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Petra V. Rosales vs.

Fortunato Rosales
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-40789 February 27, 1987

INTESTATE ESTATE OF PETRA V. ROSALES, IRENEA C.


ROSALES,petitioner,
vs.
FORTUNATO ROSALES, MAGNA ROSALES ACEBES, MACIKEQUEROX
ROSALES and ANTONIO ROSALES, respondents.

Jose B. Echaves for petitioner.

Jose A. Binghay and Paul G. Gorres for respondents.

GANCAYCO, J.:

In this Petition for Review of two (2) Orders of the Court of First Instance of Cebu the
question raised is whether the widow whose husband predeceased his mother can
inherit from the latter, her mother-in-law.

It appears from the record of the case that on February 26, 1971, Mrs. Petra V. Rosales,
a resident of Cebu City, died intestate. She was survived by her husband Fortunate T.
Rosales and their two (2) children Magna Rosales Acebes and Antonio Rosales.
Another child, Carterio Rosales, predeceased her, leaving behind a child,
Macikequerox Rosales, and his widow Irenea C. Rosales, the herein petitioner. The
estate of the dismissed has an estimated gross value of about Thirty Thousand Pesos
(P30,000.00).

On July 10, 1971, Magna Rosales Acebes instituted the proceedings for the settlement
of the estate of the deceased in the Court of First Instance of Cebu. The case was
docketed as Special Proceedings No. 3204-R. Thereafter, the trial court appointed
Magna Rosales Acebes administratrix of the said estate.

In the course of the intestate proceedings, the trial court issued an Order dated June
16, 1972 declaring the following in individuals the legal heirs of the deceased and
prescribing their respective share of the estate —

Fortunata T. Rosales (husband), 1/4; Magna R. Acebes (daughter), 1/4;


Macikequerox Rosales, 1/4; and Antonio Rosales son, 1/4.

This declaration was reiterated by the trial court in its Order I dated February 4, 1975.
These Orders notwithstanding, Irenea Rosales insisted in getting a share of the estate
in her capacity as the surviving spouse of the late Carterio Rosales, son of the deceased,
claiming that she is a compulsory heir of her mother-in-law together with her son,
Macikequerox Rosales.

Thus, Irenea Rosales sought the reconsideration of the aforementioned Orders. The
trial court denied her plea. Hence this petition.

In sum, the petitioner poses two (2) questions for Our resolution petition. First — is a
widow (surviving spouse) an intestate heir of her mother-in-law? Second — are the
Orders of the trial court which excluded the widow from getting a share of the estate
in question final as against the said widow?

Our answer to the first question is in the negative.

Intestate or legal heirs are classified into two (2) groups, namely, those who inherit by
their own right, and those who inherit by the right of representation. 1 Restated, an
intestate heir can only inherit either by his own right, as in the order of intestate
succession provided for in the Civil Code, 2 or by the right of representation provided
for in Article 981 of the same law. The relevant provisions of the Civil Code are:

Art. 980. The children of the deceased shall always inherit from him in
their own right, dividing the inheritance in equal shares.

Art. 981. Should children of the deceased and descendants of other


children who are dead, survive, the former shall inherit in their own
right, and the latter by right of representation.

Art. 982. The grandchildren and other descendants shag inherit by right
of representation, and if any one of them should have died, leaving
several heirs, the portion pertaining to him shall be divided among the
latter in equal portions.

Art. 999. When the widow or widower survives with legitimate children
or their descendants and illegitimate children or their descendants,
whether legitimate or illegitimate, such widow or widower shall be
entitled to the same share as that of a legitimate child.

There is no provision in the Civil Code which states that a widow (surviving spouse) is
an intestate heir of her mother-in-law. The entire Code is devoid of any provision
which entitles her to inherit from her mother-in- law either by her own right or by the
right of representation. The provisions of the Code which relate to the order of
intestate succession (Articles 978 to 1014) enumerate with meticulous exactitude the
intestate heirs of a decedent, with the State as the final intestate heir. The conspicuous
absence of a provision which makes a daughter-in-law an intestate heir of the deceased
all the more confirms Our observation. If the legislature intended to make the
surviving spouse an intestate heir of the parent-in-law, it would have so provided in
the Code.

Petitioner argues that she is a compulsory heir in accordance with the provisions of
Article 887 of the Civil Code which provides that:
Art. 887. The following are compulsory heirs:

(1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their legitimate


parents and ascendants;

(2) In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants, with


respect to their legitimate children and descendants;

(3) The widow or widower;

(4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by legal fiction;

(5) Other illegitimate children referred to in article 287;

Compulsory heirs mentioned in Nos. 3, 4 and 5 are not excluded by those


in Nos. 1 and 2; neither do they exclude one another.

In all cases of illegitimate children, their filiation must be duly proved.

The father or mother of illegitimate children of the three classes


mentioned, shall inherit from them in the manner and to the extent
established by this Code.

The aforesaid provision of law 3 refers to the estate of the deceased spouse in which
case the surviving spouse (widow or widower) is a compulsory heir. It does not apply
to the estate of a parent-in-law.

Indeed, the surviving spouse is considered a third person as regards the estate of the
parent-in-law. We had occasion to make this observation in Lachenal v. Salas, 4 to
Wit:

We hold that the title to the fishing boat should be determined in Civil
Case No. 3597 (not in the intestate proceeding) because it affects the
lessee thereof, Lope L. Leoncio, the decedent's son-in-law, who,
although married to his daughter or compulsory heir, is nevertheless a
third person with respect to his estate. ... (Emphasis supplied).

By the same token, the provision of Article 999 of the Civil Code aforecited does not
support petitioner's claim. A careful examination of the said Article confirms that the
estate contemplated therein is the estate of the deceased spouse. The estate which is
the subject matter of the intestate estate proceedings in this case is that of the deceased
Petra V. Rosales, the mother-in-law of the petitioner. It is from the estate of Petra V.
Rosales that Macikequerox Rosales draws a share of the inheritance by the right of
representation as provided by Article 981 of the Code.

The essence and nature of the right of representation is explained by Articles 970 and
971 of the Civil Code, viz —

Art. 970. Representation is a right created by fiction of law, by virtue of


which the representative is raised to the place and the degree of the
person represented, and acquires the rights which the latter would have
if he were living or if he could have inherited.
Art. 971. The representative is called to the succession by the law and not
by the person represented. The representative does not succeed the
person represented but the one whom the person represented would
have succeeded. (Emphasis supplied.)

Article 971 explicitly declares that Macikequerox Rosales is called to succession by law
because of his blood relationship. He does not succeed his father, Carterio Rosales (the
person represented) who predeceased his grandmother, Petra Rosales, but the latter
whom his father would have succeeded. Petitioner cannot assert the same right of
representation as she has no filiation by blood with her mother-in-law.

Petitioner however contends that at the time of the death of her husband Carterio
Rosales he had an inchoate or contingent right to the properties of Petra Rosales as
compulsory heir. Be that as it may, said right of her husband was extinguished by his
death that is why it is their son Macikequerox Rosales who succeeded from Petra
Rosales by right of representation. He did not succeed from his deceased father,
Carterio Rosales.

On the basis of the foregoing observations and conclusions, We find it unnecessary to


pass upon the second question posed by the petitioner.

Accordingly, it is Our considered opinion, and We so hold, that a surviving spouse is


not an intestate heir of his or her parent-in-law.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is hereby DENIED for lack of
merit, with costs against the petitioner. Let this case be remanded to the trial-court for
further proceedings.

SO ORDERED.

Yap (Chairman), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Feliciano and Sarmiento, JJ.,


concur.

Footnotes

1 III Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines
461, 1979 ed.

2 Articles 978 to 1014.

3 Art. 887 (3), Civil Code.

4 71 SCRA 262, 265 L-42257, June 14, 1976.


Gertrudes De Los Santos vs. Maximo De
La Cruz
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-29192 February 22, 1971

GERTRUDES DE LOS SANTOS, plaintiff-appellee,


vs.
MAXIMO DE LA CRUZ, defendant-appellant.

Benjamin Pineda for plaintiff-appellee.

Ceasar R. Monteclaros for defendant-appellant.

VILLAMOR, J.:

Direct appeal to this Court on questions of law from the judgment of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Branch IX, in its Civil Case No. Q-8792.

From the record of this case, we cull the following salient facts: On May 21, 1965,
Gertrudes de los Santos filed a complaint for specific performance against Maximo de
la Cruz, alleging, among others, that on August 24, 1963, she and several co-heirs,
including the defendant, executed an extrajudicial partition agreement (a copy of
which was attached to the complaint) over a certain portion of land with an area of
around 20,000 sq. m.; that the parties thereto had agreed to adjudicate three (3) lots
to the defendant, in addition to his corresponding share, on condition that the latter
would undertake the development and subdivision of the estate which was the subject
matter of the agreement, all expenses in connection therewith to be defrayed from the
proceeds of the sale of the aforementioned three (3) lots; that in spite of demands by
the plaintiff, by the co-heirs, and by the residents of the subdivision, the defendant
refused to perform his aforesaid obligation although he had already sold the aforesaid
lots. The plaintiff prayed the court to order the defendant to comply with his obligation
under the extrajudicial partition agreement and to pay the sum of P1,000.00 as
attorney's fees and costs.

In his answer, the defendant admitted the due execution of the extrajudicial partition
agreement, but set up the affirmative defenses that the plaintiff had no cause of action
against him because the said agreement was void with respect to her, for the reason
that the plaintiff was not an heir of Pelagia de la Cruz, deceased owner of the property,
and was included in the extrajudicial partition agreement by mistake; and that
although he had disposed of the three lots adjudicated to him, nevertheless the
proceeds of the sale were not sufficient to develop and improve properly the
subdivided estate. The answer contained a counterclaim wherein the defendant
alleged that the plaintiff had likewise sold her share in the estate for P10,000.00, and
that the extrajudicial partition agreement being void insofar as the latter was
concerned, he was entitled to one-fourth (1/4) of the proceeds as his share by way of
reversion. The defendant prayed that the complaint be dismissed; that the
extrajudicial partition agreement be declared void with respect to the plaintiff; and, on
his counterclaim, that the plaintiff be ordered to pay him the sum of P2,500.00.

On motion of the defendant, the court below entered an order on July 19, 1965,
declaring the plaintiff in default for not having answered the counterclaim.

On July 6, 1966, the case was submitted for decision on the following stipulation of
facts:

1. That the parties admit the existence and execution of the "Extra-
Judicial Partition Agreement" dated August 24, 1963, which was marked
as Exhibit "A" for the plaintiff, and Exhibit "I" for the defendant, which
partition agreement was marked as Annex "A" in the complaint;

2. That the parties agree that the original purpose of the above-
mentioned Extra-Judicial Partition Agreement was for the distribution
of the in question for the heirs of Pelagia de la Cruz; however the parties
further agree that several lots in the said land have been sold by some of
the co-heirs, and there are houses several houses constructed therein
and residents therein;

3. That the parties agree that the defendant is the appointed


Administrator and In-charge of the development and subdivision of the
land in question, as provided for in the aforementioned extrajudicial
partition agreement;

4. That parties agree that Lots 1, 2 and 3 as described on page 3, 3rd


paragraph to the last of said partition agreement have been sold by the
defendant herein; and parties further agree that there are no properly
constructed roads, nor proper light and water facilities;

5. That the parties agree that the defendant is the nephew of the deceased
Pelagia de la Cruz aforementioned, who was the owner and predecessor
in interest of the land which was the subject matter of the extra-judicial
partition agreement;

6. That the parties agree that the plaintiff is the grandniece of the said
Pelagia de la Cruz;

7. That Pelagia de la Cruz died intestate and without issue on October 16,
1962, as evidenced by a death certificate, which is marked as Exhibit "2"
for tap defendant; and

8. That Marciana de la Cruz is the mother of the plaintiff and the niece
of the said Pelagia de la Cruz, and that the said Marciana de la Cruz died
on September 22, 1935, as evidenced by Exhibit "3" for the defendant.
In its decision dated November 3, 1966, the court a quo held that the defendant, being
a party to the extrajudicial partition agreement, was estopped from raising in issue the
right of the plaintiff to inherit from the decedent Pelagia de la Cruz; hence, he must
abide by the terms of the agreement. The court ordered the defendant "to perform his
obligations to develop Lots 1, 2 and 3 of (LRC) Psd-29561 as described on page 2 of the
Extrajudicial Partition Agreement" (meaning, apparently, that the defendant should
develop the subdivision because said Lots 1, 2 and 3 were intended to be sold for this
purpose), and to pay the plaintiff the sum of P2,000.00 as actual damages, the sum of
P500.00 as attorney's fees, and the costs. No disposition was made of defendant's
counterclaim. The defendant filed a "Motion for New Trial" but the same was denied.
Hence, this appeal.

