G.R. No.

185717 June 8, 2011

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
GARRY DE LA CRUZ y DELA CRUZ, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

The Case

This is an appeal from the Decision1 dated June 30, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02727, which
affirmed in toto the February 8, 2007 Decision2 in Criminal Case No. Q-03-117814 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 82 in
Quezon City. The RTC found accused Garry de la Cruz y dela Cruz (Garry) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 5,
Article II of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.

The Facts

In an Information3 filed on June 3, 2003, accused was indicted for the crime allegedly committed as follows:

That on or about the 29th of May, 2003, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, not being authorized by law to sell, dispense,
deliver, transport or distribute any dangerous drug, did, then and there, willfully and unlawfully sell, dispense, deliver, transport,
distribute or act as broker in the said transaction, zero point zero two (0.02) gram of methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous
drug.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Upon arraignment on July 28, 2003, accused pleaded "not guilty" to the above charge. 4 Trial5 on the merits ensued.

Version of the Prosecution

After conducting surveillance for a week, the Station Drug Enforcement Unit in La Loma, Quezon City planned a buy-bust operation
against a certain Garry who was in the Barangay Watch List. The operation was coordinated with the Philippine Drug Enforcement
Agency (PDEA).

On May 29, 2003, at around 9:00 a.m., the station’s Officer-in-Charge (OIC), Police Inspector Oliver Villanueva (P/Insp. Villanueva),
gave a briefing on the buy-bust operation. Police Officer 2 Edcel Ibasco (PO2 Ibasco) was designated as poseur-buyer, while PO1
Roderick Valencia (PO1 Valencia), PO1 Alfredo Mabutol, and PO2 Ronald Pascual were assigned as back-up operatives. Their
informant attended the briefing.

Thereafter, the buy-bust team proceeded to Biak-na-Bato corner Mauban Streets, Quezon City and arrived there at around 9:30
a.m. The informant introduced PO2 Ibasco to the accused, who was standing in front of a shanty, as wanting to buy shabu. The
accused asked for PhP 100, and when PO2 Ibasco paid the amount, the former handed over to him a white crystalline substance in
a plastic sachet. Upon PO2 Ibasco’s prearranged signal, the other members of the buy-bust team approached them. The accused,
sensing what was happening, ran towards the shanty but was caught by PO1 Valencia at the alley. PO1 Valencia introduced himself
as a police officer and frisked the accused, in the process recovering the buy-bust money.

The buy-bust team then brought the accused to the station. The accused was turned over to the desk officer on duty, along with the
substance in the sachet bought from him and the recovered buy-bust money. After inquest, the Information was filed on June 3,
2003. Accused was then committed to the Quezon City Jail.6

Consequently, the substance inside the sachet believed to be shabu was sent to and examined by a Philippine National Police
forensic chemist, Engr. Leonard Jabonillo (Engr. Jabonillo). The laboratory result confirmed that the substance was positive for
methylamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.

Only PO2 Ibasco and PO1 Valencia testified for the prosecution during the trial. The testimony of Engr. Jabonillo was dispensed with
upon stipulation by the defense.

Version of the Defense

The accused denied selling shabu to PO2 Ibasco. In short, the accused used the defense of denial and alleged a frame-up by the
arresting officers.

The accused testified that he was arrested on May 29, 2003 at around 9:00 a.m. inside his house at Barangay Manresa, Quezon
City while he was alone drinking coffee. While two neighbors were talking in front of his house, a Tamaraw FX arrived. Five armed
men alighted from it, whereupon his neighbors ran away and were chased by them. The armed men then returned, saying,
"Nakatakas, nakatakbo." (They had escaped and ran.) One of the armed men saw the accused and entered his house. It was PO2
Ibasco, who frisked him and got PhP 60 from his pocket. PO1 Valencia also entered his house and came out with a shoe box, then
said, "Sige, isakay n’yo na." (Take him in the car.) He asked the armed men what his violation was but was told to merely explain at
the precinct.

In the police precinct, he was investigated and subsequently detained. They showed him a plastic sachet which they allegedly
recovered from him. Then a man approached him and demanded PhP 30,000 for his release, but he said he did not have the
money. Thereafter, he was presented for inquest.
A witness, Rodolfo Buencamino (Buencamino), narrated that in the morning of May 29, 2003, he called the police precinct to have a
certain "Taba," an alleged drug pusher in their area, arrested. PO2 Ibasco and other police officers responded immediately. W hen
the police officers arrived, Buencamino pointed to "Taba," who, however, was able to evade arrest. Thereafter, he was surprised to
see the accused inside the vehicle of the policemen. But he did not know why and where the accused was arrested since he did not
witness the actual arrest.

Another witness, Marbelita Collado Lepiten (Lepiten), testified that she was at the terrace of her house on 135 Manba St., Manresa,
San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City, when she noticed the accused talking to a certain "Taba," a resident of the area. When a
maroon Tamaraw FX stopped in front of the house of accused, "Taba" ran away and was pursued by two men who alighted from the
vehicle. The two men returned without "Taba," who evidently escaped, and entered the house of the accused. She did not know
what happened inside the house but she eventually saw the men push the accused outside into their vehicle.

The Ruling of the RTC

On February 8, 2007, the RTC rendered its Decision finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged.
The dispositive portion reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused GARRY DELA CRUZ guilty beyond reasonable doubt of a violation of
Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, and hereby sentencing him to suffer the penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT and to pay a fine in
the amount of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND (P500,000.00) PESOS.

SO ORDERED.

In convicting the accused, the RTC relied on and gave credence to the testimony of prosecution witnesses PO2 Ibasco and PO1
Valencia. Citing People v. Jubail,7 which enumerated the elements required to be established by the prosecution for the illegal sale
of prohibited drugs, the trial court found that the prosecution had established the elements of the crime.

The RTC pointed out that Buencamino may, indeed, have called the police to arrest a certain "Taba," an alleged pusher in the area,
but he was not present when the accused was arrested. The trial court likewise did not accord evidentiary weight to the testimony of
Lepiten, who testified that she saw the accused talking to "Taba" and that when the police officers entered the house of the accused,
she was unaware of what transpired inside. Thus, the RTC concluded that her testimony did not provide clear and convincing
justification to cast doubt on the candid and straightforward testimonies of the police officers.

Applying the presumption of the performance of official function, the lack of showing any ill motive on the part of the police officers to
testify against the accused, and the principle that the bare denial of an accused is inherently weak, the RTC convicted the accused.

Consequently, with his conviction, the accused started to serve his sentence8 and was subsequently committed to the New Bilibid
Prison in Muntinlupa City.

Aggrieved, accused appealed9 his conviction before the CA.

The Ruling of the CA

On June 30, 2008, the appellate court rendered the appealed decision, wholly affirming the findings of the RTC and the conviction of
appellant. The fallo reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, herein appeal is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision supra is hereby AFFIRMED in
toto.

SO ORDERED.

The CA upheld the findings of the trial court that the essential elements required for the conviction of an accused for violation of Sec.
5, Art. II of RA 9165 were present in the instant case. The appellate court brushed aside the irregularities raised by accused-
appellant by putting premium credence on the testimonies of the arresting police officers, who positively identified accused-appellant
in open court. One with the trial court, the CA found no improper motive on the part of the police officers who, it said, were regularly
performing their official duties. Besides, relying on People v. Barlaan,10 the CA held that the irregularities raised that there was no
coordination with the PDEA and that no inventory was made and no photograph taken of the seized drug, if true, did not invalidate
the legitimate buy-bust operation conducted. Moreover, the CA found that the corpus delicti, i.e., the confiscated shabu and the PhP
100 bill, were presented as evidence of the commission of the offense.

The CA also ruled that accused-appellant’s mere denial, as corroborated by Buencamino and Lepiten, deserved scant consideration
vis-à-vis the positive identification by the arresting officers who arrested him in flagrante delicto. Anent the questioned chain of
custody, the CA found it unbroken and duly proven by the prosecution.

The Issues

Hence, We have this appeal.

Only accused-appellant, however, filed his Manifestation (In Lieu of Supplemental Brief), 11 while the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), representing the People of the Philippines, submitted neither a Manifestation nor a Motion. Consequently, on July 27, 2009,
the Court dispensed with the OSG’s submission of a supplemental brief. 12 Since no new issues are raised nor supervening events
transpired, We scrutinize the Brief for the Accused-Appellant13and the Brief for the Plaintiff-Appellee,14 filed in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No.
02727, in resolving the instant appeal.

Thus, accused-appellant raises the same assignment of errors, in that:

 I

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF
VIOLATION OF SECTION 5, ARTICLE II, REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165.

II

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO ACCUSED-APPELLANT’S DEFENSE OF
DENIAL.15

The Court’s Ruling

The appeal is meritorious.

Accused-appellant argues that, first, the prosecution has not proved his commission of the crime charged for the following
irregularities: (1) the arresting officers did not coordinate with the PDEA, as required under Sec. 86 of RA 9165; (2) no physical
inventory was conducted and photograph taken of the alleged seized drug in the presence of public officials, as required by Sec. 21
of RA 9165; and (3) the chain of custody was not duly proved by the prosecution. And second, his denial is worthy of credence upon
corroboration by the credible witnesses presented by the defense.

After a careful and thorough review of the records, We are convinced that accused-appellant should be acquitted, for the
prosecution has not proved beyond reasonable doubt his commission of violation of Sec. 5, Art. II of RA 9165.

A buy-bust operation is "a form of entrapment, in which the violator is caught in flagrante delicto and the police officers conducting
the operation are not only authorized but duty-bound to apprehend the violator and to search him for anything that may have been
part of or used in the commission of the crime."16 However, where there really was no buy-bust operation conducted, it cannot be
denied that the elements for illegal sale of prohibited drugs cannot be duly proved despite the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duty and the seeming straightforward testimony in court by the arresting police officers. After all, the
indictment for illegal sale of prohibited drugs will not have a leg to stand on.

This is the situation in the instant case.

The courts a quo uniformly based their findings and affirmance of accused-appellant’s guilt on: (1) the straightforward testimony of
the arresting police officers; (2) their positive identification of accused-appellant; (3) no ill motive was shown for their testimony
against accused-appellant; (4) the self-serving defense of denial by accused-appellant; (5) the seeming irregularities in the conduct
of the buy-bust operation and the arrest of accused-appellant not invalidating the operation; and (6) the testimonies of Buencamino
and Lepiten not showing that the buy-bust operation was not conducted.

Although the trial court’s findings of fact are entitled to great weight and will not be disturbed on appeal, this rule does not apply
where facts of weight and substance have been overlooked, misapprehended, or misapplied in a case under appeal, 17 as here.

For the prosecution of illegal sale of drugs to prosper, the following elements must be proved: (1) the identity of the buyer and seller,
the object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and its payment. What is material is the proof that the
transaction actually took place, coupled with the presentation before the court of the corpus delicti. 18

In People v. Doria,19 the Court laid down the "objective test" in determining the credibility of prosecution witnesses regarding the
conduct of buy-bust operations. It is the duty of the prosecution to present a complete picture detailing the buy-bust operation—"from
the initial contact between the poseur-buyer and the pusher, the offer to purchase, the promise or payment of the consideration until
the consummation of the sale by the delivery of the illegal drug subject of sale." 20 We said that "[t]he manner by which the initial
contact was made, x x x the offer to purchase the drug, the payment of the ‘buy-bust money’, and the delivery of the illegal drug x x x
must be the subject of strict scrutiny by the courts to insure that law-abiding citizens are not unlawfully induced to commit an
offense."21

No Surveillance Conducted

The testimony of PO2 Ibasco on direct examination did not mention an alleged surveillance conducted by PO2 Ibasco and PO1
Valencia prior to the alleged buy-bust operation, the corresponding intelligence report, and the written communiqué with the PDEA.
The defense in cross-examination put to task both PO2 Ibasco and PO1 Valencia concerning these matters, as attested to in the
Joint Affidavit of Apprehension22 executed by the two police officers on May 30, 2003. PO2 Ibasco testified that his unit, specifically
PO1 Valencia and himself, conducted surveillance on accused-appellant for a week prior to the buy-bust operation on May 29, 2003
which, according to him, turned out positive, i.e., accused-appellant was, indeed, selling shabu.

PO2 Ibasco on cross-examination testified, thus:

ATTY. LOYOLA:

Being an operative, you are of course, trained in intelligence work?

PO2 IBASCO:

Yes, sir.

Q: You said you conducted surveillance but you cannot show any proof that there is an intelligence report, you have no proof?

A: Yes, sir. There is, we were dispatched.

Q: Where is your proof now?

A: It’s in our office.

Q: Your dispatch order for the surveillance do you have any?

A: I don’t have it now sir but it’s in the office.

Q: You said that you conducted surveillance for one week, did I hear you right?

A: Yes, sir.

xxxx

Q: So, you are saying you did not actually see him selling drugs at that time during the surveillance?

A: We saw him, sir.

xxxx

Q: None. You did not even coordinate this operation with the PDEA?

A: We coordinated it, sir.

Q: What is your proof that you indeed coordinated?

A: It’s in the office, sir.

ATTY. LOYOLA:

May I make a reservation for continuance of the cross-examination considering that there are documents that the witness has to
present.

COURT:

What documents?

ATTY. LOYOLA:

The proof your Honor that there was indeed a coordination and the intelligence report.

COURT:

Will you be able to produce those documents?

A: Yes, sir. "Titingnan ko po."

PROSECUTOR ANTERO:

Titingnan?

COURT:

You are not sure? You don’t have any copy of those documents?

A: You Honor, what we have in the office is the dispatch. 23

PO1 Valencia, likewise, on cross-examination testified:

ATTY. LOYOLA:

Mr. Witness, tell me during the orientation, you will agree with me that there was no coordination made to the PDEA regarding this
intended buy bust operation?

PO1 VALENCIA:

We have coordinated at the PDEA.

Q: You say that but you have no proof to show us that there was coordination?

A: We have, sir.
Q: What is your proof?

A: We have files in our office for coordination.

Q: Are you sure about that?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Now, Mr. Witness, based on the information, you already planned to conduct a buy bust operation against the accused?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: But you will agree with me that there was no surveillance against the accused?

A: We have conducted a surveillance one week before the operation and we conducted surveillance "Pinakawalan namin ang
informant."

Q: What do you mean "pinakawalan ang informant"?

A: So that we have a spy inside to verify whether Garry was really selling shabu.

xxxx

Q: In fact you don’t have any information report?

A: We have, sir. It’s in the office. It’s with Insp. Villanueva.

Q: And because you claim that you have submitted an information and report, of course, you should have come up with an
intelligence report.

A: Yes, sir. It’s also in the office of Insp. Villanueva.

xxxx

Q: And the alleged recovered item, the plastic sachet which contained white crystalline substance was brought by whom to the PNP
Crime Laboratory?

A: I cannot remember who brought it sir because it was a long time ago. 24

These documents––specifically the dispatch order, the intelligence report of the alleged surveillance, and the written communiqué
from the PDEA for the conduct of the surveillance and buy-bust operation––were not, however, presented in court. Evidently, these
documents are non-existent, tending to show that there really was no surveillance and, consequently, no intelligence report about
the surveillance or the averred written communiqué from PDEA attesting to coordination with said agency. Worse, the prosecution
never bothered to explain why it could not present these documents. Thus, there is no basis to say that accused-appellant allegedly
sold shabu a week before he was arrested.

Even putting this lapse aside, the other irregularities raised by accused-appellant in the backdrop of the uncontroverted testimonies
of Buencamino and Lepiten tend to show that there was really no buy-bust operation conducted resulting in the valid arrest of
accused-appellant.

Generally, non-compliance with Secs. 21 and 86 of RA 9165 does not mean that no buy-bust operation against appellant ever took
place.25 The prosecution’s failure to submit in evidence the required physical inventory and photograph of the evidence confiscated
pursuant to Sec. 21, Art. II of RA 9165 will not discharge the accused from the crime. Non-compliance with said section is not fatal
and will not render an accused’s arrest illegal or the items seized/confiscated from him inadmissible. 26

No Buy-Bust Operation

But where there are other pieces of evidence putting in doubt the conduct of the buy-bust operation, these irregularities take on
more significance which are, well nigh, fatal to the prosecution.

Putting in doubt the conduct of the buy-bust operation are the uncontroverted testimonies of Buencamino and Lepiten, which gave
credence to accused-appellant’s denial and frame-up theory. The Court is not unaware that, in some instances, law enforcers resort
to the practice of planting evidence to extract information from or even to harass civilians. 27 This Court has been issuing cautionary
warnings to trial courts to exercise extra vigilance in trying drug cases, lest an innocent person is made to suffer the unusually
severe penalties for drug offenses.28

The defense of frame-up in drug cases requires strong and convincing evidence because of the presumption that the law
enforcement agencies acted in the regular performance of their official duties. 29 Nonetheless, such a defense may be given
credence when there is sufficient evidence or proof making it to be very plausible or true. We are of the view that accused-
appellant’s defenses of denial and frame-up are credible given the circumstances of the case. Indeed, jurisprudence has established
that the defense of denial assumes significance only when the prosecution’s evidence is such that it does not prove guilt beyond
reasonable doubt,30 as in the instant case. At the very least, there is reasonable doubt that there was a buy-bust operation
conducted and that accused-appellant sold the seized shabu. After all, a criminal conviction rests on the strength of the evidence of
the prosecution and not on the weakness of the defense. 31
Notably, Buencamino voluntarily testified to the effect that he called the police asking them to apprehend a certain "Taba," a
notorious drug pusher in their area. PO2 Ibasco and company responded to his call and Buencamino helped identify and direct the
policemen but "Taba" unfortunately escaped. Thus, Buencamino testified:

ATTY. BARTOLOME:

Mr. Witness, who asked you to testify today?

BUENCAMINO:

I volunteered myself to testify.

xxxx

Q: Can you tell us how, when and where the accused was arrested?

A: I was the one who called-up the precinct to arrest a certain Taba and not Garry. Taba was the target of the operation.

Q: When was that?

A: May 29, 2003.

Q: Why did you call the police station?

A: Ibasco talked to me to arrest Taba.

Q: Why are they going to arrest Taba?

A: Because he is a pusher in the area.

Q: Why do you know Ibasco?

A: Because he was a previous resident of Barangay Manresa.

Q: You said you called police officer [sic] what was the topic. Mr. Witness?

A: That Taba is already there and he already showed up and they immediately responded to arrest Taba.

Q: So, Ibasco immediately responded to your call?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: When they arrived in your place what happened else, if any?

A: I pointed to Taba so they could arrest him.

Q: Where they able to arrest Taba?

A: No, sir. He was able to escape.

Q: Whey they were not able to arrest alias Taba what happened, next Mr. Witness? What happened to Garry Dela Cruz?

A: I was surprised because I saw Garry Dela Cruz already inside the vehicle and I don’t know why Garry was inside the vehicle.32

Buencamino’s assertion of knowing PO2 Ibasco was likewise not rebutted. Moreover, the presentation of the police logbook on calls
received in the morning of May 29, 2003 would indeed show if Buencamino or someone else made a call to the precinct about a
certain "Taba," but then, again, the prosecution did not bother to rebut the testimony of Buencamino. Verily, this time the
presumption "that evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced" 33applies. In fact, the prosecution did not even assail
Buencamino’s credibility as a witness but merely made the point in the cross-examination that he had no actual knowledge of the
arrest of accused-appellant. Thus, Buencamino was cross-examined:

PROSECUTOR ANTERO:

You were not with Garry at the time he was arrested?

BUENCAMINO:

No, sir.

Q: You don’t know where he was arrested at that time?

A: I don’t know where Garry was, sir.

PROSECUTOR ANTERO:

That will be all, your Honor.34

More telling is the testimony of Lepiten which, uncontroverted, shows that there was no buy-bust operation. Her testimony
corroborates the testimony of Buencamino that police enforcers indeed responded to Buencamino’s phone call but were not able to
apprehend "Taba." This destroys the buy-bust operation angle testified to by PO2 Ibasco and PO1 Valencia. Since the buy-bust
operation allegedly happened not inside the house of accused-appellant but in an open area in front of a shanty, such cannot be
sustained in light of what Lepiten witnessed: The policemen chased but were not able to arrest "Taba"; thereafter, the policemen
went inside the house of accused-appellant, emerging later with him who was led to the vehicle of the policemen. Thus, Lepiten
testified:

ATTY. BARTOLOME:

Mrs. Witness, where were you on May 29, 2003, if you could still remember?

COURT:

What time?

ATTY. BARTOLOME:

At around 9:00 in the morning.

LEPITEN:

I was at the terrace of the house we are renting while sipping coffee.

Q: Where is that house located?

A: No. 135 Mauban Street, Barangay Manresa, Quezon City.

COURT:

Where is this, Novaliches?

A: No, your Honor, near San Francisco Del Monte.

xxxx

ATTY. BARTOLOME:

While drinking coffee, what transpired next, Mrs. Witness or was there any unusual thing that happened?

A: Yes, sir. While I was sitting on the terrace in front of the house we are renting is the house of Garry. Garry was talking to a certain
Taba whom I know.

xxxx

Q: While you saw them talking to each other, what happened next?

A: Suddenly a maroon FX stopped.

Q: Where?

A: In front of the house of Garry.

Q: When this maroon FX stopped, what happened next, if any?

A: Taba ran, sir.

Q: What happened next, if any?

A: Two (2) men in blue pants and white shirt alighted from the maroon FX and ran after Taba.

Q: Were they able to arrest Taba, Ms. Witness?

A: No, sir. They were not able to catch him.

Q: When they failed to arrest Taba, what did these two (2) men do, if any?

A: They returned in front of the house and Garry and I saw them entered the house of Garry.
xxxx

Q: What did they do, if any?

A: I don’t know what they did inside because I could not see them, sir. Then I saw them went down and pushed Garry towards the
FX.

xxxx

Q: After that what else happened, if any?

A: I just saw that they boarded Garry inside the FX.

xxxx

COURT:

Any cross?

PROSECUTOR ANTERO:

No cross, your Honor.35

Thus, taking into consideration the defense of denial by accused-appellant, in light of the foregoing testimonies of Buencamino and
Lepiten, the Court cannot conclude that there was a buy-bust operation conducted by the arresting police officers as they attested to
and testified on. The prosecution’s story is like a sieve full of holes.

Non-Compliance with the Rule on Chain of Custody

Moreover, the prosecution failed to sufficiently prove the requisite chain of custody of the seized specimen. "Chain of custody"
means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals from the time of
seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction. 36 The CA found an
unbroken chain of custody of the purportedly confiscated shabu specimen. However, the records belie such conclusion.

The testimonies of PO2 Ibasco and PO1 Valencia, as well as their Joint Affidavit of Apprehension, were bereft of any assertion on
how the seized shabu in a heat-sealed sachet was duly passed from PO2 Ibasco, the chosen poseur-buyer, who allegedly received
it from accused-appellant, to forensic chemist Engr. Jabonillo, who conducted the forensic examination. While the testimony of Engr.
Jabonillo was dispensed with upon stipulation by the defense, as duly embodied in the RCT Order dated March 16, 2004, it is
likewise bereft of any assertion substantially proving the custodial safeguards on the identity and integrity of the shabu allegedly
received from accused-appellant. The stipulation merely asserts:

x x x that he is a Forensic Chemist of the Philippine National Police; that his office received a request for laboratory examination
marked as Exhibit "A"; that together with said request is a brown envelope marked as Exhibit "B"; which contained a plastic sachet
marked as Exhibit "B-1"; that he conducted a requested laboratory examination and, in connection therewith, he submitted a
Chemistry Report marked as Exhibit "C". The findings thereon showing the specimen positive for Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride
was marked as Exhibit "C-1", and the signature of the said police officer was marked as Exhibit "C-2". He likewise issued a
Certification marked as Exhibits "D" and "D-1", and thereafter, turned over the specimen to the evidence custodian and retrieved the
same for [sic] purposed proceeding scheduled today. 37

While both PO2 Ibasco and PO1 Valencia testified on the identity of the plastic sachet duly marked with the initials "EIGC," there
was no sufficient proof of compliance with the chain of custody. The records merely show that, after the arrest of accused-appellant,
the specimen was allegedly turned over to the desk officer on duty, whose identity was not revealed. Then it was the station’s OIC,
P/Insp. Villanueva, who requested the forensic examination of the specimen. In gist, from the alleged receipt of the plastic sachet
containing 0.02 gram of shabu by PO2 Ibasco from the alleged buy-bust operation, the chain of custody of the specimen has not
been substantially shown. The Court cannot make an inference that PO2 Ibasco passed the specimen to an unnamed desk officer
on duty until it made its way to the laboratory examination. There are no details on who kept custody of the specimen, who brought it
to the Crime Laboratory, and who received and kept custody of it until Engr. Jabonillo conducted the forensic examination. The
stipulated facts merely made an allusion that the specimen custodian of the Crime Laboratory had possession of the specimen and
released it for the proceedings before the trial court.

It is essential that the prohibited drug confiscated or recovered from the suspect is the very same substance offered in court as
exhibit; and that the identity of said drug be established with the same unwavering exactitude as that requisite to make a finding of
guilt.38 This, the prosecution failed to do. The prosecution must offer the testimony of key witnesses to establish a sufficiently
complete chain of custody.39

As the Court aptly put in People v. Cantalejo:

x x x the failure of the police to comply with the procedure in the custody of the seized drugs raises doubt as to its origins.

x x x failure to observe the proper procedure also negates the operation of the presumption of regularity accorded to police officers.
As a general rule, the testimony of police officers who apprehended the accused is usually accorded full faith and credit because of
the presumption that they have performed their duties regularly. However, when the performance of their duties is tainted with
irregularities, such presumption is effectively destroyed.
While the law enforcers enjoy the presumption of regularity in the performance of their duties, this presumption cannot prevail over
the constitutional right of the accused to be presumed innocent and it cannot by itself constitute proof of guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.401avvphi1

In sum, considering the multifarious irregularities and non-compliance with the chain of custody, We cannot but acquit accused-
appellant on the ground of reasonable doubt. The law demands that only proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt can justify a verdict
of guilt.41 In all criminal prosecutions, without regard to the nature of the defense which the accused may raise, the burden of proof
remains at all times upon the prosecution to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. 42 As the Court often
reiterated, it would be better to set free ten men who might probably be guilty of the crime charged than to convict one innocent man
for a crime he did not commit.43

In fine, We repeat what the Court fittingly held in People v. Ong, a case similarly involving a buy-bust operation, thus:

The Constitution mandates that an accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proven beyond reasonable doubt. While
appellant’s defense engenders suspicion that he probably perpetrated the crime charged, it is not sufficient for a conviction that the
evidence establishes a strong suspicion or probability of guilt. It is the burden of the prosecution to overcome the presumption of
innocence by presenting the quantum of evidence required.1avvphi1

In the case at bar, the basis of acquittal is reasonable doubt, the evidence for the prosecution not being sufficient to sustain and
prove the guilt of appellants with moral certainty. By reasonable doubt is not meant that which of possibility may arise but it is that
doubt engendered by an investigation of the whole proof and an inability, after such an investigation, to let the mind rest easy upon
the certainty of guilt. An acquittal based on reasonable doubt will prosper even though the appellants’ innocence may be doubted,
for a criminal conviction rests on the strength of the evidence of the prosecution and not on the weakness of the evidence of the
defense. Suffice it to say, a slightest doubt should be resolved in favor of the accused.44

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is GRANTED. Accused-appellant Garry De La Cruz y Dela Cruz is hereby ACQUITTED of the
crime charged on basis of reasonable doubt. Accordingly, the CA Decision dated June 30, 2008 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02727
is SET ASIDE. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is ordered to cause the immediate release of accused-appellant, unless he
is being lawfully held for another cause.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. Nos. 128106-07 January 24, 2003

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
GONZALO BALDOGO, accused-appellant.

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

This is an automatic review of the Joint Judgment,[i] dated October 18, 1996, of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 52, Puerto
Princesa City, finding accused-appellant Gonzalo Baldogo alias "Baguio" guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder in
Criminal Case No. 12900 and Kidnapping in Criminal Case No. 12903. The trial court imposed on accused-appellant the supreme
penalty of death in Criminal Case No. 12900 and reclusion perpetua in Criminal Case No. 12903.

I. The Indictments

Two Informations were filed against accused-appellant and Edgar Bermas alias "Bunso" which read:

"That on or about the 22nd day of February, 1996 in the evening at the residence of Mr. Julio Camacho of Iwahig Prison
and Penal Farm, Puerto Princesa City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused who
were both convicted by final judgment of the offense of Homicide and while already serving sentence, committed the above
name offense by conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill, with treachery
and evident premeditation and while armed with a bolo, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack
and hack one JORGE CAMACHO, hitting him and inflicting upon him mortal wounds at the different parts of his body, which
was the direct and immediate cause of his death shortly thereafter.

