ROLANDO TING v.

HEIRS OF DIEGO LIRIO

518 SCRA 334 (2007), SECOND DIVISION

The Court of First Instance of Cebu granted an application filed by the Spouses
Diego Lirio and Flora Atienza for registration of a certain parcel of land. A certificate of
title was thereafter issued to Spouses Lirio. On February 12, 1997, Rolando Ting filed with
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu an application for registration of title over the
same lot. The RTC dismissed Ting‘s application on the ground of res judicata.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the application for land registration should be barred for being res
judicata

Held:

In a registration proceeding instituted for the registration of a private land, with or

without opposition, the judgment of the court confirming the title of the applicant or
oppositor, as the case may be, and ordering its registration in his name constitutes, when
final, res judicata against the whole world. It becomes final when no appeal within the
reglementary period is taken from a judgment of confirmation and registration. The land
registration proceedings being in rem, the land registration court‘s approval in LRC No.
N-983 of spouses Diego Lirio and Flora Atienza‘s application for registration of the lot
settled its ownership, and is binding on the whole world including Ting.

Ting insists that the duty of the respondent land registration officials to issue the decree
is purely ministerial. It is ministerial in the sense that they act under the orders of the
court and the decree must be in conformity with the decision of the court and with the
data found in the record, and they have no discretion in the matter. However, if they are
in doubt upon any point in relation to the preparation and issuance of the decree, it is
their duty to refer the matter to the court. They act, in this respect, as officials of the court
and not as administrative officials, and their act is the act of the court. They are specifically
called upon to “extend assistance to courts in ordinary and cadastral land registration
proceedings.”

As for Ting‘s claim that under Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court reading: SEC.
6. Execution by motion or by independent action. – A final and executory judgment or
order may be executed on motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry. After
the lapse of such time, and before it is barred by the statute of limitations, a judgment
may be enforced by action. The revived judgment may also be enforced by motion within
five (5) years from the date of its entry and thereafter by action before it is barred by the
statute of limitations, the December 10, 1976 decision became “extinct” in light of the
failure of respondents and/or of their predecessors-in-interest to execute the same within
the prescriptive period, the same does not lie.
Authority for this theory is the provision in the Rules of Court to the effect that judgment
may be enforced within 5 years by motion, and after five years but within 10 years, by an
action (Sec. 6, Rule 39.) This provision of the Rules refers to civil actions and is not
applicable to special proceedings, such as a land registration case. This is so because a
party in a civil action must immediately enforce a judgment that is secured as against
the adverse party, and his failure to act to enforce the same within a reasonable time as
provided in the Rules makes the decision unenforceable against the losing party. In
special proceedings the purpose is to establish a status, condition or fact; in land
registration proceedings, the ownership by a person of a parcel of land is sought to be
established. After the ownership has been proved and confirmed by judicial declaration,
no further proceeding to enforce said ownership is necessary, except when the adverse or
losing party had been in possession of the land and the winning party desires to oust him
therefrom.

LABURADA vs. LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY

[G.R. No. 101387, March 11, 1998]

