PART EIGHT: HABEAS CORPUS

VI. HABEAS CORPUS AS A POST-CONVICTION REMEDIES

GLENN CABALLES y CHUA v COURT OF APPEALS, HON. EMMANUEL D.

LAUREA, HON. BENJAMIN T. ANTONIO, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES.
G.R. No. 163108 February 23, 2005 (CALLEJO Sr. J) SECOND DIVISION

DOCTRINE: The writ of habeas corpus does not act upon the prisoner who seeks relief, but
upon the person who holds him in what is alleged to be the unlawful authority.

FACTS:

Petitioner Glenn Chua Caballes was charged with rape of a minor in the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Malabon City. The case was docketed and presided by Judge Emmanuel D.
Laurea. Because the petitioner was charged with a non-bailable offense, he was detained. The
petitioner was arraigned and pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. The prosecution presented
two witnesses, namely, Venice Vera Pio, the private complainant, and her mother. The
petitioner, through counsel, commenced his cross-examination of Pio, but failed to complete the
same. The petitioner engaged the services of a new counsel, Atty. Noel S. Sorreda, who entered
his appearance as defense counsel. The trial was marred with many postponements for various
reasons, most prominently the continued failure of Dr. Jose Arnel Marquez to appear as a
witness. Caballes then filed a motion seeking an earlier trial date, invoking his right to speedy
trial under the Speedy Trial Act of 1998, as well as a motion for the urgent resolution of his
petition for bail. The court issued an Order declaring that the petition for bail was submitted for
its resolution and denying the motion for an earlier trial date. It then issued another order
denying the petition for bail, on its finding that the evidence of guilt against the petitioner was
strong. The Motion for Reconsideration was denied. Caballes then filed a motion to dismiss
invoking his right to speedy trial, claiming that the trial now lasted close to 400 days, far longer
than the 180 day reglementary period. The Motion however was denied. Judge Laurea then
inhibited himself from the trial. Caballes thus filed a “Petition for Habeas Corpus and/or
Certiorari and Prohibition.” The Court of appeal required him to inform the court of his choice
of remedy. In compliance therewith, he filed a manifestation that he had chosen his petition to
be treated as a petition for habeas corpus without prejudice “to the concomitant application of
certiorari if the court considered the same necessary or appropriate to give effect to the writ of
habeas corpus.”The Court of Appeals Dismissed the same dismissed the petition for habeas
corpus for being the wrong remedy. Hence the petitioner appealed to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Is a petition for habeas corpus the proper remedy for Caballes in this case?

RULING:

A writ of habeas corpus is not the proper remedy to assail the trial courts denial of the
petitioner’s motion to dismiss the case, the denial of the petition for bail, as well as the voluntary
inhibition of Judge Laurea.

A petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus is a special proceeding governed by
Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, as amended. In Ex Parte Billings, it was held that habeas
corpus is that of a civil proceeding in character. It seeks the enforcement of civil rights.
Resorting to the writ is not to inquire into the criminal act of which the complaint is made, but
into the right of liberty, notwithstanding the act and the immediate purpose to be served is relief
from illegal restraint. The rule applies even when instituted to arrest a criminal prosecution and
secure freedom. When a prisoner petitions for a writ of habeas corpus, he thereby commences a
suit and prosecutes a case in that court.

Habeas corpus is not in the nature of a writ of error; nor intended as substitute for the trial
courts function. It cannot take the place of appeal, certiorari or writ of error. The writ cannot be
used to investigate and consider questions of error that might be raised relating to procedure or
on the merits. The inquiry in a habeas corpus proceeding is addressed to the question of whether
the proceedings and the assailed order are, for any reason, null and void. The writ is not
ordinarily granted where the law provides for other remedies in the regular course, and in the
absence of exceptional circumstances. Moreover, habeas corpus should not be granted in
advance of trial. The orderly course of trial must be pursued and the usual remedies exhausted
before resorting to the writ where exceptional circumstances are extant. In another case, it was
held that habeas corpus cannot be issued as a writ of error or as a means of reviewing errors of
law and irregularities not involving the questions of jurisdiction occurring during the course of
the trial, subject to the caveat that constitutional safeguards of human life and liberty must be
preserved, and not destroyed. It has also been held that where restraint is under legal process,
mere errors and irregularities, which do not render the proceedings void, are not grounds for
relief by habeas corpus because in such cases, the restraint is not illegal.