CONTRARY TO LAW, with the aggravating circumstances of treachery, evident[,] premeditation and recidivism. Puerto
Princesa City, Philippines, March 5, 1996."1

x x x

"That on Thursday, February 22, 1996 at more or less 8:15 in the evening at the Victim's residence, Iwahig Prison and
Penal Farm, Puerto Princesa City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused while
serving sentence at the Central Sub-Colony both for the offense of Homicide, conspiring and confederating together and
mutually helping one another, commits (sic) another offense, kidnapping one JULIE E. CAMACHO, a girl 12 years of age,
and brought her to the mountains, where said Julie E. Camacho was detained and deprived of her liberty fro [sic] more than
five days.

CONTRARY TO LAW and attended by the aggravating circumstance of recidivism." 2

Accused-appellant was arraigned on June 28, 1996 and entered a plea of not guilty to both charges.3 Edgardo Bermas died before
he could be arraigned.4 The two cases were ordered consolidated and a joint trial thereafter ensued.
The prosecution presented four witnesses, namely, Julie Camacho, Dr. Edilberto Joaquin, Esteban Mamites and Julio Camacho,
Sr., and offered documentary and object evidence on its evidence-in-chief.

II. The Antecedent Facts

Julio Camacho, Sr. and his wife, Heather Esteban, had four children, namely: Julio, Jr., a student of the Palawan State University in
Puerto Princesa City and who stayed in Guaygo, Puerto Princesa City; Jorge, who was fourteen years old; 5 Julie, who was 12 years
old and a grade six elementary pupil at the Iwahig Elementary School and Jasper, who was eight years old. Julio Sr. was employed
as a security guard in the Iwahig Prison and Penal Colony. He and his family lived in a compound inside the sub-colony. Edgardo
Bermas alias "Bunso," an inmate of the penal colony, was assigned as a domestic helper of the Camacho spouses. Accused-
appellant alias "Baguio," also an inmate of the colony, was assigned in January 1996 as a domestic helper of the Camacho family.
Both helpers resided in a hut located about ten meters away from the house of the Camacho family.

In the evening of February 22, 1996, accused-appellant and Bermas served dinner to Julio Sr., Jorge and Julie in the house of the
Camachos. At about 7:30 p.m., Julio Sr. left the house to attend a bible study at the dormitory in the Agronomy Section of the Penal
Farm. Heather and her son, Jasper, were in Aborlan town. Only Jorge and his sister Julie were left in the house.

After Julio Sr. had left the house, Julie went to the sala to study her assignment. Momentarily, Bermas called Julie from the kitchen
saying: "Jul, tawag ka ng kuya mo." Julie ignored him. After five minutes, Bermas called her again but Julie again ignored him. Julie
was perturbed when she heard a loud sound, akin to a yell, "Aahh! Ahh!" coming from the kitchen located ten meters from the
house. This prompted Julie to stand up and run to the kitchen. She was appalled to see Jorge sprawled on the ground near the
kitchen, face down and bloodied. The vicinity was lighted by a fluorescent lamp. Standing over Jorge were accused-appellant and
Bermas, each armed with a bolo.6 The shirt of Bermas was bloodied.7 Julie was horrified and so petrified that although she wanted
to shout, she could not. She ran back to the sala with accused-appellant and Bermas in pursuit. Accused-appellant overtook Julie,
tied her hands at her back with a torn t-shirt and placed a piece of cloth in her mouth to prevent her from shouting for help from their
neighbors. Bermas went to the room of Julie's brothers. Accused-appellant dragged Julie outside the house and towards the
mountain. Bermas tarried in the house.

With the aid of a flashlight, accused-appellant, with Julie in tow, walked for hours towards the direction of the mountain. About a
kilometer away from the house of the Camachos, accused-appellant and Julie stopped under a big tamarind tree at the foot of the
mountain. After about thirty minutes, Bermas arrived with a kettle and raw rice. Accused-appellant and Bermas retrieved a bag
containing their clothing and belongings from the trunk of the tamarind tree. They untied Julie and removed the gag from her mouth.
The three then proceeded to climb the mountain and after walking for six hours or so, stopped under a big tree where they spent the
night. When the three woke up in the morning of the following day, February 23, 1996, they continued their ascent of the mountain.
Seven hours thereafter, they started to follow a descending route. Accused-appellant and Bermas told Julie that they would later
release her. At about 3:00 p.m., Bermas left accused-appellant and Julie. However, accused-appellant did not let go of Julie. The
two survived on sugar and rice cooked by accused-appellant. Once, they saw uniformed men looking for Julie. However, accused-
appellant hid Julie behind the tree. She wanted to shout but he covered her mouth.

In the early morning of February 28, 1996, accused-appellant told Julie that he was leaving her as he was going to Puerto Princesa
City. He told her to fend for herself and return to the lowland the next day. After their breakfast, accused-appellant left Julie alone to
fend for herself. A few hours after accused-appellant had left, Julie decided to return to the lowlands. She found a river and followed
its course toward Balsaham until she saw a hut. She called upon its occupant who introduced himself as Nicodemus. Julie sought
help from him. When asked by Nicodemus if she was the girl whom the police authorities were looking for, she replied in the
affirmative. Nicodemus brought Julie to Balsaham where they met some personnel of the penal colony and police officers, and
Nicodemus turned Julie over for custody to them.

Meanwhile, Julio, Sr. arrived home after his bible study at about 9:00 p.m. on February 22, 1996. He noticed that the television set
was switched on but no one was watching it. He looked for his children but they were nowhere to be found. He then proceeded to
the hut occupied by accused-appellant and Bermas but he also failed to find them. Julio Sr. then rushed to the house of his older
brother, Augusto Camacho, to look for his children, but Augusto told him that Jorge and Julie were not there. Julio Sr. then sought
the help of Romualdo Esparagoza, a trustee of the penal farm. The two rushed back to the Camacho residence and proceeded to
the kitchen where they noticed blood on the floor. The two proceeded to the dirty kitchen and saw the bloodied body of Jorge
dumped about three meters away from the dirty kitchen. Julio Sr. and Esparagoza then brought Jorge to the Iwahig Hospital where
he was pronounced dead on arrival at 12:40 a.m. of February 23, 1996. Dr. Edilberto Joaquin examined the cadaver and found that
the victim was stabbed on the breast once and at the back seven times. He sustained a lacerated wound on the neck. The layers of
the neck, trachea and esophagus of Jorge had been cut. Jorge did not sustain any defensive wound. Dr. Joaquin performed an
autopsy of the cadaver and signed a medical certificate with his findings, thus:

"MEDICAL CERTIFICATE

GENERAL DATA:

JORGE CAMACHO y ESTEBAN, 14 years old, student, resident of Iwahig Prison and Penal Farm, approximately 5'3
inches in-height, was brought to the hospital, (DOA) dead on arrival at 12:40 AM, 23 February 1996, approximate time of
death 8:00 P.M. February 22, 1996.

FINDINGS

1. Stab wound, deep, penetrating, approximately 1 inch in length, at the level of the xyphoid process, anteriorly.

2. Stab wound, chest, back, approximately 1 inch length, right midclavicular line, level of the 3rd rib.

3. Stab wound, back, right midclavicular line, level of the 5th rib.

4. Stab wound, back, approximately 1 inch length level of the 5th rib, left midclavicular line.
 5. Stab wound, back, approximately 1 inch length, right midclavicular line, 6th rib.

6. Stab wound, back, approximately 1 inch length, right midclavicular line, level of the 4th lumbar region.

7. Stab wound, back, approximately 1 inch in length, right third lumbar region, deep, penetrating involving the liver.

8. Stab wound, back, approximately 3/4 inch, at the level of the 2nd lumbar region.

9. Lacerated wound, neck, anteriorly, deep, penetrating, cutting the layers of the neck and the trachea and
esophagus.

CAUSE OF DEATH

Hypovolemia due to severe hemorrhage secondary to multiple stab wounds and laceration of the neck." 8

Wounds numbers 7 and 9 were fatal. It was possible that two sharp-edged and sharp pointed weapons were used in stabbing Jorge
and that two assailants stabbed the victim.9

On February 29, 1996, Julie gave her sworn statement and a supplemental sworn statement to the police investigators. 10 Julio Sr.
suffered mental anguish and sleepless nights because of the death of Jorge.

The prosecution adduced in evidence excerpts of the personal file of accused-appellant kept in the penal colony showing that he
had been convicted of homicide by the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City and that he commenced serving sentence on November
19, 1992 and that the minimum term of his penalty was to expire on August 16, 1997. 11

III. The Defenses and Evidence of Accused-Appellant

Accused-appellant denied killing Jorge and kidnapping Julie. Accused-appellant asserted that Julie implicated him because she was
coached and rehearsed. He testified that he was assigned as a helper in the house of Augusto Camacho, the Chief of the Industrial
Section of the colony and the older brother of Julio Sr. Augusto told accused-appellant that his brother, Julio Sr., wanted to have
accused-appellant transferred as his domestic helper. However, accused-appellant balked because he had heard from Edgardo
Bermas, the helper of Julio Sr., that the latter was cruel and had been maltreating Bermas. Nonetheless, in December 1995,
accused-appellant was transferred as a domestic helper of Julio Sr. Accused-appellant confirmed that indeed Julio Sr. was cruel
because whenever the latter was angry, he maltreated accused-appellant by spanking and boxing him. These would occur about
two times a week.

On February 22, 1996, at about 6:30 p.m., accused-appellant took his dinner in the kitchen. At about 7:00 p.m., while he was already
in his quarters and preparing to sleep, Bermas arrived, armed with a bloodied bolo measuring about 1½ feet long and told accused-
appellant that he (Bermas) had just killed Jorge to avenge the maltreatment he received from Julio Sr. Bermas warned accused-
appellant not to shout, otherwise he will also kill him. Petrified, accused-appellant kept silent. Bermas then brought accused-
appellant to the kitchen in the house of the Camachos where accused-appellant saw the bloodied body of Jorge sprawled near the
kitchen. Bermas called Julie three times, telling her that her brother was calling for her but Julie at first ignored Bermas. Julie later
relented and went to the kitchen where Bermas grabbed her and threatened to kill her if she shouted. Bermas tied the hands of Julie
with a piece of cloth and placed a piece of cloth around her face to prevent her from shouting.

Bermas, still armed with his bolo tucked on his waist and a knife on his hand, brought accused-appellant and Julie outside the
house. The three then trekked towards the mountain. On the way, Bermas picked a bag containing food provisions and his and
accused-appellant's clothings. Accused-appellant thought of escaping but could not because Bermas was watching him. With the
help of a flashlight brought by Bermas, the three walked towards the mountain, with Julie walking ahead of accused-appellant and
Bermas. After walking for hours, they stopped by a tree to which Bermas tied Julie. At one time, while Bermas and accused-
appellant were scouring for water, Bermas kicked accused-appellant and pushed him into a ten feet deep ravine. The right hand and
foot of accused-appellant sustained bruises. He likewise sustained a sprain on his foot. Bermas left accused-appellant and Julie
after 1½ days.

In the meantime, accused-appellant managed to climb out of the ravine and heard Julie calling his name. Julie later told accused-
appellant that before Bermas left, the latter told her that he was going to kill accused-appellant.

Accused-appellant and Julie remained in the mountain after Bermas had left. At one time, accused-appellant and Julie saw soldiers
who were looking for her. Accused-appellant did not reveal his and Julie's location to the soldiers because he was afraid that he
might be killed. On February 25, 1996, accused-appellant untied Julie. He told her that he will set her free as soon as his foot shall
have healed.

On February 27, 1996, accused-appellant told Julie that she can go home already. He ordered her to go down the mountain and
proceed to Balsaham on her way back home. Although his foot was still aching, accused-appellant went down from the mountain
ahead of Julie and proceeded to Balsaham. He then walked to Irawan where he took a tricycle to the public market in the poblacion
in Puerto Princesa City. He then took a passenger jeepney and alighted at Brooke's Point where he was arrested after one week for
the killing of Jorge and the kidnapping of Julie.

Accused-appellant maintained that he did not intend to hurt Julie or deprive her of her liberty. He averred that during the entire
period that he and Julie were in the mountain before Bermas left him, he tried to protect her from Bermas. Accused-appellant
asserted that he wanted to bring Julie back to her parents after Bermas had left them and to surrender but accused-appellant was
afraid that Julio Sr. might kill him.

IV. The Verdict of the Trial Court

After due proceedings, the trial court rendered its decision, the decretal portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, a Joint Judgment is hereby rendered in:

A. CRIMINAL CASE NO. 12900 – finding the accused Gonzalo Baldogo, alias Baguio, guilty beyond reasonable doubt as
principal of the crime of murder as defined and penalized in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section
6 of Republic Act No. 7659, and appreciating against him the specific aggravating circumstance of taking advantage and
use of superior strength, without any mitigating circumstance to offset the same, and pursuant to the provisions of the
second paragraph, No. 1, of Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code, he is hereby sentenced to death in the manner
prescribed by law; to pay the heirs of the deceased Jorge Camacho;

1. Actual and compensatory damages:

For expenses incurred for funeral and other
expenses incident to his death --- P45,000.00
2. Moral damages ---------------------------- 100,000.00
3. Civil indemnity for the death of the
victim, Jorge Camacho ------------------- 50,000.00
or the aggregate amount of ------------- 195,000.00

B. CRIMINAL CASE NO. 12903 – finding the accused GONZALO BALDOGO, alias, 'Baguio,' guilty beyond reasonable
doubt as principal of the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention as defined and penalized in Article 267 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 8 of Republic Act No. 7659, and there being no modifying circumstance
appreciated and pursuant to the provisions of the second paragraph, No. 2, of Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code, and
not being entitled to the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, he is hereby sentenced to reclusion perpetua, with the
accessory penalties of civil interdiction for life, and of perpetual absolute disqualification; to pay the offended party, Julie
Camacho for physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety and moral shock, moral damages of P100,000; and
to pay the costs.

The case as against co-accused Edgar Bermas is ordered dismissed by reason of extinction of criminal liability occasioned
by his death pending conclusion of the proceedings as against him.

SO ORDERED."12

V. Assignment of Error

In his appeal brief, accused-appellant avers that:

"I

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF
THE CRIME OF MURDER AND KIDNAPPING.

II

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REJECTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT'S DEFENSE OF DENIAL.

III

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN APPRECIATING THE QUALIFYING AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF EVIDENT
PREMEDITATION AND GENERIC AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF TAKING ADVANTAGE OF SUPERIOR
STRENGTH DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE THE SAME.

IV

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN IMPOSING THE DEATH PENALTY UPON THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT IN THE (SIC)
CRIMINAL CASE #12900."13

VI. Resolution of this Court

The first two assignments of errors being interrelated, the Court will delve into and resolve the same simultaneously.

Accused-appellant avers that he had nothing to do with, and hence should not be claimed for, the death of Jorge and the kidnapping
and detention of Julie. Accused-appellant claims that he was acting under duress because he was threatened by Bermas with death
unless he did what Bermas ordered him to do. Accused-appellant was even protective of Julie. He insists that the latter was not a
credible witness and her testimony is not entitled to probative weight because she was merely coached into implicating him for the
death of Jorge and her kidnapping and detention by Bermas.

We find the contention of accused-appellant farcical. At the heart of the submission of accused-appellant is the credibility of Julie,
the 12-year old principal witness of the prosecution and the probative weight of her testimony.

This Court has held in a catena of cases that the findings of facts of the trial court, its calibration of the testimonial evidence of the
parties, its assessment of the probative weight of the collective evidence of the parties and its conclusions anchored on its findings
are accorded by the appellate court great respect, if not conclusive effect. The raison d'etre of this principle is that this Court has to
contend itself with the mute pages of the original records in resolving the issues posed by the parties:
 "x x x The record will not reveal those tell-tale signs that will affirm the truth or expose the contrivance, like the angry flush
of an insisted assertion or the sudden pallor of a discovered lie or the tremulous mutter of a reluctant answer or the
forthright tone of a ready reply. The record will not show if the eyes have darted in evasion or looked down in confession or
gazed steadily with a serenity that has nothing to distort or conceal. The record will not show if tears were shed in anger, or
in shame, or in remembered pain, or in feigned innocence. Only the judge trying the case can see all these and on the
basis of his observations arrive at an informed and reasoned verdict." 14

In contrast, the trial court has the unique advantage of monitoring and observing at close range the attitude, conduct and deportment
of witnesses as they narrate their respective testimonies before said court. Echoing a foreign court's observation, this Court
declared:

"Truth does not always stalk boldly forth naked, but modest withal, in a printed abstract in a court of last resort. She oft
hides in nooks and crannies visible only to the mind's eye of the judge who tries the case. To him appears the furtive
glance, the blush of conscious shame, the hesitation, the sincere or the flippant or sneering tone, the heat, the calmness,
the yawn, the sigh, the candor or lack of it, the scant or full realization of the solemnity of an oath, the carriage and mien.
The brazen face of the liar, the glibness of the schooled witness in reciting a lesson, or the itching overeagerness of the
swift witness, as well as the honest face of the truthful one, are alone seen by him." 15

The rule, however, is not iron clad. This Court has enumerated exceptions thereto, namely: (a) when patent inconsistencies in the
statements of witnesses are ignored by the trial court; (b) when the conclusions arrived at are clearly unsupported by the evidence;
(c) when the trial court ignored, misunderstood, misinterpreted and/or misconstrued facts and circumstances of substance which, if
considered, will alter the outcome of the case. 16 In this case, the trial court found the youthful Julie credible and her testimony
entitled to full probative weight. Accused-appellant has not sufficiently demonstrated to this Court the application of any of the
aforestated exceptions.

The Court agrees with accused-appellant that the prosecution was burdened to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the
felonies for which he is charged. This Court has held that accusation is not synonymous with guilt. It is incumbent on the prosecution
to prove the corpus delicti, more specifically, that the crimes charged had been committed and that accused-appellant precisely
committed the same. The prosecution must rely on the strength of its own evidence and not on the weakness of the evidence of the
accused.17 The reasonable standard rule which was adopted by the United States way back in 1978 is a requirement and a
safeguard, in the words of Mr. Justice Felix Frankfurter of the United States Supreme Court, "of due process of law in the historic,
procedural content of due process." The United States Supreme Court emphasized in Re: Winship 18 that in a criminal prosecution,
the accused has at stake interests of immense importance, both because of the possibility that he may lose his liberty or even his life
upon conviction and because of the certainty that he would be stigmatized by the conviction.

In the cases at bar, the prosecution failed to adduce direct evidence to prove that accused-appellant killed Jorge. However, the
prosecution adduced indubitable proof that accused-appellant conspired with Bermas not only in killing Jorge but also in kidnapping
and detaining Julie.

Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code provides that there is conspiracy if two or more persons agree to commit a felony and decide to
commit it. Conspiracy may be proved by direct evidence or circumstantial evidence. Conspiracy may be inferred from the acts of the
accused, before, during and after the commission of a felony pointing to a joint purpose and design and community of intent. 19 It is
not required that there be an agreement for an appreciable period prior to the commission of a felony; rather, it is sufficient that at
the time of the commission of the offense, all the conspira`tors had the same purpose and were united in its execution. 20 In a
conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all.21 All the accused are criminally liable as co-principals regardless of the degree of their
participation.22 For a conspirator to be criminally liable of murder or homicide, it is not necessary that he actually attacks or kills the
victim. As long as all the conspirators performed specific acts with such closeness and coordination as to unmistakably indicate a
common purpose or design in bringing about the death of the victim, all the conspirators are criminally liable for the death of said
victim.23

In these cases, the prosecution adduced conclusive proof that accused-appellant indeed conspired with Bermas to kill Jorge and
kidnap Julie as shown by the following cogent facts and circumstances:

1. When Julie responded to the repeated calls of Bermas for her to go to the kitchen on his pretext that Jorge wanted to talk to her,
Julie saw accused-appellant and Bermas, each armed with a bolo, about half a meter from Jorge who was sprawled on the ground,
bloodied all over.24

2. Even as Julie fled from the kitchen for dear life to the sala of their house, accused-appellant and Bermas ran after her. Accused-
appellant tied the hands of Julie with a piece of cloth and inserted a piece of cloth into her mouth to prevent her from shouting for
help from their neighbors.25

3. With a flashlight on hand, accused-appellant then exited from the house, dragged Julie towards the direction of the mountain
while Bermas remained in the house to rummage through the things in the bedroom of her brothers. Accused-appellant stopped for
a while for Bermas to join him.26

4. Before the killing of Jorge, accused-appellant and Bermas placed their clothing and personal belongings in a bag and buried the
bag under a tree, and when accused-appellant and Bermas were on their way to the mountain after killing Jorge, they excavated
and retrieved the bag from under the tree.27

5. Accused-appellant and Bermas brought with them to the mountain a kettle filled with raw rice which they cooked in the forest. 28

6. When Julie saw uniformed men who were looking for her and wanted to shout for help, accused-appellant covered her mouth to
prevent her from shouting for help.29

7. Even after Bermas had left accused-appellant and Julie in the forest in the afternoon of February 23, 1991, accused-appellant
continued detaining Julie in the forest until February 27, 1996, when he abandoned Julie in the forest to fend for herself.

The evidence of the prosecution was even buttressed by the judicial admissions of accused-appellant, thus:
1. After releasing Julie on February 27, 1996, accused-appellant proceeded to Puerto Princesa City and on to Brooke's Point where
he was arrested a week after said date.30

2. Both accused-appellant and Bermas had a motive to kill Jorge and kidnap Julie, that is, to avenge the repeated maltreatment and
physical abuse on them by Julio Sr., the father of Jorge and Julie.31

The flight of both accused-appellant and Bermas from the house of Julio Sr. to the mountain where they found refuge after killing
Jorge, and their motive to kill Jorge Jr. and kidnap and detain Julie in conjunto constitute potent evidence of their confabulation and
of their guilt for the death of Jorge and kidnapping and detention of Julie. 32

The bare denial by accused-appellant of criminal liability for the crimes charged is inherently weak. Accused-appellant's claims that
he even protected Julie from harm and that he was forced by Bermas to kidnap Julie are of the same genre. 33 The bare denial by
accused-appellant of the crimes charged constitutes self-serving negative evidence which cannot prevail over the categorical and
positive testimony of Julie and her unequivocal identification of accused-appellant as one of the perpetrators of the crimes
charged.34

Accused-appellant's insistence that he was forced by Bermas, under pain of death, to cooperate with him in killing Jorge and
kidnapping and detaining Julie is merely an afterthought. For duress to exempt accused-appellant of the crimes charged, "the fear
must be well-founded, and immediate and actual damages of death or great bodily harm must be present and the compulsion must
be of such a character as to leave no opportunity to accused for escape or interpose self-defense in equal combat."35 Accused-
appellant is burdened to prove by clear and convincing evidence his defense of duress. He should not be shielded from prosecution
for crime by merely setting up a fear from, or because of, a threat of a third person." 36 As Lord Dennan declared in Reg. Vs.
Tyler,37 "No man from fear of circumstances to himself has the right to make himself a party to committing mischief on mankind." In
these cases, in light of the testimony of Julie and the inculpatory acts of accused-appellant no less, there is no doubt that the latter
acted in concert with Bermas and is himself a principal by direct participation. That accused-appellant abandoned Julie after six days
of captivity does not lessen his criminal culpability much less exempt him from criminal liability for the killing of Jorge and the
kidnapping and detention of Julie.

Accused-appellant failed to prove his claim that Julie was coached on how and what to testify on. Indeed, when asked to identify the
person or persons who coached Julie, accused-appellant failed to mention any person:

"Q You heard the testimony of Julie Camacho that she is pointing to you to have kidnapped her and participated in the
killing of her brother Jorge, what can you say to that?

A That is not true.

Q You donot (sic) know the reason why? In fact you treated her well, why she pointed you as one of the authors of the
crime?

A Maybe somebody coached her.

Q Who do you think coached her?

A I cannot mention the name but I am sure that somebody coached her." 38

It bears stressing that when she testified, Julie was merely 12 years old. The Court has repeatedly held that the testimony of a minor
of tender age and of sound mind is likewise to be more correct and truthful than that of an older person so that once it is established
that they have fully understood the character and nature of an oath, their testimony should be given full credence and probative
weight.39 Julie had no ill motive to tergiversate the truth and falsely testify against accused-appellant. Hence, her testimony must be
accorded full probative weight.40

VII. Crimes Committed by Accused-Appellant

The Court shall now delve into and resolve the issue of what crime or crimes accused-appellant is guilty of. The trial court convicted
accused-appellant of two separate crimes and not the special complex crime of kidnapping with murder or homicide under the last
paragraph of Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act 7659.41 The trial court is correct. There is no
evidence that Jorge was kidnapped or detained first by accused-appellant and Bermas before he was killed. The last paragraph of
Article 267 of the Code is applicable only if kidnapping or serious illegal detention is committed and the victim is killed or dies as a
consequence of the kidnapping or serious illegal detention.

Re: Criminal Case No. 12900

(For Murder)

The trial court convicted accused-appellant of murder with the qualifying aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation, based
on the following findings and ratiocination:

"The slaying of Jorge Camacho took place about 8:30 o'clock in the evening of February 22, 1996. It was carried out after
the accused have been through tidying-up the kitchen, the dining room and the kitchen wares the family of the Camachos
used in their early dinner before 7:00 o'clock that evening. But even before dinner, the accused have already made
preparations for their flight, shown by the fact that they already had their clothes, other personal belongings and food
provisions stacked in their respective travelling bags then placed in a spot where they can just pick them up as they take to
flight."42

The trial court also appreciated against accused-appellant the qualifying aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength with
the following disquisition:
 "The victim, Jorge Camacho, is a lad only 14 years of age and unarmed when brutally slain. On the contrary, both accused
are of age and confirmed convicted felons. Any one of them would already be superior in strength and disposition to their
hapless and innocent victim. How much more with the combined strength and force of the two of them.

Their choice of the object of their brutality is indicative of their unmistakable intent of taking advantage of their superior
strength. The likely object of their resentment, for purported cruelty to them, is Prison Guard Julio Camacho, father of the
victim. They could have directed their criminal intent on Julio Camacho himself. But Julio Camacho could be a match in
strength and agility to any of them or even to the combined force of both of them. So, to insure execution of their criminal
intent without risk to them for the defense which the offended party might put up, they directed their criminal acts against
the deceased who is very much inferior in physical combat even only to any one of them." 43

While the Court agrees that accused-appellant is guilty of murder, it does not agree with the rulings of the trial court that the crime
was qualified by evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength. To warrant a finding of evident premeditation, the prosecution
must establish the confluence of the following requisites:

"x x x (a) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime; (b) an act manifestly indicating that the offender clung
to his determination; and (c) a sufficient interval of time between the determination and the execution of the crime to allow
him to reflect upon the consequences of his act. x x x"44

The qualifying aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation, like any other qualifying circumstance, must be proved with
certainty as the crime itself. A finding of evident premeditation cannot be based solely on mere lapse of time from the time the
malefactor has decided to commit a felony up to the time that he actually commits it. 45 The prosecution must adduce clear and
convincing evidence as to when and how the felony was planned and prepared before it was effected. 46 The prosecution is
burdened to prove overt acts that after deciding to commit the felony, the felon clung to his determination to commit the crime. The
law does not prescribe a time frame that must elapse from the time the felon has decided to commit a felony up to the time that he
commits it. Each case must be resolved on the basis of the extant factual milieu.

In this case, the prosecution failed to prove evident premeditation. The barefaced fact that accused-appellant and Bermas hid the
bag containing their clothing under a tree located about a kilometer or so from the house of Julio Sr. does not constitute clear
evidence that they decided to kill Jorge and kidnap Julie. It is possible that they hid their clothing therein preparatory to escaping
from the colony. There is no evidence establishing when accused-appellant and Bermas hid the bag under the tree. The prosecution
even failed to adduce any evidence of overt acts on the part of accused-appellant, nor did it present evidence as to when and how
he and Bermas planned and prepared to kill Jorge and kidnap Julie and to prove that the two felons since then clung to their
determination to commit the said crimes. Although accused-appellant and Bermas were armed with bolos, there is no evidence that
they took advantage of their numerical superiority and weapons to kill Jorge. Hence, abuse of superior strength cannot be deemed
to have attended the killing of Jorge.47 Nighttime cannot likewise be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance because there is
no evidence that accused-appellant and Bermas purposely sought nighttime to facilitate the killing or to insure its execution or
accomplishment or to evade their arrest.48 Neither is dwelling aggravating because there is no evidence that Jorge was killed in their
house or taken from their house and killed outside the said house.

