269 SCRA 564 – Business Organization – Corporation Law – Close Corporation – Liability G.R. No.
G.R. No. 141309, June 19, 2007
for Tort
Sergio Naguiat was the president of Clark Field Taxi, Inc. (CFTI) which supplied taxi services
to Clark Air Base. At the same time, Naguiat was a director of the Sergio F. Naguiat
Enterprises, Inc. (SFNEI), their family owned corporation along with CFTI.
In 1991, CFTI had to close due to “great financial losses and lost business opportunity”
resulting from the phase-out of Clark Air Base brought about by the Mt. Pinatubo eruption
and the expiration of the RP-US military bases agreement.
CFTI then came up with an agreement with the drivers that the latter be entitled to a
separation pay in the amount of P500.00 per every year of service. Most of the drivers
accepted this but some drivers did not. The drivers who refused to accept the separation pay
offered by CFTI instead sued the latter before the labor arbiter.
The labor arbiter ruled in favor of the taxi drivers. The National Labor Relations Commission
affirmed the labor arbiter. It was established that when CFTI closed, it was in profitable
standing and was not incurring losses. It ruled that the drivers are entitled to $120.00 per
every year of service subject to exchange rates prevailing that time.
The NLRC likewise ruled that SFNEI as well as CFTI’s president and vice president Sergio
Naguiat and Antolin Naguiat should be held jointly and severally liable to pay the drivers.
The NLRC ruled that SFNEI actively managed CFTI and its business affairs hence it acted
as the employer of the drivers.
ISSUE: Whether or not the ruling of the NLRC is correct.
HELD: It is only partially correct.
1. It is correct when it ruled that the Sergio Naguiat is jointly and severally liable to
pay the drivers the award of separation pay in the amount so determined. As
president of CFTI, Sergio Naguiat is considered an “employer” of the dismissed
employees who is therefore liable for the obligations of the corporation to its
dismissed employees. Moreover, CFTI, being a close family corporation, is liable
for corporate torts and stockholders thereof shall be personally liable for corporate
torts unless the corporation has obtained reasonably adequate liability insurance
(par. 5, Section 100, “Close Corporations”, Corporation Code). Antolin Naguiat is
absolved because there was insufficient evidence as against him.
2. SFNEI is not liable jointly or severally with CFTI. SFNEI has nothing to do with
CFTI. There is no sufficient evidence to prove that it actively managed CFTI
especially so when even the drivers testified that their employer is CFTI and that
their payroll comes from CFTI. Further, SFNEI was into trading business while
CFTI was into taxi services.
Liwayway Vinzons-Chato vs. Fortune Tobacco, Corp.
on 6:55 AM in Case Digests, Civil Law
0 as it would virtually be a charge against the Republic, which is not amenable to judgment for
FACTS:
This is a case for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code filed by Fortune against
Liwayway as CIR.
On June 10, 1993, the legislature enacted RA 7654, which provided that locally
manufactured cigarettes which are currently classified and taxed at 55% shall be charged an
ad valorem tax of “55% provided that the maximum tax shall not be less than Five Pesos per
pack.” Prior to effectivity of RA 7654, Liwayway issued a rule, reclassifying “Champion,”
“Hope,” and “More” (all manufactured by Fortune) as locally manufactured cigarettes bearing
foreign brand subject to the 55% ad valorem tax. Thus, when RA 7654 was passed, these
cigarette brands were already covered.
In a case filed against Liwayway with the RTC, Fortune contended that the issuance of the
rule violated its constitutional right against deprivation of property without due process of law
and the right to equal protection of the laws.
For her part, Liwayway contended in her motion to dismiss that respondent has no cause of
action against her because she issued RMC 37-93 in the performance of her official function
and within the scope of her authority. She claimed that she acted merely as an agent of the
Republic and therefore the latter is the one responsible for her acts. She also contended that
the complaint states no cause of action for lack of allegation of malice or bad faith.
The order denying the motion to dismiss was elevated to the CA, who dismissed the case on
the ground that under Article 32, liability may arise even if the defendant did not act with
malice or bad faith.
Hence this appeal.
ISSUES:
o Whether or not a public officer may be validly sued in his/her private
capacity for acts done in connection with the discharge of the functions of
his/her office
o Whether or not Article 32, NCC, should be applied instead of Sec. 38, Book I,
Administrative Code
HELD:
On the first issue, the general rule is that a public officer is not liable for damages which a
person may suffer arising from the just performance of his official duties and within the scope
of his assigned tasks. An officer who acts within his authority to administer the affairs of the
office which he/she heads is not liable for damages that may have been caused to another,
monetary claims without its consent. However, a public officer is by law not immune from
damages in his/her personal capacity for acts done in bad faith which, being outside the
scope of his authority, are no longer protected by the mantle of immunity for official actions.
Specifically, under Sec. 38, Book I, Administrative Code, civil liability may arise where there
is bad faith, malice, or gross negligence on the part of a superior public officer. And, under
Sec. 39 of the same Book, civil liability may arise where the subordinate public officer’s act is
characterized by willfulness or negligence. In Cojuangco, Jr. V. CA, a public officer who
directly or indirectly violates the constitutional rights of another, may be validly sued for
damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code even if his acts were not so tainted with malice or
bad faith.
Thus, the rule in this jurisdiction is that a public officer may be validly sued in his/her private
capacity for acts done in the course of the performance of the functions of the office, where
said public officer: (1) acted with malice, bad faith, or negligence; or (2) where the public
officer violated a constitutional right of the plaintiff.
On the second issue, SC ruled that the decisive provision is Article 32, it being a special law,
which prevails over a general law (the Administrative Code).
Article 32 was patterned after the “tort” in American law. A tort is a wrong, a tortious act
which has been defined as the commission or omission of an act by one, without right,
whereby another receives some injury, directly or indirectly, in person, property or reputation.
There are cases in which it has been stated that civil liability in tort is determined by the
conduct and not by the mental state of the tortfeasor, and there are circumstances under
which the motive of the defendant has been rendered immaterial. The reason sometimes
given for the rule is that otherwise, the mental attitude of the alleged wrongdoer, and not the
act itself, would determine whether the act was wrongful. Presence of good motive, or rather,
the absence of an evil motive, does not render lawful an act which is otherwise an invasion
of another’s legal right; that is, liability in tort in not precluded by the fact that defendant
acted without evil intent.
ANTONIO GELUZ vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. L-16439, July 20, 1961
2 SCRA 801
FACTS:
Her present husband impregnated Nita Villanueva before they were legally married. Desiring
to conceal her pregnancy from the parent, she had herself aborted by petitioner Antonio
Geluz. After her marriage, she again became pregnant. As she was then employed in the
COMELEC and her pregnancy proved to be inconvenient, she had herself aborted again by
Geluz. Less than 2 years later, Nita incurred a third abortion of a two-month old fetus, in
consideration of the sum of P50.00. Her husband did not know of, nor consented to the
abortion. Hence Oscar Lazo, private respondent, sued petitioner for damages based on the
third and last abortion.
The trial court rendered judgment ordering Antonio Geluz to pay P3,000.00 as damages,
P700.00 as attorney’s fee and the cost of the suit. Court of Appeals affirmed the decision.
ISSUE:
Is an unborn child covered with personality so that if the unborn child incurs injury, his
parents may recover damages from the ones who caused the damage to the unborn child?
RULING:
Personality begins at conception. This personality is called presumptive personality. It is, of
course, essential that birth should occur later, otherwise the fetus will be considered as
never having possessed legal personality.
Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of injury or death pertains primarily to the
one injured, it is easy to see that if no action for damages could be instituted on behalf of the
unborn child on account of injuries it received, no such right of action could derivatively
accrue to its parents or heirs. In fact, even if a cause of action did accrue on behalf of the
unborn child, the same was extinguished by its pre-natal death, since no transmission to
anyone can take place from one that lacked juridical personality.
It is no answer to invoke the presumptive personality of a conceived child under Article 40 of
the Civil Code because that same article expressly limits such provisional personality by
imposing the condition that the child should be subsequently born alive. In the present case,
the child was dead when separated from its mother’s womb.
This is not to say that the parents are not entitled to damages. However, such damages
must be those inflicted directly upon them, as distinguished from injury or violation of the
rights of the deceased child.
Garcia, Jr. v. Salvador
Garcia, Jr. v. Salvador (2007) / Ynares-Santiago
Facts
Ranida Salvador started working as a trainee in LBHT. She underwent a medical exam @
CDC with Garcia (medtech) conducting the HBs Ag test. Her result was REACTIVE. The
company physician (Sto. Domingo) told her she is suffering from HepaB, and based on the
medical report SD submitted, LBHT terminated her employment. Ranida told her father
Ramon about her condition, then the latter suffered a heart attack and was confined at
Bataan Doctors Hospital. Ranida took another HBs Ag test in BDH, and the result was NON-
REACTIVE. She told Dr. SD about it but the latter said the CDC test was more reliable, so
she took another test at CDC again, and the result this time was NON-REACTIVE. She took
the same test used in CDC @ BDH and the result was NON-REACTIVE (four tests!). She
submitted the results to the LBHT ExecOff who requested her to undergo under test (WTF!) -
result is NEGATIVE (5th test, haha), so LBHT rehired her.
Ranida and Ramon filed a complaint for damages against medtech Garcia + pathologist
Castro, claiming that the erroneous interpretation led her to lose her job, suffer mental
anxiety, while Ramon was hospitalized + lost business opportunities. Garcia denied the
allegations of gross negligence and incompetence; explained "false positive." Castro said he
did not examine Ranida, and that the results bore only his stamped signature.
RTC dismissed the Salvadors' complaint for failure to present sufficient evidence. CA
reversed this and ordered Garcia to pay moral damages (50k), exemplary damages (50k),
and atty's fees (25k). Castro was exonerated.
Issue and Holding

