1. RAKES v ATLANTIC [G.R. No. 1719. January 23, 1907.] M. H.,
— The responsibility of an
RAKES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. THE ATLANTIC, GULF AND
PACIFIC COMPANY, defendant-appellant.
FACTS:
The plaintiff, one of a gang of eight negro laborers in the
employment of the defendant, was at work transporting iron rails
from a barge in the harbor to the company's yard near the Malecon
in Manila. Plaintiff claims that but one hand car was used in this
work. The defendant has proved that there were two immediately
following one another, upon which were piled lengthwise seven
rails, each weighing 560 pounds, so that the ends of the rails lay
upon two crosspieces or sills secured to the cars, but without side
pieces or guards to prevent them from slipping off. According to the
testimony of the plaintiff, the men were either in the rear of the car
or at its sides. According to that defendant, some of them were also
in front, hauling by a rope. At a certain spot at or near the water's
edge the track sagged, the tie broke, the car either canted or upset,
the rails slid off and caught the plaintiff, breaking his leg, which was
afterwards amputated at about the knee.
ISSUE:
Whether the company is liable
RULING:
Yes. The negligence of the plaintiff, contributing to the accident, to
what extent it existed in fact and what legal effect is to be given it. In
two particulars is he charged with carelessness:
First. That having noticed the depression in the track he continued
his work; and
Second. That he walked on the ends of the ties at the side of the car
instead of along the boards, either before or behind it.
The Court ruled that His lack of caution in continuing at his work
after noticing the slight depression of the rail was not of so gross a
nature as to constitute negligence, barring his recovery under the
severe American rule. While the plaintiff and his witnesses swear
that not only were they not forbidden to proceed in this way, but
were expressly directed by the foreman to do so, both the officers of
the company and three of the workmen testify that there was a
general prohibition frequently made known to all the gang against
walking by the side of the car, and the foreman swears that he
repeated the prohibition before the starting of this particular load.
On this contradiction of proof we think that the preponderance is in
favor of the defendant's contention to the extent of the general
order being made known to the workmen. If so, the disobedience of
the plaintiff in placing himself in danger contributed in some degree
to the injury as a proximate, although not as its primary cause.
Distinction must be between the accident and the injury, between
the event itself, without which there could have been no accident,
and those acts of the victim not entering into it, independent of it,
but contributing under review was the displacement of the
crosspiece or the failure to replace it. this produced the event giving
occasion for damages — that is, the sinking of the track and the
sliding of the iron rails.
1. CIVIL LIABILITY FOR DAMAGES. — In order to enforce the liability
of an employer for injuries to his employee, it is not necessary that a
criminal action be first prosecuted against the employer or his
representative primarily chargeable with the accident. No criminal
proceeding having been taken, the civil action may proceed to
judgment.
2. LIABILITY OF EMPLOYER TO WORKMEN.
employer to his employee of a fellow-servant of the employee
injured, is not adopted in Philippine jurisprudence.
3. FELLOW-SERVANT RULE. — Sua cuique culpa nocet. The doctrine
known as the "Fellow-servant rule," exonerating the employer
where the injury was incurred through the negligence of a fellow-
servant of the employee injured, is not adopted in Philippine
jurisprudence.
2. SABIDO AND LAGUNDA V CUSTODIO, ET AL
G.R. No. L-21512 August 31, 1966
CONCEPCION, C.J
FACTS:
In Barrio Halang, two trucks, one driven by Mudales and belonging
to Laguna-Tayabas Bus Company, and the other driven by Lagunda
and owned by Prospero Sabido, going in opposite directions met
each other in a road curve. Custodia, LTB bus passenger who was
riding on the running board as truck was full of passengers, was
sideswiped by the truck driven by Lagunda. As a result, Custodio was
injured and died. To avoid any liability, Lagunda and Sabido throw
all the blame on Mudales. However, Makabuhay, widow of Custodio,
testified that the truck was running fast when it met the LTB Bus and
Lagunda had time and opportunity to avoid the mishap if he had
been sufficiently careful and cautious because the two trucks never
collided with each other. By simply swerving to the right side of the
road, the truck could have avoided hitting Custodio. The sideswiping
of the deceased and his two fellow passengers took place on broad
daylight at about 9:30 in the morning on June 9,1955 when the LTB
bus with full load to passengers was negotiating a sharp curve of a
bumpy and sliding downward a slope, whereas the six by six truck
was climbing up with no cargoes or passengers on board but for
three helpers, owner Sabido and driver Lagunda. LTB passengers had
testified to the effect that the cargo truck was running at a fast rate
of speed. Driver Lagunda admitted that three passengers rode on
the running board of the bus when his vehicle was still at a distance
of 5 or 7 meters from the bus. Despite the presence of a shallow
canal on the right side of the road which he could pass over with
ease, Lagunda did not avert the accident simply because to use his
own language the canal is not a passage of trucks. Based upon these
facts, the Court of first Instance of Laguna and the Court of appeals
concluded that the Laguna-Tayabas Bus Co. hereinafer referred to as
the carrier and its driver Mudales none of whom has appealed, had
violated the contract of carriage with Agripino Custodio, whereas
petitioners labido and Lagunda were guilty of a quasi delict ,by
reason of which all of them were held solidarity liable.
ISSUES
1 Whether petitioners were guilty of negligence?
2 Whether petitioners should be held solidarily liable with the
carrier and its driver?
HELD
1 Yes, the views of the Court of appeals on the speed of the truck
and its location at the time of the accident are in the nature
of findings of fact, which we cannot disturb in a petition for review
by certiorari , such as the one at bar. At any rate, the correctness
of said findings is borne out by the very testimony of petitioner
Lagunda to the effect that he saw the passengers riding on the
running board of the bus while the same was still five or seven
meters away from the truck driven by him. Indeed, the distance
between the two vehicles was such that he could have avoided
sideswiping said passengers if his truck were not running at a great
speed. Although the negligence of the carrier and its driver is
independent, in its execution, of the negligence of the truck driver
and its owner, both acts of negligence are the proximate cause of
the death of Agripino Custodio. In fact, the negligence of the first
two would not have produced this result without the negligence
of petitioners herein. What is more, petitioners negligence was the
last, in point of time, for Custodio was on the running board of the
carriers bus sometime before petitioners truck came from the
opposite direction, so that, in this sense, petitioners truck had the
last clear chance.
2. Yes. Where the carrier bus and its driver were clearly guilty of
contributory negligence for having allowed a passenger to ride on
the running board of the bus, and where the driver of the other
vehicle was also guilty of contributory negligence, because that
vehicle was running at a considerable speed despite the fact that it
was negotiating a sharp curve, and, instead of being close to its right
side of the road, it was driven on its middle portion thereof and so
near the passenger bus coming from the opposite as to sideswipe a
passenger on its running board, the owners of the two vehicles are
liable solidarily for the death of the passenger, although the liability
of one arises from a breach of contract, whereas that of the other
springs from a quasi-delict. Where the concurrent or successive
negligent acts or omission of two or more persons, although acting
independently of each other, are in combination, the direct and
proximate cause of a single injury to a third person, and it is
impossible to determine in what proportion each contributed
to the injury, either is responsible for the whole injury, even
though his act alone might not have caused the entire injury, or the
same damage might have resulted from the acts of the other tort-
feasor.
3. UMALI v. BACANI
Facts: On May 14, 1972, a storm with strong rain hit the Municipality
of Alcala Pangasinan. During the storm, the banana plants standing
near the transmission line of the Alcala Electric Plant (AEP) were
blown down and fell on the electric wire. The live electric wire was
cut, one end of which was left hanging on the electric post and the
other fell to the ground.
The following morning, barrio captain saw Cipriano Baldomero, a
laborer of the AEP, asked him to fix it, but the latter told the barrio
captain that he could not do it but that he was going to look for the
lineman to fix it.
Sometime thereafter, a small boy of 3 years and 8 months old by
the name of Manuel P. Saynes, whose house is just on the opposite
side of the road, went to the place where the broken line wire was
and got in contact with it. The boy was electrocuted and he
subsequently died. It was only after the electrocution that the
broken wire was fixed.
Umali claims he cannot be held liable as owner and manager of the
AEP because the proximate cause of the boy’s death is
electrocution, which is a fortuitous event as it was caused by the
storm.
ISSUE: Whether Umali is liable for the death of the child
HELD: YES.
A careful examination of the record proves that a series of
negligence on the part of defendants’ employees in the Alcala
Electric Plant resulted in the death of the victim by electrocution.
First, by the very evidence of the defendant, there were big and tall
banana plants at the place of the incident standing on an elevated
ground and which were higher than the electric post supporting the
electric line, and yet the employees of the defendant who, with
ordinary foresight, could have easily seen that even in case of
moderate winds the electric line would be endangered by banana
plants being blown down, did not even take the necessary
precaution to eliminate that source of danger to the electric line.
Second, even after the employees of the Alcala Electric Plant were
already aware of the possible damage the storm could have caused
their electric lines, thus becoming a possible threat to life and
property, they did not cut off from the plant the flow of electricity
along the lines, an act they could have easily done pending
inspection of the wires to see if they had been cut.
Third, employee Baldomero was negligent on the morning of the
incident because even if he was already made aware of the live cut
wire, he did not have the foresight to realize that the same posed a
danger to life and property, and that he should have taken the
necessary precaution to prevent anybody from approaching the live
wire.
On defendants’ argument that the proximate cause of the victim’s
death could be attributed to the parents’ negligence in allowing a
child of tender age to go out of the house alone, it is readily seen
that because of the aforementioned series of negligence on the part
of defendants’ employees resulting in a live wire lying on the
premises without any visible warning of its lethal character,
anybody, even a responsible grown up or not necessarily an
innocent child, could have met the same fate that befell the victim..
Stated otherwise, even if the child was allowed to leave the house
unattended due to the parents’ negligence, he would not have died
that morning where it not for the cut live wire he accidentally
touched.
Umali’s liability for injury caused by his employees negligence is well
defined in par. 4, of Article 2180 of the Civil Code. The negligence of
the employee is presumed to be the negligence of the employer
because the employer is supposed to exercise supervision over the
work of the employees. This liability of the employer is primary and
direct. In fact the proper defense for the employer to raise so that
he may escape liability is to prove that he exercised, the diligence of
the good father of the family to prevent damage not only in the
selection of his employees but also in adequately supervising them
over their work. This defense was not adequately proven as found
by the trial Court.
4. ALLIED BANKING CORPORATION v. LIM SIO WAN
Facts: On November 14, 1983, Lim Sio Wan deposited with Allied
Banking Corporation (Allied) a money market placement of P
1,152,597.35 for a term of 31 days. Later on, a person claiming to be
Lim Sio Wan called up Cristina So, an officer of Allied, and instructed
the latter to pre-terminate Lim Sio Wan’s money market placement,
to issue a manager’s check representing the proceeds of the
placement, and to give the check to Deborah Dee Santos who would
pick up the check. Lim Sio Wan described the appearance of Santos.
Santos arrived at the bank and signed the application form for a
manager’s check to be issued.
Hence, the bank issued Manager’s Check representing the proceeds
of Lim Sio Wan’s money market placement in the name of Lim Sio
Wan, as payee, cross-checked "For Payee’s Account Only" and given
to Santos
Later on, Allied manager’s check was deposited in the account of
Filipinas Cement Corporation (FCC) at Metropolitan Bank and Trust
Co. (Metrobank), with the forged signature of Lim Sio Wan as
indorser. Metrobank stamped a guaranty on the check, which reads:
"All prior endorsements and/or lack of endorsement guaranteed."
Upon the presentment of the check, Allied funded the check even
without checking the authenticity of Lim Sio Wan’s purported
indorsement. The amount on the face of the check was credited to
the account of FCC
On December 9, 1983, Lim Sio Wan deposited with Allied a second
money market placement to mature on January 9, 1984
On December 14, 1983, upon the maturity date of the first money
market placement, Lim Sio Wan went to Allied to withdraw it. She
was then informed that the placement had been pre-terminated
upon her instructions which she denied. Hence, Lim Sio Wan filed
with the RTC against Allied to recover the proceeds of her first
money market placement. Allied filed a third party complaint against
Metrobank and Santos; Metrobank filed a fourth party complain
against FCC; FCC for its part filed a fifth party complaint against
Producers Bank. Summonses were duly served upon all the parties
except for Santos, who was no longer connected with Producers
Bank.
May 15, 1984, Allied informed Metrobank that the signature on the
check was forged
Metrobank withheld the amount represented by the check from
FCC. Metrobank agreed to release the amount to FCC after the FCC
executed an undertaking, promising to indemnify Metrobank in case
it was made to reimburse the amount
However, Lim Sio Wan thereafter filed an amended complaint to
include Metrobank as a party-defendant, along with Allied. RTC
ruled requiring Allied Bank to pay Lim Sio Wan plus damages and
atty. Fees. However, Allied Bank’s cross-claim against Metrobank is
dismissed. Metrobank’s and FCC’s third party complaint and fourth
party complaint were dismissed also.
CA: Modified. Allied Banking Corporation to pay 60% and
Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company 40%. On appeal Allied
presented this issue: Court of Appeals erred in holding [Allied] liable
to the extent of 60% of amount adjudged demandable in clear
disregard to the ultimate liability of Metrobank as guarantor of all
endorsement on the check, it being the collecting bank.
Issue: Did the CA erred?
Held:
No. Court held that Allied is liable to Lim Sio Wan.
Fundamental and familiar is the doctrine that the relationship
between a bank and a client is one of debtor-creditor. As provided
by the Civil Code: Art. 1953. A person who receives a loan of money
or any other fungible thing acquires the ownership thereof, and is
bound to pay to the creditor an equal amount of the same kind and
quality; Art. 1980. Fixed, savings, and current deposits of money in
banks and similar institutions shall be governed by the provisions
concerning simple loan.
Lim Sio Wan, as creditor of the bank for her money market
placement, is entitled to payment upon her request, or upon
maturity of the placement, or until the bank is released from its
obligation as debtor. Until any such event, the obligation of Allied to
Lim Sio Wan remains unextinguished. The obligation has not yet
extinguish as there is no payment yet. This is so as Lim Sio Wan did
not authorize the release of her money market placement to Santos
and the bank had been negligent in so doing.
Allied claims that Metrobank is the proximate cause of the loss of
Lim Sio Wans money. It points out that Metrobank guaranteed all
prior indorsements inscribed on the managers check, and without
Metrobanks guarantee, the present controversy would never have
occurred. Court said, however, that Allied is wrong.