In light of the evidence on record, it is clear that the killing of Jorge was qualified by treachery. When Jorge was killed by accused-
appellant and Bermas, he was barely 14 years old. The Court has previously held that the killing of minor children who by reason of
their tender years could not be expected to put up a defense is attended by treachery. 49 Since treachery attended the killing, abuse
of superior strength is absorbed by said circumstance.50

The penalty for murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act 7659 is reclusion perpetua to
death. There being no aggravating or mitigating circumstances in the commission of the crime, accused-appellant should be meted
the penalty of reclusion perpetua.51 Conformably with current jurisprudence, accused-appellant is hereby ordered to pay to the heirs
of the victim civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00 and the amount of P50,000.00 by way of moral damages. Although Julio Sr.
testified that he spent P45,000.00 during the wake and burial of the victim, the prosecution failed to adduce any receipts to prove the
same. Hence, the award of P45,000.00 by way of actual damages has no factual basis and should thus be deleted.

Re: Criminal Case No. 12903

(For Kidnapping)

The trial court convicted accused-appellant of kidnapping under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, punishable
by reclusion perpetua to death. The trial court is correct.

Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code was taken from Article 267 of the Spanish Penal Code, which reads:

"Art. 267—Detención ilegal grave.—Será castigado con la pena de reclusión temporal el particular que secuestrare o
encerrare a otro o en cualquier forma le privare de libertad."

"Secuestrare" means sequestration.52 To sequester is to separate for a special purpose, remove or set apart, withdraw from
circulation.53 It also means to lock-up or imprison. "Encerrare" is a broader concept than secuestrare.54 Encerrare includes not only
the imprisonment of a person but also the deprivation of his liberty in whatever form and for whatever length of time. As explained by
Groizard, "encerrar" es meter á una persona ó cosa en parte de donde no pueda salir"; detener o arrestar, poner en prisión, privar
de la libertad á alguno." He continued that "la detención, la prisión, la privación de la libertad de una persona, en cualquier forma y
por cualquier medio ó por cualquier tiempo en virtud de la cual resulte interrumpido el libre ejercicio de su actividad."55 On his
commentary on the Spanish Penal Code, Cuello Calon says that the law "preve dos modalidades de privacion de libertad, el
encierro y la detencion. Encerrar significa recluir a una persona en un lugar de donde no puede salir, detener a una persona
equivale a impedirle o restringirle la libertad de movimiento. Para que el sujeto pasivo no quiera permanecer en el sitio donde esta
recluido, pues no es posible llamar encierro ni detencion a la estancia de un a persona en lugar del que no quiere salir."56

In this case, Julie, a minor, was not locked up. However, she was seized and taken from her house through force and dragged to the
mountain. Since then, she was restrained of her liberty by and kept under the control of accused-appellant and Bermas. She was
prevented from going back home for a period of about six days. Patently then, accused-appellant is guilty of kidnapping and illegally
detaining Julie. The crime was aggravated by dwelling because Julie was taken from their house by accused-appellant and Bermas.
However, dwelling was not alleged in the Information as an aggravating circumstance as required by Section 9, Rule 110 of the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure which reads:

"SEC. 9. Designation of the offense. – The complaint or information shall state the designation of the offense given by the
statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting the offense, and specify its qualifying and aggravating circumstances. If
there is no designation of the offense, reference shall be made to the section or subsection of the statute punishing it."57

Even if dwelling is proven but is not alleged in the Information as an aggravating circumstance, the same will not serve to aggravate
the penalty.58

Quasi-recidivism as defined in Article 160 of the Revised Penal Code59 is alleged in both Informations. Accused-appellant is alleged
to have committed murder and kidnapping while serving sentence in the penal colony by final judgment for the crime of homicide.
Quasi-recidivism is a special aggravating circumstance.60 The prosecution is burdened to prove the said circumstance by the same
quantum of evidence as the crime itself. In the present case, to prove quasi-recidivism, the prosecution was burdened to adduce in
evidence a certified copy of the judgment convicting accused-appellant of homicide and to prove that the said judgment had become
final and executory.61The raison d'etre is that:

"x x x Since the accused-appellant entered a plea of not guilty to such information, there was a joinder of issues not only as
to his guilt or innocence, but also as to the presence or absence of the modifying circumstances so alleged. The
prosecution was thus burdened to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt and the existence of the
modifying circumstances. It was then grave error for the trial court to appreciate against the accused-appellant the
aggravating circumstance of recidivism simply because of his failure to object to the prosecution's omission as mentioned
earlier."62

In this case, the prosecution adduced in evidence merely the excerpt of the prison record of accused-appellant showing that he was
convicted of homicide in Criminal Case No. 10357-R by the Regional Trial Court of Baguio (Branch 6) with a penalty of from six
years and one day as minimum to fourteen years, eight months and one day as maximum and that the sentence of accused-
appellant commenced on November 19, 1992 and that the minimum term of the penalty was to expire on August 16, 1997. 63 The
excerpt of the prison record of accused-appellant is not the best evidence under Section 3, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of
Court64 to prove the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City and to prove that said judgment had become final and
executory. Said excerpt is merely secondary or substitutionary evidence which is inadmissible absent proof that the original of the
judgment had been lost or destroyed or that the same cannot be produced without the fault of the prosecution. The barefaced fact
that accused-appellant was detained in the penal colony does prove the fact that final judgment for homicide has been rendered
against him.65 There being no modifying circumstances in the commission of the crime, accused-appellant should be meted the
penalty of reclusion perpetua conformably with Article 63 of the Revised penal Code.66

VIII. Civil Liability of Accused-Appellant for Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention

The trial court awarded the amount of P100,000.00 to Julie by way of moral damages for the felony of kidnapping with serious illegal
detention, predicated on her having suffered serious anxiety and fright when she was kidnapped and dragged to the mountain where
she was detained for several days. The trial court is correct. Julie is entitled to moral damages. 67 In light of the factual milieu in this
case, the amount is reasonable. Julie is also entitled to exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000.00. 68

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision of the Regional Trial Court is hereby AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION:

1. In Criminal Case No. 12900, accused-appellant is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder defined in Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code as amended and is hereby meted the penalty of reclusion perpetua, there being no modifying circumstances
attendant to the commission of the felony. Accused-appellant is hereby ordered to pay to the heirs of the victim the amount of
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and the amount of P50,000.00 as of moral damages. The award of P45,000.00 as of actual damages
is deleted.

2. In Criminal Case No. 12903, accused-appellant is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of kidnapping with serious illegal
detention defined in Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act 7659, and there being no modifying
circumstances attendant to the commission of the felony is hereby meted the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Accused-appellant is
hereby ordered to pay moral damages to the victim, Julie Camacho, in the amount of P100,000.00 and exemplary damages in the
amount of P25,000.00.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. Nos. 116132-33 August 23, 1995

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
AURELIO DELOVINO Y UDAL, accused-appellant.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

On 13 November 1992, 17-year old Antonette Modesto filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City two complaints for
forcible abduction with rape against the accused. They were docketed as Criminal Case No. 92-1845 and Criminal Case No. 92-
1846 and assigned to Branch 116 of the said court.

The accusatory portions of the complaints read as follows:

CRIMINAL CASE NO. 92-1845

 That on or about the 4th day of November, 1992, in Pasay, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, AURELIO DELOVINO Y UDAL, by means of force, violence, intimidation,
threats and will [sic] lewd designs, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take and carry away complainant
Antonette Modesto, a minor 17 years of age and thereafter brought her at Queens Land Motel, this city and again by
means of force and intimidation and with the use of deadly weapon, lie and have carnal knowledge with the undersigned
complainant, against her will and
consent.1

CRIMINAL CASE NO. 92-1846

That on or about the 20th day of October, 1992, in Pasay, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Aurelio Delovino Y Udal, by means of force, violence, intimidation, threats
and will [sic] lewd designs, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take and carry away complainant
Antonette Modesto, a minor 17 years of age and thereafter brought her to Cavite and again by means of force and
intimidation and with the use of deadly weapon, lie and have carnal knowledge with the undersigned complainant, against
her will and consent.2

Upon his arraignment on 21 January 1993, the accused pleaded not guilty and waived his right to a pre-trial.3 The cases were then
consolidated and jointly tried.

The prosecution presented complainant Antonette Modesto; her mother, Elsa Modesto, PO3 Fernando Pascua; Dr. Ruperto J.
Sombilon, Jr., a medico-legal officer of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI); and Alfredo Batario, Antonette's former teacher.
The defense presented Lagrimas Delovino and Ana Pacantara, the wife and the aunt of the accused, respectively; Reynaldo
Improgo, a civilian volunteer officer; Dr. Ruperto Sombilon, Jr.; Alicia Abañez; and the accused himself.

The evidence for the prosecution established the following:

Antonette Modesto was a senior high school student of the Arellano University. She and the accused were neighbors in the
reclamation area in Pasay City. At about 12:00 noon of 20 October 1992, while she was waiting for a ride to school at Libertad
Street, Pasay City, the accused placed his hand on her shoulder and poked a knife, which was covered with a handkerchief, at her
side. He threatened to kill her if she would shout for help or run away. He ordered her to walk towards the corner of F.B. Harrison
Street and Libertad Street and to board a passenger jeepney bound for Baclaran. He made her sit between him and the driver in the
front seat. The accused held on to his knife. Upon reaching Baclaran, he alighted and ordered her to also disembark.

Thereafter, the accused brought Antonette to Dasmariñas, Cavite, on board another jeepney. Upon reaching Cavite at around 1:00
p.m., he took her to a deserted house, where he started to kiss her. She resisted, but he continued to threaten her with his knife.
When she struggled and screamed for help, he boxed her twice at her stomach, thereby weakening her. He then gagged her with a
handkerchief and tied her hands from behind. He undressed her and inserted his penis inside her vagina while she remained
helpless on the floor. Notwithstanding her struggles, the accused succeeded in his ejaculation.

Not long after, the accused raped Antonette again, and after satisfying his bestial instinct, he allowed her to dress up. He brought
her back to Pasay City at around 5:00 p.m. Before leaving her, he warned her not to tell anyone about the incident or he would kill
her and her family. When she reached home, she proceeded to her room and cried. She did not tell anyone of the shame inflicted on
her.4

Then, at about 10:00 a.m. of 4 November 1992, Antonette left home for school. While aboard a pedicab, the accused joined her and
seated himself beside her. He had a knife wrapped in a newspaper, which he poked at her. She was forced to alight with him at
Roxas Boulevard, Pasay City, where the accused flagged down a taxi which took them to Queensland Motel, Pasay City. Inside the
motel, the accused started kissing her. When she resisted, the accused boxed her twice at the stomach. He undressed her and, with
his knife, ripped off her bra. He inserted his penis into her vagina until he reached his climax. Thereafter, he sexually assaulted her
again. By late afternoon, they both dressed up. Once more, the accused threatened her to keep quiet about the incident, otherwise
he would kill her and her family. They left the motel by taxi, and when they parted at the reclamation area, he reiterated his warning.
When she reached home, she went to her room and cried. 5

It was on 10 November 1992 when her mother, Elsa Modesto, saw her crying in her room that Antonette divulged what had
happened to her. She and her parents then immediately proceeded to the police substation to lodge her complaint. 6 There, she
narrated her ordeal to PO3 Fernando Pascua, who then recorded her complaint in the police blotter7 and accompanied her to the
house of the accused. As might be expected, the accused denied the charges and was then turned over to the Investigation
Division.8

The next day, Antonette, accompanied by her mother, went to the NBI for a medical examination. 9 The medico-legal officer who
examined her,
Dr. Ruperto J. Sombilon, Jr., noticed no external injuries on her but found the presence of an "old-healed hymenal
laceration," 10 which could have been caused by sexual intercourse with a male. 11

Finally, through the testimony of Antonette, the prosecution proved that the accused offered, through her parents, to pay P40,000.00
to amicably settle these cases, which offer she declined; 12 and that as a consequence of the commission of these crimes, she had
been experiencing sleepless nights and was forced to quit her schooling. 13

According to the contrariant version of the accused, who was 33 years old at the time of the occurrence of the acts complained of
and married with four children, Antonette had a special feeling for him and eventually became his sweetheart; yet, he never took
undue advantage of such relationship by having sexual union with her.

He first noticed the special feeling of Antonette when he bought various items from her family's sari-sari store and she handed him
more than what he paid for. Taking the cue, he suggested a date with her, which she welcomed.14

Their first date was on 2 September 1992 when they discreetly met at Harrison Plaza and watched a movie. Then, they proceeded
to Dasmariñas, Cavite, where they had a brief stay in the house of his aunt, Ana Pacantara, to whom he introduced Antonette. Their
second and third trips to Cavite were on 29 September and 20 October 1992. 15 On the latter occasion, they slept together for an
hour in the house of his aunt. Antonette even borrowed a duster from his aunt, since she was still in her school uniform. While alone
together in the room, they kissed each other but did not have sexual intercourse. Thereafter, they played bingo with his aunt before
leaving for home. 16

On 4 November 1992, they went again to Cavite to join an excursion. Since the excursion did not push through, they just stayed and
had lunch at his aunt's house. They returned to Pasay in the afternoon. That was the last time they saw each other. 17

This alleged special relationship with the complainant was corroborated by Ana Pacantara, Lagrimas Delovino, and Reynaldo
Improgo.

Ana Pacantara declared that the accused and the complainant had their regular rendezvous in her house in Cavite, particularly on 2
September, 29 September, 20 October, and 4 November 1992. They acted like lovers and rested together in the bedroom, with
Antonette even borrowing her duster.18

Lagrimas Delovino testified that when she visited Antonette's sister at the San Juan de Dios Hospital on 7 November 1992, Elsa
Modesto informed her (Lagrimas) that Antonette and the accused were having an affair and that if the accused would not stop the
relationship, "something bad" would happen to him. 19

Reynaldo Improgo claimed that he is a neighbor of Antonette and the accused in the reclamation area and that he had seen them
together on several occasions.20

As a witness for the defense, Dr. Sombilon opined that the "old-healed complete laceration"21 which he had indicated in his report
could be around three months old and, therefore, could not have been sustained on 20 October or 4 November 1992. He concluded
that Antonette was no longer a virgin at the time of the alleged rapes. 22

In her rebuttal testimony, Antonette denied having an affair with the accused and having gone to Cavite on 2 September, 29
September, and
4 November 1992. On 2 September and 29 September 1992, she was actually attending her classes in school. 23Elsa likewise
denied having confronted and threatened Lagrimas Delovino.24

Alfredo Batario, Antonette's professor at the Arellano University, corroborated Antonette's claim that on 2 September and 29
September 1992, Antonette had attended his Social Studies class from 3:30 to 4:30 p.m., as shown in his school register. 25 He
declared, however, that from 20 October 1992 onwards, Antonette had been absent and considered dropped from the class. 26

In its decision27 dated 25 October 1993 but promulgated on 24 November 1993, the trial court found the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of rape in each of the two cases and disposed as follows:

WHEREFORE, in Criminal Case No. 92-1845 and in Criminal Case No. 92-1846, accused Aurelio Delovino y Udal is found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape; and he is sentenced, in each of the cases, to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua and to pay complainant Antonette Modesto y Duque the sum of P25,000.00 as moral damages.

No pronouncement is made as to costs.

It gave full faith and credit to the testimony of the offended party because her declarations describing how, through force and
intimidation, the accused was able to have sexual intercourse with her were positive, clear, and convincing and were made in a
spontaneous and straight forward manner, leaving no doubt in the mind of the court that she was telling the truth.

According to the trial court, the force and intimidation in these cases consisted in the accused's boxing the complainant and
threatening her with a knife. And, since the knife used is a deadly weapon, the penalty should be reclusion perpetua to death, but
because the imposition of the death penalty had been prohibited by the Constitution, the penalty should only be reclusion
perpetua.28

It refused to believe the accused's claim that the complainant was in love with him and was his sweetheart because, assuming this
to be true, she would not have filed these cases. It further found no improper motive on her part to falsely accuse him of the
commission of the crimes in question.

The trial court did not, however, convict the accused of the complex crime of abduction with rape as charged because, although he
had forcibly abducted the complainant, the prosecution had failed to prove lewd designs.

In this appeal, the accused contends that the trial court gravely erred in (1) convicting him not on the basis of the strength of the
prosecution's evidence but rather on the weakness of the evidence for the defense; (2) giving credence to the improbable and
inconsistent testimony of the private complainant; and (3) failing to appreciate the testimony of the NBI medico-legal officer in his
favor.29

The Appellee disagrees with him and prays that we affirm the assailed decision with the modification that the moral damages be
increased from P25,000.00 to P30,000.00.

We find no merit in this appeal. On the contrary, as hereinafter discussed, we find the accused guilty in each of the two cases of the
complex crime of forcible abduction with rape and not just of rape.

The first assigned error is baseless. The trial court convicted the accused on the basis of proof beyond reasonable doubt which the
evidence for the prosecution had established. Its reference to the weak evidence for the accused was evidently made to
demonstrate his failure to overcome the strength of the prosecution's evidence.
The second assigned error involves the issue of the credibility of the complainant. It is doctrinally entrenched that the evaluation of
the testimonies of witnesses by the trial court is received on appeal with the highest respect because such court has the direct
opportunity to observe the witnesses on the witness stand and determine if they are telling the truth or not. 30 In People vs. De
Guzman,31 this Court aptly stated:

In the resolution of the factual issues, the Court relies heavily on the trial court for its evaluation of the witnesses and their
credibility. Having the opportunity to observe them on the stand, the trial judge is able to detect that sometimes thin line
between fact and prevarication that will determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. That line may not be discernible
from a mere reading of the impersonal record by the reviewing court. The record will not reveal those tell-tale signs that will
affirm the truth or expose the contrivance, like the angry flush of an insisted assertion or the sudden pallor of a discovered
lie or the tremulous mutter of a reluctant answer or the forthright tone of a ready reply. The record will not show if the eyes
have darted in evasion or looked down in confession or gazed steadily with a serenity that has nothing to distort or conceal.
The record will not show if tears were shed in anger, or in shame, or in remembered pain, or in feigned innocence. Only the
judge trying the case can see all these and on the basis of his observations arrive at an informed and reasoned verdict.

In the first decade of this century, a foreign court likewise observed:

Truth does not always stalk baldly forth naked, but modest withal, in a printed abstract in a court of last resort. She oft hides
in nooks and crannies visible only to the mind's eye of the judge who tries the case. To him appears the furtive glance, the
blush of conscious shame, the hesitation, the sincere or the flippant or sneering tone, the heat, the calmness, the yawn, the
sigh, the candor or lack of it, the scant or full realization of the solemnity of an oath, the carriage and mien. The brazen face
of the liar, the glibness of the schooled witness in reciting a lesson, or the itching overeagerness of the swift witness, as
well as the honest face of the truthful one, are alone seen by him. 32

The recognized exceptions to the foregoing doctrine are when such evaluation was reached arbitrarily or when the trial court
overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and substance which could have affected the
result of the case. 33

The accused has miserably failed to convince us that the exceptions apply to these cases. He has not challenged the unequivocal
pronouncement of the trial court that the complainant testified in a "spontaneous and straightforward manner, leaving no doubt in the
mind of the court that she was telling the truth," and that her declarations were "positive, clear and convincing." The best that he
could do was to suggest the improbability of the commission of the abductions considering that they occurred in a public place and
in broad daylight and the complainant could have shouted for help or called the attention of the people around her. The suggestion is
not persuasive because it fails to consider the unrebutted testimony of Antonette that he poked a knife on her side and threatened to
kill her if she would run away or shout for help. He even forgot to comment on the evidence for the rapes. This studied silence on the
rapes amounts to an admission of the sexual congresses.

Our own evaluation of the evidence not only fully supports the finding of the trial court that the accused had carnal knowledge of the
complainant through force and intimidation on 20 October 1992 and 4 November 1992, but discloses, as well, proof beyond
reasonable doubt of the commission of forcible abduction as a means for the commission of the rapes.

The testimony of the complainant, although uncorroborated, is credible and convinces us with moral certainty of the accused's guilt.
No improper or ulterior motive was shown why she would falsely testify against the accused, who was her neighbor. The latter
categorically admitted on cross-examination that he knew no reason why the complainant would charge him of rape and publicly
make known the fact.34 It is settled that where there is no evidence and nothing to indicate that the principal witness for the
prosecution was actuated by improper motive, the presumption is that the said witness was not so actuated and his testimony is
entitled to full faith and credit.35

The complainant's conduct in these cases further convinces us that she told the truth and filed these cases solely to obtain justice.
She reported the commission of the crime to the police authorities, allowed an examination of her private parts, and thereafter
suffered the ordeal of a public trial. It is difficult to believe that an unmarried woman, like her, would tell a story of defloration, allow
the examination of her private parts, and thereafter permit herself to be the subject of a public trial unless she were motivated by an
honest desire to seek justice. No young decent Filipina would publicly admit that she had been criminally abused and ravished
unless that is the truth; it is her natural instinct to protect her honor.36

The accused's denial of sexual intercourse does not deserve even a passing glance. Denial is an inherently weak defense and
cannot prevail over the positive and credible testimony of the complainant.37

Moreover, the accused failed to deny the testimony of Antonette that he had offered to pay P40,000.00 to amicably settle these
cases. Such an offer was an implied admission of guilt 38 pursuant to the second paragraph of Section 27, Rule 130 of the Revised
Rules of Court, which reads in part as follows:

In criminal cases, except those involving quasi-offenses (criminal negligence) or those allowed by law to be compromised,
an offer of compromise by the accused may be received in evidence as an implied admission of guilt.

In his third assigned error, the accused faults the trial court for its failure to consider the testimony of Dr. Sombilon that the "old-
healed complete laceration" in Antonette's hymen was already three months old when he conducted the examination on 11
November 1992. He then asseverates that inasmuch as the laceration was inflicted long before 20 October 1992 and 4 November
1992 when the crimes in question were committed, he could not have caused it.

We disagree. That the laceration was three months old does not prove that the accused had no carnal knowledge of Antonette on 20
October and
4 November 1992. Antonette established with moral certainty that the accused had raped her on those dates. Any prior sexual
intercourse which could have resulted in the hymenal laceration is irrelevant in these cases, for virginity is not an element of rape
under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code.39

Moreover, the prosecution cannot be said to have relied on the old-healed hymenal laceration as evidence of rape. It primarily relied
on the testimony of the complainant which, standing alone and even without the medical examination, was sufficient to convict.
A medical examination is not indispensable in a prosecution for rape. Otherwise, grave and irreparable injustice would be inflicted
upon hapless victims if the crime were committed in remote areas where no doctor could conduct a medical examination. So too, if
the victim would not submit to it because what immediately pre-occupied her mind after the traumatic experience was not
necessarily the filing of a complaint but rather the fear of what the assailant would further inflict upon her should she reveal his
criminal act, or the embarrassment and humiliation accompanying a public disclosure of the ignominy and dishonor she had suffered
in the hands of her tormentor.40

We cannot sustain the finding of the trial court that although the complainant was brought against her will to the Queensland Motel in
the first case and to Cavite in the second case, the prosecution failed to prove the element of lewd designs. Lewd design means
unchaste design.41 We find that in both cases the principal purpose of the accused was to rape the complainant and that her
abduction was only a means to commit the rape. Rape, under any clime and civilization, will always be unchaste.42 Thus, the
abduction of the complainant was obviously with lewd designs.

Accordingly, the accused should be held liable for the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape defined and penalized under
Article 342 (forcible abduction) and Article 335 (rape) of the Revised Penal Code. Pursuant to Article 48 of the said Code, the
penalty for the more serious crime, which is rape, shall be imposed in its maximum period. Since the two rapes were committed with
a deadly weapon, the penalty is reclusion perpetua to death pursuant to the third paragraph of Article 335, to be imposed in its
maximum period — death. But since these cases were committed when the imposition of the death penalty was still prohibited under
the Constitution,43 only reclusion perpetua may be imposed.

Also, pursuant to the current policy of this Court, moral damages should be awarded in each case and increased from P25,000.00 to
P40,000.00.

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED, and the decision of Branch 116 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City in
Criminal Cases
Nos. 92-1845 end 92-1846 is modified as above indicated. As modified, accused AURELIO DELOVINO is hereby found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape, as defined and penalized under Article 342 and
Article 335, respectively, of the Revised Penal Code, in each of the said cases, and pursuant to Article 48 thereof, he is in each case
hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify complainant Antonette Modesto the sum of
P40,000.00 as moral damages.

Costs against the accused.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 189301 December 15, 2010

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
JOSE PEPITO D. COMBATE a.k.a. "PEPING," Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

The Case

This is an appeal from the January 30, 2008 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CEB CR-H.C. No. 00294 entitled
People of the Philippines v. Jose Pepito D. Combante a.k.a. "Peping," which affirmed with modification the July 2, 2003 Decision 2 in
Criminal Case Nos. 95-17070 & 95-17071 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 50 in Bacolod City.

Accused-appellant Jose Pepito D. Combate stands convicted of the crime of Murder and Homicide, as defined and penalized under
Articles 248 and 249 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), respectively. He was sentenced to suffer the penalties of reclusion temporal
and reclusion perpetua.

The Facts

The charge against accused-appellant stemmed from two Informations:

Criminal Case No. 95-17070

That on or about 16th day of March, 1995, in the Municipality of Murcia, Province of Negros Occidental, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a firearm, with treachery, with intent to kill and taking
advantage of nighttime, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot on EDMUND PRAYCO y
OSABEL, thereby inflicting gunshot wounds upon the body of the latter which caused the death of the said victim.

Contrary to law.3

Criminal Case No. 95-17071

That on or about 16th day of March, 1995, in the Municipality of Murcia, Province of Negros Occidental, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a firearm, with treachery, with intent to kill and taking
advantage of nighttime, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot on LEOPOLDO GUIRO, JR.
y PEREZ alias "Nene" thereby inflicting gunshot wounds upon the body of the latter which caused the death of the said victim.

Contrary to law.4
On November 28, 2001, the trial court ordered the consolidation of the two cases. When arraigned with assistance of counsel,
accused-appellant pleaded "not guilty" to both charges. Thereafter, a joint trial ensued.

During the trial, the prosecution offered the testimonies of Shenette Guiro, the wife of the deceased victim Leopoldo Guiro; Jose
Tomaro; Rebecca Montino Apdo; Senior Police Officer 1 (SPO1) Rolando Salamisan; Inspector Jose Labuyo; Police Inspector
William Senoron; PO1 Rommel Pregil; Dr. Jimmy Nadal; and Dr. Emmanuel Bando. On the other hand, the defense presented as its
witnesses Magno Montinola and accused-appellant.

The Prosecution’s Version of Facts

On March 16, 1995, at around 9 o’clock in the evening, Tomaro parked his passenger jeepney at the garage of Leopoldo’s mother,
Patria Guiro, located at Purok 2, Barangay Minoyan in Murcia, Negros Occidental. He then proceeded to the house of Leopoldo
where he usually sleeps after driving the jeepney owned by Leopoldo’s parents.

Upon entering the gate, Tomaro met Leopoldo and Edmund Prayco, who were on their way out. Leopoldo invited him to join them in
drinking liquor but he declined saying he was already tired. He continued on his way and was about to ascend the stairs when he
heard a gunshot. He rushed back to the road and there he saw accused-appellant pointing a gun at the fallen Leopoldo. When
Edmund was about to intervene, accused-appellant also shot Edmund at a very close range. After shooting Edmund, accused-
appellant turned his attention back to Leopoldo and shot him for a second time.

Tomaro then rushed to help Leopoldo and pleaded for his life. Instead of heeding his plea, accused-appellant pointed his gun
towards Tomaro and pulled the trigger but the gun did not fire. At that instant, Tomaro jumped on accused-appellant and was able to
grab the gun. Tomaro tried to shoot accused-appellant but the gun still did not fire. Hastily, accused-appellant fled to the direction of
Bacolod City.

Leopoldo and Edmund were later brought to the Bacolod Sanitarium and Hospital. Edmund was declared dead on arrival, while
Leopoldo died the following day.

Version of the Defense

Accused-appellant’s defense, on the other hand, was confined to a denial, to wit:

In the evening of March 16, 1995, accused-appellant was in his house drinking liquor when Montinola, a close friend, arrived to fetch
him. He was told to report to the barangay hall and to render duty as a tanod. Before leaving, Montinola also partook of a small
quantity of liquor.

On their way to the barangay hall, they passed by the house of Leopoldo, who was drinking liquor by the side of the street fronting
his house, along with Tomaro, Edmund, and someone else who accused-appellant could not identify. He and Montinola were
walking on the left side of the street going towards the direction of the Mambucal Resort, while Leopoldo and his group were on the
right side. Accused-appellant then extended a greeting to Leopoldo, who responded with a sarcastic remark. Accused-appellant and
Montinola ignored the rudeness thrown their way and just continued walking.

They, however, soon noticed Leopoldo crossing the street and started to follow them. Edmund likewise also followed them but on
the other side of the street. Suddenly, accused-appellant saw Leopoldo pull something out from his waist. He then heard a gunshot
and saw Leopoldo fall to the ground. He pushed Montinola aside and they ran away.

