimony that the
dog sat beside the package is not
testimony about an out-of-court
declaration and thus not hearsay.
The objection that the accused could
not cross-examine the dog is without
merit. Under the Constitution, the
accused’s right of confrontation refers to
witnesses. As previously discussed, a dog
is not a witness who can be cross-
examined.
Note: It is urged that utmost liberality be
exercised in grading this number. The
answer is not found in Philippine law and
jurisprudence and even in commentaries
by writers on evidence.
XIV.
When a Municipal Trial Court (MTC),
pursuant to its delegated jurisdiction,
renders an adverse judgment in an
application for land registration, the
aggrieved party’s remedy is: (1%)
(A) ordinary appeal to the Regional Trial
Court
(B) petition for review on certiorari to the
Supreme Court
(C) ordinary appeal to the Court of
Appeals
(D) petition for review to the Court of
Appeals
ANSWER:
(C) (See Sec. 34, B.P. Blg. 129)
XV.
The Ombudsman, after conducting the
requisite preliminary investigation, found
probable cause to charge Gov.
Matigas in conspiracy with Carpintero, a
private individual, for violating Section
3(e) of Republic Act (RA) No. 3019 (Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as
amended).
Before the information could be filed with
the Sandiganbayan, Gov. Matigas was
killed in an ambush. This, notwithstanding,
an information was filed against Gov.
Matigas and Carpintero.
At the
Sandiganbayan, Carpintero through
counsel, filed a Motion to Quash the
Information, on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan,
arguing that with the death of Gov.
Matigas, there is no public officer
charged in the information.
Is the motion to quash legally
tenable? (4%)
ANSWER:
No, the motion to quash is not legally
tenable.
In a case involving similar facts, the
Supreme Court held that the death of the
public officer did not mean that the
allegation of conspiracy between the
public officer and the private person can
no longer be proved or that their alleged
conspiracy is already expunged. The only
thing extinguished by the death of the
public officer was his criminal liability. His
death did not extinguish the crime nor did
it remove the basis of the charge of
conspiracy between him and the private
person. Hence the Sandiganbayan had
jurisdiction over the offense
charged. (People v. Go, 25 March 2014,
Peralta, J.)
XVI.
Plaintiff filed a complaint denominated
as accion publiciana, against defendant.
In his answer, defendant alleged that he
had no interest over the land in question,
except as lessee
of Z. Plaintiff subsequently filed an affidavit
of Z, the lessor of defendant, stating
that Z had sold to plaintiff all his rights and
interests in the property as shown by a
deed of transfer attached to the affidavit.
Thus, plaintiff may ask the court to
render: (1%)
(A) summary judgment
(B) judgment on the pleadings
(C) partial judgment
(D) judgment by default
ANSWER:
(A) (S1 & 3, R35)
XVII.
A was charged before the
Sandiganbayan with a crime of plunder, a
non-bailable offense, where the court had
already issued a warrant for his arrest.
Without A being arrested, his lawyer filed
a Motion to Quash Arrest Warrant and to
Fix Bail, arguing that the allegations in the
information did not charge the crime of
plunder but a crime of malversation, a
bailable offense. The court denied the
motion on the ground that it had not yet
acquired jurisdiction over the person of
the accused and that the accused should
be under the custody of the court since
the crime charged was nonbailable.
The accused’s lawyer counter-argued
that the court can rule on the motion even
if the accused was at-large because it
had jurisdiction over the subject matter of
the case. According to said lawyer, there
was no need for the accused to be under
the custody of the court because what
was filed was a Motion to Quash Arrest
and to Fix Bail, not a Petition for Bail.
(A) If you are the Sandiganbayan, how
will you rule on the motion? (3%)
(B) If the Sandiganbayan denies the
motion, what judicial remedy should the
accused undertake? (2%)
ANSWERS:
(A) I were the Sandiganbayan, I would
deny the Motion to Quash Arrest Warrant
and to Fix Bail.
The motion to quash warrant of arrest
may be considered since only jurisdiction
over the person not custody of the law is
required. Jurisdiction over the person of A
was obtained by his voluntary
appearance made through the filing of
the motion seeking affirmative
relief. (See Miranda v. Tuliao, 31 March
2006).
Nonetheless I would still deny the motion
to quash arrest warrant. The ground that
the offense charged is malversation not
plunder is not a valid ground to quash the
arrest warrant. A should simply file an
application for bail and contend that he
is entitled thereto as a matter of right.