The test to determine proximate cause is: If the event did not
happen, would the injury have resulted? If the answer is NO, then
the event is the proximate cause. Here, Allied’s negligence is the
proximate cause of the damage. Allied did not even ask for the
certificate evidencing the money market placement or call up Lim
Sio Wan at her residence or office to confirm her instructions.
However, When Metrobank indorsed the check without verifying
the authenticity of Lim Sio Wan’s indorsement and when it accepted
the check despite the fact that it was cross-checked payable to
payee’s account only contributed to the easier release of Lim Sio
Wan’s money and perpetuation of the fraud. Given the relative
participation of Allied and Metrobank to the instant case, both
banks cannot be adjudged as equally liable. Hence, the 60:40 ratio of
the liabilities of Allied and Metrobank, as ruled by the CA, must be
upheld
5. PEOPLE v. ILIGAN
DATE: November 26, 1990
AWARD: P50,000 as indemnity to the heirs of Esmeraldo Quiñones,
Jr.
FACTS:
At around 2am on August 4, 1980, Esmeraldo Quiñones, Jr.
, Zaldy Asis and Felix Lukban were walking home from a barrio fiesta
dance. They met the accused Fernando Iligan, his nephew Edmundo
Asis, and Juan Macandog. Edmundo Asis pushed (“winahi”) them
aside, prompting Zaldy Asis to box him. Felix Lukban told them that
they had no desire to fight. Fernando Iligan, upon seeing his nephew
fall, drew his bolo and hacked Zaldy Asis but missed. They ran but
the three accused pursued them. They only stopped running upon
seeing that they were no longer being chased by the three accused.
While walking towards the house of Quiñones, Jr. the
three accused suddenly emerged on the roadside. Fernando Iligan
hacked Quiñones, Jr. and hit him on the forehead, causing him to fall
down. The head of Quiñones, Jr. was busted and he died.
Juan Macandog remained at large while Fernando Iligan
and Edmundo Asis pleaded not guilty to the crime of Murder.
The defendants alleged that they were in their respective
houses at the time the crime was committed and that the death
certificate of Quiñones, Jr. indicates that he died of "shock and
massive cerebral hemorrhages due to a vehicular accident."
The CIF of Camarines Norte convicted them of the crime of
murder and sentenced them to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of Esmeraldo Quiñones, Jr. in
the amounts of P30,000 for the latter’s death and P256,960
representing the victim’s unrealized income.
ISSUE:
WON the three accused are guilty of murder.
RULING:
The intentional felony committed was the hacking of the
head of Quiñones, Jr. by Iligan. That it was considered as superficial
by the physician who autopsied Quiñones is beside the point. What
is material is that by the instrument used in hacking Quiñones, Jr.
and the location of the wound, the assault was meant not only to
immobilize the victim but to do away with him as it was directed at a
vital and delicate part of the body: the head.
The hacking incident happened on the national highway
where vehicles are expected to pass any moment. One such vehicle
passed seconds later when Lukban and Zaldy Asis, running scared
and having barely negotiated the distance of around 200 meters,
heard shouts of people. Quiñones, Jr., weakened by the hacking
blow which sent him to the cemented highway, was run over by a
vehicle.
Under these circumstances, we hold that while Iligan’s
hacking of Quiñones, Jr.’s head might not have been the direct
cause, it was the proximate cause of the latter’s death. Proximate
legal cause is defined as "that acting first and producing the injury,
either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all
constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a
close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final
event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and
probable result of the cause which first acted, under such
circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should,
as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable
ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury
to some person might probably result therefrom."
In other words, the sequence of events from Iligan’s
assault on him to the time Quiñones, Jr. was run over by a vehicle is,
considering the very short span of time between them, one
unbroken chain of events. Having triggered such events, Iligan
cannot escape liability.
There being no mitigating circumstance, the penalty
imposable on Iligan is reclusion temporal medium (Arts. 249 and 64,
Revised Penal Code). Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the
proper penalty is that within the range of prision mayor as minimum
and reclusion temporal medium as maximum. We find insufficient
proof to warrant the award of P256,960 for the victim’s unrealized
income and therefore, the same is disallowed.
WHEREFORE, appellant Fernando Iligan y Jamito is hereby
convicted of the crime of homicide for which he is imposed the
indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor as minimum to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one
(1) day of reclusion temporal medium as maximum and he shall
indemnify the heirs of Esmeraldo Quiñones, Jr. in the amount of fifty
thousand pesos (P50,000). Appellant Edmundo Asis is hereby
acquitted of the crime charged against him. Costs against appellant
Iligan.
SO ORDERED.
6. ORIENTAL PETROLEUM AND MINERALS CORPORATION v.
TUSCAN REALTY, INC.
G.R. No. 195481. July 10, 2013
PROCURING CAUSE
It refers to a cause which starts a series of events and
results, without break in their continuity, in the accomplishment of a
broker’s prime objective of producing a purchaser who is ready,
willing, and able to buy on the owner’s terms.
It is similar to the concept of proximate cause in Torts -
without which the injury would not have occurred.
To be regarded as the procuring cause of a sale, a broker’s
efforts must have been the foundation of the negotiations which
subsequently resulted in a sale.
FACTS:
This case is about a broker’s claim for commission for having
referred a possible buyer who later served as an intermediary to the
eventual sale of the property to a third party.
Oriental Petroleum owned two condominium units at Corinthian
Plaza in Makati City. It gave Tuscan Realty a "non-exclusive authority
to offer" these units for sale. Tuscan Realty submitted an initial list
of its prospective client-buyers that included Gateway Holdings
Corporation (Gateway). Subsequently, Oriental Petroleum advised
Tuscan Realty that it would undertake direct negotiation with a
certain Gene de los Reyes of Gateway for the sale of the units. This
resulted in a contract to sell between Oriental Petroleum and
Gateway.
Meantime, Gateway apparently turned around nearly two months
later and assigned its rights as buyer of the units to Alonzo Ancheta
in whose favor Oriental Petroleum executed a deed of absolute sale
for the price of more than ₱69.5 million. Tuscan Realty demanded
payment of its broker’s commission of more than ₱2 million by
Oriental Petroleum. The latter refused to pay claiming that Tuscan
Realty did nothing to close its deal with Gateway and Ancheta.
Tuscan Realty filed a complaint for sum of money with application
for preliminary attachment against petitioner before the Makati RTC
which granted Tuscan Realty’s application for preliminary
attachment but rendered a decision six years later dismissing the
complaint on the ground of Tuscan Realty’s failure to substantiate its
allegation that it was responsible for closing the sale of the subject
condominium units.
The CA granted the appeal of Tuscan Realty, set aside the RTC
decision, and ordered Oriental Petroleum to pay Tuscan Realty its
broker’s commission of 3% of the final purchase price, plus 6%
interest from the finality of its decision until actual payment.
ISSUE:
Whether Tuscan Realty is entitled to a broker’s commission for the
sale of Oriental Petroleum’s condominium units to Ancheta.
HELD:
The CA invoked the principle of "procuring cause" in ordering the
payment of broker’s commission to Tuscan Realty. The term
"procuring cause" refers to a cause which starts a series of events
and results, without break in their continuity, in the accomplishment
of a broker’s prime objective of producing a purchaser who is ready,
willing, and able to buy on the owner’s terms. This is similar to the
concept of proximate cause in Torts, without which the injury would
not have occurred. To be regarded as the procuring cause of a sale, a
broker’s efforts must have been the foundation of the negotiations
which subsequently resulted in a sale.
Here, it was Tuscan Realty that introduced Gateway to Oriental
Petroleum as an interested buyer of its condominium units. They
learned of Gateway’s interest in the properties from Mr. Capotosto
of Tuscan Realty. It was on account of Tuscan Realty’s effort that
Oriental Petroleum got connected to Gateway, the prospective
buyer, resulting in the latter two entering into a contract to sell
involving the two condominium units. Although Gateway turned
around and sold the condominium units to Ancheta, the fact is that
such ultimate sale could not have happened without Gateway’s
indispensable intervention as intermediate buyer. Applying the
principle of procuring cause, therefore, Tuscan Realty should be
given its broker’s commission.
Oriental Petroleum executed a deed of absolute sale in Ancheta’s
favor by virtue of Gateway’s assignment to him of its rights under
the contract to sell. Consequently, it cannot be said that Oriental
Petroleum found a direct buyer in Ancheta without the intermediate
contract to sell in favor of Gateway, Tuscan Realty’s proposed buyer.
The reason why Tuscan Realty refrained from taking part in the
negotiations with Gateway was because of Oriental Petroleum’s
advice that it would directly negotiate the sale with Gateway.
Besides, assuming that the advice amounted to a revocation of
Tuscan Realty’s authority to sell, the Court has always recognized
the broker’s right to his commission, although the owner revoked
his authority and directly negotiated with the buyer whom he met
through the broker’s efforts. It would be unfair not to give the
broker the reward he had earned for helping the owner find a buyer
who would pay the price.
The petition is denied and the CA decision is affirmed.
7. PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE CO., INC. v. COURT
OF APPEALS
Facts
Private respondent spouses Antonio and Gloria Esteban filed an
action for damages against PLDT for the injuries they sustained in
the evening of July 30, 1968 when their jeep ran over a mound of
earth and fell into an open trench, an excavation allegedly
undertaken by PLDT for the installation of its underground conduit
system. The complaint alleged that respondent Antonio Esteban
failed to notice the open trench which was left uncovered because
of the creeping darkness and the lack of any warning light or signs.
As a result of the accident, respondent Gloria Esteban allegedly
sustained injuries on her arms, legs and face, leaving a permanent
scar on her cheek, while the respondent husband suffered cut lips.
In addition, the windshield of the jeep was shattered.
PLDT denies liability on the contention that the injuries sustained by
respondent spouses were the result of their own negligence and
that the entity which should be held responsible, if at all, is L.R.
Barte and Company, an independent contractor which undertook
the construction of the manhole and the conduit system.
Accordingly, PLDT filed a third-party complaint against Barte alleging
that, under the terms of their agreement, PLDT should in no manner
be answerable for any accident or injuries arising from the
negligence or carelessness of Barte or any of its employees. In
answer thereto, Barte claimed that it had complied with the terms
of its contract with PLDT by installing the necessary and appropriate
standard signs in the vicinity of the work site, with barricades at
both ends of the excavation and with red lights at night along the
excavated area to warn the traveling public of the presence of
excavations.
Issue
WON PLDT is liable for damages – NO
Ruling
The accident which befell private respondents was due to the lack of
diligence of respondent Antonio Esteban and was not imputable to
negligent omission on the part of petitioner PLDT.
1) Plaintiff’s jeep was running along the inside lane of Lacson
Street. If it had remained on that inside lane, it would not have
hit the ACCIDENT MOUND.
The ACCIDENT MOUND was hit by the jeep swerving from the
left that is, swerving from the inside lane. What caused the
swerving is not disclosed; but, as the cause of the accident,
defendant cannot be made liable for the damages suffered by
plaintiffs. The accident was not due to the absence of warning
signs, but to the unexplained abrupt swerving of the jeep from
the inside lane. That may explain plaintiff-husband’s insistence
that he did not see the ACCIDENT MOUND for which reason he
ran into it.
2) The ditches along Lacson Street had already been covered
except the 3 or 4 meters where the ACCIDENT MOUND was
located. The ditches on Lacson Street north of the ACCIDENT
MOUND had already been covered, but not in such a way as to
allow the outer lane to be freely and conveniently passable to
vehicles.
3) Plaintiff’s jeep was not running at 25 kph as plaintiff-husband
claimed. The jeep must have been running quite fast. If the jeep
had been braked at 25 kph, plaintiffs would not have been
thrown against the windshield and they would not have suffered
their injuries.
4) If the accident did not happen because the jeep was running
quite fast on the inside lane and for some reason or other it had
to swerve suddenly to the right and had to climb over the
ACCIDENT MOUND, then plaintiff-husband had not exercised the
diligence of a good father of a family to avoid the accident. With
the drizzle, he should not have run on dim lights, but should
have put on his regular lights which should have made him see
the ACCIDENT MOUND in time. If he was running on the outside
lane at 25 kilometers an hour, even on dim lights, his failure to
see the ACCIDENT MOUND in time to brake the car was
negligence on his part. The ACCIDENT MOUND was relatively big
and visible, being 2 to 3 feet high and 1-1/2 feet wide. If he did
not see the ACCIDENT MOUND in time, he would not have seen
any warning sign either. He knew of the existence and location
of the ACCIDENT MOUND, having seen it many previous times.
With ordinary precaution, he should have driven his jeep on the
night of the accident so as to avoid hitting the ACCIDENT
MOUND.
The above findings clearly show that the negligence of respondent
Antonio Esteban was not only contributory to his injuries and those
of his wife but goes to the very cause of the occurrence of the
accident, as one of its determining factors, and thereby precludes
their right to recover damages.
The presence of warning signs could not have completely prevented
the accident; the only purpose of said signs was to inform and warn
the public of the presence of excavations on the site. The private
respondents already knew of the presence of said excavations. It
was not the lack of knowledge of these excavations which caused
the jeep of respondents to fall into the excavation but the
unexplained sudden swerving of the jeep from the inside lane
towards the accident mound. The omission to perform a duty, such
as the placing of warning signs on the site of the excavation,
constitutes the proximate cause only when the doing of the said
omitted act would have prevented the injury.
 It is basic that
private respondents cannot charge PLDT for their injuries where
their own failure to exercise due and reasonable care was the cause
thereof. As a resident of Lacson Street, Antonio Esteban passed on
that street almost everyday and had knowledge of the presence and
location of the excavations there. It was his negligence that exposed
him and his wife to danger, hence he is solely responsible for the
consequences of his imprudence.
Decision
WHEREFORE, the resolutions of respondent Court of Appeals, dated
March 11, 1980 and September 3, 1980, are hereby SET ASIDE. Its
original decision, promulgated on September 25, 1979, is hereby
REINSTATED and AFFIRMED.