After a few moments, he heard more gunshots coming from the direction of where Leopoldo and his group were situated. He was
stricken with fear so he went home. Later, he learned that he was the suspect in the killing of Leopoldo and Edmundo. Thus, to
avoid trouble, he fled to Victorias City, Negros Occidental where he was arrested by the Murcia police on October 13, 2001.

The story of accused-appellant was corroborated by Montinola.

Ruling of the Trial Court

After trial, the RTC convicted accused-appellant. The dispositive portion of its July 2, 2003 Decision reads:

FOR ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused Jose Combate, Jr. y Dallarte alias Peping, GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of HOMICIDE in Criminal Case NO. 95-17071 as Principal thereof. There being no modifying
circumstances, the accused is sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION TEMPORAL in its medium period. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the accused shall serve a prison term of Eight (8) Years and One (1) Day of Prision Mayor to Fifteen
(15) years of Reclusion Temporal.

By way of civil liability, the accused is condemned to pay the heirs of the late Leopoldo Guiro the following:

1. The sum of P50,000.00 as death indemnity.

2. The sum of P932,712.00 as compensatory damages and;

3. The sum of P56,319.59 as reimbursement for the burial expenses.

In addition, the accused is ordered to pay Shenette Guiro the sum of P50,000.00 as moral damages.

The accused is also declared GUILTY of MURDER for the death of Edmund Prayco as charged in the Information in Criminal Case
No. 95-17070 as Principal thereof. There being no modifying circumstances, the accused is sentenced to suffer the penalty of
RECLUSION PERPETUA. He is condemned to pay the heirs of the late Edmund Prayco the sum of P50,000.00 as death indemnity
and the sum of P30,000.00 as compensatory damages. 5

Ruling of the Appellate Court

On January 30, 2008, the CA affirmed the judgment of the lower court and modified the award of damages. The dispositive portion
of the CA Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Regional Trial court, Branch 50 of Bacolod City dated 2 July 200[3] is
AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATIONS. The award of compensatory damages in both cases is deleted, and in lieu thereof, exemplary
damages of P25,000.00 is awarded to the heirs of Leopoldo Guiro and another P25,000.00 to the heirs of Edmund Prayco. In all
other respects, the assailed decision is affirmed.

SO ORDERED.6

The Issue

Hence, this appeal is before us, with accused-appellant maintaining that the trial court erred in convicting him of the crimes of
homicide and murder, despite the fact that his guilt was not proved beyond reasonable doubt.

The Court’s Ruling

We sustain accused-appellant’s conviction.

Factual findings of the trial court should be respected

In his Brief, accused-appellant says that the trial court failed to consider several inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses. First, as to Tomaro, who directly implicated accused-appellant, his testimony was unsubstantiated and did not conform to
the physical evidence. According to Tomaro, Edmund was shot at close range yet no powder burns were found around the entry
wound. Second, as to the testimony of Shenette Guiro, accused-appellant harps on the fact that she never mentioned Tomaro being
present at the scene of the crime and that she only heard one gunshot while the other witnesses heard three or four. Lastly, as to
the testimony of SPO1 Salamisan, accused-appellant points out that SPO1 Salamisan testified that he only saw one spot of blood
when there were two victims.

To accused-appellant, the inconsistencies thus described erode the credibility of the witnesses when taken as a whole.

We do not agree.

Time-tested is the doctrine that the trial court’s assessment of the credibility of a witness is entitled to great weight, sometimes even
with finality.7 The Supreme Court will not interfere with that assessment, absent any indication that the lower court has overlooked
some material facts or gravely abused its discretion.8

Complementing the above doctrine is the equally established rule that minor and insignificant inconsistencies in the testimony tend
to bolster, rather than weaken, the credibility of witnesses, for they show that the testimony is not contrived or rehearsed. 9 As the
Court put it in People v. Cristobal, "Trivial inconsistencies do not rock the pedestal upon which the credibility of the witness rests, but
enhances credibility as they manifest spontaneity and lack of scheming."10

A careful review of the records shows that the RTC, as well as the CA, committed no reversible error when it gave credence to the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, as opposed to accused-appellant’s bare denials.

Moreover, the testimony of a witness must be considered in its entirety and not merely on its truncated parts. The technique in
deciphering a testimony is not to consider only its isolated parts and anchor a conclusion on the basis of said parts. In ascertaining
the facts established by witnesses, everything stated by them on direct, cross, and redirect examinations must be calibrated and
considered.11 It must be stressed in this regard that facts imperfectly or erroneously stated in an answer to one question may be
supplied or explained as qualified by the answer to other question. The principle falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus is not strictly
applied to this jurisdiction.12 As explained in People v. Osias:

It is perfectly reasonable to believe the testimony of a witness with respect to some facts and disbelieve it with respect to other facts.
And it has been aptly said that even when witnesses are found to have deliberately falsified in some material particulars, it is not
required that the whole of their uncorroborated testimony be rejected but such portions thereof deemed worthy of belief
may be credited.

The primordial consideration is that the witness was present at the scene of the crime and that he positively identified [the
accused] as one of the perpetrators of the crime charged x x x.13 (Emphasis supplied.)

In this case, we agree with the trial court that the alleged inconsistencies merely refer to minor details which do not affect the
witnesses’ credibility. In disregarding the alleged inconsistent statements, the trial court explained:

The inconsistencies are more imagined than real. The inconsistencies, like the ownership of the passenger jeepney, whether said
jeepney is owned by Guiro or his mother, are so trivial and does not at all affect credibility.

The accused also makes much fuss about the fact that Shenette Guiro heard only one (1) shot while the other prosecution
witnesses as well as the accused and his witness Magno Montinola, heard three (3) to four (4) shots. The accused conveniently
forgot that Shenette Guiro was asleep when the shooting took place. She was awakened by the shot she heard and that shot might
have been the last shot.
The accused flays the testimony of Jose Tomaro as incredible and unbelievable when the said witness testified that he ran and
cradled Guiro in his arms after the latter was shot. The accused asserts that it is unnatural for a person to unnecessarily expose
himself to danger.

The argument need not detain the Court. It is a settled rule on evidence that witnesses to a crime react in different ways. (Pp. vs.
Paynor, 261 SCRA 615).

"There is no standard behavior when one is considered with a strange, startling or frightening situation." (Pp. v. De Leon, 262 SCRA
445)

Moreover, Jose Tomaro has no quarrel with the accused. He has every reason to expect that he will not be assaulted as he was not
making any aggressive move against him.14

Likewise, we are not persuaded as to the alleged inconsistency of Tamaro’s testimony that Edmund was shot at close range but the
physical evidence revealed that there were no powder burns around the entry wounds. In his testimony, Tamaro described the
incident as follows:

COURT:

Q: Now according to your testimony, the next time around, Combate was pointing his gun at Prayco?

WITNESS

A: Yes, sir.

Q: He pointed his gun to Prayco and fired his gun. At the time he fired his gun, how far was he from Prayco?

COURT

Witness indicating a very short distance where the Court Interpreter is situated which is less than (1) meter away.15 (Emphasis
supplied.)

As aptly held by the CA, such testimony is in fact consistent with the lack of powder burns on Edmund’s body, viz:

The distance from which a shot is fired affects the nature and extent of the injury caused on the victim. In close range fire, the injury
is not only due to the missile but also due to the pressure of the expanded gases, flame and other solid products of combustion. In
contrast, distant fire usually produces the characteristic effect of the bullet alone. A shot fired from a distance of more than 60 cm or
about two (2) feet does not produce the burning, smudging or tattooing typically present in loose contact or near fire, short range fire
and medium range fire.

Powder burns is a term commonly used by physicians whenever there is blackening of the margin at the entrance of the gunshot
wound. The blackening is due to smoke smudging, gunpowder tattooing and, to a certain extent, burning of the wound margin.

In this case, the fact that there were no powder burns found in EDMUND’s body indicates that the shots were fired at a distance of
more than two (2) feet which is consistent with Jose Tomaro’s testimony that Edmund was shot at about less than 1 meter away
from appellant.16

Defense of denial cannot prevail over positive identification

For his defense, accused-appellant wants this Court to believe his innocence and offers his version of the facts wherein he did not
commit the crime. This Court is not persuaded.

Categorical and consistent positive identification, absent any showing of ill motive on the part of the eyewitness testifying on the
matter, prevails over the defense of denial.17Accused-appellant was positively and categorically identified by the witnesses. They
have no reason to perjure and accused-appellant was unable to prove that the prosecution witnesses were moved by any
consideration other than to see that justice is done. Thus, the presumption that their testimonies were not moved by any ill will and
bias stands, and, therefore, their testimonies are entitled to full faith and credit.18

Lest it be overlooked, accused-appellant fled to Victorias City, Negros Occidental right after the incident, an act that is evidence of
his guilt. It is well-established that the flight of an accused is competent evidence to indicate his guilt; and flight, when unexplained,
is a circumstance from which an inference of guilt may be drawn. 19 Indeed, the wicked flee when no man pursueth, but the innocent
are as bold as lion.20

Award of damages

This Court will now endeavor to end, once and for all, the confusion as to the proper award of damages in criminal cases where the
imposable penalty for the crime is reclusion perpetua or death. As a rule, the Court awards three kinds of damages in these types of
criminal cases: civil indemnity and moral and exemplary damages. We shall discuss all three.

First, civil indemnity ex delicto is the indemnity authorized in our criminal law for the offended party, in the amount authorized by the
prevailing judicial policy and apart from other proven actual damages, which itself is equivalent to actual or compensatory damages
in civil law.21 This award stems from Art. 100 of the RPC which states, "Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly
liable."
Civil liability ex delicto may come in the form of restitution, reparation, and indemnification. 22 Restitution is defined as the
compensation for loss; it is full or partial compensation paid by a criminal to a victim ordered as part of a criminal sentence or as a
condition for probation.23 Likewise, reparation and indemnification are similarly defined as the compensation for an injury, wrong,
loss, or damage sustained.24 Clearly, all of these correspond to actual or compensatory damages defined under the Civil Code. 25

The other kinds of damages, i.e., moral and exemplary or corrective damages, 26 have altogether different jural foundations.

The second type of damages the Court awards are moral damages, which are also compensatory in nature. Del Mundo v. Court of
Appeals explained the nature and purpose of moral damages, viz:

Moral damages, upon the other hand, may be awarded to compensate one for manifold injuries such as physical suffering, mental
anguish, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings and social humiliation. These damages must be understood to
be in the concept of grants, not punitive or corrective in nature, calculated to compensate the claimant for the injury
suffered. Although incapable of exactness and no proof of pecuniary loss is necessary in order that moral damages may be
awarded, the amount of indemnity being left to the discretion of the court, it is imperative, nevertheless, that (1) injury must have
been suffered by the claimant, and (2) such injury must have sprung from any of the cases expressed in Article 2219 27 and Article
222028 of the Civil Code. (Emphasis supplied.)

Similarly, in American jurisprudence, moral damages are treated as "compensatory damages awarded for mental pain and suffering
or mental anguish resulting from a wrong."29 They may also be considered and allowed "for resulting pain and suffering, and for
humiliation, indignity, and vexation suffered by the plaintiff as result of his or her assailant’s conduct, as well as the factors of
provocation, the reasonableness of the force used, the attendant humiliating circumstances, the sex of the victim, [and] mental
distress."30

The rationale for awarding moral damages has been explained in Lambert v. Heirs of Rey Castillon: "[T]he award of moral damages
is aimed at a restoration, within the limits possible, of the spiritual status quo ante; and therefore, it must be proportionate to the
suffering inflicted."31

And lastly, the Court awards exemplary damages as provided for in Arts. 2229 and 2230 of the Civil Code, viz:

Art. 2229. Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed, by way of example or correction for the public good, in addition to the
moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.

Art. 2230. In criminal offenses, exemplary damages as a part of the civil liability may be imposed when the crime was committed with
one or more aggravating circumstances. Such damages are separate and distinct from fines and shall be paid to the offended party.

Clearly, as a general rule, exemplary damages are only imposed in criminal offenses when the crime was committed with one or
more aggravating circumstances, be they generic or qualifying. However, there have been instances wherein exemplary damages
were awarded despite the lack of an aggravating circumstance. This led the Court to clarify this confusion in People v. Dalisay,
where it categorically stated that exemplary damages may be awarded, not only in the presence of an aggravating
circumstance, but also where the circumstances of the case show the highly reprehensible or outrageous conduct of the
offender, to wit:

Prior to the effectivity of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, courts generally awarded exemplary damages in criminal cases
when an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying, had been proven to have attended the commission of the crime,
even if the same was not alleged in the information. This is in accordance with the aforesaid Article 2230. However, with the
promulgation of the Revised Rules, courts no longer consider the aggravating circumstances not alleged and proven in the
determination of the penalty and in the award of damages. Thus, even if an aggravating circumstance has been proven, but was not
alleged, courts will not award exemplary damages. x x x

xxxx

Nevertheless, People v. Catubig laid down the principle that courts may still award exemplary damages based on the
aforementioned Article 2230, even if the aggravating circumstance has not been alleged, so long as it has been proven, in criminal
cases instituted before the effectivity of the Revised Rules which remained pending thereafter. Catubig reasoned that the retroactive
application of the Revised Rules should not adversely affect the vested rights of the private offended party.

Thus, we find, in our body of jurisprudence, criminal cases, especially those involving rape, dichotomized: one awarding exemplary
damages, even if an aggravating circumstance attending the commission of the crime had not been sufficiently alleged but was
consequently proven in the light of Catubig; and another awarding exemplary damages only if an aggravating circumstance has both
been alleged and proven following the Revised Rules. Among those in the first set are People v. Laciste, People v. Victor, People v.
Orilla, People v. Calongui, People v. Magbanua, People of the Philippines v. Heracleo Abello y Fortada, People of the Philippines v.
Jaime Cadag Jimenez, and People of the Philippines v. Julio Manalili. And in the second set are People v. Llave, People of the
Philippines v. Dante Gragasin y Par, and People of the Philippines v. Edwin Mejia. Again, the difference between the two sets rests
on when the criminal case was instituted, either before or after the effectivity of the Revised Rules.

xxxx

Nevertheless, by focusing only on Article 2230 as the legal basis for the grant of exemplary damages — taking into account simply
the attendance of an aggravating circumstance in the commission of a crime, courts have lost sight of the very reason why
exemplary damages are awarded. Catubig is enlightening on this point, thus —

Also known as "punitive" or "vindictive" damages, exemplary or corrective damages are intended to serve as a deterrent
to serious wrong doings, and as a vindication of undue sufferings and wanton invasion of the rights of an injured or a
punishment for those guilty of outrageous conduct. These terms are generally, but not always, used interchangeably. In
common law, there is preference in the use of exemplary damages when the award is to account for injury to feelings and
for the sense of indignity and humiliation suffered by a person as a result of an injury that has been maliciously and
wantonly inflicted, the theory being that there should be compensation for the hurt caused by the highly reprehensible
conduct of the defendant — associated with such circumstances as willfulness, wantonness, malice, gross negligence or
recklessness, oppression, insult or fraud or gross fraud — that intensifies the injury. The terms punitive or vindictive
damages are often used to refer to those species of damages that may be awarded against a person to punish him for his
outrageous conduct. In either case, these damages are intended in good measure to deter the wrongdoer and others like
him from similar conduct in the future.

Being corrective in nature, exemplary damages, therefore, can be awarded, not only in the presence of an aggravating
circumstance, but also where the circumstances of the case show the highly reprehensible or outrageous conduct of the offender. In
much the same way as Article 2230 prescribes an instance when exemplary damages may be awarded, Article 2229, the main
provision, lays down the very basis of the award. Thus, in People v. Matrimonio, the Court imposed exemplary damages to deter
other fathers with perverse tendencies or aberrant sexual behavior from sexually abusing their own daughters. Also, in People v.
Cristobal, the Court awarded exemplary damages on account of the moral corruption, perversity and wickedness of the accused in
sexually assaulting a pregnant married woman. Recently, in People of the Philippines v. Cristino Cañada, People of the Philippines
v. Pepito Neverio and The People of the Philippines v. Lorenzo Layco, Sr., the Court awarded exemplary damages to set a public
example, to serve as deterrent to elders who abuse and corrupt the youth, and to protect the latter from sexual abuse.

It must be noted that, in the said cases, the Court used as basis Article 2229, rather than Article 2230, to justify the award of
exemplary damages. Indeed, to borrow Justice Carpio Morales’ words in her separate opinion in People of the Philippines v. Dante
Gragasin y Par, "[t]he application of Article 2230 of the Civil Code strictissimi juris in such cases, as in the present one, defeats the
underlying public policy behind the award of exemplary damages — to set a public example or correction for the public good." 32

Before awarding any of the above-mentioned damages, the Court, however, must first consider the penalty imposed by law. Under
Republic Act No. (RA) 7659 or An Act to Impose the Death Penalty on Certain Heinous Crimes, Amending for that Purpose the
Revised Penal Laws, and for Other Purposes, certain crimes under the RPC and special penal laws were amended to impose the
penalty of death under certain circumstances.

For a full appreciation of the award on damages, it is imperative that a thorough discussion of RA 7659 be undertaken. Each crime
will be discussed as well as the proper amount of damages for each crime.

Under RA 7659, the following crimes are punishable by reclusion perpetua: piracy in general, 33 mutiny on the high seas,34 and
simple rape.35

For the following crimes, RA 7659 has imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death: qualified piracy; 36qualified bribery under
certain circumstances;37 parricide;38 murder;39 infanticide, except when committed by the mother of the child for the purpose of
concealing her dishonor or either of the maternal grandparents for the same purpose;40 kidnapping and serious illegal detention
under certain circumstances;41 robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons under certain circumstances; 42 destructive
arson, except when death results as a consequence of the commission of any of the acts penalized under the article; 43 attempted or
frustrated rape, when a homicide is committed by reason or on occasion thereof; plunder;44 and carnapping, when the driver or
occupant of the carnapped motor vehicle is killed or raped in the course of the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion
thereof.45

RA 7659 imposes the penalty of death on the following crimes:

(a) In qualified bribery, when it is the public officer who asks or demands the gift or present.

(b) In kidnapping and serious illegal detention: (i) when the kidnapping or detention was committed for the purpose of
extorting ransom from the victim or any other person; (ii) when the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the
detention; (iii) when the victim is raped, subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts.

(c) In destructive arson, when as a consequence of the commission of any of the acts penalized under Article 320, death
results.

(d) In rape: (i) when by reason or on occasion of the rape, the victim becomes insane or homicide is committed; (ii) when
committed with any of the following attendant circumstances: (1) when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and
the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree,
or the common-law-spouse of the parent of the victim; (2) when the victim is under the custody of the police or military
authorities; (3) when the rape is committed in full view of the husband, parent, any of the children or other relatives within
the third degree of consanguinity; (4) when the victim is a religious or a child below seven years old; (5) when the offender
knows that he is afflicted with Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) disease; (6) when committed by any member
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the Philippine National Police or any law enforcement agency; and (7) when by
reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has suffered permanent physical mutilation.

Nevertheless, all these must be taken in relation to Art. 63 of the RPC, which provides:

Article 63. Rules for the application of indivisible penalties. - In all cases in which the law prescribes a single indivisible penalty, it
shall be applied by the courts regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances that may have attended the commission of
the deed.

In all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, the following rules shall be observed in the
application thereof:

1. When in the commission of the deed there is present only one aggravating circumstance, the greater penalty shall be
applied.

2. When there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances in the commission of the deed, the lesser penalty shall
be applied.
 3. When the commission of the act is attended by some mitigating circumstance and there is no aggravating circumstance,
the lesser penalty shall be applied.

4. When both mitigating and aggravating circumstances attended the commission of the act, the courts shall reasonably
allow them to offset one another in consideration of their number and importance, for the purpose of applying the penalty in
accordance with the preceding rules, according to the result of such compensation.

Thus, in order to impose the proper penalty, especially in cases of indivisible penalties, the court has the duty to ascertain the
presence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances. Accordingly, in crimes where the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua
to death, the court can impose either reclusion perpetua or death, depending on the mitigating or aggravating circumstances
present.

But with the enactment of Republic Act No. (RA) 9346 or An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines, the
imposition of death penalty is now prohibited. It provides that in lieu of the death penalty, the penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be
imposed when the law violated makes use of the nomenclature of the penalties of the RPC.46

As a result, courts now cannot impose the penalty of death. Instead, they have to impose reclusion perpetua. Despite this, the
principal consideration for the award of damages, following the ruling in People v. Salome 47 and People v. Quiachon,48 is "the
penalty provided by law or imposable for the offense because of its heinousness, not the public penalty actually imposed on the
offender."49

When the circumstances surrounding the crime would justify the imposition of the penalty of death were it not for RA 9346, the Court
has ruled, as early as July 9, 1998 in People v. Victor,50 that the award of civil indemnity for the crime of rape when punishable by
death should be PhP 75,000. We reasoned that "[t]his is not only a reaction to the apathetic societal perception of the penal law and
the financial fluctuations over time, but also an expression of the displeasure of the Court over the incidence of heinous crimes
against chastity."51 Such reasoning also applies to all heinous crimes found in RA 7659.

In addition to this, the Court likewise awards moral damages. In People v. Arizapa, 52 PhP 50,000 was awarded as moral damages
without need of pleading or proving them, for in rape cases, it is recognized that the victim’s injury is concomitant with and
necessarily results from the odious crime of rape to warrant per se the award of moral damages. 53 Subsequently, the amount was
increased to PhP 75,000 in People v. Soriano.54

As to exemplary damages, existing jurisprudence has pegged its award at PhP 30,000, 55 despite the lack of any aggravating
circumstance. The reason, as previously discussed, is to deter similar conduct and to serve as an example for public good.

Essentially, despite the fact that the death penalty cannot be imposed because of RA 9346, the imposable penalty as provided by
the law for the crime, such as those found in RA 7569, must be used as the basis for awarding damages and not the actual penalty
imposed.

On the other hand, when the circumstances surrounding the crime call for the imposition of reclusion perpetua only, the Court has
ruled that the proper amounts should be PhP 50,000 as civil indemnity, PhP 50,000 as moral damages, and PhP 30,000 as
exemplary damages.56lavvphi1

Accordingly, in Criminal Case Nos. 95-17070 and 95-17071, the exemplary damages awarded by the CA in the amount of PhP
25,000 should be increased to PhP 30,000.00 in line with prevailing jurisprudence.

Moreover, the deletion of the award of compensatory damages for unearned income by the CA in Criminal Case No. 95-17071 is
proper. This Court pronounced in People v. Mallari: 57

The rule is that documentary evidence should be presented to substantiate a claim for damages for loss of earning capacity. By way
of exception, damages therefore may be awarded despite the absence of documentary evidence provided that there is testimony
that the victim was either (1) self-employed earning less than the minimum wage under current labor laws, and judicial notice may
be taken of the fact that in the victim’s line of work no documentary evidence is available; or (2) employed as a daily-wage worker
earning less than the minimum wage under current labor laws.

In this case, neither of the exemption applies. The earnings of Leopoldo at the time of his death were above minimum wage set by
labor laws in his respective place at the time of his death.58 As testified to by his wife, Shenette Guiro, Leopoldo was earning
between PhP 200 to PhP 300 per day. This is more than minimum wage. Hence, absent any documentary evidence, the award of
compensatory damages must be deleted.

Likewise, the deletion of the award of compensatory damages by the CA in Criminal Case No. 95-17070 is proper for lack of any
basis. The trial court did not discuss why it awarded compensatory damages to the heirs of Edmund.

Interest on damages

When death occurs due to a crime, the following may be recovered: (1) civil indemnity ex delicto for the death of the victim; (2) actual
or compensatory damages; (3) moral damages; (4) exemplary damages; (5) attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation; and
(6) interest, in proper cases.59 In People v. Tubongbanua,60 interest at the rate of six percent (6%) was ordered to be applied on
the award of damages. This rule would be subsequently applied by the Court in several cases such as Mendoza v. People, 61 People
v. Buban,62 People v. Guevarra,63 and People v. Regalario.64 Thus, we likewise adopt this rule in the instant case. Interest of six
percent (6%) per annum should be imposed on the award of civil indemnity and all damages, i.e., actual or compensatory damages,
moral damages and exemplary damages, from the date of finality of judgment until fully paid.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The CA Decision in CA-G.R. CEB CR-H.C. No. 00294 finding accused-appellant Jose Pepito
D. Combate guilty of the crimes charged is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. As modified, the ruling of the trial court should read as
follows:
FOR ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused Jose Combate, Jr. y Dallarte alias Peping, GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of HOMICIDE in Criminal Case NO. 95-17071 as Principal thereof. There being no modifying
circumstances, the accused is sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION TEMPORAL in its medium period. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the accused shall serve a prison term of Eight (8) Years and One (1) Day of Prision Mayor to Fifteen
(15) years of Reclusion Temporal.1avvphi1

By way of civil liability, the accused is condemned to pay the heirs of the late Leopoldo Guiro the following:

1. The sum of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity; and

2. The sum of P56,319.59 as reimbursement for the burial expenses.

In addition, the accused is ordered to pay Shenette Guiro the sum of P50,000.00 as moral damages and P30,000.00 as exemplary
damages.

The accused is also declared GUILTY of MURDER for the death of Edmund Prayco as charged in the Information in Criminal Case
No. 95-17070 as Principal thereof. There being no modifying circumstances, the accused is sentenced to suffer the penalty of
RECLUSION PERPETUA. He is condemned to pay the heirs of the late Edmund Prayco the sum of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity,
P50,000.00 as moral damages and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.

Finally, interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum shall be applied to the award of civil indemnity, moral damages and
exemplary damages from the finality of judgment until fully paid in the two (2) aforementioned criminal cases.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 110554 February 19, 1999

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ROMY SAGUN @ POKPOK, accused-appellant.

QUISUMBING, J.:

Accused-appellant Romy Sagun @ Pokpok assails the decision 1 dated April 23, 1993, of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 32, 2 of
Cabarroguis, Quirino, in Criminal Case No. 891, finding him guilty of the crime of rape, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua, and to pay private complainant the amount of P50,000.00 as damages without subsidiary imprisonment.

On September 25, 1991, the Provincial Prosecutor, Anthony A. Fox, filed with the court a quo an information,3charging accused-
appellant of the crime of rape, allegedly committed as follows:

That on or about 12:00 o'clock midnight on November 5, 1990, in Barangay Bonifacio, Municipality of Diffun,
Province of Quirino, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused ROMY SAGUN alias
POKPOK, armed with a bolo, by means of force and intimidation and lewd design, did then and there there (sic)
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with MARITESS A. MARZO against her will.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

During arraignment on June 25, 1992, accused-appellant assisted by his counsel, 4 entered a plea of not guilty. Thereafter, trial of
the case ensued.

The evidence for the prosecution, culled from the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, succinctly synthesized in the Appellee's
Brief submitted by the Office of the Solicitor General, established the following facts:

In the evening of November 5, 1990, Maritess Marzo, single and a third year high school student, was asleep in
the room of her boarding house located at Bonifacio St., Diffun, Quirino (p. 2, tsn, July 9, 1992). Fronting said
boarding house and separated by a road is the house of Romy Sagun where he and his family reside (p. 3, tsn,
March 31, 1993).

At about midnight of November 5, 1990, Maritess was awakened by sounds of footsteps approaching her.
Maritess shouted but a man whom she recognized as Romy Sagun, her neighbor, poked his bolo at her head (p.
4, tsn, Aug. 11, 1992) and uttered, 'Do not shout or else I will kill you and tomorrow you will not be living any more'
(p. 5, supra). Then, Sagun shifted his bolo to the neck of Maritess, who was lying on her side, and started
removing her skirt and panty (pp. 7-8, supra). Sagun took off his pants and laid on top of Maritess (p. 10, supra);
opened her legs and inserted his organ into Maritess' (p. 12, supra) and started gyrating for about five minutes.
Maritess struggled and pushed Sagun but to no avail. Thereafter, Sagun stood up, put on his pants and left (p.
13, supra). Maritess felt that Sagun's male genital partly penetrated her's (p. 15, supra).

After Sagun left, Maritess woke up her boardmates and informed them that somebody entered the boarding house
but did not reveal that she was raped because of Sagun's death threat (p. 15, supra). The following morning,
however, Maritess informed her landlord, Rudy Agsalud that Sagun entered her room and sexually abused her.
Rudy Agsalud immediately reported the incident to the police authorities (p. 6, supra).

On November 6, 1990 (p. 9, tsn, Aug. 17, 1992), Maritess submitted herself to a medical examination. Dr. Moises
Lazaro, the examining physician, testifying on the results of his examination, pertinently declared as follows:
 Q - Doctor, you were saying that there was a partial penetration on the vagina. How many centimeters was the
deep of the penetration?

A - As I said from the opening to the hymen 1-1.5 cm. May be the tip of the penis penetrated the hymen but it did
not break the hymen. Because we have to consider the circumstance whether there is resistance or force . . .