The motion to fix amount of bail, which is
in effect an application for bail cannot be
granted unless the accused is in custody
of the law. (Miranda v. Tuliao, 31 March
2006). Here A was not in custody of the
law but still at large. Hence the motion to
fix the amount of bail should be
denied.
(B) If the Sandiganbayan denies the
motion, the judicial remedy that the
accused should undertake is to file a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with
the Supreme Court. Certiorari is available
to challenge interlocutory orders
rendered with grave abuse of discretion
since appeal is unavailable.
Here the order denying the Motion to
Quash Arrest Warrant and to Fix Bail is
interlocutory since it does not completely
dispose of the case. Hence certiorari is
available. A should aver that the
Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack of or
excess of jurisdiction in denying his
motion.
XVIII.
A was charged with murder in the lower
court. His Petition for Bail was denied after
a summary hearing on the ground that
the prosecution had established a strong
evidence of guilt. No Motion for
Reconsideration was filed from the denial
of the Petition for Bail. During the
reception of the evidence of the
accused, the accused reiterated his
petition for bail on the ground that the
witnesses so far presented by the
accused had shown that no qualifying
aggravating circumstance attended the
killing. The court denied the petition on
the grounds that it had already ruled that:
(i) the evidence of guilt is strong; (ii) the
resolution for the Petition for Bail is solely
based on the evidence presented by the
prosecution; and (iii) no Motion for
Reconsideration was filed from the denial
of the Petition for Bail. (6%)
(A) If you are the Judge, how will you
resolve the incident?
(B) Suppose the accused is convicted of
the crime of homicide and the accused
filed a Notice of Appeal, is he entitled to
bail?
ANSWERS:
(A) If I were the judge, I will grant the
Petition for Bail if the evidence does not
show any qualifying aggravating
circumstance. In such a case the offense
would be only homicide which is
bailable.
(i) The ground that the court had
already ruled that the evidence of
guilt is strong is improper. An order
denying an application for bail is
interlocutory and remains at the
control of the court until final
judgment. Hence the court is not
bound by its earlier ruling and may
reconsider the same if the
evidence or law warrants the
same.
(ii) The ground that the resolution
for the Petition for Bail is solely
based on the evidence presented
by the prosecution is improper.
While S8 R114 provides that the
prosecution has the burden of
proof to show that the evidence of
guilt is strong, it should not be
taken to mean that the resolution
of the bail application is based
solely on the prosecution
evidence. At the hearing for the
bail application, both the
prosecution and the accused must
be given reasonable opportunity
to prove or to disprove,
respectively, that the evidence of
guilt is strong. (Santos v. Ofilada,
245 SCRA 56).
(iii) The ground that no motion for
reconsideration was filed from the
order denying the petition for bail is
improper. As previously discussed,
an order denying bail is merely
interlocutory. Hence the failure to
move for reconsideration thereof
during the trial will not render the
order final and conclusive.
(B) No, after conviction by the RTC
of an offense not punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment, admission to bail is
discretionary. (S5 R114).
XIX.
A vicarious admission is considered an
exception to the hearsay rule. It, however,
does not cover: (1%)
(A) admission by a conspirator
(B) admission by a privy
(C) judicial admission
(D) adoptive admission
(C) Note: a vicarious admission is an
extrajudicial admission. Hence C is not
covered by the rule regarding vicarious
admissions.
XX.
Tom Wallis filed with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) a Petition for Declaration of
Nullity of his marriage with Debi Wallis on
the ground of psychological incapacity of
the latter. Before filing the petition, Tom
Wallis had told Debi Wallis that he wanted
the annulment of their marriage because
he was already fed up with her irrational
and eccentric behaviour. However, in the
petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage, the correct residential address
of Debi Wallis was deliberately not
alleged and instead, the residential
address of their married son was stated.
Summons was served by substituted
service at the address stated in the
petition. For failure to file an answer, Debi
Wallis was declared in default and Tom
Wallis presented evidence ex-parte. The
RTC rendered judgment declaring the
marriage null and void on the ground of
psychological incapacity of Debi Wallis.
Three (3) years after the RTC judgment
was rendered, Debi Wallis got hold of a
copy thereof and wanted to have the RTC
judgment reversed and set aside.
If you are the lawyer of Debi Wallis, what
judicial remedy or remedies will you
take? Discuss and specify the ground or
grounds for said remedy or
remedies. (5%)
ANSWER:
If I were the lawyer of Debi Wallis, the
judicial remedy I would take is to file with
the Court of Appeals an action for
annulment of the RTC judgment under
Rule 47. An action for annulment of
judgment may be resorted to since the
remedies of appeal and petition for relief
are no longer available through no fault
of Debi Wallis. (S1 R47).