Habeas corpus is a summary remedy. It is analogous to a proceeding in rem when

instituted for the sole purpose of having the person of restraint presented before the judge in
order that the cause of his detention may be inquired into and his statements final. The writ
of habeas corpus does not act upon the prisoner who seeks relief, but upon the person who holds
him in what is alleged to be the unlawful authority. Hence, the only parties before the court are
the petitioner (prisoner) and the person holding the petitioner in custody, and the only question to
be resolved is whether the custodian has authority to deprive the petitioner of his liberty. The
writ may be denied if the petitioner fails to show facts that he is entitled theretoex merito
justicias.

A writ of habeas corpus, which is regarded as a palladium of liberty is a prerogative writ

which does not issue as a matter of right but in the sound discretion of the court or judge. It, is,
however, a writ of right on proper formalities being made by proof. Resort to the writ is to
inquire into the criminal act of which a complaint is made but unto the right of liberty,
notwithstanding the act, and the immediate purpose to be served is relief from illegal
restraint. The primary, if not the only object of the writ of habeas corpus ad subjuciendum is to
determine the legality of the restraint under which a person is held.
PART EIGHT: WRIT OF AMPARO

VIII. PROHIBITED PLEADINGS

SECRETARY LEILA M. DE LIMA, DIRECTOR NONNATUS R. ROJAS and DEPUTY

DIRECTOR REYNALDO ESMERALDA v MAGTANGGOL B. GATDUL

G.R. No. 204528 February 19, 2013 (LEONEN,J.) EN BANC

DOCTRINE: If the allegations are proven with substantial evidence, the court shall grant the
privilege of the writ and such reliefs as may be proper and appropriate. The judgment should
contain measures which the judge views as essential for the continued protection of the petitioner
in the Amparo case. These measures must be detailed enough so that the judge may be able to
verify and monitor the actions taken by the respondents. It is this judgment that could be subject
to appeal to the Supreme Court via Rule 45.

FACTS:

Respondent Magtanggol B. Gatdula filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of

Amparo in the Regional Trial Court of Manila. The Amparo was directed against petitioners
Justice Secretary Leila M. De Lima, Director Nonnatus R. Rojas and Deputy Director Reynaldo
O. Esmeralda of the National Bureau of Investigation. Gatdula wanted De Lima, et al. "to cease
and desist from framing up Petitioner Gatdula for the fake ambush incident by filing bogus
charges of Frustrated Murder against Petitioner Gatdula in relation to the alleged ambush
incident." Instead of deciding on whether to issue a Writ of Amparo, the judge issued summons
and ordered De Lima, et al. to file an Answer. He also set the case for hearing on 1 March 2012.
The hearing was held allegedly for determining whether a temporary protection order may be
issued. During that hearing, counsel for De Lima, et al. manifested that a Return, not an Answer,
is appropriate for Amparo cases. The RTC Judge ordered that since no writ has been issued,
return is not the required pleading but answer. The Judge noted that the Rules of Court apply
suppletorily in Amparo cases. He opined that the Revised Rules of Summary Procedure applied
and thus required an Answer. Judge Pampilo proceeded to conduct a hearing on the main case.
Even without a Return nor an Answer, he ordered the parties to file their respective memoranda
within five (5) working days. The RTC granted the issuance of the Writ of Amparo. The RTC
also granted the interim reliefs prayed for, namely temporary protection, production and
inspection orders in relation to the evidence and reports involving an on-going investigation of
the attempted assassination of Deputy Director Esmeralda. RTC denied herein petitioners’ MR.
Petitioners thus came to the SC assailing the RTC "Decision" dated 20 March 2012 through a
Petition for Review on Certiorari with a very urgent application for the Issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order/Writ of Preliminary Injunction via Rule 45.

ISSUE:

Is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 the proper remedy in the present
case?

