A. CHUNG FU INDUSTRIES V. CA (G.R. NO.

96283)

Facts:
Petitioner Chung Fu Industries (Philippines) and private respondent Roblecor Philippines, Inc. forged a
construction agreement whereby respondent contractor committed to construct and finish petitioner
corporation’s industrial/factory complex. In the event of disputes arising from the performance of subject
contract, it was stipulated therein that the issue(s) shall be submitted for resolution before a single arbitrator
chosen by both parties. Roblecor filed a petition for Compulsory Arbitration with prayer for Temporary
Restraining Order before respondent RTC to claim the unsatisfied account and unpaid progress billings.
Chung Fu moved to dismiss the petition and further prayed for the quashing of the restraining order.
Subsequent negotiations between the parties eventually led to the formulation of an arbitration agreement
which, among others, provides: The parties mutually agree that the decision of the arbitrator shall be final
and unappealable. Therefore, there shall be no further judicial recourse if either party disagrees with the
whole or any part of the arbitrator’s award. Respondent RTC approved the arbitration agreement and
thereafter, Engr. Willardo Asuncion was appointed as the sole arbitrator. Arbitrator Asuncion ordered
petitioner to immediately pay respondent contractor and further declared the award as final and
unappealable. Roblecor then moved for the confirmation of said award which was accordingly confirmed
and a writ of execution granted to it. Meanwhile, Chung Fu moved to remand the case for further hearing
and asked for a reconsideration of the judgment award claiming that Arbitrator Asuncion committed twelve
(12) instances of grave error by disregarding the provisions of the parties’ contract. Chung Fu’s Motion
was denied and similarly its motion for reconsiderationn. Chung Fu elevated the case via a petition
for certiorari to respondent CA. The respondent appellate court concurred with the findings and
conclusions of respondent trial court. A motion for reconsideration of said resolution was filed by petitioner,
but was similarly denied.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioners are estopped from questioning the arbitration award allegedly in view of the
stipulations in the parties’ arbitration agreement that “the decision of the arbitrator shall be final and
unappealable” and that “there shall be no further judicial recourse if either party disagrees with the whole
or any part of the arbitrator’s award.”
Ruling:
We rule in the negative. It is stated explicitly under Art. 2044 of the Civil Code that the finality of the
arbitrators’ award is not absolute and without exceptions. Where the conditions described in Articles 2038,
2039 and 2040 applicable to both compromises and arbitrations are obtaining, the arbitrators’ award may
be annulled or rescinded. Additionally, under Sections 24 and 25 of the Arbitration Law, there are grounds
for vacating, modifying or rescinding an arbitrator’s award. Thus, if and when the factual circumstances
referred to in the above-cited provisions are present, judicial review of the award is properly warranted.
This is where the proper remedy is certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court. It is to be borne
in mind, however, that this action will lie only where a grave abuse of discretion or an act without or in
excess of jurisdiction on the part of the voluntary arbitrator is clearly shown. It should be stressed, too, that
voluntary arbitrators, by the nature of their functions, act in a quasi-judicial capacity. It stands to reason,
therefore, that their decisions should not be beyond the scope of the power of judicial review of this Court.
In the case at bar, petitioners assailed the arbitral award on the following grounds, most of which allege
error on the part of the arbitrator in granting compensation for various items which apparently are disputed
by said petitioners. After closely studying the list of errors, as well as petitioners’ discussion of the same in
their Motion to Remand Case For Further Hearing and Reconsideration and Opposition to Motion for
Confirmation of Award, we find that petitioners have amply made out a case where the voluntary arbitrator
failed to apply the terms and provisions of the Construction Agreement which forms part of the law
applicable as between the parties, thus committing a grave abuse of discretion. Furthermore, in granting
unjustified extra compensation to respondent for several items, he exceeded his powers — all of which
would have constituted ground for vacating the award under Section 24 (d) of the Arbitration Law.
Wherefore, the petition is granted. The Resolutions of the CA as well as the Orders of respondent RTC are
hereby SET ASIDE. Accordingly, this case is REMANDED to the court of origin for further hearing on
this matter. All incidents arising therefrom are reverted to the status quo ante until such time as the trial
court shall have passed upon the merits of this case.
DEL MONTE CORPORATION V. CA

181 SCRA 410

FACTS:
Petitioner filed a case for trademark infringement and unfair competition against Sunshine Sauce. The
latter for a time used the bottles of Del Monte in packaging their own catsup sauce. It also used bottles
which were similar to those of petitioner.