WON CA correctly found Garcia liable for damages. YES Sometime in 1988, petitioner Peter Paul Patrick Lucas contracted "sore eyes" in his right
eye. Upon consultation with Dr. Tuano, Peter narrated that it has been 9 days since the
1. WON a person is negligent is a question of fact -- petition for review on certiorari problem with his right eye began, and that he was already taking Maxitrol to address the eye
limited to reviewing errors of law problem. According to Dr. Tuano, he performed "ocular routine examination" on Peter's
eyes, wherein: 1. a cross examination Peter's eyes and their surrounding area was made,
1. Negligence - failure to observe for the protection of another's interest and 2. Peter's visual acuity were taken, 3. Peter's eyes were palpated to check the
that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which circ demand, intraocular pressure of each; 4. the mortility of Peter's eyes were observed, and 5. the
whereby the other suffers injury ophthalmoscopy on Peter's eyes was used.

1. ALL ELEMENTS OF AN ACTIONABLE CONDUCT ARE

PRESENT IN THIS CASE
On that particular consultation, Dr. Tuano diagnosed that Peter was suffering from
1. Duty conjunctivitis or sore eyes. He then prescribed Spersacet C-eye drops for Peter and told the
latter to return for follow-up after one week.
2. Breach

3. Injury
As instructed, Peter returned and Dr. Tuano discovered that the right eye
4. Proximate causation developed Epidemic Kerato Conjunctivitis, EKC, a viral infection. To address the problem,
Dr. Tuano prescribed Maxitrol, for a dosage of 6 times a day.
2. Negligence is a violation of statutory duty -- so many laws were broken!

1. CDC is not administered, directed, supervised by licensed

physician but by a licensed medtech However, the EKC was getting worse yet Dr. Tuano still continued on advising the use of
Maxittrol, despite Peter's discovery of the inscribed warning written in its label.
1. Castro's infrequent visit barely qualifies as an admin
supervision and control

2. Garcia conducted HBs Ag test of Ranida without Castro's Upon examination, Dr. Tuano noted the hardness in Peter's right eye and discovered that
supervision the tension in Peter's right eye was 39.0 Hg. Since the tension was way over the normal IOP
which only ranged from 10.0 Hg to 21.0 Hg, Dr. Tuano then ordered him to immediately
3. HBs Ag test result released to Ranida without Castro's discontinue the use of Maxitrol and prescribed to the latter Diamox and Normoglaucon
authorization instead. He also required Peter to go for a daily check-up in order for the former to closely
monitor the pressure of the latter' eyes.
3. Garcia's failure to comply with laws, rules promulgated for the protection
of public safety and interest is failure to observe the care which a
reasonably prudent health care provider would observe --> BREACH OF
DUTY! During one of Peter's regular follow-ups, Dr. Tuano noted the recurrence of EKC in Peter's
right eye. Thus, he referred Peter to Dr. Manuel Agulto, M.D., another opthalmologist
4. Injuries suffered by Ranida could have been avoided had proper specializing in glaucoma treatment.
safeguards been followed

5. NCC 20 is the legal basis for award of damages to one who suffers
whenever another commits an act in violation of some legal provision
Damages, fees upheld. Garcia guilty of gross negligence.
G.R. 178763 Peter Paul Patrick Lucas et al v. Dr. Prospero Ma. Tuano, April 2009
Eventually, Peter, in claiming to have "steroid-induced glaucoma" and blaming Dr. Tuano for
the same, filed a civil complaint for damages against Dr. Tuano. In their complaint,
petitioners averred that as the direct consequence of Peter's prolonged use of Maxitrol, he
suffered from steroid-induced glaucoma which caused the elevation of his intra-ocular
pressure, which caused the impairment of his vision which may lead to total blindness.

