LEGAL DECISION A N D ITS JUS TIFICA TION

Jerzy WRI5BLEWSKI

1. Th e re a r e ma n y me a n in g s o f " L e g a l De cisio n " . T h e

main in tu itio n s o f the meaning o f th is t e rm in legal language
and in common language are: (a) decision taken b y an author-
ized organ o f th e state; (b ) d e cisio n determined b y la w; (c )
legally v a lid decision. I t i s n o t m y t a sk t o re co n stru ct th e
various uses of "Legal Decision" in particular languages. I take
the ju d icia l decision as the paradigm o f legal decision (
is
I t o sa y I sh a ll analyze ju d icia l decision as a mo d e l o f the
legal
) t hdecision.
a t
It is a simplification of my task since I can put aside a syste-
matic su rve y o f a ll kin d s o f legal decisions and I do not take
into account th e ir peculiarities. A t the same time my analysis
concerns th e mo st complicated a n d min u t e ly regulated k in d
of legal decision because other kinds o f legal decisions are in -
stitutionally much simpler.

2. Ju d icia l decision, as the paradigm o f legal decision, ca n

be treated as a solution of a conflict, based on legal rules, and
deciding the case b y assigning duties, obligations, powers and
other le g a l modalities to the adressees o f the decision.
In the systems o f statute la w there are some basic charac-
teristics o f ju d icia l decision. The most important fo r o u r to p ic
are: (a) the court is bound to decide any case properly presented
for the decision; (b) the decision has to be based on va lid legal
norms
;the h ie ra rch ica lly top decisions; (d ) th e co n tro l in question is
based
( c ) on the ju st if ia b ilit y o f the controlled decision.
j u
d 3.i Th e characteristics o f ju d icia l decisions stated above g ive
ca fra
i me wo rk o f institutional guarantees o f the " o b je ct ivit y" o f
athel decision, the highest standards o f this " o b je ct ivit y" based
don legal norms in any global society organized by legal norms.
e
c i
s i
o
n
i
s
i
n
s
t i
410 J . WRO BLEWSKI

Hence ju d icia l decisions are thought of as the decisions g ivin g

"justice under the la w" .
The " o b je ct ivit y" o f ju d icia l d e cisio n expressing " ju st ice
under the la w" imp lie s the justification of this decision. Rough-
ly speaking th is ju stifica tio n consists in a demonstration th a t
the decision is based o n th e applied legal n o rm. I wo u ld n o t
like t o discuss h e re t h e co n tro ve rsia l ideologies o f ju d icia l
decision-making. These ideologies appear as a continuum: fro m
Montesquieu's v i e w o f ju d ic ia l d e cisio n a s a me ch a n ica l
application o f general legal n o rm f o r a case to the " fre e ju d i-
cial decision" based mo st ly o n th e evaluation o f th e circu m-
sances o f the concrete case. The discussion o f the ju stifica tio n
of legal decision can be meaningful o n ly wit h in the context of
such ideologies o f ju d ic ia l a c t iv it y t h a t postulate t h a t t h e
decision should be justified b y legal norms.

4. " Ju stifica tio n " o f legal decision has three p rin cip a l mean.
ings: "psychological ju stifica tio n " ; " lo g ica l ju stifica tio n sensu
stricto" and " lo g ica l ju stifica tio n sensu la rg o " .

4.1. Psychological ju stifica tio n o f le g a l decision consists i n

an explanation o f the decision b y psychical phenomena. Each
decision is, g e n e ra lly speaking, a choice between va rio u s a l-
ternatives o f behaviour the decision-maker is aware of. Hence
these phenomena can be vie we d as "reasons" f o r the decision
and, in some psychological sense, as a ju stifica tio n o f this de-
cision. Each decision ex hypothesi can be justified in this way.
This kin d of justification is, however, outside our interest here.