HELD:
There is a distinction between infringment of trademark and unfair competition:
1. Infringement is the unauthorized use of a trademark while unfair competition is the passing off of one’s
goods as that of another
2. In infringement, fraudulent intent is unnecessary while it is otherwise for unfair competition
3. In infringement, prior registration of the trademark is needed whereas in unfair competition,
registration is not necessary.
In assessing the two trademarks, side-by-side comparison is not the final test of similarity because
average buyers don’t make minute scrutiny of
label details.
Also, in testing if there has been prior registration, registration in the supplemental register isn’t what the
law contemplates.

181 SCRA 410 – Mercantrile Law – Intellectual Property Law – Law on Trademarks, Service Marks and
Trade – Trademark Infringement – Unfair Competition
Del Monte Corporation is an American corporation which is not engaged in business in the Philippines.
Though not engaging business here, it has given authority to Philippine Packing Corporation (Philpack) the
right to manufacture, distribute and sell in the Philippines various agricultural products, including catsup,
under the Del Monte trademark and logo. In 1965, Del Monte also authorized Philpack to register with the
Patent Office the Del Monte catsup bottle configuration. Philpack was issued a certificate of trademark
registration under the Supplemental Register.
Later, Del Monte and Philpack learned that Sunshine Sauce Manufacturing was using Del Monte bottles in
selling its products and that Sunshine Sauce’s logo is similar to that of Del Monte. The RTC of Makati as
well as the Court of Appeals ruled that there was no infringement because the trademarks used between the
two are different in designs and that the use of Del Monte bottles by Sunshine Sauce does not constitute
unfair competition because as ruled in Shell Company vs Insular Petroleum: “selling oil in containers of
another with markings erased, without intent to deceive, was not unfair competition.”
ISSUE: Whether or not there is unfair competition and infringement in the case at bar.
HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court recognizes that there really are distinctions between the designs of the
logos or trademarks of Del Monte and Sunshine Sauce. However, it has been that side by side comparison
is not the final test of similarity. Sunshine Sauce’s logo is a colorable imitation of Del Monte’s trademark.
The word “catsup” in both bottles is printed in white and the style of the print/letter is the same. Although
the logo of Sunshine is not a tomato, the figure nevertheless approximates that of a tomato. The person who
infringes a trade mark does not normally copy out but only makes colorable changes, employing enough
points of similarity to confuse the public with enough points of differences to confuse the courts. What is
undeniable is the fact that when a manufacturer prepares to package his product, he has before him a
boundless choice of words, phrases, colors and symbols sufficient to distinguish his product from the others.
When as in this case, Sunshine chose, without a reasonable explanation, to use the same colors and letters
as those used by Del Monte though the field of its selection was so broad, the inevitable conclusion is that
it was done deliberately to deceive.
The Supreme Court also ruled that Del Monte does not have the exclusive right to use Del Monte bottles in
the Philippines because Philpack’s patent was only registered under the Supplemental Register and not with
the Principal Register. Under the law, registration under the Supplemental Register is not a basis for a case
of infringement because unlike registration under the Principal Register, it does not grant exclusive use of
the patent. However, the bottles of Del Monte do say in embossed letters: “Del Monte Corporation, Not to
be Refilled”. And yet Sunshine Sauce refilled these bottles with its catsup products. This clearly shows the
Sunshine Sauce’s bad faith and its intention to capitalize on the Del Monte’s reputation and goodwill and
pass off its own product as that of Del Monte.
INSULAR SAVINGS BANK v. FAR EAST BANK and TRUST COMPANY

FACTS:

On December 11, 1991, Far East Bank and Trust Company (Respondent) filed a complaint against Home
Bankers Trust and Company (HBTC) with the Philippine Clearing House Corporation’s (PCHC)
Arbitration Committee.

Respondent sought to recover from the petitioner, the sum of P25,200,000.00 representing the total amount
of the three checks drawn and debited against its clearing account. HBTC sent these checks to respondent
for clearing by operation of the PCHC clearing system. Thereafter, respondent dishonored the checks for
insufficiency of funds and returned the checks to HBTC. However, the latter refused to accept them since
the checks were returned by respondent after the reglementary regional clearing period.

Meanwhile, on January 17, 1992, before the termination of the arbitration proceedings, respondent filed
another complaint but this time with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Makati City for Sum of Money and
Damages with Preliminary Attachment.