Facts:
In rebutting petitioner's claim, Dr. Tuano asserted that the treatment made by him more than
three years ago has no causal connection to Peter's glaucoma. He further explained that
'drug-induced glaucoma is temporary and curable, steroids have the side effect of increasing
intraocular pressure. Steroids are prescribed to treat Epidemic Kerato Conjunctivitis or EKC
which is an infiltration of the cornea as a result of conjunctivitis or sore eyes'. Hence, the
steroid treatment of Peter's EKC caused the steroid-induced glaucoma.
RTC Ruling
The RTC dismissed the Civil Case for insufficiency of evidence, opining that petitioners
failed to prove by preponderance of evidence that Dr. Tuano was negligent in his treatment
of Peter's condition. The trial court reasoned hat the recognized standards of the medical
community has not been established in thiss case, much less has causation been
established to render Dr. Tuano liable. Further, absence of any medical evidence to the
contrary, the RTC ruled that it cannot accept petitioner's claim that the use of steroid is the
proximate cause of the damage sustained by Peter's eye.
Court of Appeals Ruling
The CA faulted petitioners because they failed to present any medical expert to testify that
Dr. Tuano's prescription of Maxitrol and Blephamide for the treatment of EKC on petiitioner's
right eye was not proper and that his palpation of Peter's right eye was not enough to detect
adverse reaction to steroid.
During the trial in CA, Peter testified that Dr. Manuel Agulto told him that he should not have
used steroid for the treatment of EKC or that he should have used it only for two weeks, as
EKC iss only a viral infection which will cure in tself. However, Dr. Agulto was not presented
by petitioners as a witness to confirm what he allegedly told Peter and therefore, the latter's
testimony is hearsay. Under Rule 130, Section 36 of the Rules of Court, a witness can testify
only to those facts which he knows of and his own personal knowledge. Familiar and
fundamental is the rule that hearsay testimony is inadmissible as evidence.
Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration was denied by resolution, hence, this appeal.
Issue: Did the petitioners failed to prove by preponderance of evidence their claim for
damages against Dr. Tuano?
Court Ruling:
Only questions of law may be raised under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court as this court
is not a trier of facts.
The said issue constitutes a question of fact, as the Supreme Court is asked to revisit anew
the factual findings of the RTC and the CA. While this general rule admits of certain
exceptions, such as the circumstance when the finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is
premised on the supposed absence of evidence, but is contradicted by the evidence on
record.
The fact of want of competence or diligence is evidentiary in nature, the veracity of
which can best be passed upon after a full-blown trial for it is virtually impossible to
ascertain the merits of a medical negligence case without extensive investigation,
research, evaluation and consultation with the medical experts.
Petitioner's position in sum is that Peter's glaucoma is the direct result of Dr. Tuano's
negligence in his improper administration of the drug Maxitrol. Clearly, the present
controversy is a classic illustration of a medical negligence case against a physician based
on the latter's professional negligence. In this type of suit, the patient or his heirs, in order to
prevail, is required to prove by is required to prove by preponderance of evidence that the
physician failed to exercise that degree of skill, care and learning possessed by other
persons in the same profession; and that as a proximate result of such faiure, the patient or
his heirs suffered damages.
For lack of a specific law geared towards the type of negligence committed by members of
the medical profession, such claim for damages is almost always anchored on the alleged
violation of Article 2176 of the Civil Code which states that "whoever by act or omission,
causes damage to another, there being no fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the
damage done. Such fault or negligence, is there is no pre-existing contractual relation
between the parties is called quasi-delict.
In medical negligence cases, the four essential elements are the following: 1. duty 2. breach
3. injury 4. proximate cause, which must be established by the plaintiffs.
In order that there may be a recovery for an injury, it must be shown that the injury for which
the recovery is sought must be the legitimate consequence of the wrong done, the
connection between the negligence and the injury must be a direct and natural sequence of
events, unbroken by intervening efficient causes.