4.2. Logical ju stifica tio n sensu stricto is limit e d to th e fie ld

of th e propositions a n d th e f o rma l lo g ic dealing w i t h them.
A proposition is ju stifie d b y other propositions i f it can be
inferred fro m them b y the accepted rules o f lo g ica l inference.
This k in d o f " ju stifica tio n " i s synonymous wit h "demonstra-
tion" o f the tru th of a proposition wit h in the above mentioned
field.
The use o f th is kin d o f ju stifica tio n f o r le g a l decisions re -
quires a n acceptance o f several assumptions. S imp lif yin g the
problem I reduce these assumptions to two : either (a) there is
 LEGAL DE CI S I O N A N D I TS J US TI FI CA TI O N 4 1 1

a formal lo g ic o f norms adequate for a formal lo g ica l ju stifica -

tion of any legal decision, o r (b) legal decisions and reasonings
ju stifyin g th e m are governed b y the fo rma l lo g ic o f proposi-
tions. Th e re i s n o p la ce h e re t o discuss i n d e ta il these a s-
sumptions. I t seems t o me , t h a t assumption (a ) i n t h e p re -
sent status o f the fo rma l ca lcu li o f the lo g ic o f n o rms is n o t
fu lfille d y e t (
2anticognitivist philosophical attitude and, hence, the p ra ctica l
)use ; o f th e lo g ic o f propositions i n th e area o f n o rms i s n o t
a s s u m e xp la in e d n e it h e r i n me ta lo g ic n o r i n g e n e ra l
sufficiently
philosophy.
p t i o n
( b
4.3. L o g ica l ju st f ica t io n se n su l a r g o co n sist s i n g i v i n g
)proper reasons f o r le g a l decision. These reasons a re the p re -
imisses f o r a n inference o f th e decision according t o th e a c-
scepted d ire ctive s o f inference. Ne it h e r a re these premisses
hrestricted a to propositions n o r can these directives o f inference
rbe reduced d t o ru le s o f the f o rma l lo g ic o f propositions. I t is
tmy contention that this concept of justification is operationally
oadequate fo r analyses o f the justification o f legal decisions.
a c
c 5. Thee concept o f lo g ica l ju stifica tio n sensu la rg o requires
psome explanatory
t comments.
i
n 5.1. L o g ica l ju stifica tio n sensu la rg o co ve rs a l l reasonings
tfor wh ich the adjective " ra tio n a l" is cu rre n tly used. I t covers,
hhence, n o t o n ly the fie ld o f a fo rma l lo g ic o f propositions and
eof norms, b u t a lso th a t o f p ra ctica l reasonings d e a lin g wit h
norms a n d evaluations. I n o th e r wo rd s su ch ju stifica tio n i s
proper to use wit h in the fra me wo rk o f the lo g ic o f argumen-
tation (
3
now o n I shall use simp ly the te rm " ju stifica tio n " f o r " lo g ica l
justification
) sensu largo".
w hEspecially imp o rta n t f o r a n y ju stifica tio n o f le g a l decision
is that
i c h the decision treated as " in d ivid u a l norm" can be inferred
from
e n a "general norm" of an applied statute and from the propo-
sitional
g l statements o f facts. Th e se ma n tica lly different status
of
o b these premisses and the relations o f norms and propositions
call
e s f o r this wid e concept o f justification.
f
o
r
m
a
l
l
o
g
412 J . WRO BLEWSKI

5.2. Legal d e cisio n i s ju st if ie d b y i t s premisses a n d t h e

rules o f inference. Th e concept o f ju stifica tio n has t o be suf-
ficie n tly ample to be used adequately f o r the cu rre n t notions
of " ra tio n a lity" o f such a decision (
4 Rational d e cisio n i s a ju s t if ie d d e cisio n . Ra t io n a lit y i s
).
relative to the amount o f knowledge o f the decision-maker, to
his evaluations and to the rules o f inference accepted b y him.
Justified decision is re la tive to the norms, evaluations and in -
ferences ta ke n in t o account b y th e decision-maker.

5.3. Th e re a re t wo kin d s o f ju stifica tio n o f le g a l decision:

internal and external ju stifica tio n .
Internal ju stifica tio n d e a ls w i t h t h e v a lid it y o f inferences
from g ive n premisses t o le g a l d e cisio n ta ke n a s t h e ir co n -
clusion. Th e decision in question is in t e rn a lly ju stifie d i f the
inferences are va lid and the soundness o f the premisses is n o t
tested. I n this respect internal ju stifica tio n is a " fo rma l" ju st i-
fication a n d is n o t adequate f o r a n analysis o f th e p ra ctica l
operation of legal decision and fo r its institutional control.
External ju stifica tio n o f le g a l d e cisio n tests n o t o n l y t h e
va lid ity of inferences, but also the soundness of premisses. The
wide scope o f external ju stifica tio n is re q u ire d especially b y
the paradigmatic ju d icia l decision because o f the highest stan-
dards imposed on it.