The complaint was filed not only against HBTC but also against Robert Young, Eugene Arriesgado and
Victor Tancuan (collectively known as Defendants), who were the president and depositors of HBTC
respectively. Aware of the arbitration proceedings between respondent and petitioner, the RTC, in an
Omnibus Order suspended the proceedings in the case against all the defendants pending the decision of
the Arbitration Committee

On February 2, 1998, the PCHC Arbitration Committee rendered its decision in favor of respondent. The
motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner was denied by the Arbitration Committee.

Consequently, to appeal the decision of the Arbitration Committee, petitioner filed a petition for review in
the earlier case filed by respondent in Branch 135 of the RTC of Makati.

In an order dated January 20, 1999, the RTC directed both petitioner and respondent to file their respective
memoranda, after which, said petition would be deemed submitted for resolution.
Both parties filed several pleadings. On February 8, 1999, respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss Petition
for Review for Lack of Jurisdiction, which was opposed by the petitioner.

On November 9, 1999, the RTC dismissed the petition for review.

The RTC denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether the Regional Trial Court erred in dismissing the Petition of Petitioner for lack of jurisdiction on
the ground that it should have been docketed as a separate case.

HELD:

No, As provided in the PCHC Rules, the findings of facts of the decision or award rendered by the
Arbitration Committee shall be final and conclusive upon all the parties in said arbitration dispute. Under
Article 2044 of the New Civil Code, the validity of any stipulation on the finality of the arbitrators’ award
or decision is recognized. However, where the conditions described in Articles 2038, 2039 and 2040
applicable to both compromises and arbitrations are obtaining, the arbitrators’ award may be annulled or
rescinded. Consequently, the decision of the Arbitration Committee is subject to judicial review.
Furthermore, petitioner had several judicial remedies available at its disposal after the Arbitration
Committee denied its Motion for Reconsideration.

It may petition the proper RTC to issue an order vacating the award
• Invoking the grounds provided for under Section 24 of the Arbitration Law;
• Filing a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court with the Court of Appeals on questions
of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law; and Lastly,
• Petitioner may file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court on the ground that the
Arbitrator Committee acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

Since this case involves acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial agency, the petition should be filed in and
cognizable only by the Court of Appeals.

In this instance, petitioner did not avail of any of the abovementioned remedies available to it. Instead it
filed a petition for review with the RTC where Civil Case No. 92-145 is pending pursuant to Section 13 of
the PCHC Rules to sustain its action. Clearly, it erred in the procedure it chose for judicial review of the
arbitral award.

Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law and not by the consent or acquiescence of any or all
of the parties or by erroneous belief of the court that it exists.

In the instant case, petitioner and respondent have agreed that the PCHC Rules would govern in case of
controversy. However, since the PCHC Rules came about only as a result of an agreement between and
among member banks of PCHC and not by law, it cannot confer jurisdiction to the RTC. Thus, the portion
of the PCHC Rules granting jurisdiction to the RTC to review arbitral awards, only on questions of law,
cannot be given effect.

Consequently, the proper recourse of petitioner from the denial of its motion for reconsideration by the
Arbitration Committee is to file either a motion to vacate the arbitral award with the RTC, a petition for
review with the Court of Appeals under Rule 43 of the
Rules of Court, or a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

Alternative dispute resolution methods or ADRs – like arbitration, mediation, negotiation and conciliation
– are encouraged by the Supreme Court. By enabling parties to resolve their disputes amicably, they
provide solutions that are less time-consuming, less tedious, less confrontational, and more productive of
goodwill and lasting relationships. It must be borne in mind that arbitration proceedings are mainly
governed by the Arbitration Law and suppletorily by the Rules of Court.
LM POWER ENGINEERING COPORATION v CAPITOL INDUSTRIAL CONSTRUCTION
GROUPS
G.R No. 141833 March 26 2003