Accused-appellant denied having committed said crime. His counter statement of the facts as tersely summarized by the trial court,
is as follows:

He knows Maritess Marzo, the complainant. She was boarding in the house of Mercedes Agsalud sometime in
November 1990. Student at the Quirino State College. Complainant's boarding house is about 45 meters from
their house. In the evening of November 5, 1990, he was in their house with his wife and children. Before 9:00
o'clock of the same evening, he had a drinking spree with his nephew. After consuming two bottles of beer grande,
he went to buy cigarette. On his way home, he noticed that the door of the boarding house of complainant was
opened. She was reviewing. His nephew at that time was already asleep. He entered the boarding house of the
complainant, sat down on the chair about four meters from her. Complainant inquired why he entered the house.
Told complainant that he just came for a visit because she is a neighbor. Because he was drunk, complainant had
to go upstairs. Complainant told him to leave the house or else she will report him to Mrs. Agsalud. With that
warning, he went home. He denied the testimony of the complainant to the effect that he threatened her with a
bolo, undressed her, removed her panty, mounted at her and had sexual intercourse with her. That there is no
truth about the testimony of the complainant because nothing had happened to her. That he does not know why
the complainant testified against him.

On cross examination, witness testified that he went to the boarding house of the complainant on the alleged night
of the incident after a drinking spree with his nephew. That it was only when he was already drunk that gave him
the idea of going to the boarding house of the complainant. At that time, he entered the boarding house,
complainant was reviewing, she was alone. He went near the complainant to talk to her being a neighbor. That he
used to go to the boarding house. He was asking complainant why she was reviewing at that late hour of the night.
He was seated near the door of the house while Maritess Marzo was reviewing in the sala of the house. That in
the first floor of the house, there are no rooms while the second floor, it has rooms.

That the drinking spree took place in his house. That after buying cigarette hed did not go home directly because
he dropped by at the boarding house of the complainant. He talked with the complainant. After he was warned that
she is going to report his coming in the house of Mrs. Agsalud, he left and that was the time he went home. He
told complainant that he was visiting her being a neighbor and sensing that she was mad, he left.

On clarificatory question of the court, accused testified that he knows that complainant was alone at that night, and
that he entered the house to talk with her considering that she is a neighbor. He entered the boarding house of the
complainant because he could not get his sleep that night. He just wanted to talk with the complainant. That he
entered the boarding house of Maritess Marzo past 9:00 o'clock that evening. That he does not know of any
reason why the complainant filed the case against him. Before November 5, 1990, he never visited Maritess
Marzo because she used to go home in their barangay except on November 5, 1990. That he did not have any
misunderstanding between Maritess Marzo and her parents before November 5, 1990 neither has he any
misunderstanding before November 5, 1990 with Mrs. Agsalud. That he left Quirino sometime on November 9,
1990 in order to have a driving job in Tondo, Manila because his former employer Engr. Valido went abroad. That
he came to know for the first time that he was charged for rape when his wife went to Manila before Christmas in
1990.6

In its decision dated May 10, 1993, the trial court found the accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape
as charged, and rendered judgment as follows:

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the guilt of the accused of the crime charged has been proven beyond
reasonable doubt. Accordingly, the accused is hereby sentenced to RECLUSION PERPETUAplus all the
accessory penalties provided for by law and to indemnity the complainant Maritess Marzo the amount of FIFTY
THOUSAND (P50,000.00) PESOS without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the cost.
The detention of the accused shall be fully credited in his favor.

SO ORDERED.7

Hence, this appeal from the lower court's decision. Significantly, accused-appellant makes only one assignment of error:

THAT THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND ERRED N GIVING CREDENCE
TO THE TESTIMONY OF THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT AND, ON THE BASIS THEREOF, IN CONVICTING
 THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIME CHARGED AGAINST HIM AND IN AWARDING DAMAGES
AGAINST HIM.

In his brief, accused-appellant contends that the trial court gravely erred in giving credence to the testimony of the complainant
because it is tainted with inconsistencies and improbabilities. Drawing our attention to the medico-legal findings, he avers that the
medical certificate issued by the physician who conducted the physical examination negates complainant's claim of carnal
knowledge as her hymen remains intact. He likewise bewails the fact that complainant's acts and deeds the day after the alleged
rape was committed are simply incredulous, as no rape victim could have easily recovered from the effects of such a traumatic
experience.

Thus, at the outset, it may be noted that accused-appellant places at issue the credibility of private complainant, upon whose
testimony he was convicted. Once again, however, we have to stress that the matter of assigning values to the testimony of
witnesses is best performed by the trial judge who, unlike appellate magistrates, can weigh such testimony in the light of the
demeanor, conduct and attitude of the witnesses presented at the trial. The trial judge is thereby placed in a vantage position to
discriminate finely between what is true and what is false 8 in the versions given by the witnesses of the opposing parties. Appellate
courts will not disturb the findings on the credibility, or lack of it, accorded by the trial court to the testimony of witnesses, unless it be
clearly shown that the trial court had overlooked or disregarded arbitrarily certain facts and circumstances of significance in the
case. 9 On this score, accused-appellant's plea that it was error to rely on the testimony of the complaining witness is less than
persuasive.

The crime of rape is essentially one committed in relative isolation or even secrecy, hence it is usually only the victim who can testify
with regard to the fact of the forced coitus. 10 As a result, conviction may be based justifiably on the plausible testimony of the private
complainant herself.

In the present case, we find the trial court's reliance on the testimony of the complainant based on solid evidentiary grounds. She
had no improper motive whatsoever, as admitted by accused-appellant himself, 11 to impute such a very serious offense to him. It is
accepted doctrine, that in the absence of evidence of improper motive on the part of the victim to falsely testify against the accused,
her testimony deserves credence. 12

The spontaneity of complainant's testimony could not be discredited by mere denials of accused-appellant. For an affirmative
testimony is far stronger than a negative testimony, especially so when it comes from the mouth of a credible witness. 13 Denial is an
intrinsically weak defense which must be buttressed by strong evidence of nonculpability to merit credence. 14 Furthermore, in the
light of the complainant's positive identification of accused-appellant as the perpetrator of the crime, the latter's defense of bare
denial must necessarily fail, as her positive testimony overrides his negative testimony. 15 Note that accused-appellant's own version
of a "friendly visit" he made to complainant in her boarding house on November 5, 1990, puts him squarely at the place and time of
the alleged offense.

As pointed out by the lower court, complainant testified in a direct and straightforward manner. She even demonstrated in court how
she was raped by accused-appellant. Complainant cried when she testified; her tears added poignancy to verity born out of human
nature and experience. 16 There was no grave abuse of discretion when the trial court considered the testimony of complainant
worthy of full faith and credit, thus:

. . . Complainant's detailed and straight forward narration and demonstration in court how she was abused and
raped bear the earmarks of truth. There is no showing that she was ill motivated in filing the case against the
accused.17

Moreover, it is simply inconceivable that complaining witness, a 17-year-old lass 18 from a remote barrio in Rafael Palma, Diffun,
Quirino, who was inexperienced with the ways of the world, would fabricate a story of defloration, allow an examination of her private
parts, and thereafter submit herself to the indignity of a public trail or endure a lifetime of ridicule, if she had not, in fact, been a victim
of rape and deeply motivated by a sincere desire to have the culprit apprehended and punished. As well said, when a woman says
she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape was committed.

As borne out by the evidence, complainant was forced to submit to appellant's bestial desires through violence and
intimidation. 19 When appellant pointed his bolo at complainant's neck, while he was removing her skirt and underwear, there was
indeed force and intimidation directly against her person. When he warned her not to shout unless she wanted to die, his evident
intentions to harm her could not be disputed. Even when appellant put down the bolo to remove his pants, the threat and intimidation
continued, since he could pick up the bolo anytime, to stab her. In any event, the significant consideration is that, the violence and
intimidation were continuous as to engender fear for the safety of her life and limb.

Intimidation is said to be addressed to the mind of the victim. It is subjective and its presence cannot be tested by any hard-and-fast
rule, but must be viewed in the light of the victim's perception and judgment at the time of the crime. 20 It may be of the moral kind,
such as the fear caused by threatening a woman with a knife. 21 It is enough that it produces fear--fear that if the victim does not
yield to the bestial lust of the accused, something would happen to her at the moment or thereafter, as when she is threatened with
death if she reports the incident. 22 Intimidation would also explain why sometimes there are no traces of struggle which would
indicate that the victim fought off her attacker. 23

Based on the record with the testimony of the complainant in the light of experience and common sense, we entertain no doubt that
appellant employed such amount of intimidation and violence sufficient to consummate rape. Appellant admittedly had been drinking
and the influence of alcohol on his conduct was undeniable. Moreover, according to the complainant, appellant is much stronger
than her. The physical superiority of appellant would show not only when his body violently held down complainant's but also when
her mind was subdued by his intimidating words and weapon at hand.

Moreover, though a man lays no hand on a woman, yet if by an array of physical forces, he so overpowers her mind that she does
not resist, or she ceases resistance through fear of greater harm, the consummation of the sexual act is recognized in jurisprudence
as rape. 24 Physical resistance need not be established in rape, when intimidation is exercised upon the victim and the latter submits
herself, against her will, to the rapist's embrace because of fear for life and personal safety. 25
Undoubtedly, in the present case, complainant could not have safely resisted accused-appellant's unchaste urge as the latter poked
the bolo he was holding first at her head, then at her neck. Threats, intimidation, violence, fear and terror all combined to suppress
the will to resist, kick, shout or struggle against the rapist. Thus, despite her lack of strong resistance or failure to shout in order to
attract the attention of her boardmates, who were just sleeping a few meters away in another room, she could not be considered as
giving consent to his attacker's bestial deed. Evidence shows that the appellant had undressed the complainant and forcibly taken
off her underwear while he was holding a bolo aimed at her neck, before he took off his pants and had sex with her. The
consummation of the offense of rape could not be any clearer.

Moreover, settled is the rule that for rape to exist, it is not necessary that the force or intimidation employed in accomplishing it be so
great or of such character as to be irresistible. It is only necessary that the force or intimidation be sufficient to consummate the
purpose which the accused had in mind. 26

Appellant would want to capitalize on the fact that there was no full or deep penetration of complainant's vagina to negate the finding
that rape had been committed. But penetration of a woman's sex organ is not an element of the crime of rape. Penile invasion of and
contact with the labia would suffice. Note that even the briefest of contacts under circumstances of force, intimidation, or
unconsciousness is already rape in our jurisdiction. 27 In order to sustain a conviction for rape, penetration of the female genital
organ by the male is not indispensable. Neither rupture nor laceration of any part of the woman's genitalia is required. Thus, the fact
that the complainant's hymen is intact and there is no sign of laceration will not negate a finding that rape was
committed. 28 In this case, what counts is the fact of contact with and penetration of the sexual organ, no matter how slight. 29 There
was, therefore, on this point no error on the part of the trial court in concluding that indeed rape has been committed.

Accused-appellant likewise contends that complainant's acts and deeds after the assault was unnatural and not in accord with the
ordinary experience of mankind, for a rape victim usually suffers trauma or even a nervous breakdown. But it has been repeatedly
held by the Court, that different people react differently to emotional stress. There is no standard form of behavior when one is
confronted by a shocking incident. The workings of the human mind when placed under emotional stress are unpredictable. 30 As
held in People v. Luzorata, 31 "this Court indeed has not laid down any rule on how a rape victim should behave immediately after
she has been abused. This experience is relative and may be dealt with in any way by the victim depending on the circumstances,
but her credibility should not be tainted with any modicum of doubt.

Certain victims of rape might never be able to complain or file criminal charges against the rapist. They might bear the ignominy and
pain of the offense in private, rather than reveal their shame to the world or risk the rapist's making good the threat to kill or hurt the
victims. 32 But the silence of the victim of rape, or her failure to disclose her state without loss of time to persons close to her and to
report the matter promptly to the authorities, will not perforce warrant the conclusion that she was not sexually molested or that her
charges against the accused are baseless, untrue and fabricated. Mere failure to report the incident immediately will not cast doubt
on the credibility of the charge. Even if delay could not be attributed to death threats and intimidation made and exercised by the
accused on the victim, 33 such failure in making a prompt report to the proper authorities does not destroy the truth per se of the
complaint.

Moreover, accused-appellant could not capitalize on the minor inconsistencies in the testimony of the complainant, even if they do
exist. Such minor inconsistencies tend to bolster, rather than weaken, her credibility for they show that her testimony was not
contrived nor rehearsed. Besides, errorless testimony could not be expected when complainant is recounting details of a harrowing
experience. No matter how courageous she is, the act of filing a complaint and appearing in court would exact a heavy psychological
and social toll on the victim who is usually twice victimized: by the rapist during the act of rape and by misguided elements of society
which devalue the victim's worth. She would not be expected to possess total recall and complete composure on the witness stand.

To conclude, we find the assigned error in this appeal utterly without basis. The conviction of the accused-appellant beyond
reasonable doubt for the crime of rape is supported by the prosecution's evidence which could not be overthrown by the accused-
appellant's self-serving denials. Consistent with prevailing jurisprudence, we note that the award of moral damages is in
order. 34 They are awarded to victims of rape cases involving young girls between thirteen and nineteen years of age, taking into
account the immeasurable havoc wrought on their youthful feminine psyche. 35 Such award is distinct from indemnity awarded to
complainant for the injury that she suffers because of the offense committed on her person. In this case, both indemnity and moral
damages are justifiably called for.

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The assailed Decision of the court a quo imposing the penalty of reclusion
perpetua on accused-appellant is hereby AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that accused-appellant is further ORDERED to pay
the complainant indemnity in the amount of fifty thousand (P50,000.00) pesos and moral damages also in the amount of fifty
thousand pesos (P50,000.00). Costs against appellant.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 122746 January 29, 1999

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
MARIO VILLANUEVA y FAUSTINO, accused-appellant.

DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:

In a decision 1 rendered in Criminal Case No. 93-127826, the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 28, found accused-appellant
MARIO VILLANUEVA y FAUSTINO (hereafter MARIO) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder as charged, and sentenced him to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay P50,000.00 as death indemnity, P53,800.00 as actual damages, P1,663,668.00
for the loss of earning capacity of the victim, P50,000.00 as moral damages and the costs of suit.

The Information charged MARIO with murder allegedly committed as follows:

 That on or about September 19, 1993 in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused conspiring and
confederating with one whose true name, real identity and present whereabouts are still unknown and mutually
helping each other, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill and with evident
premeditation and treachery, attack, assault and use personal violence upon one JOAQUIN NACIONAL Y BANEZ
by then and there shooting the latter with an unknown caliber revolver hitting him at the back of his right ear,
thereby inflicting upon the said Joaquin Nacional y Banez a mortal gunshot wound which was the direct and
immediate cause of his death.2

MARIO pleaded not guilty upon his arraignment on 17 December 1993.3

Witnesses for the prosecution were Adelfa Nacional, Bienvenida Nacional, PO3 Rosales M. Fernandez, PO3 Ireneo Manalili and Dr.
Maximo Reyes. Witnesses for the defense were MARIO, Domingo Peliño, Eva Torio and Edmundo Ventura.

Adelfa Nacional, the wife of Joaquin Nacional, the victim, testified that on 19 September 1993, at around 10:00 p.m., in Area C,
Parola Compound, Tondo, Manila, she fetched Joaquin from a wake. Before proceeding home, they first bought cigarettes from a
store owned by Joaquin's sister, Bienvenida Nacional. While were buying cigarettes, Adelfa was about one arm's length to the left of
Joaquin. She noticed two persons walk behind them. One of the two, whom she identified as MARIO, moved to about a foot and a
half behind her husband, pulled a gun from his waist, pointed the gun below her husband's right ear and shot her husband. MARIO
and his companion then ran towards a nearby alley. Joaquin fell to the ground and Adelfa shouted for help. According to Adelfa, the
crime scene was illuminated by a fluorescent lamp. 4

Adelfa recognized MARIO because she often saw him at the plaza which was near Adelfa's house and a usual venue for cockfights.
She remembered that about a year before the incident, she saw her husband in front of their house having an "altercation" with
MARIO over a cockfight. 5

Adelfa again saw MARIO on the night of 22 September 1993 at the police station after she and Bienvenida Nacional were informed
that MARIO had been apprehended. From a line-up of eight persons, Adelfa identified Mario as her husband's killer. 6

Adelfa spent P32,000.00 for her husband's coffin and P5,000.00 during the wake. Other expenses related to her husband's funeral
were paid for by her mother-in-law.

Adelfa further testified that her husband earned about P2,500.00 a week from selling fish, and that because of his death, she
suffered grief and wounded feelings, which could not "be paid in terms of money." 7 Moreover, she also lost someone who could
help her.8

The prosecution wanted to present Yolanda Nacional, the victim's mother, to prove the amount spent for funeral, but the defense
stipulated that the victim's heirs spent P53,800.00 for the purpose. 9

Bienvenida Nacional, the victim's sister, corroborated Adelfa's testimony as to the circumstances attending the commission of the
crime, but as viewed from a different angle since Bienvenida was positioned about one arm's length in front of the victim. She tried to
help lift her brother after he was shot, but in her nervousness and fear from seeing blood flow from her brother's head, she was
unaware that she had already run to the police station to get help. At the station, she had the incident recorded in the police blotter
and gave a physical description of MARIO and his companion. She was informed on 22 September 1993 that MARIO had been
apprehended. 10

Bienvenida surmised that the killing of her brother Joaquin was due to an altercation between him and MARIO over a bet in a
cockfight. During that altercation, which occurred at the plaza some ten days before the incident, Bienvenida pacified the two and
told her brother to go home, and the latter obeyed. She described her brother as the calmer one between the two, and that during
the altercation, he answered MARIO's grave and serious curses with less grave curses. 11 This altercation was different from that
reported by Adelfa which occurred a year before the crime.

PO3 Rosales M. Fernandez arrested MARIO on the night of 22 September 1993, after following a lead provided by another officer.
Later that night, Fernandez arranged a police line-up where Adelfa Nacional pointed out MARIO as her husband's killer. Fernandez
divulged that MARIO was not assisted by counsel at the line-up, and admitted that Edgar Rioferio was also arrested but the inquest
fiscal ordered his release. 12

13
PO3 Ireneo Manalili received Bienvenida Nacional's report on the night of the incident and entered it in the police blotter. With
Bienvenida, he went to the crime scene to investigate.

Dr. Maximo Reyes, National Bureau of Investigation Medico-Legal Officer, conducted the post-mortem examination on the victim.
His findings were summarized in an autopsy report 14 as follows:

Cyanosis, lips and nailbeds.

Contused abrasions: zygomatic area, right 2.0 x 2.0 cms.; mandibular area, medical aspect, 1.0 x 0.5 cm.

Gunshot wound, entrance, ovaloid, 0.7 x 0.8 cm., contusion collar widest at its infero-lateral border, edges inverted
with area of smudging and tatooing, 5.0 x 4.0 cms., located at the scalp, post-auricular area, right, 3.0 cms. behind
and 0.5 cm. above the right external auditory meatus, directed forwards, upwards and medially, involving the
scalp, fracturing the right temporal bone, into the cranial cavity, penetrating the right temporal lobe at the brain
where a deformed bullet was lodged and subsequently recovered.

Other visceral organs, congested.

Stomach, contains small amount of rice and other partially digested food particles.
 CAUSE OF DEATH: GUNSHOT WOUND AT THE HEAD.

The fatal bullet entered from behind the victim's right ear with an upward trajectory, thus it was retrieved in the right
temporal area. There was smudging or tattooing at the bullet's entry point, indicating that the muzzle of the gun was
between three to six inches away from said entry point. There were abrasions on the right zygomatic area, that is, below
the eye, indicating that the victim fell to the ground on his face with force. 15

Domingo Peliño, the first defense witness, testified that he and MARIO were neighbors in Parola Compound, Tondo. On 19
September 1993, between 9:00 to 10:00 in the evening, Peliño went to MARIO's house to ask for help in replacing a fuse in Peliño's
fuse box at his house. MARIO was not at home, however, because according to his wife, MARIO was in Malinta, Caloocan City.
After the incident in question, Peliño heard rumors from his neighbors that MARIO was involved in said incident; and after he learned
of MARIO's arrest, Peliño went to police headquarters to ask MARIO about the killing. MARIO said that he had nothing to do with the
killing. Peliño then executed an affidavit attesting to MARIO's innocence, which he filed with the City Prosecutor's Office. 16

Eva Torio testified that she knew MARIO as the brother of her neighbor and friend Nilda. On 19 September 1993, at about 2:00 p.m.,
MARIO brought carabao skin to the Torio residence at Sitio Gitna, Kaybiga, Caloocan City, for Eva's husband's birthday party. From
2:00 to 4:00 that afternoon, MARIO, one Boyet, and Eva's husband prepared and cooked the carabao skin. The group brought five
cases of beer then engaged in a drinking session. She stayed with the group, although she did not join in the drinking but only sat
beside her husband. She slept at 10:30 p.m. while the three were still drinking. The next morning, at around 6:00 p.m., Torio went to
Nilda's house where MARIO slept. She asked him to build a fusebox for her, which he completed between 8:00 to 9:00 that
morning. 17

Edmundo Ventura testified that he joined in the drinking session, which lasted until midnight. MARIO never left the group except
when he took his dinner, but he returned shortly thereafter. When the drinking session ended, Ventura left with MARIO and a certain
Rony Macapobre, and Ventura saw MARIO enter Nilda's house. 18

MARIO reiterated the story told by the defense witnesses. The trial court summarized his testimony as follows:

[T]hat on September 19, 1993, at 10:00 . . . in the evening, he was in Sitio Gitna, Kaybiga, Kalookan City; that he
left his house that day at about 10:30 in the morning, passed by Divisoria and bought carabao and cow skins or
hides, which he bought with him to Gitna to be cooked or made into kilawin as pulutan in the house of Jun Torio;
that they finished cooking at 4:00 p.m., and after they had bought beer they started drinking up to 12 . . . midnight;
that he did not leave Sitio Gitna, Kaybiga, Kalookan City; and that he went home to his house in Area C, Parola
Compound, Tondo, Manila, on September 20, 1993, at 11:00 . . . in the morning. 19

Additionally, MARIO explained that the victim was once a friend of his, but Adelfa Nacional accused him of killing the victim
because sometime in 1992, "in a highway near [MARIO's] place," the victim lost P20.00 to MARIO in a game of cara y
cruz. 20 The victim's family also harbored ill feelings towards MARIO because he refused to testify for Joaquin Nacional in
two criminal case, including one for the killing of a son of MARIO'scompadre, where Joaquin Nacional was one of the
accused. 21

In its decision 22 of 14 June 1995, the trial court gave full faith and credence to the testimonies of the witness for the prosecution,
describing them as candid, straightforward and frank. The trial court took judicial notice of the volume of traffic from Caloocan City to
Tondo, and concluded that it was not impossible for MARIO to have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission.
The trial court likewise dismissed MARIO's contention that the Nacionals wanted to get even with him for his refusal to testify for
Joaquin Nacional in the criminal cases filed against the latter. The court noted that these cases were filed several years before the
victim was even married, hence MARIO's refusal to testify was inconsequential.

The trial court determined that there was treachery in the killing of Joaquin Nacional since the attack came from behind the victim
with a concealed weapon which was suddenly fired at the victim. The victim was completely unaware of the attack and was thus
totally defenseless. The court then decreed as follows:

WHEREFORE, finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder in the shooting of
Joaquin Nacional y Banez, the accused, Mario Villanueva, is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, the medium period of the penalty prescribed for murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code,
there being no mitigating or aggravating circumstance. The duration of said penalty shall be that provided in Article
27 of the Revised Penal Code before it was amended by R.A. No. 7659.

The accused is ordered to indemnify the heirs of Joaquin Nacional in the sum of P50,000.00; to pay the widow,
Adelfa Nacional, and the mother, Yolanda Nacional, actual damages in the sum of P53,800.00; to pay the heirs of
Joaquin Nacional for the loss of earning capacity of the deceased in the sum of P1,663,680.00; and to pay moral
damages to the widow, Adelfa Nacional, in the sum of P50,000.00; and finally, the accused must pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.

The award for loss of earning capacity was computed in accordance with the decision in Monzon v. Intermediate Appellate
Court. 23 His Motion for reconsideration 24 having been denied by the trial court in its order 25 of 18 September 1995, MARIO
interposed this appeal.

In his Appellant's Brief, MARIO claims that the trial court erred in:

1. not giving credit to the accused-appellant's testimony and that of his witnesses, and in
disregarding his defense of alibi;

2. giving credence to the testimonies of the two prosecution witnesses, who are related to the
victim; and in holding that the accused-appellant was positively and spontaneously identified by
these prosecution witnesses; and
 3. concluding that the guilt of the accused for the crime of murder has been established by
evidence beyond reasonable doubt.

As to the first error assigned, MARIO scores the trial court for venturing into conjecture, particularly in the following portion of the
decision:

Sitio Gitna, Kaybiga, Kalookan City is located midway between, and lies along Gen. Luis Street which joins
Novaliches and the Valenzuela Exit of the North Expressway. General Luis St. is a two lane road where many
vehicles, private and public, pass everyday, but as the day wanes and advances into the night the traffic volume
lessens at between the hours of 9:00 and 11:00 and travel is fast either way to Novaliches or to the North
Expressway, such that in less than an hour, one can get to Tondo, Manila, whether through Novaliches along
Quirino Highway to Balintawak, or from Valenzuela Exit along the North Expressway to Balintawak, then EDSA to
Grace Park, Kalookan City, then to J. Abad Santos Avenue to Tondo. Of these facts this court can take judicial
notice. And in a taxicab, of which the accused by his own testimony, is a driver, the travel time will be much less. It
was not physically impossible for the accused to be at the scene of the shooting of Joaquin Nacional. 26

where the trial court assumed that traffic from MARIO's original location to the crime scene was light and that he could
readily avail of means of transportation.

MARIO insists on his testimony that he was in Caloocan City in the middle of a drinking spree, which was corroborated by number of
defense witnesses. MARIO claims that he and his witnesses were candid, straightforward and frank, and considering that the
corroborating witnesses were neither related to him nor good friends of his, they had no reason to lie.

Although MARIO admits it could have been possible for him to be at the crime scene, he asserts that the prosecution failed to
establish this possibility as fact by proof beyond reasonable doubt.

Anent the second assigned error, MARIO expresses doubts that prosecution witnesses were able to positively identify him as the
killer of the victim. In the first place, no ocular inspection of the crime scene was ever conducted, hence lighting conditions, which
the trial court concluded were sufficient for a positive identification, were not definitely determined. He adds that even if a place were
lit, "light casts shadows and can play tricks with a person's sight." Also, MARIO was shorter than the victim, hence it was possible for
the victim to have blocked the view of Bienvenida and prevented her from clearly seeing the assailant. Moreover, Adelfa Nacional's
identification was flawed since it was merely instilled in her mind by Bienvenida Nacional, as shown by Adelfa's testimony:

Q Do you still remember Madam witness, what did you and your sister-in-law do if any, after
your husband was shot?

A Yes, sir.

Q And what did she do if any?

A She also cried.

Q And did she tell you anything, while you were embracing your husband?

A Yes, sir. According to her, it was Mario who shot my husband. 27

MARIO further claims that Adelfa's testimony was less than candid and straightforward as illustrated by the following segment:

Q And then Mrs. witness, while he [Joaquin Nacional] was then buying cigarettes, he was
standing about one arm's length, what happened next?

28
A Somebody arrived and shot my husband at the back of the lower portion of his right ear sir.

and argues that if Adelfa positively identified him as the gunman, she should have forthwith stated his name instead of
simply referred to him as "Somebody."

MARIO also questions his arrest three days after the commission of the crime. If he was indeed positively identified, he should have
been immediately arrested. Additionally, at the police line-up on 24 September 1993. Adelfa identified Edgar Rioferio y Medano as
MARIO's companion on the night of the crime, yet Rioferio was released by the police.

On the third assigned error, MARIO claims the prosecution presented no hard evidence, such as a paraffin test, fingerprints, blood
samples or clothing, to indubitably link him to the crime. The prosecution merely had and relied on the prosecution witnesses'
testimony; which MARIO claims was insufficient to dispel reasonable doubt. In sum, he assesses the prosecution's evidence as
circumstantial and conjectural.

In the Appellee's Brief, the Solicitor General belittles MARIO's defense of alibi, and asserts that for alibi to prosper, an accused must
prove not only that he was not at the crime scene at the time of the commission of the crime, but that it was absolutely impossible for
him to have been there at that time. Furthermore, assuming that the defense witnesses were telling the truth that they were drinking
with MARIO, none of them categorically admitted that they kept an eye on him at all times from 4:00 p.m. to 12:00 midnight of 19
September 1993. Hence, MARIO was unable to demonstrate the feasibility of his alibi.