Criminal Law- Proximate cause: It is the cause, which is the natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and
without which the result would not have occurred. That is, the negligence must be the
proximate cause of the injury.
Just as with the elements of duty and breach of the same, in order to establish the proximate
cause by preponderance of evidence, the patient must similarly use expert testimony,
because the question of whether the alleged professional negligence caused the patient's
injury is generally one for specialized expert knowledge beyond the ken of the average
layperson; using the specialized knowledge and training of his field, the expert's role is to
present to the court a realistic assessment of the likelihood that the physician's alleged
negligence caused the patient's injury.
In this case, Dr. Tuano was able to clearly explain what is only required of ophthalmologists,
in cases such as Peter's is the conduct of standard tests/ procedures known as "ocular
routine examination" composed of five (5) test procedures, specifically: gross examination of
the eyes and the surrounding area, taking of the visual acuity of the patient, checking the
intraocular pressure of the patient, checking the motility of the eyes--and he did all those
tests every time Peter went to see him for follow-up consultation and/or check-up.
Even if we are to assume that Dr. Tuano committed negligent acts in his treatment of Peter's
condition, the causal connection between Dr. Tuano's supposed negligence and Peter's
injury still needed to be established. The critical and clinching factor in a medical
negligence case is proof of the causal connection between the negligence which the
evidence established and the plaintiff's injuries.
Civil procedure, burden of proof: In civil cases, the party having the burden of proof
must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence, or evidence which is more
convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition
thereto. The party having the burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of
evidence or "evidence which is of greater weight or more convincing that that which is
offered in opposition to it; in the last analysis, it means the probability of truth.
It seems basic that what constitutes proper medical treatment is a medical question that
should have been presented to experts. If no standard is established through expert medical
witnesses, then courts have no standard by which to gauge the basic issue of breach by the
physician or surgeon. The RTC, Court of Appeals and even the Supreme Court; could not be
expected to determine on its own what medical technique should have been utilized for a
certain disease or injury. Absent expert medical opinion, the courts would be dangerously
engaging in speculations.
OCEAN BUILDERS and/or HAO vs. SPOUSES CUBACUB
G.R. No. 150898
April 13, 2011
FACTS: Bladimir Cubacub was employed as maintenance man by petitioner Ocean Builders
Construction Corp. at its office in Caloocan City.
Bladimir was afflicted with chicken pox. He was thus advised by petitioner Hao, the
company’s general manager, to rest for 3 days which he did at the company’s “barracks.”
3 days later, Bladimir went about his usual chores. Later in the afternoon, however, he
asked a co-worker Silangga, to accompany him to his house in Capas, Tarlac so he could
rest. Informed by Silangga of Bladimir’s intention, Hao gave Bladimir P1,000.00 and ordered
Silangga to instead bring Bladimir to the nearest hospital.
Along with co-workers Narding and Vergado, Silangga thus brought Bladimir to the nearest
Community Hospital, a primary-care hospital around 1 kilometer away from the office of the
company.
The hospital did not allow Bladimir to leave the hospital. He was then confined. The next
day, Bladimir’s parents-respondent spouses Cubacub, with their friend Dr. Frias, arrived at
the Hospital and transferred Bladimir to the Quezon City General Hospital where he was
placed in the ICU and died the following day.
Bladimir’s parents-herein respondents later filed before the Tarlac RTC at Capas a complaint
for damages against petitioners, alleging that Hao was guilty of negligence which resulted in
the deterioration of Bladimir’s condition leading to his death.
The Tarlac RTC dismissed the complaint, holding that Hao was not negligent. On
respondents’ appeal, the CA eversed the trial court’s decision, holding that by Hao’s failure
to bring Bladimir to a better-equipped hospital, he violated Article 161 of the Labor Code.
ISSUE: Is petitioner company and its co-petitioner manager Hao guilty of negligence.
HELD: NO
Art. 161 of the Labor Code provides:
ART. 161. Assistance of employer. – It shall be the duty of any employer to provide all the
necessary assistance to ensure the adequate and immediate medical and dental attendance
and treatment to an injured or sick employee in case of emergency.
The Implementing Rules of the Code do not enlighten what the phrase “adequate and
immediate” medical attendance means in relation to an “emergency.” It would thus appear
that the determination of what it means is left to the employer, except when a full-time
registered nurse or physician are available on-site as required, also under the Labor Code,
specifically Art. 157 which provides:
Article 157. Emergency Medical and Dental Services. ─ It shall be the duty of every
employer to furnish his employees in any locality with free medical and dental attendance
and facilities consisting of:
(a) The services of a full-time registered nurse when the number of employees exceeds fifty
(50) but not more than two hundred (200) exceptwhen the employer does not maintain
hazardous workplaces, in which case, the services of a graduate first-aider shall be provided
for the protection of workers, where no registered nurse is available. The Secretary of
Labor and Employment shall provide by appropriate regulations, the services that shall be
required where the number of employees does not exceed fifty (50) and shall determine by
appropriate order, hazardous workplaces for purposes of this Article;
(b) The services of a full-time registered nurse, a part-time physician and dentist, and an
emergency clinic, when the number of employees exceeds two hundred (200) but not more
than three hundred (300); and
(c) The services of a full-time physician, dentist and a full-time registered nurse as well as a
dental clinic and an infirmary or emergency hospital with one bed capacity for every one
hundred (100) employees when the number of employees exceeds three hundred (300).
In the present case, there is no allegation that the company premises are
hazardous. Neither is there any allegation on the number of employees the company has. If
Hao’s testimony would be believed, the company had only seven regular employees and 20
contractual employees ─ still short of the minimum 50 workers that an establishment must
have for it to be required to have a full-time registered nurse.
The Court can thus only determine whether the actions taken by petitioners when Bladimir
became ill amounted to the “necessary assistance” to ensure “adequate and immediate
medical . . . attendance” to Bladimir as required under Art. 161 of the Labor Code.
As found by the trial court and borne by the records, petitioner Hao’s advice for Bladimir to,
as he did, take a 3-day rest and to later have him brought to the nearest hospital constituted
“adequate and immediate medical” attendance that he is mandated, under Art. 161, to
provide to a sick employee in an emergency.
AT ALL EVENTS, the alleged negligence of Hao cannot be considered as the
proximate cause of the death of Bladimir. Proximate cause is that which, in natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by an efficient intervening cause, produces injury, and
without which, the result would not have occurred. An injury or damage is proximately
caused by an act or failure to act, whenever it appears from the evidence in the case that the
act or omission played a substantial part in bringing about or actually causing the injury or
damage, and that the injury or damage was either a direct result or a reasonably probable
consequence of the act or omission.
FAUSTO BARREDO, petitioner, vs. SEVERINO GARCIA and TIMOTEO ALMARIO,
respondents
No. 48006. July 8, 1942
Facts:
A head-on collision between a taxicab owned by Barredo and a carretela occurred.
The carretela was overturned and one of its passengers, a 16-year old boy, the son of
Garcia and Almario, died as a result of the injuries which he received. The driver of the
taxicab, an employee of Barredo, was prosecuted for the crime and was convicted. When
the criminal case was instituted, Garcia and Almario reserved their right to institute a
separate civil action for damages. Subsequently, Garcia and Almario instituted a civil action
for damages against Barredo, the employer of the taxicab driver.
Issue:
Whether or not they can file a separate civil action against Fausto Barredo
making him primarily and directly responsible
Held:
(Foreword: The Barredo case was decided by the Supreme Court prior to the present Civil
Code. However, the principle enunciated in said case, that responsibility for fault or
negligence as quasi-delict is distinct and separate from negligence penalized under the
Revised Penal Code, is now specifically embodied in Art. 2177 of the Civil Code.)
The defendant maintains that Fontanilla’s negligence being punishable by the Penal Code,
his (defendant’s) liability as an employer is only subsidiary, according to said Penal Code,
but Fontanilla has not been sued in a civil action and his property has not been exhausted.
To decide the main issue, we must cut thru the tangle that has, in the minds of many,
confused and jumbled together delitos and cuasi delitos, or crimes under the Penal Code
and fault or negligence under Articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code. According to the
Supreme Tribunal of Spain:
“Authorities support the proposition that a quasi-delict or ‘culpa aquiliana’ is a separate
legal institution under the Civil Code, with a substantivity all its own, and individuality that is
entirely apart and independent from a delict or crime. Upon this principle, and on the wording
and spirit of Article 1903 of the Civil Code, the primary and direct responsibility of employers
may be safely anchored.
“It will thus be seen that while the terms of Article 1902 of the Civil Code seem to be broad
enough to cover the driver’s negligence in the instant case, nevertheless Article 1903 limits
cuasi-delitos TO ACTS OR OMISSIONS ‘NOT PUNISHABLE BY LAW.’ But inasmuch as
Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code punishes not only reckless but even simple
imprudence or negligence, the fault or negligence under Article 1902 of the Civil Code has
apparently been crowded out. It is this overlapping that makes the “confusion worse
confounded.’ However, a closer study shows that such a concurrence of scope in regard to
negligent acts does not destroy the distinction between the civil liability arising from a crime
and the responsibility for cuasi-delitos or culpa extra-contractual. The same negligent act
causing damages may produce civil liability arising from a crime under Article 100 of the
Revised Penal Code; or create an action for cuasi-delito or culpa extra-contractual under
Articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code. “Some of the differences between crimes under the
Penal Code are:
“1. That crimes affect the public interest, while quasi-delitos are only of private concern.
“2. That consequently, the Penal Code punishes or corrects the criminal act, while the Civil
Code, by means of indemnification, merely repairs the damage.
“3. That delicts are not as broad as quasi-delicts, because for the former are punished only if He can sue and be sued in court only with the assistance of his father, mother or guardian.”
there is a penal law clearly covering them, while the latter, cuasi-delitos, include all acts in Therefore, Article 2180 is applicable to Marvin Hill – the SC however ruled since at the time
which ‘ any kind of fault or negligence intervenes.’ However, it should be noted that not all of the decision, Reginald is already of age, Marvin’s liability should be subsidiary only – as a
violations of the penal law produce civil responsibility, such as begging in contravention of matter of equity.
ordinances, violation of the game laws, infraction of the rules of traffic when nobody is hurt.
ANDAMO VS IAC
“The foregoing authorities clearly demonstrate the separate individuality of cuasi-delitos or
culpa aquiliana under the Civil Code. Specifically they show that there is a distinction G.R. No. 74761 November 6, 1990
between civil liability arising from criminal negligence (governed by the Penal Code) and
responsibility for fault or negligence under Articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code, and that Lessons Applicable: Elements of Quasi-Delict (Torts and Damages)
the same negligent act may produce either a civil liability arising from a crime under the
Penal Code, or a separate responsibility for fault or negligence under Articles 1902 to 1910
of the Civil Code. Still more concretely the authorities above cited render it inescapable to
conclude that the employer – in this case the defendant-petitioner – is primarily and directly
liable under Article 1903 of the Civil Code.” FACTS:

