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LIBEL

6. Malit v P
The communication must be pertinent and material to the subject
matter.
The statement uttered by an attorney while cross-examining an
adverse witness in an administrative case: "I doubt how did you become a
doctor" is not libelous or vexatious. In this case, the attorney was prompted
to say � "I doubt how did you become a doctor" when the adverse witness
who was a doctor would not answer the question as to who prepared the
document presented to her, and when the witness repeatedly evaded the
question by saying that she did not understand the word "made." (Malit vs.
People, supra)

7. Mercado v CFI
8. Agbayani v. Sayo
9. Newsweek v. IAC
Defamatory remarks directed at a group of persons is not actionable
unless the statements are all-embracing or sufficiently specific for
the victim to be identifiable.
Where the defamation is alleged to have been directed at a group or
class, it is essential that the statement must be so sweeping or all-embracing
as to apply to every individual in that group or class, or sufficiently specific
so that each individual in that class or group can prove that the defamatory
statement specifically pointed to him, so that he can bring the action
separately, if need be. (Newsweek, Inc. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court,
142 SCRA 171)

10. Lacsa v. IAC


11. Soriano v. IAC
12. Bulletin Publishing v Noel

13. MVRS Publication v Isalmic De Wah Council


Defamation.
Defamation, which includes libel and slander, means the offense of
injuring a person's character, fame or reputation through false and malicious
statements. It is that which tends to injure reputation or to diminish the
esteem, respect, good will or confidence in the plaintiff or to excite derogatory
feelings or opinions about the plaintiff. It is the publication of anything
which is injurious to the good name or reputation of another or tends to
bring him into disrepute. Defamation is an invasion of a relational interest
since it involves the opinion which others in the community may have, or
tend to have, of the plaintiff. (MVRS Pub. Inc. vs. Islamic Da'wah Council of
the Phils., Inc., G.R. No. 135306, 444 Phil. 230, 241 [2003])

14. Santos v CA

15. Sazon v CA

16. Vazquez v CA
17. GMA Network v Bustos

SLANDER
18. Reyes v P
The words, "Agustin, putang ina mo" is a common expression in the
dialect that is often employed not really to slander but rather to express
anger or displeasure. It is seldom, if ever, taken in its literal sense by the
hearer, that is, as a reflection on the virtue of a mother. In the instant case,
it should be viewed as part of the threats voiced by appellant against the
complainant evidently to make the same more emphatic. (Reyes vs. People,
27 SCRA 686)

19. Victoria v CA

20. P v Judge Orcullo


21. Villanueva v P
Slander is libel committed by oral (spoken) means, instead of in writing.
The term oral defamation or slander as now understood, has been defined as
the speaking of base and defamatory words which tend to prejudice another
in his reputation, office, trade, business or means of livelihood. (Villanueva
vs. People: G.R. No. 160351, April 10, 2006, 487 SCRA 42)
Pointing a dirty finger constitutes simple slander by deed.
Pointing a dirty finger ordinarily connotes the phrase "Fuck You," which
is similar to the expression "Puta" or "Putang Ina mo," in local parlance.
Such expression was not held to be libelous in Reyes vs. People, 137 Phil. 112,
120 (1969), where the Court said that: "This is a common enough expression
in the dialect that is often employed, not really to slander but rather to
express anger or displeasure. It is seldom, if ever, taken in its literal sense
by the hearer, that is, as a reflection on the virtues of a mother." Following
Reyes, and in light of the fact that there was a perceived provocation coming
from complainant, petitioner's act of pointing a dirty finger at complainant
constitutes simple slander by deed, it appearing from the factual milieu of
the case that the act complained of was employed by petitioner "to express
anger or displeasure" at complainant for procrastinating the approval of his
leave monetization. While it may have cast dishonor, discredit or contempt
upon complainant, said act is not of a serious nature. (Villanueva vs. People,
G.R. No. 160351, April 10, 2006)
As a public official, petitioner, who was holding the position of
Councilor at that time, is hidebound to be an exemplar to society against
the use of intemperate language particularly because the offended party
was a Vice-Mayor. However, we cannot keep a blind eye to the fact that
scathing words were uttered by petitioner in the heat of anger triggered by
the fact that complainant refused, without valid justification to approve the
monetization of accrued leave credits of petitioner, the crime committed is
only slight oral defamation. (Villanueva vs. People, G.R. No. 160351, April
10,2006)

SLANDER BY DEED
22. P v Motita

INCRIMINATING AN INNOCENT PERSON


23. P v Alagao

WIRETAPPING
24. Ganaan v IAC
Framers of Republic Act No. 4200 were more concerned with
penalizing the act of recording a telephone conversation than
merely listening thereto.
The law refers to a "tap" of a wire or cable or the use of a "device
or arrangement" for the purpose of secretly overhearing, intercepting or
recording the communication. There must be either a physical interruption
through a wire tap or the deliberate installation of a device or arrangement
in order to overhear, intercept, or record the spoken words.
An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as a
dictaphone, dictagraph or the other devices enumerated in Section 1 of
Republic Act No. 4200 as the use thereof cannot be considered as "tapping"
the wire or cable of a telephone line. (Ganaan vs. Intermediate Appellate
Court, 145 SCRA 112)
25. Ramirez v CA
F: A civil case was filed by petitioner Ramirez alleging that the private
respondent, Garcia, allegedly insulted and humiliated her during a confrontation in
the office, in an offensive manner contrary to morals, good customs and public
policy. To support her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the
event and sought moral damages.
H: The Court ruled that the language of the law is clear and unambiguous. The
provision clearly makes it illegal for ANY person, NOT AUTHORIZED BY ALL PARTIES to
any private communication to secretly record such communication by means of a tape
recorder.

