Janae Thomas

AET Final Paper

In the last chapter of his book, The Retrieval of Ethics, Talbot Brewer argues that

contemporary virtue ethicists and virtue epistemologists have formed their studies

around dramatically different concepts. Theoretically, the study of virtue epistemology

should benefit the study of virtue ethics by providing more insight on epistemic and

ethical virtues and how we come to form these ideas about the virtues. However, this

disagreement between the concepts from the two areas have only impeded the growth

of virtue ethics. For virtue epistemologists to positively influence the study of virtue

ethics, we first must address the differences between the concepts and analyze how we

can find common ground between the two areas.

The first concept Brewer address is that of the relation concerning the virtues and

the purpose (or, as Brewer use, telos) of deliberation (287). He states that

contemporary virtue epistemologists use an a priori concept of the proper end of

theoretical reasoning and intellectual virtues are present to promote this end. Virtue

ethicists, on the other hand, believe that we must first better refine our conception of the

virtues to understand the proper end of theoretical reasoning (287). Simply, virtue

epistemologists believe that intellectual virtues are tools we use to maximize our true

beliefs and virtue ethicists believe that we cannot understand the value of theoretical

thought without understanding the virtues first.

Ernest Sosa, a virtue epistemologist, gives an example of the epistemic concept

in his essay “The Raft and The Pyramid.” In the paper, he gives two assumptions: “not
everything believed is known, but nothing can be known without being believed” and

justification involves some sort of normative property and it must be relevant to

theoretical reasoning to pertain to knowledge (Sosa, 3). He goes on in his paper to

provide two metaphors to show how we form beliefs. The first one, the pyramid (the

foundationalist view), describes that our beliefs are built off of one another, the first fews

being supports to the rest of beliefs concerning the subject (Sosa, 5). This forms a

pyramid-like structure with each belief influencing the forming of another distinct belief,

each purporting that the original belief is true. The second metaphor, the raft (the

coherentist view), a belief is somehow logically related to other beliefs that provide

justification for its truth (Sosa, 8). Although Sosa address how we come to form beliefs,

he does not provide any information on the relations between our beliefs and our

epistemic values. He does not address this issue until the end of his paper, in which he

states, “primary justification would apply to intellectual virtues, to stable dispositions for

belief acquisition, through their greater contribution toward getting us to the truth” (Sosa,

23).

The problem with Sosa’s analysis (and that of many other virtue epistemologists

that followed in his path) is that it does not provide us with any information about the

actual value of the virtues themselves. It does not provide us with any ground-breaking

reasoning for the belief that these virtues contain any intrinsic value. As Brewer argues,

Sosa stated that mental attributes are virtuous because they help us form true beliefs,

yet, we still know nothing of the value of these mental attributes that we call virtues nor

of the value of justification and knowledge (290). We cannot say that these virtues add
any extra value to beliefs and we still cannot say what exactly is the importance of

theoretical reasoning.

The second conceptual difference between the two areas is that of the nature of

the final end of deliberation (Brewer, 287). As Brewer explains, virtue ethicists tend to

believe that the purpose of practical deliberation is that it is an activity in which the

virtues are actualized while virtue epistemologists tend to believe that the purpose of

theoretical deliberation is the “goal” to which a virtuous person should aim and the

virtues will help bring about. Virtue epistemologists tend to believe this goal is attainable

to all people in any mental state. Virtue ethicists, on the contrary, believe that the value

of the virtues lies in some form of human activity.

According to Brewer, virtue epistemologists make the mistake in asserting that

the final end of theoretical reasoning is the attainment of true beliefs or understanding,

which is a certain state (306). Understanding, rather, requires action to display the sort

of knowledge that a person has gained. These actions are responsible for showing that

a person fully comprehend the knowledge that they possess. Brewer offers an example

explaining how the value of being able to hear lies within the actualization of hearing,

such as hearing music or hearing a car. The same goes for understanding. In

actualizing the ability of understanding, someone must display this ability in many

different scenarios such as understanding certain laws or understanding why one was

rewarded or punished (Brewer, 307). This way of thinking seems intuitive. We usually

do not assert that someone understand something without perceiving some type of

evidence to support the claim. For example, a math teacher will only know her students

understand how to work certain types of equations by seeing their work visually.
Perceiving understanding as a state seems to leave open possibilities that seem non

plausible. A person can achieve this final end of deliberation whether they are aware,

sleep, mentally inactive, etc, as long as they have reach this sort of mental point of

understanding. This idea seems downplay the value of understanding by allowing many

people to achieve this “state” without recounting in some sort of way that they have and

it is unsettling to think of understanding in this way. Because of this, Brewer’s

reassessment of understanding and how it involves activity seems more towards the

right direction.

Although virtue epistemologists and virtue ethicists have form these two

important conceptually different theories, it is still possible for virtue epistemology to

have the positive impact on virtue ethics that the study aims to do. This would require

that the two areas of study reconcile their differences, mostly with virtue epistemology

restructuring these specific concepts. A lot work would have to be done, but it is not

impossible. I conclude on line from Brewer that sheds some hope to this goal: “It

remains possible that the best-known practitioners of virtue epistemology have thus far

been insufficiently radical, and that the real promise of [a virtue-centric] approach lies

not in resolving puzzles that already preoccupy epistemologists but in inducing the sort

of fundamental shift in the scope, ambitions, and agenda of epistemology that a genuine

retrieval of Aristotelian thought spells for ethics” (Brewer, 288).

 Works Cited

Brewer, Talbot. The retrieval of ethics. Oxford University Press, 2011.

Sosa, Ernest (1980). The Raft and the Pyramid: Coherence versus Foundations in the

Theory of Knowledge. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 5 (1):3-26.