The seven (7) errors assigned by defendant-appellant in his brief boil down to the
following:

1. The court a quo erred in not holding that the extrajudicial partition
agreement is null and void with respect to plaintiff-appellee, and,
consequently, that plaintiff-appellee has no cause of action against
defendant-appellant.

2. The court a quo erred in holding that defendant-appellant is estopped


from questioning plaintiff-appellee's right to have the agreement
enforced.

3. The court a quo erred in ordering defendant-appellant to pay actual


damages to plaintiff-appellee, and, on the other hand, in not granting the
relief prayed for by defendant-appellant in his counterclaim.

We shall discuss seriatim these errors as thus condensed.

1. In the stipulation of facts submitted to the court below, the parties admit that the
owner of the estate, subject matter of the extrajudicial partition agreement, was
Pelagia de la Cruz, who died intestate on October 16, 1962; that defendant-appellant
is a nephew of the said decedent; that plaintiff-appellee is a grandniece of Pelagia de
la Cruz, her mother, Marciana de la Cruz, being a niece of the said Pelagia de la Cruz;
that plaintiff-appellee's mother died on September 22, 1935,
thus predeceasing Pelagia de la Cruz; and that the purpose of the extrajudicial
partition agreement was to divide and distribute the estate among the heirs of Pelagia
de la Cruz.

The pivotal question is whether, in the premises, plaintiff-appellee is a heir of the


decedent. We are convinced that she is not. Plaintiff-appellee being a mere grandniece
of Pelagia de la Cruz, she could not inherit from the latter by right of representation.

ART. 972. The right of representation takes place in the direct


descending line, but never in the ascending.

In the collateral line, it takes place only in favor of the children of


brothers or sisters, whether they be of the full or half blood.

Much less could plaintiff-appellee inherit in her own right.


ART. 962. In every inheritance, the relative nearest in degree excludes
the more distant ones, saving the right of representation when it
properly takes place. ... .

Applying these two (2) provisions, this Court, in Linart y Pavia vs. Ugarte y Iturralde,
5 Phil., 176 (1905), said,

... [I]n an intestate succession a grandniece of the deceased and not


participate with a niece in the inheritance, because the latter being a
nearer relative, the more distant grandniece is excluded. In the collateral
line the right of representation does not obtain beyond sons and
daughters of the brothers and sisters, which would have been the case if
Pablo Linart, the father of the plaintiff, had survived his deceased uncle.

In the present case, the relatives "nearest in degree" to Pelagia de la Cruz are her
nephews and nieces, one of whom is defendant-appellant. Necessarily, plaintiff-
appellee, a grandniece is excluded by law from the inheritance.

But what is the legal effect of plaintiff-appellee's inclusion and participation in the
extrajudicial partition agreement insofar as her right to bring the present action is
concerned? They did not confer upon her the right to institute this action. The express
purpose of the extrajudicial partition agreement, as admitted by the parties in the
stipulation of facts, was to divide the estate among the heirs of Pelagia de la Cruz.
Indeed, the said agreement itself states that plaintiff-appellee was participating
therein in representation of her deceased mother. The pertinent portion of the
agreement is herein quoted, thus:

NOW, THEREFORE, we ... and Diego de los Santos, married to


Anastasia de la Cruz; Mariano delos Santos married to Andrea
Ramoy; Gertrudes delos Santos, married to Pascual Acuna; Alejo delos
Santos, married to Leonila David; and Sotera delos Santos, married to
Narciso Ramota; all in representation of our mother, MARCIANA
DELA CRUZ, ..., do hereby by these presents, mutually, voluntarily and
amicably agree among ourselves to equitably divide the property left by
the deceased PELAGIA DELA CRUZ, and adjudicate unto ourselves
definite and independent portions of the estate in the following manner
... .

It is quite apparent that in executing the partition agreement, the parties thereto were
laboring under the erroneous belief that plaintiff-appellee was one of the legal heirs of
Pelagia de la Cruz. Plaintiff-appellee not being such a heir, the partition is void with
respect to her, pursuant to Article 1105 of the Civil Code, which reads:

ART. 1105. A partition which includes a person believed to be a heir, but


who is not, shall be void only with respect to such person.

Partition of property affected between a person entitled to inherit from the deceased
owner thereof and another person who thought he was an heir, when he was not really
and lawfully such, to the prejudice of the rights of the true heir designated by law to
succeed the deceased, is null and void (De Torres vs. De Torres, et al., 28 Phil. 49).
A fortiori, plaintiff-appellee could hardly derive from the agreement the right to have
its terms enforced.
2. The extrajudicial partition agreement being void with respect to
plaintiff-appellee, she may not be heard to assert estoppel against defendant-
appellant. Estoppel cannot be predicated on a void contract (17 Am. Jur. 605), or on
acts which are prohibited by law or are against public policy (Baltazar vs. Lingayen
Gulf Electric Power Co., et al., G.R. Nos. 16236-38, June 30, 1965 [14 SCRA 5221).
In Ramiro vs. Graño, et al., 54 Phil., 744 (1930), this Court held:

No estoppel arises where the representation or conduct the party sought


to be estopped is due to ignorance founded upon a mistake. And which
there is authority to the contrary, the weight of authority is that the acts
and declarations of a party based upon an innocent mistake as to his
legal rights will not estop him to assert the same, especially where every
fact known to the party sought to be estopped is equally well known to
the party setting up the estoppel. (21 C.J., 1125, 1126.)

And in Capili, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. L-18148, February 28, 1963
(7 SCRA 367), this Court said:

Finally, petitioners-appellants claim that appellees are estopped to raise


the question of ownership of the properties involved because the widow
herself, during her lifetime, not only did not object to the inclusion of
these properties in the inventory of the assets of her deceased husband,
but also signed an extra-judicial partition of those inventoried
properties. But the very authorities cited by appellants require that to
constitute estoppel, the actor must have knowledge of the facts and be
apprised of his rights at the time he performs the act constituting
estoppel, because silence without knowledge works no estoppel. ... .

3. The award of actual damages in favor of plaintiff-appellee cannot be sustained in


view of the conclusion we have arrived at above. Furthermore, actual or compensatory
damages must be duly proved (Article 2199, Civil Code). Here, no proof of such
damages was presented inasmuch as the case was decided on a stipulation of facts and
no evidence was adduced before the trial court.

We now come to defendant-appellant's counterclaim, in which he alleged that


plaintiff-appelee sold her share to a certain person for the price of P10,000.00, and
claims that he is entitled to one-fourth (1/4) of the proceeds by right of reversion. It
will be noted that plaintiff-appellee had been declared in default on defendant-
appellant's counterclaim; but the latter did not present any evidence to prove the
material allegation therein — more specifically, the alleged sale of the former's share
for the sum of P10,000.00. That no such evidence had been adduced is
understandable, for the parties expressly submitted the case for the resolution of the
court upon their stipulation of facts which, unfortunately, did not make any mention
of the alleged sale; and neither had defendant made any offer or move to introduce the
necessary evidence to that effect for the consideration and evaluation by the trial court.

Defendant-appellant contends, however, that in view of plaintiff-appellee's having


been declared in default, the latter must be deemed to have admitted all the allegations
in his counterclaim, so that the court a quo should have granted the relief prayed for
by him. We find no merit in this contention.

Section 1, Rule 18 of the Revised Rules of Court, reads:


SECTION 1. Judgment by default.—if the defendant fails to answer
within the time specified in these rules, the court shall, upon motion of
the plaintiff and proof of such failure, declare the defendant in default.
Thereupon the court shall proceed to receive the plaintiff's evidence and
render judgment granting him such relief as the complaint and the facts
proven may warrant. This provision applies where no answer is made to
a counterclaim, crossclaim or third-party complaint within the period
provided in this rule.

The abovequoted rule was taken from Sections 128 and 129 of the Code of Civil
Procedure. In Macondray & Co. vs. Eustaquio, 64 Phil., 446 (1937), this Court said:

Under section 128 of our Code of Civil Procedure, the judgment by


default against a defendant who has neither appeared nor filed his
answer does not imply a waiver of rights except that of being heard and
of presenting evidence in his favor. It does not imply admission by the
defendant of the facts and causes of action of the plaintiff, because the
codal section requires the latter to adduce his evidence in support of his
allegations as an indispensable condition before final judgment could be
given in his favor. Nor could it be interpreted as an admission by the
defendant that the plaintiff's causes of action find support in the law or
that the latter is entitled to the relief prayed for. ... .

Nevertheless, the basic fact appears in the stipulation submitted by the parties that
said plaintiff-appellee admitted having received a portion of the estate by virtue of the
extrajudicial partition agreement dated August 24, 1963, to wit:

(9). Lot 9, (LRC) Psd-29561, containing an area of 1,691 sq. m. as


described in the Technical Description to be adjudicated to Diego delos
Santos, married to Anastacia dela Cruz; Mariano delos Santos, married
to Regina Baluyot; Hilario delos Santos, married to Andrea
Ramoy; Gertrudes delos Santos, married to Pascual Acuna; Alejo delos
Santos, married to Leonila David; and Sotera delos Santos, married to
Narciso Ramota, in co-ownership, share and share alike.

Such being the case, defendant-appellant is apparently correct in his contention that
the lower court erred in not passing on his counterclaim and, consequently, in not
sentencing appellee to turn over to him his corresponding share of said portion
received by appellee under the void partition. Remote relatives or unrelated person
who unduly received and took possession of the property of a deceased person without
any right, by virtue of a null and void partition, must restore it to the legitimate
successor in the inheritance (De Torres vs. De Torres, et al., supra). Of course, if such
share has already been disposed of by appellee to a bona fide purchaser, as seems to
be indicated in the unproven allegations of the counterclaim, We cannot render
judgment awarding any specific amount to defendant-appellant as his proportionate
share of the proceeds of such sale for the reason that, as already stated above, this
aspect of the counterclaim has not been touched upon in the stipulation of facts nor
has it been supported by evidence which appellant should have presented in the lower
court but did not.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the judgment appealed from is
hereby reversed and set aside; the defendant-appellant is absolved from any ability to
and in favor of plaintiff-appellee; and, on appellant's counterclaim, appellee is hereby
sentenced to restore or reconvey to him his corresponding share of the property she
has received under the extrajudicial partition hereinbefore mentioned if the same has
not already been disposed of as alleged. Costs in both instance against plaintiff-
appellee.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar Castro, Fernando,


Teehankee, Barredo and Makasiar, JJ., concur.
Vicente B. Teotico vs. Ana del Val, etc.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-18753 March 26, 1965

VICENTE B. TEOTICO, petitioner-appellant,


vs.
ANA DEL VAL, ETC., oppositor-appellant.

