Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal

Volume 11, Number 1

Judgment and Being

Friedrich Hölderlin

JUDGMENT (URTEIL), in its highest and most rigorous sense, is the

originary separation of object and subject, which, in intellectual intui-
tion, are most intimately united. It is that separation whereby object
and subject become at all possible; judgment is originary division (Ur-
teilung). The concept of division already implies that of the reciprocal
relation between object and subject as weIl as the necessary presupposi-
tion of a whole, ofwhich object and subject are the parts. "I am I" is the
most appropriate example of this concept of originary division as
theoretical, for in a practical originary division the 1 posits itself over-
against the not-I and not overagainst itself
Actuality and possibility are differentiated as mediate and im-
mediate consciousness. When 1 think an object as possible, 1only repeat
the prior consciousness, by virtue of which the object is actual. For us,
there is no thinkable possibility that has not been actuality. That is
why the concept ofpossibility is not valid for the objects ofreason: they
never occur in consciousness as what they ought to be. For them only
the concept of necessity is valid. The concept of possibility is valid for
the objects ofthe understanding, the concept of actuality for the objects
of perception and intuition.

Being (Sein) expresses the connection of subject and object. Where

subject and object are united as such (schlechthin) and not merely par-
tially - where they are therefore united in such a way that no division

Translated by Pierre Adler. This text was first published in Friedrich Hölderlin, Grosse
Stuttgarter Ausgabe (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer Verlag), Vol. 4.1, pp. 216f. We would
like to thank this company for granting us permission to publish its translation.

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can be carried out without injuring the essence (Wesen) ofthat which is
to be separated - there and nowhere else can one speak of being as
such (Sein. schlechthin), as is the case in intellectual intuition.
But this being must not be confused with identity. When I say: I am
I, then the subject (I) and the object (I) are not so united that no separat-
ing at all can be carried out without injuring the essence of that which
is to be separated. On the contrary, the I is only possible through this
separating of the I from the I. How can I say: I! without self-conscious-
ness? Yet how is self-consciousness possible? It is possible through my
positing myself overagainst myself, through my separating myself
fr~m myself, although, heedless of this separating, I recognize myself
as the same in what is posited overagainst myself. But in what respect
do I recognize myself as the same? I can, I must ask that way; for in
another respect it is posited overagainst itself. Hence the identity is not
a union of object and subject, which would take place as such. Identity
is therefore not == absolute being.

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