ELCANO VS HILL  Missionaries of Our Lady of La Salette, Inc., a religious corporation, built through
its agents, waterpaths, water conductors and contrivances including an artificial
77 SCRA 100 – May 26, 1977 lake within its land

Torts and Damages – Civil Liability from Quasi Delicts vs Civil Liability from Crimes
Reginald Hill, a minor, caused the death of Agapito (son of Elcano). Elcano filed a criminal
case against Reginald but Reginald was acquitted for “lack of intent coupled with mistake.”
Elcano then filed a civil action against Reginald and his dad (Marvin Hill) for damages based
on Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Hill argued that the civil action is barred by his son’s
acquittal in the criminal case; and that if ever, his civil liability as a parent has been
extinguished by the fact that his son is already an emancipated minor by reason of his
marriage.
 inundated and eroded the spouses Emmanuel and Natividad Andamo's
land, caused a young man to drown, damaged petitioners' crops and
plants, washed away costly fences, endangered the lives of petitioners
and their laborers during rainy and stormy seasons, and exposed plants
and other improvements to destruction
 July 1982:spouses instituted a criminal action
 February 22, 1983: spouses filed a civil case for damages

ISSUE: Whether or not Marvin Hill may be held civilly liable under Article 2180.
 CA affirmed trial court issued an order suspending further hearings in Civil Case
until after judgment in the related Criminal Case
HELD: Yes. The acquittal of Reginald in the criminal case does not bar the filing of a
separate civil action. A separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act,
whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the
 spouses contend that the trial court and the Appellate Court erred in
offended party is not allowed, if accused is actually charged also criminally, to recover dismissing Civil Case since it is predicated on a quasi-delict
damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award
ISSUE: W/N there is quasi-delict even if done in private propety
of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. In other words, the extinction
of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability
founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act
considered as a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a
declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not
HELD: YES. REVERSED and SET ASIDE
been committed by the accused. Briefly stated, culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and
negligent acts which may be punishable by law.
 All the elements of a quasi-delict are present, to wit:
While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon emancipation of the child (Article
327, Civil Code), and under Article 397, emancipation takes place “by the marriage of the  (a) damages suffered by the plaintiff
minor child”, it is, however, also clear that pursuant to Article 399, emancipation by marriage
of the minor is not really full or absolute. Thus “Emancipation by marriage or by voluntary  (b) fault or negligence of the defendant, or some other person for whose
concession shall terminate parental authority over the child’s person. It shall enable the acts he must respond
minor to administer his property as though he were of age, but he cannot borrow money or
alienate or encumber real property without the consent of his father or mother, or guardian.
  (c) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of he told her that he is already married to someone in Bacolod City. So Marilou went
the defendant and the damages incurred by the plaintiff home and later sued Gashem for damages.

 While the property involved in the cited case belonged to the public domain and
the property subject of the instant case is privately owned, the fact remains that
petitioners' complaint sufficiently alleges that petitioners have sustained and will The trial court ruled in favor of Marilou and awarded her P20k in moral damages. The
continue to sustain damage due to the waterpaths and contrivances built by Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.
respondent corporation