RULING:

No it is not the proper remedy in this case. The "Decision" dated 20 March 2012
granting the writ of Amparo is not the judgment or final order contemplated under Rule 45.
Hence, a Petition for Review under Rule 45 may not yet be the proper remedy at this time. The
"Decision" dated 20 March 2012 assailed by the petitioners could not be the judgment or final
order that is appealable under Section 19 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo. This is clear from
the tenor of the dispositive portion of the "Decision" which merely directs the issuance and
service of the Writ of Amparo. The "Decision" is thus an interlocutory order, as suggested by
the fact that temporary protection, production and inspection orders were given together with the
decision. The temporary protection, production and inspection orders are interim reliefs that may
be granted by the court upon filing of the petition but before final judgment is rendered. The
confusion of the parties arose due to the procedural irregularities in the RTC First, the insistence
on filing of an Answer was inappropriate. It is the Return that serves as the responsive pleading
for petitions for the issuance of Writs of Amparo. The requirement to file an Answer is contrary
to the intention of the Court to provide a speedy remedy Under Section 25 of the same rule on
the Writ of Amparo, the Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily insofar as it is not inconsistent
with the said rule. It is clear from this rule that this type of summary procedure only applies to
MTC/MTCC/MCTCs. The Supreme court noted that it is mind-boggling how this rule could
possibly apply to proceedings in an RTC. Aside from that, this Court limited the application of
summary procedure to certain civil and criminal cases. A writ of Amparo is a special proceeding.
Second was the holding of a hearing on the main case prior to the issuance of the writ and the
filing of a Return. Without a Return, the issues could not have been properly joined. Third
irregularity: it required a memorandum in lieu of a responsive pleading of De Lima, et al. The
fourth irregularity was in the "Decision" dated 20 March 2012 itself. "Accordingly the Supreme
Court court granted the privilege of the writ and the interim reliefs prayed for by the petitioner."
The Court then directed Judge Pampilo to determine within forty-eight hours from his receipt of
this Resolution whether the issuance of the Writ of Amparo is proper on the basis of the petition
and its attached affidavits.

PART EIGHT: WRIT OF AMPARO

VIII. PROHIBITED PLEADINGS

EDGARDO NAVIA, RUBEN DIO, and ANDREW BUISING, Petitioners,

vs.
VIRGINIA PARDICO, for and in behalf and in representation of BENHUR V.
PARDICO Respondent.
G.R. No. 184467 June 19, 2012

DOCTRINE: Awrit of amparo may lie against a private individual or entity. But even if the
person sought to be held accountable or responsible in an amparo petition is a private individual
or entity, still, government involvement in the disappearance remains an indispensable element.

FACTS: On March 31, 2008, at around 8:30 p.m., a vehicle of Asian Land Strategies
Corporation arrived at the house of Lolita M. Lapore located at 7A Lot 9, Block 54, Grand
Royale Subdivision, Barangay Lugam, Malolos City. The arrival of the vehicle awakened
Lolita’s son, Enrique Lapore, and Benhur Pardico, who were then both staying in her house.
When Lolita went out to investigate, she saw two uniformed guards disembarking from the
vehicle. One of them immediately asked Lolita where they could find her son Bong. Before
Lolita could answer, the guard saw Bong and told him that he and Ben should go with them to
the security office of Asian Land because a complaint was lodged against them for theft of
electric wires and lamps in the subdivision.

Shortly thereafter, Bong, Lolita and Ben were in the office of the security department of Asian
Land also located in Grand Royale Subdivision. The supervisor of the security guards, petitioner
Edgardo Navia, also arrived thereat. As to what transpired next, the parties’ respective versions
diverge.

Petitioners alleged that they invited Bong and Ben to their office because they received a report
from a certain Mrs. Emphasis, a resident of Grand Royale Subdivision, that she saw Bong and
Ben removing a lamp from a post in said subdivision. At the security office, Dio and Buising
interviewed Bong and Ben. The suspects admitted that they took the lamp but clarified that they
were only transferring it to a post nearer to the house of Lolita. Soon, Navia arrived and Buising
informed him that the complainant was not keen in participating in the investigation. Since there
was no complainant, Navia ordered the release of Bong and Ben. Bong then signed a statement
to the effect that the guards released him without inflicting any harm or injury to him. His mother
Lolita also signed the logbook below an entry which states that she will never again harbor or
entertain Ben in her house. Thereafter, Lolita and Bong left the security office.

Ben was left behind as Navia was still talking to him about those who might be involved in the
reported loss of electric wires and lamps within the subdivision. After a brief discussion though,
Navia allowed Ben to leave. Ben also affixed his signature on the logbook to affirm the
statements entered by the guards that he was released unharmed and without any injury.