Antonio Gonzales for petitioner-appellant.


J.C. Zulueta, G. D. David and N. J. Quisumbing for oppositor-appellant.

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:

Maria Mortera y Balsalobre Vda. de Aguirre died on July 14, 1955 in the City of Manila
leaving properties worth P600,000.00. She left a will written in Spanish which she
executed at her residence at No. 2 Legarda St., Quiapo, Manila. She affixed her
signature at the bottom of the will and on the left margin of each and every page thereof
in the presence of Pilar Borja, Pilar C. Sanchez, and Modesto Formilleza, who in turn
affixed their signatures below the attestation clause and on the left margin of each and
every page of the will in the presence of the testatrix and of each other. Said will was
acknowledged before Notary Public Niceforo S. Agaton by the testatrix and her
witnesses.

In said will the testatrix made the following preliminary statement: that she was
possessed of the full use of her mental faculties; that she was free from illegal pressure
or influence of any kind from the beneficiaries of the will and from any influence of
fear or threat; that she freely and spontaneously executed said will and that she had
neither ascendants nor descendants of any kind such that she could freely dispose of
all her estate.

Among the many legacies and devises made in the will was one of P20,000.00 to Rene
A. Teotico, married to the testatrix's niece named Josefina Mortera. To said spouses
the testatrix left the usufruct of her interest in the Calvo building, while the naked
ownership thereof she left in equal parts to her grandchildren who are the legitimate
children of said spouses. The testatrix also instituted Josefina Mortera as her sole and
universal heir to all the remainder of her properties not otherwise disposed of in the
will.

On July 17, 1955, Vicente B. Teotico filed a petition for the probate of the will before
the Court of First Instance of Manila which was set for hearing on September 3, 1955
after the requisite publication and service to all parties concerned.

Ana del Val Chan, claiming to be an adopted child of Francisca Mortera, a deceased
sister of the testatrix, as well as an acknowledged natural child of Jose Mortera, a
deceased brother of the same testatrix, filed on September 2, 1955 an opposition to the
probate of the will alleging the following grounds: (1) said will was not executed as
required by law; (2) the testatrix was physically and mentally incapable to execute the
will at the time of its execution; and (3) the will was executed under duress, threat or
influence of fear.

Vicente B. Teotico, filed a motion to dismiss the opposition alleging that the oppositor
had no legal personality to intervene. The probate court, after due hearing, allowed the
oppositor to intervene as an adopted child of Francisca Mortera, and on June 17, 1959,
the oppositor amended her opposition by alleging, the additional ground that the will
is inoperative as to the share of Dr. Rene Teotico because the latter was the physician
who took care of the testatrix during her last illness.

After the parties had presented their evidence, the probate court rendered its decision
on November 10, 1960, admitting the will to probate but declaring the disposition
made in favor of Dr. Rene Teotico void with the statement that the portion to be
vacated by the annulment should pass to the testatrix's heirs by way of intestate
succession.

Petitioner Teotico, together with the universal heir Josefina Mortera, filed a motion
for reconsideration of that part of the decision which declares the portion of the estate
to be vacated by the nullity of the legacy made to Dr. Rene Teotico as passing to the
legal heirs, while the oppositor filed also a motion for reconsideration of the portion
of the judgment which decrees the probate of the will. On his part, Dr. Rene Teotico
requested leave to intervene and to file a motion for reconsideration with regard to
that portion of the decision which nullified the legacy made in his favor.

The motions for reconsideration above adverted to having been denied, both petitioner
and oppositor appealed from the decision, the former from that portion which nullifies
the legacy in favor of Dr. Rene Teotico and declares the vacated portion as subject of
succession in favor of the legal heirs, and the latter from that portion which admits the
will to probate. And in this instance both petitioner and oppositor assign several errors
which, stripped of non-essentials, may be boiled down to the following: (1) Has
oppositor Ana del Val Chan the right to intervene in this proceeding?; (2) Has the will
in question been duly admitted to probate?; (3) Did the probate court commit an error
in passing on the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will and in determining who
should inherit the portion to be vacated by the nullification of the legacy made in favor
of Dr. Rene Teotico?

These issues will be discussed separately.

1. It is a well-settled rule that in order that a person may be allowed to intervene in a


probate proceeding he must have an interest in the estate, or in the will, or in the
property to be affected by it either as executor or as a claimant of the estate (Ngo The
Hua v. Chung Kiat Hua, et al., L-17091, September 30, 1963); and an interested party
has been defined as one who would be benefited by the estate such as an heir or one
who has a claim against the estate like a creditor (Idem). On the other hand,
in Saguinsin v. Lindayag, et al., L-17750, December 17, 1962, this Court said:

According to Section 2, Rule 80 of the Rules of Court, a petition for letters of


administration must be filed by an "interested person." An interested party has
been defined in this connection as one who would be benefited by the estate,
such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor
(Intestate Estate of Julio Magbanwa 40 O.G. 1171). And it is well settled in this
jurisdiction that in civil actions as well as special proceedings, the interest
required in order that a person may be a party thereto must be material and
direct, and not merely indirect or contingent (Trillana vs. Crisostomo, G.R. No.
L-3370, August 22, 1951; Rapinosa vs. Barrion, 70 Phil. 311).

The question now may be asked: Has oppositor any interest in any of the provisions of
the will, and, in the negative, would she acquire any right to the estate in the event that
the will is denied probate?

Under the terms of the will, oppositor has no right to intervene because she has no
interest in the estate either as heir, executor, or administrator, nor does she have any
claim to any property affected by the will, because it nowhere appears therein any
provision designating her as heir, legatee or devisee of any portion of the estate. She
has also no interest in the will either as administratrix or executrix. Neither has she
any claim against any portion of the estate because she is not a co-owner thereof, and
while she previously had an interest in the Calvo building located in Escolta, she had
already disposed of it long before the execution of the will.

In the supposition that, the will is denied probate, would the oppositor acquire any
interest in any portion of the estate left by the testatrix? She would acquire such right
only if she were a legal heir of the deceased, but she is not under our Civil Code. It is
true that oppositor claims to be an acknowledged natural child of Jose Mortera, a
deceased brother of the deceased, and also an adopted daughter of Francisca Mortera,
a deceased sister of the testatrix, but such claim cannot give her any comfort for, even
if it be true, the law does not give her any right to succeed to the estate of the deceased
sister of both Jose Mortera and Francisca Mortera. And this is so because being an
illegitimate child she is prohibited by law from succeeding to the legitimate relatives
of her natural father. Thus, Article 992 of our Civil Code provides: "An illegitimate
child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of
his father or mother; ... ." And the philosophy behind this provision is well expressed
in Grey v. Fabie, 68 Phil. 128, as follows:

Between the natural child and the legitimate relatives of the father or mother
who acknowledged it, the Code denies any right of succession. They cannot be
called relatives and they have no right to inherit. Of course, there is a blood tie,
but the law does not recognize it. On this, article 943 is based upon the reality
of the facts and upon the presumption will of the interested parties; the natural
child is disgracefully looked down upon by the legitimate family; the legitimate
family is, in turn, hated by the natural child; the latter considers the privileged
condition of the former and the resources of which it is thereby deprived; the
former, in turn, sees in the natural child nothing but the product of sin, a
palpable evidence of a blemish upon the family. Every relation is ordinarily
broken in life; the law does no more than recognize this truth, by avoiding
further grounds of resentment. (7 Manresa, 3d., p. 110.)

The oppositor cannot also derive comfort from the fact that she is an adopted child of
Francisca Mortera because under our law the relationship established by adoption is
limited solely to the adopter and the adopted and does not extend to the relatives of
the adopting parents or of the adopted child except only as expressly provided for by
law. Hence, no relationship is created between the adopted and the collaterals of the
adopting parents. As a consequence, the adopted is an heir of the adopter but not of
the relatives of the adopter.

The relationship established by the adoption, however, is limited to the


adopting parent, and does not extend to his other relatives, except as expressly
provided by law. Thus, the adopted child cannot be considered as a relative of
the ascendants and collaterals of the adopting parents, nor of the legitimate
children which they may have after the adoption, except that the law imposes
certain impediments to marriage by reason of adoption. Neither are the
children of the adopted considered as descendants of the adopter. The
relationship created is exclusively between the adopter and the adopted, and
does not extend to the relatives of either. (Tolentino, Civil Code of the
Philippines, Vol. 1, p. 652).

Relationship by adoption is limited to adopter and adopted, and does not


extend to other members of the family of either; but the adopted is prohibited
to marry the children of the adopter to avoid scandal. (An Outline of Philippine
Civil Law by Justice Jose B. L. Reyes and Ricardo C. Puno, Vol. 1, p. 313; See
also Caguioa, Comments and Cases on Civil Law 1955, Vol 1, pp. 312-313; Paras,
Civil Code of the Philippines, 1959 ed., Vol. 1, p. 515)

It thus appears that the oppositor has no right to intervene either as testamentary or
as legal heir in this probate proceeding contrary to the ruling of the court a quo.

2. The next question to be determined is whether the will Exhibit A was duly admitted
to probate. Oppositor claims that the same should not have been admitted not only
because it was not properly attested to but also because it was procured thru pressure
and influence and the testatrix affixed her signature by mistake believing that it
contained her true intent.

The claim that the will was not properly attested to is contradicted by the evidence of
record. In this respect it is fit that we state briefly the declarations of the instrumental
witnesses.

Pilar Borja testified that the testatrix was in perfect state of health at the time she
executed the will for she carried her conversation with her intelligently; that the
testatrix signed immediately above the attestation clause and on each and every page
thereof at the left-hand margin in the presence of the three instrumental witnesses and
the notary public; that it was the testatrix herself who asked her and the other
witnesses to act as such; and that the testatrix was the first one to sign and later she
gave the will to the witnesses who read and signed it.

Pilar G. Sanchez also testified that she knew the testatrix since 1945; that it was the
testatrix herself who asked her to be a witness to the will; that the testatrix was the
first one to sign and she gave the will later to the witnesses to sign and afterwards she
gave it to the notary public; that on the day of the execution of the will the testatrix was
in the best of health.

Modesto Formilleza also testified that he was asked by the testatrix to be one of the
witnesses to the will; that he read and understood the attestation clause before he
signed the document, and all the witnesses spoke either in Spanish or in Tagalog. He
finally said that the instrumental witnesses and the testatrix signed the will at the same
time and place and identified their signatures.

This evidence which has not been successfully refuted proves conclusively that the will
was duly executed because it was signed by the testatrix and her instrumental
witnesses and the notary public in the manner provided for by law.

The claim that the will was procured by improper pressure and influence is also belied
by the evidence. On this point the court a quo made the following observation:

The circumstance that the testatrix was then living under the same roof with
Dr. Rene Teotico is no proof adequate in law to sustain the conclusion that there
was improper pressure and undue influence. Nor is the alleged fact of isolation
of the testatrix from the oppositor and her witnesses, for their supposed failure
to see personally the testatrix, attributable to the vehemence of Dr. Rene
Teotico, to exclude visitors, took place years after the execution of the will on
May 17, 1951. Although those fact may have some weight to support the theory
of the oppositor, yet they must perforce yield to the weightier fact that nothing
could have prevented the testatrix, had she really wanted to from subsequently
revoking her 1951 will if it did not in fact reflect and express her own
testamentary dispositions. For, as testified to by the oppositor and her
witnesses, the testatrix was often seen at the Escolta, in Quiapo and Sta. Cruz,
Manila, walking and accompanied by no one. In fact, on different occasions,
each of them was able to talk with her.