The ground for annulment of judgment
would be lack of jurisdiction. Lack of
jurisdiction also covers lack of jurisdiction
over the person of the defendant since
the judgment would be void. (1 FLORENZ
D. REGALADO, REMEDIAL LAW
COMPENDIUM 558 [7 rev.
th ed.,
3rd printing]).
Here the court did not acquire jurisdiction
over the person of Debi since there was
no valid substituted service of
summons. Substituted service of summons
should have been made at Debi’s
residence. (S7 R14). Hence the
judgment of the RTC was void. Since the
judgment is void, the petition for
annulment thereof is imprescriptible. (S3
R47).
Furthermore, default judgments are not
allowed in declaration of nullity of
marriage. (S3[e] R9). Hence the trial
court’s rendition of a default judgment
was made with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
XXI.
Goodfeather Corporation, through its
President, Al Pakino, filed with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) a complaint for
specific performance against Robert
White. Instead of filing an answer to the
complaint, Robert White filed a motion to
dismiss the complaint on the ground of
lack of the appropriate board resolution
from the Board of Directors
of Goodfeather Corporation to show the
authority of Al Pakino to represent the
corporation
and file the complaint in its behalf. The
RTC granted the motion to dismiss and,
accordingly, it ordered the dismissal of
the complaint. Al Pakino filed a motion for
reconsideration which the RTC denied. As
nothing more could be done by Al
Pakino before the RTC, he filed an appeal
before the Court of Appeals (CA). Robert
White moved for dismissal of the appeal
on the ground that the same involved
purely a question of law and should have
been filed with the Supreme Court (SC).
However, Al Pakino claimed that the
appeal involved mixed questions of fact
and law because there must be a factual
determination if, indeed, Al Pakino was
duly authorized by Goodfeather
Corporation to file the complaint. Whose
position is correct? Explain. (4%)
ANSWER:
Robert White’s position is correct. In a
case involving similar facts, the Supreme
Court held that the issue of whether or not
the trial court erred in dismissing the
complaint on the ground that the person
who filed the complaint in behalf of the
plaintiff corporation was not authorized to
do so is a legal issue, reviewable only by
the Supreme Court in a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45. (Tamondong
v. Court of Appeals, 26 November 2004).
(Note: An alternative answer would be
that the appeal raises a factual question
of whether or not Al Pakino was indeed
authorized to file the complaint in behalf
of Goodfeather Corporation. A reading
of Tamondong would show that the
appellant only raised a legal question of
whether it was proper to dismiss the
complaint for failure to state a cause of
action but did not raise a factual issue as
to whether the filer was in fact authorized
by the corporation.).
XXII.
Which of the following decisions may be
appealed directly to the Supreme Court
(SC)? (Assume that the issues to be raised
on appeal involve purely questions of
law) (1%)
(A) Decision of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) rendered in the exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction.
(B) Decision of the RTC rendered in the
exercise of its original jurisdiction.
(C) Decision of the Civil Service
Commission.
(D) Decision of the Office of the President.

ANSWER:
(B) Note: In an appeal from RTC
judgment in the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction, the appeal should be to the
CA even if the questions are only legal.
Hence A should be excluded. (S2[c]
R42).
XXIII.
Mr. Humpty filed with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) a complaint against Ms.
Dumpty for damages. The RTC, after due
proceedings, rendered a decision
granting the complaint and ordering Ms.
Dumpty to pay damages to Mr.
Humpty. Ms. Dumpty timely filed an
appeal before the Court of Appeals (CA),
questioning the RTC decision. Meanwhile,
the RTC granted Mr. Humpty’s motion for
execution pending appeal. Upon receipt
of the RTC’s order granting execution
pending appeal, Ms. Dumpty filed with
the
CA another case, this time a special civil
action for certiorari assailing said RTC
order. Is there a violation of the rule
against forum shopping considering that
two (2) actions emanating from the same
case with the RTC were filed by Ms.
Dumpty with the CA? Explain. (4%)
ANSWER:
No, there is no violation of the rule against
forum shopping.
Forum shopping applies where two or
more initiatory pleadings were filed by the
same party. This is discernible from the
use of the phrase “commenced any
action or filed any claim” in S5 R7.
Here the first case involves the filing by Ms.
Dumpty of a notice of appeal which is not
an initiatory pleading. Hence there is no
forum shopping.