FACTS:
Sps. Laburada applied for the registration of Lot 3-A which was approved by
the trial court. Upon motion of petitioners, the trial court issued an order requiring
the LRA to issue the corresponding decree of registration. However, the LRA refused.
Hence, petitioners filed an action for mandamus.
The LRA revealed that based on records, Lot 3-A which sought to be registered
by Sps. Laburada is part of Lot No. 3, over which TCT No. 6595 has already been
issued. Upon the other hand, Lot 3-B of said Lot 3 is covered by Transfer Certificate
of Title No. 29337 issued in the name of Pura Escurdia Vda. de Buenaflor, which was
issued as a transfer from TCT No. 6595. The LRA contended that to issue the
corresponding decree of registration sought by the petitioners, it would result in the
duplication of titles over the same parcel of land, and thus contravene the policy and
purpose of the Torrens registration system, and destroy the integrity of the same.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the LRA may be compelled by mandamus to issue a decree of
registration if it has evidence that the subject land may already be included in an
existing Torrens certificate of title?
HELD:
NO. It is settled that a land registration court has no jurisdiction to order the
registration of land already decreed in the name of another in an earlier land
registration case. A second decree for the same land would be null and void, since
the principle behind original registration is to register a parcel of land only once. Thus,
if it is proven that the land which petitioners are seeking to register has already been
registered in 1904 and 1905, the issuance of a decree of registration to petitioners
will run counter to said principle. The issuance of a decree of registration is part of
the judicial function of courts and is not a mere ministerial act which may be
compelled through mandamus. It is not legally proper to require the LRA to issue a
decree of registration.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED but the case is REMANDED to
the court of origin in Pasig City. The LRA, on the other hand, is ORDERED to submit
to the court a quo a report determining with finality whether Lot 3-A is included in
the property described in TCT No. 6595, within sixty (60) days from notice. After
receipt of such report, the land registration court, in turn, is ordered to ACT, with
deliberate and judicious speed, to settle the issue of whether the LRA may issue the
decree of registration, according to the facts and the law as herein discussed.
Baldoz v. Papa
Facts: The spouses Bruno Papa and Valentina Agaceta, parents of herein appellees, applied for the
registration under Act 496 of a parcel of land (Psu-59688) containing an area of 37,671 sq. meters in
the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan (Case No. 2215, L.R.C. Record No. 12389). After the
requisite publication of the application in the Official Gazette, the case was called for hearing on May
16, 1957 in the course of which an order of general default was entered. On the same date,
however, Baldomero Baldoz father of herein appellant, filed a petition to lift the order of default as
against him and praying that his opposition to the application, thereto attached, be admitted. On the
same date, the court granted the petition, and the case was reset for hearing on October 1, 1958.
Prior to this date, however, oppositor Baldoz died. His son, herein appellant Superior Baldoz
appears not to have informed the court about his father's death. As a result, the notice of the hearing
scheduled for October 1, 1958 was addressed to the latter and was returned unserved.

At the scheduled hearing on October 1, 1958, appellees and their counsel were present but there
was no appearance for any oppositor. Upon motion of the former, the court allowed them to present
evidence in support of their application while, at the same time, declaring the original oppositor
Baldomero Baldoz in default for nonappearance. On October 10, 1958, the latter's counsel filed a
motion to set aside the order of default alleging that the reason for the nonappearance of oppositor
Baldoz was his death on July 28, 1957 and praying that his son, appellant herein, be substituted as
party-oppositor. Although this motion was denied on October 31 of the following year, appellant
appears not to have appealed from the order of denial aforesaid.
The court rendered judgment decreeing the registration of the parcel of land described in Psu 59688
in favor of appellees. After this judgment had become executory, the court issued an order for the
issuance of the decree on May 4, 1959. By virtue thereof, the Land Registration Commission issued
on June 16, 1959 Decree No. N-1779, and pursuant thereto the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan
subsequently issued Original Certificate of Title No. 15264 in their names.

Appellees filed a "Motion for Issuance of Writ of Demolition" and a "Motion for Issuance of Writ of
Possession," to which appellant filed an "Opposition to the Petition for Demolition for Fences and
Counter Petition to Stay Effects of Judgment."

Three weeks later, appellant commenced the present action in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan
against appellees for the annulment of the decision in Registration Case No. 2215, on the ground (1) that
the court in said case committed a reversible error in declaring oppositor Baldoz in default despite his
having filed a written opposition which was duly admitted by it and (2) that its order denying
appellantÊs motion for substitution as oppositor therein has deprived him of his day in court.

Issue: whether or not the final decree of registration can still be reviewed.

Ruling:

It is Settled that registration procedings being in rem are binding upon the whole world, and that a final
decree of registration issued therein in accordance with law is reviewable only within one year and upon
the ground of fraud. Any petition to set aside the decree must be filed within one year from the issuance
thereof, not in the form of a separate action but in the form of a motion filed in the same registration
proceeding where the decree was issued.