We have examined the evidence on the matter and we are fully in accord with the
foregoing observation. Moreover, the mere claim that Josefina Mortera and her
husband Rene Teotico had the opportunity to exert pressure on the testatrix simply
because she lived in their house several years prior to the execution of the will and that
she was old and suffering from hypertension in that she was virtually isolated from her
friends for several years prior to her death is insufficient to disprove what the
instrumental witnesses had testified that the testatrix freely and voluntarily and with
full consciousness of the solemnity of the occasion executed the will under
consideration. The exercise of improper pressure and undue influence must be
supported by substantial evidence and must be of a kind that would overpower and
subjugate the mind of the testatrix as to destroy her free agency and make her express
the will of another rather than her own (Coso v. Deza, 42 0. G. 596). The burden is on
the person challenging the will that such influence was exerted at the time of its
execution, a matter which here was not done, for the evidence presented not only is
insufficient but was disproved by the testimony of the instrumental witnesses.

3. The question of whether the probate court could determine the intrinsic validity of
the provisions of a will has been decided by this Court in a long line of decisions among
which the following may be cited:

Opposition to the intrinsic validity or legality of the provisions of the will cannot
be entertained in Probate proceeding because its only purpose is merely to
determine if the will has been executed in accordance with the requirements of
the law." (Palacios v. Palacios, 58 0. G. 220)

... The authentication of a will decides no other questions than such as touch
upon the capacity of the testator and the compliance with those requisites or
solemnities which the law prescribes for the validity of wills. It does not
determine nor even by implication prejudge the validity or efficiency of the
provisions, these may be impugned as being vicious or null, notwithstanding its
authentication. The questions relating to these points remain entirely
unaffected, and may be raised even after the will has been authenticated. ...

From the fact that the legalization of a will does not validate the provisions
therein contained, it does not follow that such provision lack the efficiency, or
fail to produce the effects which the law recognizes when they are not impugned
by anyone. In the matter of wills it is a fundamental doctrine that the will of the
testator is the law governing the interested parties, and must be punctually
complied with in so far as it is not contrary to the law or to public morals.
(Montañano v. Suesa, 14 Phil. 676, 679-680)

To establish conclusively as against everyone, and once for all, the facts that a
will was executed with the formalities required by law and that the testator was
in a condition to make a will, is the only purpose of the proceedings under the
new code for the probate of a will. (Sec. 625.) The judgment in such proceedings
determines and can determine nothing more. In them the court has no power
to pass upon the validity of any provisions made in the will. It can not decide,
for example, that a certain legacy is void and another one is valid. (Castañeda v.
Alemany, 3 Phil. 426, 428)

Pursuant to the foregoing precedents the pronouncement made by the court a


quo declaring invalid the legacy made to Dr. Rene Teotico in the will Exhibit A must
be set aside as having been made in excess of its jurisdiction. Another reason why said
pronouncement should be set aside is that the legatee was not given an opportunity to
defend the validity of the legacy for he was not allowed to intervene in this proceeding.
As a corollary, the other pronouncements touching on the disposition of the estate in
favor of some relatives of the deceased should also be set aside for the same reason.

WHEREFORE, with the exception of that portion of the decision which declares that
the will in question has been duly executed and admitted the same to probate, the rest
of the decision is hereby set aside. This case is ordered remanded to the court a quo for
further proceedings. No pronouncement as to costs.

Bengzon, C.J., Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Regala, Makalintal,


Bengzon, J.P., and Zaldivar, JJ., concur.
Dizon, J., took no part.
Anselma Diaz vs. Intermediate Appellate
Court
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-66574 February 21, 1990

ANSELMA DIAZ, guardian of VICTOR, RODRIGO, ANSELMINA and


MIGUEL, all surnamed SANTERO, and FELIXBERTA PACURSA, guardian
of FEDERICO SANTERO, et al., petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and FELISA PAMUTI
JARDIN,respondents.

Ambrosio Padilla, Mempin & Reyes Law Offices for petitioners.

Pedro S. Sarino for respondent Felisa Pamuti Jardin.

RESOLUTION

PARAS, J.:

The decision of the Second Division of this Court in the case of Anselma Diaz, et al. vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., G.R. No. 6574, promulgated June 17, 1987
declaring Felisa Pamuti-Jardin to be the sole legitimate heir to the intestate estate of
the late Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, and its Resolution of February 24, 1988
denying the Motion for Reconsideration dated July 2, 1987, are being challenged in
this Second Motion for Reconsideration dated July 5, 1988. After the parties had filed
their respective pleadings, the Court, in a resolution dated October 27, 1988, resolved
to grant the request of the petitioners for oral argument before the court en banc, and
the case was set for hearing on November 17, 1988 to resolve the question: Does the
term "relatives" in Article 992 of the New Civil Code which reads:

An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the


legitimate children or relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such
children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate
child.

include the legitimate parents of the father or mother of the illegitimate children?
Invited to discuss as amici curiae during the hearing were the following: Justice Jose
B.L. Reyes, former Justice Minister Ricardo C. Puno, Dr. Arturo Tolentino, former
Justice Eduardo Caguioa, and Professor Ruben Balane.
The facts of the case, as synthesized in the assailed decision, are as follows:

It is undisputed: 1) that Felisa Pamuti Jardin is a niece of Simona Pamuti


Vda. de Santero who together with Felisa's mother Juliana were the only
legitimate children of the spouses Felipe Pamuti and Petronila Asuncion;
2) that Juliana married Simon Jardin and out of their union were born
Felisa Pamuti and another child who died during infancy; 3) that Simona
Pamuti Vda. de Santero is the widow of Pascual Santero and the mother
of Pablo Santero; 4) that Pablo Santero was the only legitimate son of his
parents Pascual Santero and Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero; 5) that
Pascual Santero died in 1970; Pablo Santero in 1973 and Simona Santero
in 1976; 6) that Pablo Santero, at the time of his death was survived by
his mother Simona Santero and his six minor natural children to wit:
four minor children with Anselma Diaz and two minor children with
Felixberta Pacursa.
(pp. 1-2, Decision; pp. 190-191, Rollo)

Briefly stated, the real issue in the instant case is this — who are the legal heirs of
Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero — her niece Felisa Pamuti-Jardin or her
grandchildren (the natural children of Pablo Santero)?

The present controversy is confined solely to the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti
Vda. de Santero. In connection therewith, We are tasked with determining anew
whether petitioners as illegitimate children of Pablo Santero could inherit from
Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, by right of representation of their father Pablo
Santero who is a legitimate child of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.

Petitioners claim that the amendment of Articles 941 and 943 of the old Civil Code
(Civil Code of Spain) by Articles 990 and 992 of the new Civil Code (Civil Code of the
Philippines) constitute a substantial and not merely a formal change, which grants
illegitimate children certain successional rights. We do not dispute the fact that the
New Civil Code has given illegitimate children successional rights, which rights were
never before enjoyed by them under the Old Civil Code. They were during that time
merely entitled to support. In fact, they are now considered as compulsory primary
heirs under Article 887 of the new Civil Code (No. 5 in the order of intestate
succession). Again, We do not deny that fact. These are only some of the many rights
granted by the new Code to illegitimate children. But that is all. A careful evaluation of
the New Civil Code provisions, especially Articles 902, 982, 989, and 990, claimed by
petitioners to have conferred illegitimate children the right to represent their parents
in the inheritance of their legitimate grandparents, would in point of fact reveal that
such right to this time does not exist.

Let Us take a closer look at the above-cited provisions.

Art.902. The rights of illegitimate children set forth in the preceding


articles are transmitted upon their death to their descendants, whether
legitimate or illegitimate.

Art. 982. The grandchildren and other descendants shall inherit by right
of representation and if any one of them should have died, leaving
several heirs, the portion pertaining to him shall be divided among the
latter in equal portions. (933)
Art. 989. If, together with illegitimate children, there should survive
descendants of another illegitimate child who is dead, the former shall
succeed in their own right and the latter by right of representation.
(940a)

Art. 990. The hereditary rights granted by the two preceding articles
to illegitimate children shall be transmitted upon their death to their
descendants, who shall inherit by right of representation from their
deceased grandparent. (941a) Emphasis supplied).

Articles 902, 989, and 990 clearly speak of successional rights of illegitimate children,
which rights are transmitted to their descendants upon their death. The descendants
(of these illegitimate children) who may inherit by virtue of the right of representation
may be legitimate or illegitimate. In whatever manner, one should not overlook the
fact that the persons to be represented are themselves illegitimate. The three named
provisions are very clear on this matter. The right of representation is not available to
illegitimate descendants of legitimatechildren in the inheritance of a legitimate
grandparent. It may be argued, as done by petitioners, that the illegitimate descendant
of a legitimate child is entitled to represent by virtue of the provisions of Article 982,
which provides that "the grandchildren and other descendants shall inherit by right of
representation." Such a conclusion is erroneous. It would allow intestate succession by
an illegitimate child to the legitimate parent of his father or mother, a situation which
would set at naught the provisions of Article 992. Article 982 is inapplicable to instant
case because Article 992 prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestato between the
illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother. It
may not be amiss to state that Article 982 is the general rule and Article 992 the
exception.

"The rules laid down in Article 982 that 'grandchildren and other descendants shall
inherit by right of representation and in Article 902 that the rights of illegitimate
children ... are transmitted upon their death to their descendants, whether legitimate
or illegitimate are subject to the limitation prescribed by Article 992 to the end that an
illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and
relatives of his father or mother."' (Amicus Curiae's Opinion by former Justice
Minister Ricardo C. Puno, p. 12)

"Article 992 of the New Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits
absolutely a succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child and the legitimate
children and relatives of the father or mother of said illegitimate child. They may have
a natural tie of blood, but this is not recognized by law for the purpose of Article 992.
Between the legitimate family and the illegitimate family there is presumed to be an
intervening antagonism and incompatibility. The illegitimate child is disgracefully
looked down upon by the legitimate family; and the family is in turn, hated by the
illegitimate child; the latter considers the privileged condition of the former, and the
resources of which it is thereby deprived; the former, in turn, sees in the illegitimate
child nothing but the product of sin, palpable evidence of a blemish broken in life; the
law does no more than recognize this truth, by avoiding further ground of resentment."
(7 Manresa 110 cited in Grey v. Fable 40 OG (First S) No. 3, p. 196).

According to petitioners, the commentaries of Manresa as above- quoted are based on


Articles 939 to 944 of the old Civil Code and are therefore inapplicable to the New Civil
Code and to the case at bar. Petitioners further argue that the consistent doctrine
adopted by this Court in the cases of Llorente vs. Rodriguez, et al., 10 Phil.,
585; Centeno vs. Centeno, 52 Phil. 322, and Oyao vs. Oyao, 94 Phil. 204, cited by
former Justice Minister Justice Puno, Justice Caguioa, and Prof. Balane, which
identically held that an illegitimate child has no right to succeed ab intestato the
legitimate father or mother of his natural parent (also a legitimate child himself is
already abrogated by the amendments made by the Now Civil Code and thus cannot
be made to apply to the instant case.