XXIV.
Solomon and Faith got married in 2005. In
2010, Solomon contracted a second
marriage with Hope. When Faith found out
about the second marriage
of Solomon and Hope, she filed a criminal
case for bigamy before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Manila sometime in 2011.
Meanwhile, Solomon filed a petition for
declaration of nullity of his first marriage
with Faith in 2012, while the case for
bigamy before the RTC of Manila is
ongoing. Subsequently, Solomon filed a
motion to suspend the proceedings in the
bigamy case on the ground of prejudicial
question. He asserts that the proceedings
in the criminal case should be suspended
because if his first marriage with Faith will
be declared null and void, it will have the
effect of exculpating him from the crime
of bigamy. Decide. (4%)
ANSWER:
Motion to suspend proceedings denied.
Under the Rules of Criminal Procedure, a
prejudicial question arises if there has
been a previously filed civil action. Here
the civil action was filed after the criminal
action. Hence no prejudicial question will
arise.
Moreover the Supreme Court has held
that a pending case for declaration of
nullity of marriage does not raise a
prejudicial question to a charge of
bigamy since a person who contracts a
second marriage without first awaiting a
judicial declaration of nullity of his first
marriage has already committed
bigamy. (People v. Odtuhan, 17 July
2013, Peralta, J.).
XXV.
Mr. Boaz filed an action for ejectment
against Mr. Jachin before the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC). Mr.
Jachin actively participated in every
stage of the proceedings knowing fully
well that the MeTC had no jurisdiction
over the action. In his mind, Mr.
Jachin was thinking that if the MeTC
rendered judgment against him, he could
always raise the issue on the jurisdiction of
the MeTC. After trial, the MeTC rendered
judgment against Mr. Jachin. What is the
remedy of Mr. Jachin? (1%)
(A) File an appeal
(B) File an action for nullification of
judgment
(C) File a motion for reconsideration
(D) File a petition for certiorari under Rule
65
ANSWER:
(A) See S8 R40. R47 is not available since
appeal is still available. Not C since a
prohibited pleading.
XXVI.
Parole evidence is an: (1%)
(A) agreement not included in the
document
(B) oral agreement not included in the
document
(C) agreement included in the document
(D) oral agreement included in the
document
ANSWER:
(A) Note: It is suggested that either A or
B be considered as correct. Strictly
speaking parol evidence does not have
to be an agreement; it is simply any
evidence, whether written or oral, which is
not contained in a written agreement
subject of a case and which seeks to
modify, alter, or explain the terms of the
written agreement.
XXVII.
Mr. Avenger filed with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) a complaint against Ms.
Bright for annulment of deed of sale and
other documents. Ms. Bright filed a motion
to dismiss the complaint on the ground of
lack of cause of action. Mr. Avenger filed
an opposition to the motion to dismiss.
State and discuss the appropriate
remedy/remedies under each of the
following situations: (6%)
(A) If the RTC grants Ms. Bright’s motion to
dismiss and dismisses the complaint on
the ground of lack of cause of action,
what will be the remedy/remedies of Mr.
Avenger?
(B) If the RTC denies Ms. Bright’s motion to
dismiss, what will be her
remedy/remedies?
(C) If the RTC denies Ms. Bright’s motion to
dismiss and, further proceedings,
including trial on the merits, are
conducted until the RTC renders a
decision in favor of Mr. Avenger, what will
be the remedy/remedies of Ms. Bright?
ANSWERS:
(A) If the RTC grants Ms. Brights’s motion
to dismiss, the remedies of Mr. Avenger
are:
(a) File a motion for
reconsideration under Rule 37.
(b) Re-file the complaint. The
dismissal does not bar the re-filing
of the case (S5 R16).
(c) Appeal from the order of
dismissal. The dismissal order is a
final order as it completely disposes
of the case; hence it is
appealable.
(d) File an amended complaint as
a matter of right curing the defect
of lack of cause of action before
the dismissal order becomes
final. This is because a motion to
dismiss is not a responsive
pleading; hence Mr. Avenger can
amend the complaint as a matter
of right. (S2 R10).
(B) If the RTC denies Ms. Bright’s motion to
dismiss, her remedies are:
(a) File a motion for
reconsideration.
(b) Proceed to trial and if she loses,
appeal and assign the failure to
dismiss as a reversible error.
(c) File a special civil action for
certiorari and/or mandamus if the
denial of the order to dismiss is
made with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of or
excess of jurisdiction.