FACTS:
LM Power Engineering Corporation (Petitioner) and Capitol Industrial Construction Groups
(Respondent) entered into a Subcontract Agreement involving electrical work at the Port of
Zamboanga. Respondent then took over some of the work contracted to Petitioner, It was
alleged that the petitioner failed to finish it because of its inability to procure materials.
Upon completion of the task, Petitioner billed the respondent the amount of
6,711,813.90 pesos. Respondent refused to pay and contested the accuracy of the amount of
advances and billable accomplishments listed by the petitioner. Respondent also took refuge in
the termination clause agreement which allowed it to set off the cost of the work that
petitioner had failed to undertake (due to termination of take over).
Because of the dispute, the Petitioner filed a complaint foe collection of the balance due
under the subcontract agreement. However, instead of filing an answer, the respondent filed a
Motion to Dismiss, alleging that the complaint was premature because there was no prior
recourse to arbitration. RTC denied the motion on the ground that the dispute did not involve
the interpretation or implementation of the agreement and was, therefore, not covered by the
arbitral clause. Also, the RTC ruled that the take over of some work items by the respondent
was not equivalent to termination but a mere modification of the subcontract.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there exists a dispute between petitioner and respondent regarding the
interpretation and implementation of the Sub-Contract Agreement that requires prior recourse
to voluntary arbitration.

RULING:
Yes. The instant case involves technical discrepancies that are better left to an arbitral
body that has expertise on those areas. The Subcontract has the Arbitral clause stating that the
parties agree that “Any dispute or conflict as regards to interpretation and implementation of
this agreement which cannot be settled between the parties amicably shall be settled by means
of arbitration.” Within the scope of the Arbitration clause are discrepancies as to the amount of
advances and billable accomplishments, the application of the provision on termination, and
the consequent set-off expenses. Also, there is no need for prior request for arbitration. As long
as the parties agre to submit to voluntary arbitration, regardless of what forum they may
choose, their agreement will fall within the jurisdiction of the CIAC, such that, even if they
specifically choose another forum, the parties will not be precluded form electing to submit
their dispute before the CIAC because this right has been vested upon each party by the law.
KOREA TECHNOLOGIES CO. LTD VS LERMA (GR NO. 143581 JANUARY 7, 2008)

Korea Technologies Co. Ltd vs Lerma

GR No. 143581 January 7, 2008

Facts: Petitioner Korea Technologies Co., Ltd. (KOGIES) is a Korean corporation which is engaged in the
supply and installation of Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) Cylinder manufacturing plants, while private
respondent Pacific General Steel Manufacturing Corp. (PGSMC) is a domestic corporation. On March 5,
1997, PGSMC and KOGIES executed a Contract whereby KOGIES would set up an LPG Cylinder
Manufacturing Plant in Carmona, Cavite. The contract was executed in the Philippines. On April 7, 1997,
the parties executed, in Korea, an Amendment for Contract No. KLP-970301 dated March 5, 1997
amending the terms of payment. The contract and its amendment stipulated that KOGIES will ship the
machinery and facilities necessary for manufacturing LPG cylinders for which PGSMC would pay USD
1,224,000. KOGIES would install and initiate the operation of the plant for which PGSMC bound itself to
pay USD 306,000 upon the plants production of the 11-kg. LPG cylinder samples. Thus, the total contract
price amounted to USD 1,530,000. On October 14, 1997, PGSMC entered into a Contract of Lease with
Worth Properties, Inc. (Worth) for use of Worths 5,079-square meter property with a 4,032-square meter
warehouse building to house the LPG manufacturing plant. The monthly rental was PhP 322,560
commencing on January 1, 1998 with a 10% annual increment clause. Subsequently, the machineries,
equipment, and facilities for the manufacture of LPG cylinders were shipped, delivered, and installed in the
Carmona plant. PGSMC paid KOGIES USD 1,224,000. However, gleaned from the Certificate executed
by the parties on January 22, 1998, after the installation of the plant, the initial operation could not be
conducted as PGSMC encountered financial difficulties affecting the supply of materials, thus forcing the
parties to agree that KOGIES would be deemed to have completely complied with the terms and conditions
of the March 5, 1997 contract. For the remaining balance of USD306,000 for the installation and initial
operation of the plant, PGSMC issued two postdated checks: (1) BPI Check No. 0316412 dated January
30, 1998 for PhP 4,500,000; and (2) BPI Check No. 0316413 dated March 30, 1998 for PhP 4,500,000.
When KOGIES deposited the checks, these were dishonored for the reason PAYMENT STOPPED. Thus,
on May 8, 1998, KOGIES sent a demand letter to PGSMC threatening criminal action for violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 in case of nonpayment. On the same date, the wife of PGSMCs President faxed a letter
dated May 7, 1998 to KOGIES President who was then staying at a Makati City hotel. She complained that
not only did KOGIES deliver a different brand of hydraulic press from that agreed upon but it had not
delivered several equipment parts already paid for.