Once more, We decline to agree with petitioner. We are fully aware of certain
substantial changes in our law of succcession, but there is no change whatsoever with
respect to the provision of Article 992 of the Civil Code. Otherwise, by the said
substantial change, Article 992, which was a reproduction •f Article 943 of the Civil
Code of Spain, should have been suppressed or at least modified to clarify the matters
which are now the subject of the present controversy. While the New Civil Code may
have granted successional rights to illegitimate children, those articles, however, in
conjunction with Article 992, prohibit the right of representation from being exercised
where the person to be represented is a legitimate child. Needless to say, the
determining factor is the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the person to be represented. If
the person to be represented is an illegitimate child, then his descendants, whether
legitimate or illegitimate, may represent him; however, if the person to be represented
is legitimate, his illegitimate descendants cannot represent him because the law
provides that only his legitimate descendants may exercise the right of representation
by reason of the barrier imposed Article 992. In this wise, the commentaries of
Manresa on the matter in issue, even though based on the old Civil Code, are still very
much applicable to the New Civil Code because the amendment, although substantial,
did not consist of giving illegitimate children the right to represent their natural
parents (legitimate) in the intestate succession of their grandparents (legitimate). It is
with the same line of reasoning that the three aforecited cases may be said to be still
applicable to the instant case.

Equally important are the reflections of the Illustrious Hon. Justice Jose B.L. Reyes
which also find support from other civilists. We quote:

In the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 the right of representation was


admitted only within the legitimate family; so much so that Article 943
of that Code prescribed that an illegitimate child can not inherit ab
intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father and
mother. The Civil Code of the Philippines apparently adhered to this
principle since it reproduced Article 943 of the Spanish Code in its own
Art. 992, but with fine inconsistency, in subsequent articles (990, 995
and 998) our Code allows the hereditary portion of the illegitimate child
to pass to his own descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate. So
that while Art. 992 prevents the illegitimate issue of a legitimate child
from representing him in the intestate succession of the grandparent, the
illegitimates of an illegitimate child can now do so. This difference being
indefensible and unwarranted, in the future revision of the Civil Code we
shall have to make a choice and decide either that the illegitimate issue
enjoys in all cases the right of representation, in which case Art. 992
must be suppressed; or contrariwise maintain said article and modify
Articles 992 and 998. The first solution would be more in accord with an
enlightened attitude vis-a-vis illegitimate children. (Reflections on the
Reform of hereditary Succession, JOURNAL of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, First Quartet 1976, Volume 4, Number 1, pp. 40-41). (p. 7,
Decision; p. 196, Rollo)

It is therefore clear from Article 992 of the New Civil Code that the phrase "legitimate
children and relatives of his father or mother" includes Simona Pamuti Vda. de
Santero as the word "relative" is broad enough to comprehend all the kindred of the
person spoken of. (Comment, p. 139 Rollo citing p. 2862 Bouvier's Law Dictionary vol.
11, Third Revision, Eight Edition) The record reveals that from the commencement of
this case the only parties who claimed to be the legitimate heirs of the late Simona
Pamuti Vda. de Santero are Felisa Pamuti Jardin and the six minor natural or
illegitimate children of Pablo Santero. Since petitioners herein are barred by the
provisions of Article 992, the respondent Intermediate Appellate Court did not commit
any error in holding Felisa Pamuti Jardin to be the sole legitimate heir to the intestate
estate of the late Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.

It is Our shared view that the word "relatives" should be construed in its general
acceptation. Amicus curiae Prof. Ruben Balane has this to say:

The term relatives, although used many times in the Code, is not defined
by it. In accordance therefore with the canons of statutory interpretation,
it should be understood to have a general and inclusive scope, inasmuch
as the term is a general one. Generalia verba sunt generaliter
intelligenda. That the law does not make a distinction prevents us from
making one: Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguera
debemus. Esrinche, in his Diccionario de Legislacion y
Jurisprudencia defines parientes as "los que estan relacionados por los
vinculos de la sangre, ya sea por proceder unos de otros, como los
descendientes y ascendientes,ya sea por proceder de una misma raiz o
tronco, como los colaterales. (cited in Scaevola, op. cit., p. 457). (p. 377,
Rollo)

According to Prof. Balane, to interpret the term relatives in Article 992 in a more
restrictive sense than it is used and intended is not warranted by any rule of
interpretation. Besides, he further states that when the law intends to use the term in
a more restrictive sense, it qualifies the term with the word collateral, as in Articles
1003 and 1009 of the New Civil Code.

Thus, the word "relatives" is a general term and when used in a statute it embraces not
only collateral relatives but also all the kindred of the person spoken of, unless the
context indicates that it was used in a more restrictive or limited sense — which as
already discussed earlier, is not so in the case at bar.

To recapitulate, We quote this:

The lines of this distinction between legitimates and illegitimates. which


goes back very far in legal history, have been softened but not erased by
present law. Our legislation has not gone so far as to place legitimate and
illegitimate children on exactly the same footing. Even the Family Code
of 1987 (EO 209) has not abolished the gradation between legitimate and
illegitimate children (although it has done away with the sub-
classification of illegitimates into natural and 'spurious'). It would thus
be correct to say that illegitimate children have only those rights which
are expressly or clearly granted to them by law (vide Tolentino, Civil
Code of the Philippines, 1973 ed., vol. III, p. 291). (Amicus Curiae's
Opinion by Prof. Ruben Balane, p. 12).

In the light of the foregoing, We conclude that until Article 992 is suppressed or at
least amended to clarify the term "relatives" there is no other alternative but to apply
the law literally. Thus, We hereby reiterate the decision of June 17, 1987 and declare
Felisa Pamuti-Jardin to be the sole heir to the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda.
de Santero, to the exclusion of petitioners.

WHEREFORE, the second Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED, and the assailed
decision is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Feliciano, Gancayco, Cortes, Griño-


Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, JJ., took no part.

Separate Opinions

GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:

The ponente, Mr. Justice Edgardo L. Paras, is a noted teacher of Civil Law subjects and
a well-known author of many Commentaries on the Civil Code. The amicus curiae —
former Justice Jose B.L. Reyes, former Justice Ricardo C. Puno, former Senator Arturo
Tolentino, former Justice Eduardo Caguioa, and Professor Ruben Balane — together
with the ponente read like a veritable Who's Who in Civil Law in the Philippines.

It is, therefore, with trepidation that I venture to cast a discordant vote on the issue
before the Court. But it is perhaps because I am not as deeply steeped in the civil law
tradition and in the usually tidy and methodical neatness characterizing its ancient
precepts that I discern a change effected by our own version of the Civil Code. The
orthodox rules which earlier inflexibly separated the legitimate from the illegitimate
families have been relaxed a little. The oppobrium cast on illegitimate children and the
disadvantages they suffer in law are no longer as overwhelming as before. The wall is
no longer as rigid as it used to be. The efforts of the Code Commission and the Congress
to make our civil law conform "With the customs, traditions, and idiosyncrasies of the
Filipino people and with modern trends in legislation and the progressive principles
of law" have resulted in deviations from the strict and narrow path followed by
Manresa and other early glossators. I, therefore, do not feel bound to follow the ancient
interpretations in the presence of absurd and unjust results brought about by
amendments in the new Civil Code.
We have here a case of grandchildren who cannot inherit from their direct ascendant,
their own grandmother, simply because their father (who was a legitimate son) failed
to marry their mother. There are no other direct heirs. Hence, the properties of their
grandmother goes to a collateral relative — her niece. If the niece is no longer alive, an
even more distant group of grandnieces and grandnephews will inherit as against the
grandmother's own direct flesh and blood.

As pointed out by the petitioners, the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court
disregards the order of intestate succession in Arts. 978 to 1014 of the Civil Code and
the right of representation in Art. 970 of descendants, whether legitimate or
illegitimate as provided by Arts. 902, 993, and 995.

I agree that a clear and precise amendment is needed if collateral relatives such as
illegitimate children and legitimate uncles, aunts, or cousins or illegitimate siblings
and their legitimate half-brothers or half-sisters are to inherit from one another. But I
must stress that the barrier is between the legitimate and illegitimate families. I see no
reason why we should include a grandmother or grandfather among those where a
firm wall of separation should be maintained. She cannot be a separate "family" from
her own grandchildren.

The ancient wall was breached by our Code Commission and Congress in Art. 902 of
the Code which provides:

The rights of illegitimate children set forth in the preceding articles are
transmitted upon their death to their descendants, whether legitimate or
illegitimate. (843a)

The illegitimate children of an illegitimate child have the right to represent him in the
circumstances given in preceding articles. Before the Code was amended, that right
was reserved to the illegitimate child's legitimate off-spring.

I find it absurd why the petitioners could have represented their father Pablo if their
grandparents Simona and Pascual had not been legally married. Senator Tolentino,
while supporting the majority view of this Court states:

xxx xxx xxx

In the present article, the Code Commission took a step forward by


giving an illegitimate child the right of representation, which he did not
have under the old Code. But in retaining without change provisions of
the old Code in Article 992, it created an absurdity and committed an
injustice, because while the illegitimate descendant of an illegitimate
child can represent, the illegitimate descendant of a legitimate child
cannot. The principle that the illegitimate child should succeed by
operation of law only to persons with the same status of illegitimacy has
thus been preserved. And this is unfair to the illegitimate descendants of
legitimate children.Dura lex, sed lex. (Tolentino, Commentaries and
Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. III, 1987 ed., p.
330.)

The adoption of a harsh and absurd interpretation, pending an amendment of the law,
does not impress me as correct. Precisely, the word "relatives" in Art. 992 calls for
reinterpretation because the Code has been amended. The meaning of relatives must
follow the changes in various provisions upon which the word's effectivity is
dependent.

My dissent from the majority opinion is also premised on a firm belief that law is based
on considerations of justice. The law should be interpreted to accord with what
appears right and just. Unless the opposite is proved, I will always presume that a
grandmother loves her grandchildren — legitimate or illegitimate — more than the
second cousins of said grandchildren or the parents of said cousins. The grandmother
may be angry at the indiscretions of her son but why should the law include the
innocent grandchildren as objects of that anger. "Relatives" can only refer to collateral
relatives, to members of a separate group of kins but not to one's own grandparents.

I, therefore, vote to grant the motion for reconsideration.

Separate Opinions

GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:

The ponente, Mr. Justice Edgardo L. Paras, is a noted teacher of Civil Law subjects and
a well-known author of many Commentaries on the Civil Code. The amicus curiae —
former Justice Jose B.L. Reyes, former Justice Ricardo C. Puno, former Senator Arturo
Tolentino, former Justice Eduardo Caguioa, and Professor Ruben Balane — together
with the ponente read like a veritable Who's Who in Civil Law in the Philippines.

It is, therefore, with trepidation that I venture to cast a discordant vote on the issue
before the Court. But it is perhaps because I am not as deeply steeped in the civil law
tradition and in the usually tidy and methodical neatness characterizing its ancient
precepts that I discern a change effected by our own version of the Civil Code. The
orthodox rules which earlier inflexibly separated the legitimate from the illegitimate
families have been relaxed a little. The oppobrium cast on illegitimate children and the
disadvantages they suffer in law are no longer as overwhelming as before. The wall is
no longer as rigid as it used to be. The efforts of the Code Commission and the Congress
to make our civil law conform "With the customs, traditions, and idiosyncrasies of the
Filipino people and with modern trends in legislation and the progressive principles
of law" have resulted in deviations from the strict and narrow path followed by
Manresa and other early glossators. I, therefore, do not feel bound to follow the ancient
interpretations in the presence of absurd and unjust results brought about by
amendments in the new Civil Code.

We have here a case of grandchildren who cannot inherit from their direct ascendant,
their own grandmother, simply because their father (who was a legitimate son) failed
to marry their mother. There are no other direct heirs. Hence, the properties of their
grandmother goes to a collateral relative — her niece. If the niece is no longer alive, an
even more distant group of grandnieces and grandnephews will inherit as against the
grandmother's own direct flesh and blood.