 It must be stressed that the use of one's property is not without limitations. Article
On appeal, Gashem averred that he never proposed marriage to Marilou and that he
431 of the Civil Code provides that "the owner of a thing cannot make use thereof
cannot be adjudged to have violated Filipino customs and traditions since he, being an
in such a manner as to injure the rights of a third person." SIC UTERE TUO UT
Iranian, was not familiar with Filipino customs and traditions.
ALIENUM NON LAEDAS. Moreover, adjoining landowners have mutual and
reciprocal duties which require that each must use his own land in a reasonable
manner so as not to infringe upon the rights and interests of others. Although we
recognize the right of an owner to build structures on his land, such structures ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals is correct.
must be so constructed and maintained using all reasonable care so that they
cannot be dangerous to adjoining landowners and can withstand the usual and
expected forces of nature. If the structures cause injury or damage to an adjoining
landowner or a third person, the latter can claim indemnification for the injury or HELD: Yes. Gashem is liable to pay for damages in favor of Marilou not really because
damage suffered. of his breach of promise to marry her but based on Article 21 of the Civil Code which
provides:
 Article 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is
entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under
the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or
omission of the defendant. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
 whether it be conviction or acquittal would render meaningless the independent
character of the civil action and the clear injunction in Article 31, that his action
may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the
result of the latter Breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong per se. In this case, it is the
deceit and fraud employed by Gashem that constitutes a violation of Article 21 of the
Civil Code. His promise of marrying Marilou was a deceitful scheme to lure her into
sexual congress. As found by the trial court, Marilou was not a woman of loose morals.
She was a virgin before she met Gashem. She would not have surrendered herself to
Gashem had Gashem not promised to marry her. Gashem’s blatant disregard of
Filipino traditions on marriage and on the reputation of Filipinas is contrary to morals,
219 SCRA 115 – Civil Law – Torts and Damages – Breach of promise to Marry – Article
good customs, and public policy. As a foreigner who is enjoying the hospitality of our
21 of the Civil Code
country and even taking advantage of the opportunity to study here he is expected to
respect our traditions. Any act contrary will render him liable under Article 21 of the Civil
BAKSH VS CA
Code.
In August 1986, while working as a waitress in Dagupan City, Pangasinan, Marilou
Gonzales, then 21 years old, met Gashem Shookat Baksh, a 29 year old exchange
The Supreme Court also elucidated that Article 21 was meant to expand the concepts
student from Iran who was studying medicine in Dagupan. The two got really close and
of torts and quasi delict. It is meant to cover situations such as this case where the
intimate. On Marilou’s account, she said that Gashem later offered to marry her at the
breach complained of is not strictly covered by existing laws. It was meant as a legal
end of the semester. Marilou then introduced Gashem to her parents where they
remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight
expressed their intention to get married. Marilou’s parents then started inviting sponsors
to specifically enumerate and punish in the statute books – such as the absence of a
and relatives to the wedding. They even started looking for animals to slaughter for the
law penalizing a the breach of promise to marry
occasion.Meanwhile, Marilou started living with Gashem in his apartment where they
had sexual intercourse. But in no time, their relationship went sour as Gashem began
maltreating Marilou. Gashem eventually revoked his promise of marrying Marilou and
 The Supreme Court however agreed with legal luminaries that if the promise to marry
was made and there was carnal knowledge because of it, then moral damages may be
recovered (presence of moral or criminal seduction), Except if there was mutual lust; or Issue: Whether or not GPS falls under the category of a common carrier.
if expenses were made because of the promise (expenses for the wedding), then actual
damages may be recovered.

CANGCO VS MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY G.R. L-12191 OCTOBER 14, 1918
FACTS:
On January 20, 1915, Jose Cangco was riding the train of Manila Railroad Company where
he was an employee. As the train drew near to his destination, he arose from his seat. When
he was about to alight from the train, Cangco accidentally stepped on a sack of watermelons
which he failed to notice because it was already 7:00pm and it was dim when it happened.
As a result, he slipped and fell violently on the platform. His right arm was badly crushed and
lacerated which was eventually amputated.
Cangco sued Manila Railroad Company on the ground of negligence of its employees
placing the sacks of melons upon the platform and in leaving them so placed as to be a
menace to the security of passenger alighting from the company’s trains.
Held: Note that GPS is an exclusive contractor and hauler of Concepcion Industries, Inc.
offering its service to no other individual or entity. A common carrier is one which offers its
services whether to the public in general or to a limited clientele in particular but never on an
exclusive basis. Therefore, GPS does not fit the category of a common carrier although it is
not freed from its liability based on culpa contractual
PNR V. ETHEL BRUNTY
G.R. NO.169891
DATE: November 2, 2006
PONENTE: Callejo, Sr., J.

The company’s defense was that granting that its employees were negligent in placing an
obstruction upon the platform, the direct and proximate cause of the injury suffered by FACTS:
plaintiff was his own contributing negligence.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was a contributing negligence on the part of the plaintiff.
HELD: In determining the question of contributory negligence in performing such act – that is
to say, whether the passenger acted prudently or recklessly – the age, sex, and physical
condition of the passenger are circumstances necessarily affecting the safety of the
passenger, and should be considered.
Rhonda Brunty, an American citizen and daughter of Ehtel Brunty, visited the Philippines.
Before her departure, she with her Filipino host, Juan Manuel Garcia, went to Baguio on
board a Mercedez Benz driven by Mercelita, around 12 midnight. On the other hand, a PNR
train bound for Tutuban, Manila left La Union station at 11pm. At around 2am, the Benz was
approaching the railroad crossing at Moncada, Tarlac. The car was running at a speed of
70km/hr and had overtaken a vehicle when it collided with the PNR train. Brunty was rushed
to the hospital, but was pronounced dead 10 minutes after arrival, while Garcia suffered
severe head injuries.

The place was perfectly familiar to the plaintiff as it was his daily custom to get on and off the
train at the station. There could, therefore, be no uncertainty in his mind with regard either to
the length of the step which he was required to take or the character of the platform where
he was alighting. The Supreme Court’s conclusion was that the conduct of the plaintiff in
undertaking to alight while the train was yet slightly under way was not characterized by
imprudence and that therefore he was not guilty of contributory negligence.
A demand letter was sent to PNR which did not respond. A complaint for damages was filed
against it. PNR argues that since there is freedom of control and greater maneuverability on
the part of motor vehicles, it is obvious that in railroad crossings, they have the last clear
chance to prevent or avoid an unwanted accident from taking place.

FGU INSURANCE CORP. VS. G.P. SARMIENTO TRUCKING CORP. (GPS)G.R. No.
RTC: PNR negligent; CA: affirmed
141910. August 6, 2002