8. ST. MARY’S ACADEMY v. CARPITANOS
ST. MARY’S ACADEMY vs WILLIAM CARPITANOS and LUCIA
CARPITANOS, GUADA DANIEL, JAMES DANIEL II, JAMES DANIEL SR.
and VIVENCIO VILLANUEVA (GR 143363, February 6, 2002)
FACTS:
It appears that from 13 to 20 February 1995, St. Mary’s Academy of
Dipolog City conducted an enrollment drive for the school year
1995-1996. A facet of the enrollment campaign was the visitation of
schools from where prospective enrollees were studying. As a
student of St. Mary’s Academy, Sherwin Carpitanos was part of the
campaigning group. Accordingly, Sherwin, along with other high
school students were riding in a Mitsubishi jeep owned by
defendant Vivencio Villanueva on their way to Larayan Elementary
School. The jeep was driven by James Daniel II then 15 years old and
a student of the same school. Allegedly, the latter drove the jeep in
a reckless manner and as a result the jeep turned turtle.
Sherwin Carpitanos died as a result of the injuries he sustained from
the accident.
Claiming damages for the death of their only son (Sherwin
Carpitanos), spouses William Carpitanos and Lucia Carpitanos filed
on June 9, 1995 a case against James Daniel II and his parents, James
Daniel Sr. and Guada Daniel, the vehicle owner (Vivencio Villanueva)
and St. Mary’s Academy before the Regional Trial Court of Dipolog
City.
RTC ruled in favor of plaintiff, ordering St. Mary’s to pay damages.
Also, in view of their subsidiary liability, the parents of James Daniel
(Spouses DANIEL) were also ordered to pay said damages in case of
insolvency of St. Mary’s. James Daniel II, being a minor at the time of
the commission of the tort and who was under special parental
authority of defendant St. Mary’s Academy, was ABSOLVED from
paying the above-stated damages. Vivencio Villanueva was
ABSOLVED of any liability.
COURT OF APPEALS promulgated a decision reducing the actual
damages to P25,000.00 but otherwise affirming the decision a quo,
in toto. It held St. Mary’s Academy liable for the death of Sherwin
Carpitanos under Articles 2187 and 2198 of the Family Code,
pointing out that petitioner was negligent in allowing a minor to
drive and in not having a teacher accompany the minor students in
the jeep.
ISSUE/S and RULING:
1) Whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding the
petitioner liable for damages for the death of Sherwin Carpitanos.
- Yes.
Under Article 218 of the Family Code, the following shall have
special parental authority over a minor child while under their
supervision, instruction or custody: (1) the school, its administrators
and teachers; or (2) the individual, entity or institution engaged in
child care. This special parental authority and responsibility applies
to all authorized activities, whether inside or outside the premises of
the school, entity or institution. Thus, such authority and
responsibility applies to field trips, excursions and other affairs of
the pupils and students outside the school premises whenever
authorized by the school or its teachers.
Under Article 219 of the Family Code, if the person under custody is
a minor, those exercising special parental authority are principally
and solidarily liable for damages caused by the acts or omissions of
the unemancipated minor while under their supervision, instruction,
or custody.
However, for petitioner to be liable, there must be a finding that the
act or omission considered as negligent was the proximate cause of
the injury caused because the negligence must have a causal
connection to the accident. It must be shown that the injury for
which recovery is sought must be the legitimate consequence of the
wrong done; the connection between the negligence and the injury
must be a direct and natural sequence of events, unbroken by
intervening efficient causes.
In this case, the respondents failed to show that the negligence of
petitioner was the proximate cause of the death of the victim.
Spouses Daniel and Vivencio Villanueva admitted that the
immediate cause of the accident was not the negligence of
petitioner or the reckless driving of James Daniel II, but the
detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep. They admitted
documentary evidence establishing that the cause of the accident
was the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep. Hence,
the cause of the accident was not the recklessness of James Daniel II
but the mechanical defect in the jeep of Vivencio Villanueva.
Significantly, respondents did not present any evidence to show that
the proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of the
school authorities, or the reckless driving of James Daniel II.
Further, there was no evidence that petitioner school allowed the
minor James Daniel II to drive the jeep of respondent Vivencio
Villanueva. It was Ched Villanueva, grandson of respondent Vivencio
Villanueva, who had possession and control of the jeep. He was
driving the vehicle and he allowed James Daniel II, a minor, to drive
the jeep at the time of the accident.
Hence, liability for the accident, whether caused by the negligence
of the minor driver or mechanical detachment of the steering wheel
guide of the jeep, must be pinned on the minor’s parents primarily.
The negligence of petitioner St. Mary’s Academy was only a remote
cause of the accident. Between the remote cause and the injury,
there intervened the negligence of the minor’s parents or the
detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep.
2) Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the award
of moral damages against the petitioner.
YES.
Considering that the negligence of the minor driver or the
detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep owned by
respondent Villanueva was an event over which petitioner St. Mary’s
Academy had no control, and which was the proximate cause of the
accident, petitioner may not be held liable for the death resulting
from such accident.
Consequently, petitioner likewise cannot be held liable for moral
damages in the amount of P500,000.00 awarded by the trial court
and affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Though incapable of
pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if they
are the proximate result of the defendant’s wrongful act or
omission. In this case, the proximate cause of the accident was not
attributable to petitioner.
With the evidence presented by petitioner and the respondent
Daniel spouses that the accident occurred because of the
detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep, it is not the
school, but the registered owner of the vehicle who shall be held
responsible for damages for the death of Sherwin Carpitanos.
DAMAGES RTC CA SC
AWARDED
Indemnity for Php 50,000 Php 50,000 NIL
loss of life
Actual damages Php 40,000 Php 25,000 Php 25,000
Attorney’s fees Php 10,000 Php 10,000 NIL
Moral Damages Php 500,000 Php 500,000 NIL
9. CALIMUTAN v. PEOPLE
FACTS:
February 4, 1996 around 10 am: Cantre and witness Sañano,
together with two other companions, had a drinking spree at a
videoke bar but as they were headed home, they crossed paths with
Calimutan and Michael Bulalacao. Cantre, 26 years old and 5 ft. 9
inches, had a grudge against Bulalacao, a 15 year-old boy of 5ft. for
suspecting that he threw stones at the his house on a previous night
so he punched him Seeking to protect Bulalacao and to stop Cantre,
Calimutan picked a stone, as big as a man’s fist and hitting Cantre at
the left side of his back not noticing that Bulalacao was already able
to ran away. Cantre stopped for a moment and held his back and
Calimutan desisted from any other act of violence.Witness Sañano
then brought Cantre home where he complained of backache and
also of stomach ache and was unable to eat
By night time, he felt cold then warm then he was sweating
profusely and his entire body felt numb. Having no vehicle, they
could not bring him to a doctor so his mother just continue to wipe
him with a piece of cloth and brought him some food when he
asked. After eating a little, he vomited. Shortly after complaining
again of his backache and stomach ache, he died.
The Post-Mortem Examination Report and Certification of Death,
issued and signed by Dr. Ulanday, stated that the cause of death of
victim Cantre was cardio-respiratory arrest due to suspected food
poisoning. With the help of the Lingkod Bayan-Circulo de Abogadas
of the ABS-CBN Foundation, an autopsy was done by Dr. Ronaldo B.
Mendez which showed that there was internal hemorrhage and
massive accumulation of blood in his abdominal cavity due to his
lacerated spleen caused by a blunt object like a stone.
RTC issued a warrant of arrest and during arraignment Calimutan
pleaded not guilty to the crime of homicide
RTC: Essentially adopting the prosecution’s account of the incident,
held that Calimutan was guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
homicide with a penalty of imprisonment from 8 years of Prision
Mayor as minimum, to 12 years and 1 day of Reclusion Temporal as
maximum, and to indemnify the heirs of Philip Cantre the sum of
P50,000 as compensatory damages and the sum of P50,000 as moral
damages
NOT defense of stranger, because after the boxing Bulalacao, he was
able to run thereby the unlawful aggression by Cantre ceased. The
act of throwing a stone from behind which hit the victim at his back
on the left side was a treacherous act.
One is criminally liable for all the direct and natural consequences of
this unlawful act even if the ultimate result had not been intended
CA: Affirmed RTC
Calimutan filed a petition for review on certiorari contending that
the dissimilar findings on the cause of death constituted reasonable
doubt
ISSUE: W/N he is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide
HELD: Calimutan is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
reckless imprudence resulting in homicide, under Article 365 of the
Revised Penal Code, and is accordingly sentenced to imprisonment
for a minimum period of 4 months of arresto mayor to a maximum
period of two years and one day of prision correccional. Petitioner
Calimutan is further ORDERED to pay the heirs of the victim Cantre
the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for the latter’s death
and P50,000.00 as moral damages
Proof beyond reasonable doubt requires only a moral certainty or
that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced
mind (NOT absolute certainty and the exclusion of all possibility of
error)
Dr. Mendez’s testimony as an expert witness is evidence, and
although it does not necessarily bind the courts, it is accorded great
weight and probative value. It may sufficiently establish the causal
relationship between the stone thrown by the Calimutan and the
lacerated spleen of the Cantre which resulted in the latter’s death
Prosecution was able to establish that the proximate cause of the
death of the Cantre was the stone thrown at him by petitioner
Calimutan.
Comparing the limited autopsy conducted by Dr. Ulanday and her
unconfirmed suspicion of food poisoning of the victim Cantre, as
opposed to the exhaustive autopsy performed by Dr. Mendez and
his definitive finding of a ruptured spleen as the cause of death, then
the latter, without doubt, deserves to be given credence by the
courts
Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code classifies felonies according to
the means by which they are committed, in particular:
(1) intentional felonies - existence of malicious intent
(2) culpable felonies - absence of malicious intent
Absence of intent, Calimutan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
culpable felony of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide under
Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code
Reckless imprudence consists in voluntarily, but without malice,
doing or failing to do an act from which material damage results by
reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person
performing or failing to perform such act, taking into consideration
his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical
condition and other circumstances regarding persons, time and
place.
10. CORPUZ v. LUGUE
AMADOR CORPUZ and ROMEO GONZALES vs. EDISON LUGUE and
CATHERINE BALUYOT, G.R. No. 137772, July 29, 2005
Chico- Nazario J.
FACTS:
On 14 September 1984, at around 7:15 in the morning, while an
Isuzu KC-20 passenger jeep (KC-20), then being driven by Jimmy
Basilio, was traversing the right side of the Roman Highway in
Barangay Pias, Orion, Bataan, it collided with a tanker truck driven
by Gerardo Lim, which was then moving from the right shoulder of
the highway. As a consequence of the accident, passengers of the
KC-20, including respondent Lugue, suffered physical injuries.
Respondent Lugue then filed an action for damages arising from the
vehicular incident before the Balanga, Bataan RTC, Branch 2, against
herein petitioners Amador Corpuz and Romeo Gonzales, owner and
driver of the minibus, respectively, and Oscar Jaring and Gerardo
Lim, owner and driver of the tanker truck, respectively. Therein
defendants filed a third-party complaint against Ricardo Santiago
and Jimmy Basilio, owner/operator and driver of the KC-20,
respectively.
ISSUE: whether or not the appellate court erred in holding them
liable for damages based on the findings of facts adduced by the trial
court.
RULING:
It is clear that the proximate cause of the injuries suffered by
respondent Lugue was the collision between the KC-20 and the
tanker truck. As correctly pointed out by the lower court, proximate
legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury either
immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a
natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal
connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the
chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable
result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that
the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinarily
prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at
the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person
might probably result therefrom. This conclusion of the appellate
court of recklessness on the part of petitioner Gonzales is, however,
unwarranted. Based on the unchallenged testimony of petitioner
Gonzales, he signaled to overtake the KC-20 because the way was
clear. That despite his best effort to do everything to avoid hitting
the KC-20, petitioner failed to do so because the KC-20 had moved
to a position blocking the way of the minibus as a result of the
tanker bumping the KC-20. Furthermore, based on the unrebutted
testimony of both Remigio Gervacio and Patrocinio Carillo, at the
time when the minibus hit the KC-20, the former was already
moving towards the middle portion of the highway, occupying the
left portion of the road, a little beyond the center line. Certainly,
even assuming that petitioner Gonzales had a few seconds before
actual collision, he no longer had any opportunity to avoid it.
Petitioner Gonzales cannot be deemed negligent for failing to
prevent the collision even after applying all means available to him
within the few instants when he had discovered the impending peril.
11. EQUITABLE BANK v. CALDERON
Moral Damages: When awardable; when not
EQUITABLE BANKING CORPORATION v. CALDERON
2004 Dec 14 G. R. No. 156168
Facts: Jose Calderon, a prominent businessman, applied and was
issued an Equitable International Visa card which can be used for
both peso and dollar transactions within and outside the Philippines.
In its dollar transactions, respondent is required to maintain a dollar
account with a minimum deposit of $3, 000.00, the balance shall
serve as a credit limit. In one of his trips to Hongkong, together with
a friend, he went to a Gucci Department Store where he tried to
purchase several Gucci items (which amounted to HK$4,030.00 or
equivalent to US$523.00) using his Visa card. The saleslady informed
him in front of his friend and other shoppers that the transaction
failed because his Visa card was blacklisted. Upon his return to the
Philippines, Calderon filed a complaint for damages claiming he
suffered much torment and embarrassment on account of EBC’s
wrongful act of blacklisting/suspending his Visa card while at the
Gucci Store in Hongkong. The trial court ruled in favor of Caldeon.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the ruling of the lower court but
reducing the moral damages awarded by the latter and justified that
EBC was negligent in not informing Calderon that his credit card was
already suspended even before he left for Hongkong, ratiocinating
that petitioner’s right to automatically suspend a cardholder’s
privileges without notice should not have been indiscriminately used
in the case of respondent because the latter has already paid his
past obligations and has an existing dollar deposit in an amount
more than the required minimum for credit card at the time he
made his purchases in Hongkong.
Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the
respondent is entitled to moral damages notwithstanding its finding
that petitioner’s actions have not been attended with any malice or
bad faith?
Ruling: In law, moral damages include physical suffering, mental
anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded
feelings, moral shock, social humiliation and similar injury. However,
to be entitled to the award thereof, it is not enough that one merely
suffered sleepless nights, mental anguish or serious anxiety as a
result of the actuations of the other party.
Conditions to be met in order that moral damages may be
recovered:
1) Evidence of besmirched reputation, or physical,
mental or psychological suffering sustained by the
claimant;
2) A culpable act or omission factually established;
3) Proof that the wrongful act or omission of the
defendant is the proximate cause of the damages
sustained by the claimant; and
4) That the case is predicated on any of the instances
expressed or envisioned by Articles 2219 and 2220 of
 the Civil Code. (Philippine Telegraph & Telephone
Corporation vs. Court of Appeals)
Particularly, in culpa contractual or breach of contract,
moral damages are recoverable only if the defendant has acted
fraudulently or in bad faith, or is found guilty of gross negligence
amounting to bad faith, or in wanton disregard of his contractual
obligations. Verily, the breach must be wanton, reckless, malicious
or in bad faith, oppressive or abusive.