On MARIO's contention that the eyewitnesses' relation to the victim clouded their reliability, the Office of the Solicitor General replies
that relationship is not equal to bias; on the contrary, a witness' relationship with the victim would deter him or her from
indiscriminately implicating anybody in the crime. As to MARIO's comment on the lighting conditions at the crime scene, responds
that a witness' familiarity with another person makes it easy for the former to identify the latter. Adelfa and Bienvenida Nacional were
not only familiar with MARIO, but they knew him quite well, thus making it easy for them to identify him. The point as regards
MARIO's height was likewise inconsequential since two eyewitnesses clearly recognized and positively identified him as the
assailant. If at all, that MARIO was shorter than the victim conformed with the evidence that the fatal bullet took an upward
trajectory.

As to Bienvenida's reference to MARIO in her testimony as "Somebody," the Office of the Solicitor General asserts that it is not
necessary for the name of the accused to be specified by a witness in an affidavit or testimony since victims of crimes can not
always identify their assailants by name.

Lastly, the Office of the Solicitor General argues that although the police waited for three days before arresting MARIO, said action
or inaction was the fault of the authorities and not a factor that could affect the eyewitnesses' credibility.

There being sufficient evidence to convict MARIO, the Office of the Solicitor General dismisses as unnecessary the other evidence
that MARIO seeks. If presented, these pieces of evidence would only be corroborative of the eyewitnesses' positive identification of
MARIO as the assailant. At any rate, choosing which evidence to present to the trial court is the prosecutor's prerogative.

We find no merit in this appeal.

Alibi, upon which MARIO's defense hinges upon, is the weakest of defenses. For alibi to prosper, an accused must prove that not
only was he absent at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission, but also that it was physically impossible for him to be so
situated at said instance. 29 MARIO set out to prove his alibi by claiming that he was in Caloocan City engaged in a drinking spree
from 2:00 p.m. to midnight. But as the Office of the Solicitor General pointed out, MARIO failed to show that it was physically
impossible for him to have been at the crime scene at the time the crime was committed. None of the corroborating witnesses kept
so close a watch on MARIO as to be able to account for his whereabouts during the entire period from 2:00 p.m. to 12:00 midnight:
Eva Torio admitted that she did not know MARIO's whereabouts from 10:30 p.m. of 9 September 1993 to 6:00 a.m. the following
day; 30Edmundo Ventura admitted that MARIO momentarily left the drinking session and the Torio residence to take dinner; 31 and
Domingo Peliño revealed that a trip from Malinta, where MARIO allegedly was on 19 September 1993, to Manila, would take only
half an hour, and at any rate, Peliño did not personally know that MARIO was in Malinta. 32

We acknowledge that the trial court improperly took judicial notice of the travel time from Caloocan City to Tondo, since the same
can not be considered a law of nature, nor was it shown to be capable of unquestionable demonstration or to be of public
knowledge, nor could it have been known to the trial judge due to the nature of his judicial functions. 33 But the point remains that
MARIO failed to prove that he could not have been at the crime scene at the time of the commission of the crime. On the contrary,
he even admitted that it was possible for him to be at the scene of the offense at the time of its commission, but he was confident
that the prosecution failed to disprove this circumstance by proof beyond reasonable doubt. MARIO's confidence betrays a
misconception of which party has the burden of providing alibi. It is settled that alibi is an affirmative defense 34 and, considering that
it is easy to concoct, when an accused relies thereon, he has the burden of proving it, i.e., that he could not have been at the scene
of the crime at the time of its commission. 35

MARIO failed in this task, as in fact he relinquished his duty to the prosecution, which, in turn, was not bound to perform the same
for him.

The already feeble defense of alibi further weakens in the face of positive identification of the accused. Equally cognizant of this
canon, MARIO sought to cast doubt on his positive identification by the eyewitnesses, speculating as to the presence of shadows
and the relative positions of the victim and the assailant. These speculations are, however, unworthy of consideration and must
remain mere speculations, for the eyewitnesses categorically stated that they saw MARIO shoot the victim.

MARIO also misunderstood Adelfa when he interpreted the latter's testimony to mean that Bienvenida suggested to her that MARIO
shot the victim. Construing Adelfa's testimony in its entirety, and not merely taking a portion out of context, we find that Bienvenida
merely confirmed what Adelfa saw. In fact, on cross-examination, Adelfa insisted that she saw MARIO shoot her husband, thus:

Q: Now, while you were embracing your husband who was lying on his back and you were
crying profusely and continuously someone from behind said that a certain "Mario" shot your
husband?

PROSECUTOR

Again, Your Honor, the witness already said that she cannot remember what happened after the
shooting.

ATTY. LEYBLE

My question, Your Honor, is that since she remembered that there were many people around
and at the time she was crying if she heard somebody saying that it was "Mario" who shot her
husband, Your Honor.

COURT

Let the witness answer.

WITNESS

36
A: I did not hear anything. I saw it myself.

That Adelfa referred to MARIO as "Somebody," instead naming him, is of no moment. One must consider that the examining
counsel was taking Adelfa step by step through her story, and the question propounded to her did not require that she immediately
name the assailant. But earlier in her testimony Adelfa identified MARIO by name because the questions asked her were as follows:
 Q What was the cause of death your husband?

A He was shot sir.

Q By whom?

A By Mario Villanueva sir. 37

At any rate then, Adelfa identified "Somebody" as none other than MARIO.

We fail to see how the arrest of MARIO three days after Adelfa reported the crime to the police could mean that Adelfa failed to
identify MARIO. Clearly a third party's action or inaction cannot affect a witness credibility.

MARIO'S reliance on the transcripts of the testimonies, which he quoted out of context, has led him to unfounded conclusions and
justifies our well-ingrained rule that when the issue is one of credibility of witnesses, appellate courts will generally not disturb the
findings of the trial court, considering that the latter is in a better position to decide the question, having heard the witnesses
themselves and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial, unless it has plainly overlooked certain facts of
substance and value that, if considered; might affect the result of the case. 38 For this case boils down to an appraisal of the
credibility of the witnesses, and we cannot undertake the assessment with accuracy when all we have before us are the cold,
unspeaking records of the case; otherwise we would make the same mistakes that Mario committed. Instead, we rely on the
evaluation by the trial judge, who had the advantage of directly observing witness' deportment and manner of testifying, as well as
having certain potent aids in understanding and weighing the testimony of witnesses, such as the emphasis, gesture and inflection
of the voice of the witnesses while on the stand. 39

We see no oversight on the part of the trial court which would justify nullifying its determination of the credibility of the prosecution
witnesses. Not even MARIO's allegation of bias against the eyewitnesses due to their relationship to the victim persuades us.
Relationship by itself does not give rise to a presumption of bias or ulterior motive, nor does it ipso facto impair the credibility or
tarnish the testimony of a witness. The natural interest of witnesses, who are relatives of the victim, in securing the conviction of the
guilty would deter them from implicating persons other than the true culprits, otherwise, the guilty would go unpunished. A witness'
relationship to a victim of a crime would even make his or her testimony more credible as it would be unnatural for a relative who is
interested in vindicating the crime to accuse thereof somebody other than the real culprit. 40

Regarding MARIO's refusal to testify for Joaquin Nacional in the criminal cases against the latter, the Nacionals could not have
borne any ill motive against MARIO due to the same, because said cases were in fact dismissed, even without MARIO's testimony.
Without any ill motive to encourage them to falsely testify against MARIO, we find the testimonies of the eyewitnesses to be credible
and trustworthy, consistent with the trial court's assessment of these witnesses.

Because credible witnesses had already demonstrated MARIO's culpability, there was no need to present further evidence linking
him to the crime. There is no requirement of a certain quantity of evidence before one may be justly convicted for an offense. The
only requisite is that the prosecution prove the accused's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution in the instant case
successfully accomplished its task.

Finally, the trial court correctly held that there was treachery in this case. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the
crimes against the person, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly or specifically to ensure
its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. 41 The victim was not aware of
any impending attack against his person, and even Adelfa Nacional, who had seen MARIO approach her husband, was surprised by
the suddenness with which MARIO shot her husband. Under these circumstances, the victim was clearly deprived of an opportunity
to defend himself, thus ensuring the execution of the offense without risk to MARIO. Hence, there was treachery.

There is, however, the matter of lost income awarded by the trial court in favor of the heirs of the victim. Although the award was not
objected to by MARIO, we feel the same is unjustified, hence must be deleted. In fixing the award, the trial court relied on the
unsubstantiated and incomplete testimony of Adelfa Nacional, specifically the following:

Q Do you have children by Joaquin Nacional?

A Yes, Your Honor.

Q How many?

A Two, Your Honor.

Q When Joaquin Nacional was alive who support it?

A Me, sir, I was selling fish then.

Q Joaquin Nacional was not supporting your children?

A Sometimes Your Honor, he helps me in vending fish.

Q Do you know what was his income more or less — per month?

A Sometimes Your Honor, we earned P5,000.00 a week.

Q How much was he earned — share of Joaquin Nacional in that earning?

 A P2,500.00, Your Honor.

Q Was that his regular income?

A Yes, Your Honor.

xxx xxx xxx

FISCAL VIOLA:

Q By the way Mrs. Witness, when your husband died — when he was stabbed [sic] how old was
he at that time?

A 28 years old, sir.

Q And what was his physical condition at that time?

A He was healthy, sir.

Q And do you think with that present condition physical condition up to what age can he still
work to provide finance for your family?

ATTY. LEBLE:

I think the witness incompetent, Your Honor.

FISCAL VIOLA:

She competent Your Honor, she is the wife, Your Honor.

COURT:

42
At any rate there is a rule for that provided by the Supreme Court.

The rule alluded to by the trial judge dates back to Alcantara v. Surro, 43 where the Court, using the American
Experience/Expectancy Table of Mortality or the Actuarial or Combined Experience Table of Mortality, estimated the life span of an
average human being to be up to 80 years old, and with that in mind, computed the estimated income to be earned by the deceased
had he or she not been killed. But the compensation for lost income is in the nature of damages, 44 and as such requires due proof
of the damage suffered. 45 For lost income due to death, there must be unbiased proof of the deceased's average income. Adelfa
gave only a self-serving, hence unreliable, statement of her husband's income. Also, the award for lost income refers to the net
income of the deceased, that is, his total income less his average expenses. 46 In the instant case, no proof of the victim's expenses
was presented, thus there can be no reliable estimate of his lost income.

WHEREFORE, the decision in Criminal Case No. 93-127826 by Branch 28 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, rendered on 14
June 1995, finding accused-appellant MARIO VILLANUEVA y FAUSTINO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of MURDER is hereby
AFFIRMED, with the modification that the award for the loss of earning capacity of the deceased is deleted. The rest of the decision
stands.

Costs against accused-appellant.1âwphi1.nêt

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 129556 November 11, 1998

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
REY GADO, accused-appellant.

MELO, J.:

Accused-appellant Rey Gado seeks reversal of the judgment of conviction rendered by Branch 276 of the Regional Trial Court of the
National Capital Judicial Region stationed in Muntinlupa City.

The Information dated July 14, 1992 charging accused-appellant and his co-accused Emma Gallos with Murder pertinently alleged:

That on or about the 30th day of January, 1992, in the Municipality of Muntinlupa, Metro Manila,
Philippines, and within and jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring and confederating together and both of them mutually helping and aiding one
another, with intent to kill, with treachery, while armed with a bladed weapon, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously stab Melencio M. Manalang, Jr. in his abdomen as a result of
which said victim sustained a serious body injury which caused his death, to the damage and
prejudice of his heirs in such amount as may be proven at the trial.
During trial, the prosecution adduced the inculpatory facts through Fernando Reyes, Melencio Manalang, Sr. (the victim's father),
and Dr. Alberto M. Reyes, then Acting Chief of the NBI Medico-Legal Division, which may be summarized as follows:

On the evening of January 30, 1992, the victim and some of his friends were having a drinking session at the house of Juanito
Vicente. Shortly thereafter, the victim decided to leave and accused-appellant Rey Gado and Juanito Vicente decided to bring him
home. With them were a certain Emma and her brother whose name the victim failed to mention. On their way, and while they were
along Fleur De Liz Street, the victim was held by his companions and he was stabbed in the abdomen by Rey Gado. As the victim
freed himself from his assailants, the latter fled. He immediately grabbed a stone and hurled it at them.

While he was proceeding home, he was chanced upon by barangay tanod Fernando Reyes who offered to help him home. At about
9 o'clock that evening, he reached their house. He immediately slumped on the floor and asked his father to bring him to the
hospital. Upon his father's query, the victim identified Rey Gado as his assailant.

While aboard a jeep on their way to Perpetual Help Hospital at Las Piñas, Metro Manila, the victim once more related what
happened to him, identifying the other companions of Rey Gado. He was given medical attention at Perpetual Help Hospital but
about four hours thereafter, at around 2 o'clock early morning of January 31, 1992, he succumbed.

On September 15, 1992, an Information charging Rey Gado and Emma Gallos was filed in court. An order for the arrest of the
accused was accordingly issued on September 17, 1992, but the same was left unserved. The trial court ordered the case to be
archived on February 22, 1993. It was not until May 30, 1994 when Rey Gado, one of the two accused, was served an alias writ of
arrest by the PNP Criminal Service Command of the Cavite Provincial Office while detained at Camp Vicente Lim, Calamba, Laguna
due to a charge of Robbery/Hold Up before the Municipal Trial Court of Carmona, Cavite (p. 11, Record).

On November 21, 1994, both accused-appellant Rey Gado, and his co-accused Emma Gallos, who voluntarily appeared in court
upon notice, were arraigned and both entered a plea of not guilty. Emma Gallos was then also ordered to be detained.

The two accused, on their part, sought refuge in their defense of alibi. Rey Gado claimed to have been tending the store of his
brother at Sucat, Cupang, Muntinlupa, about five kilometers away from the place where the incident happened, while Emma Gallos
averred that she was at home tending to her sick daughter.

The trial court rendered judgment acquitting Emma Gallos. Rey Gado was, however, convicted of the crime of murder and
sentenced to suffer "the penalty of reclusion perpetua . . . and [to] indemnify the heirs of his victim the sum of P50,000.00 and to pay
P50,000.00 as reimbursement for the medical and burial expenses. . ." Hence, the present appeal anchored on the following
assigned errors:

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONSIDERING THE AFFIDAVIT OF WITNESS FERNANDO

REYES.

II

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONSIDERING MELENCIO MANALANG'S TESTIMONY AS

A DYING DECLARATION.

III

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT LENDING CREDENCE TO ACCUSED-APPELLANT'S

ALIBI.

IV

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND

REASONABLE DOUBT.

After carefully going over accused-appellant's arguments as well as the evidentiary record, we find his appeal wanting in merit.

On the issue of witness Fernando Reyes's retraction, the trial court, in its order denying the motion for reconsideration of accused-
appellant, explained thus:
 After carefully evaluating the grounds relied upon in the MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
AND/OR NEW TRIAL, this Court holds that the conviction of accused Rey Gado is not only
based on the affidavit of the eye witness which admittedly was recanted by the affiant, but also
on the declaration of the victim who told his father Melencio Manalang, Sr. that he was stabbed
by accused; at a time when this victim Melencio Manalang, Jr. felt he was weakening, and
therefore conscious of an impending death . . .

We find no further reason to entertain the argument of accused-appellant on this matter. We shall instead look into whether or not
sufficient evidence remains to sustain the conviction of accused-appellant for the crime charged.

Accused-appellant vigorously takes exception to the trial court's admission of the testimony of Melencio Manalang, Sr., who testified
in regard to the statements and declarations of his son concerning his assailants, claiming that the said declarations are not in the
nature of a dying declaration for the simple reason that they were not made under a clear consciousness of an impending death.

We are not persuaded.

Forthwith, we must stress that with regard to the credibility of Melencio Manalang, Sr. as witness, we find no reason to disturb the
trial court's findings. The settled and time-tested jurisprudence is that the findings and conclusions of the trial court on the credibility
of witnesses enjoy the respect of appellate courts for the reason that trial courts have the advantage of observing the demeanor of
witnesses as they testify (People vs. Cabiles, G.R. No. 112035, January 16, 1998; People vs. Moran, 241 SCRA 709 [1995]; People
vs. Gamiao, 240 SCRA 254 [1995]). In the absence of any arbitrariness in the trial court's findings and evaluation of evidence which
tends to show that it overlooked certain material facts and circumstances, such findings and evaluation of evidence should be
respected on review (People vs. Dio, 226 SCRA 176 [1993]). The presiding judge of the trial court had the opportunity to actually
observe the conduct and demeanor of the witnesses on the witness stand while being asked direct-examination questions by the
prosecution, cross-examination questions by the defense, as well as clarificatory questions by the trial judge himself. Between the
trial judge and this Court, the former is in a far better position to determine whether a witness is telling the truth or not. From the
records before us we find no reason to disturb the trial court's assessment and to discredit Melencio Manalang, Sr. as a witness.

The central issue to be resolved is whether the statements, uttered by the victim before he died partake of the nature of a dying
declaration or not.

The Court finds in the affirmative.

Through the dying declarations of the victim as related by his father, Melencio Manalang, Sr. before Atty. Pepito Tan at the National
Bureau of Investigation, National Capital Region (Taft Avenue, Manila), the identity of the killer was established in this case, to wit:

07. T: Maari bang isalaysay mo ang buong pangyayari ayon sa pagkakakuwento sa iyo ng
biktima na si MELENCIO MANALANG, JR.?

S: Ayon po sa aking anak, nag-inuman silang magbabarkada sa bahay ni JUANITO VICENTE

at nang siya ay malasing na inihatid siya ni REY GADO at JUANITO VICENTE na may
kasamang isang babae nagngangalang EMMA at isang lalaki na hindi ko alam ang pangalan na
kapatid ni EMMA. Noong nasa daan na sila ang Fleur de Luz St. sa ilalim ng puno ng aratiles ay
doon na raw siya sinaksak ni REY GADO sa may tiyan. Noong nakabitaw si MELENCIO
MANALANG, JR. ay nakadampot pa siya ng bato at pinukol ang grupo nina REY GADO na
nakanya-kanya na ng takbo. Noong pauwi na siya ay nasalubong daw niya si FERNANDO
REYES, isang Barangay Tanod na siyang naghatid sa kanya sa bahay. Pagdating sa bahay ay
inihatid na namin siya sa hospital ng Perpetual Help Medical Center, Las Piñas, Metro Mla. na
kung saan siya ay nalagutan ng hininga ng bandang alas-dos ng madaling araw ng January 31,
1992.
The witness reiterated the material points of this sworn statement during his testimony before the trial court. He also established the
basis for the admissibility of the dying declaration, as an exception to the hearsay rule, to wit:

COPY

Q. You said that the victim when he arrived at your house he was holding his
wounds?

A. Yes, your honor.

Q. Immediately when he arrived at your house, what did he do?

A. He sat down, your honor.

Q. He sat down, where?

A. He sat down on the floor, your honor.

Q. And, you talk at him?

A. Yes, your honor.

Q. And, he was just sitting on the floor, and was he was holding his wounds?

A. Yes, your honor.

Q. And, did you see any blood coming from his wounds?

A. Yes, your honor.

Q. Now, did you ask him how he felt?

A. He told me to bring him to the hospital, your honor.

Q. Did he tell you why he should be taken to the hospital?

A. Because he is getting weak, your honor.

Q. Now, did you ask him why he was getting weak?

A. He told me that he was stabbed by Rey Gado, your honor.

Q. And, so he asked you to bring him to the hospital because he was getting
weak?

A. Yes, your honor.

Q. He told you that he was only feeling weak. Did you tell him or did you ask
him if he did something or if he wants to eat or anything?

A. I did not say anything, your honor.

Q. Did he say, he did something?

A. No, your honor.

Q. He just told you to bring him to hospital because he was getting weak?

A. Yes, your honor.

Q. Now, did you ask him where he was stabbed?

A. Yes, your honor, he said that he was stabbed in the stomach, your honor.
 (pp. 17-20, tsn, April
10, 1995)

As a rule, a dying declaration is hearsay and is inadmissible as evidence. In order that a dying declaration may be admissible as
evidence, four requisites must concur, namely: that the declaration must concern the cause and surrounding circumstances of the
declarant's death; that at the time the declaration was made, the declarant was under a consciousness of an impending death; that
the declarant is competent as a witness; and that the declaration is offered in a criminal case for homicide, murder or parricide, in
which the declarant is a victim (People vs. Israel, 231 SCRA 155 [1994]; People vs. Lazarte, 200 SCRA 361 [1991]).

Capitalizing on the fact that the victim was still able to stand and walk even after the first declaration was made, accused-appellant
contends that there could not have possibly been a belief of a looming and impending death on the part of the victim.

We cannot quite agree. From the established facts in the case at bar, the trial court correctly considered the declaration of the victim
a dying declaration and, therefore, admissible. The declarant was conscious of his impending death. This may be gleaned not only
from the victim's insistence right after he reached their house that he should immediately be brought to the hospital and that he was
becoming weaker by the moment, but also from the serious nature of his wounds (People vs. Sarabia, 127 SCRA 100 [1984] and
the fact that the said victim died shortly afterwards (People v. Araja, 105 SCRA 133 [1981]).

Even assuming that the victim's utterances were not made under a firm belief of an impending death, the victim's statements may, at
the very least, form part of the res gestae. For the admission of evidence as part of the res gestae, it is required that (a) the principal
act, the res gestae, be a startling occurrence, (b) the statements forming part thereof were made before the declarant had the
opportunity to contrive, and (c) the statements refer to the occurrence in question and its attending circumstances (People vs.
Siscar, 140 SCRA 316 [1985]). We have ruled that while the statement of the victim may not qualify as a dying declaration because
it was not made under the consciousness of impending death (People vs. Palamos, 49 Phil. 601 [1926]), it may still be admissible as
part of the res gestae if it was made immediately after the incident (People vs. Reyes, 52 Phil. 538 [1928]), or a few hours thereafter
(People vs. Tumalip, 60 SCRA 303 [1974]). Definitely, the victim's statement in the case at hand was made immediately after the
incident, before he could even have the opportunity to contrive or concoct a story. Of relevance, too, is the fact that on two
occasions, first at their house, and later while he was being brought to the hospital, he identified one and the same person as his
assailant.

Where the elements of both a dying declaration and a statement as part of the res gestae are present, as in the case at bar, the
statement may be admitted as a dying declaration and at the same time as part of the res gestae (People vs. Balbas, 122 SCRA 859
[1983]).

From a perusal of the decision of the trial court, one gets the impression that the supposed eyewitness account was heavily relied
upon. Thus, on motion for reconsideration, accused-appellant pointed to the inevitable fact that because of retraction by the
supposed eyewitness of the sworn statement executed by him before the investigating officer, full credence thereto may no longer
be accorded. The trial court justified the conviction anyway, upon the strength of the dying declaration as related by Melencio
Manalang, Sr.

The court has re-assessed the evidence of the prosecution minus the supposed eyewitness account to determine whether it would
be correct to convict accused-appellant of murder, and not simple homicide. This Court finds ample basis to uphold the conviction of
accused-appellant for the killing of Melencio Manalang, Jr. qualified by treachery, as alleged in the Information.

While the victim was being brought to the Perpetual Help Hospital at Las Piñas, Metro Manila boarded on a jeep hired for the
purpose, the victim related the following to his father.

FISCAL DE JOYA:

Q. What was your conversation, between you and your son?

A. He told me that he was stabbed by Rey Gado under the tree of alatires,
ma'am.

Q. And what else did your son tell you?

A. He was able to free himself from the person who was holding him, he got a
stone and he cast stone to the person who stabbed him, ma'am.

Q. You said that your son told you that one Rey Gado stabbed him?

A. Yes, ma'am.

Q. What else did your son tell you about the said stabbing incident?

A. Besides the is being stabbed, he told me that this Rey Gado has
companions in the name of Emma Gallos, Juanito Vicente and a certain
person who is a tall guy and one John Doe, ma'am.

(pp. 9-10, tsn, April 10,

1995)

It seems fairly established, therefore, that more than one person attacked the victim. While he was being stabbed by accused-
appellant, some of the companions of accused-appellant were holding the victim in a defenseless position. The manner in which the
stabbing was done tended directly and specially to ensure its execution, affording the victim no chance to put up any defense. This
constitutes alevosia. The killing, therefore, was qualified to murder. It is to be noted also that accused-appellant and his companions
were supposed to assist the victim home. However, instead of bringing him safely home, accused-appellant and his companions
ganged up on the victim, who had no inkling of any impending attack, having placed himself in the safekeeping of persons who then
turned vicious assailants.

The defense of alibi presents itself to be very weak vis-à-vis the evidence adduced by the prosecution pointing to accused-appellant
as the perpetrator of the crime. Besides, as correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General in the People's Brief.

For alibi to prosper, it would not be enough for the accused to prove that he has been elsewhere
when the crime was committed but he must further demonstrate that it would have been
physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission.
(People vs. Esquilona, 248 SCRA 139 [1995]).

(pp. 8-9, Appellee's Brief.)

Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, Murder is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death, both indivisible
penalties. There being neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances, the trial court correctly sentenced accused-appellant to the
lower penalty of reclusion perpetua.

The trial court likewise correctly awarded civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00. However, we do not see how the award of
actual damages in the same amount may be justified in the light of the evidence tending to show that only the total amount of
P23,217.65 was actually spent (see: Exhibit F-II, p. 9 Folder of Exhibits). It is elementary that actual and compensatory damages,
unlike moral and exemplary damages, cannot be left to the sole discretion of the court. In Del Mundo vs. Court of Appeals, 240
SCRA 3348 [1995] we stressed that:

A party is entitled to an adequate compensation for such pecuniary loss actually suffered by him
as he has duly proved. Such damages, to be recoverable, must not only be capable of proof, but
must actually be proved with a reasonable degree of certainty. We must emphasize that these
damages cannot be presumed, and courts, in making an award must point out specific facts
which could afford a basis for measuring whatever compensatory or actual damages are borne.

The award of actual and compensatory damages in the case at bar must, therefore, be reduced to the amount duly proved
at the trial which is to P23,217.65.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION as to the actual
damages as hereinabove indicated. No special pronouncement is made as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 116279 January 29, 1996

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ROGELIO CRISTOBAL, accused-appellant.

DECISION

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

Rape is the forcible violation of the sexual intimacy of another person. It does injury to justice and charity. Rape deeply wounds the
respect, freedom, and physical and moral integrity to which every person has a right. It causes grave damage that can mark the
victim for life. It is always an intrinsically evil act,1 an outrage upon decency and dignity that hurts not only the victim but the society
itself.

The pain rape causes becomes more excruciating when the victim carries the life of an unborn within her womb. That tender and
innocent life, born of love and its parents' participation in the mystery of life, is thereby placed in undue danger. Such was the case
of Cherry Tamayo, a married woman. She was twenty-eight years old, with one child and another on the way, when tragedy struck.
She was sexually assaulted on 31 March 1986. Fortunately, the life in her womb survived.

She accused Rogelio Cristobal of rape in a sworn complaint2 filed with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Maddela, Quirino, on 8
April 1986.

Having found sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that the crime charged has been committed and the accused was
probably guilty thereof, the court ruled that the accused should be held for trial. 3 Accordingly, it issued a warrant for his arrest4 and
fixed his bail bond at P17,000.00. 5 The accused was arrested but was later released on bail. 6 Thereafter, the court increased the
amount of bail to P30,000.00 and, consequently, ordered the rearrest of the accused. 7 Unfortunately, by this time, he was nowhere
to be found.
On 26 August 1986, the MTC ordered the case to be "sent to the files without prejudice to its subsequent prosecution as soon as the
defendant is apprehended." 8 Almost a year after, or specifically on 24 August 1987, the said court ordered the records of the case to
be forwarded to the Provincial Fiscal for proper disposition. 9

On 15 September 1987, the Provincial Fiscal of Quirino filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cabarroguis, Quirino, an
information10 charging accused Rogelio Cristobal with the crime of rape committed as follows:

That between the hours of 12:00 to 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon of March 31, 1986 in Barangay San Dionisio I, Municipality
of Maddela, Province of Quirino, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused
by means of force, threat and intimidation and with lewd design, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse
with one CHERRY A. TAMAYO against the will of the latter.

That the aggravating circumstance of the accused having committed the crime in uninhabited place attended the
commission of the crime.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 604 and assigned to Branch 32 of the said court.

A warrant of arrest was issued on 18 October 1987. Because it was returned unserved, an alias warrant of arrest was issued on 1
February 1988, which was also returned unserved. The trial court then ordered the archival of the case and the arrest of the
accused. 11

It was only on 27 July 1993 when accused Rogelio Cristobal was arrested and detained at the provincial jail. 12 On 21 October 1993,
the Provincial Prosecutor filed a Manifestation for the revival of the case, 13 which the court favorably acted upon.14

Upon arraignment, the accused entered a plea of not guilty. Trial on the merits ensued.