6. Ju d icia l decision, taken as the paradigm of legal decision,

can be treated as a result o f more o r less complicated reason-
ings and is ju stifie d b y va rio u s techniques.

6.1. Th e p sych o lo g y o f ju d icia l d e cisio n i s o f n o in te re st

here (comp. p o in t 4.1). The psychological process o f reaching
a decision can be quite independent on the ju stifica tio n g ive n
ex post facto. We are interested in the lo g ica l analysis o f ju s-
tification and not in the comparative generalizations of the data
from the va rio u s style s o f ju d icia l decisions. M y to p ic is th e
discussion o f wh a t a re elements o f ju stifica tio n o f le g a l d e -
cision in a theoretical model ta kin g in to account a ll re le va n t
issues as presented in ju d icia l decision and its justification.
 LEGAL DE CI S I O N A N D I TS J US TI FI CA TI O N 4 1 3

6.2. Fo r this purpose it is convenient to single out three kinds

of ju d icia l decisions. " In te rp re ta tive decision" determines th e
meaning o f th e a p p lie d le g a l n o rm. " De cisio n o f evidence"
states that the fact o f a case has taken place. " Fin a l decision"
determines t h e consequences o f the p ro ve d facts o f the case
according t o th e dispositions o f the applied le g a l n o rm.
The fin a l decision takes in to account the in te rp re ta tive de-
cision and th e decision o f evidence. Th e separation o f these
kinds o f decisions in vo lve d i n t h e a p p lica tio n o f l a w b y a
court i n a syste m o f statute l a w (
5
evaluation o f th e ir re la tive importance n o r suggests t h e ir se-
) d o in
quence e the
s psychological
i m p l yprocess o f decision-making. Each
of
n thee three
i t decisions
h e requires
r proper justification.
a n y
7. Interpretative d e cisio n (') i s needed wh e n t h e la w-a p -
plying organ has doubts concerning the meaning o f the n o rm
to b e applied. Th is is a n " o p e ra tive interpretation" (
7
takes place when there is no " iso mo rp h y" (
in
) w h i c and
8 question h the legal n o rm at hand.
) b e t w e e n t h e
7.1. Fo r the determination o f the meaning o f the n o rm one
c a s e
uses interpretative directives as rules regulating h o w one has
to seek the " tru e " meaning o f a norm. These d ire ctive s have
a h e u ristic ro le and/or a ro le o f rationalization. De a lin g here
with the justification o f interpretative decision we are interest-
ed o n ly in interpretative directives used as tools f o r ra tio n a li-
zation. These d ire ctive s re q u ire evaluations a t least f o r t wo
reasons: (a ) wh e n the d ire ctive s a re n o t imposed b y la w, th e
interpreter has t o ma ke an evaluative choice deciding wh ich
directives to use and in wh ich wa y to use them; (b) the d ire c-
tives can e va lu a tive ly determine the interpretative behaviour.

7.2. In te rp re ta tive 'decision h a s t o b e ju st if ie d b y t h e i n -

terpretative d ire ctive s a n d th e evaluations d e te rmin in g t h e ir
choice and t h e ir use.
The fo rmu la o f in te rp re ta tive decision ma kin g e xp licit th e
ju stifica to ry elements is fo llo win g :
414 J . WROBLEWSKI