In the present case, the CA ruled, and rightly so, that no
malice or bad faith attended petitioner’s dishonor of respondent’s
credit card. For, as found no less by the same court, petitioner was
justified in doing so under the provisions of its Credit Card
Agreement with respondent, paragraph 3 of which states:
xxx the CARDHOLDER agrees not to exceed
his/her approved credit limit, otherwise, all
charges incurred including charges incurred
through the use of the extension CARD/S, if any
in excess of credit limit shall become due and
demandable and the credit privileges shall be
automatically suspended without notice to the
CARDHOLDER in accordance with Section 11
hereof.
We are thus at a loss to understand why, despite its very
own finding of absence of bad faith or malice on the part of the
petitioner, the CA nonetheless adjudged it liable for moral damages
to respondent.
Calderon’s card privileges for dollar transactions were
suspended because of his past due and demandable obligations. He
made a deposit of US$14,000.00 in his dollar account but did not
bother to request the petitioner for the reinstatement of his credit
card privileges for dollar transactions, thus the same remained
under suspension. On account of this, and with the express provision
on automatic suspension without notice under paragraph 3 of the
parties’ Credit Card Agreement, there is simply no basis for holding
petitioner negligent for not notifying respondent of the suspended
status of his credit card privileges. And, certainly, respondent could
not have justifiably assumed that petitioner must have reinstated his
card by reason alone of his having deposited US$14,000.00 a day
before he left for Hongkong. As issuer of the card, petitioner has
the option to decide whether to reinstate or altogether terminate a
credit card previously suspended on considerations which the
petitioner deemed proper, not the least of which are the
cardholder’s payment record, capacity to pay and compliance with
any additional requirements imposed by it.
Even on the aspect of negligence, therefore, petitioner
could not have been properly adjudged liable for moral damages.
Unquestionably, respondent suffered damages as a result
of the dishonor of his card. There is, however, a material distinction
between damages and injury. To quote from the decision in BPI
Express Card Corporation vs. Court of Appeals:
Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right; damage is the loss, hurt
or harm which results from the injury; and damages are the
recompense or compensation awarded for the damage suffered.
Thus, there can be damage without injury in those instances in
which the loss or harm was not the result of a violation of a legal
duty. In such cases the consequences must be borne by the injured
person alone, the law affords no remedy for damages resulting from
an act which does not amount to a legal injury or wrong. These
situations are often called damnum absque injuria.
In other words, in order that a plaintiff may maintain an
action for the injuries of which he complains, he must establish that
such injuries resulted from a breach of duty which the defendant
owed to the plaintiff- a concurrence of injury to the plaintiff and
legal responsibility by the person causing it. The underlying basis for
the award of tort damages is the premise that an individual was
injured in contemplation of law. Thus, there must first be a breach
of some duty and the imposition of liability for that breach before
damages may be awarded; and the breach of such duty should be
the proximate cause of the injury.
In the situation in which respondent finds himself, his is a
case of damnum absque injuria.
On a final note, x x x “moral damages are in the category
of an award designed to compensate the claim for actual injury
suffered and not to impose a penalty on the wrongdoer.”
12. AZNAR v. CITIBANK, N.A. (PHILIPPINES)
Petitioner Aznar, a known businessman, is a holder of a
Preferred Master Credit Card (Mastercard) issued by Citibank. On
July 17,1994, Aznar, his wife and grandchildren left for their Asian
tour. The plane tickets to Kuala Lumpur for his groups were
purchased using his credit card. During their tour, Aznar used his
credit card in some establishments in Malaysia, Singapore and
Indonesia, but the said credit card was not honored. And when he
tried to use the same in Ingtan Tour and Travel Agency (Ingtan
Agency) in Indonesia to purchase plane tickets to Bali, it was again
dishonored for the reason that his card was blacklisted by Citibank.
Such dishonor forced him to buy the tickets in cash. He further
claims that his humiliation caused by the denial of his card was
aggravated when Ingtan Agency spoke of swindlers trying to use
blacklisted cards.
On August 26, 1994, Aznar filed a complaint for damages
against Citibank and raffled to RTC Branch 20, Cebu City, claiming
that Citibank fraudulently or with gross negligence blacklisted his
Mastercard which forced him, his wife and grandchildren to abort
important tour destinations and prevented them from buying
certain items in their tour. He further claimed that he suffered
mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings, besmirched
reputation and social humiliation due to the wrongful blacklisting of
his card.To prove that Citibank blacklisted his Mastercard, Aznar
presented a computer print-out, denominated as on-line
authorizations foreign account activity report, issued to him by
Ingtan Agency with the signature of one Victrina Elnado Nubi (Nubi)
which shows that his card in question was "DECL OVERLIMIT" or
declared over the limit.
Citibank denied the allegation that it blacklisted Aznar’s card. To
prove that they did not blacklist Aznar’s card, Citibank’s Credit Card
Department Head, Dennis Flores, presented Warning Cancellation
Bulletins which contained the list of its canceled cards covering the
period of Aznar’s trip.
On May 29, 1998, RTC Branch 20, Cebu City, through Judge
Ferdinand J. Marcos, rendered its decision dismissing Aznar’s
complaint for lack of merit. Aznar filed a motion for reconsideration
with motion to re-raffle the case and On Novembe 25, 1998, Aznar’s
motion for reconsideration was granted by Judge Jesus S. De la Peña
of Branch 10 of Cebu City.Citibank filed an appeal with the CA. On
January 30, 2004, the CA rendered its Decision granting Citibank’s
appeal. The assailed order of the Regional Trial Court, 7th Judicial
Region, Branch 10, Cebu City, in Civil Case No. CEB-16474 was set
aside and the decision, dated 29 May 1998 of the Regional Trial
Court, 7th Judicial Region, Branch 20, Cebu City was reinstated.
Hence, the appeal.
Issue:
(1) Is the On Line Authorization Report is an electronic
document and constitutes electronic evidence.
(2) Is Citibank liable for damages for the dishonor of Aznar’s
Mastercard?
Held:
(1) No.
The dishonor of Aznar’s Mastercard is not sufficient to support a
conclusion that said credit card was blacklisted by Citibank,
especially in view of Aznar’s own admission that in other merchant
establishments in Kuala Lumpur and Singapore, his Mastercard was
accepted and honored.
Aznar puts much weight on the ON-LINE AUTHORIZATION
FOREIGN ACCOUNT ACTIVITY REPORT, a computer print-out handed
to Aznar by Ingtan Agency, marked as Exh. "G", to prove that his
Mastercard was dishonored for being blacklisted. On said print-out
appears the words "DECL OVERLIMIT" .
As correctly pointed out by the RTC and the CA, however, such
exhibit cannot be considered admissible as its authenticity and due
execution were not sufficiently established by petitioner.
While the Court commiserates with Aznar for whatever undue
embarrassment he suffered when his credit card was dishonored by
Ingtan Agency, especially when the agency’s personnel insinuated
that he could be a swindler trying to use blacklisted cards, the
supreme court cannot grant his present petition as he failed to show
by preponderance of evidence that Citibank breached any obligation
that would make it answerable for said suffering.
(2) No.
The allegations of blacklisting not having been proved, is
Citibank liable for damages for the dishonor of Aznar’s Mastercard?
No.
Note that Citibank invokes paragraphs 7 and 15 of the
terms and conditions governing the issuance of its Mastercard.
In this case, paragraph 7 of the terms and conditions
states that "[Citibank is] not responsible if the Card is not honored
by any merchant affiliate for any reason x x x". While it is true that
Citibank may have no control of all the actions of its merchant
affiliates, and should not be held liable therefor, it is incorrect,
however, to give it blanket freedom from liability if its card is
dishonored by any merchant affiliate for any reason. Such phrase
renders the statement vague and as the said terms and conditions
constitute a contract of adhesion, any ambiguity in its provisions
must be construed against the party who prepared the contract, in
this case Citibank. Note that the contract is on of adhesion.
Citibank also invokes paragraph 15 of its terms and
conditions which limits its liability to ₱1,000.00 or the actual damage
proven, whichever is lesser. Again, such stipulation cannot be
considered as valid for being unconscionable as it precludes
payment of a larger amount even though damage may be clearly
proven. Court is not precluded from ruling out blind adherence to
the terms of a contract if the attendant facts and circumstances
show that they should be ignored for being obviously too one-sided.
The invalidity of the terms and conditions being invoked by
Citibank, notwithstanding, the Court still cannot award damages in
favor of petitioner.
As a rule, in order that a plaintiff may maintain an action
for the injuries of which he complains, he must establish that such
injuries resulted from a breach of duty which the defendant owed to
the plaintiff – a concurrence of injury to the plaintiff and legal
responsibility by the person causing it. The underlying basis for the
award of tort damages is the premise that an individual was injured
in contemplation of law; thus there must first be a breach before
damages may be awarded and the breach of such duty should be
the proximate cause of the injury.
It is not enough that one merely suffered sleepless nights,
mental anguish or serious anxiety as a result of the actuations of the
other party. It is also required that a culpable act or omission was
factually established, that proof that the wrongful act or omission of
the defendant is shown as the proximate cause of the damage
sustained by the claimant and that the case is predicated on any of
the instances expressed or envisioned by Arts. 2219 and 2220 of the
Civil Code.
In culpa contractual or breach of contract, moral damages
are recoverable only if the defendant has acted fraudulently or in
bad faith, or is found guilty of gross negligence amounting to bad
faith, or in wanton disregard of his contractual obligations. The
breach must be wanton, reckless, malicious or in bad faith,
oppressive or abusive.
13. DAPAR v. BIASCAN
DATE: September 27, 2004
AWARD: None
FACTS:
In 1996, Gloria and Mario Biascan were married in civil
rights in Quezon City. They had 4 children: Robert, Edward, Glomary
and Eric.
Mario is an electrician who worked in Saudi Arabia as an
OCW from 1977 to 1981. In 1979, he met Zenaida Dapar who was
working as a domestic helper. The two became lovers and Mario
failed to give support to his wife and family in the Philippines.
Zenaida returned to the Philippines in 1981. When Mario
also returned, they lived together in a rented house in Valenzuela
and opened a joint account with PNB. Mario returned to Saudi
Arabia in February 1984 while Zenaida stayed behind and worked in
a garment factory. He remitted his earnings to Zenaida and the
latter deposited them in their joint savings account. These
remittances were credited in said account as well as others coming
from Zenaida’s relatives working abroad. It had a balance of
P257,225.
A contract to sell was executed between State Land
Investment Corp. and Spouses Mario and Zenaida Biascan over a
parcel of land with an area of 150 sq. m. in Novaliches for P177,189.
A Deed of Sale was executed in favor of Spouses Mario and Zenaida
Biascan as vendees and A TCT was issued by the RD of Caloocan
under their names.
Gloria Biascan filed a complaint against Zenaida for
annulment if title, reconveyance and damages in the RTC of
Caloocan. She alleged that Zenaida fraudulently misrepresented
herself as Mario’s legal wife and had no legal basis in having her
name included in the TCT and tax declaration; and that Gloria, as
legal wife, is entitled to damages because of Zenaida’s use of the
surname Biascan which is a usurpation of surname under Article 377
of the New Civil Code.
Zenaida filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that,
under Article 113 of the Civil Code and Section 4, Rule 3 of the Rules
of Court, a married woman cannot sue or be sued alone without
joining her husband, and that, as registered co-owner of the subject
property, the latter was an indispensable party. She also alleged that
she had no idea that Mario was a married man; that she tried to
leave him when such fact came to her knowledge; and that Mario
made repeated promises of marriage.
Zenaida had also previously instituted an action for
Partition when Mario and his family fraudulently and maliciously
forced her to vacate the house and lot of which the RTC declared her
as a co-owner of the subject lot.
Zenaida’s motion to dismiss was denied. In her
counterclaim she averred that most of the money used for the
amortization and purchase of the subject lot, as well as the
construction of the improvements thereon, was sourced from her
earnings and income and not solely from Mario Biascan. She further
alleged that Mario was, in fact, unemployed from the later part of
1985 to the early part of 1988, and that they had to secure a loan in
the total amount of P80,000 from her mother, which was used to
pay part of the amortization of the property and, which to date, has
remained unpaid.
The court ruled in Zenaida’s favor. CA reversed and set
aside the lower court’s decision. Her motion for reconsideration was
likewise denied.
ISSUE: WON Gloria Biascan is entitled to an award of damages. - NO
RULING:
The action filed by Gloria is barred by the decision of RTC
in the Partition case.
Anent respondent Gloria Biascan’s claim for damages for
the petitioner’s alleged usurpation of her husband’s name, we rule
that she is not entitled to an award therefor.
The usurpation of name under Article 377 of the Civil Code
implies some injury to the interests of the owner of the name. It
consists in the possibility of confusion of identity between the owner
and the usurper, and exists when a person designates himself by
another name. The elements are as follows: (1) there is an actual
use of anothers name by the defendant; (2) the use is unauthorized;
and (3) the use of anothers name is to designate personality or
identify a person. None of the foregoing exist in the case at bar.
Respondent Gloria Biascan did not claim that the petitioner ever
attempted to impersonate her. In fact, the trial court found that
respondent Mario Biascan allowed the petitioner to use his
surname.
The very first time that Zenaida Dapar’s name had the
surname Biascan was when defendant Mario Biascan had executed
the affidavit of undertaking in connection with his employment in
Saudi Arabia, wherein he designated as his beneficiary Zenaida
Dapar Biascan. The undertaking was sworn to by the defendant on
April 7, 1982 and which also showed that his effective date of
employment in Saudi Arabia was April 1982 and to expire on
February 1984.
Zenaida appeared to have no participation in the
preparation of said document. Moreover, when the contract to sell
and the deed of sale of the property in question were executed,
Zenaida Dapar used the surname Biascan and defendant Mario
Biascan did not object to the use of such surname. Also, in the joint
bank account with the PNB Valenzuela, the name Zenaida Dapar
Biascan is described as a joint depositor.
Defendant Zenaida Dapar testified that she used the
surname Biascan because she was instructed by her co-defendant to
do so and she thought the latter was not married. She only became
aware of his civil status a few years later after their living together in
1981.