QUASI NEGLIGENCE
26. Cano v. P
F: Ambrocio Cano y Pineda was charged of the crime of damage to property with
multiple physical injuries, thru reckless imprudence.
He filed a motion to quash the information on the ground That the crime of slight
physical injuries thru reckless imprudence cannot be complexed with damage to
property, serious and less serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence.
H: It should be "reckless imprudence resulting in homicide," or "simple
imprudence causing damages to property."
When a person, by reckless imprudence, caused the death of another,
the strict technical offense is more accurately, "reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide."
When a person, by simple imprudence or negligence, caused damage
to the property of another, the strict technical offense is more accurately,
"simple imprudence causing damages to property."
Criminal negligence in our Revised Penal Code is treated as a mere
quasi-offense, and dealt separately from willful offenses. It is not a mere
question of classification or terminology. In intentional crimes, the act itself
is punished; in negligence or imprudence, what is principally penalized is
the mental attitude or condition behind the act, the dangerous recklessness,
lack of care or foresight; the "imprudeneia punible." Much of the confusion
has arisen from the common use of such descriptive phrases as "homicide
thru reckless imprudence," and the like; when the strict technical offense
is more accurately, "reckless imprudence resulting in homicide," or "simple
imprudence causing damages to property."

27. Ibabao v. P
F: A witness saw a Hit and Run accident and recognized the accused as the driver of
the jeep.
He was convicted by the trial court and increased his penalty for failure to render
aid to the victim
H: His failure to render aid to the victim cannot be considered as an aggravating
circumstance and cannot be used to inrease the penalty because the same is not
alleged in the information.
The increased penalty is inapplicable to him because the failure to give aid to the
injured on the spot has not been alleged in the Information.
"the failure to render assistance, constitutes a qualifying circumstances because
the presence thereof raises the penalty by one degree (like treachery which
qualifies homicide to murder). The same must be alleged in the information to
apprise the defendant of this charge unlike an ordinary aggravating circumstance
which even if not alleged in the information, can be taken into account if proved
at the trial without objection.

28. Buerano v. CA
F: The trial court found the pertitioner guilty for slight and lessserious physical
injuries through reckless imprudence.
Another case was filed for the Crime of Damage to property through
recklessimprudence. Petitioner filed motion to quash: he asserts it�s double
jeopardy forhe has been convicted already of slight and less serious
physicalinjuries through reckless imprudence
H: Double jeopardy exists where reckless act resulted in damage to property;
Conviction of accused in the charge of slight and less serious physical injuries
through reckless imprudence constitutes double jeopardy to the charge of the crime
of damage to property throughreckless imprudence. He stressed that �if double
jeopardy existswhere the reckless act resulted into homicide and physicalinjuries,
then the same consequence must perforce follow wherethe same reckless act caused
merely damage to property �notdeath�and physical injuries. Verily, the value of a
human lifelost as a result of a vehicular collision cannot be equated with
anyamount of damages caused to a motor vehicle arising from thesame mishap.�

29. Gan v. CA
F: While Gan was driving his vehicle, there was a vehicle from the opposite
direction which tried to overtake encroaching the lane of the car driven by Gano.
To avoid head on collision Gano swerved to the right and as a consequence hit an
old man.

H: The SC finds the petitioner not guilty of the crime of simple imprudence
resulting in Homicide. Under the emergency rule, one who suddenly fonds himself in
a place of danger, and is required to act w/o tme to consider the best means that
may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence, if he
fails to adopt what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to have been a
better method, unless the emergency in which he finds himself is brought about by
his own negligence.

30. Carillo v. People


F: Catherine Acosta, 13 y.o, had an appendicitis. Petitioner anesthesiologist when
summoned could not be readily found and when he finally appeared at 10:30 in the
evening, he was evidently in a bad temper. He did not perform any weight test to
determine the right amount of anestesia to be used on Catherine. After the
operation, complications arose and she was in comatose. After 3 days she died.

H: The circumstance indicative that he was not disposed to attend to this


unexpected call, in violation of the canons of his profession that as a physician,
he should serve the interest of his patient "with the greatest of solicitude,
giving them always his best talent and skill." In the crime of simple negligence,
the gravamen of the offense is the failure to exercise the diligence necessitated
or called for the situation which was not immediately life-destructive but which
culminated, in the present case, in the death of a human being three (3) days
later.

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