(C) If the RTC renders a decision in favor
of Mr. Avenger, Ms. Bright’s remedies are:
(a) File a motion for
reconsideration or new trial under
Rule 37.
(b) File an appeal to the Court of
Appeals under Rule 41.
(c) File an appeal to the Supreme
Court under Rule 45 if the appeal
will raise only questions of law.
(d) File a petition for relief from
judgment under Rule 38.
(e) File an action for annulment of
judgment under Rule 47 on the
ground of extrinsic fraud or lack of
jurisdiction.
XXVIII.
A was adopted by B and C when A was
only a toddler. Later on in life, A filed with
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) a petition for
change of name under Rule 103 of the
Rules of Court, as he wanted to reassume
the surname of his natural parents
because the surname of his adoptive
parents sounded offensive and was
seriously affecting his business and social
life.
The adoptive parents gave their consent
to the petition for change of name.
May A file a petition for change of name?
If the RTC grants the petition for change of
name, what, if any, will be the effect on
the respective relations of A with his
adoptive parents and with his natural
parents? Discuss. (4%)
ANSWER:
Yes, A may file a petition for change of
name. Changing name on the ground
that it is offensive and seriously affects the
petitioner’s business and social life is a
valid ground especially where the
adoptive parents had given their
consent.
The grant of the petition will not change
A’s relations with his adoptive and natural
parents. The Supreme Court has held that
change of name under Rule 103 affects
only the name and not the status of the
petitioner. (Republic v. CA, 21 May
1992).
XXIX.
Estrella was the registered owner of a
huge parcel of land located in a remote
part of their barrio in Benguet. However,
when she visited the property after she
took a long vacation abroad, she was
surprised to see that her childhood
friend, John, had established a vacation
house on her property.
Both Estrella and John were residents of
the same barangay. To recover
possession, Estrella filed a complaint for
ejectment with the Municipal Trial Court
(MTC), alleging that she is the true owner
of the land as evidenced by her
certificate of title and tax declaration
which showed the assessed value of the
property as P21,000.00. On the other
hand, John refuted Estrella’s claim of
ownership and submitted in evidence a
Deed of Absolute Sale between him
and Estrella. After the filing of John’s
answer, the MTC observed that the real
issue was one of ownership and not of
possession. Hence, the MTC dismissed the
complaint for lack of jurisdiction.
On appeal by Estrella to the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), a full-blown trial was
conducted as if the case was originally
filed with it. The RTC reasoned that based
on the assessed value of the property, it
was the court of proper jurisdiction.
Eventually, the RTC rendered a judgment
declaring John as the owner of the land
and, hence, entitled to the possession
thereof. (4%)
(A) Was the MTC correct in dismissing the
complaint for lack of jurisdiction? Why or
why not?
(B) Was the RTC correct in ruling that
based on the assessed value of the
property, the case was within its original
jurisdiction and, hence, it may conduct a
full-blown trial of the appealed case as if
it was originally filed with it? Why or why
not?
ANSWERS:
(A) No, the MTC was not correct in
dismissing the case for lack of
jurisdiction. The Supreme Court has held
that an allegation of ownership as a
defense in the answer will not oust the
MTC of jurisdiction in an ejectment case.
(Subano v. Vallecer, 24 March
1959). What determines subject-matter
jurisdiction is the allegations in the
complaint and not those in the
answer. Furthermore, the MTC is
empowered under S16 R70 to resolve the
issue of ownership, albeit for the purpose
only of resolving the issue of possession.
(B) No the RTC was not correct in ruling
that the case was within its original
jurisdiction and that hence it may
conduct a full-blown trial of the appealed
case as if it were originally filed with it.
Under S8 R40, if an appeal is taken from
an MTC order dismissing a case for lack of
jurisdiction without a trial on the merits,
the RTC on appeal may affirm the
dismissal order and if it has jurisdiction
thereover, try the case on the merits as if
the case was originally filed with it.
Here the RTC did not have jurisdiction
over the case since it is an ejectment suit
cognizable exclusively by the MTC. The
assessed value of the land is irrelevant for
the purpose of determining jurisdiction in
ejectment suits and would not oust the
MTC of jurisdiction in the same manner as
allegations of ownership would not oust
the MTC of jurisdiction.
The RTC should have reversed the
dismissal order and remanded the case
to the MTC for further proceedings. (S8
R40).
Note: Utmost liberality should be given to
the examinee on this question as it does
not appear to be within the coverage of
the remedial law examination per the bar
examination syllabus given by the
Supreme Court.
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