The use by Zenaida Dapar of the surname of her co-
defendant Mario Biascan was allowed by the latter and in no case
could it be considered usurpation of surname. Accordingly, co-
defendant Zenaida Dapar can no longer be held liable for damages
for the use thereof.
The mere use of a surname cannot be enjoined; it is the
use thereof coupled with the representation that one is the lawful
wife, or the usurpation of the wife’s status, which gives rise to an
action for damages.
Petition is GRANTED.
14. SAFEGUARD SECURITY AGENCY, INC. vs.
TANGCO
G.R. No. 165732. December 14, 2006
FACTS:
In 1997, Evangeline Tangco (Evangeline) went to Ecology Bank,
Katipunan Branch, Quezon City, to renew her time deposit per
advise of the bank's cashier as she would sign a specimen card.
Evangeline, a duly licensed firearm holder with corresponding
permit to carry the same outside her residence, approached security
guard Pajarillo, who was stationed outside the bank, and pulled out
her firearm from her bag to deposit the same for safekeeping. 1) Whether the CA correctly held that respondents, in filing a
Suddenly, Pajarillo shot Evangeline with his service shotgun hitting separate civil action against petitioners are limited to the
her in the abdomen instantly causing her death. recovery of damages arising from a crime or delict;

Lauro Tangco, Evangeline's husband, together with his six minor 2) Whether Pajarillo is guilty of negligence in shooting
children (respondents) filed with the Quezon City RTC a criminal Evangeline; and
case of Homicide against Pajarillo. Respondents reserved their right
to file a separate civil action in the said criminal case. The RTC of 3) Whether Safeguard should be held solidarily liable for the
Quezon City subsequently convicted Pajarillo of Homicide, which damages awarded to respondents.
was affirmed by the CA.
HELD:
Meanwhile, respondents filed with Marikina City RTC, a complaint
1) The CA erred in ruling that the liability of Safeguard is only
for damages against Pajarillo for negligently shooting Evangeline and
subsidiary.
against Safeguard for failing to observe the diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent the damage committed by its security
Respondents reserved the right to file a separate civil action and in
guard.
fact filed the same later on.
Petitioners denied the material allegations in the complaint and
An act or omission causing damage to another may give rise to two
alleged that Safeguard exercised the diligence of a good father of a
separate civil liabilities on the part of the offender, i.e.,
family in the selection and supervision of Pajarillo; that Evangeline's
death was not due to Pajarillo's negligence as the latter acted only in (1) civil liability ex delicto, under Article 100 of the Revised
self-defense. Penal Code; and

The RTC found respondents to be entitled to damages and ordered (2) independent civil liabilities, such as those:
Pajarillo and Safeguard Security Agency, Inc. to pay jointly and
severally the following: (a) not arising from an act or omission complained of as a
felony, e.g., culpa contractual or obligations arising
1) P157,430.00, as actual damages; from law under Article 31 of the Civil Code,
intentional torts under Articles 32 and 34, and culpa
2) P50,000.00 as death indemnity
aquiliana under Article 2176 of the Civil Code; or
3) P1,000,000.00, as moral damages;
(b) where the injured party is granted a right to file an
action independent and distinct from the criminal
4) P300,000.00, as exemplary damages;
action under Article 33 of the Civil Code.
5) 30,000.00), as attorney's fees; and
Either of these liabilities may be enforced against the offender
6) costs of suit. subject to the caveat that the offended party cannot recover
damages twice for the same act or omission or under both causes.
The RTC ruled that Pajarillo did not act in self-defense and being the
guard on duty, the situation demanded that he should have A reading of respondents' complaint shows that the latter are
exercised proper prudence and necessary care by asking Evangeline invoking their right to recover damages against Safeguard for their
for him to ascertain the matter instead of shooting her instantly; vicarious responsibility for the injury caused by Pajarillo's act of
that Pajarillo had already been convicted of Homicide and that he shooting and killing Evangeline under Article 2176.
also failed to proffer proof negating liability in the instant case.
The scope of Article 2176 is not limited to acts or omissions resulting
The RTC also found Safeguard as employer of Pajarillo to be jointly from negligence but also covers acts criminal in character, whether
and severally liable with Pajarillo. It ruled that there was no intentional and voluntary or negligent.
sufficient evidence to show that Safeguard exercised the diligence of
The civil action filed by respondents was not derived from the
a good father of a family in the supervision of its employee.
criminal liability of Pajarillo in the criminal case but one based
The CA affirmed the decision with the modification that Safeguard on culpa aquiliana or quasi-delict which is separate and distinct from
Security Agency, Inc.'s civil liability is only subsidiary under Art. 103 the civil liability arising from crime.18 The source of the obligation
of the RPC. sought to be enforced in the civil case is a quasi-delict not an act or
omission punishable by law.
ISSUES:
The fact that appellants reserved their right in the criminal case to
file an independent civil action did not preclude them from
choosing to file a civil action for quasi-delict.
Although the judgment in the criminal case finding Pajarillo guilty of
Homicide is already final and executory, such judgment has no
relevance or importance to this case. It would have been entirely
different if respondents' cause of action was for damages arising
from a delict, in which case the CA is correct in finding Safeguard to
be only subsidiary liable pursuant to Article 103 of the RPC.
2) The issue of negligence is a question of fact. A review of the
records of the case fails to show any reason for us to deviate from
the factual finding of the trial court and affirmed by the CA that
petitioner Pajarillo was guilty of negligence in shooting Evangeline.
1. Yes, Pajarillo is guilty of negligence in shooting Evangeline as
upheld by both the RTC and CA
Pajarillo failed to substantiate his claim that Evangeline was seen
roaming outside the vicinity of the bank and acting suspiciously prior
to the shooting incident. That Evangeline just wanted to deposit her
gun before entering the bank and was actually in the act of pulling
her gun from her bag when petitioner Pajarillo recklessly shot her,
finds support from the contentions raised in petitioners' petition for
review.
Evangeline's death was merely due to Pajarillo's negligence in
shooting her on his imagined threat that Evangeline will rob the
bank.
3) As the employer of Pajarillo, Safeguard is primarily and solidarily
liable for the quasi-delict committed by the former. Safeguard is
presumed to be negligent in the selection and supervision of his
employee by operation of law.
We agree with the RTC's finding that while Safeguard had exercised
the diligence in the selection of Pajarillo since the record shows that
Pajarillo underwent a psychological and neuro-psychiatric
evaluation, it fell short of the diligence required in the supervision of
Pajarillo. It was established that Pajarillo was not aware of company
rules and regulations and that there was no showing that Pajarillo
had attended classroom instructions as claimed by Safeguard. The
records also failed to show that there was adequate training and
continuous evaluation of the security guard's performance.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED. The Decision of the
Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the civil
liability of petitioner Safeguard Security Agency, Inc. is SOLIDARY
and PRIMARY under Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
15. GARRATT v. DAILEY
Facts
Brian Dailey, age five year, nine months, was visiting with Naomi
Garratt, and adult and a sister of the plaintiff, Ruth Garratt, in the
backyard of the plaintiff’s home.
Dailey, picked up a lightly built wood and canvas lawn chair which
was then and there located in the backyard, moved it sideways a
few feet and seated himself therein, at which time he discovered
that Ruth Garratt about to sit down at the place where the lawn
chair had formerly been, at which time he hurriedly got up from the
chair and attempted to move it toward Ruth Garratt to aid her in
sitting down in the chair; that due to the defendant's small size and
lack of dexterity he was unable to get the lawn chair under the
plaintiff in time to prevent her from falling to the ground. That
plaintiff fell to the ground and sustained a fracture of her hip, and
other injuries and damages as hereinafter set forth.
A case was filed against Dailey for an alleged battery.
Issue
In an action for battery, what constitutes willful and unlawful intent?
Ruling
Battery is the intentional infliction of a harmful bodily contact upon
another. The rule that determines liability for battery is:
An act which, directly or indirectly, is the legal cause of a harmful
contact with another's person makes the actor liable to the other, if
(a) the act is done with the intention of bringing about a
harmful or offensive contact or an apprehension thereof to the
other or a third person, and
(b) the contact is not consented to by the other or the other's
consent thereto is procured by fraud or duress, and
(c) the contact is not otherwise privileged.
Character of actor's intention. In order that an act may be done with
the intention of bringing about a harmful or offensive contact or an
apprehension thereof to a particular person, either the other or a
third person, the act must be done for the purpose of causing the
contact or apprehension or with knowledge on the part of the actor
that such contact or apprehension is substantially certain to be
produced. It is not enough that the act itself is intentionally done
and this, even though the actor realizes or should realize that it
contains a very grave risk of bringing about the contact or
apprehension. Such realization may make the actor's conduct
negligent or even reckless but unless he realizes that to a substantial
certainty, the contact or apprehension will result, the actor has not
that intention which is necessary to make him liable.
A battery would be established if, in addition to plaintiff's fall, it was
proved that, when Brian moved the chair, he knew with substantial
certainty that the plaintiff would attempt to sit down where the
chair had been. If Brian had any of the intents which the trial court
found that he did not have, he would of course have had the
knowledge to which we have referred. The mere absence of any
intent to injure the plaintiff or to play a prank on her or to
embarrass her, or to commit an assault and battery on her would
not absolve him from liability if in fact he had such knowledge.
Without such knowledge, there would be nothing wrongful about
Brian's act in moving the chair, and, there being no wrongful act,
there would be no liability.
The cause is remanded for clarification, with instructions to make
definite findings on the issue of whether Brian Dailey knew with
substantial certainty that the plaintiff would attempt to sit down
where the chair which he moved had been, and to change the
judgment if the findings warrant it.
Decision
Remanded for clarification.

16. TALMAGE v. SMITH
FACTS:
Defendant found several boys atop his sheds. He requested that
they get down and they did. As he rounded the corner he saw two
other boys remaining. He ordered them down, and as they began to,
he threw a stick at them. The stick struck one boy in the eye causing
an injury therefrom.
Issue:
Was the throwing of the stick reasonable force or intent to injure?
Holding: There was Intent to injure.
Procedure: Jury verdict for Pl. Affirmed
Rule: If intent existed to trespass the person of another, and the
trespass caused an injury, the trespasser is liable for the injury.
Ct. Rationale: The defendant caused the stick to be propelled in the
direction of the boys, knowing that the boys were there, and intent
on hitting one of them. It is no defense that the one hit, wasn’t
aimed for, nor hit in the manner determined, only that he caused
the stick to be propelled under the intent to hit someone.
17. PEOPLE v. HERRERA
Facts:
At 6:30pm, Enrique Ganan was eating fishballs while cuddling his
youngest child. He was talking with his brother, and his sister-in-law.
At the same time, Corazon Cajipo was talking with a friend about 10
meters away. The calm evening was shattered when someone
armed with a .38 caliber revolver suddenly approached Enrique from
behind and shot him. Although wounded, Enrique was able to pass
his child in the continuing uproar and attempted to crawl to safety.
However, his attacker continued to follow him and shot him 6 more
times and casually walked away. Enrique Ganan and Corazon Cajipo
were found dead.
Edgardo Herrera, a policeman, was then charged with murder from
the killing of Enrique Ganan, and homicide for the killing of Corazon.
The court rendered him guilty on both charges.
On automatic review of the Court, Herrera professed his innocence
claiming that he was only acting on self-defense. He insists that he
did not provoke the victim because he was merely asking Ganan on
what really transpired during the birthday of a friend where Herrera
lost consciousness. He was allegedly drugged, and Ganan and his
cohorts fired his gun and started kicking and urinating on him, while
he was unconscious.
He claims that there was unlawful aggression because Ganan
allegedly tried to grab his gun, and that he had to use the most
reasonable means to resist such force. According to Herrera, his act
of shooting the victim to stop the latter from reaching his gun is a
result of spontaneous reflexes of self-preservation.
Issue:
WON he acted in self-defense
Ruling:
No. The nature and number of the gunshot wounds negates the
claim of self-defense. The victim suffered 6 gunshot wounds. The
medico legal officer who performed the autopsy on the victim
testified that the most fatal wound was located on the head,
inflicted not more than half an inch from behind.
Moreover, Herrera’s claim of self-defense was established solely by
his testimony. He failed to corroborate his claim of self-preservation
with evidence other than his own testimony. Where an accused
invokes self-defense, the burden is shifted to him to prove that he
killed the victim to save his life.
There were 3 eyewitnesses, who positively identified Herrera as the
assailant. Furthermore, immediately after the incident, Herrera fled
to Batangas for more than a month. Flight strongly indicates a guilty
mind and betrays the existence of a guilty conscience.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated September 27, 1999 of the
Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 110, finding accused-
appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Murder and Homicide.
Further, accused-appellant is ordered to pay the heirs of Enrique
Ganan the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00
as moral damages; and to pay the heirs of Corazon Cajipo the
amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral
damages, and P25,000.00 as funeral and burial expenses.The award
for exemplary damages is DELETED.
18. QUINTO v. ANDRES
Facts:
At around 7:30 a.m. on November 13, 1995, eleven-year-old Edison
Garcia, a Grade 4 elementary school pupil, and his playmate, Wilson
Quinto, who was also about eleven years old, were at Barangay San
Rafael, Tarlac, Tarlac. They saw respondents Dante
Andres and Randyver Pacheco by the mouth of a drainage culvert.
Andres and Pacheco invited Wilson to go fishing with them inside
the drainage culvert. Wilson assented. When Garcia saw that it was
dark inside, he opted to remain seated in a... grassy area about two
meters from the entrance of the drainage system.
Respondent Pacheco had a flashlight. He, along with respondent
Andres and Wilson, entered the drainage system which was covered
by concrete culvert about a meter high and a meter wide, with
water about a foot deep. After a while, respondent Pacheco, who
was holding a fish, came out of the drainage system and left without
saying a word. Respondent Andres also came out, went back inside,
and emerged again, this time, carrying Wilson who was already
dead. Respondent Andres laid the... boy's lifeless body down in the
grassy area. Shocked at the sudden turn of events, Garcia fled from
the scene. For his part, respondent Andres went to the house of
petitioner Melba Quinto, Wilson's mother, and informed her that...
her son had died. Melba Quinto rushed to the drainage culvert
while respondent Andres followed her.
CAUSE OF DEATH: Asphyxia by drowning; traumatic head injuries,
contributory.
Issues:
WHETHER OR NOT THE EXTINCTION OF RESPONDENTS' CRIMINAL
LIABILITY, LIKEWISE, CARRIES WITH IT THE EXTINCTION OF THEIR
CIVIL LIABILITY.
