Professional Documents
Culture Documents
6. Malit v P
The communication must be pertinent and material to the subject
matter.
The statement uttered by an attorney while cross-examining an
adverse witness in an administrative case: "I doubt how did you become a
doctor" is not libelous or vexatious. In this case, the attorney was prompted
to say � "I doubt how did you become a doctor" when the adverse witness
who was a doctor would not answer the question as to who prepared the
document presented to her, and when the witness repeatedly evaded the
question by saying that she did not understand the word "made." (Malit vs.
People, supra)
7. Mercado v CFI
8. Agbayani v. Sayo
9. Newsweek v. IAC
Defamatory remarks directed at a group of persons is not actionable
unless the statements are all-embracing or sufficiently specific for
the victim to be identifiable.
Where the defamation is alleged to have been directed at a group or
class, it is essential that the statement must be so sweeping or all-embracing
as to apply to every individual in that group or class, or sufficiently specific
so that each individual in that class or group can prove that the defamatory
statement specifically pointed to him, so that he can bring the action
separately, if need be. (Newsweek, Inc. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court,
142 SCRA 171)
14. Santos v CA
15. Sazon v CA
16. Vazquez v CA
17. GMA Network v Bustos
SLANDER
18. Reyes v P
The words, "Agustin, putang ina mo" is a common expression in the
dialect that is often employed not really to slander but rather to express
anger or displeasure. It is seldom, if ever, taken in its literal sense by the
hearer, that is, as a reflection on the virtue of a mother. In the instant case,
it should be viewed as part of the threats voiced by appellant against the
complainant evidently to make the same more emphatic. (Reyes vs. People,
27 SCRA 686)
19. Victoria v CA
SLANDER BY DEED
22. P v Motita
WIRETAPPING
24. Ganaan v IAC
Framers of Republic Act No. 4200 were more concerned with
penalizing the act of recording a telephone conversation than
merely listening thereto.
The law refers to a "tap" of a wire or cable or the use of a "device
or arrangement" for the purpose of secretly overhearing, intercepting or
recording the communication. There must be either a physical interruption
through a wire tap or the deliberate installation of a device or arrangement
in order to overhear, intercept, or record the spoken words.
An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as a
dictaphone, dictagraph or the other devices enumerated in Section 1 of
Republic Act No. 4200 as the use thereof cannot be considered as "tapping"
the wire or cable of a telephone line. (Ganaan vs. Intermediate Appellate
Court, 145 SCRA 112)
25. Ramirez v CA
F: A civil case was filed by petitioner Ramirez alleging that the private
respondent, Garcia, allegedly insulted and humiliated her during a confrontation in
the office, in an offensive manner contrary to morals, good customs and public
policy. To support her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the
event and sought moral damages.
H: The Court ruled that the language of the law is clear and unambiguous. The
provision clearly makes it illegal for ANY person, NOT AUTHORIZED BY ALL PARTIES to
any private communication to secretly record such communication by means of a tape
recorder.
QUASI NEGLIGENCE
26. Cano v. P
F: Ambrocio Cano y Pineda was charged of the crime of damage to property with
multiple physical injuries, thru reckless imprudence.
He filed a motion to quash the information on the ground That the crime of slight
physical injuries thru reckless imprudence cannot be complexed with damage to
property, serious and less serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence.
H: It should be "reckless imprudence resulting in homicide," or "simple
imprudence causing damages to property."
When a person, by reckless imprudence, caused the death of another,
the strict technical offense is more accurately, "reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide."
When a person, by simple imprudence or negligence, caused damage
to the property of another, the strict technical offense is more accurately,
"simple imprudence causing damages to property."
Criminal negligence in our Revised Penal Code is treated as a mere
quasi-offense, and dealt separately from willful offenses. It is not a mere
question of classification or terminology. In intentional crimes, the act itself
is punished; in negligence or imprudence, what is principally penalized is
the mental attitude or condition behind the act, the dangerous recklessness,
lack of care or foresight; the "imprudeneia punible." Much of the confusion
has arisen from the common use of such descriptive phrases as "homicide
thru reckless imprudence," and the like; when the strict technical offense
is more accurately, "reckless imprudence resulting in homicide," or "simple
imprudence causing damages to property."
27. Ibabao v. P
F: A witness saw a Hit and Run accident and recognized the accused as the driver of
the jeep.
He was convicted by the trial court and increased his penalty for failure to render
aid to the victim
H: His failure to render aid to the victim cannot be considered as an aggravating
circumstance and cannot be used to inrease the penalty because the same is not
alleged in the information.
The increased penalty is inapplicable to him because the failure to give aid to the
injured on the spot has not been alleged in the Information.
"the failure to render assistance, constitutes a qualifying circumstances because
the presence thereof raises the penalty by one degree (like treachery which
qualifies homicide to murder). The same must be alleged in the information to
apprise the defendant of this charge unlike an ordinary aggravating circumstance
which even if not alleged in the information, can be taken into account if proved
at the trial without objection.
28. Buerano v. CA
F: The trial court found the pertitioner guilty for slight and lessserious physical
injuries through reckless imprudence.
Another case was filed for the Crime of Damage to property through
recklessimprudence. Petitioner filed motion to quash: he asserts it�s double
jeopardy forhe has been convicted already of slight and less serious
physicalinjuries through reckless imprudence
H: Double jeopardy exists where reckless act resulted in damage to property;
Conviction of accused in the charge of slight and less serious physical injuries
through reckless imprudence constitutes double jeopardy to the charge of the crime
of damage to property throughreckless imprudence. He stressed that �if double
jeopardy existswhere the reckless act resulted into homicide and physicalinjuries,
then the same consequence must perforce follow wherethe same reckless act caused
merely damage to property �notdeath�and physical injuries. Verily, the value of a
human lifelost as a result of a vehicular collision cannot be equated with
anyamount of damages caused to a motor vehicle arising from thesame mishap.�
29. Gan v. CA
F: While Gan was driving his vehicle, there was a vehicle from the opposite
direction which tried to overtake encroaching the lane of the car driven by Gano.
To avoid head on collision Gano swerved to the right and as a consequence hit an
old man.
H: The SC finds the petitioner not guilty of the crime of simple imprudence
resulting in Homicide. Under the emergency rule, one who suddenly fonds himself in
a place of danger, and is required to act w/o tme to consider the best means that
may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence, if he
fails to adopt what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to have been a
better method, unless the emergency in which he finds himself is brought about by
his own negligence.