Facts: GPS is an exclusive contractor and hauler of Concepcion Industries, Inc. One day, it
was to deliver certain goods of Concepcion Industries, Inc. aboard one of its trucks. On its
ISSUE/S: WON the doctrine of last clear chance applies
way, the truck collided with an unidentified truck, resulting in damage to the cargoes. FGU,
insurer of the shipment paid to Concepcion Industries, Inc. the amount of the damage and
filed a suit against GPS. GPS filed a motion to dismiss for failure to prove that it was a
common carrier.
RULING: NO. The proximate cause of the injury having been established to be the
negligence of PNR, the doctrine finds no application in the instant case.
PNR was negligent because of its failure to provide the necessary safety device to ensure
the safety of motorists in crossing the railroad track: (1.) absence of flagbars or safety
railroad bars; (2.) inadequacy of the installed warning signals; and (3.) lack of proper lighting
within the area.
Thus, even if there was a flagman stationed at the site as claimed by PNR, it would still be
impossible to know or see that there is a railroad crossing/tracks ahead, or that there is an
approaching train from the Moncada side of the road since one’s view would be blocked by a
cockpit arena. A vehicle coming from the Moncada side would have difficulty in knowing that
there is an approaching train because of the slight curve, more so, at an unholy hour as 2:00
a.m. Thus, it is imperative on the part of the PNR to provide adequate safety equipment in
the area
This Court has previously determined the liability of the PNR for damages for its failure to put
a cross bar, or signal light, flagman or switchman, or semaphores. Such failure is evidence
of negligence and disregard of the safety of the public, even if there is no law or ordinance
requiring it because public safety demands that said device or equipment be installed.
There was a contributory negligence on the part driver of the Mercedez Benz, Mercelita, as
the place was not properly illuminated; one’s view was blocked by a cockpit arena; and
Mercelita was unfamiliar with the place, yet he drove at 70km/hr and had overtaken a vehicle
before arriving at the railroad track. However, the effect of contributory negligence on the
mitigation of liability does not apply here. Both before the lower courts, no damages were
awarded to Mercelita and he did not appeal. There is neither proof as to the relationship
between Mercelita and Rhonda Brunty.
ROBERTO C. SICAM and AGENCIA de R.C. SICAM, INC. vs. SPOUSES JORGE
G.R. No. 159617, August 8, 2007
FACTS: On different dates, Lulu Jorge pawned several pieces of jewelry with Agencia de R.
C. Sicam located in Parañaque to secure a loan.
On October 19, 1987, two armed men entered the pawnshop and took away whatever cash
and jewelry were found inside the pawnshop vault.
On the same date, Sicam sent Lulu a letter informing her of the loss of her jewelry due to the
robbery incident in the pawnshop. Respondent Lulu then wroteback expressing disbelief,
then requested Sicam to prepare the pawned jewelry for withdrawal on November 6, but
Sicam failed to return the jewelry.
Lulu, joined by her husband Cesar, filed a complaint against Sicam with the RTC of Makati
seeking indemnification for the loss of pawned jewelry and payment of AD, MD and ED as
well as AF.
The RTC rendered its Decision dismissing respondents’ complaint as well as petitioners’
counterclaim. Respondents appealed the RTC Decision to the CA which reversed the RTC,
ordering the appellees to pay appellants the actual value of the lost jewelry and AF.
Petitioners MR denied, hence the instant petition for review on Certiorari.
ISSUE: are the petitioners liable for the loss of the pawned articles in their possession?
(Petitioners insist that they are not liable since robbery is a fortuitous event and they are not
negligent at all.)
HELD: The Decision of the CA is AFFIRMED.
YES
Article 1174 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 1174. Except in cases expressly specified by the law, or when it is otherwise declared by
stipulation, or when the nature of the obligation requires the assumption of risk, no person
shall be responsible for those events which could not be foreseen or which, though foreseen,
were inevitable.
Fortuitous events by definition are extraordinary events not foreseeable or avoidable. It is
therefore, not enough that the event should not have been foreseen or anticipated, as is
commonly believed but it must be one impossible to foresee or to avoid. The mere difficulty
to foresee the happening is not impossibility to foresee the same.
To constitute a fortuitous event, the following elements must concur:
(a) the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence or of the failure of the debtor to
comply with obligations must be independent of human will;
(b) it must be impossible to foresee the event that constitutes the caso fortuito or, if it can be
foreseen, it must be impossible to avoid;
(c) the occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill obligations
in a normal manner; and,
(d) the obligor must be free from any participation in the aggravation of the injury or loss.
The burden of proving that the loss was due to a fortuitous event rests on him who invokes
it. And, in order for a fortuitous event to exempt one from liability, it is necessary that one has
committed no negligence or misconduct that may have occasioned the loss.
Sicam had testified that there was a security guard in their pawnshop at the time of the
robbery. He likewise testified that when he started the pawnshop business in 1983, he
thought of opening a vault with the nearby bank for the purpose of safekeeping the valuables
but was discouraged by the Central Bank since pawned articles should only be stored in a
vault inside the pawnshop. The very measures which petitioners had allegedly adopted show
that to them the possibility of robbery was not only foreseeable, but actually foreseen and
anticipated. Sicam’s testimony, in effect, contradicts petitioners’ defense of fortuitous event.
Moreover, petitioners failed to show that they were free from any negligence by which the
loss of the pawned jewelry may have been occasioned.
Robbery per se, just like carnapping, is not a fortuitous event. It does not foreclose the
possibility of negligence on the part of herein petitioners.
Petitioners merely presented the police report of the Parañaque Police Station on the
robbery committed based on the report of petitioners’ employees which is not sufficient to
establish robbery. Such report also does not prove that petitioners were not at fault. On the
contrary, by the very evidence of petitioners, the CA did not err in finding that petitioners are
guilty of concurrent or contributory negligence as provided in Article 1170 of the Civil Code,
to wit:
Art. 1170. Those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence,
or delay, and those who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof, are liable for damages.
**
Article 2123 of the Civil Code provides that with regard to pawnshops and other
establishments which are engaged in making loans secured by pledges, the special laws
and regulations concerning them shall be observed, and subsidiarily, the provisions on
pledge, mortgage and antichresis.
The provision on pledge, particularly Article 2099 of the Civil Code, provides that the creditor
shall take care of the thing pledged with the diligence of a good father of a family. This
means that petitioners must take care of the pawns the way a prudent person would as to
his own property.
In this connection, Article 1173 of the Civil Code further provides:
Art. 1173. The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the omission of that diligence
which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of
the persons, of time and of the place. When negligence shows bad faith, the provisions of
Articles 1171 and 2201, paragraph 2 shall apply.
If the law or contract does not state the diligence which is to be observed in the
performance, that which is expected of a good father of a family shall be required.
We expounded in Cruz v. Gangan that negligence is the omission to do something which a
reasonable man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of
human affairs, would do; or the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man
would not do. It is want of care required by the circumstances.
A review of the records clearly shows that petitioners failed to exercise reasonable care and
caution that an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation. Petitioners
were guilty of negligence in the operation of their pawnshop business. Sicam’s testimony
revealed that there were no security measures adopted by petitioners in the operation of the
pawnshop. Evidently, no sufficient precaution and vigilance were adopted by petitioners to
protect the pawnshop from unlawful intrusion. There was no clear showing that there was
any security guard at all. Or if there was one, that he had sufficient training in securing a
pawnshop. Further, there is no showing that the alleged security guard exercised all that was
necessary to prevent any untoward incident or to ensure that no suspicious individuals were
allowed to enter the premises. In fact, it is even doubtful that there was a security guard,
since it is quite impossible that he would not have noticed that the robbers were armed with
caliber .45 pistols each, which were allegedly poked at the employees. Significantly, the
alleged security guard was not presented at all to corroborate petitioner Sicam’s claim; not
one of petitioners’ employees who were present during the robbery incident testified in court.
Furthermore, petitioner Sicam’s admission that the vault was open at the time of robbery is
clearly a proof of petitioners’ failure to observe the care, precaution and vigilance that the
circumstances justly demanded.
The robbery in this case happened in petitioners’ pawnshop and they were negligent in not
exercising the precautions justly demanded of a pawnshop.
NOTES:
We, however, do not agree with the CA when it found petitioners negligent for not taking
steps to insure themselves against loss of the pawned jewelries.
Under Section 17 of Central Bank Circular No. 374, Rules and Regulations for Pawnshops,
which took effect on July 13, 1973, and which was issued pursuant to Presidential Decree
No. 114, Pawnshop Regulation Act, it is provided that pawns pledged must be insured, to
wit:
Sec. 17. Insurance of Office Building and Pawns- The place of business of a pawnshop and
the pawns pledged to it must be insured against fire and against burglary as well as for the
latter(sic), by an insurance company accredited by the Insurance Commissioner.
However, this Section was subsequently amended by CB Circular No. 764 which took effect
on October 1, 1980, to wit:
Sec. 17 Insurance of Office Building and Pawns – The office building/premises and pawns of
a pawnshop must be insured against fire. (emphasis supplied).
where the requirement that insurance against burglary was deleted. Obviously, the Central
Bank considered it not feasible to require insurance of pawned articles against burglary.
The robbery in the pawnshop happened in 1987, and considering the above-quoted
amendment, there is no statutory duty imposed on petitioners to insure the pawned jewelry
in which case it was error for the CA to consider it as a factor in concluding that petitioners
were negligent.
Nevertheless, the preponderance of evidence shows that petitioners failed to exercise the
diligence required of them under the Civil Code.
FAR EASTERN SHIPPING COMPANY vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY
G.R. No. 130150; October, 1998
FACTS:
M/V PAVLODAR, owned and operated by the Far Eastern Shipping Company (FESC),
arrived at the Port of Manila and was assigned Berth 4 of the Manila International Port, as its
berthing space. Gavino, who was assigned by the Appellant Manila Pilots' Association to
conduct the docking maneuvers for the safe berthing, boarded the vessel at the quarantine
anchorage and stationed himself in the bridge, with the master of the vessel, Victor
Kavankov, beside him. After a briefing of Gavino by Kavankov of the particulars of the vessel
and its cargo, the vessel lifted anchor from the quarantine anchorage and proceeded to the
Manila International Port. The sea was calm and the wind was ideal for docking maneuvers.
When the vessel reached the landmark, one-half mile from the pier, Gavino ordered the
engine stopped. When the vessel was already about 2,000 feet from the pier, Gavino
ordered the anchor dropped. Kavankov relayed the orders to the crew of the vessel on the
bow. The left anchor, with two (2) shackles, were dropped. However, the anchor did not take
hold as expected. The speed of the vessel did not slacken. A commotion ensued between
the crew members. After Gavino noticed that the anchor did not take hold, he ordered the
engines half-astern. Abellana, who was then on the pier apron, noticed that the vessel was
approaching the pier fast. Kavankov likewise noticed that the anchor did not take hold.
Gavino thereafter gave the "full-astern" code. Before the right anchor and additional
shackles could be dropped, the bow of the vessel rammed into the apron of the pier causing
considerable damage to the pier as well as the vessel.
does not release the pilot from the consequences of his own negligence. The master is not
entirely absolved of responsibility with respect to navigation when a compulsory pilot is in
charge. Except insofar as their liability is limited or exempted by statute, the vessel or her
owners are liable for all damages caused by the negligence or other wrongs of the owners or
those in charge of the vessel. As a general rule, the owners or those in possession and
control of a vessel and the vessel are liable for all natural and proximate damages caused to
persons or property by reason of her negligent management or navigation.