WHETHER OR NOT PREPONDERANT EVIDENCE EXISTS TO HOLD
RESPONDENTS CIVILLY LIABLE FOR THE DEATH OF WILSON QUINTO.
Ruling:
Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable.
a person committing a felony is criminally liable for all the natural
and logical consequences resulting therefrom although the wrongful
act done be different from that which he intended.
The felony committed must be the proximate cause of the resulting
injury.
If a person inflicts a wound with a deadly weapon in such a manner
as to put life in jeopardy and death follows as a consequence of their
felonious act, it does not alter its nature or diminish its criminality to
prove that other causes cooperated in producing the factual...
result. The offender is criminally liable for the death of the victim if
his delictual act caused, accelerated or contributed to the death of
the victim. Moreover, a person committing a felony is criminally
liable for all the natural and logical consequences resulting
therefrom although the wrongful act done be different from that
which he intended.[24] Natural refers to an occurrence in the
ordinary course of human life or events, while logical means that
there is a rational connection between the act of the accused and
the resulting injury or damage. The felony committed must be the
proximate cause of the resulting injury. Proximate cause is that
cause which in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by an
efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which
the result would not have occurred. The proximate legal cause is
that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately, or by
setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and
continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection
with its immediate predecessor.
In the present case, the respondents were charged with homicide by
dolo.
In the present case, we rule that, as held by the trial court and the
CA, the prosecution failed to adduce preponderant evidence to
prove the facts on which the civil liability of the respondents rest,
i.e., that the petitioner has a cause of action against the...
respondents for damages.
He presented two possibilities: (a)... that the deceased could have
been hit by a blunt object or instrument applied with full force; or
(b) the deceased could have slipped, fell hard and his head hit a hard
object:
The trial court gave credence to the testimony of Dr. Aguda that the
deceased might have slipped, causing the latter to fall hard and hit
his head on the pavement,... However, the absence of any ill-motive
to kill the deceased is relevant and admissible in evidence to prove
that no violence was perpetrated on... the person of the deceased.
In this case, the petitioner failed to adduce proof of any ill-motive on
the part of either respondent to kill the deceased before or after the
latter was invited to join them in fishing. Indeed, the petitioner
testified that respondent
Andres used to go to their house and play with her son before the
latter's death:
Principles:
The prime purpose of the criminal action is to punish the offender in
order to deter him and others from committing the same or similar
offense, to isolate him from society, to reform and rehabilitate him
or, in general, to maintain social order.
The... sole purpose of the civil action is the restitution, reparation or
indemnification of the private offended party for the damage or
injury he sustained by reason of the delictual or felonious act of the
accused
Natural" refers to an occurrence in the ordinary... course of human
life or events... logical" means that there is a rational connection
between the act of the accused and the resulting injury or damage
Proximate cause is that cause which... in natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by an efficient intervening cause, produces the
injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.
There must be a relation of "cause and effect," the cause being the
felonious act of the offender, the effect being the resultant injuries
and/or death of the victim.
19. FISHER v. CARROUSEL MOTOR HOTEL, INC.
Brief Fact Summary. At a professional conference held in
Defendant’s hotel, one of Defendant’s employees seized a plate
from the Plaintiff’s hand, shouting that a “Negro could not be served
in the club”�. Defendant’s employee did not make physical contact
with Plaintiff, but the event was witnessed by many of Plaintiff’s
colleagues. Plaintiff sought actual and punitive damages for assault
and battery.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. A Plaintiff may recover for battery even
when not physically touched so long as the Defendant committed an
unwanted an intentional invasion of the inviolability of the Plaintiff’s
person.
Facts. Plaintiff sued for assault and battery when Defendant’s
employee forcibly removed a plate from Plaintiff’s hand, but did not
actually make physical contact with Plaintiff. The jury returned a
verdict of $400 for actual damages and $500 in punitive damages.
The trial court, however, set aside the verdict because no actual
physical contact was made with Plaintiff.
Issue. Did the trial court correctly set aside the jury’s verdict
because no actual physical contact was made with the Plaintiff?
* May actual damages stemming from mental suffering be awarded
when no physical contact occurred?
Held. The trial court’s decision was reversed and the verdict
reinstated.
* Unwanted and intentional invasion of one’s person through
dispossession of an object is battery even in the absence of physical
contact.
* Actual damages for mental suffering stemming from battery may
be awarded even when no physical contact is made.
Discussion. The Court distills battery as a tort concerned primarily
with personal dignity, not merely personal space. However, the
Court repeatedly refers to offenses to “the person”, implying that
some nexus with physical contact must be present in cases of
battery. The Court suggests that any objects grasped by a person are
considered part of “the person” for the purposes of battery. Other
courts have sometimes referred to such objects as “appurtenances.”
20. US v. LICARTE
There had been some trouble between the family of the appellant
and that of the offended party prior to the occurrences which form
the basis of this action. On the 18th of September, 1910, the
offended party, Benita Soyso, sent her small son to the house of the
accused for the purpose of obtaining a bolo which her husband had
loaned to tjie husband of the accused. On arrival of the messenger
at the house, he found that neither the accused nor her husband
was there, and on asking Filomena, daughter of the accused, for the
bolo, Filomena replied by saying that she knew nothing
about it. The offended party, on hearing this reply (her house and
that of the accused being opposite and very near each other), began
abusing Filomena, calling her vile names. The accused and her
husband being in a neighbor's house nearby, heard these insulting
words, and thereupon the accused left the house where she was
and appeared in front of that of Benita Soyso and
demanded of the latter an explanation of the insult to her daughter
Filomena. A quarrel ensued between Benita and the accused, in
which abusive language was exchanged. The accused becoming
very angry and very much excited, and having in her hand at that
time a short working bolo, entered the house of Benita and
began striking her with the bolo. As a result of the wounds
inflicted, Benita was incapacitated and required medical attendance
for a period of fifteen days. The court below, in fixing the penalty
imposed, took into consideration the aggravating
circumstance of morada, inasmuch as the crime was committed in
the house of the offended party.
Issue: Did the court erred in imposing the penalty?
Held: In this we think the court erred.
Article 10 of the Penal Code reads:
"The following are aggravating circumstances:
"No. 20. That the act be committed with insult or in disregard of
the respect due the offended party on account of his rank, age, or
sex, or that it be committed in the dwelling of the offended party, if
the latter has not given provocation."
In the case at bar the offended party, by calling Filomena vile
names, started the trouble. This vile language was not directed at
the accused, but to her daughter. This was, however, a sufficient
provocation to cause the accused to demand an explanation
why her daughter was so grossly insulted. So, under these facts, it
was error to hold that the aggravating circumstance
of morada existed. (Decision of the supreme court of Spain, October
24,1894.)
The accused was a woman about fifty years of age. She heard her
single daughter grossly insulted. She appeared in front of the house
of Benita and demanded an explanation. The explanation was not
forthcoming, and a quarrel immediately ensued between these two
women. The accused was laboring under great excitement
and passion when she entered the house of Benita and inflicted the
wounds. These facts should be considered as a circumstance
mitigating the offense. (Art. 9, No. 7, Penal Code,) There being no
aggravating circumstances present, and one mitigating
circumstance, the penalty should have been imposed in its minimum
degree.
The judgment appealed from is hereby modified by imposing upon
the appellant a penalty of one month and one day of arresto
mayor,instead of four months and one day of arresto mayor. As
thus modified, the judgment is affirmed, with costs against the
appellant.
21. DISINI, JR. v. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE
DATE: February 11, 2014
FACTS:
The case arises out of consolidated petitions to the
Supreme Court of the Philippines on the constitutionality of several
provisions of the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012, RA 10175.
The Petitioners argued that even though the Act is the
government’s platform in combating illegal cyberspace activities, 21
separate sections of the Act violate their constitutional rights,
particularly the right to freedom of expression and access to
information.
In February 2013, the Supreme Court extended the
duration of a temporary restraining order against the government to
halt enforcement of the Act until the adjudication of the issues.
ISSUE: WON RA 10175 is unconstitutional.
RULING:
The Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012 was adopted for
the purpose of regulating access to and use of cyberspace. Several
sections of the law define relevant cyber crimes and enable the
government to track down and penalize violators.
Among 21 challenged sections, the Court declared
Sections 4(c)(3), 12, and 19 of the Act as unconstitutional.
Section 4(c)(3) prohibits the transmission of unsolicited
commercial electronic communications, commonly known as spams,
that seek to advertise, sell, or offer for sale of products and services
unless the recipient affirmatively consents, or when the purpose of
the communication is for service or administrative announcements
from the sender to its existing users, or “when the following
conditions are present: (aa) The commercial electronic
communication contains a simple, valid, and reliable way for the
recipient to reject receipt of further commercial electronic messages
(opt-out) from the same source; (bb) The commercial electronic
communication does not purposely disguise the source of the
electronic message; and (cc) The commercial electronic
communication does not purposely include misleading information
in any part of the message in order to induce the recipients to read
the message.”
The government argued that unsolicited commercial
communications amount to both nuisance and trespass because
they tend to interfere with the enjoyment of using online services
and that they enter the recipient’s domain without prior permission.
The Court first noted that spams are a category
of commercial speech, which does not receive the same level of
protection as other constitutionally guaranteed forms of expression
,”but is nonetheless entitled to protection.” It ruled that the
prohibition on transmitting unsolicited communications “would
deny a person the right to read his emails, even unsolicited
commercial ads addressed to him.” Accordingly, the Court declared
Section4(c)(3) as unconstitutional.
Section 12 of the Act authorizes the law enforcement
without a court warrant “to collect or record traffic data in real-time
associated with specified communications transmitted by means of
a computer system.” Traffic data under this Section includes the
origin, destination, route, size, date, and duration of the
communication, but not its content nor the identity of users.
The Petitioners argued that such warrantless authority
curtails their civil liberties and set the stage for abuse of discretion
by the government. They also claimed that this provision
violates the right to privacy and protection from the government’s
intrusion into online communications.
According to the Court, since Section 12 may lead to
disclosure of private communications, it must survive the rational
basis standard of whether it is narrowly tailored towards serving a
government’s compelling interest. The Court found that the
government did have a compelling interest in preventing cyber
crimes by monitoring real-time traffic data.
As to whether Section 12 violated the right to privacy, the
Court first recognized that the right at stake concerned
informational privacy, defined as “the right not to have private
information disclosed, and the right to live freely without
surveillance and intrusion.” In determining whether a
communication is entitled to the right of privacy, the Court applied a
two-part test: (1) Whether the person claiming the right has a
legitimate expectation of privacy over the communication, and (2)
whether his expectation of privacy can be regarded as objectively
reasonable in the society.
The Court noted that internet users have subjective
reasonable expectation of privacy over their communications
transmitted online. However, it did not find the expectation as
objectively reasonable because traffic data sent through internet
“does not disclose the actual names and addresses (residential or
office) of the sender and the recipient, only their coded Internet
Protocol (IP) addresses.”
Even though the Court ruled that real-time traffic data
under Section 12 does not enjoy the objective reasonable
expectation of privacy, the existence of enough data may reveal the
personal information of its sender or recipient, against which the
Section fails to provide sufficient safeguard. The Court viewed the
law as “virtually limitless, enabling law enforcement authorities to
engage in “fishing expedition,” choosing whatever specified
communication they want.”
Accordingly, the Court struck down Section 12 for lack
of specificity and definiteness as to ensure respect for the right to
privacy.
Section 19 authorizes the Department of Justice to restrict
or block access to a computer data found to be in violation of the
Act. The Petitioners argued that this section also violated the right
to freedom of expression, as well as the constitutional protection
against unreasonable searches and seizures.
The Court first recognized that computer data constitutes
a personal property, entitled to protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures. Also, the Constitution requires the
government to secure a valid judicial warrant when it seeks to seize
a personal property or to block a form of expression. Because
Section 19 precluded any judicial intervention, the Court found it
unconstitutional.
WHEREFORE, the Court DECLARES:
1. VOID for being UNCONSTITUTIONAL:
a. Section 4(c)(3) of Republic Act 10175 that penalizes
posting of unsolicited commercial communications;
b. Section 12 that authorizes the collection or recording of
traffic data in real-time; and
c. Section 19 of the same Act that authorizes the
Department of Justice to restrict or block access to
suspected Computer Data. xxx
Further, the Court DECLARES:
1. Section 4(c)(4) that penalizes online libel as VALID and
CONSTITUTIONAL with respect to the original author of
the post; but VOID and UNCONSTITUTIONAL with respect
to others who simply receive the post and react to it; and
2. Section 5 that penalizes aiding or abetting and attempt
in the commission of cybercrimes as VA L I D and
CONSTITUTIONAL only in relation to Section 4(a)(1) on
Illegal Access, Section 4(a)(2) on Illegal Interception,
Section 4(a)(3) on Data Interference, Section 4(a)(4) on
System
Interference, Section 4(a)(5) on Misuse of Devices, Section
4(a)(6) on Cyber-squatting, Section 4(b)(1) on Computer-related
Forgery, Section 4(b)(2) on Computer-related Fraud, Section 4(b)(3)
on Computer-related Identity Theft, and Section 4(c)(1) on Cybersex;
but VOID and UNCONSTITUTIONAL with respect to Sections 4(c)(2)
on Child Pornography, 4(c)(3) on Unsolicited Commercial
Communications, and 4(c)(4) on online Libel.1âwphi1
Lastly, the Court RESOLVES to LEAVE THE DETERMINATION
of the correct application of Section 7 that authorizes prosecution of
the offender under both the Revised Penal Code and Republic Act
10175 to actual cases, WITH THE EXCEPTION of the crimes of:
1. Online libel as to which, charging the offender under
both Section 4(c)(4) of Republic Act 10175 and Article 353
of the Revised Penal Code constitutes a violation of the
proscription against double jeopardy; as well as
2. Child pornography committed online as to which,
charging the offender under both Section 4(c)(2) of
Republic Act 10175 and Republic Act 9775 or the Anti-
Child Pornography Act of 2009 also constitutes a violation
of the same proscription, and, in respect to these, is VOID
and UNCONSTITUTIONAL
22. COMMONWEALTH v. SILANEY
COMMONWEALTH vs. RICHARD P. SLANEY
345 Mass. 135
October 1, 1962 - November 8, 1962
FACTS:
For a year and half to two years before the alleged offence, the
defendant, a married man, and Mrs. Bowen, a married woman
separated from her husband, had frequently been in one another's
company. Shortly before the alleged offence there was a change in
Mrs. Bowen's attitude toward the defendant.