As pointed out by the petitioners, the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court
disregards the order of intestate succession in Arts. 978 to 1014 of the Civil Code and
the right of representation in Art. 970 of descendants, whether legitimate or
illegitimate as provided by Arts. 902, 993, and 995.

I agree that a clear and precise amendment is needed if collateral relatives such as
illegitimate children and legitimate uncles, aunts, or cousins or illegitimate siblings
and their legitimate half-brothers or half-sisters are to inherit from one another. But I
must stress that the barrier is between the legitimate and illegitimate families. I see no
reason why we should include a grandmother or grandfather among those where a
firm wall of separation should be maintained. She cannot be a separate "family" from
her own grandchildren.

The ancient wall was breached by our Code Commission and Congress in Art. 902 of
the Code which provides:

The rights of illegitimate children set forth in the preceding articles are
transmitted upon their death to their descendants, whether legitimate or
illegitimate. (843a)

The illegitimate children of an illegitimate child have the right to represent him in the
circumstances given in preceding articles. Before the Code was amended, that right
was reserved to the illegitimate child's legitimate off-spring.

I find it absurd why the petitioners could have represented their father Pablo if their
grandparents Simona and Pascual had not been legally married. Senator Tolentino,
while supporting the majority view of this Court states:

xxx xxx xxx

In the present article, the Code Commission took a step forward by


giving an illegitimate child the right of representation, which he did not
have under the old Code. But in retaining without change provisions of
the old Code in Article 992, it created an absurdity and committed an
injustice, because while the illegitimate descendant of an illegitimate
child can represent, the illegitimate descendant of a legitimate child
cannot. The principle that the illegitimate child should succeed by
operation of law only to persons with the same status of illegitimacy has
thus been preserved. And this is unfair to the illegitimate descendants of
legitimate children.Dura lex, sed lex. (Tolentino, Commentaries and
Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. III, 1987 ed., p.
330.)

The adoption of a harsh and absurd interpretation, pending an amendment of the law,
does not impress me as correct. Precisely, the word "relatives" in Art. 992 calls for
reinterpretation because the Code has been amended. The meaning of relatives must
follow the changes in various provisions upon which the word's effectivity is
dependent.

My dissent from the majority opinion is also premised on a firm belief that law is based
on considerations of justice. The law should be interpreted to accord with what
appears right and just. Unless the opposite is proved, I will always presume that a
grandmother loves her grandchildren — legitimate or illegitimate — more than the
second cousins of said grandchildren or the parents of said cousins. The grandmother
may be angry at the indiscretions of her son but why should the law include the
innocent grandchildren as objects of that anger. "Relatives" can only refer to collateral
relatives, to members of a separate group of kins but not to one's own grandparents.

I, therefore, vote to grant the motion for reconsideration.


Filomena Abellana de Bacayo vs.
Gaudencia Ferraris de Borromeo, et al.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-19382 August 31, 1965

IN RE SUMMARY SETTLEMENT OF THE ESTATE OF MELODIA


FERRARIS.

FILOMENA ABELLANA DE BACAYO, petitioner-appellant,


vs.
GAUDENCIA FERRARIS DE BORROMEO, CATALINA FERARIS DE
VILLEGAS,
JUANITO FERRARIS and CONCHITA FERRARIS, oppositors-appellees.

Mateo C. Bacalso and C. Kintanar for petitioner-appellant.


Gaudioso Sosmeña and C. Tomakin for oppositors-appellees.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

This is a pauper's appeal, directly brought to this Court on points of law, from a
resolution, dated September 20, 1961, excluding petitioner-appellant herein, Filomena
Abellana de Bacayo, as heir in the summary settlement of the estate of Melodia
Ferraris, Special Proceeding No. 2177-R of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Third
Branch, as well as from the order, dated October 16, 1961, denying a motion to
reconsider said resolution.

The facts of this case are not disputed by the parties.

Melodia Ferraris was a resident of Cebu City until 1937 when she transferred to
Intramuros, Manila. She was known to have resided there continuously until 1944.
Thereafter, up to the filing on December 22, 1960 of the petition for the summary
settlement of her estate, she has not been heard of and her whereabouts are still
unknown. More than ten (10) years having elapsed since the last time she was known
to be alive, she was declared presumptively dead for purposes of opening her
succession and distributing her estate among her heirs.

Melodia Ferraris left properties in Cebu City, consisting of one-third (1/3) share in the
estate of her aunt, Rosa Ferraris, valued at P6,000.00, more or less, and which was
adjudicated to her in Special Proceeding No. 13-V of the same court.

The deceased Melodia Ferraris left no surviving direct descendant, ascendant, or


spouse, but was survived only by collateral relatives, namely, Filomena Abellana de
Bacayo, an aunt and half-sister of decedent's father, Anacleto Ferraris; and by
Gaudencia, Catalina, Conchita, and Juanito, all surnamed Ferraris, her nieces and
nephew, who were the children of Melodia's only brother of full blood, Arturo Ferraris,
who pre-deceased her (the decedent). These two classes of heirs claim to be the nearest
intestate heirs and seek to participate in the estate of said Melodia Ferraris.

The following diagram will help illustrate the degree of relationship of the contending
parties to said Melodia Ferraris:

Note: Picture

The sole issue to be resolved in this case is: Who should inherit the intestate estate of
a deceased person when he or she is survived only by collateral relatives, to wit an aunt
and the children of a brother who predeceased him or her? Otherwise, will the aunt
concur with the children of the decedent's brother in the inheritance or will the former
be excluded by the latter?

The trial court ruled that the oppositors-appellees, as children of the only predeceased
brother of the decedent, exclude the aunt (petitioner-appellant) of the same decedent
reasoning out that the former are nearer in degree (two degrees) than the latter since
nieces and nephews succeed by right of representation, while petitioner-appellant is
three degrees distant from the decedent, and that other collateral relatives are
excluded by brothers or sisters or children of brothers or sisters of the decedent in
accordance with article 1009 of the New Civil Code.

Against the above ruling, petitioner-appellant contends in the present appeal that she
is of the same or equal degree of relationship as the oppositors appellees, three degrees
removed from the decedent; and that under article 975 of the New Civil Code no right
of representation could take place when the nieces and nephew of the decedent do not
concur with an uncle or aunt, as in the case at bar, but rather the former succeed in
their own right.

We agree with appellants that as an aunt of the deceased she is as far distant as the
nephews from the decedent (three degrees) since in the collateral line to which both
kinds of relatives belong degrees are counted by first ascending to the common
ancestor and then descending to the heir (Civil Code, Art. 966). Appellant is likewise
right in her contention that nephews and nieces alone do not inherit by right of
representation (i.e., per stripes) unless concurring with brothers or sisters of the
deceased, as provided expressly by Article 975:

ART. 975. When children of one or more brothers or sisters of the deceased
survive, they shall inherit from the latter by representation, if they survive with
their uncles or aunts. But if they alone survive, they shall inherit in equal
portions.

Nevertheless, the trial court was correct when it held that, in case of intestacy, nephews
and nieces of the de cujus exclude all other collaterals (aunts and uncles, first cousins,
etc.) from the succession. This is readily apparent from articles 1001, 1004, 1005, and
1009 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, that provided as follows:

ART. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow
or widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the
brothers and sisters or their children to the other half.
ART. 1004. Should the only survivors be brothers and sisters of the full blood,
they shall inherit in equal shares.

ART. 1005. Should brothers and sisters survive together with nephews and
nieces, who are the children of the decedent's brothers and sisters of the full
blood, the former shall inherit per capita, and the latter per stripes.

ART. 1009. Should there be neither brothers nor sister nor children of brothers
or sisters, the other collateral relatives shall succeed to the estate.

The latter shall succeed without distinction of lines or preference among them
by reason of relationship by the whole blood.

Under the last article (1009), the absence of brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces of
the decedent is a precondition to the other collaterals (uncles, cousins, etc.) being
called to the succession. This was also and more clearly the case under the Spanish
Civil Code of 1889, that immediately preceded the Civil Code now in force (R.A. 386).
Thus, Articles 952 and 954 of the Code of 1889 prescribed as follows:

ART. 952. In the absence of brother, or sisters and of nephews or nieces,


children of the former, whether of the whole blood or not, the surviving spouse,
if not separated by a final decree of divorce, shall succeed to the entire estate of
the deceased.

ART. 954. Should there be neither brothers or sisters, nor children of brothers
or sisters, nor a surviving spouse, the other collateral relatives shall succeed to
the estate of deceased.

The latter shall succeed without distinction of lines or preference among them
by reason of the whole blood.

It will be seen that under the preceding articles, brothers and sisters and nephews and
nieces inherited ab intestato ahead of the surviving spouse, while other collaterals
succeeded only after the widower or widow. The present Civil Code of the Philippines
merely placed the spouse on a par with the nephews and nieces and brothers and
sisters of the deceased, but without altering the preferred position of the latter vis-a-
vis the other collaterals.

Appellants quote paragraph 2 of Tolentino's commentaries to Article 1009 of the


present Civil Code as declaring that Article 1009 does not establish a rule of preference.
Which is true as to "other collaterals," since preference among them is according to
their proximity to the decedent, as established by Article 962, paragraph 1.

ART. 962. In every inheritance, the relative nearest in degree excludes the more
distant ones, saving the right of representation when it properly takes place.

But Tolentino does not state that nephews and nieces concur with other collaterals of
equal degree. On the contrary, in the first paragraph of his commentaries to Article
1009 (Vol II, p. 439) (which counsel for appellants had unethically omitted to quote),
Tolentino expressly states:
Other collaterals. — The last of the relatives of the decedent to succeed in
intestate succession are the collaterals other than brothers or sisters or
children of brothers or sisters. They are, however, limited to relatives within
the fifth degree. Beyond this, we can safely say there is hardly any affection to
merit the succession of collaterals. Under the law, therefore, relatives beyond
the fifth degree are no longer considered as relatives, for successional purposes.

Article 1009 does not state any order of preference. However, this article should
be understood in connection with the general rule that the nearest relatives
exclude the farther. Collaterals of the same degree inherit in equal parts, there
being no right of representation. They succeed without distinction of lines or
preference among them on account of the whole blood relationship. (Emphasis
supplied)

We, therefore, hold, and so rule, that under our laws of succession, a decedent's uncles
and aunts may not succeed ab intestato so long as nephews and nieces of the decedent
survive and are willing and qualified to succeed.

The decision appealed from, in so far as it conforms to this rule, is hereby affirmed. No
costs.

Bengzon, C.J., Concepcion, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., and Zaldivar,
JJ., concur.
Bautista Angelo, J., took no part.
Tomas Corpus vs. Rafael Corpus
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-22469 October 23, 1978

TOMAS CORPUS, plaintiff-appellant,


vs.
ADMINISTRATOR and/or EXECUTOR of the Estate of Teodoro R. Yangco,
RAFAEL CORPUS, AMALIA CORPUS, JOSE A. V. CORPUS, RAMON L.
CORPUS, ENRIQUE J. CORPUS, S. W. STAGG, SOLEDAD ASPRER and
CIPRIANO NAVARRO, defendants-appellees.

AQUINO, J.:

Teodoro R. Yangco died in Manila on April 20, 1939 at the age of seventy-seven years.
His will dated August 29, 1934 was probated in the Court of First Instance of Manila
in Special Proceeding No. 54863. The decree of probate was affirmed in this Court's
1941 decision in Corpus vs. Yangco, 73 Phil. 527. The complete text of the will is quoted
in that decision.