ISSUES:
(1) Is the pilot of a commercial vessel, under compulsory pilotage, solely liable for the
damage caused by the vessel to the pier, at the port of destination, for his negligence?;
(2) Would the owner of the vessel be liable likewise if the damage is caused by the
concurrent negligence of the master of the vessel and the pilot under a compulsory pilotage?

HELD:
(1) Generally speaking, the pilot supersedes the master for the time being in the command
and navigation of the ship, and his orders must be obeyed in all matters connected with her
navigation. He becomes the master pro hac vice and should give all directions as to speed,
course, stopping and reversing anchoring, towing and the like. And when a licensed pilot is
employed in a place where pilotage is compulsory, it is his duty to insist on having effective
control of the vessel, or to decline to act as pilot. Under certain systems of foreign law, the
pilot does not take entire charge of the vessel, but is deemed merely the adviser of the
master, who retains command and control of the navigation even in localities where pilotage
is compulsory. It is quite common for states and localities to provide for compulsory pilotage,
and safety laws have been enacted requiring vessels approaching their ports, with certain
exceptions, to take on board pilots duly licensed under local law. The purpose of these laws
is to create a body of seamen thoroughly acquainted with the harbor, to pilot vessels seeking
to enter or depart, and thus protect life and property from the dangers of navigation. Upon
assuming such office as compulsory pilot, Capt. Gavino is held to the universally accepted
high standards of care and diligence required of a pilot, whereby he assumes to have skill
and knowledge in respect to navigation in the particular waters over which his license
extends superior to and more to be trusted than that of the master. He is not held to the
highest possible degree of skill and care, but must have and exercise the ordinary skill and
care demanded by the circumstances, and usually shown by an expert in his profession.
Under extraordinary circumstances, a pilot must exercise extraordinary care. In this case,
Capt. Gavino failed to measure up to such strict standard of care and diligence required of
pilots in the performance of their duties. As pilot, he should have made sure that his
directions were promptly and strictly followed.

(2) The negligence on the part of Capt. Gavino is evident; but Capt. Kabancov is no less
responsible for the allision. The master is still in command of the vessel notwithstanding the
presence of a pilot. A perusal of Capt. Kabankov's testimony makes it apparent that he was
remiss in the discharge of his duties as master of the ship, leaving the entire docking
procedure up to the pilot, instead of maintaining watchful vigilance over this risky maneuver.
The owners of a vessel are not personally liable for the negligent acts of a compulsory pilot,
but by admiralty law, the fault or negligence of a compulsory pilot is imputable to the vessel
and it may be held liable therefor in rem. Where, however, by the provisions of the statute
the pilot is compulsory only in the sense that his fee must be paid, and is not in compulsory
charge of the vessel, there is no exemption from liability. Even though the pilot is
compulsory, if his negligence was not the sole cause of the injury, but the negligence of the
master or crew contributed thereto, the owners are liable. But the liability of the ship in rem