On the night of August 2, 1961, the defendant went to the Oxford
Grille, a restaurant and bar in Cambridge owned by DeVincentis,
where Mrs. Bowen was employed as a waitress. He persistently
asked Mrs. Bowen to wait on him and to see him after work. She
refused. At 1:15 A.M. when DeVincentis and Mrs. Bowen left the
restaurant and were crossing the street toward a lot where
DeVincentis's car was parked, a car driven by the defendant
emerged from a nearby alley at high speed and stopped in front of
the entrance to the lot. The defendant got out of his car,
approached Mrs. Bowen and DeVincentis, and demanded that Mrs.
Bowen go with him. DeVincentis explained that he merely was going
to take Mrs. Bowen to a nearby taxi stand. The defendant "threw a
punch” then pulled out a gun, pointed it "right at" DeVincentis, and
advised him to start praying because he was going to shoot Mrs.
Bowen, DeVincentis, and himself. DeVincentis tried to move closer
to the defendant in order to maneuver into a position to take the
gun away from him. The defendant backed away and, while doing
so, the gun was discharged. The bullet pierced Mrs. Bowen's
handbag and dress. Police on foot patrol heard the shot, went to the
scene, disarmed the defendant, and placed him under arrest.
DeVincentis testified that he was not afraid at any time; that when
he tried to get closer to the defendant to maneuver to get the gun
he was not afraid that he was going to be shot.
The defendant Slaney was found guilty on two indictments, one
charging him with assault and battery by means of a dangerous
weapon on Mary Bowen and the other charging him with assault by
means of a dangerous weapon on Joseph A. De Vincentis. Trial was
had in the Superior Court without jury.
The defendant contends that he was entitled to a finding of not
guilty on the charge of assault with a dangerous weapon on
DeVincentis based on his thesis that fear on the part of the victim is
an essential element of the crime of assault, and that DeVincentis's
testimony conclusively eliminates that element from the
Commonwealth's case.
The cases come to us upon appeals
ISSUE:
Whether fear on the part of the victim must be proved in order to
support a conviction of assault under the common law (NO)
HELD:
Defendant contends that too constitute an assault, the person
assaulted must be put in actual fear and terror; where there is no
actual fear or terror there can be no assault.This definition expresses
a concept of common law assault which, as applied to the criminal
law, is at variance with that held by the overwhelming number of
authorities, both old and recent, who define the essentials of a
common law assault in such familiar terms as: an attempt (or offer)
to do bodily harm to another by force and violence; or simply, an
attempt to commit a battery.
Obvious practical considerations militate against acceptance of the
defendant's contention. The criminal law is designed primarily to
preserve the public peace. The imperturbability or fortitude of a
victim, or the unawareness of an intended victim, should not
afford a defence to the criminal prosecution of the wrongdoer. The
guilt or innocence of a person charged with assault "depends
entirely upon what the wrongdoer does and intends and not at all
upon what the other apprehends, or does not apprehend."
It follows from what we have said that in this Commonwealth
neither fear, nor terror nor apprehension of harm is an essential
ingredient of the common law crime of assault.
In particular, the defendant cites Commonwealth v. White, 110
Mass. 407, and Ross v. Michael, 246 Mass. 126. We think that the
argument of the defendant rests upon a misapprehension of the
issue which was before the court in each of the cases cited, with the
result that there is a misconception of the holdings, and a
misapplication of the language used to the case now under
consideration.
In Commonwealth v. White, 110 Mass. 407, a criminal case, the
defendant contended that the gun with which he threatened the
complainant was not loaded, that he was consequently lacking in
the present ability to do the harm threatened, and therefore should
be found not guilty.
In Ross v. Michael, 246 Mass. 126, a civil case, the defendant
contended that the threatening words which accompanied the overt
act were clearly conditional, that they revealed that he was lacking
in any present intention to do harm, and therefore he could not be
held liable for an assault.
The trial judge in each case rejected the defendant's contention and
in substance instructed the jury that if, notwithstanding the
defendant's present inability to do harm in the one case, and
notwithstanding the defendant's disclaimer of a present intent to do
harm in the other case, the complainant nevertheless had a well
grounded and reasonable belief that he was in immediate danger
of personal injury at the hands of the defendant, a verdict that an
assault had been committed should be returned.
In each case the conduct of the defendant was menacing by
objective standards. In each case it was left to the jury to determine
if, as the result of the menacing conduct, fear of immediate bodily
harm was reasonably engendered in the victim.
In the civil case, fear, or at least apprehension, was essential to
recovery whether the threat was conditional or absolute.
In the criminal case the court held that in the circumstances it was
relevant that the objectively menacing conduct of the defendant,
despite an actual inability to do harm, produced the fear of harm
which it was intended to produce, with the same consequential
tendency to provoke a breach of the peace as if he had the actual
ability to do harm. "It is the outward demonstration that constitutes
the mischief which is punished as a breach of the peace."
In this context, the cited cases do not support the proposition for
which the defendant argues. Far from suggesting that fear on the
part of the victim must be proved in order to support a conviction of
assault under the common law, Commonwealth v. White, in the
opinion of contemporary authorities, establishes an additional
category of criminal assault which is separate and distinct from, but
not in substitution for, the basis originally provided by the common
law.
We have discussed the cited cases to show that they do not, as
argued, alter the common law conception that fear on the part of
the victim need not be proved in the crime of assault. The language
of the cited cases has no application to the case before us. There
could be no doubt that Slaney was able to inflict bodily harm, and
that he indicated a present purpose to do it by his unequivocal
words and conduct.
The ruling of the judge on the request relating to the element of
fear, although harmless in the particular case, was erroneous, and is
inherently harmful to the interests of the Commonwealth. His
special finding that the victims were in a state of apprehension,
although warranted, was not necessary to his conclusion of guilt. His
ruling that the defendant was not entitled to a finding of not guilty
was manifestly correct.
Judgments affirmed.
23. MADEJA v. CARO
No. L-51183
December 21, 1983
Topic: Scope of Physical Injuries – Intentional Torts
Facts
Dr. Eva Japzon was charged with reckless imprudence resulting to
homicide for the death of Cleto Madeja after an appendectomy.
Carmen Madeja, widow of the deceased, reserved her right to file a
separate civil action for damages.
The criminal case still pending, Madeja sued Dr. Japzon for damages
of the same court. She alleged that her husband died because of the
gross negligence of Dr. Japzon. The respondent judge granted the
defendant's motion to dismiss. According to the respondent judge,
"under the foregoing Sec. 3 (a), Rule 111, New Rules of Court, the
instant civil action may be instituted only after final judgment has
been rendered in the criminal action.
The instant petition which seeks to set aside the order of the
respondent judge granting the defendant's motion to dismiss.
Issue
WON the order granting the motion to dismiss the civil action should
be set aside – YES
Ruling
Section 2, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court in relation to Article 33 of
the Civil Code is the applicable provision. The two enactments are
quoted hereinbelow:
"Sec. 2. Independent civil action.—In the cases provided for in
Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the Civil Code of the Philippines,
an independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the
criminal action, may be brought by the injured party during the
pendency of the criminal case, provided the right is reserved as
required in the preceding section. Such civil action shall proceed
independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence." (Rule 111, Rules of Court.)
"Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil
action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal
action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall
proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require
only a preponderance of evidence." (Civil Code.)
There are at least two things about Art. 33 of the Civil Code which
are worth noting, namely:
1. The civil action for damages which it allows to be instituted is ex-
delicto. This is manifest from the provision which uses the
expressions "criminal action" and "criminal prosecution."
2. The term "physical injuries" is used in a generic sense. It is not the
crime of physical injuries defined in the Revised Penal Code. It
includes not only physical injuries but consummated, frustrated and
attempted homicide.
The term 'physical injuries' should be understood to mean bodily
injury, not the crime of physical injuries, because the terms used
with the latter are general terms. In any case the Code Commission
recommended that the civil action for physical injuries be similar to
the civil action for assault and battery in American Law, and this
recommendation must have been accepted by the Legislature when
it approved the article intact as recommended. If the intent has
been to establish a civil action for the bodily harm received by the
complainant similar to the civil action for assault and battery, as the
Code Commission states, the civil action should lie whether the
offense committed is that of physical injuries, or frustrated
homicide, or attempted homicide, or even death."
Decision
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted; the order dismissing
Civil Case No. 141 is hereby set aside; no special pronouncement as
to costs.
Concurring Opinion: Aquino, J.
Death due to a negligent act may be a delict or quasi-delict. It may
create a civil action based on article 100 of the Penal Code or an
action based on culpa aquiliana under article 2176 of the Civil Code.
These alternatives are assumed in article 2177 of the Civil Code "but
the plaintiff cannot recover twice for the same act or omission of the
defendant."
The term "physical injuries" in article 33 of the Civil Code includes
death and may give rise to an independent civil action.
24. PEOPLE v. GENOSA
(GR 135981, January 15, 2004)
FACTS:
Appellant and Ben rented from Steban Matiga a house at Barangay
Bilwang, Isabel, Leyte where they lived with their two children,
namely: John Marben and Earl Pierre.
On November 15, 1995, Ben Genosa (husband of appellant Marivic
Genosa) and Arturo Basosbas went to a cockfight after receiving
their salary. They each had two (2) bottles of beer before heading
home. When they arrived at the Genosas, Ben found out that
Marivic went to Isabel, Leyte, to look for him.
On November 16, 1995, appellant asked Erlinda Paderog, her close
friend and neighbor to look after her pig because she was going to
Cebu for a pregnancy check-up. Appellant likewise asked Erlinda to
sell her motorcycle to their neighbor Ronnie who unfortunately had
no money to buy it. That same day, about 12:15 in the afternoon,
while waiting for a bus going to Ormoc, Joseph Valida saw Marivic
going out of their house with her two kids, each one carrying a bag,
locking the gate and taking her children to the waiting area where
he was. Joseph lived about fifty (50) meters behind the Genosas'
rented house. They rode the same bus to Ormoc, but had no
conversation since Joseph noticed that appellant did not want to
talk to him.
On November 18, 1995, the neighbors of Steban Matiga told him
about the foul odor emanating from his house being rented by Ben
and appellant. Steban went there to find out the cause of the stench
but the house was locked from the inside. Since he did not have a
duplicate key with him, Steban destroyed the gate padlock with a
borrowed steel saw. Steban went inside the unlocked bedroom
where the offensive smell was coming from. There, he saw the
lifeless body of Ben lying on his side on the bed covered with a
blanket. He was only in his briefs with injuries at the back of his
head. There was blood at the nape of Ben who only had his briefs
on. SPO3 Acodesin found in one corner at the side of an aparador a
metal pipe about two (2) meters from where Ben was, leaning
against a wall. The metal pipe measured three (3) feet and six (6)
inches long with a diameter of one and half (1 1/2) inches. It had an
open end without a stop valve with a red stain at one end.
Appellant admitted killing Ben
Marivic testified that they lived happily during their first year of
marriage. But apparently, soon thereafter, they would quarrel often
and their fights would become violent. That after the first year of
marriage, Ben became cruel to her and was a habitual drinker. She
said he provoked her, he would slap her, sometimes he would pin
her down on the bed, and sometimes beat her. Marivic said Ben
would beat her or quarrel with her every time he was drunk, at least
three times a week.
Several witnesses not so close to Marivic testified that the couple
quarrel many times in a week and Ben would often inflict injuries on
her whenever he came home drunk. A doctor witness even said that
he would treat her the wounds inflicted on her by her husband. She
had a clinical history of the tension headache and hypertension on
twenty-three (23) separate occasions and (6) incidents of physical
injuries.
On cross examination, Marivic said that she only hit Ben once with
the long pipe, but Ben got hold of her and was able to wound her on
the wrist with a bolo. She said she threw the gun away, the next
morning she went to Manila and found a job as a field researcher
and went by the name “Marvelous Isidro”. She said she was able to
do these things as she only wanted to safely deliver her baby.
The RTC found Marivic guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of parricide, and further found treachery as an aggravating
circumstance, thus sentencing her to the ultimate penalty of DEATH.
The case was brought to the Supreme Court for Automatic Review.
In the meantime, appellant’s lawyer filed an URGENT OMNIBUS
MOTION praying for the allowance of the exhumation of the body of
Ben Genosa and the re-examination of the cause of his death; allow
the examination of Marivic Genosa by qualified psychologists and
psychiatrists to determine her state of mind at the time she killed
her husband; and finally, to allow a partial re-opening of the case a
quo to take the testimony of said psychologists and psychiatrists.
Attached to the URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION was a letter of Dr.
Raquel Fortun, then the only qualified forensic pathologist in the
country, who opined that the description of the death wound (as
culled from the post-mortem findings, Exhibit 'A') is more akin to a
gunshot wound than a beating with a lead pipe.
The motion was partially granted to allow the the reception of
expert psychological and/or psychiatric opinion on the 'battered
woman syndrome' plea.
The RTC gave credence to the prosecution evidence that appellant
had killed the deceased while he was in bed sleeping. Further, the
trial court appreciated the generic aggravating circumstance of
treachery, because Ben Genosa was supposedly defenseless when
he was killed -- lying in bed asleep when Marivic smashed him with a
pipe at the back of his head.
ISSUE:
1. May Marivic validly invoke the “battered woman syndrome”
as self defense?
-No.
In claiming self-defense, appellant raises the theory of the battered
woman syndrome. While new in Philippine jurisprudence, the
concept has been recognized in foreign jurisdictions as a form of
self-defense or, at the least, incomplete self-defense. By
appreciating evidence that a victim or defendant is afflicted with the
syndrome, foreign courts convey their "understanding of the
justifiably fearful state of mind of a person who has been cyclically
abused and controlled over a period of time.
Dra. Natividad Dayan, appearing before the Court said that the
battered woman usually has a very low opinion of herself. She has a
self-defeating and self-sacrificing characteristics; they usually think
very lowly of themselves and so when the violence would happen,
they usually think that they provoked it, that they were the one who
precipitated the violence, they provoked their spouse to be
physically, verbally and even sexually abusive to them.' As a result of
the battery of psychological tests she administered, it was her
opinion that Marivic fits the profile of a battered woman.
Battered Woman, defined
A battered woman has been defined as a woman "who is repeatedly
subjected to any forceful physical or psychological behavior by a
man in order to coerce her to do something he wants her to do
without concern for her rights. Battered women include wives or
women in any form of intimate relationship with men. Furthermore,
in order to be classified as a battered woman, the couple must go
through the battering cycle at least twice. Any woman may find
herself in an abusive relationship with a man once. If it occurs a
second time, and she remains in the situation, she is defined as a
battered woman.”