Yangco had no forced heirs. At the time of his death, his nearest relatives were (1) his
half brother, Luis R. Yangco, (2) his half sister, Paz Yangco, the wife of Miguel Ossorio
(3) Amalia Corpus, Jose A. V. Corpus, and Ramon L. Corpus, the children of his half
brother, Pablo Corpus, and (4) Juana (Juanita) Corpus, the daughter of his half
brother Jose Corpus. Juanita died in October, 1944 at Palauig, Zambales.

Teodoro R. Yangco was the son of Luis Rafael Yangco and Ramona Arguelles, the
widow of Tomas Corpus. Before her union with Luis Rafael Yangco, Ramona had
begotten five children with Tomas Corpus, two of whom were the aforenamed Pablo
Corpus and Jose Corpus.

Pursuant to the order of the probate court, a project of partition dated November 26,
1945 was submitted by the administrator and the legatees named in the will. That
project of partition was opposed by the estate of Luis R. Yangco whose counsel
contended that an intestacy should be declared Because the will does not contain an
institution of heir. It was also opposed by Atty. Roman A. Cruz, who represented
Juanita Corpus, Pedro Martinez and Juliana de Castro. Juanita Corpus was already
dead when Atty. Cruz appeared as her counsel.

Atty. Cruz alleged in his opposition that the proposed partion was not in conformity
with the will because the testator intended that the estate. should be "conserved" and
not physically partitioned. Atty. Cruz prayed "que declare que el finado no dispuso en
su testamento de sus bienes y negocios y que ha lugar a sucession intestado con
respecio a los raismos y que same un dia en esta causa para la recepcion de pruebas
previa a la declaracion de quienes son los herederos legales o abintestato del difunto."

The Probate court in its order of December 26, 1946 approved the project of partition.
It held that in certain clauses of the will the testator intended to conserve his properties
not in the sense of disposing of them after his death but for the purpose of Preventing
that "tales bienes fuesen malgastados o desfilpar radios por los legatarios" and that if
the testator intended a Perpetual prohibition against alienation, that conch tion would
be regarded "como no puesta o no existents". it concluded that "no hay motives legales
o morales para que la sucession de Don Teodoro R. Yangco sea declarada intestada
(See Barretto vs. Tuason, 50 Phil. 888, which cites article 785 of the Spanish Civil Code
as prohibiting perpetual entails, and Rodriguez vs. Court of Appeals, L-28734, March
28, 1969, 27 SCRA 546.)

From that order, Pedro Martinez, Juliana de Castro , Juanita Corpus (deceased) and
the estate of Luis R. Yangco aped to this Court (L-1476). Those appeals were dismissed
in tills Court's resolutions of October 10 and 31, 1947 after the legatees and the
appellants entered into compromise agreements. In the compromise dated October 7,
1947 the legatees agreed to pay P35,000 to Pedro Martinez, the heirs of Pio V. Corpus,
the heirs of Isabel Corpus and the heir of Juanita Corpus. Herein appellant Tomas
Corpus signed that compromise settlement as the sole heir of Juanita Corpus. The
estate of Luis R. Yangco entered into a similar compromise a ment A the resolution
dismissing the appeal became, final and executory on October 14 and November 4,
1947, entries of judgment were made on those dates.

Pursuant to the compromise agreement, Tomas Corpus Signed a receipt dated October
24, 1947 wherein he acknowledge that he received from the Yangco estate the sum of
two thousand pesos (P2,000) "as settlement in full of my share of the compromise
agreement as per understanding with Judge Roman Cruz, our attorney in this case"
(Exh. D or 17).

On September 20, 1949, the legatees executed an agreement for the settlement and
physical partition of the Yangco estate. The probate court approved that agreement
and noted that the 1945 project of partition was pro tanto modified. That did not set
at rest the controvery over the Yangco's estate.

On October 5, 1951, Tomas Corpus, as the sole heir of Juanita corpus, filed an action
in the Court of First Instance of Manila to recover her supposed share in Yangco
intestate estate. He alleged in his complaint that the dispositions in his Yangcos will
sing perpetual prohibitions upon alienation rendered it void under article 785 of the
old Civil Code and that the 1949 partition is invalid and, therefore, the decedent's
estate should be distributed according to the rules on intestacy.

The trial court in its decision of July 2, 1956 dismissed the action on the grounds of res
judicata and laches. It held that the intrinsic validity of Yangco's will was passed upon
in its order dated December 26, 1946 in Special Proceeding No. 54863 approving the
project of partition for the testator's estate.

Tomas Corpus appealed to the Court of Appeals which in its resolution dated January
23, 1964 in CA-G. R. No. 18720-R certified the appeal to this Court because it involves
real property valued at more than fifty thousand pesos (Sec. 17151 Judiciary Law before
it was amended by Republic Act No. 2613).
Appellant Corpus contends in this appeal that the trial court erred in holding (1) that
Teodoro R. Yangco was a natural child, (2) that his will had been duly legalized and (3)
that plaintiff's action is barred by res judicata and laches.

In the disposition of this appeal it is not necessary to resolve whether Yangco's will had
been duly legalized and whether the action of Tomas Corpus is barred by res judicata
and laches. The appeal may be resolved by de whether Juanita Corpus, the mother of
apt Tomas Corpus was a legal heir of Yangco. Has Tomas Corpus a cause of action to
recover his mother's supposed intestate share in Yangco's estate?

To answer that question, it is necessary to ascertain Yangco's filiation The trial court
found that Yangco "a su muerte tambien le sbrevivieron Luis y Paz appellidados
Yangco, hermanos naturales reconocidos por su padre natural Luis R. Yangco". The
basis of the trial court's conclusion that Teodoro R. Yangco was an acknowledged
natural child and not a legitimate child was the statement in the will of his father, Luis
Rafael Yangco, dated June 14, 1907, that Teodoro and his three other children were
his acknowledged natural children. His exact words are:

Primera. Declaro que tengo cuatro hijos naturales reconocidos,


Hamados Teodoro, Paz, Luisa y Luis, los cuales son mis unicos
herederos forzosos (Exh. 1 in Testate Estate of Teodoro Yangco).

That will was attested by Rafael del Pan Francisco Ortigas, Manuel Camus and
Florencio Gonzales Diez

Appellant Corpus assails the probative value of the will of Luis R. Yangco, Identified
as Exhibit 1 herein, which he says is a mere copy of Exhibit 20, as found in the record
on appeal in Special Proceeding No. 54863. He contends that it should not prevail over
the presumption of legitimacy found in section 69, Rule 123 of the old Rules of Court
and over the statement of Samuel W. Stagg in his biography of Teodoro R. Yangco,
that Luis Rafael Yangco made a second marital venture with Victoria Obin implying
that he had a first marital venture with Ramona Arguelles, the mother of Teodoro.

These contentions have no merit. The authenticity of the will of Luis Rafael Yangco, as
reproduced in Exhibit I herein and as copied from Exhibit 20 in the proceeding for the
probate of Teodoro R. Yangco's wilt in incontestable. The said will is part of a public
or official judicial record.

On the other hand, the children of Ramona Arguelles and Tomas Corpus are presumed
to be legitimate. A marriage is presumed to have taken place between Ramona and
Tomas. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. It is disputably presumption "That a
man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a
lawful contract of marriage"; "that a child born in lawful wedlock, there being no
divorce, absolute or from bed and board, is legitimate", and "that things have
happened according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of life"
(Sec. 5[z], [bb] and cc Rule 131, Rules of Court).

Since Teodoro R. Yangco was an acknowledged natural child or was illegitimate and
since Juanita Corpus was the legitimate child of Jose Corpus, himself a legitimate
child, we hold that appellant Tomas Corpus has no cause of action for the recovery of
the supposed hereditary share of his mother, Juanita Corpus, as a legal heir, in
Yangco's estate. Juanita Corpus was not a legal heir of Yangco because there is no
reciprocal succession between legitimate and illegitimate relatives. The trial court did
not err in dismissing the complaint of Tomas Corpus.

Article 943 of the old Civil code provides that "el hijo natural y el legitimado no tienen
derecho a suceder abintestato a los hijos y parientes legitimos del padre o madre que
to haya reconocido, ni ellos al hijo natural ni al legitimado". Article 943 "prohibits all
successory reciprocity mortis causa between legitimate and illegitimate relatives" 16
Sanchez Roman, Civil Code, pp. 996-997 cited in Director of Lands vs. Aguas, 63 Phil.
279, 287. See 16 Scaevola Codigo Civil, 4th Ed., 455-6). ...

Appellant Corpus concedes that if 'Teodoro R. Yangco was a natural child, he (Tomas
Corpus) would have no legal personality to intervene in the distribution of Yangco's
estate (p. 8, appellant's brief).

The rule in article 943 is now found in article 992 of the Civil Code which provides that
"an illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestatofrom the legitimate children
and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the
same manner from the illegitimate child".

That rule is based on the theory that the illegitimate child is disgracefully looked upon
by the legitimate family while the legitimate family is, in turn, hated by the illegitimate
child.

The law does not recognize the blood tie and seeks to avod further grounds of
resentment (7 Manresa, Codigo Civil, 7th Ed., pp. 185- 6).

Under articles 944 and 945 of the Spanish Civil Code, "if an acknowledged natural or
legitimated child should die without issue, either legitimate or acknowledged, the
father or mother who acknowledged such child shall succeed to its entire estate; and if
both acknowledged it and are alive, they shall inherit from it share and share alike. In
default of natural ascendants, natural and legitimated children shall be succeeded by
their natural brothers and sisters in accordance with the rules established for
legitimate brothers and sisters." Hence, Teodoro R. Yangco's half brothers on the
Corpus side, who were legitimate, had no right to succeed to his estate under the rules
of intestacy.

Following the rule in article 992, formerly article 943, it was held that the legitimate
relatives of the mother cannot succeed her illegitimate child (Cacho vs. Udan L- 19996,
April 30, 1965, 13 SCRA 693. See De Guzman vs. Sevilla, 47 Phil. 991).

Where the testatrix, Rosario Table was the legitimate daughter of Jose Table the two
acknowledged natural children of her uncle, Ramon Table her father's brother, were
held not to be her legal heirs (Grey vs. Table 88 Phil. 128).

By reason of that same rule, the natural child cannot represent his natural father in
the succession to the estate of the legitimate grandparent (Llorente vs. Rodriguez, 10
Phil. 585; Centeno vs. Centeno, 52 Phil. 322; Allarde vs. Abaya, 57 Phil. 909).

The natural daughter cannot succeed to the estate of her deceased uncle, a legitimate
brother of her natural mother (Anuran vs. Aquino and Ortiz, 38 Phil. 29).

WHEREFORE the lower court's judgment is affirmed. No costs.


SO ORDERED.

Barredo, (Actg. Chairman), Antonio, Concepcion, Jr. and Santos, JJ., concur.
Mauricio Sayson, et al. vs. Court of
Appeals, et al.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. Nos. 89224-25 January 23, 1992

MAURICIO SAYSON, ROSARIO SAYSON-MALONDA, BASILISA SAYSON-


LIRIO, REMEDIOS SAYSON-REYES and JUANA C. BAUTISTA, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, DELIA SAYSON, assisted by her
husband, CIRILO CEDO, JR., EDMUNDO SAYSON AND DORIBEL
SAYSON,respondents.

CRUZ, J.:

At issue in this case is the status of the private respondents and their capacity to inherit
from their alleged parents and grandparents. The petitioners deny them that right,
asserting if for themselves to the exclusion of all others.