The prosecution presented the offended party, Cherry Tamayo, and the physician who conducted a medical examination on her, Dr.
Mercedita S. Erni-Reta. The defense presented the accused Rogelio Cristobal and his employer, Wilfredo Manzano, who is married
to the accused's cousin, Emilia Manzano. Being merely corroborative to the testimonies of the first two defense witnesses that at the
time of the alleged commission of the crime the accused was hired by the Manzano spouses to plow their field, 15 the testimony of
Mrs. Emilia Manzano was admitted by the prosecution to expedite the disposition of the case. 16

The evidence for the prosecution established the following facts:

In the morning of 31 March 1986, Cherry Tamayo, a resident of Barangay San Dionisio I, Maddela, Quirino, went to the nearby
Bilala Creek to wash her family's clothes. She was alone. At around midday, between the hours of 12:00 and 1:00 and after
accomplishing her task, she decided to take a bath in the creek. She was about to start when somebody held her neck from behind
and thereafter forcibly laid her down the ground. Only then did she recognize her attacker, the accused Rogelio Cristobal. Cherry
managed to stand up and run away, but Rogelio caught up with her and delivered two fistblows to her stomach. Not content with
this, Rogelio, while viciously holding her hair, pressed down Cherry's face into the water. Rogelio then took her three meters away
from the creek and forcibly laid her down on the ground. Because of her weakened and pregnant state, Cherry could not struggle
any further. Rogelio removed her clothes and panties. He then went on top of her, inserted his private organ into hers, and
succeeded in satisfying his lust on her.17 Afterwhich, he slapped and threatened Cherry with death if she would talk. 18

The threat went unheeded as Cherry, upon reaching her home, immediately told her husband of what had happened to her. Her
husband accompanied her to the police station of Maddela, Quirino, to report the incident and then to Dr. Mercedita Erni-Reta for
medical examination.19

Dr. Erni-Reta found that Cherry's vaginal canal had a laceration at the erythematous border at 2:00 and chemoses at 3:00 at the
vaginal os.20 On the witness stand, Dr. Erni-Reta confirmed these findings.21 She added that, upon internal examination, she found
seminal fluid in the vaginal canal which must have been there for no longer than twenty-four hours.22

The defense, on the other hand, established the following to refute the version of the prosecution:

On 31 March 1986, Rogelio Cristobal was plowing the land of the spouses Wilfredo and Emilia Manzano located in Salay, San
Agustin, Isabela. He started plowing at 7:00 a.m. and went with Wilfredo to the latter's home for lunch at around 11:00 a.m.. Emilia
was with them for lunch. The three of them talked until 2:00 p.m.. He went home thereafter, attended to his children, and then
brought out his carabao to graze in Talaytay, Dagubog Grande, which is about 200 meters away from his house. 23 Then he went to
the house of Melchor Cristobal. While he was at Melchor's house, a policeman by the name of Jimmy Benedicto arrested him for the
crime of rape and brought him to Councilor Benjamin Dumlao. He was subsequently taken to the 166th PC Detachment in San
Dionisio, Maddela, Quirino, where he was interrogated and where he spent the night. In the morning, he was brought to the
municipal court to face the charges filed against him.24

In its decision25 dated 28 March 1994, the trial court found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and
sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the complainant, Cherry Tamayo, in the amount of
P30,000.00.

The trial court found clear and convincing the categorical testimony of Cherry Tamayo of having been accosted from behind,
knocked to the ground, boxed, submerged in water, taken three meters from the creek, and raped. 26 In view of her positive
identification of the accused, it disregarded the defense of alibi set up by the latter, which it found to be a weak one. It ruled that for
the defense of alibi to prosper the accused must show physical impossibility to be at the scene of the crime at the time it was
committed. The accused was within three kilometers only from Bilala Creek where the rape was committed. Such distance is near
enough to cover by walking in a matter of thirty minutes. 27 It was not, therefore, physically impossible for him to be at the crime
scene at the time the crime was committed.
In this appeal, the accused contends that the trial court erred in (1) convicting him on the basis of the private complainant's
inconsistent testimony, and (2) not giving due weight to his defense of alibi. 28

The Appellee disagrees with him and prays that the assailed decision be affirmed with modification of the award for moral damages,
which should be increased from P30,000.00 to P50,000.00. 29

Central to the accused's assigned errors is the issue of the credibility of the complainant. It has long been settled that when the issue
is one of credibility of witnesses, appellate courts will generally not disturb the findings of the trial court, considering that the latter is
in a better position to decide the question, having heard the witnesses themselves and observed their deportment and manner of
testifying during the trial.30 It has been aptly said:

In the resolution of the factual issues, the Court relies heavily on the trial court for its evaluation Of the witnesses and their
credibility. Having the opportunity to observe them on the stand, the trial judge is able to detect that sometimes thin line
between fact and prevarication that will determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. That line may not be discernible
from a mere reading of the impersonal record by the reviewing court. The record will not reveal those tell-tale signs that will
affirm the truth or expose the contrivance, like the angry flush of an insisted assertion or the sudden pallor of a discovered
lie or the tremulous mutter of a reluctant answer or the forthright tone of a ready reply. The record will not show if the eyes
have darted in evasion or looked down in confession or gazed steadily with a serenity that has nothing to distort or conceal.
The record will not show if tears were shed in anger, or in remembered pain, or in feigned innocence. Only the judge trying
the case can see all these and on the basis of his observations arrive at an informed and reasoned verdict. 31

This rule admits of exceptions, such as when the evaluation was reached arbitrarily, when the trial court overlooked, misunderstood,
or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and substance which could affect the result of the case. 32 None of these
exceptions exists in this case.

It is also settled that when a woman Says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that she has
been raped, and if her testimony meets the test of credibility the accused may be convicted on the basis thereof.33

Moreover, the accused was unable to prove any ill motive on the part of the complainant. In fact, in his answer to the court's
questions, he categorically stated that there was no grudge between him and the complainant. 34 Where there is no evidence to show
any dubious reason or improper motive why a prosecution witness should testify falsely against the accused or falsely implicate him
in a heinous crime, the said testimony is worthy of full faith and credit. 35

Additionally, no married woman in her right mind, like Cherry Tamayo, would subject herself to public scrutiny and humiliation in
order to perpetuate a falsehood. Neither would she take the risk of being alienated from her husband and her family. If Cherry
Tamayo then resolved to face the ordeal and relate in public what many similarly situated would have kept secret, she did so simply
to obtain justice.

To cast doubt on the credibility of the complainant, the accused cites an inconsistency in the testimony of the complainant. He points
out that at first, the complainant said that her panties were removed by the accused while she was already lying down, but later she
said that it was before she was laid down on the ground that the accused stripped her of her panties. The accused failed to elevate
this inconsistency to the level of a major one sufficient to strip the complainant of credibility. Being too trivial, such inconsistency
does not rock the pedestal upon which the complainant's credibility rests. In fact, it enhances her credibility, as it manifests
spontaneity and lack of scheming. 36

As to the second assigned error, the accused submits that although as a general rule alibi is a weak defense, it gained strength in
this case in the light of the aforementioned inconsistency in the complainant's testimony. We are not persuaded. Since, as discussed
above, such inconsistency does not pierce the complainant's credibility, the, second assigned error has therefore no leg to stand on.

The alibi of the accused thus maintains its weak and impotent state. For the defense of alibi to prosper, it must establish the physical
impossibility for the accused to be present at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. 37 The accused's testimony placing
himself somewhere else was corroborated by the testimony of Wilfredo and Emilia Manzano. But he failed to establish physical
impossibility because the alibi places him within only three kilometers from where the crime was committed, a manageable distance
to travel in a few minutes.

For sexually assaulting a pregnant married woman, the accused has shown moral corruption, perversity, and wickedness. He has
grievously wronged the institution of marriage. The imposition then of exemplary damages by way of example to deter others from
committing similar acts or for correction for the public good 38 is warranted. 39 We hereby fix it at P25,000.00.

Pursuant to the current policy of this Court, the moral damages awarded by the trial court should be increased from P30,000.00 to
P40,000.00.

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED, and the decision of Branch 32 of the Regional Trial Court of Cabarroguis, Quirino,
in Criminal Case No. 604 convicting the accused ROGELIO CRISTOBAL of the crime of rape is AFFIRMED, subject to the foregoing
modifications. As modified, the award of moral damages is increased from P30,000.00 to P40,000.00, and the accused is further
ordered to pay exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000.00.

Costs against the accused.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 150756 October 11, 2006

EDUARDO LEYSON, EDUARDO BANTULO alias "BOY," DOMINADOR BANTULO alias "DOMING," EDUARDO PADAYAG
alias "EDRING," EDDIE PADAYAG alias "OYONG," and RODOLFO PADAYAG alias "JUAN," petitioners,
vs.
PEDRO LAWA, JENNIFER MOSO, LINO MENDI, MAMER BAGON, JOEL BAGON, LEA TACULOD, LILIA BAGON, GLORIA
ANDA, ALICIA GILON, EDDIE BAGON, PEDRO BAGON, ROMEO JARMIN, and THE COURT OF APPEALS (Third
Division), respondents.

DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 23756
affirming that of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), General Santos City, Branch 23, in Criminal Case No. 12205, except as to the
penalty imposed on petitioners Eduardo Leyson, Sr., Eduardo Bantulo, Dominador Bantulo, Eduardo Padayag, Eddie Padayag and
Rodolfo Padayag.

The Antecedents

On February 28, 1997, an Information charging petitioners with arson was filed before the RTC of General Santos City:

That on or about 10:00 o'clock in the morning of September 7, 1996 at Nopol, Conel, General Santos City, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused Eduardo Leyson, as ranch owner, and the
accused Ramon Soy, Dominador Bantulo alias Doming, Bernardo Bantulo alias Boy, Eduardo Padayag alias Edring, Eddie
Padayag alias Oyong and Rodolfo Padayag alias Juan, who are the cowboys or farm-hands of accused Eduardo Leyson,
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another with malice aforethought, with intent to destroy and cause
damage and in order to drive away the different complainants from the area of the ranch of Eduardo Leyson which they
have been cultivating for years, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously set fire on the thirteen (13) houses
one after the other of the complainants causing damage representing the value of the houses and their personal belongings
which were reduced to ashes with their corresponding value as follows:

1. Pedro Lawa - P67,795.00

2. Jennifer Moso - 7,000.00

3. Lino Mendi - 37,500.00

4. Mamer Bagon - 85,950.00

5. Joel Bagon - 8,500.00

6. Teresita Bagon - 19,000.00

7. Lea Taculod - 31,160.00

8. Lilia Bagon - 25,000.00

9. Gloria P. Anda - 7,000.00

10. Alicia B. Gilon - 98,735.00

11. Eddie Bagon - 27,140.00

12. Pedro Bagon - 28,710.00

13. Romeo Jarmin - 25,000.00

with the total value of P468,490.00, more or less, and to their damage and prejudice in such amount.

CONTRARY TO LAW.2

Petitioners, assisted by counsel, were arraigned on September 25, 1997 and entered their respective pleas of not guilty.

The Case for the Prosecution

Sometime in October 1993, Eduardo Leyson allowed some members of the B'laan Tribe to till portions of his 29-hectare landholding
in Nopol, Conel, General Santos City which he called Nopol Hills Ranch. The following members of the B'laan Tribe were allowed to
build their houses and till portions of the land, provided that they would deliver to Leyson 50% of their produce: Romeo Jarmin,
Judith Jarmin, Mamer Bagon, Joel Bagon, Teresita Bagon, Lilia Bagon, Eddie Bagon, Pedro Bagon, Pedro Lawa, Jennifer Moso,
Lino Mendi, Leah Taculod, Gloria P. Anda, Alicia B. Gilon, and Bonifacio Batata.

Romeo Jarmin built his house on the ranch sometime in December 1993. The roof was made of cogon, the walls of split bamboo,
and the side of a coconut tree was used for flooring. The portion of the ranch where he planted corn and palay was about 3
hectares.3 Mamer Bagon, his brother-in-law, lived about 50 meters away from him, also in a house made of wood.4 Mamer Bagon
planted palay, coconut trees and other agricultural plants and gave 50% of his produce to Leyson. 5 Joel, Teresita, Lilia, Eddie,
Pedro, all surnamed Bagon, also built their respective huts in the ranch. Pedro Lawa, who also built a house on the landholding, also
delivered to Leyson his share of the produce from his agricultural crops as agreed upon.

However, on July 20, 1996, Leyson called all the farmers to a meeting and told them to vacate his ranch. The farmers refused to
leave the premises.6

At about 4:00 p.m. on September 1, 1996, Leyson and his son Winkie, together with his employees Ramon Soy, Dominador
Bantulo, Juan Padayag and Eduardo Padayag and some policemen, arrived in the ranch. They were armed, and Leyson himself
had a long firearm.7 They fired their guns at the farmers in an effort to drive them away from the land. Although no one was hurt, the
farmers were petrified. They fled from the ranch and sought sanctuary at the barangay hall. The next day, Romeo Jarmin, Mamer
Bagon, Bonifacio Batata and the other farmers returned to their houses to retrieve their farm animals.8 Leyson and his men
threatened to inflict bodily harm on them unless they left the ranch. The farmers reported the incident to Barangay Captain Manuel
Abadimas and to Benjamin Sumog-Oy, the Executive Assistant for Community Affairs of the City Mayor of General Santos City. 9

At about 10:00 a.m. on September 7, 1996, Romeo Jarmin returned to his house in the ranch with Mamer Bagon and Bonifacio
Batata. Bonifacio Batata wanted to get his share of the agricultural crops from Alicia Gilon. 10 Jarmin proceeded to the house of his
brother-in-law, Mamer Bagon, and saw Leyson with his employees Rodolfo Padayag, Dominador Bantulo, Eduardo Bantulo,
Eduardo Padayag, Eddie Padayag and Ramon Soy.11 Two of the men were armed with M-16 carbine rifles, another with an M-16
rifle, and yet another with an armalite.12 When they saw the armed men, Jarmin and Batata hid in a canal near the cogon area. The
armed men fired their guns in the air. One of them set fire on the houses of Mamer Bagon, Pedro Bagon, Alicia Gilon, Joel Bagon,
Romeo Jarmin, Pedro Lawa. The houses of the other farmers were also set aflame. He, along with Mamer Bagon and Bonifacio
Batata, watched as the houses burned down to mere rubble. The value of the structures and personal belongings that were lost in
the fire, as well as their respective owners, are as follows:

a. Pablo Lawa, for his house & the items inside P67,000.00

b. Jennifer Moso, for her house 7,000.00

c. Lino Mendi, for his house, corn plants, and lost personal properties 37,500.00

d. Mamer Bagon, for his house, 8 chickens, shoes, pants, 2 sacks rice, 2 sacks
corn 85,000.00

e. Joel Bagon, for his house 8,500.00

f. Teresita Bagon, for her house 19,000.00

g. Lea Taculod, for her house, 1/2 sack rice, a plow, and a guitar 31,000.00

h. Delia Bagon, for her house & personal belongings 30,000.00

i. Gloria P. Anda, for her small hut 7,000.00

j. Alicia B. Gilon, for her house, corn planted in l/2 hectares of land, 35 punos of
banana plants, 10 head chickens, and carpentry tools 98,000.00

k. Eddie Bagon, for his house & other belongings 27,000.00

l. Pedro Bagon, for his house and Other lost properties 28,700.00

m. Romeo Jarmin, for his house 25,000.0013

The farmers reported the matter to Sumog-Oy who then invited members of the media, police and barangay personnel to the ranch
on September 10, 1996. Leyson and the six employees responsible for the burning of the farmers' houses were pointed out to
Sumog-Oy.14 He examined the debris and what remained of the farmers' razed houses. Pictures of the site were also
taken.15 Sumog-Oy also saw cattle owned by Leyson feasting on the crops of the farmers nearby. 16 When Sumog-Oy asked Leyson
what the latter planned to do about the incident, the latter replied that he wanted to be furnished the list of the crops which had been
eaten by his cattle, including the damages sustained by the farmers and the amount thereof. He averred, however, that the cost of
the wood used in constructing the huts should not be included because the farmers had taken the same from his ranch. 17 Leyson
stated that he would pay for the damages sustained by the farmers.

The Case for the Accused

Petitioners denied having burned the huts of the complainants and interposed the defense of alibi.

Leyson testified that his co-accused Dominador Bantulo, Eduardo Bantulo, Eduardo Padayag, Jun Padayag and Eddie Padayag,
were employees in his eight-hectare farm located at Lower Nopol, Purok 7, Barangay Mabuhay, General Santos City. 18 Ramon Soy,
however, was not his employee. Leyson claimed that this property is different from his ranch. He had a contract with Pioneer Seeds
Production for the use of his property for the production of corn seeds.19

He narrated that during the period of September 1 to 11, 1996, he was supervising his men in the harvesting and loading of corn in
his farm which was about 6 kilometers from his ranch, one to two hours away by horse ride. 20They did not go to his ranch on
September 1 to 7, 1996.21 He admitted that he allowed Pedro Lawa, Judith Jarmin, who was the wife of Romeo Jarmin, Leah
Taculod, Romeo Mozo, Eddie Bagon, Mamer Bagon, Joel Bagon, Lilia Bagon and her two sons, to farm portions of his ranch and to
construct their huts thereon.22 He asked them to leave the place after two years, but they refused to go, and even filed a complaint
against him before the barangaycaptain, who endorsed it to the Department of Environment and Natural Resources. 23 Sometime in
August 1996, he went to his ranch to repair the perimeter fence and saw 47 heavily armed men who appeared to be professional
squatters and MILF elements.24
Dominador Bantulo testified that he and Bernardo Bantulo were brothers, employed by Leyson as laborers in the farm. Rodolfo and
Eduardo Padayag were also Leyson's laborers. All of them resided in Leyson's house in Lower Nopol, Purok 7. Romeo Jarmin was
also employed as Leyson's "cowboy."25 Dominador denied any involvement in the burning of the farmers' houses. He claimed that
he and his co-accused were harvesting corn in Leyson's farm in Lower Nopol from September 1 to 11, 1996. Leyson and his son
later asked him to operate the trailer-tractor, while the others loaded the corn.26 They did not leave the place because they were
prohibited from visiting their families. They had to watch the seeds. 27

The other accused likewise denied the charge. They insisted that they were in the farm of Eduardo Leyson harvesting and loading
corn from September 1 to 11, 1996.

Renilo Punay, a laborer of Pioneer Seeds Production, corroborated the testimony of the accused. He narrated that he was the roving
guard of the company and stayed with the men as they harvested and loaded corn for Pioneer Seeds Production from September 1
to 11, 1996. His tour of duty was from 6:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m. the following day. 28 There were times that the accused left the farm, but
only one at a time to get food.29 He further testified that at 4:30 p.m. on September 1, 1996, the accused were in Leyson's farm,
which was about 5 to 6 kms away from the ranch.30 They were also in the farm on September 7, 1996 at 10:00 a.m.

On August 10, 1997, the court rendered judgment convicting all the accused of arson, except Leyson who was acquitted on the
ground of reasonable doubt. However, all the accused were ordered to pay, jointly and severally, the damages sustained by the
private complainants. The fallo of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, JUDGMENT is hereby rendered finding the accused DOMINADOR BANTULO alias DOMING, EDUARDO
BANTULO alias BOY, EDUARDO PADAYAG alias EDRING, EDDIE PADAYAG alias OYONG, RODOLFO PADAYAG alias
JUAN, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of ARSON, and there being no aggravating or mitigating
circumstance, each of them is hereby sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of two years four months and one day as
minimum, to eight years, as maximum. All of them, including Eduardo Leyson, are severally liable for the actual damages of
private complainants.

Accused EDUARDO LEYSON, SR. is hereby ACQUITTED. However, he is hereby ordered to pay jointly and severally with
the other accused the following amounts to the private complainants:

1. Pablo Lawa, for his house & the items inside P62,000.00

2. Jennifer Moso, for her house 7,000.00

3. Lino Mendi, for his house, corn plants, and lost personal 32,500.00
properties

4. Mamer Bagon, for his house, 8 chickens, shoes, pants, 2 sacks 80,000.00
rice, 2 sacks corn

5. Joel Bagon, for his house 8,500.00

6. Teresita Bagon, for her house 14,000.00

7. Lea Taculod, for her house, 1/2 sack rice, a plow, and a guitar 26,000.00

8. Delia Bagon, for her house & personal belongings 25,000.00

9. Gloria P. Anda, for her small hut 7,000.00

10. Alicia B. Gilon, for her house, corn planted in l/2 hectares of 93,000.00
land, 35 punos of banana plants, 10 chickens, and carpentry tools

11. Eddie Bagon, for his house & other belongings 22,000.00

12. Pedro Bagon, for his house and other lost properties 23,700.00

13. Romeo Jarmin, for his house 20,000.00

The accused found guilty should suffer all the accessory penalties provided for by law. Also, they are ordered to pay the
cost of suit.

SO ORDERED.31

The accused appealed the decision to the CA, alleging that

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE IDENTITIES OF THE PERSONS WHO BURNED THE
HOUSES OF PRIVATE COMPLAINANTS WERE CLEARLY ESTABLISHED.

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED EDUARDO BANTULO ALIAS BOY, DOMINADOR
BANTULO ALIAS DOMING, EDUARDO PADAYAG ALIAS EDRING, EDDIE PADAYAG ALIAS OYONG, AND RODOLFO
PADAYAG ALIAS JUAN DESPITE REASONABLE DOUBTS ON THE IDENTITIES OF THE PERSONS WHO
ALLEGEDLY BURNED THE HOUSES.32

On July 31, 2001, the CA rendered judgment affirming the decision of the RTC with modification as to the sentence of the
appellants. The fallo of the decision reads:
 WHEREFORE, the decision of the court a quo is AFFIRMED with the modification that accused DOMINADOR BANTULO,
EDUARDO BANTULO, EDUARDO PADAYAG, EDDIE PADAYAG and RODOLFO PADAYAG are hereby sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. In all other respects, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED.33

According to the appellate court, the testimony of Batata and Jarmin, corroborated by Lino Mendi, were credible and entitled to full
probative weight. It took into account Leyson's admission that he would pay for the damages sustained by the private complainants.
The appellate court rejected as barren of factual basis the appellants' defenses of denial and alibi.

Leyson and his men filed a motion for reconsideration, which the appellate court denied; hence, the instant petition for review
on certiorari, where petitioners submit the following contentions:

BOTH COURTS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE IDENTITIES OF THE PERSONS WHO BURNED THE
HOUSES OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS WERE CLEARLY ESTABLISHED. THIS FINDING IS PURE SPECULATION,
SURMISE AND CONJECTURE, BEING CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD IN THIS CASE.

xxx

BOTH COURTS GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED EDUARDO BANTULO alias "BOY" DOMINADOR
BANTULO alias "DOMING," EDUARDO PADAYAG alias "EDRING," EDDIE PADAYAG alias "OYONG" and "RODOLFO
PADAYAG alias "JUAN," DESPITE DOUBTS ON THE IDENTITIES OF THE PERSONS WHO ALLEGEDLY BURNED THE
HOUSES OF THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS. THIS FINDING IS A MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS.

xxx

BOTH COURTS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING EDUARDO LEYSON, SR. CIVILLY LIABLE TOGETHER WITH THE
CONVICTED ACCUSED, THUS, THE TRIAL COURT AND THE COURT OF APPEALS WRONGLY APPLIED THE LAW
ON CIVIL LIABILITY OF AN ACCUSED IN A CRIMINAL CASE.34

The issues to be resolved in the present case are: (1) whether the prosecution was able to prove the guilt of petitioner, except
petitioner Leyson, of the crime of arson under Article 320 of the Revised Penal Code; and (2) whether petitioner Leyson is civilly
liable for alleged damages to the private complainants.

Petitioners aver that respondents failed to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt for arson. The testimonies of respondent
Romeo Jarmin and Bonifacio Batata were inconsistent with the affidavits given to the police investigators. While Jarmin pointed to
and identified petitioner Eduardo Leyson during the trial as one of those who burned the houses, in his affidavit, 35 Jarmin failed to
mention Leyson, and even erroneously declared that the men were "cowboys." Petitioners further point out that Jarmin had admitted
that he returned to the farm only on September 2, 1996; hence, it was impossible for him to have seen the burning of the houses on
September 11, 1996.

Bonifacio Batata admitted when he testified that even before the burning of the houses on September 7, 1996 he already knew
petitioner Leyson, yet, never identified him as one of the perpetrators in the affidavit which he gave to the police investigators.36 In
fact, Batata, in his affidavit, never identified any of petitioners as the perpetrators. Moreover, Batata and Jarmin could not have seen
the burning of the houses so as to properly identify the culprits, considering that the surface of the canal where they claim to have
hidden was covered by three feet cogon grass, and Jarmin and Batata were only 5 feet and four inches tall. While Batata declared
that he saw petitioners burn the houses of private respondents, he later changed his testimony and declared that he saw only one of
them setting the houses on fire. Batata even admitted that he did not see the face of the arsonist. And contrary to the ruling of the
CA, Lino Mendi did not see the burning of the houses.

Petitioners conclude that conformably with the aphorism falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus, the testimonies of Jarmin and Batata have
no probative weight.

For its part, the Office of the Solicitor General asserts that the ruling of the CA is buttressed by the testimonial and documentary
evidence on record. The alleged inconsistencies between the testimonies of Jarmin and Batata and their respective affidavits pertain
to minor and peripheral matters, and did not necessarily discredit them. The OSG asserts that Leyson, having been acquitted merely
on reasonable doubt, is nevertheless civilly liable to private respondents. It points out that he even obliged himself to pay for the
damages sustained by private respondents.

We agree with the rulings of the RTC and the CA that petitioners conspired to burn the houses of private respondents on September
7, 1996.

Well-entrenched rule is that the findings of the trial court, affirmed by the CA on appeal, are accorded with high respect, if not
conclusive effect by this Court. The assessment by the trial court of the credibility of the witnesses and its calibration of the probative
weight thereof are even conclusive on this Court, absent clear evidence that facts and circumstances of substance which if
considered would alter or reverse the outcome of the case were ignored, misinterpreted or misconstrued. 37

The testimony of a witness must be considered in its entirety instead of in truncated parts. The technique in deciphering a testimony
is not to consider only its isolated parts and anchor a conclusion on the basis of said parts. In ascertaining the facts established by a
witness, everything stated by him on direct, cross and redirect examinations must be calibrated and considered.

It must be stressed that facts imperfectly or erroneously stated in answer to one question may be supplied or explained as qualified
by his answer to other question. The principle falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus is not strictly applied in this jurisdiction.38 The doctrine
deals only with the weight of evidence and is not a positive rule of law, and the same is not an inflexible one of universal
application.39 The testimony of a witness can be believed as to some facts and disbelieved as to others:

Nor can we subscribe to the proposition that since the trial court did not give credit to Edwin and Lina's testimonies that
they positively identified Edgardo, it should, pursuant to the maxim "falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus," likewise disregard
their testimonies as against the appellant and accordingly acquit him. In People vs. Dasig, this Court stated that the maxim
 is not a mandatory rule of evidence, but rather a permissible inference that the court may or may not draw. In People vs.
Pacada, we stated that the testimony of a witness can be believed as to some facts and disbelieved as to others. And
in People vs. Osias, we ruled that:

It is perfectly reasonable to believe the testimony of a witness with respect to some facts and disbelieve it with
respect to other facts. And it has been aptly said that even when witnesses are found to have deliberately falsified
in some material particulars, it is not required that the whole of their uncorroborated testimony be rejected but such
portions thereof deemed worthy of belief may be credited.

The primordial consideration is that the witness was present at the scene of the crime and that he positively
identified [the accused] as one of the perpetrators of the crime charged x x x."

Professor Wigmore gives the following enlightening commentary:

"It may be said, once for all, that the maxim is in itself worthless —first, in point of validity, because in one form it
merely contains in loose fashion a kernel of truth which no one needs to be told, and in the others, it is absolutely
false as a maxim of life; and secondly, in point of utility, because it merely tells the jury what they may do in any
event, not what they must do or must not do, and therefore it is a superfluous form of words. It is also in practice
pernicious, first, because there is frequently a misunderstanding of its proper force, and secondly, because it has
become in the hands of many counsel a mere instrument for obtaining new trials upon points wholly unimportant in
themselves."40

The general rule is that inconsistencies and discrepancies between the testimony of a witness in contrast with what he stated in an
affidavit do not necessarily discredit him. Affidavits given to police and barangay officers are made ex parte and often incomplete or
incorrect for lack or absence of sufficient inquiries by the investigating officer. 41 It is of judicial knowledge that sworn statements are
almost incomplete and often inaccurate and are generally inferior to the testimony of a witness in open court. 42

Inconsistencies or discrepancies in the testimony of the witness relative to minor or peripheral matters and not to the significant facts
vital to the guilt or innocence of the accused from the crime charged or the elements of such crime are not grounds for the acquittal
of the accused.