3 phases of the Battered Woman Syndrome
The battered woman syndrome is characterized by the so-called
"cycle of violence," which has three phases: (1) the tension-building
phase; (2) the acute battering incident; and (3) the tranquil, loving
(or, at least, nonviolent) phase.
During the tension-building phase, minor battering occurs -- it could
be verbal or slight physical abuse or another form of hostile
behavior. The woman usually tries to pacify the batterer through a
show of kind, nurturing behavior; or by simply staying out of his
way. What actually happens is that she allows herself to be abused
in ways that, to her, are comparatively minor. All she wants is to
prevent the escalation of the violence exhibited by the batterer. This
wish, however, proves to be double-edged, because her "placatory"
and passive behavior legitimizes his belief that he has the right to
abuse her in the first place.
However, the techniques adopted by the woman in her effort to
placate him are not usually successful, and the verbal and/or
physical abuse worsens. Each partner senses the imminent loss of
control and the growing tension and despair. Exhausted from the
persistent stress, the battered woman soon withdraws emotionally.
But the more she becomes emotionally unavailable, the more the
batterer becomes angry, oppressive and abusive. Often, at some
unpredictable point, the violence "spirals out of control" and leads
to an acute battering incident.
The acute battering incident is said to be characterized by brutality,
destructiveness and, sometimes, death. The battered woman deems
this incident as unpredictable, yet also inevitable. During this phase,
she has no control; only the batterer may put an end to the violence.
Its nature can be as unpredictable as the time of its explosion, and
so are his reasons for ending it. The battered woman usually realizes
that she cannot reason with him, and that resistance would only
exacerbate her condition.
At this stage, she has a sense of detachment from the attack and the
terrible pain, although she may later clearly remember every detail.
Her apparent passivity in the face of acute violence may be
rationalized thus: the batterer is almost always much stronger
physically, and she knows from her past painful experience that it is
futile to fight back. Acute battering incidents are often very savage
and out of control, such that innocent bystanders or intervenors are
likely to get hurt.
The final phase of the cycle of violence begins when the acute
battering incident ends. During this tranquil period, the couple
experience profound relief. On the one hand, the batterer may show
a tender and nurturing behavior towards his partner. He knows that
he has been viciously cruel and tries to make up for it, begging for
her forgiveness and promising never to beat her again. On the other
hand, the battered woman also tries to convince herself that the
battery will never happen again; that her partner will change for the
better; and that this "good, gentle and caring man" is the real
person whom she loves.
Effect of Battery on Appellant
Because of the recurring cycles of violence experienced by the
abused woman, her state of mind metamorphoses. As the battered
woman believes that she is somehow responsible for the violent
behavior of her partner, she also believes that he is capable of killing
her, and that there is no escape. Battered women feel unsafe, suffer
from pervasive anxiety, and usually fail to leave the relationship.
Unless a shelter is available, she stays with her husband, not only
because she typically lacks a means of self-support, but also because
she fears that if she leaves she would be found and hurt even more.
BWS, as applied in this case
In the instant case, the Court said that there was no sufficient
evidence that would support a conclusion that Marivic became
afflicted with the battered woman syndrome as a result of the
repeated abuse she had suffered from her spouse over a long period
of time. More specifically, it failed to find ample evidence that would
confirm the presence of the essential characteristics of BWS.
The defense fell short of proving all three phases of the "cycle of
violence" supposedly characterizing the relationship of Ben and
Marivic Genosa. No doubt there were acute battering incidents. In
relating to the court how the fatal incident that led to the death of
Ben started, Marivic perfectly described the tension-building phase
of the cycle. She was able to explain in adequate detail the typical
characteristics of this stage. However, that single incident does not
prove the existence of the syndrome. In other words, she failed to
prove that in at least another battering episode in the past, she had
gone through a similar pattern.
There was no showing how the tension between them usually arose
or build up prior to acute battering, how Marivic normally
responded to Ben's relatively minor abuses or what means she
employed to try to prevent the situation from developing into the
next (more violent) stage. Appellant did not proffer sufficient
evidence in regard to the third phase of the cycle. She simply
mentioned that she would usually run away to her mother's or
father's house; that Ben would seek her out, ask for her forgiveness
and promise to change; and that believing his words, she would
return to their common abode. In other words, the defense failed to
elicit from appellant herself her factual experiences and thoughts
that would clearly and fully demonstrate the essential characteristics
of the syndrome. The expert witnesses failed to present in court the
factual experiences and thoughts that appellant had related to them
-- if at all -- based on which they concluded that she had BWS.
25. CARANDANG v. SANTIAGO
Carandang v. Santiago (Judge), Valenton (assailant)
Facts:
Carandang filed a complaint in the RTC Manila to recover from
Valenton damages for bodily injuries received by him on the
occasion of frustrated homicide. Carandang invokes Article 33 of the
Civil Code.
"In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for
damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action,
may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed
independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence."
The respondents argue that the term “physical injuries” is used to
designate a specific crime defined in the Revised Penal Code, and
therefore said term should be understood in its peculiar and
technical sense, in accordance with the rules statutory construction
In the case at bar, the accused was convicted of the crime of
frustrated homicide, and not of physical injuries for the reason that
the infliction of the wound is attended by intent to kill.
Issue:
WON the term “physical injuries” in Art 33 means physical injuries in
the RPC or any physical or bodily injury, whether inflicted with intent
to kill or not.
Ruling:
The Article in question uses the words "defamation", "fraud" and
"physical injuries." Defamation and fraud are used in their ordinary
sense because there are no specific provisions in the Revised Penal
Code using these terms as means of offenses defined therein, so
that these two terms defamation and fraud must have been used
not to impart to them any technical meaning in the laws of the
Philippines, but in their generic sense. With this apparent
circumstance in mind, it is evident that the term "physical injuries"
could not have been used in its specific sense as a crime defined in
the Revised Penal Code, for it is difficult to believe that the Code
Commission would have used terms in the same article — some in
their general and another in its technical sense. In other words, the
term "physical injuries" should be understood to mean bodily injury,
not the crime of physical injuries, because the terms used with the
latter are general terms.
Dispositive: For the foregoing considerations, we find that the
respondent judge committed an error in suspending the trial of the
civil case, and his order to that effect is hereby revoked, and he is
hereby ordered to proceed with the trial of said civil case without
awaiting the result of the pending criminal case. With costs against
the Defendant-Appellees.
26. Gatchalian v. Delim
Facts: On July 11, 1973, petitioner Reynalda Gatchalian boarded as
paying passenger a minibus owned by respondents. While the bus
was running along the highway, a “snapping sound” was heard, and
after a short while, the bus bumped a cement flower pot, turned
turtle and fell into a ditch. The passengers were confined in the
hospital, and their bills were paid by respondent’s spouse on July 14.
Before Mrs. Delim left, she had the injured passengers sign an
already prepared affidavit waiving their claims against respondents.
Petitioner was among those who signed. Notwithstanding the said
document, petitioner filed a claim to recover actual and moral
damages for loss of employment opportunities, mental suffering and
inferiority complex caused by the scar on her forehead. Respondents
raised in defense force majeure and the waiver signed by petitioner.
The trial court upheld the validity of the waiver and dismissed the
complaint. The appellate court ruled that the waiver was invalid, but
also that the petitioner is not entitled to damages.
Issues:
(1) Whether there was a valid waiver
(2) Whether the respondent was negligent
(3) Whether the petitioner is entitled to actual and moral damages
Held:
(1) We agree with the majority of the Court of Appeals who held
that no valid waiver of her cause of action had been made by
petitioner. A waiver, to be valid and effective, must in the first place
be couched in clear and unequivocal terms which leave no doubt as
to the intention of a person to give up a right or benefit which legally
pertains to him. A waiver may not casually be attributed to a person
when the terms thereof do not explicitly and clearly evidence an
intent to abandon a right vested in such person.
The circumstances under which the Joint Affidavit was signed by
petitioner Gatchalian need to be considered. Petitioner testified that
she was still reeling from the effects of the vehicular accident when
the purported waiver in the form of the Joint Affidavit was
presented to her for signing; that while reading the same, she
experienced dizziness but that, seeing the other passengers who had
also suffered injuries sign the document, she too signed without
bothering to read the Joint Affidavit in its entirety. Considering these
circumstances, there appears substantial doubt whether petitioner
understood fully the import of the Joint Affidavit (prepared by or at
the instance of private respondent) she signed and whether she
actually intended thereby to waive any right of action against private
respondent.
Finally, because what is involved here is the liability of a common
carrier for injuries sustained by passengers in respect of whose
safety a common carrier must exercise extraordinary diligence, we
must construe any such purported waiver most strictly against the
common carrier. To uphold a supposed waiver of any right to claim
damages by an injured passenger, under circumstances like those
exhibited in this case, would be to dilute and weaken the standard
of extraordinary diligence exacted by the law from common carriers
and hence to render that standard unenforceable. We believe such a
purported waiver is offensive to public policy.
(2) In case of death or injuries to passengers, a statutory
presumption arises that the common carrier was at fault or had
acted negligently "unless it proves that it [had] observed
extraordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733 and 1755." To
overcome this presumption, the common carrier must show to the
court that it had exercised extraordinary diligence to present the
injuries. The standard of extraordinary diligence imposed upon
common carriers is considerably more demanding than the standard
of ordinary diligence. A common carrier is bound to carry its
passengers safely "as far as human care and foresight can provide,
using the utmost diligence of a very cautious person, with due
regard to all the circumstances".
The records before the Court are bereft of any evidence showing
that respondent had exercised the extraordinary diligence required
by law. The obvious continued failure of respondent to look after
the roadworthiness and safety of the bus, coupled with the driver's
refusal or neglect to stop the mini-bus after he had heard once again
the "snapping sound" and the cry of alarm from one of the
passengers, constituted wanton disregard of the physical safety of
the passengers, and hence gross negligence on the part of
respondent and his driver.
(3) At the time of the accident, she was no longer employed in a
public school. Her employment as a substitute teacher was
occasional and episodic, contingent upon the availability of
vacancies for substitute teachers. She could not be said to have in
fact lost any employment after and by reason of the accident. She
may not be awarded damages on the basis of speculation or
conjecture.
Petitioner's claim for the cost of plastic surgery for removal of the
scar on her forehead, is another matter. A person is entitled to the
physical integrity of his or her body; if that integrity is violated or
diminished, actual injury is suffered for which actual or
compensatory damages are due and assessable. Petitioner
Gatchalian is entitled to be placed as nearly as possible in the
condition that she was before the mishap. A scar, especially one on
the face of the woman, resulting from the infliction of injury upon
her, is a violation of bodily integrity, giving raise to a legitimate claim
for restoration to her conditio ante.
Moral damages may be awarded where gross negligence on the part
of the common carrier is shown. Considering the extent of pain and
anxiety which petitioner must have suffered as a result of her
physical injuries including the permanent scar on her forehead, we
believe that the amount of P30,000.00 would be a reasonable
award. Petitioner's claim for P1,000.00 as attorney's fees is in fact
even more modest.
27. Carticiano v. Nuval
FACTS: Plaintiff Zacarias Carticiano was on his way home to Imus,
Cavite. He was driving his father’s Ford Laser car. On the same date
and time, defendant Nuval’s owner-type Jeep, then driven by
defendant Darwin was traveling on the opposite direction going to
Parañaque. When the two cars were about to pass one another,
Darwin veered his vehicle to his left going to the center island of the
highway an occupied the lane which plaintiff Zacarias was traversing.
Zacarias’ Ford Laser collided head-on with Nuval’s Jeep. Darwin
immediately fled from the scene. Zacarias suffered multiple fracture.
He underwent a leg operation and physical therapy. Nuval offered
P100,000.00 as compensation for the injuries caused. Plaintiffs
refused to accept it. Plaintiffs filed a criminal suit against Darwin and
a civil suit against defendants for damages. Trial court ruled infavor
of plaintiffs. CA reversed the decision.
ISSUE: W/N employer Nuval can be held liable.
RULING: Petition granted.
RATIO: Article 2180 of the Civil Code provides that employers shall
be liable for damages caused by their employees acting within the
scope of their assigned tasks. The facts established in the case at bar
show that Darwin was acting within the scope of the authority given
him when the collision occurred. That he had been hired only to
bring respondent’s children to and from school must be rejected.
True, this may have been one of his assigned tasks, but no
convincing proof was presented showing that it was his only task.
His authority was to drive Nuval’s vehicle. Once a driver is proven
negligent in causing damages, the law presumes the vehicle owner
equally negligent and imposes upon the latter the burden of proving
proper selection of employee as a defense. Respondent failed to
show that he had satisfactorily discharged this burden.
28. INTERNATIONAL FLAVORS AND FRAGRANCES (PHILS.) INC. v.
ARGOS
Facts:
Merlin J. Argos and Jaja C. Pineda, general manager and commercial
director respectively of the International Flavors and Fragrances
Incorporated (IFFI) filed a libel case against Hernan H. Costa, the
managing director of IFFI after being described by the latter as
pesona non grata in his Personal Announcement after termination
of their services. They later filed a separate civil case for damages
against Costa and IFFI in its subsidiary capacity as employer with the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig wherein IFFI moved to dismiss the
complaint. The Regional Trial Court granted IFFI’s motion to dismiss
for respondent’s failure to reserve its right to institute a separate
civil action. Upon a motion for reconsideration, the Regional Trial
Court granted Argos and Pineda’s petition which was later affirmed
by the appellate court.
Issue:
Whether or not Argos and Pineda could sue IFFI for damages based
on subsidiary liability in an independent civil action under Article 33
of the Civil Code.
Ruling:
IFFI, petitioner contends that respondents did not allege that IFFI
was primarily liable for damages and on the contrary, the complaint
was replate with references that IFFI was being sued for its
subsidiary capacity. Article 33 of the New Civil Code provides that in
cases of defamation, a civil action for damages, entirely separate
and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured
party. As ruled in Joaquin vs. Aniceto however, article 33
contemplates an action against the employer in his primary
capacity. It does not apply to an action against the employer to
enforce its subsidiary civil liability as such liability arises only after
conviction of the employee in the criminal case or when the
employee is adjudged guilty of the wrongful act. Thus, the
Supreme Court granted IFFI’s petition for dismissal.