Issue: Whether or not the arbitration clause in the contract of the parties should govern.

Held: Yes. Established in this jurisdiction is the rule that the law of the place where the contract is made
governs. Lex loci contractus. The contract in this case was perfected here in the Philippines. Therefore, our
laws ought to govern. Nonetheless, Art. 2044 of the Civil Code sanctions the validity of mutually agreed
arbitral clause or the finality and binding effect of an arbitral award. Art. 2044 provides, Any stipulation
that the arbitrators award or decision shall be final, is valid, without prejudice to Articles 2038, 2039 and
2040.

The arbitration clause was mutually and voluntarily agreed upon by the parties. It has not been shown to be
contrary to any law, or against morals, good customs, public order, or public policy. There has been no
showing that the parties have not dealt with each other on equal footing. We find no reason why the
arbitration clause should not be respected and complied with by both parties. In Gonzales v. Climax Mining
Ltd., we held that submission to arbitration is a contract and that a clause in a contract providing that all
matters in dispute between the parties shall be referred to arbitration is a contract. Again in Del Monte
Corporation-USA v. Court of Appeals, we likewise ruled that [t]he provision to submit to arbitration any
dispute arising therefrom and the relationship of the parties is part of that contract and is itself a contract.

Having said that the instant arbitration clause is not against public policy, we come to the question on what
governs an arbitration clause specifying that in case of any dispute arising from the contract, an arbitral
panel will be constituted in a foreign country and the arbitration rules of the foreign country would govern
and its award shall be final and binding.

Thus, it can be gleaned that the concept of a final and binding arbitral award is similar to judgments or
awards given by some of our quasi-judicial bodies, like the National Labor Relations Commission and
Mines Adjudication Board, whose final judgments are stipulated to be final and binding, but not
immediately executory in the sense that they may still be judicially reviewed, upon the instance of any
party. Therefore, the final foreign arbitral awards are similarly situated in that they need first to be
confirmed by the RTC.
1. MARIA LUISA PARK ASSOCIATION, INC.,
Petitioner, vs.
SAMANTHA MARIE T. ALMENDRAS and PIA
ANGELA T. ALMENDRAS,
Respondents.
[G.R. No. 171763, June 5, 2009,
QUISUMBING,

J.
:]
NATURE: Petition for review on certiorari
FACTS:
1.respondents Samantha Marie T. Almendras and Pia Angela T. Almendras purchased from MRO
Development Corporation a residential lot in Cebu City
2.Almendras then filed with Maria Luisa Park Association Inc an application to construct a residential
house which was approved
3.Upon ocular inspection MLPAI found out that Almendras violated the prohibition against multi-
dwelling
4.MLPAI sent a letter to the respondents, demanding that they rectify the structure
a.respondents, as represented by their father Ruben D. Almendras denied having violated MLPAI’s
Deed of Restriction
b.MLPAI, in its reply, pointed out respondents’ specific violations of the subdivision rules:
i.installation of a second water meter and tapping the subdivision’s main water pipeline
ii.construction of “two separate entrances that are mutually exclusive of each other.”
5.Respondents filed a complaint with the RTC of Cebu for Injunction, Declatory Relief, Annulment of
Provisions of Articles and By-Laws with Prayer for Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order
(TRO)/Preliminary Injunction.
a.MLPAI moved for dismissal of the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction and
failure to comply with the arbitration clause provided for in MLPAI’s by-laws.
b.TC dismissed the complaint holding that it was the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board that
has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the case.
c.MR filed by respondents was denied.
6.CA declared the decision of RTC null and void, and ordering it to take cognizance of the case
ISSUE: Whether the HLURB and not the RTC has jurisdiction over the case.
HELD: the Home Insurance and Guaranty Corporation (HIGC), now HLURB, has original and exclusive
jurisdiction over the case. Petition Granted.
1.Pursuant to EO No 535, the HIGC assumed the regulatory and adjudicative functions of the SEC over
homeowners’ associations
2. In addition to the powers and functions vested under the Home Financing Act, the
Corporation, shall have among others, the following additional powers:
(a) . . . and exercise all the powers, authorities and responsibilities that are vested on the
Securities and Exchange Commission with respect to homeowners associations, the provision of
Act 1459, as amended by P.D. 902-A, to the contrary notwithstanding;
(b) To regulate and supervise the activities and operations of all houseowners
associations registered in accordance therewith;
2.HIGC also assumed the SEC’s original and exclusive jurisdiction under Section 5 of Presidential
Decree
No. 902-A to hear and decide cases involving:
b) Controversies arising out of intra-corporate or partnership relations, between and among
stockholders, members, or associates;
between any and/or all of them and the corporation,
partnership or association of which they are stockholders, members or associates
,
respectively; and between such corporation, partnership or association and the state insofar as it
concerns their individual franchise or right to exist as such entity;
3.PRESENT CASE: respondents are members of MLPAI as they have even admitted it. Therefore, as
correctly ruled by the trial court, the case involves a controversy between the homeowners’ association
and some of its members. Thus, the exclusive and original jurisdiction lies with the HLURB.
a.
Sta. Clara Homeowners’ Association v. Gaston
:
. . . the
HIGC exercises limited jurisdiction over homeowners' disputes
.
The law
confines its authority to controversies that arise from any of the following intra-corporate
relations
: (1) between and among members of the association; (2)
between any and/or all of
them and the association of which they are members
; and (3) between the association and
the
state
insofar as the controversy concerns its right to exist as a corporate entity.
4.The extent to which the HLURB has been vested with quasi-judicial authority must also be determined
by referring to Section 3 of P.D. No. 957:
G.R. No. 182248 December 18, 2008