The relevant genealogical facts are as follows.

Eleno and Rafaela Sayson begot five children, namely, Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa,
Remedios and Teodoro. Eleno died on November 10, 1952, and Rafaela on May 15,
1976. Teodoro, who had married Isabel Bautista, died on March 23, 1972. His wife died
nine years later, on March 26, 1981. Their properties were left in the possession of
Delia, Edmundo, and Doribel, all surnamed Sayson, who claim to be their children.

On April 25, 1983, Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa, and Remedios, together with Juana C.
Bautista, Isabel's mother, filed a complaint for partition and accounting of the
intestate estate of Teodoro and Isabel Sayson. It was docketed as Civil Case No. 1030
in Branch 13 of the Regional Trial Court of Albay. The action was resisted by Delia,
Edmundo and Doribel Sayson, who alleged successional rights to the disputed estate
as the decedents' lawful descendants.

On July 11, 1983, Delia, Edmundo and Doribel filed their own complaint, this time for
the accounting and partition of the intestate estate of Eleno and Rafaela Sayson,
against the couple's four surviving children. This was docketed as Civil Case No. 1042
in the Regional Trial Court of Albay, Branch 12. The complainants asserted the defense
they raised in Civil Case No. 1030, to wit, that Delia and Edmundo were the adopted
children and Doribel was the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and Isabel. As such, they
were entitled to inherit Teodoro's share in his parents' estate by right of
representation.

Both cases were decided in favor of the herein private respondents on the basis of
practically the same evidence.

Judge Rafael P. Santelices declared in his decision dated May 26,


1986, 1 that Delia and Edmundo were the legally adopted children of Teodoro and
Isabel Sayson by virtue of the decree of adoption dated March 9, 1967. 2 Doribel was
their legitimate daughter as evidenced by her birth certificate dated February 27,
1967. 3 Consequently, the three children were entitled to inherit from Eleno and
Rafaela by right of representation.

In his decision dated September 30, 1986, 4 Judge Jose S. Sañez dismissed Civil Case
No. 1030, holding that the defendants, being the legitimate heirs of Teodoro and Isabel
as established by the aforementioned evidence, excluded the plaintiffs from sharing in
their estate.

Both cases were appealed to the Court of Appeals, where they were consolidated. In its
own decision dated February 28, 1989, 5 the respondent court disposed as follows:

WHEREFORE, in Civil Case No. 1030 (CA-G.R. No. 11541), the appealed
decision is hereby AFFIRMED. In Civil case No. 1042 (CA-G.R. No.
12364), the appealed decision is MODIFIED in that Delia and Edmundo
Sayson are disqualified from inheriting from the estate of the deceased
spouses Eleno and Rafaela Sayson, but is affirmed in all other respects.

SO ORDERED.

That judgment is now before us in this petition for review by certiorari. Reversal of
the respondent court is sought on the ground that it disregarded the evidence of the
petitioners and misapplied the pertinent law and jurisprudence when it declared the
private respondents as the exclusive heirs of Teodoro and Isabel Sayson.

The contention of the petitioners is that Delia and Edmundo were not legally adopted
because Doribel had already been born on February 27, 1967, when the decree of
adoption was issued on March 9, 1967. The birth of Doribel disqualified her parents
from adopting. The pertinent provision is Article 335 of the Civil Code, naming among
those who cannot adopt "(1) Those who have legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged
natural children, or natural children by legal fiction."

Curiously enough, the petitioners also argue that Doribel herself is not the legitimate
daughter of Teodoro and Isabel but was in fact born to one Edita Abila, who manifested
in a petition for guardianship of the child that she was her natural mother. 6

The inconsistency of this position is immediately apparent. The petitioners seek to


annul the adoption of Delia and Edmundo on the ground that Teodoro and Isabel
already had a legitimate daughter at the time but in the same breath try to demolish
this argument by denying that Doribel was born to the couple.

On top of this, there is the vital question of timeliness. It is too late now to challenge
the decree of adoption, years after it became final and executory. That was way back
in 1967. 7 Assuming the the petitioners were proper parties, what they should have
done was seasonably appeal the decree of adoption, pointing to the birth of Doribel
that disqualified Teodoro and Isabel from adopting Delia and Edmundo. They did not.
In fact, they should have done this earlier, before the decree of adoption was issued.
They did not, although Mauricio claimed he had personal knowledge of such birth.

As the respondent court correctly observed:

When Doribel was born on February 27, 1967, or about TEN (10) days
before the issuance of the Order of Adoption, the petitioners could have
notified the court about the fact of birth of DORIBEL and perhaps
withdrew the petition or perhaps petitioners could have filed a petition
for the revocation or rescission of the adoption (although the birth of a
child is not one of those provided by law for the revocation or rescission
of an adoption). The court is of the considered opinion that the adoption
of the plaintiffs DELIA and EDMUNDO SAYSON is valid, outstanding
and binding to the present, the same not having been revoked or
rescinded.

Not having any information of Doribel's birth to Teodoro and Isabel Sayson, the trial
judge cannot be faulted for granting the petition for adoption on the finding inter
alia that the adopting parents were not disqualified.

A no less important argument against the petitioners is that their challenge to the
validity of the adoption cannot be made collaterally, as in their action for partition, but
in a direct proceeding frontally addressing the issue.

The settled rule is that a finding that the requisite jurisdictional facts
exists, whether erroneous or not, cannot be questioned in a collateral
proceeding, for a presumption arises in such cases where the validity of
the judgment is thus attacked that the necessary jurisdictional facts were
proven [Freeman on Judgments, Vol. I, Sec. 350, pp. 719-720].
(Emphasis supplied.)

In the case of Santos v. Aranzanso, 8 this Court declared:

Anent this point, the rulings are summed up in 2 American


Jurisprudence, 2nd Series, Adoption, Sec. 75, p. 922, thus:

An adoption order implies the finding of the necessary


facts and the burden of proof is on the party attacking it; it
cannot be considered void merely because the fact needed
to show statutory compliance is obscure. While a judicial
determination of some particular fact, such as the
abandonment of his next of kin to the adoption, may be
essential to the exercise of jurisdiction to enter the order of
adoption, this does not make it essential to the
jurisdictional validity of the decree that the fact be
determined upon proper evidence, or necessarily in
accordance with the truth; a mere error cannot affect the
jurisdiction, and the determination must stand until
reversed on appeal, and hence cannot be collaterally
attacked. If this were not the rule, the status of adopted
children would always be uncertain, since the evidence
might not be the same at all investigations, and might be
regarded with different effect by different tribunals, and
the adoption might be held by one court to have been valid,
while another court would hold it to have been of no avail.
(Emphasis supplied.)

On the question of Doribel's legitimacy, we hold that the findings of the trial courts as
affirmed by the respondent court must be sustained. Doribel's birth certificate is a
formidable piece of evidence. It is one of the prescribed means of recognition under
Article 265 of the Civil Code and Article 172 of the Family Code. It is true, as the
petitioners stress, that the birth certificate offers only prima facie evidence 9 of
filiation and may be refuted by contrary evidence. However, such evidence is lacking
in the case at bar.

Mauricio's testimony that he was present when Doribel was born to Edita Abila was
understandbly suspect, coming as it did from an interested party. The affidavit of
Abila 10 denying her earlier statement in the petition for the guardianship of Doribel
is of course hearsay, let alone the fact that it was never offered in evidence in the lower
courts. Even without it, however, the birth certificate must be upheld in line
with Legaspi v. Court of Appeals, 11 where we ruled that "the evidentiary nature of
public documents must be sustained in the absence of strong, complete and conclusive
proof of its falsity or nullity."

Another reason why the petitioners' challenge must fail is the impropriety of the
present proceedings for that purpose. Doribel's legitimacy cannot be questioned in a
complaint for partition and accounting but in a direct action seasonably filed by the
proper party.

The presumption of legitimacy in the Civil Code . . . does not have this
purely evidential character. It serves a more fundamental purpose. It
actually fixes a civil status for the child born in wedlock, and that civil
status cannot be attacked collaterally. The legitimacy of the child can be
impugned only in a direct action brought for that purpose, by the
proper parties, and within the period limited by law.

The legitimacy of the child cannot be contested by way of defense or as


a collateral issue in another action for a different purpose. . .
. 12(Emphasis supplied.)

In consequence of the above observations, we hold that Doribel, as the legitimate


daughter of Teodoro and Isabel Sayson, and Delia and Edmundo, as their adopted
children, are the exclusive heirs to the intestate estate of the deceased couple,
conformably to the following Article 979 of the Civil Code:

Art. 979. Legitimate children and their descendants succeed the parents
and other ascendants, without distinction as to sex or age, and even if
they should come from different marriages.

An adopted child succeeds to the property of the adopting parents in the


same manner as a legitimate child.
The philosophy underlying this article is that a person's love descends first to his
children and grandchildren before it ascends to his parents and thereafter spreads
among his collateral relatives. It is also supposed that one of his purposes in acquiring
properties is to leave them eventually to his children as a token of his love for them
and as a provision for their continued care even after he is gone from this earth.

Coming now to the right of representation, we stress first the following pertinent
provisions of the Civil Code:

Art. 970. Representation is a right created by fiction of law, by virtue of


which the representative is raised to the place and the degree of the
person represented, and acquires the rights which the latter would have
if he were living or if he could have inherited.

Art. 971. The representative is called to the succession by the law and not
by the person represented. The representative does not succeed the
person represented but the one who the person represented would have
succeeded.

Art. 981. Should children of the deceased and descendants of other


children who are dead, survive, the former shall inherit in their own
right, and the latter by right of representation.

There is no question that as the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and thus the
granddaughter of Eleno and Rafaela, Doribel has a right to represent her deceased
father in the distribution of the intestate estate of her grandparents. Under Article 981,
quoted above, she is entitled to the share her father would have directly inherited had
he survived, which shall be equal to the shares of her grandparents' other children. 13

But a different conclusion must be reached in the case of Delia and Edmundo, to whom
the grandparents were total strangers. While it is true that the adopted child shall be
deemed to be a legitimate child and have the same right as the latter, these rights do
not include the right of representation. The relationship created by the adoption is
between only the adopting parents and the adopted child and does not extend to the
blood relatives of either party. 14

In sum, we agree with the lower courts that Delia and Edmundo as the adopted
children and Doribel as the legitimate daughter of Teodoro Sayson and Isabel Bautista,
are their exclusive heirs and are under no obligation to share the estate of their parents
with the petitioners. The Court of Appeals was correct, however, in holding that only
Doribel has the right of representation in the inheritance of her grandparents' intestate
estate, the other private respondents being only the adoptive children of the deceased
Teodoro.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, and the challenged decision of the Court of
Appeals is AFFIRMED in toto, with costs against the petitioners.

Narvasa, C.J., Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1 Rollo, pp. 66-71.

2 Exhibit C.

3 Exhibit B.

4 Rollo, pp. 60-64.

5 Martinez, J., ponente, with Castro-Bartolome and Elbinias, JJ., concurring.

6 Original Records of Civil Case No. 1042, pp. 115-117.

7 Exhibit C.

8 16 SCRA 344.

9 Rule 131, Sec. 5(m), which provides the disputable presumption that official duty has
been regularly performed; Article 410 of the Civil Code, which provides: "The books
making up the civil register and all documents relating thereto shall be considered
public documents and shall be prima facie evidence of the facts therein contained."

10 Rollo, pp. 52-53.

11 142 SCRA 82.

12 Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. 1, p. 559.

13 Article 972, Civil Code.

14 Teotico v. Del Val, 13 SCRA 406.

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