"The norm N has the meaning M according to the int erpret at iv e

directives D I
choice
1 and f or the use of the
. . . DI , ,
7.3.aIn ten rnda l ju stifica tio n o f in te rp re ta tive decisions i s re -
la tiveely vsimplea l in situations wh e n the content o f DI
1 D u i a t precise
sufficiently i and the values V
In Vo i Th
mined. .n e ss looseness o f these t wo elements o f ju stifica tio n
makes
s u 1f the f 7i statements
c i e n t ol f yinternal ju stifica tio n v e ry d ifficu lt i f
not
d imp e1 o ssibt lee, w hr e n - t h e re co n stru ctio n o f in t e rp re t a t ive
. . and/or
directives . V evaluations is n o t possible.
i i
7.3.nExteern a l ju stifica tio n o f interpretative decision is mo re
complicated.
c e
s s
Interpretative directives can b y imposed by legal norms and,
then, ain the r regime of the ru le of la w one has to use them. The
y
correctness o f t h e ir use re q u ire s a fo rmu la tio n o f re la tio n a l
f
statements n d e scrib in g t h e in te rp re ta tive b e h a vio u r a s co n -
sistento o r inconsistent with legal norm containing the directives
r
of interpretation. I n general such kin d o f interpretative d ire c-
t
tives formulated in la w is not sufficient f o r the needs o f legal
h
interpretation and, hence, t h e in te rp re te r has t o choose o th e r
e
directives from various sets put forth in legal science o r in legal
practice. Th is choice can be qualified as ju stifie d o r not.
Analogous comments can be re fe rre d to evaluations. These
evaluations can be p a rt ly reconstructed f ro m th e la w, b u t in
general the results o f this are fa r too general f o r the determi-
nation o f in te rp re ta tive behaviour. Th e re is th u s a need f o r
a choice of extra-legal values and all argumentative techniques
can be related wit h the ju stifica tio n o f these choices.

8. Decisions o f evidence (") a re p rima fa cie decisions e x -

pressed in propositions o f the f o rm e.g. -
F at ime
at c t t aFn d i n hp la a
ce ps " . T h is i s a n e le me n ta ry f o r m o f
o existential
an c c u rstatement.
r e d A demonstration of its tru th o r fa lsity
depends o n it s re la tio n t o o th e r statements f ro m wh ich i t is
inferred. These statements a re "evidence". Th e simplest f o rm
of the decision o f evidence wo u ld be: " F has occurred in t, p
according to accepted evidence E
l E „ " .
 LEGAL DE CI S I O N A N D I TS J US TI FI CA TI O N 4 1 5

8.1. To simp lif y o u r analysis le t us assume tha t the fa ct o f

the case F is denotated in the applied legal n o rm d e scrip tive ly
and that it is a "simple", " p o sitive " fa ct and that its existence
can be stated e mp irica lly according to the cu rre n t methodolo-
gical paradigm of natural sciences o r according to the common
sense o r co mmo n experience. I f we denominate these d ire c-
tives o f accepting evidence "rules o f emp irical evidence'' then
the formula o f the decision o f evidence is:

"T has oc c urred in t p. ac c ording t o accepted ev idenc e E

based
l on t he rules of empiric al ev idenc e REE, . . . REE
n. . . E
"n
Justification o f such kin d of decisions o f evidence is clo se ly
simila r to the demonstration o f the tru th o f the statements in
natural science, i f th e ru le s o f e mp irica l evidence a re those
accepted in such science. Legal systems can impose such kin d
of evidence and then the ju stifica tio n o f the decision o f e vi-
dence can be a lo g ica l ju stifica tio n sensu stricto (comp. p o in t
4.2.).

8.2. I n legal systems, however, we have also other directives

of evidence wh ich are binding e x lege and a re n o t e mp irica l
rules. These rules, wh ich I name " ru le s o f legal evidence" are
either not e mp irica lly va lid o r even n o t e mp irica lly meaning-
ful. Rules o f legal evidence have various h isto rica l forms f ro m
the mediaeval rules o f proof to the contemporary rules fo r the
exclusion o f evidence o r legal presumptions. I cannot discuss
new imp o rt a n t differences b e twe e n these kin d s o f ru le s o f
legal evidence. Imp o rta n t f o r us here is th a t the ju stifica tio n
of a decision of evidence depends upon the consistency o f the
behaviour o f the co u rt wit h le g a l n o rms expressing the ru le s
of legal evidence. This relation is formulated in the above-men-
tioned relational statements. I f these statements are true, then
the decision of evidence is justified. Hence we have the second
formula:

"T has oc c urred i n Lip

based
, a c onc the
o r rules
d i n of
g legal evidence RI.E1...RLE11"
t o
a c c e p t
e d
e v i d
e n c e
E
x
. . . E
x
416 J . WRO BLEWSKI