EQUITABLE PCI BANKING CORPORATION

,
1

GEORGE L. GO, PATRICK D. GO, GENEVIEVE W.J. GO,

FERDINAND MARTIN G. ROMUALDEZ, OSCAR P. LOPEZ-DEE, RENE J. BUENAVENTURA,
GLORIA L.
TAN-CLIMACO, ROGELIO S. CHUA, FEDERICO C. PASCUAL, LEOPOLDO S. VEROY,
WILFRIDO V.
VERGARA, EDILBERTO V. JAVIER, ANTHONY F. CONWAY, ROMULAD U. DY TANG,
WALTER C.
WESSMER, and ANTONIO N. COTOCO vs. RCBC CAPITAL CORPORATION
The Facts

Petitioners Equitable PCI Bank, Inc. (EPCIB) and the individual shareholders of Bankard, Inc., as sellers,
and respondent
RCBC Capital Corporation (RCBC), as buyer, executed a
Share Purchase Agreemen
t
5
(
SPA) for the purchase of
petitioners’ interests in Bankard, representing 226,460,000 shares, for the price of PhP 1,786,769,400. To
expedite the
purchase, RCBC agreed to dispense with the conduct of a due diligence audit on the financial status of
Bankard.
RCBC deposited the stipulated downpayment amount in an escrow account after which it was given full
management and
operational control of Bankard.
June 2, 2000
is also considered by the parties as the
Closing Date
referred to in the SPA.
Sometime in September 2000, RCBC had Bankard’s accounts audited, creating for the purpose an audit
team
and the
conclusion was that the warranty, as contained in Section 5(h) of the SPA (simply Sec. 5[h] hereinafter),
was correct.
RCBC paid the balance of the contract price. The corresponding deeds of sale for the shares in question
were executed in
January 2001. Thereafter RCBC informed petitioners of its having overpaid the purchase price of the
subject shares,
claiming that there was an overstatement of valuation of accounts amounting to PhP 478 million,
resulting in the
overpayment of over PhP 616 million. Thus, RCBC claimed that petitioners violated their warranty, as
sellers, embodied in
Sec. 5(g) of the SPA (Sec. 5[g] hereinafter).
RCBC, in accordance with Sec. 10 of the SPA, filed a
Request for Arbitration
dated May 12, 2004 with the ICC-ICA. In the
request, RCBC charged Bankard with deviating from, contravening and not following generally accepted
accounting
principles and practices in maintaining their books.
Arbitration in the ICC-ICA proceeded after the formation of the arbitration tribunal consisting of retired
Justice Santiago M.
Kapunan, nominated by petitioners; Neil Kaplan, RCBC’s nominee; an
d Sir Ian Barker, appointed by the ICC-ICA.
After drawn out proceedings with each party alleging deviation and non-compliance by the other with
arbitration rules, the
tribunal, with Justice Kapunan dissenting, rendered a Partial Award . On the matter of prescription, the
tribunal held that
RCBC’s claim is not time
-barred, the claim properly falling under the contemplation of Sec. 5(g) and not Sec. 5(h). As
such, the tribunal concluded, RCBC’s claim was filed within the three (3)
-year period under Sec. 5(g) and that the six (6)-
month period under Sec. 5(h) did not apply.The tribunal also exonerated RCBC from laches, the latter
having sought relief
within the three (3)-year period prescribed in the SPA.
Notably, the tribunal considered the rescission of the SPA and ASPA as impracticable and "totally out of
the question."
RCBC filed with the RTC a Motion to Confirm Partial Award. The RTC issued the first assailed order
confirming the Partial
Award and denying the adverted separate motions to vacate and to suspend and inhibit. From this order,
petitioners
sought reconsideration, but their motion was denied by the RTC .
Issue: WON there is manifest disregard of the law by the ICC-ICA