According to respondent, Bong and Ben were not merely invited. They were unlawfully arrested,
shoved into the Asian Land vehicle and brought to the security office for investigation. Upon
seeing Ben at the security office, Navia lividly grumbled "Ikaw na naman?" and slapped him
while he was still seated. Ben begged for mercy, but his pleas were met with a flurry of punches
coming from Navia hitting him on different parts of his body. Navia then took hold of his gun,
looked at Bong, and said, "Wala kang nakita at wala kang narinig, papatayin ko na si Ben." Bong
admitted that he and Ben attempted to take the lamp. He explained that the area where their
house is located is very dark and his father had long been asking the administrator of Grand
Royale Subdivision to install a lamp to illumine their area. But since nothing happened, he took
it upon himself to take a lamp from one of the posts in the subdivision and transfer it to a post
near their house. However, the lamp Bong got was no longer working. Thus, he reinstalled it on
the post from which he took it and no longer pursued his plan. Moments after Lolita and Bong
reached their house, Buising arrived and asked Lolita to sign the logbook again. Lolita asked
Buising why she had to sign again when she already twice signed the logbook at the
headquarters. Buising assured her that what she was about to sign only pertains to Bong’s
release. Since it was dark and she has poor eyesight, Lolita took Buising’s word and signed the
logbook without, again, reading what was written in it.

The following morning, Virginia went to the Asian Land security office to visit her husband Ben,
but only to be told that petitioners had already released him together with Bong the night before.
She then looked for Ben, asked around, and went to the barangay. Since she could not still find
her husband, Virginia reported the matter to the police. Exasperated with the mysterious
disappearance of her husband, Virginia filed a Petition for Writ of Amparo before the RTC of
Malolos City. Finding the petition sufficient in form and substance, the amparo court issued an
Order dated June 26, 2008 directing, among others, the issuance of a writ of amparo and the
production of the body of Ben before it on June 30, 2008.

ISSUE: Is the issuance of a writ of amparo proper in this case?

RULING: No, for the protective writ of amparo to issue, allegation and proof that the persons
subject thereof are missing are not enough. It must also be shown and proved by substantial
evidence that the disappearance was carried out by, or with the authorization, support or
acquiescence of, the State or a political organization, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the
same or give information on the fate or whereabouts of said missing persons, with the intention
of removing them from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time. Simply put, the
petitioner in an amparo case has the burden of proving by substantial evidence the indispensable
element of government participation.

But lest it be overlooked, in an amparo petition, proof of disappearance alone is not enough. It is
likewise essential to establish that such disappearance was carried out with the direct or indirect
authorization, support or acquiescence of the government. This indispensable element of State
participation is not present in this case. The petition does not contain any allegation of State
complicity, and none of the evidence presented tend to show that the government or any of its
agents orchestrated Bens disappearance. In fact, none of its agents, officials, or employees were
impleaded or implicated in Virginia's amparo petition whether as responsible or accountable
persons.51 Thus, in the absence of an allegation or proof that the government or its agents had a
hand in Bens disappearance or that they failed to exercise extraordinary diligence in
investigating his case, the Court will definitely not hold the government or its agents either as
responsible or accountable persons.

Under Section 1 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC a writ of amparo may lie against a private individual or
entity. But even if the person sought to be held accountable or responsible in an amparo petition
is a private individual or entity, still, government involvement in the disappearance remains an
indispensable element. Here, petitioners are mere security guards at Grand Royale Subdivision in
Brgy. Lugam, Malolos City and their principal, the Asian Land, is a private entity. They do not
work for the government and nothing has been presented that would link or connect them to
some covert police, military or governmental operation. As discussed above, to fall within the
ambit of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC in relation to RA No. 9851, the disappearance must be attended
by some governmental involvement. This hallmark of State participation differentiates an
enforced disappearance case from an ordinary case of a missing person.
PART EIGHT: WRIT OF AMPARO

VIII. PROHIBITED PLEADINGS

Reverend Father ROBERT P. REYES, Petitioner,

vs.
RAUL M. GONZALEZ, in his capacity as the secretary of the COURT OF APPEALS,
secretary DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, AND COMMISSIONER MARCELINO C.
LIBANAN, IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE COMMISSIONER OF THE BUREAU OF
IMMIGRATION, Respondents.
G.R. No. 182161 December 3, 2009

DOCTRINE: A writ of Amparo shall be issued if the Court is preliminarily satisfied with the
prima facie existence of the ultimate facts determinable from the supporting affidavits that detail
the circumstances of how and to what extent a threat to or violation of the rights to life, liberty
and security of the aggrieved party was or is being committed.