8.3. These t wo fo rmu la s o f 8.1 a n d 8.2. ma ke e xp licit th e

justification o f the decision o f evidence. I assumed, however,
that th e fa ct o f th e case F is a " d e scrip tive " , " simp le " a n d
"positive" fact. Th is is n o t a lwa ys the case, because we have
to d o wit h mo re complicated facts: facts determined evalua-
tive ly (e.g. immo ra l behaviour); fa cts determined n e g a tive ly
(e.g. omission o f due care); facts determined b y the relation to
norms (e.g. u n la wf u l exercise o f p o we r) e tc. N o t discussing
the complicated problems o f th e evidence o f such kin d s o f
facts i t is patent, t h a t a t le a st i n some situ a tio n t o ma ke a
decision o f evidence concerning these facts it is necessary to
evaluate. Th e ju stifica tio n o f t h e d e cisio n o f evidence has,
therefore, t o re fe r to evaluations.
The formula of the decision of evidence wh ich makes e xp licit
the ma in requirements o f ju stifica tio n f o r va rio u s kin d s o f
facts is:

"F has oc c urred i n t,p. ac c ording t o accepted ev idenc e E

based
l on the rules of empiric al evidence R E E
1
the
...E rules
„ of legal evidence R E L
V
l. . . R E E
t.D. . Ra E nL „ d a/ on rd / o or n
8.4..oIn te rnn a l ju stifica tio n o f t h e d e cisio n o f e vid e n ce e x -
pressed .e inv thea formulas
l u a o t f points
i o n8.1. and 8.2. does not in vo lve
evaluations..
s Fo r th e fo rmu la o f p o in t 8.3., however, in t e rn a l
V
justification depends o n t h e d e g re e o f preciseness o f t h e
evaluations 2 V
V "
I External ju stifica tio n , i f th e l a w determines ru le s o f le g a l
nevidence . a n d / o r imposes t h e u se o f t h e ru le s o f e mp irica l
.evidence, f o r simple cases presents no differences wit h the in -
ternal ju stifica tio n . I f , h o we ve r, w e h a ve t o d o wit h evalua-
tions a s i n choosing th e d ire ctive s o f evidence o r choosing
relevant values as in the fo rmu la in p o in t 8.3., then o u r p re -
vious comments t o the external ju stifica tio n o f in te rp re ta tive
decision are to be applied (point 7.3).

9. Th e f in a l ju d icia l decision determines th e consequences

of the proved fa ct according to the applied legal n o rm in the
determined meaning (").
 LEGAL DE CI S I O N A N D I TS J US TI FI CA TI O N 4 1 7

9.1. Th e consequences o f th e fa ct F can be determined b y

the applied legal n o rm e ith e r st rict ly o r wit h some lee-ways.
In th e f o rme r case th e t a sk o f d e te rmin in g consequences i s
merely mechanical, in the la tte r it is a matter o f choice.
This ch o ice wit h in le e -wa ys h a s a degree o f freedom d e -
pending upon the content of the legal system. If this system con-
tains n o rms fo rmu la tin g the d ire ctive s o f choices o f the con-
sequences, then the co u rt is bound b y th e m as b y a n y other
legal norms. Such directives can e.g. determine circumstances
which a re t o b e ta ke n in to account wh e n choosing between
various kin d s o f possible consequences o r wh e n f ix in g t h e
"quantity" of a consequence. These directives, however, gener-
a lly do n o t e limin a te a ll le e -wa ys g ive n b y le g a l n o rms and
hence, there remains some area f o r evaluative choices.

The f o r m u la o f t h e f in a l d e c is io n is , henc e, as f o llo ws : " A c c o r -

d in g t o t h e n o r m N i n t h e m e a n i n g M t h e f a c t F w h i c h h a s
oc c urred i n t,p. has f o r it s le g a l c ons equenc es C
ito t h e d ire c t iv e s o f t h e c h o ic e o f c ons equenc es D C
ev. . •aluat
1 C „ ions
a c Vc o r d i n g
i. . . D C „ a n d
9.2.. In. . te
V „rn
" a l and external ju stifica tio n o f the f in a l decision
are analogous t o those o f in te rp re ta tive decisions (p o in t 7.2;
7.3). Fo r the external ju stifica tio n o f the decision in question
there is, however, an additional factor: the ju stifica tio n o f the
final decision depends on the justification o f the corresponding
interpretative decision (point 7.1) and of the decision of eviden-
ce (p o in t 8.3). Th is dependence i s c le a rly expressed i n t h e
formula above (p o in t 9.1).