Held: The petition must be denied.

This is a procedural miscue for petitioners who erroneously bypassed the Court of Appeals (CA) in
pursuit of its appeal.
While this procedural gaffe has not been raised by RCBC, still we would be remiss in not pointing out the
proper mode of
appeal from a
decision of the RTC confirming, vacating, setting aside, modifying, or correcting an arbitral award.
Rule 45 is not the remedy available to petitioners as the proper mode of appeal assailing the decision of
the RTC
confirming as arbitral award is an appeal before the CA pursuant to Sec. 46 of Republic Act No. (RA)
9285, otherwise
known as the
Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004
, or completely,
An Act to Institutionalize the Use of an Alternative
Dispute Resolution System in the Philippines and to Establish the Office for Alternative Dispute
Resolution, and for other
Purposes
, promulgated on April 2, 2004 and became effective on April 28, 2004 after its publication on April 13,
2004.
In
Korea Technologies Co., Ltd v. Lerma
, we explained,
inter alia
,
that the RTC decision of an assailed arbitral award
is appealable to the CA and may further be appealed to this Cour
t.
CHAN KENT vs. MICAREZ , G.R. No. 185758, March 9, 2011
Facts: Petitioner filed a complaint for recovery of real property and annulment of title against her parents and brother. She
alleged that the subject residential lot was purchased by her but was named under her parents under an implied trust due to the
difficulty in registering a real property in her name being married to an American citizen. However, she learned from her sister
that their parents sold the subject lot to her brother. After the issues had been joined, the RTC ordered the referral
of the case to the Philippine Mediation Center
(PMC)
. Conferences were then scheduled. Based on the Report of Mediator Esmeraldo O. Padao, Sr.
that respondents’ counsel
and representative did not appear on the conferences, the RTC issued an order allowing petitioner to present her evidence
ex parte
. It was later been clarified by Padao that it was petitioner
’s
counsel and representative who did not attend the mediation proceedings. With this, the RTC issued Order dismissing the
case. Motion for reconsideration to set aside the order, appealing the relaxation of the rule on non-appearance in the mediation
proceddings, was denied. Petitioner invoked that the dismissal of the case was not in accordance with applicable law
and jurisprudence. She claims that it was unjust because her representative and counsel did not deliberately
snub the mediation proceedings for they have attended twice the mediation conferences and only left when
respondent’s counsel
had not yet arrived. Her reason for failing to attend the last scheduled conference was due to some urgent matters caused by the
sudden increase in prices of commodities. Issue: Whether or not dismissal is the proper sanction for failure to attend
the mediation process. Ruling: Negative. Although the RTC has legal basis to order the dismissal of the case,
the Court finds the sanction too severe to be imposed on the petitioner where the records of the case is devoid of
evidence of willful or flagrant disregard of the rules on mediation proceedings. A.M. No. 01-10-5-SC-PHILJA
provides sanction including but not limited to censure, reprimand,

contempt and such other sanctions as are provided under the Rules of Court for failure to

appear for pre-trial, in case any or both of the parties absent himself/themselves, or for abusive

conduct during mediation proceedings.

The Court held that a
mere censure or reprimand would have been sufficient for petitioner’s representative and her counsel so as to be informed of
the court’s intolerance of tardiness and laxity
in the observation of its order. By failing to do so and refusing to resuscitate the case, the RTC impetuously deprived petitioner
of the opportunity to recover the land which she allegedly paid for. Unless the conduct of the party is so negligent, irresponsible,
contumacious, or dilatory as for non-appearance to provide substantial grounds for dismissal, the courts should consider lesser
sanctions which would still achieve the desired end