FACTS: Petitioner was among those arrested in the Manila Peninsula Hotel siege on November
30, 2007. In the morning of November 30, 2007, petitioner together with fifty (50) others, were
brought to Camp Crame to await inquest proceedings. In the evening of the same day, the
Department of Justice (DOJ) Panel of Prosecutors, composed of Emmanuel Y. Velasco, Phillip
L. Dela Cruz and Aristotle M. Reyes, conducted inquest proceedings to ascertain whether or not
there was probable cause to hold petitioner and the others for trial on charges of Rebellion and/or
Inciting to Rebellion.

Upon the request of the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG), respondent DOJ
Secretary Raul Gonzales issued Hold Departure Order (HDO) No. 45 ordering respondent
Commissioner of Immigration to include in the Hold Departure List of the Bureau of
Immigration and Deportation (BID) the name of petitioner and 49 others relative to the
aforementioned case in the interest of national security and public safety.

After finding probable cause against petitioner and 36 others for the crime of Rebellion under
Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code, the DOJ Panel of Prosecutors filed an Information
Regional Trial Court, Branch 150 of Makati City.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause and Release of the
Accused Fr. Reyes Upon Recognizance asserting that the DOJ panel failed to produce any
evidence indicating his specific participation in the crime charged; and that under the
Constitution, the determination of probable cause must be made personally by a judge.

The RTC issued an Order dismissing the charge for Rebellion against petitioner and 17 others for
lack of probable cause. The trial court ratiocinated that the evidence submitted by the DOJ Panel
of Investigating Prosecutors failed to show that petitioner and the other accused-civilians
conspired and confederated with the accused-soldiers in taking arms against the government; that
petitioner and other accused-civilians were arrested because they ignored the call of the police
despite the deadline given to them to come out from the 2nd Floor of the Hotel and submit
themselves to the police authorities; that mere presence at the scene of the crime and expressing
one’s sentiments on electoral and political reforms did not make them conspirators absent
concrete evidence that the accused-civilians knew beforehand the intent of the accused-soldiers
to commit rebellion; and that the cooperation which the law penalizes must be one that is
knowingly and intentionally rendered.

Counsel for petitioner file thru the DOJ for the lifting of the HDO since despite the dismissal of
the crime of rebellion, he was held by the BID officials at NAIA as his name is included in the
Hold Departure List. This happens every time he left for abroad. Writ of Amparo was filed on
the ground that the respondents violated the petitioner’s constitutional right to travel.

The petition for a writ of amparo is anchored on the ground that respondents violated petitioner’s
constitutional right to travel. Petitioner argues that the DOJ Secretary has no power to issue a
Hold Departure Order (HDO) and the subject HDO No. 45 has no legal basis since Criminal
Case No. 07-3126 has already been dismissed.
The CA rendered the assailed Decision dismissing the petition and denying the privilege of the
writ of amparo.

ISSUE: Was the petitioner’s right to liberty has been violated or threatened with violation by the
issuance of the subject HDO, which would entitle him to the privilege of the writ of amparo?

RULING: No, it was not. The writ shall issue if the Court is preliminarily satisfied with the
prima facie existence of the ultimate facts determinable from the supporting affidavits that detail
the circumstances of how and to what extent a threat to or violation of the rights to life, liberty
and security of the aggrieved party was or is being committed. Petitioner invokes this
extraordinary remedy of the writ of amparo for the protection of his right to travel. He insists that
he is entitled to the protection covered by the Rule on the Writ of Amparo because the HDO is a
continuing actual restraint on his right to travel. The Court is thus called upon to rule whether or
not the right to travel is covered by the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.The rights that fall within the
protective mantle of the Writ of Amparo under Section 1 of the Rules thereon are the following:
(1) right to life; (2) right to liberty; and (3) right to security.
The restriction on petitioner’s right to travel as a consequence of the pendency of the criminal
case filed against him was not unlawful. Petitioner has also failed to establish that his right to
travel was impaired in the manner and to the extent that it amounted to a serious violation of his
right to life, liberty and security, for which there exists no readily available legal recourse or
remedy.