10. Ju stifica tio n o f a legal decision is a means for controlling

its content. Internal ju stifica tio n deals wit h the fo rma l va lid it y
of reasonings lin kin g the premisses and the decision. Directives
of inference are p a rt ly determined b y the accepted lo g ic and
p a rtly imposed b y the legal norms (
1
tives is the object o f logico-legal research.
' ) .External
A n a jul stifica
y s i tios n o f legal decision deals wit h the ch o i-
o o f f various d ire ctive s and wit h evaluations needed d u rin g
ces
their
t huse.e These
s deire ctive s and evaluations appear i n the in -
d i r e c -
418 J . WRO BLEWSKI

terpretation o f norms, in assessing evidence o f the facts o f the

case and in the determination of the legal consequences of these
facts wit h in the provided lee-ways o f decision. Th a t ju stifica -
tion can be h a rd ly reduced to formalized techniques.
Taking in t o account th e co mp le xit y o f th e ju stifica tio n o f
legal decision one has t o assess it s g re a t social significance.
Legal decision has to be based on la w and has t o be rational.
Justification is a means fo r controlling the dependence of a de-
cision upon la w and f o r determining it s ra tio n a lity depending
upon norms, facts and values. I f legal decisions are functional
parts o f the legal control through law, then the decision-maker
has t o be able t o ju st if y h is decisions wit h in th e legal, co n -
ceptual and ideological fra me wo rk o f his activities.

NOTES

(
it t1h e ju d g e i s " e l c anon d e l s ujet o c ognos c ente" ( C. Cos s io, L a le o r ia
egologica
) d e l derec ho y e l c onc ept ° ju r id ic ° d e libert ad, Buenos A ires ,
1964,
T 2 ed., p. 29 33 and ff., 124 and ff.
(9
h Comp. G. KALINOWSKI, I nt roduc t ion a la logique juridique, Paris, 1965,
chapt,
i I I I a n d esp. p. 137.
s(
Paris,
a3 1958, 2 v ol.; C. PERELMAN, J us tic e et rais on, Brux elles , 1963, chap. XI I ,
XIV,s) X V I ; P, FORIERS, L'ét al des rec herc hes d e logique ju rid iq u e en Belgi-
que,sC (in ) Etudes d e logique juridique, Brux elles , 1968, v o l. I I ; T. VIEEIWEG,
Topik
uo u n d J uris prudenz , Miinc hen, 1965, 3 ed.; J. STONE, Legal Systems and
Lawyers',
m Reas oning, Stanford, 1964, c hap. V I I I , § 8, 9.
m
p(p
sadowym
t4. s tos owaniu prawa, St udia Prawno-Ek ononic z we 3, 1969, p. 26-30;
J. KMITA,
)iC L . NOWAK, S t u d io n a d t eoret y c z ny mi pods t awami humanis t yki,
Poznan,
.oC 1968, chap. II, § 3 i G. G orruEs , The Logic o f Choic e, London, 1968,
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nP
Cambridge,
m 1968, c hapt. V .
iE
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p Comp. t he concept of the applic at ion o f la w J. WROBLEWSKI, I I modello
s R
teorico dell'applic az ione della legge, Riv is ta intern. d i filos ofia d e l d irit t o 1,
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nL
Moskwa, 1960, p . 11; K . MAKKONEN, Z u r P roblemat ik d e r juridis c hen E nt -
e.M
scheidung, Tu rk u , 1965, p . 13.
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Legal 8 Interpretation, Logique et Analy s e 21/24, 1963; t he same author, Legal
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 LEGAL DE CI S I O N A N D I TS J US TI FI CA TI O N 4 1 9

Reasonings i n Legal Interpretation, Logique e t Analy s e 45, 1969; t he s ame

autor, Zagadnienia t e o rii wy k ladni prawa ludowego, Wars z awa, 1959, chapt.
II-V.
(
Riv7is ta int ern. d i filos ofia d e l d irit t o 1, 1966.
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L(8
Logique
.9 ) e t A naly s e 49/50, 1970.
(F)K
ache0
E J. Studien z ur Geselzanwendung, Heidelberg, 1969, 2 ed., p. 32-82; PEREL-
MAN,)R .M Justice..., op. cit., c hapt, X I I I ; GOTTLIEB, op. Cit., c hapt. I V .
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