It is not correct for petitioners to claim that Jarmin 43 in his affidavit, did not implicate petitioner Leyson for the burning of the houses.
In fact, Jarmin declared therein that petitioner Leyson conspired with his co-petitioners to burn the houses of private respondents
because they refused to vacate the ranch.44 Moreover, petitioner Leyson, with his co-petitioners, was present when the houses were
burned on September 7, 1996, as he was even armed with a long firearm. Petitioner Leyson even assured Sumog-oy later that he
would pay for the damages sustained by private respondents. The testimony of Sumog-Oy on the matter reads:

Q And you talked to Mister Leyson?

A Yes, sir, and in fact I asked him what things he will do considering that his cattle were feasting on the crops of the
B'laans and he told me that all these things will be listed and he will pay for them. 45

Sumog-oy reiterated his testimony on cross examination:

Q Because you of course asked Mister Leyson if he could assist those people?

A No sir, I just asked him what is he planning to do that his cattle were feasting on the crops of the B'laans.

Q And so you asked particularly on the crops that as you said were feasted by his cattle?

A Yes sir including the houses and he said to list all the things that were damaged and then including the crops amount
and he also mentioned about the houses and in fact he told me that they should not charge the cost of the woods because
the woods used for the construction of the houses were just cut from his ranch, he said.

Q And that was the response of Mister Leyson when you asked him if he could assist these people?

A I did not particularly ask him to assist, it was his own suggestion.

Q So he suggested that he would assist these people?

A Because I told him, "what are you going to do now that the houses of these people were destroyed and your cattle
were feasting on the crops" and he told me that "just tell them to list the things that were destroyed including the amount
and I will pay them."

Q Pay them as his assistance to these people?

A He just plainly said, "I will pay."

Q In other words, his offer to pay was in response to your questioning him what he would do to the destroyed houses
and on the damaged crops, correct?

A That is the logical interpretation sir.

Q That is the correct interpretation?

 A Probably the logical interpretation.46

On redirect examination, Jarmin declared that, in his affidavit he wanted to charge not only petitioner Leyson's employees but also
the "cowboys" as well:

Q Mister Witness, do you understand the words or how do you understand the words "to file a complaint against the
cowboys of Mr. Eduardo Leyson", as far as against whom you are filing?

A All of them, Mister Leyson and his cowboys.47

Apparently, Jarmin did not know whether petitioners were farmhands or cowboys of petitioner Leyson. But whether petitioners were
the farmhands or cowboys of petitioner Leyson is of little significance. The fact of the matter is that petitioner Leyson employed his
co-petitioners, who were given long firearms when they drove away the private respondents from the farm on September 1 to 2,
1996; and on September 7, 1996, they fired shots and burned private respondents' houses.

Petitioner Leyson ordered his men to intimidate the private respondents with bodily harm if they did not leave the ranch. Indeed, as
testified by Jarmin, petitioner Leyson was with his co-petitioners on September 7, 1996 when private respondents' houses were
burned:

Q Where are your houses now?

A Our houses were burned on September 7, 1996.

Q How many houses were burned on September 7, 1996?

A 13 houses were burned down.

Q Around what time were the houses burned?

A 10 o'clock in the morning.

Q Who were those persons who burned the houses Mister Jarmin?

A Their companions were Ramon Soy, Doming Bantolo, Juan Padayag, Boy, Ebring Padayag together with Mister
Eduardo Leyson.

Q Are they in court today Mister Jarmin?

A There are only four here in court now.

Q Will you please point at them.

A That is one (witness pointing to a person wearing a striped t-shirt who answered by the name of Rodolfo Padayag).
That person Doming Bantolo (who answered by the name of Dominador Bantolo) and that person (who answered by the
name of Fernando Bantolo) and Mister Eduardo Leyson (pointing to a person wearing red t-shirt who answered by the
name of Eduardo Leyson).

Q Will you tell us how they burned your houses?

A They set on fire on the cogo[n] roofing with a match.48

We agree with petitioners' contention that during his direct examination on June 24, 1998, Jarmin testified that after they were driven
off with gun fire from their houses on September 2, 1996, they were never able to return to their farmhouses "until today." However,
when queried by the trial court if he returned to the farm after September 2, 1996, Jarmin declared that he came back on September
2 and on September 7, 1996:

COURT:

Q Did you not return on September 2?

A I returned there to get some vegetables and to get my carabao.

Q So that was the only time you returned?

A Yes, Your Honor.

Q On September 2, 1996?

A The last time to go there was on September 7.

COURT

Proceed.
 ATTY. MELLIZA:

Q And what was the reason why you returned there on September 2, 1996?

A To get my carabao and to harvest some vegetables.

Q As a matter of fact, you were not able to enter the area?

A I actually went inside the area because my carabao was inside the area.

Q And you were able to get your carabao?

A Yes, sir.

Q Who were your companions in returning to that place on September 2, 1996?

A Mamer Bagon and Bonifacio Batata.

Q And were they able to get their work animals?

A This Bonifacio Batata has no animal of his own there because he just went there to harvest palay.

Q What is the complete name of Batata?

A Bonifacio Batata.49

Evidently, when Jarmin was asked whether he returned to the farm after September 2, 1996 he understood the question to refer to
him and to the other private respondents. Indeed, the only persons who returned to the farm on September 7, 1996, were Jarmin
himself, Mamer Bagon and Batata. The other private respondents no longer returned to their farmhouses.

We agree with petitioners' contention that Lino Mendi did not witness the burning of his house and the houses of the other private
respondents on September 7, 1996 and that he learned of the burning and all the perpetrators thereof only from Batata and
Jarmin.50 However, the thrust of Mendi's testimony was only for the purpose of proving the actual damages he sustained, consisting
of the value of his house and his other personal belongings which were burned. Likewise of minimal significance is the seeming
discrepancy between the testimony of Jarmin, that petitioners burned the houses of private respondents, and the testimony of
Batata, that only one of petitioners whose face he did not actually see burned the houses.

Considering the entirety of the testimonies of Batata and Jarmin, they declared that all the petitioners were responsible for the
burning because of their collective acts, including those that transpired on September 1 and 2, 1996. By their collective acts,
petitioners (except petitioner Leyson) conspired to burn the houses of private respondents. It is elementary that when there is a
conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all the conspirators, and a conspirator may be held as a principal even if he did not participate
in the actual commission of every act constituting the offense. In conspiracy, all those who in one way or another helped and
cooperated in the consummation of the crime are considered co-principals since the degree or character of the individual
participation of each conspirator in the commission of the crime becomes immaterial. Thus, liability exists notwithstanding appellant's
non-participation in every detail in the execution of the crime.51

Thus, Batata testified that petitioners, who were in the company of petitioner Leyson, burned private respondents' houses. From the
canal where he and Jarmin hid, they saw one of them burn the houses after firing their guns:

Q Did you see the persons who fired their guns?

A Yes, sir.

Q Will you still be able to recognize them if you see them again?

A I only knew them through their faces but not their names.

Q Are they in court today?

A Yes, sir, they are here.

Q Please point at them.

A These persons (pointing to all the persons seated at the accused bench).

Q So what did you do Mister Witness when you heard the persons firing their guns?

A We jumped towards the canal near the cogonal place and hid ourselves.

Q And then what happened thereafter?

A After firing their guns, they set the houses on fire.

Q Whose house Mister Witness?

A The first house was the house of Mamer Bagon.

Q And then?

A They again went upwards and set fire the house of Pedro Bagon and Alicia Gilon, as well the house of Eddie Bagon.

Q Did you see the persons who set the fire on the houses?

A The same persons who burned the house of Mamer.

Q Are they in court today?

A Yes, sir.

Q Will you please point to them.

A The same persons seated in the accused bench.

Q And after witnessing the persons setting fire on the houses of the complaining witnesses in this case, what happened
next?

A They proceeded going towards the upper direction.

Q How many houses were burned?

A From the house starting down going upward were burned.

Q Can you estimate how many houses were burned?

A About 14 houses.

Q Do you know the owners of the houses Mister Witness?

A Mamer, Eddie, Pedro, Alicia, Romeo Jarmin, the house of Ronnie, Lawa while the others I do not know the owners'
names but which were also burned.

Q Do you still remember at what time were the houses burned by the accused?

A About 10 o'clock in the morning.52

xxxx

ATTY. MELLIZA:

Q You said the persons whom you saw set fire on the houses. Do you mean that all those persons whom you saw
actually set fire on the houses?

A Yes, sir, although only one person set fire on the houses.

Q Who was that person when you said only one person set fire on the houses, who was that person?

A I did not see him when he set fire on the houses because his back was towards me.

Q So it is now clear Mister Batata that the person whom you actually saw setting fire on the houses could not be one of
the persons now sitting on the accused bench?

A No, sir, because his back was towards me.

Q But you are very much certain that only one of the six (6) armed men set fire on the houses?

A Yes, sir.

Q What weapons if you could remember were used by the six (6) armed men who fired the gunshots?

A Garand, carbine and M-16 armalite.

Q So you are very sure of that, that it is or the only weapons used?

A Yes, sir.
Q What weapon was being held by that person who was setting fire on the houses?

A Garand.

Q You have generally pointed to all the persons sitting now on the accused bench. What weapon was being held by this
man?

A M-16 armalite.

Q What [w]as he doing with the M-16 armalite?

A While he was setting fire on the houses, the other accused were standing by as if they are guarding.

Q How many garand rifles did you see at that time?

A If I am not wrong, two of them were carrying a garand.

Q And how many of them did you see carrying M-16 rifles?

A One.

Q So what else were the weapons you saw at that time?

A Carbine.

Q How many carbine rifles did you see?

A Two.

Q So one armalite, two garands and two carbines, is that what you mean?

A Yes, sir.

COURT:

Q Five?

A Yes, Your Honor.53

xxxx

Q Mister Batata, you said you were in Nopol Hills on September 7, 1996 when you witnessed the burning by the accused
in this case and you pointed to these persons in the accused bench. Why, please tell us, did you point at these persons in
the accused bench?

A Because they are the ones whom I saw setting fire on the houses and fire their guns.

Q You saw them on September 7, 1996?

A Yes, sir.

Q You see the first person?

COURT:

Q At a distance of 40 meters?

A Yes, Your Honor, but only through their faces but not their names.

COURT:

Continue.

ATTY. GACAL:

Q Did you see the first person and I am pointing to Mister Leyson?

A Yes and I know him.

ATTY. MELLIZA:
 May we request Your Honor that the statement "I know him because he is an ex-kagawad" be included.

ATTY. GACAL:

Q About the second person in the person of Eduardo Padayag?

A I also saw him.

Q And the third person by the name of Dominador Bantolo, you saw him also?

A Yes, sir.

Q What about the fourth person Bernardo Bantolo, you saw him?

A Yes, sir.

Q What about the fifth person Padayao?

A Yes, sir, I saw him.54

It bears stressing that Batata saw petitioners before the latter burned the houses, when they fired their guns to scare off anybody
who could be in the houses:

COURT:

Q So actually you were only going there from time to time to harvest palay or corn in the farm of your friends?

A Yes, Your Honor.

Q Because you have no farm there of your own?

A No, Your Honor.

Q So during the gun firing or the burning you were only looking at these persons?

A Yes, Your Honor.

Q For how many minutes did you look at them?

A I can not estimate Your Honor.

Q For a long time or a short time.

A For quite a time.

Q About one hour?

A No, Your Honor.

Q About half an hour?

A About 10 minutes only.55

While it is true that Jarmin and Batata fled, jumped into a canal and hid there while petitioners burned private respondents' houses,
the foliage or the surface of the canal did not obstruct their view. Batata is five feet and four inches tall, and the canal was only three
feet deep:

ATTY. GACAL:

Q Mister Batata, you mentioned that while you were in the canal or where cogon grasses on the surface of the canal, will
you tell us how tall are the cogon grasses?

A The height of the cogon is that when you will stand up, your head will be exposed.

COURT:

So that must be about two (2) feet tall from the ground?

A About this tall (demonstrating a height of about 2 to 3 feet).

Q How tall are you?

 A 5'4".

Q How tall is the canal?

A Up to my breast (about 3 feet deep).

COURT:

3 feet cogon above the canal about 6 feet.56

Jarmin's view was likewise not obstructed by the cogon grass:

Q Were the cogons then thick Mister Witness?

A Not so thick.

Q Were there obstructions from your vision to the 40 meters distance where you said you saw the accused?

A None, if you will look down, you can see the place.

Q Were you on a high plain or lower plain?

A We are on the higher plain.

Q So the cogon grass were never an obstruction to your vision?

A No, sir.57

Thus, petitioners' denials and alibi cannot prevail over the collective positive testimonies of Jarmin and Batata, who positively and
spontaneously pointed to them as the perpetrators at the trial. Denial and alibi are weak defenses in criminal prosecution: alibi is
easy to concoct and difficult to disprove, while denial is mere self-serving evidence which cannot prevail over the positive
testimonies of witnesses who identified the perpetrators. To merit approbation, clear and convincing evidence must be adduced to
show that petitioners were in a place other than the situs of the crime when it was committed, such that it was physically impossible
for them to have committed the crime.58 In this case, it was not impossible for petitioners to rush to the ranch of petitioner Leyson
from his farm which was only 5 to 6 kms away on horseback, arrive there at 10:00 a.m., fire their guns and burn the houses of
private respondents.

The trial court acquitted petitioner Leyson of arson but ruled that he is civilly liable to private respondents. The CA affirmed the ruling
of the court a quo. We quote with approval the ruling of the appellate court:

Finally, the rule is that a person's acquittal of a crime on the ground that his guilt has not been proven beyond reasonable
doubt does not bar a civil action for damages founded on the same acts involved in the offense. Rule 111, Section 2(b) of
the Revised Rules of Court provides: "Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the
extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not
exist." It is also an established rule that the acquittal of an accused on reasonable doubt is not generally an impediment to
the imposition, in the same criminal action, of civil liability for damages on said accused. In the case at bar, there is no
finding by the court a quo that the houses of the complainants were not burned which is the basis of the civil liability of
appellant Leyson. Leyson was acquitted for lack of evidence to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.59

Besides, petitioner Leyson obliged himself to pay for the damages sustained by private respondents.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 23756
is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 167955 September 30, 2009

(Formerly G.R. No. 151275)

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.
ARMANDO PADILLA y NICOLAS, Appellant.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

For review is the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated February 23, 2005 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00571 which affirmed,
with modification, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 15, in Criminal Case No. 166-M-
96,2 finding appellant Armando Padilla y Nicolas guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Statutory Rape and sentencing him
to suffer the penalty of Death. The CA found appellant guilty of Qualified Rape and likewise imposed on him the penalty of Death. It
reduced the awards for civil indemnity from ₱100,000.00 to ₱75,000.00 and exemplary damages from ₱50,000.00 to ₱25,000.00. In
addition, the CA awarded moral damages in the amount of ₱50,000.00.
Consistent with the Court's decision in People v. Cabalquinto,3 the real name of the rape victim in this case is withheld and, instead,
fictitious initials are used to represent her. Also, the personal circumstances of the victim or any other information tending to
establish or compromise her identity, as well as those of her immediate family or household members, are not disclosed in this
decision.

The facts of the case, as established by the prosecution, are as follows:

Around 9 o'clock in the evening of February 22, 1994, AAA was inside their house located at Marilao, Bulacan. 4With her were her
father, herein appellant, her two older brothers and her sister BBB.5 She was then staying in one of the rooms because she was
suffering from asthma and was taking medicine through the help of her sister, BBB.6On the other hand, her brothers were already
asleep in another room.7 After AAA took her medicine, appellant told BBB to sleep outside the room where AAA was staying. 8 When
BBB went outside, appellant turned off the light and proceeded to their kitchen.9 Thereafter, appellant returned to the room where
AAA was staying.10 He then took off AAA's clothes and also removed his. 11 He went on top of AAA and tried to insert his penis into
her vagina.12 AAA resisted but appellant held her hands and boxed her left thigh twice.13 She was then rendered weak enabling
appellant to successfully insert his organ inside her vagina. 14 AAA felt pain, after which her vagina bled.15 While appellant's penis
was inside her vagina, he made push and pull movements. 16 She pleaded with appellant to stop but to no avail. 17 It was in the
course of her struggle against appellant's advances that she called on her sister for help.18 Thereafter, she felt something come out
of his penis.19 Appellant withdrew his penis from her vagina but remained on top of her and even began touching her breast. 20 It was
during that compromising position that BBB entered the room and saw them.21 Appellant immediately gathered his clothes and went
to the comfort room.22Thereafter, AAA cried while BBB handed her clothes to her.23 They then slept beside each other.24

AAA did not complain nor tell her brothers about her ordeal because she was afraid as she was threatened by appellant that he will
hurt them and burn their house if she relates the incident to them.25 It was only in October 1995 that she was able to tell her aunt
about her experience in the hands of appellant. 26 Subsequently, her aunt accompanied her to the office of the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) where they filed a complaint against appellant. 27

On February 1, 1996, an Information28 was filed against appellant charging him before the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan with the crime of
statutory rape, the accusatory portion of which reads:

That on or about the 22nd day of February, 1994 in the Municipality of Marilao, province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with lewd
designs have carnal knowledge of said AAA, a minor who is 11 years old, against her will.

All contrary to law with an aggravating circumstance that the accused is the legitimate father of AAA.29

On arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty.30 Pre-trial conference followed.31 Thereafter, trial ensued.

On November 5, 2001, the RTC rendered its Decision,32 the dispositive portion of which is as follows:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Armando Padilla y Nicolas GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Statutory
Rape described and penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code and Republic Act 7659 otherwise referred to as the
Death Penalty Law, and hereby sentences him the capital penalty of DEATH.

The accused is likewise ordered to indemnify the offended party AAA damages in the amount of ₱100,000.00 and to pay exemplary
damages in the amount of ₱50,000.00 to deter other sex perverts from sexually assaulting hapless and innocent girls especially their
kin.

In passing, Justice Vicente Abad Santos once remarked – there should be a special place in hell for child molesters. The accused
deserves a deeper pit because the child he molested was his own daughter. More than anyone else, it was he to whom the child
would have looked up for

the protection of her chastity. He cynically betrayed that faith with his unnatural lechery.

SO ORDERED.33

In an Order34 dated November 6, 2001, the RTC directed the transmittal of the entire records of the case to this Court and likewise
ordered the commitment of the accused to the National Penitentiary in Muntinlupa.

Pursuant to the Court's pronouncement in People v. Mateo,35 which modified the provisions of the Rules of Court insofar as they
provide for direct appeals from the RTC to this Court in cases where the penalty imposed by the trial court is death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, the case was referred to the CA for appropriate action and disposition. 36

After a review of the case, the CA affirmed, with modification, the decision of the RTC convicting the appellant. The dispositive
portion of the CA Decision reads, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed judgment dated November 5, 2001 of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos,
Bulacan, Branch 15 in Criminal Case No. 166-M-96 finding Armando Padilla y Nicolas guilty of Qualified Rape and sentencing him to
suffer the supreme penalty of DEATH is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that he is ordered to pay the victim the amount
of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.

In accordance with A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC which took effect on October 15, 2004, amending Section 13, Rule 124 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure, let the entire records of this case be elevated to the Supreme Court for review.

Costs against the accused-appellant.

SO ORDERED.37
The case was then elevated to this Court for review.

In a Resolution38 dated July 19, 2005, the parties were required to simultaneously submit their respective supplemental briefs if they
so desire. However, both parties manifested that they are not filing their supplemental briefs as their positions in the present case
had been thoroughly expounded in their respective appeal briefs which were forwarded to the CA. Thereafter, the case was deemed
submitted for deliberation.

Appellant assigned the following assignment of errors in his Brief:

APPLYING THE PRUNA GUIDELINES, THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN IMPOSING THE DEATH PENALTY ON
ACCUSED-APPELLANT CONSIDERING THE PROSECUTION’S FAILURE TO SUFFICIENTLY PROVE THE MINORITY OF THE
COMPLAINANT AND HER RELATIONSHIP WITH THE ACCUSED.

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE PROSECUTION HAD PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT
ACCUSED-APPELLANT’S GUILT FOR QUALIFIED RAPE.

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN AWARDING DAMAGES TO THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT.39

As to the first assigned error, appellant avers that the death penalty may not be imposed because the qualifying circumstances of
minority and relationship were not properly alleged and proved by the prosecution.

The Court agrees in part.

The first issue is whether or not the qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship were properly alleged by the prosecution.

It is clear from the Information that AAA was alleged to be a minor who was aged eleven (11) at the time of the commission of the
crime and that the accused is her father. Contrary to the prosecution's asseveration, it does not matter that the private complainant's
relationship with the accused was denominated as an "aggravating circumstance" and not as a "special qualifying circumstance."

The Court has repeatedly held, even after the amendments to the Rules of Criminal Procedure took effect, 40 that qualifying
circumstances need not be preceded by descriptive words such as "qualifying" or "qualified by" to properly qualify an offense.41 The
Court has repeatedly qualified cases of rape where the twin circumstances of minority and relationship have been specifically
alleged in the Information even without the use of the descriptive words "qualifying" or "qualified by." 42 In the instant case, the fact
that AAA's relationship with appellant was described as "aggravating" instead of "qualifying" does not take the Information out of the
purview of Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC ), as amended by Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659 (RA 7659), 43 which
was the prevailing law at the time of the commission of the offense. Article 335 does not use the words "qualifying" or "aggravating"
in enumerating the circumstances that qualify rape so as to make it a heinous crime punishable by death. It merely refers to the
enumerated circumstances as "attendant circumstances." The specific allegation of the attendant circumstances in the Information,
coupled with the designation of the offense and a statement of the acts constituting the offense as required in Sections 8 44 and 945 of
Rule 110, are sufficient to warn appellant that the crime charged is qualified rape punishable by death.

In the present case, the attendant circumstances of minority and relationship were specifically alleged in the Information. These
allegations are sufficient to qualify the offense of rape.

The next question to be resolved is whether the prosecution was able to prove appellant's relationship with AAA as well as the
latter's minority.

As to AAA’s relationship with appellant, the Court agrees that the prosecution was able to prove it beyond reasonable doubt. The
Information alleged that appellant is the father of AAA. Appellant, in turn, admitted during trial that AAA is her daughter. 46 Under
prevailing jurisprudence, admission in open court of relationship has been held to be sufficient and, hence, conclusive to prove
relationship with the victim.47

However, with respect to AAA's minority, the settled rule is that there must be independent evidence proving the age of the victim,
other than the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and the absence of denial by appellant.48 The victim's original or duly
certified birth certificate, baptismal certificate or school records would suffice as competent evidence of her age.49 In the instant
case, aside from the testimonies of prosecution witnesses, coupled with appellant's absence of denial, no independent substantial
evidence was presented to prove the age of AAA. Neither was it shown by the prosecution that the said documents had been lost,
destroyed, unavailable or were otherwise totally absent.

Anent appellant’s failure to object to the testimony of AAA, regarding her age, the Court has held that the failure of the accused to
object to the testimonial evidence regarding the rape victim’s age shall not be taken against him. 50Even the appellant's implied
admission of the victim's age, in the absence of any supporting independent evidence, may not be considered sufficient to prove her
age. In People v. Biong,51 the appellant testified as to the exact date when her daughter, the complainant, was born. However, the
Court held that appellant's testimony falls short of the quantum of proof required to establish her age. As the qualifying circumstance
of minority alters the nature of the crime of rape and increases the penalty thereof, it must be proved with equal certainty and
clearness as the crime itself.52 In the present case, the Court agrees with appellant that the prosecution failed to discharge this
burden.

Coming to the second assigned error, appellant questions the credibility of the victim, AAA, arguing that his constitutional right to be
presumed innocent should take precedence over the unfounded claim of AAA that he raped her.

It is settled that to determine the innocence or guilt of the accused in rape cases, the courts are guided by three well-entrenched
principles: (1) an accusation of rape can be made with facility and while the accusation is difficult to prove, it is even more difficult for
the accused, though innocent, to disprove; (2) considering that in the nature of things, only two persons are usually involved in the
crime of rape, the testimony of the complainant should be scrutinized with great caution; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution
must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense. 53
Accordingly, in resolving rape cases, primordial consideration is given to the credibility of the victim's testimony.54The settled rule is
that the trial court’s conclusions on the credibility of witnesses in rape cases are generally accorded great weight and respect, and at
times even finality, unless there appear in the record certain facts or circumstances of weight and value which the lower court
overlooked or misappreciated and which, if properly considered, would alter the result of the case. 55

Having seen and heard the witnesses themselves and observed their behavior and manner of testifying, the trial court stood in a
much better position to decide the question of credibility.56 Findings of the trial court on such matters are binding and conclusive on
the appellate court, unless some facts or circumstances of weight and substance have been overlooked, misapprehended or
misinterpreted.57 No such facts or circumstances exist in the present case.

In this case, both the RTC and the CA are in agreement that AAA’s account of her ordeal in the hands of her father was categorical
and straightforward.

Appellant contends that AAA had a grudge against him and, aside from that, she was influenced and even instigated by her aunt,
Elena Manahan, to file the complaint against appellant because of the bitterness that Elena feels towards him. According to the
appellant, this bitterness was brought about by a misunderstanding between him and Elena involving money entrusted to the latter
by his wife which was supposed to be used for the construction of apartments. 58 However, appellant's claim deserves scant
consideration. The Court finds it incredible for private complainant to trump up a charge of rape against appellant on the simple
reason that she has a grudge against the latter or that she was influenced by her aunt who harbors resentment against him. No
woman would cry rape, allow an examination of

her private parts, subject herself to humiliation, go through the rigors of public trial and taint her good name if her claim were not
true.59

Thus, the unfounded claim of evil motive on the part of the victim would not destroy the credibility reposed upon her by the RTC and
the CA because, as the Court has held, a rape victim’s testimony is entitled to greater weight when she accuses a close relative of
having raped her, as in the case of a daughter against her father. 601avvphi1

Moreover, appellant's rape of private complainant was corroborated by no less than the latter's sister who is also a daughter of
appellant. The rule is that where there is no evidence that the witness for the prosecution was actuated by improper motive, the
presumption is that he was not so actuated and his testimony is entitled to full credence.61

In addition, AAA’s subsequent acts of disclosing and complaining about her molestation to her aunt and the authorities and taking
immediate steps to subject herself to medical examination represent conduct consistent with her straightforward, logical and
probable testimony that she was in fact raped by appellant. They represent strong and compelling factors that enhance
complainant’s credibility as a witness.

Against the overwhelming evidence of the prosecution, appellant merely interposed the defense of denial. Categorical and
consistent positive identification, absent any showing of ill-motive on the part of the eyewitness testifying on the matter, prevails over
the defense of denial.62 In the present case, there is no showing of any improper motive on the part of the victim to testify falsely
against the appellant or to implicate him falsely in the commission of the crime; hence, the logical conclusion is that no such
improper motive exists and that the testimony is worthy of full faith and credence. Accordingly, appellant's weak defense of denial
cannot prosper.

The prevailing law at the time the crime was committed in 1994 was still Article 335 of the RPC as amended by Section 11 of RA
7659, the first paragraph of which provides as follows:

When and how rape is committed. - Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:

1. By using force or intimidation;

2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and

3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.

The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.

xxxx

Paragraph 7(1) of the same Article further provides that:

The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:

1. when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by
consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.

xxxx

The elements of statutory rape, of which appellant was charged are: (1) that the accused had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (2)
that the woman is below 12 years of age.63

In the present case, the prosecution failed to prove the age of AAA, much less the allegation that she was under the age of twelve
when she was raped. Thus, the Court cannot hold appellant liable for statutory rape. However, since the prosecution was able to
establish, without any objection from the defense, that appellant had carnal knowledge of AAA with the use of force, he can be
convicted of simple rape the penalty for which is reclusion perpetua. Appellant may not be convicted of rape in its qualified form, as
to impose upon him the penalty of death, considering that, while the aggravating circumstance of relationship was proven, the
prosecution failed to establish AAA's minority by independent proof.

With respect to the last assigned error, the Court agrees with the CA in awarding civil indemnity as well as moral and exemplary
damages to AAA. However, since the penalty is reclusion perpetua, the civil indemnity must be reduced from ₱75,000.00 to
₱50,000.00 in line with prevailing jurisprudence. 64 Moreover, when a crime is committed with an aggravating circumstance, either
qualifying or generic, an award of ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages is justified under Article 2230 of the New Civil Code. 65

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated February 23, 2005 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00571 is
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellant Armando Padilla is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the Crime of Simple
Rape under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and
ordered to pay the private complainant AAA the reduced amount of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages
and the increased amount of ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages. Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.